china not a threat

7/30/2019 China Not a Threat

1/26

Planet Debate

Deficit Supercommittee September 22

China Not A Threat GeneralChina cant deploy forces beyond its borders until 2015

Armed Forces Journal, June 2009, p. 16

Even so, the study said China could not deploy and sustain even small military units far beyond its

borders before 2015. Further, China would not be able to deploy and sustain large forces in combatoperations far from China until well into the following decade, the report states.

PLA force projection limited for decades

Ronald ORourke, Congressional Research Service, July 17, 2009, China Naval Modernization:Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress,http://opencrs.com/document/RL33153/

The PLA's force projection capabilities will remain limited over the next decadeas the PLA replacesoutdated aircraft and maritime vessels and adjusts operational doctrine to encompass new capabilities.These changes will require tailored logistics equipment and training which will take time and moneyto develop proficiency. Although foreign produced equipment and maintenance parts, as well as the civilsector, may help to fill near-term gaps, continued reliance on non-organic assets will hinder PLAcapabilities to sustain large-scale operations over time. (93) A July 2008 press article on the PLAAF states:The Chinese have released photos of a Chengdu J-10 fighter refueling in flight, "so it certainly wants theworld to believe that it is equipping its Air Force to project power," said Thomas Kane, author of"Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power." "I keep hearing people talk about the PLAAF

beyond Taiwan, but it is all fluff," [a] former U.S. defense official said.

1

1


2/26

Planet Debate


China Doesnt Threaten U.S. HegemonyChina is not trying to counterbalance U.S. global leadership

Evan S. Medeiros, RAND Corporation, August 2009, Chinas International Behavior:Opportunity, Activism, and Diversification,http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf, p. xxi

China does not seek to displace the United States as the predominant global power. Its elites do not

currently want China to be a global leader on par with the United Statesa peer competitor. They

view their domestic challenges as too great to assume the risks and responsibilities associated with such

a role, and they recognize that they lack the material resources to do so. They also fear that such a

global role would divert much needed resources from national development and could foster regional

backlashes against China. To be sure, Chinese leaders welcome a more multipolar world, one in whichmultilateralism reigns and U.S. power is constrained. Chinese leaders also want China to be eventuallyrecognized as a great poweralthough that aspiration has very general attributes and is not well defined.Chinese leaders aspire to such a status as external validation of Chinas achievements, but they are also waryof the burdens and costs associated with it.

U.S. will remain the global leader; China cant challenge

Evan S. Medeiros, RAND Corporation, August 2009, Chinas International Behavior: Opportunity,Activism, and Diversification, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdfp. 216-7

A further consideration is that even as Chinese capabilities and influence grow, the costs of confronting theUnited States will remain high and the benefits of doing so will remain unclear, if not low. U.S. economicand military power will not remain static over the next 20 years, even if the gap in relative capabilities

narrows. And the United States is not likely to take an overtly confrontational strategy toward China, whichwould fundamentally alter Beijings cost-benefit calculus in its international behavior. The United Stateswill continue to remain important (but not as central as before) to Chinese perceptions of their externalsecurity environment and the structure of the international system. Even assuming that the world

becomes distinctly more multipolar, the U.S. economy and military will continue to cast a long shadow

over Asian and global affairs.

2

2
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdfhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdfhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdfhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf


3/26

Planet Debate


China Not a Threat to the U.S.

Russia and China have not formed an alliance against the U.S.

Evan S. Medeiros, RAND Corporation, August 2009, Chinas International Behavior:Opportunity, Activism, and Diversification,http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf, p. xxi

Some of Chinas foreign policy actions are directed at eroding relative U.S. influence in certain regions andinstitutions. Russia has been a useful Chinese partner in this effort. However, relations between the twocountries remain complex, and they do not currently constitute a united front against the United States.

China wants to integrate with the global community to sustain its growth

Evan S. Medeiros, RAND Corporation, August 2009, Chinas International Behavior:Opportunity, Activism, and Diversification,http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf, p. 20

But, first, two overarching beliefs shade Chinas view of its current security environment. One is a widelyheld belief that Chinas future is inextricably (and increasingly) linked to the international community.Chinese leaders understand that Chinas current growth model combined with the acceleration of

globalization have deeply connected China to the international community. Chinas success in

accomplishing national revitalization depends on close and continuing interaction with global and

regional powers, markets, and institutions. In the words of Chinas 2008 national defense white paper,

the future and destiny of China have been increasingly closely connected with the international

community. China cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy

prosperity and stability without China.3 Even in the wake of the global financial crisis in fall 2008 and

the resulting rapid declines in Chinese growth, Hu Jintao affirmed during the December 2008 Central

Economic Work Conference that the direction of global economic integration for China was correct

and should continue.

China wants to avoid military conflict with the U.S. to sustain its own rise


Third, avoiding conflict and overt geopolitical competition with the United States is critical to Chinaseffort to ensure a stable and peaceful security environment; major strategic competition or outright

military conflict with the United Statesmore than with any other nationwould significantly disrupt

Chinas security environment. Under severe conditions, it could lead China to shift national resources fromeconomic development to military modernizationan outcome not desired by Chinas leaders. Chinese

scholars write about the need for space and time for Chinas rise, and stable relations with the UnitedStates is critical to both. To be sure, Chinese analysts also recognizethat although a stable, if not amicable,relationship with the United States is a necessary condition for its rise, it is by no means a sufficient one.

3

3
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdfhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdfhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdfhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdfhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdfhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf


4/26

Planet Debate


China Not a Threat to the U.S.China not confronting the U.S.

Evan S. Medeiros, RAND Corporation, August 2009, Chinas International Behavior:Opportunity, Activism, and Diversification,http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdfp. 214-5

Third, China has not adopted a confrontational posture with the United States, despite its discomfortwith U.S. unipolar status and the U.S. democracy-promotion agenda. Even during the Bush years,Chinese leaders avoided confrontation with the United States (such as on Iraq in 2003), put effort into

stabilizing U.S.-China relations (especially after 9/11), and sought to expand areas of practical

cooperation (e.g., North Korea). U.S. and Chinese leaders have broadened their channels of diplomatic

exchange. These new channels have resulted in limited changes in Chinese behavior on key internationalsecurity issues such as North Korea, Iran, Sudan, and Burma. Chinas international behavior reflects acontinued recognition that an adversarial relationship with the United States would have a very negativeeffect on Chinas security environment and on its ability to accomplish both its long-standing and its moreimmediate objectives. Furthermore, China has not sought to create an anti-U.S. coalition to balance U.S.power. Beijing has pursued bilateral ties with nations close to the United States and also those alienated

from Washington. China appears to have quietly rejected such approaches by leaders from Venezuela andIran. China has been embracing multilateral organizations that include U.S. membership and also those thatthe United States is not a part of. And, in regional organizations such as the SCO and EAS, China has notsought to dominate them and has deferred its advances when they have been met with resistance fromregional states, including U.S. allies.

U.S. defense spending massively exceeds Chinas

Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The IndependentInstitute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in appliedeconomics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He hasbeen Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working forCongress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign

Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office, CATO,The independent, April 13, 2009, p. online

In addition, the gap between U.S. and Chinese defense spending remains vast. The massive U.S. defensespending is equal to almost half the total defense expenditure for the entire world. Although Chinas defensespending has increased by double digits in recent years, this increase followed a period of slack spending andstarts from a much lower base level than the gargantuan U.S. defense budget. U.S. yearly spending on defenseis $711 billion, whereas Chinas is only 17 percent of that at $122 billion annually.

Chinas deployments dont threaten the U.S.

Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent

Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in appliedeconomics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He hasbeen Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working forCongress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House ForeignAffairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office, CATO,The independent, April 13, 2009, p. online

Furthermore, the U.S. military deploys far forward around China; Chinas general military forces do notdeploy in the Western Hemisphere and do not threaten the United States. The most important finding in thePentagons report was that China could not deploy and sustain even small military units far away from its

4

4
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdfhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf


5/26

Planet Debate

Deficit Supercommittee September 22borders before 2015. The report continued that China would not be able to deploy and sustain large units incombat far away from China until well into the decade after that. Instead, the Pentagon concluded that Chinais modernizing its military for short conflicts around its borders. In other words, Chinas capability to projectconventional power is and will remain pathetic far into the future" thus making most of Chinas neighborsrelatively safe, and the faraway U.S. very safe, against a Chinese attack.

5

5


6/26

Planet Debate


No China threat to U.S. interests, risks exaggerated, and the U.S. security guarantee is

strong

Robert S. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College, an associate of the John KingFairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security

Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The National Interest,September- October 2009, Here Be Dragons, http://www.nationalinterest.org/

AFTER MORE than thirty years of post-Mao economic reforms and average annual economic growth ratesof approximately 10 percent, China has begun to develop a new generation of military technologies thatsignificantly advance its strategic capabilities. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is developing a widerange of weaponry that enables it to project power off of the Asian mainland and into new theaters, includingthe high seas and space. These advances underscore the potential challenge China poses to U.S. security andthe importance of paying vigilant attention to the developments in the U.S.-China balance of power. YetChina does not pose a threat to America's vital security interests today, tomorrow or at any time in the

near future. Neither alarm nor exaggerated assessments of contemporary China's relative capabilities

and the impact of Chinese defense modernization on U.S. security interests in East Asia is needed

because, despite China's military advances, it has not developed the necessary technologies to constitute

a grave threat. Beijing's strategic advances do not require a major change in Washington's defense or

regional security policy, or in U.S. policy toward China. Rather, ongoing American confidence in itscapabilities and in the strength of its regional partnerships allows the United States to enjoy both

extensive military and diplomatic cooperation with China while it consolidates its regional security

interests. The China threat is simply vastly overrated. AMERICA'S VITAL security interests,including in East Asia, are all in the maritime regions. With superior maritime power, the United

States can not only dominate regional sea-lanes but also guarantee a favorable balance of power that

prevents the emergence of a regional hegemon. And despite China's military advances and its challenge

to America's ability to project its power in the region, the United States can be confident in its ability toretain maritime dominance well into the twenty-first century. East Asia possesses plentiful offshore assetsthat enable the United States to maintain a robust military presence, to contend with a rising China and tomaintain a favorable balance of power. The U.S. alliance with Japan and its close strategic partnershipwith Singapore provide Washington with key naval and air facilities essential to regional power

projection. The United States also has developed strategic cooperation with Malaysia, Indonesia andthe Philippines. Each country possesses significant port facilities that can contribute to U.S. capabilities

during periods of heightened tension, whether it be over Taiwan or North Korea. The United States

developed and sustained its strategic partnerships with East Asia's maritime countries and maintained

the balance of power both during and after the cold war because of its overwhelming naval superiority.

America'spower-projection capability has assured U.S. strategic partners that they can depend on theUnited States to deter another great power from attacking them; and, should war ensue, that they

would incur minimal costs. This American security guarantee is as robust and credible as ever. Thecritical factor in assessing the modernization of the PLA's military forces is thus whether China is on theverge of challenging U.S. deterrence and developing war-winning capabilities to such a degree that EastAsia's maritime countries would question the value of their strategic alignment with the United States. But,though China's capabilities are increasing, in no way do they challenge U.S. supremacy. America's

maritime security is based not only on its superior surface fleet, which enables it to project airpower

into distant regions, but also on its subsurface ships, which provide secure "stealth" platforms forretaliatory strikes, and its advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,

surveillance and re-connaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. In each of these areas, China is far from

successfully posing any kind of serious immediate challenge.

Current U.S. nuclear readiness sufficient to counter China

Robert S. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College, an associate of the John KingFairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security

6

6


7/26

Planet Debate


Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The National Interest,September- October 2009, Here Be Dragons, http://www.nationalinterest.org/

Critics of U.S.-China policy offer little in the way of an alternative. The United States is doing nearlyeverything Professor Friedberg argues it should do. His one novel proposal is that the United States respondto China's advancing nuclear capability by improving its strategic deep-strike air capability. But it is notplausible that China's limited nuclear arsenal and its minimal deterrent capability has so undermined U.S.

retaliatory deterrent capability and nuclear stability that the B-2 stealth bomber will soon be obsolete and thatthe United States must spend huge sums to develop a more advanced strategic bomber that would providemarginal, if any, additional security.

China Wont Attack the U.S.Only a 1% risk that China will attack the U.S.

Robert S. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College, an associate of the John KingFairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the SecurityStudies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The National Interest,September- October 2009, Here Be Dragons, http://www.nationalinterest.org/

China has made progress in developing a narrow range of capabilities, including missiles and submarines,which challenge U.S. surface vessels. But Professor Friedberg's worst-case assessment fails to consider eitherChinese vulnerabilities or U.S. strengths. U.S. cyber-warfare capabilities, its long-range conventional missilesand its ability to dominate space-based communications systems make China's offensive capabilities highlyvulnerable to American retaliation. Perhaps China could launch a surprise attack, but then what does it do onthe third day of the war, after the United States has degraded its communication, reconnaissance, andtargeting systems and then engaged China with its superior and secure air and naval capa-bilities? The notionthat China might launch a war against the United States is the essence of the "1 percent doctrine" thatcontributed to many of the George W. Bush administration's costly and ultimately counterproductiveinternational and domestic security policies.

7

7


8/26

Planet Debate


Chinas Naval Modernization Doesnt Threaten the U.S.

Chinas naval modernization, including aircraft carrier development, does not threaten the

U.S.


CHINA IS buying and building a better maritime capability. However, the net effect of China's navaladvances on U.S. maritime superiority is negligible. Since the early 1990s--especially later in the decade asthe Taiwan conflict escalated and following the 1996 U.S.-China Taiwan Strait confrontation--Beijingfocused its maritime-acquisitions program primarily on the purchase of modern submarines to

contribute to an access-denial capability that could limit U.S. operations in a Taiwan contingency. Itpurchased twelve Kilo-class submarines from Russia and it has developed its own Song-class and Yuan-classmodels. These highly capable diesel submarines are difficult to detect. In addition, China complemented itssubmarine capability with a coastal deployment of Russian Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft and over one thousand

five hundred Russian surface-to-air missiles. The combined effect of these deployments has been greaterChinese ability to target an American aircraft carrier and an improved ability to deny U.S. ships and aircraftaccess to Chinese coastal waters. Indeed, American power-projection capabilities in East Asia are morevulnerable now than at any time since the end of the cold war. We can no longer guarantee the security ofa carrier. Nevertheless, the U.S. Navy is acutely aware of Chinese advances and is responding with

measures to minimize the vulnerability of aircraft carriers. Due to better funding, improved

technologies and peacetime surveillance of Chinese submarines, the American carrier strike group's

ability to track them and the U.S. Navy's antisubmarine capabilities are constantly improving. The U.S.

strike group's counter-electronic-warfare capabilities can also interfere with the PLA Navy's

reconnaissance ability. Improved Chinese capabilities complicate U.S. naval operations and require greatercaution in operating an aircraft carrier near the Chinese coast, particularly in the case of a conflict overTaiwan. A carrier strike force may well have to follow a less direct route into the area and maintain agreater distance from China's coast to reduce its vulnerability to Chinese capabilities. But such

complications to U.S. operations do not significantly degrade Washington's ability to project superiorpower into maritime theaters. The United States still possesses the only pow-er-projection capability in

East Asia. IN ANOTHER attempt to counter U.S. maritime superiority, China has been planningconstruction of an aircraft carrier since the mid-1980s, and it will soon begin building its first. Contrary to theworst-case assessments of some U.S. observers, a Chinese aircraft carrier will not improve the PLA'snaval capability. One or even two Chinese carriers will be insufficient to maintain a constant presence

in distant waters. China will need multiple large carriers before it can develop a war-fighting

capability. Building many will take decades. In addition, Beijing will have to be able to construct its

own advanced aircraft to go on these carriers--rather than depend on imported Russian models and

supplies, an intrinsically unreliable source of military power. China will also have to develop state-of-

the-art C4ISR capa-bilities so it can defend its carrier and target U.S. maritime assets. This, too, will be

a lengthy process. The PLA Navy will also confront challenging organizational demands as it attempts

to put a completed carrier into operation. The requirements for effective management of a carrier and

its aircraft are extremely difficult. Any carrier threat from China on this front is decades away.Ultimately, a Chinese carrier may simply become an additional target for U.S. aircraft and cruisemissiles. Thus, the unintended effect of China's carrier program may be to augment U.S. maritime

security, insofar as it diverts China's defense resources from its more effective submarine-based access-

denial capability. Moreover, the acute vulnerability of a Chinese carrier to U.S. maritime forces and

Chinese concern for force protection will likely contribute to greater caution in Beijing's use of its

naval forces to challenge U.S. interests. China's deployment of a carrier may contribute to both the

strength of the American ability to deter Chinese challenges to the regional order and also to the

stability of U.S. strategic partnerships. China's developing naval capabilities have yet to undermine U.S.maritime security, the stability of U.S. maritime partnerships or the regional security order.

8

8


9/26

Planet Debate


China Doesnt Threaten the U.S. in AsiaU.S. has strong alliances in East Asia to counter China


THE UNITED States enjoys military superiority in the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea, as well as theability to deter the use of force against maritime states and to defend them during hostilities. U.S. deterrenceand war-fighting capabilities have been the decisive factors in developing and sustaining strategicpartnerships that are critical to Washington's efforts to maintain a favorable regional balance of power. Inrecent years, even as China has modernized its military forces and become a global economic power, theUnited States has consolidated these relationships. The U.S.-Japan alliance remains as important as ever toJapanese security. Tokyo has shown minimal interest in either accommodating Chinese power or developingan independent security capability, despite the constant hand-wringing and doubt in Japan over the U.S.commitment to the country's defense. Southeast Asia, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippinescontinue to improve naval cooperation with the United States, and they have exhibited minimal interest inmeeting Chinese territorial demands in the South China Sea.

Despite Chinas modernization, U.S. remains the dominant military power in East Asia


Despite impressive Chinese advances, in maritime East Asia the United States retains military superiority andeffective deterrence and war-fighting capacities. But just as the United States cannot base policy on anexaggerated assessment of the China threat, it cannot allow strategic complacency to undermine U.S. security.

Washington must maintain those capabilities that underpin U.S. strategic part-nerships with the maritimestates in China's neighborhood and a favorable regional balance of power. Respect for Beijing's strategicpotential requires that U.S. defense policy continues to stress advancement of those capabilities that supportAmerican power projection in the western Pacific Ocean, even as the United States prepares for a protractedera of counterinsurgency warfare. Short-term contingencies cannot preclude attention to long-term great-power competition. If the United States maintains its focus on the multiple sources of maritime supremacy,including carrier-based power projection, subsurface platforms and information technologies, it can continueto engage the rise of China without undermining U.S. security.

Asian allies enhancing military cooperation with the U.S.


Professor Friedberg worries that the China threat will undermine American strategic partnerships in EastAsia. But even a cursory examination of regional trends reveals that our maritime allies in East Asia areactually enhancing defense cooperation with the U.S. Navy and Air Force. Despite prolonged Japaneseanxiety over the American commitment to its defense, U.S.-Japan defense cooperation is better today than atany time during the cold war or the 1990s, and it continues to improve. Similarly, U.S. naval cooperation withSingapore and Malaysia continues to improve, as these countries welcome the U.S. contribution to theirsecurity and regional stability. Even the Philippines, despite its resistance to cooperation with its former

9

9


10/26

Planet Debate

Deficit Supercommittee September 22colonial power, is improving cooperation with the U.S. Navy. The United States should be confident, ratherthan alarmed, in its ability to retain its strategic presence in East Asia.

10

10


11/26

Planet Debate


China Doesnt Threaten the U.S. in AsiaChina not trying to push the U.S. out of Asia

Evan S. Medeiros, RAND Corporation, August 2009, Chinas International Behavior:Opportunity, Activism, and Diversification,http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdfp. 215-6

Fourth, in Asia, China is not actively trying to break up U.S. alliances. It is not offering U.S. alliessecurity assurances and military cooperation as a replacement to their security arrangements with the

United States. Indeed, military diplomacy and defense cooperation is perhaps the smallest part of Chinasbilateral diplomacy with Asian nations. China is not promoting itself as an alternative security partner tothe United States. Rather, it has focused on growing economic cooperation and reassuring U.S. allies by

participating in regional institutions and committing to their norms of behavior, at least for now. Sincethe beginning of this decade, more Chinese strategists recognize thatofficial rhetoric asideU.S.security commitments play a stabilizing role in Asia.

China not trying to confront the U.S. in Asia

Evan S. Medeiros, RAND Corporation, August 2009, Chinas International Behavior:Opportunity, Activism, and Diversification,http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdfp. 208

This does not mean that there are not competitive aspects of Chinas foreign policy that challenge U.S.security interests. Some of Chinas international behaviors are directed at eroding U.S. influence in specificregions and in certain institutions. The most competitive aspects of Chinas foreign policy are evident in theAsia-Pacific region. China is not currently trying to push the United States out of this region. Chineseleaders recognize the dangers and likely failure of such an approach, and some recognize the stabilityprovided by U.S. alliances. Rather, China is trying to increase its power and influence relative to theUnited States. A core Chinese objective is to hinder the U.S. ability to constrain China; that is, Chinaseeks to maximize its freedom of action and leverage as means of countering perceived U.S. efforts to

limit Chinese choices. China seeks political influence to increase the costs, for the United States and itsallies, of constraining China. Thus, China is challenging the United States by trying to reduce its relativeinfluence, but it does not seek to confront the United States by trying to expel it. As noted above, Chinais pursuing this approach by deepening economic interactions with Asian nations, joining multilateralorganizations to shape regional agendas, expanding bilateral interactions to shape these nations preferences,and generally reassuring countries on its periphery about Chinas intentions and capabilities. In this sense,Chinas approach is more gravitational than confrontationalpulling nations toward China (to bind

them) rather than pushing them away from the United States or each other.

11

11


12/26

Planet Debate


China Naval Modernization Answers

China cant run the ships without Russians on board, and they wont be there during

combat


Every piece of equipment [on China's Sovremenny-class destroyers] from hull, mechanicaland electrical (HM&E) technologies to guns, sonar, communications, electroniccountermeasures (ECM) and missiles are totally new to the PLAN. ... [For these ships,] Chinais dependent on Russian advisers for training, operations and maintenance. These ships largelyremain in the Russian support cocoon in Dinghai rather than at a fleet base. ... Isolationfrom other ships and crews hurts fleet integration and coordinated operations. ... It is nocoincidence that the Sovremnyi and Kilo submarine home bases are in an enclave of Russiansupport in an isolated area near the Eastern Fleet headquarters at Ningbo. It is unlikely

that Russian advisers would be onboard during actual combat operations against Taiwan andU.S. Navy air, surface and subsurface threats. PLAN officers and crew are not expected tobe able to handle operations when under fire, sustaining hits and suffering system degradationor loss. This could include problems in night or rough weather environment as well. Becauseall of the combat systems, except for three noted, are modern Russian equipments, Chinahas minimal capability even to repair peacetime losses in port. ...

China cant maintain its equipment

Ronald ORourke, Congressional Research Service, July 17, 2009, China Naval Modernization:Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress,

http://opencrs.com/document/RL33153/

What kind of record is provided by prior Chinese built warships with imported Russian and Westerntechnology? These include sensors, fire control, weapons and communications as well as HM&E. TheChinese new-construction DDGs are a mix of local designed and manufactured systems, foreign importswith production rights, illegally copied import equipment and illegal examples with no local productioncapability at all. The latter two represent serious training and maintenance problems. Unfortunately for thePLAN, some of them are in the highest mission-critical areas. For example, the DDGs being built have arapid-fire Gatling gun close-in weapon system that looks like the Dutch Goalkeeper system. Signaal andthe Dutch government deny exporting the equipment or production rights to China. This key weaponresponsible for downing incoming cruise missiles is probably lacking documentation and training because

it must be illegally obtained. (109)

12

12


13/26

Planet Debate


Chinese Military Modernization AnswersMany obstacles to Chinese military modernization

Robert S. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College, an associate of the John KingFairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the SecurityStudies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The National Interest,

September- October 2009, Here Be Dragons, http://www.nationalinterest.org/

But China's post-cold-war defense research program has not exclusively focused in this area. Since America'suse of high-technology, precision-guided weaponry in the Gulf War, China has actively researched a broadspectrum of advanced military and dual-use civilian technologies. The PLA is now introducing many ofthese technologies into new weapons systems that are transforming the PLA's asymmetric military capability.Should these advances significantly enhance the PLA's ability to degrade U.S. operations, they couldtransform the U.S.-China strategic balance and have a far-reaching impact on regional alignments and thegreat-power security order. But similar to the evaluation of China's aircraft-carrier capability, abalanced assessment of the country's military-modernization program requires attention to the

obstacles to Beijing's developing and effectively operating these technologies. There are also the clear

vulnerabilities of these technologies to U.S. weaponry. And even more so, the United States can adjust

its operations in response to new PLA capabilities--we are not a stagnant military. OF FOREMOSTconcern to many observers is Chinese research and development of a mobile antiship ballistic missile(ASBM) with a range of over one thousand five hundred kilometers. If land-based ballistic missiles couldtarget, accurately track and then penetrate the defenses of U.S. surface ships, that would dramatically degradeU.S. power-projection capabilities in maritime theaters. As an access-denial weapon, a Chinese ASBM forcehas the potential to preclude U.S. naval operations in much of the western Pacific and the South China Sea,undermining the U.S. ability to protect its strategic partners throughout the region. But it would be unwise tounderestimate the obstacles China faces in developing ASBMs and to exaggerate the strategic

implications of such a capability.1 Detection of a small moving target on a large ocean, such as a

carrier, remains highly challenging.Following detection, real-time tracking of a moving carrier isnecessary for accurate targeting--this is an additional major technological obstacle. Finally, penetrating

the ship's defenses would be extremely difficult. U.S. carrier strike forces can include defenses against

ASBMs, such as electronic countermeasures; low-technology, cost-effective decoys that interfere with

the missile's tracking capability; and basic camouflage techniques, including "fog machines." Such po-

tential U.S. countermeasures have created considerable uncertainty and a wide-ranging debate amongChinese specialists on the feasibility of this project. Of course, none of these technological obstacles isnecessarily insurmountable, and China is devoting considerable resources to building an ASBM force. ThePLA may eventually develop the necessary ASBM surveillance and targeting capabilities to enable it tosignificantly degrade U.S. surface-ship capabilities. But China has yet to carry out its first successfulpublic test of an ASBM. Following the first such test, China will require a protracted period of

additional research and testing to develop an ASBM capability effective in real-world conditions.Andeven if China could eventually construct a functioning ASBM system it would face considerable

obstacles to achieving wartime effectiveness. Though a mobile and concealed Chinese land-based

ASBM would be difficult to destroy before launch, it is dependent on its surveillance systems. China's

ground-based radar that would support maritime reconnaissance and the tracking of a U.S. carrier as

well as Chinese air-defense systems would be easily detectable and degraded with U.S. air-launched

missiles. Chinese leaders would have only minimal confidence after destroying the first aircraft carrier that

the United States would not target China's land-based radar facilities immediately thereafter. China'ssurveillance, tracking and targeting systems are also dependent on its satellite capability, and here tooChinese capabilities would be vulnerable to a U.S. attack--far more vulnerable than U.S. satellites would be toone from China.2 Once China employed its ASBM capability, its antiship capability would likely beshort-lived and it would have a limited impact on U.S. power-projection capability and on the course

and outcome of hostilities. Thus, the argument that China is on the verge of developing and deploying atransformative asymmetric force rests on unrealistic worst-case estimates that do not reflect the limits

of current Chinese capabilities; the intrinsic difficulty of designing and producing high-technology,

experimental weapons systems; and the vulnerability of an ASBM system to U.S. countermeasures.

China's ASBM program is not a "silver bullet" that will magically transform the U.S. deterrent

posture in the region or undermine American alliances.

13

13


14/26

Planet Debate


Chinese Military Modernization AnswersU.S. has many options to counter Chinese modernization


Moreover, U.S. maritime war-fighting capability is not limited to its surface fleet, and it would be foolish tounderestimate the vast array of systems the United States has at its disposal. U.S. nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines (SSGNs) contain 154 western-Pacific-based Tomahawk cruise missiles that can targetcritical Chinese assets and penetrate Chinese coastal waters with minimal fear of detection. U.S. SSGNsprovide the United States with a powerful sea-based retaliatory capability and a persuasive and credibledeterrent. Should China make progress on its ASBM force, the United States can deploy additionalcounterattack and offensive weaponry on subsurface platforms, thereby negating any new Chinesecapabilities.

China cant effectively utilize UAVs


China has been carrying out extensive research into unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Chinese UAVs couldprovide the PLA with an advanced reconnaissance and weapons-delivery capability. But the Chinese militarylacks a secure platform for launching the UAVs. Chinese surface vessels would not be a secure UAVplatform; they would be as vulnerable to a U.S. attack as a Chinese aircraft carrier. Chinese land-based UAVs

would lack the range to target distant U.S. ships. Moreover, the UAV's surveillance technologies would allsuffer from the same vulnerabilities as the ASBM surveillance technologies. Without the full array of secureC4ISR capabilities and a secure maritime capability, UAVs cannot significantly contribute to China's effort tochallenge U.S. maritime superiority.

14

14


15/26

Planet Debate


China Naval Modernization Answers No Aircraft ThreatSeveral years until China has an aircraft carrier

Breaking News from globeandmail.com, April 21, 2009, p. online

But the display of force, which is to include the first public showing of China's nuclear submarine fleet, will

also serve notice that the country has arrived as a global naval power. It's a moment of obvious pride for thisnation of 1.3 billion people, and one of quiet concern for some of its neighbours. Beijing also has recentlyconfirmed that it is moving toward developing its first aircraft carrier, though that milestone is likely severalyears away.

15

15


16/26

Planet Debate


China Not A Threat A2: Aircraft CarriersU.S. carriers more powerful and China wont build until 2020

Space & Missile Defense Report, February 16, 2009

China is planning to build at least two nuclear powered aircraft carriers, according to a report inthe Asahi Shimbun newspaper in Tokyo. The only plus for the United States here is thatconstruction might not begin until 2020 on the carriers that would be based on designs for thediscontinued Russian Ulanovsk Class carriers displacing about 60,000 tons, though China willbegin building two conventionally powered aircraft carriers this year. (The U.S. Nimitz Classnuclear powered carriers displace about 78,000 tons empty and 101,000 tons loaded.)

China doesnt have any fighters to take off from the aircraft carriers


Although an operational carrier is unlikely to be commissioned soon, a source within the Chinese

shipbuilding industry has confirmed that the PLAN is planning to convert the ex-Soviet navy carrierVaryag into a training carrier. The 67,500 ton vessel, bought from Ukraine for USD20 million in 1997, hasbeen docked at the Dalian Shipyard for refurbishment since 2002. If the PLAN manages to overcome thetechnical difficulties involved in fitting the vessel with a new propulsion system and the necessary take-offand landing systems, Varyag will serve as a capable platform for the PLAN's future shipborne flighttraining programme, pending the introduction of the first operational Chinese aircraft carriers perhaps by2020. Another major obstacle faced by the PLAN is the lack of suitable aircraft. In the past, PLANpilots have reportedly undertaken short-range take-off and landing using the indigenous J-8 fighter on asimulated carrier deck but the aircraft's poor aerodynamic performance makes it impossible for realshipborne operations. The third-generation indigenous J-10 and J-11 fighters are potential candidates butboth require substantial structural modifications before they can take off and land on the carrier deck.

16

16


17/26

Planet Debate


Nuclear Modernization Has Not Created Sub ThreatsNuclear modernization has not resulted in increased sub patrols


Twenty-five years after it launched its first ballistic missiles submarine, Xia (Type 092), China has yet toconduct its first deterrent patrol. The new information confirms that neither the Xia, nor the two new Jin-class (Type 094) ballistic missile submarines--the first of which was launched in 2004--have everconducted a deterrent patrol. ... Implications Despite the rebound in general purpose submarine patrols,dramatic reports from recent years about Chinese submarines operating inside Japanese territorial waters orsurfacing close to U.S. aircraft carriers have been largely absent in 2007. The meaning of the patrolrebound is yet unclear. After all, it follows a complete absence of submarine patrols in 2005, the fourthyear since 1981 that China's submarine fleet did not conduct any patrols despite introduction of several

new classes of more advanced submarines for greater reach. That modernization has (not yet) manifesteditself in the form of a clear increase in submarine patrols.

Lack of patrols means Chinese subs are only for coastal defense


Yet for the Chinese submarine force overall, six patrols do not provide very much operational experiencefor more than 50 submarines and their crews. If China did plan a more extended reach for its submarine

force, one might expect the patrol rate to continue to increase in the next couple of years. Only the futurewill tell. But the operational experience from the 55 patrols conducted by the entire submarine forcebetween 1981 and the end of 2007 suggests that China's submarine force--at least for now--remains acoastal defense force. (45)

17

17


18/26

Planet Debate


China Space Threat AnswersChinese space capabilities exaggerated


BEIJING'S PROGRESS on its other high-technology programs is equally unsure and does not threaten U.S.security. China is making advances in its satellite program, which can contribute to its ability to target U.S.ships. But alarmists exaggerate China's capabilities and underestimate U.S. superiority in space technologiesand U.S. ability to degrade Chinese satellite capabilities. China's antisatellite program is also developing, butits limited targeting capability and American redundancy in satellites minimize China's ability to destroyAmerica's satellite communications systems.

18

18


19/26

Planet Debate


China Cyberwarfare Answers

Chinas cyber warfare developments exaggerated


Beijing is also developing cyber-warfare techniques, but exaggerated assessments of this capability fail toevaluate China's own emerging vulnerability to such attacks. Cyber-warfare technologies and skills arereadily accessible and U.S. advanced munitions are increasingly dependent on high-technologycommunication and surveillance technologies. The United States is thus vulnerable to cyber attacks, and aChinese cyber offensive against the United States could influence U.S. operations in the western Pacific.Nonetheless, the reciprocal effect of Washington's cyber-warfare capability on Beijing's ability to wage high-technology warfare is equally significant. The same advanced Chinese technologies and weaponry thatpessimists argue present a major threat to U.S. security, including ASBMs, are highly dependent on advancedcommunication and surveillance technologies that are par-ticularly vulnerable to U.S. cyber attacks. And once

the United States degrades the PLA's advanced communication technologies, China would lose its high-technology asymmetric capability that so alarms America's pessimists, and it would be very susceptible to awide range of superior U.S. sea-based forces, even if the United States suffered from an effective Chinesecyber attack.

19

19


20/26

Planet Debate


China Not Counterbalancing the U.S.China not counterbalancing the U.S.


To be sure, countercontainment is not the primary objective in Chinese global diplomacy or in Asia. If

it were, Chinese diplomacy would likely be far more confrontational with the United States and its

regional allies; for example, China would actively try to pull and prod U.S. allies away from the United

States by proffering China as an alternative security partner. Rather, Chinese diplomacy has focused

on economic opportunism and expanding its multilateral cooperation. In particular, it has been seeking to createnew and expand existing multilateral organizations in which the United States has a limited role but also as a way to develop a regionalorder in East Asia in which U.S. influence is diluted. And China seeks to do this gradually so as not to appear to directly oppose the

United States or its allies. Thus, countercontainment is a distinct Chinese objective, but it does not manifest

itself in a confrontational set of policies that emphasize defense cooperation and zero-sum interactions.

This objective may receive greater expression in the future if U.S.-China relations become more

competitive, if Chinas regional influence grows, and if Beijing sees itself as less dependent on stable

relations with Washington.

Chinas partnerships are not designed to counterbalance the U.S.


To varying degrees, China has used its strategic partnerships with major powers, such as with Russia,

France, and the EU, to broaden its economic relationships, to foster the development of other power centers in global

politics, and to seek support for its vision of a multipolar global order. These major power partnerships do not amount

to building an anti-U.S. coalition to balance against U.S. power. However, these partnerships allow China greateroptions and help it to foster an environment that could be used to constrain U.S. unilateral actions, especially if that power is directed at

Chinese interests.30 There is no overtly anti-U.S. element in such Chinese diplomacy, but Chinas discomfort withperceived U.S. unilateralism is one of the drivers of its strategic partnerships. These themes and motivations were readily apparent in the2003 EU-China Joint Statement, which founded that strategic partnership during a period of trans-Atlantic tension, as well as in theRussia-China Joint Communiqu and the SCOs summit statement in July 2005. Chinas strategic partnerships with these major powers

are bounded by two considerations that limit their potential to be potent mechanisms for balancing U.S. power. First, Chinas

interests with all of these major powers, especially Russia and India, both converge and divergeon

different issues and to different degrees. There is no single, dominant political or strategic logic to any of these strategic

partnerships that could serve as the basis for collectively and consistently countervailing U.S. power. Indeed, most ofChinas

strategic partners are not interested in creating a de facto coalition to balance U.S. power, with the possible

exception of Russia. These nations have numerous interests in positive relations with the United States. Also,although there are many cooperative dimensions to Chinas strategic partnerships, they are also fraught with tensions on both economic

and security questions. For example, Russia and China may have common interests related to constraining U.S.

influence globally and in Central Asia, but they diverge on economic issues and security questions

revolving around access to Central Asian energy supplies and Chinese influence in Russias Far East.31

Also, for China, Russia has shown itself to be an unreliable partner in the past. Chinas unwillingness in summer 2008 to endorse theRussian position on the independence of the Georgian enclaves exemplifies the limits of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership. A secondmajor consideration is that, historically, China has not favored or relied on alliances (or even strong bilateral partnerships) in itsdiplomacy. Chinas historic disposition in favor of independence and against relying on alliances calls into question the extent to which itcan or will rely on them now. Although China has formed alliances in the past (e.g., the ChinaSoviet Union alliance of the 1950s), itwas never entirely comfortable with them. Beijing prefers, instead, greater autonomy to maximize its leverage and maneuverability.32This enduring predisposition is evident in the intensifying concerns among Chinese elites about the economic and security vulnerabilitiesthat have resulted from Chinas global interdependence and the globalization of national security challenges.33 Chinas historical

predispositions were further confirmed in 2001 when Russia shifted away from its emerging anti-U.S. cooperation with China and turnedback toward greater rapprochement with the United States, even before 9/11. Specifically, Russia abandoned China in their joint

opposition to U.S. missile defense policies. These events, thus, suggest a third possible constraint on the scope of

Chinas strategic partnerships: Most major powers have more interests at stake in their relations with

the United States than with China. Some states may not be willing to jeopardize their ties with the

United States to coordinate with China in an effort, implicit or explicit, to constrain the United States.

20

20


21/26

Planet Debate


China Not Counterbalancing the U.S.China not trying to counterbalance the U.S.

Evan S. Medeiros, RAND Corporation, August 2009, Chinas International Behavior:Opportunity, Activism, and Diversification,http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf, p. 208-9

China does not seek to displace the United States as the global superpower. Chinese leaders do not want China to

be a global power on par with the United Statesa peer competitor. They view their domestic challenges as too great to

assume the burdens associated with such a role, and they recognize that they lack currently the

material resources to be able to project and sustain military and economic power all over the world.

They also fear that playing such a role could deplete much needed resources and might foster a

backlash against China. For Chinese leaders, trying to play such a role would represent a major break from Dengist orthodoxy onforeign affairsa significant but not insurmountable political barrier to a major change in strategy. Such a course correction would likelyonly come about in reaction to a dramatic shift in Chinas external security environmentone that precipitated a complete reassessment

by Chinas top leaders. In addition, if China were seeking to become a global competitor to the United States,

its behavior would look far different than it does, as discussed below.

21

21
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdfhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf


22/26

Planet Debate


U.S.-China War AnswersEconomic interdependence prevents conflict

Susan Shirk, served as deputy assistant secretary for China at the U.S. State Department from 1997

2000.CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 249

China started recycling the huge amount of foreign currency reserves it earned from exportsand foreign investment to buy up U.S. government debt. The primary motive is economicU.S. governmentsecurities are considered the safest place to keep foreign currency holdingsbut the political benefit oflinking the two economies surely has not escaped China's decision makers. The two sides need eachother no was one Chinese writer put it, they have become ec onomic "Siamese twins."" According to one2005 Chinese estimate, China bought U.S. treasury bonds with over perc ent of its massi ve econ omy Chinesecap ita l flo ws to America allowed American consumers to enjoy low interest rates and high levels ofconsumption. Yet reliance on China to keep our economy afloat triggers the anxiety that one day China could

pull the p lug. The day a fter th e Democrat ic Part y won co nt ro l ov er bo th ho uses of Co ngress in No ve mb er2006, the head of C hina's central bank said that the bank in tended to diversify more of its Si trillionreserves into currencies other than dollars. The value of the dollar tumbled as international investors soldtheir dollars."' The timing may have been coincidental, but it was a vi vid remin der that Ameri can

pr os pe ri ty and gl oba l inf lue nc e inc rea s ingly depend on decisions made in Beijing...

22

22


23/26

Planet Debate


Taiwan War Answers

Political barriers block a Chinese invasion of Taiwan


Regarding the option of an amphibious invasion, DOD states furtherthat: The PLA currently is capable ofaccomplishing various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overtmilitary preparations beyond seasonally routine amphibious training, China could launch an invasion of asmall Taiwan-held island such as Pratas or Itu Aba. Such a limited invasion of a lightly defended islandcould demonstrate military capability and political resolve, would achieve tangible territorial gain, andcould be portrayed as showing some measure of restraint. However, such an operation includessignificant--if not prohibitive--political risk as it could galvanize the Taiwan populace and generateinternational opposition.

An invasion of Taiwan would overwhelm Chinas military capabilities


Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and logistics-intensive, and thereforedifficult, military maneuvers. Success depends upon air and sea supremacy in the vicinity of theoperation, rapid buildup of supplies and sustainment on shore, and an uninterrupted flow of supportthereafter. An invasion of Taiwan would strain the capabilities of China's untested armed forces andwould almost certainly invite international intervention. These stresses, combined with the combat attritionof China's forces, the complex tasks of urban warfare and counterinsurgency--assuming a successfullanding and breakout--make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for

China's leaders. Modest targeted investments by Taiwan to harden infrastructure and strengthendefensive capabilities could have measurable effects on decreasing Beijing's ability to achieve itsobjectives.

23

23


24/26

Planet Debate


U.S.-China Arms Control AnswersChina wont engage in arms control with the U.S.

Christopher P. Twomey co-directs the Center for Contemporary Conflict and is an assistant

professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, both at the Naval Postgraduate School,Monterey, California, Arms Control Today, January 2009 - February 2009, p. 17

The Chinese are not currently interested in discussing traditional bilateral arms control agreements for tworeasons: doing so suggests an equating of the contemporary Chinese-U.S. relationship with the Cold Warstandoff between the Soviet Union and the United States and the U.S. arsenal remains much larger thanChina's.

China wont engage in arms control with the U.S.

Christopher P. Twomey co-directs the Center for Contemporary Conflict and is an assistantprofessor in the Department of National Security Affairs, both at the Naval Postgraduate School,

Monterey, California, Arms Control Today, January 2009 - February 2009, p. 17

There is no simple solution for this set of problems. The differences in national interests held by Beijing andWashington are not likely to be materially affected by Barack Obama's inauguration as president. That said,the unilateralist and anti-institutional approach to arms control that characterized the Bush admin-istration islikely to wane. The Chinese are not currently interested in discussing traditional bilateral arms controlagreements for two reasons: doing so suggests an equating of the contemporary Chinese-U.S. relationshipwith the Cold War standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States and the U.S. arsenal remainsmuch larger than China's. Yet, it is wrong to expect such views to hold in perpetuity. Beijing's emphasis onambiguity about its arsenal, which is incompatible with serious ne-gotiations over arms control, is not acultural predisposition toward "strategic deception" any more than was the Soviet Union's early Cold Waremphasis on secrecy. Instead, these are rational strategies when nuclear arsenals are small. Intrusiveverification eventually became conceivable even to hard-line Soviet leaders. Certainly, economic exhaustion

contributed to that change, but so too did fundamental changes in Soviet threat perceptions.4 Although theformer seems unlikely in China in the near term, the latter is something that might be fomented. The furtherdevelopment of those U.S.-Russian arms control discussions will have critical implications for China. Iffollow-on agreements to START and SORT include further quantitative reductions, as is likely, they willagain move the U.S. arsenal toward an important rhetorical threshold that China has used to justify its ownstance on bilateral arms control. This poses risks and opportunities. The opportunity to bring the other nuclearpowers to the table, even informally, as the Russian-U.S. discussions progress would be a useful vehicle toelicit China's interest in serious moves in this area. The risk of enticing China to engage in an arsenal buildupto U.S. levels is not one that should be overstated. At the geostrategic level as well as in operational doctrineas it is understood, China's approach to nuclear strategy has emphasized elements that would be inconsistentwith a large buildup: coun-ter-value rather than counter-force or war-fighting doctrines, a historical to-leranceof much lower arsenal sizes given a perception of the limited utility of nuclear forces, and, explicitly,avoidance of a strategic arms race. The United States can actively reduce these risks further. Deepening

engagement on nuclear and nuclear-related strategic issues would be constructive in this regard. Bilateralconfidence measures between China and the United States could be discussed, particularly in the area ofdeclaratory policy. The Chinese have often asked why the United States is unwilling to offer a no-first-usepledge. A blanket no-first-use pledge might undermine U.S. credibility in other regions. Yet, a pledgenarrowly confined to the Chinese-U.S. arena would seem to have fewer costs. What benefits would theUnited States garner from such a pledge from Beijing? Similarly, would Beijing view posi- tively a definitivestatement that the United States accepts the existence of a Chinese secure second-strike capability? For whatmight the United States hope in return? These questions remain unanswered.

24

24


25/26

Planet Debate


Various Counterplans

CP Transparency measures

Jeffrey Lewis, New America Foundation, Nonproliferation Review, July 2009, p. 197-209

Chinese leaders continue to seek such assurances, as evidenced by the continuing interest in securing a

bilateral no-first-use pledge from the United States. He Yafei, in the 2008 bilateral talks with Rood, againexpressed China's interest in having the United States pledge not to use nuclear weapons first against China.(China sought such an assurance in the 1990s, resulting in the so-called non-targeting agreement signed byPresident Bill Clinton and President Jiang Zemin.) Chinese leaders, in return, might propose additionaltransparency measures to assure the United States that China seeks only a minimal deterrent and will notattempt to move toward numerical parity with the United States as it continues to reduce the number ofoperationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. This would contribute to what Chinese officials havecalled mutual strategic trust. There are those in the United States who would believe U.S. security is bestmaintained by acquiring the ability to negate China's deterrent through technological superiority and todissuade competition through overwhelming numerical advantage. An alternative view, however, is thatkeeping China's modernization within the confines of minimum deterrence and a doctrine of no-first-use ismanifestly in the interest of the United States and requires a political commitment that reflects the simplereality that no U.S. president is likely to attempt a disarming first strike against another nuclear-armed power.

No matter which view one takes, China's possession of the minimum means of reprisaland how thatdeterrent evolvesis now the central issue for the future of both countries' nuclear forces. At best, an effortby Washington to engage China more deeply on disarmament issues will require bureaucracies in bothWashington and Beijing to more thoroughly consider the ramifications for stability of their respectivestrategic force modernizations. At the very least, opening such a dialogue can reduce the possibility ofaccidents, miscalculations, or misunderstandings.

Extensive human authentication prevents unauthorized use

Larry Wortzel, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007, Chinas Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training,

Doctrine, Command, Control, and Campaign Planning,https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB776.pdf

Second Artillery, Hu Jintao spoke to an assemblage of people that included Xiang Shouzhi, first commanderof the organization, and a number of previous leaders. Hu was present in the combined capacity of Presidentof China, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, and Chairman of the Communist Party CMC.96 In

Jiefangjun Bao, articles have referred to the PLAN headquarters as the Navys tongshuaibu, and to theCMC as the tongshuaibu.97 Thus, while it is possible that the reference to a valid firing order means that itcomes from the commander of the Second Artillery, the consensus among American scholars who follow thePLA closely is that in the context of nuclear and missile-firing orders, tongshuaibu refers to the CMC.This is the highest and most centralized level of military leadership in the Chinese Communist Party.98 In thephoto of Hu Jintao that appeared inJiefangjun Bao depicting his 40th Anniversary speech to the leaders ofthe Second Artillery, Hu was wearing a PLA uniform without insignia or rank. Moreover, to confirm that the

tongshuaibu is the CMC, in another account of Hu Jintaos speech published byXinhua NewsService, Hu is quoted as saying The Second Artillery Corps is a Second Artillery command orders arecentralized, encoded and protected, and require human authentication. PLA military writers eschewcompletely automated command and control systems. There is a very strong emphasis on the need for a manin the loop even in modern, information age warfare. One writer specializing in command and control issuesmakes the point that no matter how advanced a computer is used in a command and control system, it willnever substitute for the strength and utility of the human brain.100 The implications of this insistence on aman in the loop for nuclear firing orders is that the PLA will likely reject calls for automated protectiveaction links in its doctrine.

Civilians control Chinese nuclear weapons now

25

25
https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB776.pdfhttps://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB776.pdf


26/26

Planet Debate


Larry Wortzel, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007, Chinas Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training,Doctrine, Command, Control, and Campaign Planning,https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB776.pdf

This is important to follow because the CMC of the Chinese Communist Party ultimately has the finger on

Chinas nuclear trigger, and technologically oriented civilians today, not former leaders of the PLA, controlthe CMC.

China may miscalculate U.S. good will, triggering war


Examining the doctrinal text,Zhanyi Lilun Xuexi Zhinan (A Guide to the Study of CampaignTheory)provided more information on Chinas nuclear doctrine, force deployment, command and control,and survivability measures than has been available in the past. Combining the examination of authoritative

doctrinal text with materials from the Chinese press and those obtained through the Open Source Centerhelped to confirm the authenticity of the doctrinal text and provided supporting evidence for judgments aboutthe nature of Chinas strategic rocket forces, their organization, readiness levels, and their control. Anothercritical factor in the nuclear threat equation faced in the United States is the calculation by the CMC thatChina is able to absorb nuclear strikes with less catastrophic effects that the United States. This judgment is afunction of Chinas historical military culture, geography, and an intentional state-directed policy of civildefense and risk distribution.111 For the United States, this means that Chinese leaders may miscalculateAmerican will a and mistakenly take risky actions.

The decision by Beijing


Internal debate in China over NFU policy Finally, the debate inside China over the viability of its no firstuse policy is real. At present, older veterans of the Foreign Ministry and the PLA insist that the policy stayunchanged. However, younger scholars, soldiers, and diplomats will keep up the pressure to pull back fromthis policy, which requires continued attention and strategic dialogue with Chinas policy community.

26
https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB776.pdfhttps://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB776.pdfhttps://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB776.pdfhttps://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB776.pdfhttps://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB776.pdfhttps://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB776.pdf

china not a threat

Documents