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1PORPHYRYANDIAMBLICHUSONUNIVERSALS

RICCARDO CHIARADONNA

Porphyry and Iamblichus on Universals

and Synonymous Predication*

1. PORPHYRYSVIEWSON GENUSANDTH E PLATONISM OF TH EISAGOGE

In two crucial passages of the Isagoge, Porphyry presents the genus/species relation as a kind of genealogy, the origin of which is situated in thehighest genus :

a) First, the origin of anyones birth was named a genus; and after that, theplurality of people coming from a single origin (for example, from Hercules),demarcating which and separating it from the others we say that the wholeassemblage of Heraclids is a genus. Again, in another sense we call a genus thatunder which a species is ordered, no doubt in virtue of a similarity with theformer case; for such a genus is a sort of origin for the items under it, and itseems also to contain the whole plurality under it1 (Isag ., p. 2, 7-13 Busse).

b) The items before the most special, ascending as far as the most general, aresaid to be genera and species and subaltern genera2 . As Agamemnon is an Atreidand a Pelopid and a Tantalid and, finally, of Zeus. But in the case of genealogies,for the most part they trace back the origin to a single person say to Zeus whereas in the case of genera and species this is not so (Isag., pp. 5, 23-6, 5 Busse).

* I wish to thank Concetta Luna for reading and commenting on a earlier draft o f this study.1 I will make use of Jonathan Barnes translation with a few changes. Cf. J. BARNES, Porphyry.

Isagoge, Translated with an Introduction and Commentary, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2003. TheGreek text at p. 2, 12-13 reads: kai; ga;r ajrchv tiv" ejsti to; toiou'to gevno" tw'n uJf eJauto; kai; dokei'

kai; to; plh'qo" perievcein pa'n to; uJf eJautov. Barnes translation runs as follows : For such agenus is a sort of origin for the items under it, and a plurality is held to contain everything underit . Unfortunately, such a translation is wrong : the subject ofdokei' is not to; plh'qo" (which canhardly be translated as a plurality ), but to; toiou'to gevno"; to; plh'qo" [] pa'n to; uJf eJautov isthe object ofperievcein. The sentence is correctly trans lated by E. W. Warren : and it seemsalso to contain the whole subordinate multitude (E. W. WARREN, Porphyry the Phoenician.

Isagoge, Translation, Introduction and Notes, The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies,Toronto 1975, p. 29) and by A. de Libera and A.-Ph. Segonds: et il semble embrasser toute lamultiplicit qui est sous lui (A. DE LIBERA-A.-PH. S EGONDS, Porphyre. Isagoge, Texte grec et latin,traduction par A. D. L. et A.-PH. S., introduction et notes par A. D. L., Vrin, Paris 1998, p. 2). Also,see Boethius translation: videturque etiam multi tudinem continere omnem quae sub eo est.

2 Barnes suggests that a line might have dropped out of the text after uJpavllhla gevnh at p.

6, 1 Busse. Cf. BARNES, Porphyry. Isagoge cit., p. 116.


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2 RICCARDOCHIARADONNA

There is a slight difference between these texts : while at p. 2, 12 BussePorphyry presents the whole genus as the origin (ajrchv) of the items under

it (tw'n uJf eJauto;), at p. 6, 4 Busse he limits the term origin to the ancestorof the genealogy, i.e. to each of thesupreme genera (the genus substance andeach of the first categories) (seeIsag ., p. 6, 7 Busse). However, this differenceis not highly significant and can easily be explained as a simple nuance in thepresentation: in both passages Porphyry conceives of the relation betweenthe genus and the subordinated items (i.e. the subordinate genera and speciesdown to the a[tomon ei\do") as a kind of genealogy, where the highest genus actsas an origin. The genus substance is thus ananalogon of the genus Heraclids,which takes its name from the ancestor Heracles.

In Metaphysics, D, 28, Aristotle provides a list of the different meanings of

the term genus. The genealogical meaning plays an important role in thisclassification (cf. Metaph., D, 28, 1024a31-36), but to the best of myknowledge neither in Metaphysics, D, 28 nor anywhere else does Aristotleever describe the genus/species relation as a kind of genealogy3 . Rather,Aristotle carefully aims to distinguish the genealogy and the genus species/relation and he conceives of the genus as a kind of matter4 . Whatever the exactmeaning of this theory may be5 , it obviously conflicts with Porphyrysgenealogical analogy: the progenitor of a genealogy is not a sort of materialcause of his offspring. Aristotle points out that genealogies are regularly,though not always, named after the male ancestor, who is a first moving causefor his offspring, rather than after the female, who only provides the matter6 .Porphyry presents the highest genus as the first male ancestor of a genealogy(Zeus, Heracles), whereas Aristotles logico-philosophical genus is auJpokeivmenon for differences; it plays the role of a material cause for thespecies and cannot be regarded as an autonomous entity acting as a movingcause for subordinated items. According to the Porphyrian classification ofprinciples apud SIMPL., In Phys ., 10, 25 ff. Diels = Porph. Fr. 120 Smith,material and moving principles are designated by two different prepositional

3 Cf. R. CHIARADONNA, Sostanza movimento analogia. Plotino critico di Aristotele, Bibliopolis,Neaples 2002, p. 251.

4 Cf. ARIST., Metaph ., D, 6,1016a25-28; D, 28, 1024b6-8; Z, 12, 1038a5-6; I, 8, 1058a23-24.5 On Aristotles theory of genus as matter see now M. Rasheds remarkable discussion inM.

RASHED,Ar istote. De la gnration et la corruption, Texte tabli et traduit, Les Belles Lettres, Paris2005, pp. XCVII ff. The issue was controversial also among ancient commentators : cf. ALE X.APH R., Quaest., II. 28 o{ti mh; hJ u{lh gevno" . The genus as matter analogy, however, was widelyaccepted : cf. BARNES, Porphyry. Isagoge cit., pp. 194-197. On Alexanders views on genus anddifferentia see M. RASHED, ALHQEIA FUSIS. Alexandre dAphrodise entre logique, physique et

cosmologie , De Gruyter, Berlin-New York, forthcoming.6 Cf. ARIST., Metaph., D, 28, 1024a34-36.


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formulas7 : matter is the ejx ou| and the moving efficient principle (to; poiou'n)is the uJf ou |. It is not implausible that a Peripatetic genus might play the role

of an ejx ou|, whereas Porphyrys highest genus in the Isagoge is a uJf ou | for itssubordinated objects. Accordingly, Porphyrys genealogical conception of thegenus/species relation appears un-Aristotelian.

This is not surprising : the fact that at the very beginning of the IsagogePorphyry declares that he will attempt to show how the old masters andespecially the Peripatetics among them treated genera and species (Isag., 1,14-16 Busse), should not imply that Aristotelianism is the sole philosophicalcomponent of the Isagoge8 . The same genealogical conception of the genus/species relation is found in the pre-Porphyrean tradition9 , and was widelyemployed by Neoplatonists, who conceived of the ajf eJnov" relation (i.e. the

relation of dependence upon a single origin) as a derivative structure mirroringthe hierarchy of beings10 . Plotinus opposes the predicative (koino;n kata;pavntwn) and the genealogical (ajf eJnov") genera, and tentatively suggests thatthe ajf eJnov" relation helps explain how prior and posterior substances (i.e.intelligible substance, matter, form and the composite of both) belong to thesame genus (VI 1 [44], 3.1-4)11 .

The ajf eJnov" Neoplatonic genus is a hierarchy encompassing entitieswhich are prior and posterior by nature (e.g. the intelligible substance and thephysical one). In an important passage of his commentary on Aristotles

7 On this passage and its sources see J. MANSFELD , Plato, Pythagoras, Aristotle, the Peripatetics,the Stoics, and Thales and his Followers On Causes (Ps.-Plutarchus Placita I 11 and StobaeusAnthologium I 13), in A. BRANCACCI ed.,Antichi e moderni nella f ilosofia di et imperia le , Atti delcolloquio internazionale, Roma, 21-23 settembre 2000, Bibliopolis, Neaples 2001, pp. 17-68,esp. 52-54.

8 According to P. Hadot theIsagoge is a blending of Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic notions(see P. HADOT, Porphyre et Victorinus, I, tudes Augustiniennes, Paris 1968, pp. 231-232, n. 5).I agree with Hadots general assessment, although specific points, such as the question ofPorphyrys relation to Stoicism, are controversial. Barnes argues for a different interpretationand maintains that many of Porphyrys doctrines in the Isagoge were current logical theoriesshared by school professors ; they did not convey any distinctive philosophical (Platonic,Peripatetic or Stoic) meaning (cf. BARNES, Porphyry. Isagoge cit., pp. 129, 140 etc.). At least in thecase of the genealogical conception of the genus/species relation, Barnes conclusion does notseem correct to me.

9 Cf. CIC ., Top., 31; SEN ., ep . 58, 8 and 12. Cf. J. MANSFELD , Heresiography in Context.Hyppolytus Elenchos as a Source for Greek Philosophy , Brill, Leiden-New York-Kln 1992, p.123. Further references in CHIARADONNA, Sostanza movimento analogia cit., p. 229.

10 See, e.g. , SIMPL., In Cat. , p. 77, 16 ff. Kalbfleisch. Cf. also, in previous tradition, ALCIN.,Didasc ., 163, 19-20 Hermann (use ofajpov).

11 Plotinus, however, does not regard the genealogical notion of genus as an appropriate wayof representing the relation between intelligible and corporeal substances. Cf. CHIARADONNA ,Sostanza movimento analogia cit., pp. 238 ff.


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Physics, Simplicius argues that Aristotle was right in maintaining that motionis not a single genus in the Aristotelian meaning of the word ; motion,

however, is a genus in the Platonic hierarchical sense. This makes Aristotlestheory on the homonymy of motion in PhysicsG and Platos doctrine of motionas one of the five highest genera in the Sophist two compatible alternatives :

Therefore this is one signification of genus that which is divided intospecies which share equally in genus, which Aristotle rejects for change, becausethe many sorts of change differ in degree of change from each other, but thereis another signification of genus by which Plato calls genera of being thosethings which pervade all things in turn (to; dia; pavntwn tw'n ejfexh'" dihvkonta) evenif they are not present equally nor in the same particular way to all in turn. So

it is nothing surprising if Plato calls change a genus according to this significationof genus (S IMPL., In Phys ., p. 405, 10-17 Diels, trans. J. O. Urmson).

According to Simplicius, Aristotle conceives of genera and species aselements in individuals (stoicei'a tw'n ajtovmwn) and not as transcendent causes(aijtiva" ejxh/rhmevna")12 .

It is worth noting that in the Isagoge Porphyry mentions both thegenealogical and the hyletic meaning of the term genus. In the passagesquoted above, Porphyry presents the genus/species relation as a kind ofgenealogy, but at p. 11 he expounds the standard Aristotelian doctrine of

genus as matter :

For in the case of objects which are constituted of matter and form or whichhave a constitution at least analogous to matter and form, just as a statue isconstituted of bronze as matter and its figure as form, so too the common andspecial man is constituted of the genus analogously to matter and of thedifference as shape, and these rational mortal animal taken as a whole arethe man, just as there they are the statue (Isag ., p. 11, 12-17 Busse).

Porphyry does not point to any difference between the two meanings : the

genealogical analogy and that of genus as matter are simply used in differentpassages of the Isagoge and their different meanings are never discussed. Itseems to me that the introductory character of the Isagoge offers astraightforward explanation for this apparently disconcerting fact. At the

12 SIMPL.,In Phys ., p. 405, 21 Diels. Cf. C. LUN A, Simplicius. Commentaire sur les Catgories,Traduction et commentaire sous la direction de I. HADOT, III, Commentaire au premier chapitredes Catgories (p. 21-40, 13 Kalbfleisch), trad. de PH. HOFFMANN (avec la collaboration dI. HADOT,P. HADOT et C. LUNA), commentaire et notes la traduction par C. LUNA, Brill, Leiden-New York-Kbenhavn-Kln 1990, pp. 92-93.


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beginning of theIsagoge Porphyry declares that he will limit his discussion toan introduction and steer clear of any deep (metaphysical) account (Isag ., p.

1, 7-9 Busse). Porphyrys introductory programme has often been understoodas a radical separation of logic from ontology : Porphyry would be presentinglogic as an autonomous subject, independent from ontology13 . As I haveargued elsewhere in detail14 , this interpretation is misleading. It would bewrong to believe that theIsagoge has nothing to do with ontology. The set ofdoctrines Porphyry is presenting in the Isagoge are not bereft of ontologicalsignificance; rather, Porphyry simply avoids discussing this particular aspect,which is too difficult for beginners (ontology then is not absent, but onlylatent). He never claims logic to be an autonomous discipline completelyseparate from ontology; what he argues is that afull account of the doctrines

he is introducing in his logical writings would require in-depth ontologicaldiscussions, which are not suitable for an introductory work (cf. PORPH., InCat., p. 75, 26-29 Busse). PorphyrysIsagoge and commentary on Categories arethus partial, introductory accounts of doctrines, the complete presentation ofwhich is to be found elsewhere. Porphyrys reticence is only due to pedagogicalreasons and does not point to any separation between logic and ontology.

The account of genus in the Isagoge proves this point. While Porphyrybriefly mentions the key elements of his theory of genus, a full developmentof the theory, including the clear distinction between the two meanings ofgenus and the discussion of their respective ontic status, is not to be found inan introductory work such as the Isagoge. This does not imply that thetreatment of genus in the Isagoge bears no relation to such profounddevelopments: in the Isagoge Porphyry mentions two doctrines (thegenealogical conception of genus and the analogy of genus as matter), whichcan only be properly appreciated in a wider ontological framework. The factthat Porphyry refrains from carrying out a more detailed discussion, whichwould be pedagogically inappropriate in the context, does not imply paceBarnes that he is simply describing current logical doctrines with nospecific philosophical connotation. This point requires further clarification.

Does PorphyrysIsagoge contain any Platonic theories ? This question hasoften been raised, but the answers provided are often unsatisfactory. Scholarsassume that Platonism can only be said to be present in Porphyrys discussionof genera and species to the extent that Porphyry describes universals asautonomous entities separate from particulars (i.e. to the extent that Porphyrys

13 Cf. BARNES, Porphyry. Isagoge cit., and S. EBBESEN , Porphyrys Legacy to Logic. AReconstruction , in R. SORABJI ed., Aris totle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and TheirInfluence, Duckworth, London 1990, pp. 141-171.


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genera and species in theIsagoge are conceived of asante rem universals). Onepassage in particular has occasionally been quoted to support this view :

Accidents subsist principally on (ejpi;) individuals, whereas genera and speciesare prior by nature to individual substances (Isag., p. 17, 9-10 Busse).

The words prior by nature (fuvsei provtera) have been interpreted asreferring to the priority of Platonic ideal genera and species. Such a view,however, which is endorsed e.g. by Giuseppe Girgenti15 , can easily be disproved.Elsewhere (In Cat., p. 90, 12 ff. Busse) Porphyry claims that in re universalsare prior to particulars. For instance, should the universal man be removed,Socrates would also be removed, whereas removing Socrates would not do

away with man. A species exists independently of each particular, althougheach species is posterior to the whole extension of the objects under it. Theassumption that universals are prior to each subordinate particular was acommonplace in the Peripatetic tradition16 , and does not entail any Platonictheory ofante rem universals. As Jonathan Barnes aptly observes, Porphyrysassertion of the natural priority of genera and species is not a piece ofPlatonic metaphysics17 .Isag., p.17, 9-10 Busse tells nothing about Platonicideas: Barnes is certainly correct in rejecting the idealistic interpretation.This, however, does not mean that these lines have no Platonic implications.Both Barnes and Girgenti share an over-simplified conception of (neo)Platonicontology. They conceive of (neo)Platonic ideas in terms of hypostatisedanterem universal genera and species. On their view, Platonism is only found inPorphyrysIsagoge to the extent that this work includes a reference toante remPlatonic universals. Things, however, are more complex than that. As amatter of fact, Porphyrys ontology includes both transcendent and immanentforms (cf. Sent. 19 and 42). Porphyrys theory of immanent incorporeal forms,

14 Cf. R. CHIARADONNA, Concetti generali, astrazioni e forme in Porfirio, in C. ERISMANN ed.,Dela logique lontologie. tudes sur la philosophie de Porphyre et son influence durant lAntiquit

tardive et le haut Moyen ge, Vrin, Paris (forthcoming).15 Cf. G. GIRGENTI, Porfir io. Isagoge, Rusconi, Milano 1995, p. 28.16 See ALEX. APHR., Quaest., I 11, p. 24, 11-15 and 19-22 Bruns. There is a close parallelism

between Porphyrys and Alexanders views on in re universals: cf. CHIARADONNA, Concetti generali,astrazioni e forme in Porfirio cit. (with further references); R. SORABJI, The Philosophy of theCommentators, 200-600 AD. A Sourcebook, III, Logic and Metaphysics, Cornell University Press,Ithaca, NY 2005, pp. 130 and 157. On Alexanders theory of universals cf. (among severalcontributions) M. RASHED, Priorit de lei \do"ou du gevno" entre Andronicos et Alexandre. Vestiges

arabes et grecs indits , Arabic Sciences and Philosophy , 14, 2004, pp. 9-63 ; R. SHARPLES,Alexander of Aphrodisias on Universals. Two Problematic Texts , Phronesis, 50, 2005, pp. 43-55.

17 Cf. BARNES, Porphyry. Isagoge cit., p. 272.


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though indebted to Peripatetic doctrines18 , is part of his overall Platonicposition19 , and is crucial to understand his conception of universal genera

and species. Words stand for20

sensible entities (intelligibles are outside thescope of ordinary language)21 and immanent forms provide the ontologicalcorrelate of Porphyrys logical universals. This doctrinal framework is partiallylatent in the Isagoge and in the short commentary on Aristotles Categories,but other non-introductory works, such as the Sentences and the commentaryon Ptolemys Harmonics, give the full logico-physical context of Porphyrysdoctrine of universal genera and species22 . As I see it, then, Isag., p. 17, 9-10Busse provides a cursory reference to Porphyrys doctrine ofin re universals;there is no reason to read transcendent forms into this passage. However,since in re universals are part of Porphyrys Platonic ontology,Isag., p. 17, 9-

10 Busse is neither a-Platonic nor ontologically neutral.Furthermore, it is simply wrong to state that a committed Platonist should

regard universal predicates as transcendent forms. As a matter of fact,Neoplatonic intelligibles are universal in a qualified way23 . In Plotinus, e. g.,intelligible forms are parts of a perfectly unified whole where universalityand particularity are fully interpenetrated (Plotinus nou'" is an auto-reflexiveplurality aptly grasped by a self-validating intellectual intuition)24 . It is worthnoting that the difference between Neoplatonic intelligible substances andtheir corporeal images is not merely the difference between universal andparticular entities : the distinction between transcendent forms and sensiblesubstances lies rather in their respective ontological degree and causalpower. Universality and particularity exist both in the intelligible and in thephysical world, but their mutual relation varies : intelligible universals containtheir particularising differences in a perfectly unified form, whereas physical

18 See above, n. 16.19 On Porphyrys thesis that Aristot le essentially agrees with Plato, see now G. KARAMANOLIS,

Plato and Aristotle in Agreement ? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry, ClarendonPress, Oxford 2006, pp. 243-330.

20 Clearly, Porphyrys notion of meaning implies no distinction between meaning andreference. Cf. A. C. LLOYD, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1990, p. 48.

21 PORPH., In Cat., p. 91, 7-12; p. 91, 19-27 Busse.22 More details in CHIARADONNA, Concetti generali, astrazioni e forme in Porfirio cit., ID., Porphyrys

Views on the Immanent Incorporeals, in G. KARAMANOLIS-A. SHEPPARD eds., Studies in Porphyry,Institute of Classical Studies, London, forthcoming ; see also my study quoted above, n. 14.

23 Cf. SORABJI , The Philosophy of the Commenta tors, 200-600 AD. A Sourcebook, III,Logic andMetaphysics cit., pp. 129-130.

24 More details in R. CHIARADONNA, Plotino e la teoria degli universali (Enn. VI 3 [44], 9), i nV. CELLUPRICA-C. DANCONA eds., con la collaborazione di R. C HIARADONNA, Ar is to te le e i suoi

es eget i neoplatonic i. Logica e ontolog ia ne ll e int erpretaz ioni gr eche e ara be , Bibliopolis, Neaples2004, pp. 1-35.


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in re universals are somehow split among their particular instantiations25 ,and post rem universals are abstractions of the immanent forms.

The notion ofante rem universals requires further scrutiny. Transcendentforms can certainly be presented as universals26 , but the notion of universalas such does mostly apply topost rem abstractions and does not in itselfconveythe ontological priority which characterises intelligibles. Simplicius excursuson the three universals is particularly clear on this point. Simplicius writes :

Perhaps one should take common item (koinovn) in three ways, the firsttranscending the individuals and being the cause of the common item in them invirtue of its single nature, as it is also the cause of the difference in virtue of its pre-encompassing many species. [] The second common item is

the one that the different species are endowed with by their common cause andwhich resides in them, like the one in each animal. The third is the commonfeature established in our thoughts by means of abstraction, which is later-bornand most of all admits the notion of the non-differentiated and commonfeature (S IMPL., In Cat., pp. 82,35-83,10 Kalbfleisch, trans. F. A. J. de Haas).

While all of the notions mentioned above (logical interpenetration,intellectual intuition, degrees of being, incorporeal causal power) haveacquired a bad name among contemporary (esp. analytical) philosophers,they are central to any understanding of later Platonism in its own terms. It

would be wrong, therefore, to identify Porphyrys Platonism with the doctrineaccording to which genera and species are self-subsistent universal entitiesindependent of particulars and prior to them. It is worth noting here that inhis short commentary on the Categories Porphyry clearly regards 1) therelation of particular sensible substancesversus universal genera and speciesand 2) the relation of particular sensible substancesversus intelligible realitiesas two different and separate problems27 . Intelligible substances are not (ornot simply) self-subsistent universal concepts.

To sum up: some scholars argue in favour of the presence of Platonistnotions in Porphyrys Isagoge while others reject the idea. Both views share

a common assumption, i.e. that intelligibles are universal hypostatisedconcepts and that Platonism can only be said to be present in PorphyrysIsagoge if the work contains explicit references to ante rem universals. This

25 Cf. PORPH., Sent. 22, p. 13, 14-16 Lamberz : .. in the universal intellect even particularbeings are found in a universal mode, whereas in the particular intellect even universals arefound in a particular mode (trans. J. Dillon).

26 Cf. K. KREMER, Der Metaphysikbegrif f in den Aris toteles-Kommentaren der Ammonius-Schule, Aschendoffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Mnster Westf. 1961, pp. 46 ff. and passim .

27 Cf. PORPH., In Cat., p. 91, 5-12 and p. 91, 23-27.


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assumption, however, is wrong, and Platonism is rather to be found in theIsagoge in the partial form we would expect to find in an introductory work.

What I have argued so far is that there are two ways in which Platonismemerges in theIsagoge. On the one hand, the doctrine of universal genera andspecies points to Porphyrys physical ontology, which is part of his broaderPlatonic conception of being ; on the other, in the Isagoge Porphyry brieflydescribes genus in terms of an ajf eJnov" relation, and the full significance ofthis theory can only be appreciated in the wider context of the Platonisthierarchy of beings. I am not suggesting we should regard the above quotedpassages on genus as a short account of the Neoplatonic hierarchy of beings28 ;nor do I intend to present genus in the Isagoge as a metaphysical causativeprinciple of the species. What I suggest is that Porphyrys remarks about the

genealogical meaning of the genus/species relation represent an initial,partial and introductory account of a doctrine which can only be fullyappreciated in the wider framework of the Platonic hierarchy of beings.

Since the Isagoge is not a metaphysical treatise, it does not discuss themetaphysical relevance of the genealogical meaning of genus. In this workPorphyry mentions both the geneaological analogy (metaphysical meaning ofgenus) and that of genus as matter (physical meaning) without elaborating ontheir ontological basis. Simplicius commentary on the Physics provides anidea of what Porphyrys discussion of the different meanings of genus mighthave appeared like in a different context, where the ontological significanceof the doctrines presented in the Isagoge would have been clarified.

2. PORPHYRYAND IAMBLICHUSON SYNONYMOUSPREDICATION

The first part of this study leads to the following conclusions: 1) Porphyrysuniversal genera and species are not Platonic intelligibles ; 2) Platonism inPorphyrys logical writings takes the form of an indirect and partial allusionto doctrines (the theory of immanent bodiless entities and the doctrine of thehierarchy of beings), the complete significance of which only emerges in a

wider context. Two fragments of Porphyrys large commentary on the Categoriesapparently contradict this interpretation, and seem explicitly to refer toPlatonic intelligibles in their account of substantial predication. Porphyryasserts that subject and predicate in synonymous de subiecto predicationdenote two different items, the ajkatavtakton and the katatetagmevnon :

a) Porphyry says that the concept (ejpivnoia) of animal is twofold: one is of thecoordinated (hJ me ;n tou ' katatetagme vnou) animal, and the other of the

28Contra KREMER, Der Metaphysikbegrif fcit., pp. 37 and 40.


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uncoordinated (hJ de ; tou' ajkatata vktou). Thus, the uncoordinated is predicatedof the coordinated, and thereby it is different (S IMPL., In Cat., p. 53, 6-9Kalbfleisch = Porph. Fr. 56 Smith, trans. M. Chase).

b) that which is said of a subject is not said in the same way as that whichis in a subject, but as that which is not co-ordinated is predicated of that whichis (wJ" to; ajkatavtakton tou' katatetagmevnou kathgorei'tai). For to call a particularhuman being a human being is not different from calling Socrates Socrates. Ina way then it is said about itself, and it will not be predicated of something elsenor will it be in something else. In this way Porphyry too resolves the aporia,as well as Iamblichus, who follows Porphyry to the very words (SIMPL.,In Cat .,p. 79, 24-30 Kalbfleisch = Porph. Fr. 59 Smith, trans. F. A. J. de Haas)

The word ajkatavtakton is sometimes (though not always) used by laterPlatonists to denote the Platonic ante rem form29 . Pierre Hadot assumed thatajkatavtakton has the same meaning in Porphyrys account of synonymouspredication. Substantial predication would then express the metaphysicalrelation of participation between sensible objects and their transcendentforms : Le passage de lincoordonn au cordonn correspond uneconcrtisation et une particularisation: le genre animal par exempledevient sensible et visible en devenant tel animal raisonnable, tel homme30 .

Hadots interpretation, authoritative as it may be, does not convince me.

In his short commentary on the Categories Porphyry conceives of the universalsynonymous predicate as a post rem notion:

You must recognise that individual substance does not mean just one of theparticulars, but rather all of the particular men, from whom we conceive the manthat is predicated in common, and all the particular animals, through which wethink the animal that is predicated in common. These are the cause of the being ofthe common predicates (PORPH.,In Cat., p. 90, 31-91, 1, Busse trans. S. K. Strange).

I fail to see how Porphyry could hold such a view in his short commentary,only to argue in favour of a completely different doctrine in his largecommentary on the Categories (where universal predicates equal intelligibleforms). One might object that the short commentary provides a logical

29 Cf. SYRIAN., In Metaph ., p. 98, 35 Kroll ; PROCL., In Parm ., II, p. 727, 19 Cousin ; etc. Cf.LLOYD, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism cit., p. 67; R. CHIARADONNA, Essence et prdicat ion chezPorphyre et Plotin, Revue des Sciences philosophiques et thologiques , 82, 1998, pp. 577-606,esp. pp. 591-595 (with further references and a discussion of the previous literature).

30 P. HADOT,La mtaphysique de Porphyre , in Porphyre, [casa ed.], Vanduvres-Genve 1966(Entretiens sur lAntiquit classique, XII), pp. 127-163, repr. in P. H ADOT, Plotin, Porphyre.

tudes noplatoniciennes, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1999, pp. 317-353, esp. pp. 340-341.


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account of predication, whereas the larger commentary offers an ontologicalinterpretation of it. However, I do not find this a persuasive argument. Here

it is not correct to oppose a logical and an ontological account of synonymouspredication; rather two different ontological accounts can be opposed: onereferring to transcendent principles and the other referring to the ontology ofthe physical world (immanent forms and their abstractions). As noted above,Porphyrys account of predication in the short Categories commentary is notmerely logic, as it entails a precise ontological doctrine fully expounded inPorphyrys Sentences and in his commentary on Ptolemys Harmonics. Theontological basis of Porphyrys view on universals is provided by the doctrineof immanent incorporeal forms (Sent. 19 and 42) : immanent bodiless entities31

are not corporeal by nature, although their actual existence is always linked

to a concrete body. According to Porphyrys conception of the physical world,immanent forms are embodied (swmatou'tai) when they are transferred intomatter (In Ptol. Harm ., p. 14, 20 Dring). The soul takes the form and restoresit to its bodiless status via the process of abstraction (In Ptol. Harm., p. 14, 2-3 and 20-21 Dring). Consequently, abstraction is not merely a logicalconstruct, but the act of tearing(ajpospa'n: cf.In Ptol. Harm., p. 13, 22 Dring)what is immanent from matter : form is de-materialised and stored in thesoul32 . As I have argued elsewhere33 , parallels between the short commentaryon the Categories, the Sentences and the commentary on PtolemysHarmonicsstrongly suggest that Porphyry identified the universal synonymous predicateswith the abstractions of immanent incorporeal forms. For instance, if oneclaims that Socrates is a man, the universal man an abstraction of theimmanent form man is being predicated of one of its particularinstantiations, i.e. the form man in Socrates34 .

31 See the list in PORPH., Sent., 42, p. 53, 6-11 Lamberz.32 Cf. I. MUELLER, Aris totle s doctrine of abstraction in the Commentators , in SORABJI ed.,

Ar istotle Transformed cit., pp. 463-480 esp. 479.33 See CHIARADONNA , Concetti generali, astrazioni e forme in Porfirio cit., and Porphyrys Views

on the Immanent Incorporeals cit.34 The katatetagmevnon is the immanent common nature residing in things, which is distributed

among its instances (cf. SORABJI, The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200-600 AD. A Sourcebook,III,Logic and Metaphysics cit., p 133). See also the related (probably Iamblichean) notion ofto ;ajtomwqe;n ei\do" ([SIMPL.] ,In De An ., p. 217, 36 Hayduck): cf. M. RASHED, Un texte proto-byzantin

sur les universaux et la trini t , forthcoming). I cannot discuss here the following questions whichdeserve further scrutiny : 1) What is the status of the katatetagmevnon in Porphyrys hierarchy ofbeings (the katatetagmevnon man is certainly not the individual intelligible soul, but it should beconceived of as a derivation of it : on Porphyrys distinction between transcendent andembodied soul cf. KARAMANOLIS , Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? cit., pp. 287 ff.) ? 2) How canstatements about non-existent objects be accounted for (for a tentative hypothesis cf. CHIARADONNA,

Essence et prdicat ion chez Porphyre et Plotin cit., p. 595 n. 90)? 3) What is the logical and

ontological structure of false predications ?


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Iamblichus noera; qewriva certainly entailed a thorough Neoplatonisationof Aristotles Categories37, and the theory of intelligible, transcendent beings

played a decisive role in Iamblichus exegesis. Iamblichus commentary nodoubt included several passages on metaphysics38 . Such an attitude conflictswith the physical foundation of Porphyrys conception of categories.Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to get a precise idea of what exegeticalmethods Porphyry and Iamblichus employed in their large commentaries onthe Categories, since both these works are now lost. Simplicius commentary,however, makes it possible to get an approximate idea of what Porphyrys andIamblichus different approaches might have been. Simplicius repeatedlypoints out that Iamblichuss work was very close to Porphyrys (SIMPL., InCat., pp. 2, 11; 79, 29-30). It seems plausible, then, to infer that Iamblichus

began with Porphyrys interpretation and presented his noera; qewriva as itsdevelopment. I believe the first of the two passages on the ajkatavtakton/katatetagmevnon distinction quoted above provides a good example of thisattitude. Just after the reference to Porphyry, Simplicius adds:

Iamblichus, however, says that it is not genera which are predicated ofsubstrata, but other things in virtue of these (e{tera dia; tau'ta). For when we say,Socrates is a man, we are not saying he is the generic (geniko;n) Man, but ratherthat he participates in the generic Man, just as saying that the vine is white isthe same as saying it bears white grapes, since the vine is so called by reference

to its fruit. Aristotle made clear distinctions with regard to these matters in theMetaphysics . Here, however, he has used meanings in a more common way, aswe also do when we say that definitions are from genus and differentiae : herewe do not take genus in the proper sense, but are using it instead of case (ajnti;th'" ptwvsew"), which is explained by participation in the generic (SIMPL., InCat., p. 53, 9-18 = fr. 16 Larsen, trans. M. Chase slightly modified).

This passage is extremely obscure39 . As I previously argued, Porphyryconceives of the substantial genus of Aristotles Categories as an in re physical

37 Cf. J. M. DILLON,IamblichusNoera; Qewrivaof Aristotles Categories, Syllecta Classica,8, 1997, pp. 65-77 ; R. L. CARDULLO, La Noera; Qewriva di Giamblico come chiave di lettura delleCategorie di Aristotele: alcuni esempi, Syllecta Classica, 8, 1997, pp. 79-94.

38 Cf. P. HADOT, Lharmonie des philosophies de Plot in et dAristote selon Porphyre dans lecommentaire de Dexippe sur les Catgories, in Plotino e il Neoplatonismo in Oriente e inOccidente, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Roma 1974, pp. 31-47, repr. in HADOT, Plotin,Porphyre. tudes noplatoniciennes cit., pp. 355-382.

39 Cf. A.C. LLOYD, Neop la toni st s Ac coun t of Pr ed ic at ion and Me dieva l Log ic , in LeNoplatonisme, Actes du Congrs international sur la Noplatonisme, Royaumont, 9-13 juin1969, CNRS, Paris 1971, pp. 357-364, esp. p. 359 and C. LUN A, Simplicius. Commentaire sur lesCatgories dAristote. Chapitres 2-4, Traduction par PH. HOFFMANN avec la collaboration de I.

HADOT et P. HADOT, commentaire par C. LUN A, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2001, pp. 429-430.


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form, the actual existence of which is always linked to a concrete body. The inre form is separated from matter by the soul, and the synonymous predicate of

Aristotles Categories is the universal abstraction of the immanent form. Porphyrycertainly regarded immanent forms and incorporeals as derivative beings, theexistence of which ultimately depends on transcendent realities ; the referenceto intelligible beings, however, remains outside the scope of predication andcategories. The real correlate of universal genera and species is provided byphysical incorporeals and not by transcendent forms. Apparently, Iamblichustook over Porphyrys formulas (SIMPL., In Cat., p. 79, 29-30 Kalbfleisch),starting from the ajkatavtakton/katatetagmevnon distinction, and further developedPorphyrys speculations in a different direction. While Porphyrys genus is aphysical form, Iamblichus points out that the genus is a transcendentante rem

form and that physical individuals participate in it (SIMPL.,In Cat., p. 53, 10-12Kalbfleisch). For Iamblichus, the generic man is not the embodied form ofman, but the transcendent form. Such an interpretation gives rise to a crucialexegetical problem : how can the generic/intelligible form of Man be asynonymous predicate of its corporeal instantiations ? As I understand it,Iamblichus solution presents the synonymous predication as an improper wayof expressing the participation of corporeal beings in their transcendent form.Unsurprisingly enough, Iamblichus insists that (intelligible) genera are notproperly predicated of physical individuals : they belong to different levels inthe hierarchy of being and it cannot be maintained that Socrates, for instance,is the intelligible form of Man. Rather, other things (e{tera) are predicatedin virtue of the genera (dia; tau'ta: SIMPL., In Cat., p. 53, 10 Kalbfleisch)40 .Obscure as it may be, this formula suggests that essential predication properlyrefers to the participation of corporeal beings in their intelligible forms, andnot to the forms themselves (SIMPL.,In Cat., p. 53, 17-18 Kalbfleisch). Iamblichuswould then be arguing that the genus (i.e. the intelligible) is not a properpredicate of the corporeal individual : in essential predication other things(i.e. the sensible participations of the intelligible forms) are predicated of theindividuals in virtue of the transcendent genera. Socrates is man is thus an

40 According to Iamblichus, other things (i.e. the participations of the genera) are predicatedof their subjects in virtue of the genera (dia; tau'ta : tau'ta is anaphoric), since transcendentgenera provide the basis (diav) for this kind of predication (cf. the vine is white example in thefollowing lines), though they are not properly predicated in themselves. As I understand it, thedia; tau'ta refers to the peculiar function of the transcendent genus in kata; ajnaforavn predication.I am inclined to disagree with C. Lunas interpretation of this passage. According to L UN A,Simplicius. Commentaire sur les Catgories dAristote. Chapitres 2-4 cit., p. 430, n. 1, dia; tau'tadoes not refer to gevnh but means pour les raisons que voici , car il est absurde de dire quedes choses autres que les genres (e{tera) sont prdiques des sujets laide des genres ou travers les genres ou par lintermdiaire des genres.


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inadequate way of expressing the fact that the corporeal Socrates participatesin the transcendent form of Man.

Porphyrys and Iamblichus accounts of predications are based on differentontological foundations. Porphyrys predication mirrors the physical relationbetween a sensible particular and its immanent bodiless form ; Iamblichuspredication (improperly) mirrors the metaphysical relation between a sensibleparticular and its ante rem form. Hence, in his exegesis Iamblichus refers tothe notion of ontological derivation. Iamblichus compares the synonymouspredication Socrates is Man to the formula the vine is white (SIMPL.,In Cat.,p. 53, 12-14 Kalbfleisch). Both are improper ways of expressing a conditionwhich involves a reference to something else not explicitly mentioned in thepredicative statement: Socrates is man means that Socrates participates in

the form of man; the vine is white means that the vine bears white grapes.Accordingly, Socrates is called man in virtue of the reference to hisante remform; the vine is called white in virtue of the reference to its fruit.

The vine is white example was not new. It also occurs in the pseudo-Galenic treatise De qualitatibus incorporeis (ll. 306-317 Giusta). In his anti-Stoic polemics, the author of this treatise 41 opposes two ways of treatingcorporeal affections (pavqh). The Stoics mistakenly conceive of affections asbodies. While this view should be rejected, affections may correctly be termedbodies via reference to something else : they are not bodies in their ownnature, but they always occurin bodies (there is no affection if there are noagent and patient bodies). The vine is white example instantiates the methodof naming in accordance with reference-back (kata; ajnafora;n) (ll. 308-309Giusta, trans. I. Kupreeva)42 . The vine is not white in itself, but is called whitein virtue of its white grapes43 . Iamblichus certainly took this textbook examplefrom the previous tradition and employed it in his own account of predication.The predication Socrates is man is thus analogous to the predication theaffection is a body : in both cases, the predicate is not a proper attribute of thesubject, but it refers to something else (the bodies that act or are acted uponand the ante rem form) which provides the basis for the predication.

Ingenious as it may be, Iamblichus interpretation clearly has no textualbasis in Aristotles Categories44 . This is the chief problem the second part of

41 The treatise is usually dated to the second century AD, see I. KUPREEVA, Qualities andBodies : Alexander against the Stoics, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 25, 2003, pp. 297-344, esp. p. 304.

42 Cf. IAMBL.apud SIMPL., In Cat., p. 53, 13-14 Kalbfleisch : kata; ajnafora;n th;n ejpi; to;n karpo;nou{tw" auJth'" kaloumevnh".

43 For a detailed discussion of this text cf. KUPREEVA, Qualities and Bodies: Alexander againstthe Stoics cit., pp. 318-319.

44 According to LLOYD, Neoplatonists Account o f Predicat ion and Medieval Logic cit., p. 359

Iamblichus position is totally non-Aristotelian.


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the passage quoted above is faced with. Iamblichus briefly refers to theMetaphysics in order to find clear distinctions concerning these matters (S IMPL.,

In Cat., p. 53, 14-15 Kalbfleisch). The general purpose of Iamblichus referenceis clear: in his Metaphysics Aristotle provides a full treatment of his ontologicaltheory of substance and predication which involves a detailed discussion of thenotion of form. I must admit, however, that I am unable to provide an exactparallel for Iamblichus developments. The final lines of the passage refer backto the Categories (SIMPL.,In Cat., p. 53, 15 ff. Kalbfleisch). Following conventionalexegetical methods, Iamblichus emphasises the introductory character of thetreatise, which explains why Aristotle presents the generic man as a properpredicate of the sensible particulars. Aristotle does not discuss the ontologicalbasis of this doctrine in depth, nor does he make it clear that the generic man

is not properly predicated of its sensible instantiations.Iamblichus closing remark deserves close scrutiny. Iamblichus significantly

employs the notion ofptw'si": when, in his introductory discussions, Aristotlepresents the genus as a predicate, he improperly uses the genus instead of itscase (SIMPL.,In Cat., p. 53, 13 Kalbfleisch). I am inclined to believe that ptw'si"here should be read in its Aristotelian sense, i.e. as a derivative flexion(suchas grammatical or courageous) which is paronymous to the substantive formand derives from it (grammatical and courageous are both adjectival formswhich derive from grammar and courage respectively)45 . The philosophicalsignificance of Aristotles paronymy is still an open question: does the linguisticderivation of the ptw'si" also express an ontological relation of dependence ?Whatever the original Aristotelian meaning of this doctrine46 , it is well knownthat later Platonists used paronymy to describe the derivation of lower realitiesfrom their principles47 . Iamblichus reference to the ptw'si" broadly agrees withthis Neoplatonist conception : he points out that Aristotle improperly uses thegenus instead of the ptw'si", where this notion refers to to the participation ofphysical things in their ante rem form.

Iamblichus exegesis bears remarkable consequences. Aristotle sharplydistinguishes essential predication from paronymous predication (Top., II, 2,

109b4-12 ; 111)48

: substantial predicates are synonymous and are notpredicated of their subject in the paronymous form, whereas non-substantialpredicates need to be declined in order to be attributed to substances. It

45 Cf. ARIST., Cat., 1, 1a12-15.46 Cf. K. OEHLER, Ar is to te les. Kategori en , bersetzt und erlutert, Akademie, Berlin 1997,

pp. 198 ff.47 Cf. HADOT, Porphyre et Victorinus, I cit., pp. 361-363.48 Cf. J. VUILLEMIN, De la logique la thologie. Cinq tudes sur Aristote , Flammarion, Paris

1967, p. 73 : Aristote ne donne jamais dexemple de paronymes tirs de substances .


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cannot be said that Socrates is courage : the paronymous form Socrates iscourageous is required. Instead, it would be correct to claim that Socrates is

man. According to Iamblichus, however, this is not the case, and thepredication Socrates is man is as improper as Socrates is courage. Manimproperly occurs in the predication instead of its ptw'si": it is tempting tosuppose that Iamblichus is referring here to an adjectival construction likehuman. Such a paronymous form would correctly refer to the participationof Socrates in its transcendent form.

Iamblichus, then, presents the synonymous predication Socrates is manas an improper way of asserting that Socrates is human, i.e. that Socratesparticipates in the intelligible form of man. This exegesis blurs Aristotlesdistinction between essential synonymous and accidental paronymous

predication and gives rise to several problems. For instance, it would beinteresting to know whether, and in what way, Iamblichus distinguished thestatus of the paronymous predicates human and courageous with respect tothe subject Socrates. Difficulties such as these, however, cannot be avoidedif Aristotles theory of predication is used (as is the case in Iamblichus noera;qewriva) to express the Platonic relation of participation.

3. CONCLUSIONS

Porphyrys interpretation of Aristotles theories of genus and substantialpredication is based on two related assumptions : 1) that a clear separationexists between logic and metaphysics (= doctrine of transcendent realities) ;2) that there is a close relation between logic and physics. Since Porphyrysphysics is part of his ontology, logic and ontology (i.e. the logic and theontology of the physical world) stand in close relation with each other.Porphyry only makes very partial references to metaphysics in his logicalworks. What I have argued is that Porphyrys conception of genus in theIsagogereflects the Platonic theory of the hierarchy of beings, since Porphyry presentshis genus as a ajf eJnov" hierarchical relation. This, on the other hand, does not

imply that Porphyrys treatment of genus in the Isagoge refers to transcendentante rem principles. Porphyry carefully introduces a doctrine in theIsagoge, thecomplete significance of which emerges in adifferent context: the Porphyreantree is thus a mere analogon of the Platonic hierarchy of beings.

The presence of physical doctrines is far more essential to Porphyrysviews of universals and predication. Physical enti ties such as bodi lessimmanent forms provide real correlates for Porphyrys universal predicates :Aristotles substantial predication mirrors the relation between a particularand its immanent form. Physical forms are not outside the scope of logic ;rather, they provide the real foundation for Porphyrys views on predication.


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Such a foundation is presented in a introductory way in Porphyrys logicalwritings, and is only made explicit in his more systematic works.

Iamblichus attitude is different in that his Platonising of Aristotles logicis more direct and pervasive. Consequently, Iamblichus offers a Platonisingreading of the Aristotelian theory of substantial predication which refers toante rem genera and to the metaphysical relation of participation. Iamblichusis well aware that anante rem form cannot be a universal synonymous predicateof its particular instantiations, and he conceives of substantial predication asa paronymous relation. Neither Porphyry nor Iamblichus believe that an anterem form can be predicated synonymously of corporeal individuals.

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