china’ s solar pv value...

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CHINA’ S SOLAR PV VALUE CHAIN

Spring 2011

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About the China Greentech Initiative

Founded in 2008, the China Greentech Initiative (CGTI) Partner Program has rapidly grown to become the only China-‐international collaboration platform of 100+ organizations, focused on identifying, developing and promoting green technology solutions in China. Partnering organizations are technology buyers and sellers, service providers, investors, policy makers and influencers. Sector tracks addressed during the 2011 CGTI Partner Program include Cleaner Conventional Energy, Renewable Energy, Electric Power Infrastructure, Green Building, Cleaner Transportation and Clean Water.

Built on two cornerstones, strategic market research and a community of 300+ industry experts, CGTI provides participating organizations with three core benefits: world class market insights that enable better decisions, meaningful relationships that lead to business opportunities, and thought leadership and education that position participants as leaders in China’s greentech markets.

In addition to the Partner Program, CGTI offers Advisory Services, conducts briefings and publishes public content, including White Papers and the annual China Greentech Report. The flagship China Greentech Report, released at the World Economic Forum, together with the China Greentech Report 2011, have more than 60,000 copies in use globally and have helped establish CGTI as the authority on China’s ever evolving greentech markets.

Renewable Energy Sector Definition

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Executive Summary

Given current challenges in world solar markets, China’s solar photovoltaic (PV) producers seek opportunities to reduce costs and preserve gross margins through vertical integration and industry consolidation.

Solar producers face uncertain times: While global solar PV markets may continue to grow, rapidly falling prices, unstable subsidy schemes and module oversupply result in falling margins across the value chain. Low-‐cost Chinese producers are raising production capacity to new records, in turn driving down selling prices and margins. At the same time, as domestic competition increases, the pressure to increase profits and market share has intensified. China’s historically fragmented solar industry, with hundreds of small players across the value chain, are looking for strategies to strengthen financial performance, including vertical integration and capacity expansion, which is already widespread, and industry consolidation. While the number of manufacturers in China may not decline in the short-‐term, stakeholders should expect the top-‐tier players, with strong cost advantages, to continue to grow in size and market share. Thus far, however, vertical integration and expanding production capacity do not appear to guarantee profitability. Companies must also seek innovative strategies and partnerships to stay ahead of the market.

Definition and Scope

This White Paper focuses on opportunities for companies to reduce costs and improve profitability along the solar PV value chain in China. The value chain includes seven segments:

The White Paper does not cover thin film PV or concentrated PV due to their relatively small current market share in China. The White Paper begins with an overview of global solar market conditions, and then explores opportunities and trends for vertical integration and industry consolidation (horizontal integration).

Industry Consolidation (horizontal integration) occurs when the number of companies involved declines as successful companies grow in size and smaller companies are either bought out or go out of business. Consolidation is particularly common for high-‐tech industries with high barriers to entry, who focus on the importance of reaching economies of scale in production. Many experts anticipate consolidation in China’s solar industry, particularly in the commoditized module segment of the value chain, which currently has hundreds of competitors.

Vertical Integration occurs when companies acquire new production or service capabilities along the value chain, in either an upstream or downstream manner relative to their core competency. For example, a company that produces solar cells may vertically integrate upstream by producing polysilicon, or integrate downstream by producing solar modules or systems.

Polysilicon Ingots Wafers Cells Modules Systems Projects


Market Context

Subsidy cuts slow growth in European markets, while solar PV demand grows in non-‐European markets

Following a year of robust global growth in 2010 with 16.6 GW of installed capacity, solar PV continued its rapid expansion in 2011. Established European markets, such as Germany and Italy, continued to account for the majority of early 2011 installations representing up to 60% of market demand.1 Due to recent subsidy cuts, however, total demand in Europe is falling. Italy, for example, has made capped funding for large-‐scale installations, reduced feed-‐in tariffs beginning in 2012, and removed all tax breaks for solar production and installation. At the beginning of 2011, uncertainties surrounding these new policies resulted in a dramatic slow-‐down in installations and an accumulating module inventory in Italy reaching nearly 3 GW.2 Feed-‐in tariffs have also been cut in the Czech Republic, France and Spain. The impact of subsidy cuts may be less drastic than feared in the world’s largest PV market, Germany, following the decision to decommission all nuclear power plants by 2022. Germany currently obtains 23% of electricity from nuclear power, leaving room for new renewable energy capacity development.3 German installations, however, declined 32% from 2010 as a result of a 13% cut in the country’s favorable feed-‐in tariff, potentially due to falling PV equipment prices.4

Global solar PV demand, while recently concentrated in Europe, is diversifying as a result of the growing interest in low-‐carbon energy sources, concerns raised by the March 2011 nuclear disaster in Japan, and rapidly dropping module prices, which has accelerated the discussion of “grid-‐parity” cost for solar. State-‐based incentives in California, New Jersey and Texas may make the U.S. the fastest growing market, with 241% growth in 2010.5 Other incentives and policy mandates are driving demand in other new markets. For example, Ontario, Canada has introduced a feed-‐in tariff for projects under 10 MW, Japan has increased emphasis on solar development through a residential feed-‐in tariff scheme, and India has established a 20 GW installation target for 2020.

Long a major exporter of solar modules, China looks set to develop its domestic market and become one of Asia’s largest solar energy producers. By the end of 2010, China had 860 MW of installed solar power capacity, whereas it produced nearly 8 GW of modules annually. This imbalance has left China’s solar producers vulnerable to fluctuations in overseas markets. The government, which supports domestic PV manufacturers, has recognized this and is working to ensure a continued demand for domestically-‐produced modules through the creation of feed-‐in-‐tariff policies. This is in-‐line with the central government’s focus on reducing carbon emissions and improving environmental conditions, as emphasized in the current 12th Five-‐Year Plan. The plan, which lays out China’s policy priorities for the

1 European Photovoltaic Industry Association (EPIA), “Global market outlook for photovoltaics until 2015,” May, 2011 2 Osborne, Mark, “Italy has a new FiT,” PV-‐Tech, May 6, 2011, www.pv-‐tech.org 3 The Guardian, “Germany pledges nuclear shutdown by 2022,” May 30, 2011, www.guardian.co.uk 4 Hughes, Emma, “Germany Feed-‐in Tariffs,” PV-‐Tech, Dec. 13, 2010, www.pv-‐tech.org 5 Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA), “Solar Policies”, www.seia.org, (accessed on May 9, 2011)


2011-‐2015 period, targets 10 GW of solar power by 2015 and 50 GW by 2020.6 Exactly how China will achieve these ambitious targets remains to be seen, but given the rapid growth experienced in the wind industry, few doubt China’s ability to meet its targets.7

Production capacity may exceed demand by 6 GW in 2011, fueling fears of oversupply While demand for solar modules and systems has increased, production capacity is growing at an

even faster rate. In 2010, production capacity outpaced demand by over 1 GW and, in 2011, this discrepancy may grow to as much as 6 GW.8 Much of the 26 GW of predicted new supply comes from Chinese producers, whose astounding expansion plans will account for 80% of global production capacity growth, while recognizing that economies of scale are important for eventual success. This sentiment was echoed by one CGTI interviewee who noted that manufacturers producing less than 1 GW per year will not survive. By the end of 2011, Chinese companies may produce almost 16 GW of solar PV, or roughly 60% of global capacity, up from 50% in 2010, and only 8% in 2005.9

Leading Chinese players JA Solar and LDK Solar exemplify this trend. LDK Solar plans to more than double its wafer production capacity from 2009 levels of 1.8 GW to 4 GW by the end of 2011, while JA Solar hopes to reach 2.2 GW of solar cell and module capacity by the beginning of 2012.10

6 EPIA, “Global market outlook for photovoltaics until 2015,” May, 2011 7 China Greentech Initiative (CGTI) Partner interviews 8 EPIA, “Global market outlook for photovoltaics until 2015,” May, 2011 9 Ibid. 10 CGTI analysis


This rapid acceleration has had multiple effects on the industry. The first is a significant decline in average selling prices (ASPs) globally. Between May 2010 and February 2011, ASPs dropped by 16% on average. Since the beginning of 2011, cell and module ASPs have fallen by a staggering 30%.11 Crystalline silicon (c-‐Si) solar cell ASPs are approaching the US$ 1/W mark, their lowest price to date, with modules dipping below US$ 1.50/W.12 The second effect is a growing fear of oversupply spreading throughout the industry, particularly as European countries scale back the costliest subsidy programs. The degree of overcapacity that will be created is in dispute, depending on the ability of manufacturers to trim back expansion plans or the variable effects of newly-‐introduced subsidies on the market. At any rate, oversupply fears could accelerate further declines in ASPs, which would hurt the financial performance of smaller, lower-‐tier producers.13

Falling module selling prices squeeze profits across the value chain Falling ASPs, caused by capacity expansions, as well as technology and manufacturing

improvements and competition from low-‐cost producers, places pressure on gross profits across the value chain. Module producers, in particular, have experienced substantial declines. Some analysts estimate gross profit declines of 84% between 2008 and the end of 2011 for module producers relative to declines of 64% in aggregate profits across the value chain during the same period.14 While wafer producers currently boast higher profits than cell and module producers, this segment remains vulnerable. Upstream polysilicon producers, however, have maintained the highest gross margins of roughly 50%.

In this context of increasing competition and uncertain demand, solar PV producers must look for new strategies to ensure profitability and preserve gross margins. One of the most popular strategies is vertical integration, which has become the mantra of many producers, particularly in China. Many analysts also expect to see the initiation of industry consolidation given the high number of independent companies in downstream module and project development segments. The following sections of this White Paper explore how these strategies and trends are playing out, and what impacts they may have on key producers across the value chain.

11 Seeking Alpha, “ReneSola could face higher than expected silicon wafer price pressure in Q2,” Jun. 12, 2011, www.seekingalpha.com 12 Buemi, David, “Update: Continuing ASP Decline in the PV Supply Chain,” The PV Advocate, Apr. 29, 2011, www.davebuemi.com 13 Williams, Andrew, “Growing Fears of PV Module Oversupply in 2011,” Renewable Energy World, Mar. 3, 2011, www.renewableenergyworld.com 14 Deutsche Bank, “Solar Industry 2011 Outlook,” Jan. 5, 2011


Vertical Integration Trends

Paths to vertical integration vary widely by company and do not guarantee high margins

All of the world’s largest solar PV module suppliers in 2010 were vertically integrated to some degree, with companies such as Hanwha SolarOne (China) and REC (Norway) fully integrated from polysilicon production to project development. Vertical integration most commonly occurs across the ingot to module segments of the value chain (which includes wafers and cells), with capital and energy-‐intensive polysilicon production and service-‐oriented project development left to specialists. However, not all companies follow the same path to integration. Some producers, such as Yingli and Hanwha SolarOne, began in the module segment of the value chain and gradually expanded into polysilicon production. LDK Solar, on the other hand, started out in wafer production and then simultaneously integrated upstream into polysilicon and downstream into cells and modules.15

Although many companies have capabilities across the value chain, production capacity is not necessarily spread evenly. For example, in 2010, JA Solar shipped nearly 2 GW of cell capacity and only 500 MW of module capacity, while LDK Solar shipped 628 MW of wafers and only 27 MW of cells.16 This uneven integration leaves producers open to value chain bottlenecks and potential conflicts of interest with downstream customers who may also be competitors.17

15 CGTI analysis 16 Ibid. 17 CGTI interviews


Fluctuating demand driven by incentive policies, barriers to entry in upstream portions of the value chain, and production bottlenecks in a rapidly expanding market have increased the appeal of vertical integration. However, vertical integration at this stage of market development has not necessarily led to higher gross margins and better financial performance. According to CGTI’s analysis, there appears to be no correlation between the degree of vertical integration and gross profit margin. The same data also reveals that increased production capacity and presumed economies of scale is no guarantee of gross margin success. While many factors determine a company’s gross margin, including pricing strategy, manufacturing efficiencies and technology, the lack of clear correlation suggests companies should consider these other areas of potential competitive advantage before pursuing a vertical integration model.

Upstream integration can help control costs and secure supply, but faces high barriers Upstream integration in the crystalline silicon value chain generally refers to polysilicon production.

Polysilicon, made from quartz through a chemical production process, is the primary raw material used in solar PV modules. For many module producers, securing a high-‐quality, stable supply of polysilicon remains one of the biggest challenges. Polysilicon production remains concentrated in a small number of companies, of which the top four produce more than 50% of global capacity.18 In 2008, when polysilicon was in short supply, spot prices skyrocketed to more than US$ 450 per kilogram, forcing prices up across the value chain and eating into downstream profits.19 While prices have fallen dramatically since then to less than US$ 75 per kilogram, companies still struggle to secure high-‐quality polysilicon supply. This phenomenon is particularly evident in China, where domestic production cannot keep pace with demand. In 2010, China imported 50% of its polysilicon, and much of its domestic supply came from small, low-‐quality producers.20

Downstream Chinese producers have three main ways of procuring polysilicon: buying on the spot market, signing long-‐term supply contracts and producing in-‐house. Given supply constraints in China, many companies have chosen to develop in-‐house capacity, including Yingli, LDK and ReneSola. Advantages to this approach include:

▪ Cost reduction potential (since polysilicon makes up 15% of the total cost of a solar module) ▪ Higher gross margin capture (the polysilicon segment of the value chain has enjoyed 50% gross margins compared to 20-‐30% for module producers) ▪ Reduced exposure to polysilicon price and supply fluctuations ▪ Assured source of consistent polysilicon for better product quality

Despite the advantages listed above, there is no consensus on in-‐house polysilicon production as the best strategy. The investment and time required to develop in-‐house supply is high, and production

18 Shah, Abhishek, “List of World’s Top (Solar, Semi) 8 Polysilicon Companies – Asia Rising as Big get Bigger,” Green World Investor, Mar. 2, 2011, www.greenworldinvestor.com 19 Wilkinson, Sam, “Silicon update: polysilicon suppliers call the shots,” IMS Research, Apr. 12, 2011, www.solarnovus.com 20 Research Report on China Polysilicon Industry, 2011-‐2012, (Maryland, US: Market Research, 2011)


is only efficient at a very large scale. As Chinese companies like GCL-‐Poly expand rapidly (which is projected to be the largest producer in the world in 2012), supply constraints may ease, in turn making supply-‐contracts more cost-‐effective and discouraging the significant financial investments required for upstream integration.

Downstream integration gives companies new revenue streams and access to new markets

While many solar companies in the U.S. and Europe have long been active in project development—SunPower and Solar World, for example—Chinese solar companies have focused on manufacturing modules and other components. With many markets across the world growing rapidly, companies look to project development and operation and maintenance (O&M) services as promising new revenue streams, as well as a path to secure demand for their own modules in new markets.21 In China, downstream integration success will depend on business models dictated by the evolution of market support policies, and will largely be determined by the role that large state-‐owned enterprises (SOEs) will play in project development and ownership.

Feed-‐in tariffs and other measures to stimulate growth have remained elusive, but China’s solar market is set to grow rapidly in the coming years based on government targets. If China’s experience with wind power is any indication, concession rounds will be used to stimulate growth in the near-‐term. The government will use these concession rounds to allow for controlled development of the market, by concurrently providing developers with practical experience and allowing the price of solar power generation to drop to acceptable levels before the government would implement broader subsidies. To date, the small-‐scale Golden Sun and Solar Roofs subsidy programs, in addition to two concession rounds (where developers bid for individual projects) for utility-‐scale projects, have resulted in 860 MW of solar power capacity.22

Solar PV producers, which are mostly private companies, will have to compete or cooperate with China’s powerful SOEs for project development and operation rights. Some examples of downstream activity by module producers exist, such as Suntech’s 10 MW project in Tibet and China Sunergy’s 7 MW building-‐integrated PV roof in Nanjing, but the largest projects, thus far, have been developed by SOEs who have won all of the major projects in the first two concession rounds. 23 While these concession rounds are not expected to result in high profits for participating companies, early participation in these concession rounds may help companies continue scaling production and secure a piece of what may be a RMB 125 billion solar pie by 2020.24

21 This opportunity assessment focused on downstream opportunities in China and the U.S., but similar opportunities exist elsewhere in the world. 22 CGTI analysis 23 National Energy Administration, “第二批光伏特许权招标结果公告,” [Result of the second concession round], (accessed on May 10, 2011) 24 CGTI analysis


The U.S. installation market also looks particularly promising as it shifts to more utility-‐scale projects.25 Up to 3 GW of new capacity may be installed in 2011 in solar-‐friendly states, with tax incentives and government loan guarantees piquing the interest of developers worldwide. This is the case in California, where the state’s Solar Initiative will subsidize 3 GW of rooftop installations before 2016.26 Chinese producers have already established strong distribution channels into the U.S. and supply roughly 40% of all modules to the California program.27 Chinese companies will continue to supply modules to the U.S. in the years to come, but expanding into the solar project development segment will be complex.

Because the U.S. lacks coordinated federal government support for solar power – the current 30% investment tax credit grant may expire at the end of 2012 – state-‐based initiatives have been embraced by the industry. Yet, navigating state-‐based initiatives can be a daunting task, particularly for Chinese companies accustomed to a more centralized approach. Incentives favoring U.S. producers, as well as increasing overseas shipping costs (shipping from China adds an estimated 2.5% to the cost of each module28), will put increasing pressure on producers to consider local manufacturing when entering the U.S. market. Even though manufacturing costs are higher in the U.S., some companies have chosen this approach. Suntech, for example, has set up a factory in Phoenix, Arizona, with 30 MW of capacity, while other companies are taking exploratory steps and establishing representative U.S. offices. 29 Few examples of Chinese-‐led projects exist, but this may change as Chinese companies gain more experience, and their ability to offer project financing through support from the China Development Bank or China Ex-‐Im may give them a competitive advantage.

Industry Consolidation

Hundreds of Chinese companies occupy the module segment, but only a few produce at large-‐scale

Thanks to local government support for the solar industry, hundreds of Chinese companies have entered the market and several production clusters have emerged in Baoding and Changzhou. Most of these companies are in the module manufacturing segment, due to the relative ease of market entry compared to the more capital-‐ or technology-‐intensive polysilicon and solar cell segments of the value chain. Turn-‐key manufacturing lines can be purchased, installed and rapidly put into production and, as

25 Utility-‐scale projects are more lucrative for project developers. 26 SEIA, “U.S. Solar Market Insight: 2010 Year,” 2011, www.seia.org 27 Woody, Todd, “California’s solar power increasingly Chinese made,” Grist, Jan., 18, 2011, www.grist.org 28 CGTI interviews 29 Landberg, Reed, “Suntech boosts employment, production at Arizona solar factory,” Bloomberg, Jan. 31, 2011, www.bloomberg.com


a result, there are over 600 module producers in China compared to 167 cell companies and fewer than 50 polysilicon producers.30

While hundreds of module companies exist in China today, most production is concentrated in the factories of only a few top-‐tier producers. The top five module companies in China account for over 60% of production capacity.31 These large companies, like Suntech and Trina Solar, differentiate themselves by having over 1 GW of production capacity, sourcing select materials from foreign suppliers, using advanced manufacturing equipment, and focusing resources on marketing and branding. 32 Some companies are even beginning to develop their own manufacturing equipment, one of the last areas of the solar value chain still dominated by foreign companies.33

The pace of M&A in China will depend on local incentives, but global consolidation will accelerate

While China’s market appears ready for consolidation, few mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have taken place to date. The pace of consolidation and M&As in the Chinese domestic market will be influenced in part by the amount of financial support from local governments for local industry. Provincial and local governments have offered low-‐interest loans, land at reduced cost and capital subsidies, often regardless of profitability. The lack of Chinese M&A activity to date may also stem from difficulties related to integrating new companies with incompatible production equipment or

30 CGTI analysis 31 Ibid. 32 CGTI interviews 33 Ibid.


management structures and, in many cases, expanding internal capacity is seen as simpler than acquiring it from other companies.

In the past year, rapid growth in Chinese production capacity, global pricing pressure and a series of high-‐level international downstream deals suggest that global solar industry consolidation may be close at hand: MEMC acquired developer SunEdison, First Solar acquired developer NextLight Renewable Power, and the petrochemical company Total acquired a controlling interest in the manufacturer SunPower.34

In March 2010, China Sunergy acquired CEEG Solar Science & Technology and CEEG New Energy Co. for US$ 47 million, adding 220 MW of new module capacity. The acquisition represented a downstream move for China Sunergy, which subsequently gained distribution networks in the U.S., Europe and Southeast Asia.35 Also, in 2010, LDK Solar invested US$ 21.5 million in Best Solar’s 600 MW module manufacturing plant. (LDK Solar formerly supplied solar cells to Best Solar’s module facility.) Interestingly, Best Solar will continue to produce thin film modules and remain a downstream competitor to LDK Solar.36

34 Ausick, Paul, “The Solar Consolidation Phase May Just Be Starting,” 24/7 Wall St., Jul. 1, 2011, www.247wallst.com 35 China Sunergy, “China Sunergy announces acquisition of two solar module manufacturers,” Mar. 15, 2010, http://zd.qiye8.com 36 PRNewswire, “LDK Solar acquires Best Solar’s crystalline module manufacturing plant,” www.prnewswire.com, (accessed on May 1, 2011)


The Path Ahead

Challenging market conditions require innovative business development strategies In a period of oversupply and uncertain demand, companies should investigate a range of

opportunities, including vertical integration, to increase profitability and reduce costs. Vertical integration is an increasingly popular trend for companies but, as this White Paper suggests, does not necessarily lead to increased profitability.

Stakeholders can improve profit across the solar PV value chain in a number of ways:

§ Solar PV Producers should identify the most effective cost-‐reduction strategies to retain margins, and analyze potential benefits of polysilicon production and developing in-‐house manufacturing equipment. In China’s downstream market, close partnerships with SOEs will result in access to concession-‐round projects, and localization or acquisitions in markets like the U.S. will help producers overcome local content requirements.

§ Materials and Components Suppliers should anticipate the continued vertical integration of their customers and assess the impact of industry consolidation on their current and future customer-‐base.

§ Solar PV Developers and Project Owners should plan for continued declines in solar PV ASPs while understanding the potential for solar PV producers to move downstream and become competitors.

§ Financial Service Firms should prepare for simultaneous consolidation in solar PV industry and continued production capacity expansions. They should also facilitate M&A between industry players across the supply chain, both domestically and cross-‐border.

§ Regulators, particularly in China, should set strong policy targets with clear implementation roadmaps to provide more certainty to producers and bring greater stability to the industry which will benefit all stakeholders. Regulators should also strengthen quality standards and certification programs to prevent reckless development and poor grid integration.

All producers, including material and component suppliers, must watch for pending Chinese domestic policy incentives and expansion of production capacity in China to understand the impact on global supply/demand balances and the pace of industry consolidation. With continued reduction in solar PV pricing, new installation markets independent of subsidies will potentially emerge yielding new investment opportunities.


This license allows for the copying, distributing, transmitting and adapting of the work for non-‐commercial purposes, provided that new content is distributed using a comparable license, and this work is attributed as: China Greentech Initiative (Greentech Networks Limited), “China’s Solar PV Value Chain” Spring 2011. Permissions beyond the scope of this license may be available at www.china-‐greentech.com.

The China Greentech Initiative™ and The China Greentech Report™ are trademarks of Greentech Networks Limited, a Hong Kong limited liability company. While significant input was received in the creation of this Report, with the large number of participating organizations, by necessity this is not a consensus deliverable. All opinions expressed herein are based on the judgment of CGTI at the time of distribution, and are subject to change without notice due to economic, political, industry and firm-‐specific factors.

Greentech Networks Limited and its partners and advisors make no representation or warranty, express or implied, concerning the fairness, accuracy or completeness of the information and opinions contained herein. While every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information supplied, Greentech Networks Limited and its partners and advisors cannot be held responsible for any errors or omissions, and are not liable for any loss arising from any use of this White Paper or its contents.

This White Paper may include case studies of partners, advisors and other organizations which the research team believes added value to the analysis. The White Paper does not provide and should not be construed as making any specific public policy recommendations. Comments and suggestions about this White Paper are welcome at CGTI@china-‐greentech.com.

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Acknowledgements

Hundreds of individuals provide input into the work of CGTI and the content of this White Paper, including leaders of major Chinese enterprises, foreign companies, entrepreneurs, investors, government, NGOs and policy advisors. CGTI Partners and Advisors that support the Renewable Energy Sector are presented on the front cover of this White Paper.

CGTI wishes to acknowledge several organizations for their support of this White Paper, including Bayer, BP, Dow Corning, DuPont, Hanwha SolarOne, J Capital Research, Suntech, Talesun, Trina Solar and Tsing Capital. CGTI Senior Research Analysts Claire Nelson, Olivier Pincon and Jackie Wang led the writing of this White Paper based on an Opportunity Assessment, under the direction of Manager Anders Hove and Managing Director Alan Beebe. Cina Loarie provided copyediting support and managed publication of the White Paper. CGTI Partner Relations team members Mark Wehling and Chitra Hepburn supported the Opportunity Assessment, under the direction of Managing Director Ellen Carberry.

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