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05THE RIGHT TO FOOD IN CHINA:

WHAT (AND WHO) IS AT STAKE?

With a population comprising 20 percent ofthe world’s total, China has never been ableto overlook the importance of food supply.The question now is how China’s integrationinto the world economy through membershipin the World Trade Organization is affectingthis most basic of social challenges.

IntroductionFood, along with water, housing and healthcare, is one of thenecessities of daily life, and probably the most essential. Foodis indispensable in sustaining the minimum survival of anable-bodied individual, and with that constitutes a basichuman asset of livelihood.

The origin of the concept of the right to food comes fromthe observation that most famines in recent history have beenthe product of poor governance. China is a notable example,with the death of 70 million during the Great Leap Forward,but other cases include North Korea, Ethiopia and Somalia.Withholding or obstructing food production and supply hasalso been used by governments against portions of their popu-lation, especially in the context of secessionists’ civil conflicts.Over the years, the concept has evolved to summarize the vari-ous obligations that a state has to comply with regarding equi-table and rational access to food for its population, with anemphasis on the eliminating extreme poverty.2

The UN defines the right to food as “the right to have regu-lar, permanent and free access, either directly or by means offinancial purchase, to quantitatively and qualitatively adequateand sufficient food corresponding to the cultural traditions ofthe people to which the consumer belongs, and which ensuresa physical and mental, individual and collective, fulfilling anddignified life free of fear.”3 Availability and accessibility are theessence of the right to food. Reference to the right to food isexplicitly noted in the International Covenant on Economic,Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and other internationaltreaties,4 underpinning the legitimacy of the right to food ininternational law and signatory states’ commitment to realiz-ing this right.5

China ratified the ICESCR in 2001, committing itself toadvancing human rights and meeting international standards.In the first report to the Committee on Economic, Social andCultural Rights (CESCR),6 China repeatedly makes reference toits marked progress in poverty reduction in the past twodecades as a means of demonstrating progress in economic,social and cultural rights, while providing little solid evidencesto prove compliance “on the ground.” In the section on theright to food, China articulates government efforts in agricul-tural development, the protection of agricultural land andfarming conditions, and food circulation system reforms.There is little doubt that these initiatives foster conditions toachieve the right to food, but they focus primarily on boostingdomestic food availability, with little concern for addressingfood accessibility among individuals.

In part, this shows a misplaced emphasis on linking thehunger issue with poverty reduction.While it is true thatpoverty reduction has contributed to freeing people fromhunger in China, the understanding of when a populace isfood secure requires more than ascertaining whether individu-als enjoy an income of more than one dollar a day.7 China’slaudable efforts in relieving millions of people from absolutepoverty may do little to ensure equitable access to food at theindividual level.The prevalence of under-nourishment inChina stood at 11 percent of the total population in2000–2002, dropped by only one percent from 1995–1997.8

Regarding child malnutrition, the incidence of underweightchildren in the under-5 age group was 11 percent, and theproportion of children below normal height was 16 percent.9

The official malnutrition rate is even higher, reaching 20–30percent of the national population, or 50 percent in poverty-stricken counties in western China.10 China’s malnutrition rateis comparable to that of the world’s least developed countries,including Bangladesh (32 percent), Laos (22 percent), Cam-bodia (38 percent) and Ethiopia (42 percent).11 Consideringthat China’s economy has grown at an annual average of 9 per-cent in macro terms since the late 1970s, and that the povertyheadcount dropped to 3 percent in 2002, the malnutrition fig-ures are disappointing.12

This paper aims to revisit the concept of the right to food inChina, especially the extent to which the right to food is oper-ationalized.This provides an important means of evaluating the

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government’s genuine commitment to fulfilling its obligationto protect the right to food as opposed to its rhetoric in ensur-ing food security.Two key issues stand out here; first, China’spolitical system lacks the accountability necessary to guaranteethe enjoyment of the basic human right to adequate food, andas a result there is little incentive to incorporate the protectionof food access into the policy-making process. Second, littleattention has been paid to understanding how China’s increas-ing integration into the world economy is changing social andeconomic environment in ways that threaten the right to food,especially among segments of the population whose access tofood is most susceptible to disruption.

The legal basis of the right to foodThe right to food is a treaty right embodied in the Interna-tional Bill of Rights.13 Article 25 of the Universal Declaration ofthe Human Rights (UDHR) stipulates that everyone has theright to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food.14This provi-sion is further elaborated in the 1966 International Covenanton Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), now rati-fied by 151 countries, including China.15 In recognizing thefundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, Article 11 of theICESCR identifies a set of core actions related to food produc-tion and distribution as well as nutrition that states must take,individually or collectively, to achieve this goal. Signatories areurged to take every possible means to ensure the right to food.For instance, state parties are advised to incorporate the rightto food in national law and administration to facilitate imple-mentation at the national level as the first and major step inrealizing their commitments.

A host of other instruments, declarations or pronounce-ments include references to and affirmation of the right tofood.16The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child(CRC), to which some 192 states are party, recognizes foodand nutrition rights in the context of the right of the child tolife17 and to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standardof health.18

In 1999, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-tural Rights (UNCESCR) issued General Comment No.12

highlighting the content, obligations, violations and monitor-ing mechanism of the right to food in great detail.19The con-cept of the right to food expounded in the General Commentinspired the adoption of a working definition of the right tofood by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food in 2001.20

Embracing Amartya Sen’s renowned analysis of food secu-rity,21 the General Comment reaffirms that the right to foodinvolves fostering conditions to ensure food availability in suf-ficient quantity and quality and sustainable accessibility forpeople to care for themselves and their own food needs.22TheGeneral Comment also provides a framework with which todetermine when the right to food is violated, and the ways inwhich the right to food can be achieved. Sen identifies fourmeans of food entitlement: producing food (production-based), trading for food (trade-based), working for food(labor-based) and being given food (transfer-based).23 Under-mining means of food access means damaging food security,and hence violates the right to food.

For example, land conscription deprives farmers of theircapability to grow food for their own consumption or trade infood. Landless farmers who are not given reasonable compensa-tion or entitled to social security benefits lack the means to gainaccess to food. In this case, the farmers’ right to food is violatedand the government assumes responsibility for failing to pro-tect the people’s right to food.The General Comment makesclear that it is the duty of governments to make informed deci-sions when a policy may threaten anyone’s food security.

The General Comment also identifies the state as the pri-mary duty-holder of the right to food for the people under itsjurisdiction.24 National governments are obliged to respect,protect and fulfill this right (see chart below), and any denialof food on political or economic grounds contravenes the rightto food endorsed by the international community.25 Neverthe-less, NGOs, international organizations and private businessesalso have responsibilities in realizing the right to food, eventhough international law has no power to sanction non-com-pliance.26

There are two major challenges to implementing the rightto food in real practice. First, the term “adequate” in relation tofood access is problematic and often subject to interpretation.

Three levels of obligations to the right to food (General Comment No. 12, para 15)

Obligation to respect � Set limits on the exercise of state power, rather than positive action. The state should not, in general,interfere with the livelihoods of her people or their ability to provide for themselves.

Obligation to protect � Regulate the conduct of non-state actors. This entails the establishment of an enabling regulatory environ-ment, that is, legislation and sanctions. Land tenure and food safety regulations are notable examples.

Obligation to fulfill � to facilitate:Take positive action to identify vulnerable groups and to design, implement and monitor policies that will

facilitate their access to food-producing resources or an income.

� to provide:Provide the right directly by any available means when an individual or group is unable, for reasons beyond

their control, to enjoy the RTF. This also applies to victims of natural or other disasters.

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There is a lack of specific benchmarks and indicators for moni-toring the implementation of the right to food at the nationallevel. For that reason, food security indicators such as adult andchildren malnutrition rates, calorie consumption per day, andshare of household income on food expenses are often used asproxies to measure right to food status. However, typical foodsecurity indicators reflect only the outcome of exercising theright to food, but fail to capture the barriers to exercising theright at the access points.

The second challenge is the lack of available means forredress and standards for justifiability of violations of the rightto food.27 Paragraph 32 of the General Comment stipulates this:

Any person or group who is a victim of a violation of theright to adequate food should have access to effective judicialor other appropriate remedies at both national and interna-tional levels.All victims of such violations are entitled to ade-quate reparation, which may take the form of restitution,compensation, satisfaction or guarantees of non-repetition.National Ombudsmen and human rights commissionsshould address violations of the right to food.

Endorsement of the right to food in national laws would“enhance the scope and effectiveness of remedial measuresand should be encouraged in all cases.” However, there areonly a handful of countries that have incorporated the right tofood in domestic law.

Proving violations of the right to food is complex. Forinstance, victims have to prove that the violation of the right tofood, such as starvation of certain groups of people, is anintentional act or omission by the state.28 In cases where theright to food is incorporated in domestic law, implying accessto legal redress, domestic courts may offer varying legal inter-pretations of what constitutes violation to the right to food.For example, neglect and incompetence in protecting therights due to domestic circumstances such as budget con-straints may not be sufficient proof of violations.At the sametime, UN human rights institutions that are entrusted toaddress people’s complaints of human rights violations havelimited power to do so.These institutional limitations hindervictims’ ability to lodge their claims via legal means, leavingtheir grievances unaddressed.

The right to food in the Chinese contextChina is a signatory to the ICESCR, which means that it has to“respect, protect, and fulfil” its people’s right to food.Yet theright to food is neither stipulated in Chinese law, nor given ref-erence in policy rhetoric, leaving an institutional vacuum toenforce the right or remedy any violations.The lack of recogni-tion of the right to food in the policy domain implies that thegovernment does not hold itself accountable for food crisesand famines resulting from policy failures.Without a legalbuffer, people’s right to food is reduced to a mere politicalchip, largely at the disposal of policymakers who may chooseto pursue “sound” food security policy to protect the availabil-ity and accessibility of food for the masses only when it ispolitically expedient.

Self-sufficiency in food is the backbone of China’s foodsecurity policy.29The means by which localities produce andmake food available in the marketplace are significant inensure people’s right to food.The government’s role in foster-ing conditions for food availability and accessibility in the Maoand post-Mao eras essentially reflects how the right to food isperceived in practice.

Without a legal buffer, people’s right tofood is reduced to a mere political chip.

In Mao’s era, the right to food was arguably protectedinformally through the Communist ideology of collectivewellbeing. For both rural villagers and urban dwellers, accessto food was based on a reasonably equitable distribution sys-tem. In the rural areas, access to food was protected through acommunal system in which villagers shared agricultural pro-duce grown on the communal land and ate together in thecommunal kitchen (chi dahuofan). In urban areas, distribution offood was based on a rationing system that appeared equitablein theory.

From 1961 and 1977, China was essentially closed to for-eign trade. Foreign import of cereal amounted to a mere fivepercent annually.To ensure adequate food supply, the govern-ment encouraged mass production of food in rural areas andprovided farmers with agricultural production support includ-ing land, high-yield seeds, pesticides and chemical fertilizers.30

Subsidy of rural production was aimed at ensuring smoothoperation of the urban food rationing system.Thus, whilefarmers shared their produce in the communal kitchen, theywere required to submit a fixed quantity of food to the gov-ernment for urban rationing, even in times of reduced produc-tion caused by natural disasters.

Urban residents received rationing tickets from their workunits as part of their salary and procured their food inrationing shops.The amount of food needed to feed the nationwas reflected in a state plan used to guide farmers’ productiontargets.An accurate state plan for food production assumedgreat importance in balancing food demand and supply,because any mistakes in central planning would worsen foodavailability and also weaken people’s access to food. However,such plans tend to be inflexible and ill-equipped to handleproduction fluctuations resulting from natural or manmadefactors, and any error could jeopardize food security and vio-late the people’s right to food.The great famine resulting frompolicy failures during the Great Leap Forward is a notableexample of a policy failure that imperiled the people’s right tofood.

The post-Mao era was marked with the launching of eco-nomic reform in 1978.31 As the communal system andrationing were abandoned in the late 1970s and early 1990srespectively, the government’s role in guaranteeing access tofood in both rural and urban areas became ambiguous.As aresult, the concept of right to food has become an invisiblepublic policy issue in the reform era.

The Chinese government perceives food problems as the

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symptom of poverty and underdevelopment, and economicdevelopment is seen as a panacea to relieve people from “inad-equate food and clothing,” a phrase used interchangeably with“poverty” in the report China submitted to the CESCR and inthe Poverty Reduction White Paper.32 Food problems are con-sidered an intrinsic element in a broad concept of poverty, andcurbing poverty implies solving the food problems at the sametime.As a result, “having adequate clothing and food (wenbao)”is set as an indicator for xiaokang, or a “moderately well-offsociety,” the development goal for China adopted by DengXiaoping.33The government no longer articulates its role inguaranteeing food for everybody; but instead has focused onmotivating the people to become “developed,” the code wordfor attaining adequate food and clothing.

In the reform era, the right to food isabsent from the policy domain and reliesprimarily on individual efforts to catch upwith the development process.

The government provides for the wellbeing of impover-ished groups under a two-tiered social security system oper-ated in rural and urban areas. In rural areas, the system has runin the form of social relief since the 1950s, but its coverageextends only to specific disadvantaged groups, such as elderly,disabled people and minors with no immediate families.Thetarget population is entitled to the “five guarantees” of food,clothing, housing, healthcare and burial expenses (along withcompulsory education for minors).34 In urban areas, socialsecurity is operated through the state pension system on thebasis that urban residents work in either state-owned compa-nies or civil service.

A minimum living standard allowance scheme was intro-duced in 1999 to remedy redundancy and unemploymentcaused by reforms to the State-Owned Enterprise system.Thiscan be seen as a new initiative for China’s social security sys-tem. Urban families whose per capita income is lower than thelocal urban resident’s minimum standard of living can receivebasic subsistence assistance from the local government.35 Bythe end of 2003, 2.5 million people were covered by the “fiveguarantees,” and 22.5 million urban residents nationwidedrew the minimum living allowance, which averaged 58 yuanper person per month. However, the two systems are problem-atic in practice and have been only minimally effective inreaching out to the needy.36

While the right to food is not articulated in policy terms,the government’s concerns with food focus on the amount offood available in China as a whole. Grain self-sufficiency hasbecome a central element in China’s commitment to achievefood self-sufficiency because rice and wheat are staple foodsfor the Chinese, and as a result, boosting domestic grain pro-duction has been placed high on the policy priority list.37

Until the mid-1990s, state procurement of grain was themajor policy tool to secure domestic availability of staple grainand to keep grain prices low in urban areas. For instance, the

government increased procurement prices for grain in order tomaintain farmers’ incentive to produce enough grain to meetdemand.The form of incentives was changed to cash subsidyand agricultural tax exemptions in 2003.38 In 2004, grain pro-duction reached 469.5 million metric tonnes, the first increaseregistered after five consecutive years of decline in grain out-put.39The high grain yield was used by the government as anindicator that it had finally shed the persistent worry of foodinsecurity, and that the resulting high degree of food self-suffi-ciency was bringing China closer to its goal of “xiaokang.” Inaddition, there have been notable investments in science andtechnology aimed at increasing agricultural productivity, withgenetically modified (GM) rice in particular seen as an alterna-tive means of increasing food availability.40

Nevertheless, the right to food remains ambiguous in theChinese context.There is no avenue to address any violations tothe right to food because the right is not written into the Con-stitution or any national legislation.Although the right to foodseems to have been respected in the Mao era, it was neverexplicitly affirmed, and advocacy of the right to food at thattime was merely part of the rhetoric of Communist ideology.The right to food was recognized neither as an individualright, nor a responsibility of the government. In the reformera, the right to food is absent from the policy domain andrelies primarily on individual efforts to catch up with thedevelopment process.The emphasis on national food availabil-ity has become a response to ease public fears of not havingenough food in the country, but the right of individuals tofood is not addressed in public discourse.

The perception of the right to food in China has significantimplications. First, there is a lack of accountability in the Chi-nese political system to guarantee the basic human right toadequate food. Hence, the protection of access to food isunlikely to be included in policy deliberations. Second, with-out scrutinizing what the right to food encompasses, the gov-ernment’s efforts to boost domestic food production or importfrom elsewhere address only the element of availability, whichdoes not necessarily imply that each person will secure a fairshare of the national food basket.41 Social and economicinequality can and does destabilize food and resource alloca-tions among individuals, and in such cases it is food access thatmatters most.

Third, national stock is an important element in ensuringfood security and protecting the right to food, but the issue offood stock is rarely discussed. Indeed, the national grain stockis a state secret.42The government never discloses the amountof food in the national stock, or any relevant information.Given that the national grain stock is the last resort for emer-gency food supplies, or to stabilize food prices at times ofhoarding, it is dangerous to conceal this information from thepublic.Although the government has noted the need to reformthe existing stock system, the timetable and progress of suchreform has yet to be made public.

Food security and the right to food: a problem in the future?Food security is a pressing and long-standing issue in China. Itis overly simplistic to view overall improvement in national

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income as the cure for food insecurity. Food security is a multi-faceted issue; meteorological, social, economic, political oreven cultural factors may alter the dynamics of food securityconditions for individuals. Environmentalist Lester Brown isamong those warning the Chinese government to take thefood issue seriously.43 He argues that China will need to absorba considerable amount of world resources, food in particular,to meet the needs of its growing population. China’s mountingdemand for food will accelerate a rise in food prices to theinevitable detriment of the world’s poor, and a point will even-tually be reached where world food production will not beenough to feed the people in China.

While Brown’s arguments have been criticized, they rightlydraw attention to some key challenges to China’s food securityprospects. Internally, population growth, soil degradation andland erosion have exerted substantial pressures on fooddemand and production, threatening food self-sufficiency andaccess. Externally, further specialization of production amongcountries as a result of growing international trade may makefood prices more unpredictable. Given that China’s competitiveadvantage lies in manufacturing rather than agriculture, Chinamay become increasingly reliant on external food supply. Inthat case, price volatility would likely hinder food access,which could be devastating in China, with its vast geographicalexpanse and alarming rise in income disparity.

Concern over China’s food security has been the subject ofdiscussions in various international forums. Focusing on the

domestic policy front, the lack of a comprehensive and coherentfood security policy raises doubts over the government’s sincer-ity in addressing the plight of people with inadequate food.

One should note that a person whose income lies just abovethe national poverty line can still be food insecure. Householdspursue different coping strategies for food security in differentcircumstances. For instance, poor farmers in rural areas mayprefer to save their produce, which can be used for their ownconsumption or to raise cash to pay for children’s school feesor the family’s medical bills. Hence, actual food consumptionis a function of not only total household income, but alsohousehold budget.Women and elderly are the most commonvictims of malnutrition, because they tend to spare food formen and children when the family has only limited food.44Theabsence of a social security system in rural areas also puts theelderly at risk of insufficient food intake because it forces themto rely on what they can raise from their own labor, or onremittances from any children they may have working in theurban areas.

Agricultural development efforts fail to target the disadvan-taged groups in rural areas whose food security conditions aremost vulnerable to economic change.These disadvantagedgroups are usually characterized by limited market access andlack of financial capital to increase production, hindering theircapability to participate in and enjoy the benefits of agricul-tural development.

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Photo: Sinopix

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The WTO as a factor in the right to foodChina’s accession to the WTO in 2001 has brought hope andchallenges to the livelihoods of 1.3 billion Chinese people.Thebenefits associated with WTO membership may look impres-sive, but the socioeconomic impact will create even greaterchallenges to the survival of disadvantaged groups who havealready missed out on the current development process. Specif-ically in reference to their food security prospects and the basicright to food in the post- WTO era, two key issues deserve par-ticular attention from the Chinese government and the inter-national community.

1. Food supply.The accelerated adjustment of China’s eco-nomic structure resulting from growing integration into theinternational trading system has hindered efforts to achievefood self-sufficiency, or more precisely, grain self-sufficiency.Given that China’s comparative advantage lies in its light man-ufactured sector due to an abundance of low-skilled labor andlimited arable land, agriculture has been losing ground toindustry as trade and foreign direct investment have becomethe pillars of the Chinese economy.45 Between 1995 and 2002,agriculture’s contribution to total GDP dropped from 35 per-cent to 26.1 percent, while industry’s increased from 42 per-cent to 45 percent.46 Intensified trade flow in manufacturedgoods will continue to hasten the drift.

As the industrial sector continues to dominate the econ-omy, young and productive laborers from rural areas movefrom farming to industry for better pay. Rural-urban migrationhas resulted in a slump in agricultural production as neededlabor has become unavailable to sustain productivity.At thesame time, structural changes have also taken place within theagriculture sector. Farmers have made a noticeable shift awayfrom land and capital-intensive staple crops to labor-intensivecash crops such as vegetables and fruit.While this shift resultsin part from increasing demand in Hong Kong and neighbor-ing Asian cities,47 it is also a response to China’s changing eco-nomic structure.

Although the government attempts tostabilize food prices via various policytools, food prices have been movingsteadily upward.

As staple food available from local sources decreases,demand for food imports will inevitably rise to fill the gap.Although China is obliged to reduce tariffs and expand quotasfor most agricultural goods, its trade regime remains domi-nated by non-tariff barriers such as state procurement.48 Forinstance, the import of cereals such as rice and wheat must belicensed by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Coop-eration (MOFTEC), but export of cereals is monopolized bythe government-backed China National Cereals, Oils andFoodstuffs Corporation (COFCO).With the government effec-tively controlling domestic food availability, China’s food avail-ability is subject not only to market forces, but also to thegovernment’s flexibility and timeliness in responding to sup-

ply and demand both domestically and overseas. In times ofglobal food shortage as a result of natural disaster, China’s foodsecurity would be at risk, echoing Brown’s arguments thatinternational food availability and volatility in food prices mayhamper food security in China.

2. Food price.Another issue related to China’s WTO accessionis food price increases. Rising food prices were anticipatedafter compulsory state procurement of food in rural areas andfood rationing in urban areas were officially abandoned in themid-1990s; when the government stopped manipulating foodprices to maintain affordability for urban consumers, foodprices became a function of market demand and supply.49Thepricing mechanism has now assumed importance in deter-mining who gets what at what cost.Although the governmentattempts to stabilize food prices, especially for staple grains, viavarious policy tools, food prices have been moving steadilyupward. For instance, in the first ten months of 2004, foodprices grew 10.8 per cent year-on-year, with grain prices ris-ing a staggering 28.4 per cent.50

Food price changes will have little adverse effects on thequantity and the quality of food that a household can afford ifaccompanied by a rise in living standards. However, the prospectof an across-the-board rise in China’s living standard is bleak.Poor subsistent farming households, the rural elderly and low-income migrant workers in urban areas are likely to suffer most.

Farmers may not have extra food available for sale, and evenif they manage to produce some cash crops, their produce mayoffer poor competition to imports due to poor quality and lackof urban market access. Under such conditions, poor farmerswill become increasingly isolated from the market and moredependant on their food crops for daily sustenance and forbartering for services.Their food security would be vulnerableto bad harvest, which could deprive them of cash income forhousehold expenses such as fertilizer and seeds, children’sschool fees and medical expenses.This would further under-mine their ability to gain minimum access to food and main-tain a healthy diet.

Food access among the rural elderly is equally worrying.Elderly persons languishing in the absence of immediate fam-ily members has become a common phenomenon in ruralareas. Given that social security is non-existent in rural areas,with only a very limited number of rural elderly entitled tosocial relief funds from the government, the ways in which theelderly secure access to food are uncertain.While many live onremittances from their sons and daughters working in urbanareas, most live off the land. Similar to poor subsistent farminghouseholds, their access to food depends almost entirely onwhat the land and their labors can produce. Given their lowproductivity, they are all the more vulnerable to bad harvestsand health problems.

For migrant workers, rising food prices effectively reducetheir household food allotment. Since migrant workers do notbenefit from housing and other public services such as health-care, recent dramatic increases to the cost of living in urbanareas has forced them to minimize expenses elsewhere, usuallyin food consumption, in order to sustain a meager living.51

Growing income disparity has further complicated food

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security in China.The adverse impact of income inequality hasbeen widely discussed in various forums. China’s Gini Co-effi-cient, an internationally recognized index measuring inequal-ity, rose from 26.8 to 36.48 between 1985 and 2001.52Thereare now 560 million people, or 46.7 percent of the total popu-lation, living on less than $2 a day in China.53

Unequal income distribution implies that different incomegroups will be affected differently by food price fluctuations.As discussed above, high food prices are likely to hit low-income groups the hardest because they tend to have a smallbudget for food, while food expenditure tends to constitute asubstantial share of their cost of living.

An official survey comparing income and expenditure (espe-cially for food) for the bottom 5 percent income group and thetop 10 percent income group in urban areas found that spend-ing on food takes up nearly half of the total income of the bot-tom 5 percent group, but about 31 percent of the top 10 percentincome group.54 Given that staple grains such as rice and wheatare the major dietary component for most low-income house-holds, rising grain prices inevitably increase food budgets. Giventhat incomes in the low-income group increase far more slowlythan among the well-off group, there is reason to worry aboutfood access among the low-income groups, even though foodavailability is not a problem in the current market.

Important implications also lie with the dietary patternsand nutritional intake of the poor. Low-income householdsmay economize by purchasing low quality food that is cheapand filling. For instance, in rural areas where villagers consumemeat and eggs only occasionally during the year, many chil-dren suffer stunted growth. In such cases, it is not only foodaccess that is a major concern in discussing the right to foodamong the poor households, but also the nutritional value andsafety of the food consumed.

Concluding remarks and recommendationsThis article draws attention on the issue of food security inChina, and frames the issue within the human rights frame-work, in which food security must be understood at the indi-vidual and household level.As discussed throughout the paper,the right to food in China has yet to be addressed in any seri-ous manner. It is true that the government has made consider-able efforts to promote domestic food production, but theseefforts are of doubtful sustainability and effectiveness in keep-ing pace with the sea change in China’s economy.

China’s WTO membership is likely to bring more chal-lenges than benefits to the poor within the current policy set-tings.While GDP is increasing as a whole, income disparityand economic inequality are deepening, hindering food acces-sibility, which is a major element of individual and householdfood security in China.With the lack of a competent socialsecurity scheme and the phasing out of food aid from theWorld Food Program (WFP) and other donor countries,China’s poor are deprived of even the most passive means ofaccess to food—transfer-based food entitlement.55

Food is indispensable to the minimum survival of humanbeings. China has become a land of opportunity for many,notably in the business sector, foreign governments and interna-

tional organizations such as WTO,56 but they fail to take note ofthe fundamental issues concerning many poor Chinese, whosevoices are muffled in social and political discourse.The govern-ment’s misguided efforts to address food security by concentrat-ing on food availability instead of food access will inevitablyintensify the problem. It is prime time for the Chinese govern-ment to live up to the promise of respecting human rights, anotion enshrined in a recent amendment to China’s Constitu-tion, by looking into individual food security and commit itselfto upholding the right to food for everyone in China.To thatend, there are some areas that deserve special consideration:

Recognize the right to food in Chinese law.The right to foodshould be written into the Constitution.The government’srole in respecting, protecting and fulfilling the right to foodshould be specified in the domestic legal context.Thiswould increase policymakers’ accountability and incentivesto formulate policies that ensure people’s ability to securetheir right to food. Such accountability is important ingood governance and in respecting the rights of the people.

Operationalize the right to food. The government needs acomprehensive national food security strategy to enhancefood availability and food accessibility of through an all-round policy targeting different income groups as well ascomplementary programs to help the disadvantaged. Such astrategy would include programs that foster income secu-rity to protect the transfer mechanism for those withoutsufficient means.

Target a pro-poor development policy. A pro-poor develop-ment policy is needed to enhance food security. China’sdevelopment efforts have failed to take note of the impor-tance of pro-poor growth in contributing to increasingincome inequality between rural and urban areas, betweencoastal and inland provinces and within regions. Incomegeneration among China’s poorest would strengthen theircapability to access food by their own means. Micro-creditprograms that give the poor access to finance and capital toexpand their agricultural production is one policy option.Food-for-work programs are also a policy option to providefood and income transfers to the poorest under govern-ment initiatives. More resources and funding in publicservices such as medical care and education in rural andurban areas are also pertinent in alleviating the financialburden of poor households, allowing them to allocate moremoney for food consumption.

Public participation. Due consideration of public opinion inpolicymaking, and the monitoring of policy formulationand implementation, are key to ensuring that the people’sright to food is protected.The right to food is a fundamen-tal human right. People should not be seen as passive recip-ients of a benefit bestowed by some higher authority. Publicparticipation is fundamental to good governance andshould be the core mechanism for China to fulfil its obliga-tion to respect and protect its people’s right to food.

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NOTES1. The primary researcher and drafter of this issues brief is Wing Lam.

2. See UN General Assembly. Human rights questions:human rights situations and

reports of special rapporteurs and representatives, July 23, 2001 (A/56/210).

http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/465/52/PDF/N0

146552.pdf?OpenElement.

3. U.N. Commission on Human Rights. The Right to Food—Report Submitted by

the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food. (E/CN.4/2001/53) The report was

submitted on February 7, 2001. Para. 4.

4. The right to food is also recognized in the Convention on the Elimina-

tion of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the

Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).

5. Art. 2 of ICESCR.

6. UN Commission on Human Rights. Implementation of the Interna-

tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Initial Reports

Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant.

Addendum—People’s Republic of China. (E/1990/5/Add.59). Sub-

mitted on March 4, 2004 (Mimeo).

7. Robert Eastwood and Michael Lipton. “Pro-Poor Growth and Pro-

Growth Poverty Reduction:What Do They Mean? What Does the Evi-

dence Mean? What Can Policymakers Do?” Paper presented at the Asia

and Pacific Forum on Poverty Reduction, Manila, February 5–9, 2001.

8. FAO.The State of Food Insecurity in the World (Rome: FAO, 2005).Table

1.

9. UNICEF.The State of the World’s Children 2005 (Geneva: UNICEF,

2005).

10. “30 percent of the population suffered from malnutrition”, China.org.cn,

7 April 2005, http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2005/Apr/831931.

htm.The survey was conducted by the Ministry of Health.

11. Data for the year 1999/2001, from UNDP, Human Development Report 2004

(New York: UNDP, 2004).

12. Note that the poverty rate reflects only the poverty level in rural areas;

China does not publish an urban poverty rate. For poverty statistics, see

National Bureau of Statistics, Poverty Monitoring Report of Rural China 2003

(Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2003).

13. This refers to the three human rights instruments, the Universal Decla-

ration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant of Civil

and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant of Eco-

nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).

14. Article 25, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948.

15. UNHCR. Ratifications and Reservations. UNHCR, last updated on November 24,

2004,.http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/3.htm.

16. These include the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-

crimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Vienna Declaration and Pro-

gram of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights of 1993, the

Copenhagen Declaration and Program of Action of the World Summit

for Social Development of 1995, the Beijing Conference on Women of

1995, and the Rome Declaration on World Food Security and the World

Food Summit Plan of Action of 1996.

17. The Convention on the Rights of the Child,Article 6, obligates States

Parties to “ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and

development of the child.” CRC,Article 6(2).The right to life is one of

four core principles of the Convention, which is interpreted in the

broadest sense as “a holistic concept, embracing the child’s physical,

mental, spiritual, moral, psychological and social development . . . .

aimed at achieving the optimal development for all children.” General

Comments No. 5: General Measures of Implementation of the Conven-

tion on the Rights of the Child (arts. 4, 42 and 44, para.6).

CRC/GC/2003/5, (November 27, 2003), para 12.

18. Status as at June 29, 2005, Office of the United Nations High Commis-

sioner for Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/

ratification/11.htm.

19. U.N. Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Twentieth session.

General Comment No.12 of The Right to Adequate Food (Art.11). E/C.12/1999/5.

Official Record, adopted on 12 May 1999. Para. 8.

20. See UN Commission of Human Rights, 2001, supra note 2.

21. The analysis is first introduced in Sen’s famous work Poverty and Famines

and then further elaborated in Hunger and Public Actions, published in 1981

and 1989 respectively. See Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines:An Essay on Enti-

tlement and Deprivation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981); Jean Drèze and

Amartya Sen, Hunger and Public Action (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).

22. Ruth Haug and Estrellita Rauan, Noragric Report:Operationalising the Right to

Food in Africa. (As: Centre for International Environment and Develop-

ment Studies, Noragric, 2001).

23. Supra note 20, Sen, 1981.

24. See also Para. 36–39, General Comment No. 12, 1999, supra note 18.

25. The framework was developed by Eide in a commissioned study on the

right to adequate food in 1989. It is the first study laying out in great

detail the obligations of states and the international community in the

realization of the right to food. See Asbjorn Eide. Right to Adequate Food as a

Human Right, Human Rights Studies No.1. (Geneva: UN, 1989).

26. Para 20, General Comment No. 12.Three NGOs (FIAN International,

WANAHR and the International Jacques Maritain Institute) took the

lead in preparing a Code of Conduct in on the right to food for NGOs.

The draft, produced in 1997, has gained the support of more than 800

NGOs. See Margret Vida. “Towards Voluntary Guidelines on the right to

adequate food,” ERS Review,Vol 15, No. 1 March 2004, http://www.

communitylawcentre.org.za/ser/esr2004/2004march_guidelines.php.

27. Justifiability of the violations is problematic in the right to food as well

as other social and economic rights enshrined in the ICESCR. For

instance, governments are committed to make possible means to realise

the rights progressively, yet, it is not clear what defines “possible

means” to achieve “progressive realization” of the rights.This leaves

room for national governments to justify their omissions in protecting

the right to food as a result of limited resources and specific domestic

circumstances.

28. See AAAS, The Right to Food:A Resource Manual for NGOs (Washington:AAAS,

1999), chap.4, http://shr.aaas.org/manuals/rtf.shtml.

29. USDA, “China: Is current ag policy a retreat from reform?” USDA Agricul-

tural Outlook, March 1997 (Washington: USDA, 1997). pp. 28–31.

30. Data extracted from FAO Statistical Database (FAO. FAO Statistical Data-

base (online), last updated July 2005, http://faostat.fao.org/) Domes-

tic food availability refers to the sum of local food production, food

imports and stock and minus food exports.

31. The speech made by Deng Xiaoping at the Third Plenary Session of the

11th CPC Central Committee held in December 1978 kick-started the

“Open and Reform” policy. See Dazhong Wang, “ The turning point of

Deng Xiaoping and the Third Plenary Session of 11th CPC Central

Committee,” May 5, 2005, http://www.dzwww.com/xinwen/shan-

dong/sdszzt/dengxiaoping/lilun/zhengzhi/t20040804_365447.htm;

see also the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee,

http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/208146.htm.

32. U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 2004, supra note 5; State Council.

Progress in China’s Human Rights Cause in 2003. China.org.cn, last updated on

March 2004, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20040330/index.htm.

33. Deng Xiaoping introduced the xiaokang concept during the Party Con-

gress in March 1979 when market reforms were launched. He envi-

sioned China reaching a xiaokang society by the end of the 20th century.

Although Deng did not provide a clear definition of xiaokang, the concept

was later translated into 16 indices, including GDP per capita, protein

intake and life expectancy.The concept largely mirrors favorable out-

comes of development such as economic growth and rising living stan-

dards. (“Party Congress urges rural well-being”, China.org.cn, November

9, 2002, http://www.china.org.cn/english/2002/Nov/48333.htm).

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34. State Council, Regulations Concerning the Work of Providing the ‘Five Guarantees’ in

the Rural Areas. (Beijing: State Council, 1994) See also, “Social Security in

Rural China,” China Development Gateway.com, http://www.chinagate.com.

cn/english/14030.htm.

35. State Council, Regulations on Guaranteeing Urban Residents’Minimum Standard of

Living. (Beijing: State Council, 1999).The minimum living standard is

determined primarily on the basis of urban residents’ average income

and consumption level per capita, price levels during the previous year,

the consumption price index, the local cost necessary for maintaining

the basic livelihood, other connected social security standards, the

materials for the basic needs of food, clothing and housing, and the

expenditure on under-age children’s compulsory education. See also

“China’s Social Security White Paper (full text),” China Daily, September

7, 2004, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-09/07/

content_372369_10.htm.

36. Lin Ka, “Transformation of the Chinese Social Security system: collec-

tive welfare against state,” University of Turku, 2003. (Mimeo), http://

www.helsinki.fi/nacs/nacs2003_papers/nacs_papers_fulltext_lin.pdf).

37. Wen Jiabao, Report on the work of the Government, report presented in the Sec-

ond Session of the 10th National People’s Congress, Beijing, March 6,

2004.

38. The initiative was first piloted in a few major grain producing provinces

such as Anhui, and later extended to other provinces. “China revives

farmers’ enthusiasm for grain production,” XinhuaNet.com, June 23, 2004,

http://en.ce.cn/Industries/Basic-industries/200406/23/t20040623_

1140255.shtml.

39. “China’s grain production ends a 5-year slide”, China Daily, November

1, 2004, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-11/01/

content_387570.htm.

40. “China planning large-scale introduction of genetically-engineered

rice,” YahooNews.com, February 17, 2005, http://story.news.yahoo.com/

news?tmpl=story2&u=/afp/20050217/wl_asia_afp/chinafood

agriculturegmo.

41. See Sen, 1981, supra note 20, for a thorough discussion on the impor-

tance of food entitlement in food security analysis. He explained that

the great Bengal famine in 1943 was failure of food entitlement, not

food availability.

42. Regulation on the Scope and Classification of State Secrets Pertaining to

Food Grain, jointly issued by the State Bureau of Grain Reserve and

National State Secrets Bureau (June 26, 1995). See also “Agricultural

trade deficit implies food crisis,” China.org.cn, September 12, 2004,

http://www.china.org.cn/english/2004/Sep/106787.htm.

43. Brown’s controversial book Who will feed China sparked fierce discussion

of China’s food security prospects. See Lester Brown, Who will feed China:

Wake-up Call for a Small Planet (New York:W.W. Norton, 1995).

44. Jacqueline Sims, “Nutrition and Agriculture,” In An Anthology on Women,

Health and Environment (Geneva:World Health Organisation, 1994). 31–64.

45. Labor to arable land ratio is as low as 1: 0.1 hectares, which is less than

40 percent of the world average. Farming is small scale and subsistent-

based. See “China Takes Tough Measures to protect farmland,” China

Daily, March 4, 2004, http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/

2004-03/04/content_311804.htm.

46. National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). China Statistical Yearbook 2003 (Beijing:

NBS, 2003).

47. Bryan Lohmar, Fred Gale, and Linxiu Zhang. “New Opportunities for

Economic Assessment with Rural Household Data in China.” Paper pre-

sented at the MEXSAI Third Annual Conference on Agricultural Statistics, Cancun,

November 2–4, 2004.

48. State food trading companies often act on the government’s behalf to

stabilise food supply and food prices by buying and selling food in the

market.The effectiveness of state trading has become uncertain since

the practice has been phased out in order to comply with WTO trade

rules.Adding to import quota expansion and tariff reduction, imports

are likely to flood the domestic food market as non-tariff trade barriers

such as state-trading practices are gradually removed.Take rice as an

example.The import quota for rice was expanded from 3.32 million

metric tons in 2001 to 5.32 million metric tons in 2004.The in-quota

tariff was set at 1 percent in the years 2001 to 2004, while the over-

quota tariff was reduced from 114 percent in 2001 to 65 percent in

2004 (WTO. China Accession Protocol (Geneva:WTO, 2001). Schedule

CLII).

49. Andrew Watson and Christopher Findlay, “Food and Profit:The Political

Economy of Grain Market Reform in China,” In Food Security an Economic

Reform:The Challenges Facing China’s Grain Marketing System, edited by Christo-

pher Findlay and Andrew Watson, 5–38 (London: Macmillan Press,

1999).

50. “Stable price increases expected in 2005,” China Daily, December 26,

2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-12/26/

content_403375.htm.

51. Zhang Ye, “Hope for China’s Women Migrant Workers,” China Business

Review, May–June 2002.

52. The Gini co-efficient ranges from 0 to 100, or in some cases from 0 to

1.The score of 0 implies equitable income distribution in a population,

while 1 implies the opposite.The Gini co-efficient is estimated by Mar-

tin and Chen based on official income data in China (Ravallion Martin

and Chen Shaohua, “China’s (uneven) progress against poverty,” World

Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3408 (Washington:World Bank, 2004)).

The estimates published in the World Development Indicators 2004 are

even higher, reaching 44.1 in 2001 (World Bank, World Development Indica-

tors 2004, (Washington:World Bank, 2004)). China is amongst the few

countries (such as Brazil,Argentina and many African countries) in the

world with a Gini Co-efficient over 40.

53. Ibid.

54. Data is based on an official household survey.The actual discrepancy is

likely to be higher because the household survey did not include

migrant families, a group likely to make up a substantial proportion of

the lower income population in the urban areas. Data by income groups

is only available for urban residents. (NBS, China Statistical Yearbook. (China

Statistics Press, Beijing, various years)).

55. “World Food Program Phases,” AP via YahooNews.com, March 31, 2005,

http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20050401/ap_on

_re_as/china_food_aid_1

56. See also “A Survey of the World Economy:The Dragon and the Eagel,”

The Economist, October 2, 2004, and “China’s New Revolution—

Remaking our World, One Deal at a Time,”Time, June 27, 2005,

24–53.

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