chiaradonna universals ancient philosophy introduction-libre

8/10/2019 Chiaradonna Universals Ancient Philosophy Introduction-libre

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SEMINARI

E CONVEGNI

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Universals inAncient Philosophy

edited byRiccardo ChiaradonnaGabriele Galluzzo


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Scuola Normale Superiore Pisa

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Table of contents

Introduction

R C, G G

Universals before Universals: Some Remarks on Platoin His ContextM B

Platos Conception of the Forms: Some RemarksF A

Platos Five Worlds Hypothesis (Ti. cd),Mathematics and UniversalsM R

Plato and the One-over-Many PrincipleD S

Universals, Particulars and Aristotles Criticism of Platos FormsL M. C

Universals in Aristotles Logical WorksM M

Universals in AristotlesMetaphysicsG G

Epicureans and Stoics on UniversalsA B

Alexander, Boethus and the Other Peripatetics: The Theory ofUniversals in the Aristotelian CommentatorsR C


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One of a Kind: Plotinus and Porphyry on Unique Instantiation

P A Universals, Education, and Philosophical Methodologyin Later NeoplatonismM G

Universals in Ancient MedicineR C

Universals in the Greek Church FathersJ Z

Bibliography

Index locorum

Index of names


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Introduction

I. Although the so-called problem of universals may certainly be

regarded as one of the most important and enduring in the wholehistory of philosophy, there is still no consensus as to what exactlythe problem consists in and hence as to what form its solution shouldtake. It is sometimes maintained, for instance, that there is no such athing as theproblem of universals: what we are used to calling theproblem of universals is actually a bundle of different and yet re-lated issues, which are rather differently articulated and analysed indifferent historical contexts. is possibly mistaken impression stems

from the undeniable fact that the problem embraces a large number ofphilosophical areas, ranging from metaphysics to semantics and epis-temology. According to one influential tradition, for instance, whichreached its peak in early modern philosophy but may be traced backat least as far as Boethius and Porphyry, the question of universalityconcerns the nature of our general concepts. Agreed, we all possessgeneral concepts, such as the concept of a human being or of a whitething, concepts, in other words, that indifferently represent a plurality

of particular things. But do we also need to posit in reality univer-sal entities corresponding to our general concepts? Or is universalityjust the product of our conceptual apparatus, of our natural capac-ity to generalize over a plurality of particular things? Realists tend totake the first line, while nominalists deny that any special entities areneeded to account for our cognition of particular things and insistthat generality is just the product of our conceptual apparatus. It iscertainly this epistemological debate that John Locke wished to close

out by famously remarking: General and universal are creatures ofthe understanding, and belong not to the real existence of things []ideas are general when they are set up as the representatives of manyparticular things: but universality belongs not to things themselves1.

L, EHU, III...


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2 Riccardo Chiaradonna, Gabriele Galluzo

In the Middle Ages, when the problem of universals was prominent

in the philosophical agenda, the epistemological side of the issue be-came inextricably linked with a series of subtle semantic questions.Many medieval realists, for instance, firmly believed that language isa safe road to reality. In order to make their point, they pointed to thephenomenon of general reference. On their view, general terms, suchas human being or white, primarily signify the common naturesor universal properties that a certain class of particulars share, andcan only derivatively be made to stand for the particulars that possess

these natures and properties. us, it is language itself that shows theexistence of universal entities in reality. Medieval nominalists fierce-ly reacted to this strategy by insisting that general terms always andinvariably signify particular things and so that the phenomenon ofgeneral reference can be accounted for without positing any universalentities in reality, just as the phenomenon of general representationcan be accounted for without positing special entities correspondingto our general concepts2.

On a widespread view, however, the problem of universals is firstof all an ontological and metaphysical issue, even though it may haveand in fact does have important connections with a series of crucialepistemological and semantic issues. According to this perspective,the problem of universals concerns how many categories of things weshould introduce in our ontology: are there only particular things inthe world? Or do we need to include in our ontology universal entitiesas well, i.e. entities that are shared or shareable by many particulars?Moreover, if universal entities exist, the question immediately arises

as to their metaphysical status: do they belong to the same, concreterealm as particular things or are they rather abstract entities, that isentities existing outside the spatiotemporal boundaries we all live in? Itis a distinctive feature of the contemporary debate on universals to putemphasis on the ontological and metaphysical side of the question3.Contemporary philosophers are not unaware of the far-reaching rami-fications of the controversy over universals. Arguments for the exis-tence of universals that centre on semantics or cognition are popular

For the connection between semantic debates in the Middle Ages and the problem

of universals, see K ; K . For an introduction to the problem of universals in contemporary metaphysics,

see A a; A ; L a; L . See also O

.


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3 Introduction

in contemporary philosophy, as are nominalist accounts that explain

the phenomena of general reference and general representation with-out introducing universal entities in the ontology. It may be argued,however, that, although epistemological and semantic considerationsmay certainly play a crucial role in solving the problem of universals,the problem itself remains, at the bottom, an ontological and meta-physical issue. e way language and cognition work may be taken asevidence in favour of or against the existence of universal entities, butwhat we are interested in is ultimately whether or not universals existand, if they do, what they are like.

It must be observed, for another thing, that language and cognitionare not the only areas that are appealed to in the solution of the prob-lem of universals. e ontological and metaphysical side of the prob-lem, for instance, revolves around the issue of the so-called attributeagreement. We commonly observe that things resemble each other inmany different ways and so agree in their attribute or properties: thereare many red things around, as well as many human beings and manycows. Attribute agreement is an undeniable fact about the world. But

how to interpret it? Realists insist that the phenomenon of attributeagreement is in need of an explanation and further maintain that suchan explanation can be provided only if we introduce universal entitiesin our ontology. All red things are red, and all human beings are hu-man beings, because there is something, the property rednessand thekind human being, respectively, that they literally have in common. esense in which different particulars have some property in common orbelong to the same natural kind may differ depending on the form of

realism one chooses to endorse. All forms of realism, however, share acommon strategy. e similarity among particular things is ultimatelygrounded in some form of identity: things resemble each other and soagree in their attributes because there is something they have in com-mon. It is precisely this assumption that nominalists call into question.For a nominalist, the phenomenon of attribute agreement calls for noexplanation. It is simply a fact about the world that things resembleeach other and there is not much more to say: similarity is primitive

and not grounded in some form of identity. In the case of nominalistsas well, philosophers may be at variance about how exactly the nomi-nalist intuition should be fleshed out. For some nominalists, there areno universal properties simply because there are no properties, butonly particular objects. For others, by contrast, properties do exist, butthey are as particular as the objects of which they are the properties.Both brands of nominalism, however, share the common view that the


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phenomenon of attribute agreement can be accounted for by having

recourse to a one-category ontology, in which only particulars exist.Even though the multifaceted character of the problem of univer-sals should not be underestimated, there is something to be said infavour of the view that it is first of all an ontological and metaphysicalissue, which has important consequences for our semantics and epis-temology as well. At the end of the day, what distinguishes realists andnominalists is that the former think there are more things in heavenand earth than we usually dream of, while the latter are irresistibly at-

tracted by solitary and desert landscapes

4

.

II. e present volume collects thirteen papers on the problem ofuniversals in ancient philosophy, from the Presocratics to Neopla-tonism. e volume has two main objectives. On the one hand, wewish to highlight the contribution of ancient thought to the philo-sophical problem of universals by reconstructing the different strate-gies endorsed in Antiquity to deal with the problem, both in the real-ist and in the nominalist camp. On the other hand, our objective isto reconstruct the specific conceptual and historical context in whichthe debate over the nature of universals unfolded in Antiquity. To thisaim, we have aimed at some form of completeness by covering a largechronological span and dealing with figures and historical momentsthat are not sufficiently discussed in the contemporary literature onthe problem of universals in ancient philosophy.

at there was a debate about universals in Antiquity is testifiedby several Neoplatonic attempts to put some order in the debate and

sometimes to reconcile the different positions on the market. A rathercursory remark by Porphyry in his Introduction to Aristotles logicwas destined to spark a debate that continued for over a thousandyears:

For example, about genera and species whether they subsist, whether they

actually depend on bare thoughts alone, whether if they actually subsist they

are bodies or incorporeal and whether they are separable or are in perceptible

items and subsist about them these matters I shall decline to discuss, sucha subject being very deep and demanding another and a larger investigation

(trans. B ).

See G, Q for this general intuition.


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5 Introduction

Rather surprisingly from our point of view, Porphyry declines to

deal with the problem of universals on the grounds that it is somehowvery deep. In his chapter, however, Michael Griffin explains whyPorphyry and other Neoplatonists following him (especially Iambli-chus and Simplicius) regarded the problem as too deep and techni-cally sophisticated for beginners. More particularly, Porphyry andhis followers postponement of the problem of universals is rootedin a group of pedagogical and psychological doctrines that illuminatethe Neoplatonist position on the role of universals in knowledge ac-quisition. Central in this context is the idea that ordinary language istailored for sensible things and hence lacks the resources to refer tointelligible natures, which are the true referents of specific and ge-neric terms. Such intelligible natures will not be discovered throughthe study of Aristotles Categoriesand so it would be of no use forNeoplatonist philosophers to tackle the issue of the metaphysical sta-tus of universals when providing an introduction to Aristotles mostcelebrated writing.

Traditionally, Porphyrys remark on universals has been studied in

relation to its importance for the medieval discussion of universals.Medieval commentaries on Porphyrys Introduction(which was madeavailable to the Latin world thanks to Boethiuss neat translation) brimwith extensive treatments of the metaphysical status of universals. Itshould not escape our notice, however, that Porphyrys brief remarkalso provides an interesting picture of the ancient debate. Porphyry infact seems to single out at least three different positions on universals:a nominalist or conceptualist position, according to which species and

genera consist in our thoughts alone; a moderately realist position, ac-cording to which species and genera do exist extra-mentally, but onlyin their particular instances; a theory of transcendent universals, con-ceived of as separate from their instances. If the identification of thesecond and third views with, respectively, Aristotles and Platos po-sitions is sufficiently uncontroversial, Ada Bronowskis contributionto this volume shows that Stoics and, possibly, Epicureans might bethe philosophers lying behind the first of the positions singled out by

Porphyry.An analogous threefold classification somehow emerges if we look

at a rather interesting piece of Neoplatonist doctrine, namely the so-called doctrine of the three states of a universal. According to thisdoctrine, which finds a standard formulation in Ammonius, thereare different kinds of universal: the universal before the thing (anterem), the universal in the thing (in re), and the universal aer the thing


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(post rem)5. Universals before the thing are transcendent universals

and hence roughly correspond to Platonist Forms; universals in thething are Aristotle-style immanent universals; finally, universals aerthe thing are concepts obtained through abstraction or otherwise fromparticulars and hence meet the demands of more deflationary views.Clearly, Neoplatonists did not think that the three kinds of universalwere on a par. Transcendent universals, for instance, may be taken tobe the causes of immanent universals, which may in turn be thoughtof as the ground for mental concepts. Alternatively, one could insist

that transcendent universals are the causes of both immanent univer-sals and concepts. Be that as it may, it is significant that the doctrineof the three states of a universal originated in the Porphyrian milieu,which was particularly sensitive to the harmonizing of the philosophi-cal tenets of the various ancient Schools (with particular reference toPlato and Aristotle). It is not surprising, therefore, that the doctrinecomfortably accommodates the different tendencies about universalsthat emerge from Antiquity. It is no chance, finally, that no trace ofsuch a doctrine can be found in Plotinus, who shows no inclination forthe harmonizing tendency so typical of Porphyry and his followers. AsPeter Adamson shows, however, Plotinus unease runs very deep andconcerns the very notions of universal and particular. For Plotinus,universality and particularity can be found in both the sensible andthe intelligible world. As a result, the opposition between particularand universal turns out to be inadequate to characterize the relationbetween the sensible and the intelligible world. is original view putsPlotinus in strong opposition to the Platonism of his time as well as to

the subsequent history of Platonism with regard to universals.

III. According to a well-established classification, contemporary re-alists about universals are divided between Aristotelians and Platon-ists6. As Porphyrys remarks already show, the source of disagreementbetween these two brands of realism is intuitively clear enough. Bothschools maintain that universals exist, but while Aristotelians believethat universals exist in some sense intheir instances, Platonists contend

that they exist separatefrom their instances. ere are many different

A., In Isag., , -, and , -, Busse. For the standard Aristotelian position see A b. For Platonism see

R and the more recent defence in I . See also A-

a, pp. -; H, R .


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7 Introduction

ways, however, in which this general intuition may be fleshed out. One

common idea is that Aristotelian universals are concrete, while Platon-ist universals are abstract. As is oen observed, it may be difficult todraw a clear contrast along the lines of the concrete-abstract distinc-tion, since the terms abstract and concrete have been understoodin so many different ways in the history of philosophy7. But certainlymany contemporary philosophers believe that concrete entities existin space and time, while abstract entities exist neither in space nor intime. is general idea can be given some more content if we turn to

the relationships of dependence obtaining between universals and theirparticular instances. According to Aristotelians, universals depend fortheir existence on the existence of their particular instances: the uni-versal redness, for instance, exist only if there are particular red things.Aristotelians, in other words, accept the so-called Principle of Instan-tiation: there are no uninstantiated universals. On this view, it seemsfairly reasonable to conclude that universals exist in space and time be-cause they exist wherever and whenever their instances, which are spa-tiotemporal entities, do. For Platonists, by contrast, universals do notdepend for their existence on the existence of their particular instanc-es: the universal rednessexists whether or not there are particular redthings around. Platonists, in other words, reject the Principle of Instan-tiation: there can be, and there actually are, uninstantiated universals8.On this conception, universals are better thought of as existing, at leastprimarily, outside space and time. For some universals, i.e. uninstanti-ated universals, clearly do not exist in space and time, since they do nothave any spatiotemporal instances. But if some universals exist outside

space and time, there seem to be good reasons to think that all do, andhence also instantiated universals exist outside space and time. Indeed,for Platonists the relation of instantiation should not be cashed out interms of parts or constituents: there is no sense in which universalsthat are instantiated are parts or constituents of their instances; thereis no sense, in other words, in which the redness of red things is a partor a constituent of them or even exists in them. For Platonists, par-ticular things acquire their properties and characteristics by entering

into some special relation, by somehow participating in, entities en-tirely distinct from them and belonging to an entirely different realm.

See L D. , pp. -. See also S . On the Principle of Instantiation see A , pp. -; L ,

pp. -.


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ere are two other sources of disagreement between contemporary

Aristotelians and Platonists that are worth mentioning in this context.Both concern in some sense the question of how many universals thereare. Platonists tend to read off universals from descriptive language. Ofcourse, not all meaningful predicates introduce universals, and Platon-ists may be willing to put some restrictions on the number of univer-sals that there are. But in general they are inclined to think that non-synonymous predicates introduce distinct universals. Aristotelians, bycontrast, tend to posit as many universals as are required to account

for the characteristics of particular sensible objects. us, they tend toeliminate all universals that make no contribution towards explainingthe sensible objects fundamental traits and typical behaviour, even incases in which we do have general terms corresponding to such puta-tive universals. As a result, Platonist theories of universals tend to bemore abundant, while Aristotelian ones are generally more parsimoni-ous or economical concerning the number of universals that there are.On another matter, at least some Aristotelians distinguish betweentwo different categories of universals, which may be called, in homageto a millenarian tradition, substantial and accidental universals9. Weshould distinguish, in other words, between universals that tell us whatthings are, i.e. that express the essence or nature of particular things,and universals that tells us only how things are, i.e. that express theinessential properties of particular things. e former universals areoen called kinds, while the latter are oen described as proper-ties in the strict sense of the term. Although there is nothing in Pla-tonism as such that prevents one from drawing a distinction between

kinds and properties, Platonists have historically been less inclined todo so. One reason might be the following. If particular things acquiretheir characteristics by participating in some sort of abstract entities,then there is a sense in which all the features of particular things arepossessed by them derivatively and contingently, and so the essential-accidental distinction loses part of its meaning.

e group of papers dealing with Plato and Aristotle touch uponmany of the issues that are at the centre of the debate between Platon-

ists and Aristotelians. Laura Castellis chapter deals with a somewhatpreliminary issue. e way contemporary philosophers standardlyframe the contrast between Aristotelian and Platonic realism essen-

For an Aristotelian who accepts only properties and does away with kinds, see

A .


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9 Introduction

tially derives from Aristotles account, in theMetaphysics, of the differ-

ence between Platos conception of universals and his own. It is Aristo-tle who claims, in a critical vein, that Plato conceived Forms as univer-sals, but made universals separate from their particular instances. Inthe same critical vein, Aristotle sometimes attributes to Forms a some-what ambiguous metaphysical status, presenting them as both univer-sals and particulars. Castelli reviews the complex issue of Aristotlesreconstruction and critique of Platos doctrine of Forms. Instead ofsolving the problem in terms of the correctness or incorrectness of Ar-

istotles report, she tries to lead the controversy between Aristotle andPlato back to their fundamental disagreement about what it means forsomething to be one, as well as to their radically different conceptionsof the notions involved in the dispute, such as universality and par-ticularity. In doing so, she also touches upon the question of whetherthe separation of Forms from particulars can or cannot be understoodin terms of the Principle of Instantiation, i.e. in terms of the existen-tial independence of Forms from their sensible instances. FrancescoAdemollos paper is entirely devoted to a textual and philosophical re-construction of Platos theory of Forms. For one thing, he argues thatPlatos Forms are universals and so explains away those passages inthe Dialoguesthat have led some scholars to conclude that Forms are(or are also) perfect particulars. One line of argument to this effect isparticularly worth mentioning in this context. ere is a typical claimof Platos that seems to commit him to a paradoxical endorsement ofthe Principle of Instantiation10. On the face of it, Plato maintains thatForms are self-predicated: the Form of large, for instance, is large and

the Form of animal is animal. Now, if this claim is taken in the sensethat Forms are instances of themselves (e.g. the Form of large is a largething and the Form of animal is an animal), then for Plato there areactually no uninstantiated universals simply because there is alwaysat least one instance of the relevant universal, i.e. the Form itself. Ad-emollo argues against the view that Forms are instances of themselvesand contends that there are good reasons to think that self-predicationdoes not imply that predicates apply to Forms and to their instances

in the same sense. Furthermore, the paper deals with the issue of themetaphysical status of Forms as universals, i.e. with the problem as towhat kind of universals they are. Ademollo lends further support tothe view that Platonist universals are in fact non-spatiotemporal enti-

See on this L , p. f.


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ties. He qualifies, by contrast, the sense in which Plato rejects the Prin-

ciple of Instantiation. Platos opinion is not that there areuninstanti-ated universals but rather that there canbe such universals both inthe sense that Forms existed uninstantiated before the creation of theworld and in sense that they are only contingently instantiated and socould exist without having any actual instance.

As said, contemporary Platonists oen go for an abundant theory ofuniversals. is is due to their endorsement of a language-based ver-sion of the so called one-over-many principle: there is a universal cor-responding to every, or at least to a high number of, non-synonymouspredicates. In his chapter, David Sedley calls into question the wide-spread assumption that Plato subscribed to the claim that there is aform corresponding to every general term. Sedley does not deny thatForms are universals, i.e. entities capable of being multiply instantiated,but challenges the view that Forms were postulated as the ontologicalcharacterization of general terms or predicates. For one thing, the textsthat have traditionally been taken as evidence of Platos endorsement ofthe one-over-many principle should be construed as making the more

familiar and less uncontroversial assumption that there is one and onlyone Form for every plurality of things for which we have reasons topostulate a Form. For another thing, the Plato of the middle dialoguesdoes not endorse an unrestricted version of the theory of Forms: thereare pluralities to which no Forms correspond. In particular, there seemto be no Forms of natural kinds. On the basis of some passages fromRepublicV and X, Sedley argues that, in the canonical version of thetheory of Forms, Plato seems to introduce Forms only for pairs of op-

posite properties and for artefacts. It is only in the later dialogues thatPlato broadens the range of Forms and hence comes close to endorsingthe one-over-many principle. But in these contexts, Sedley argues, it isless clear that Plato is still talking about Forms conceived of as tran-scendent entities that are ontologically prior to their sensible instances.

Another common assumption of the contemporary debate aboutuniversals is that Aristotle was a realist about universals. is view,however, has been questioned both in Antiquity (see Riccardo Chi-

aradonnas chapter on ancient commentators) and in contemporaryscholarship. Mauro Mariani and Gabriele Galluzzo try to give furtherstrength to the realist interpretation of Aristotle by analysing in somedetail Aristotles views on universals in the Organon and the Meta-physics. More particularly, Mariani rejects the irrealist understandingsof Aristotles theory of predication in the Organon. According to oneview, for instance, Aristotles talk of universals should be understood


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11 Introduction

without committing ourselves to entities other than the particulars of

which universals are predicated. Against this view, Mariani argues thatAristotelian universals are distinct in terms of being and unity fromthe particulars of which they are predicated. On another view, the uni-versals of which Aristotle speaks in the Organonshould be taken not asextra-mental entities, but rather as concepts, i.e. conceptual contents.is interpretation, however, finds no support in Aristotles texts. In sofar as theMetaphysicsis concerned, Galluzzo denies that Aristotelianforms should be construed as particulars, and gathers arguments in

favour of the view that they are rather common or universal entitieswhich are identical in all the things they exist in and are made particu-lar by the different chunks of matter they happen to be combined with.Jointly, however, the two papers also show that Aristotles realismis much more complex than it is oen thought to be and undergoesconsiderable transformation from the Organonto theMetaphysics. AsMariani shows, for instance, one difficulty in providing a unified ac-count of Aristotles theory of universals in the Organonis that along-side substantial universals Aristotle introduces accidental universals,i.e. universals belonging to categories other than substance. Now, acci-dental universals complicate the picture because, even though at timesAristotle expresses himself as if accidental universals were instantiatedby pluralities of individual substances, he also seems to believe thatthey are at the same time instantiated by particular and unrepeatableproperty instances, something analogous to the contemporary notionof a trope. In theMetaphysics, by contrast, accidental universals seemto leave the scene and Aristotles interest chiefly, if not exclusively,

focuses on substantial universals. e Organon and the Metaphysicsdiffer, however, in a more radical sense. While the Organondisplaysa logical approach to universals, according to which universals are theontological counterparts of the predicates that can truly be applied tosensible objects, the Metaphysics tends to take a more physical andbiological approach, according to which the entities that are universalare rather constituents or principles of sensible objects11. As a result, intheMetaphysicsAristotle comes to endorse the radical view that some

of the entities that he regarded as universals in the logical works, i.e.species and genera, either do not exist at all or are radically derivativeentities. In the new picture, the only universals that are admissible arethe forms of particular sensible objects.

For a contemporary revival of Aristotles constituent approach, see L b.


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IV. Just like realism, nominalism too comes in different forms12. As

we have seen, all forms of nominalism share the common assump-tion that there are no universal entities and hence that all things areparticular. Nominalists also share a common strategy against real-ists. Universals, realists maintain, need to be postulated to explain avast range of metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic phenom-ena. ings agree in their attributes because there are properties thatthey all instantiate. Predicates apply to a plurality of things because allmembers of the plurality will instantiate the properties corresponding

to the given predicates. Finally, things will fall under the same conceptbecause they all instantiate the properties which that concept repre-sents. e nominalists challenge is to show that we do not need topostulate universals to explain these phenomena and so that particu-lars can play the theoretical roles that universals are commonly takento play. And nominalists insist ontological economy tells us that weshould not postulate entities that are unnecessary and, consequently,that we should do away with universals altogether. Attribute agree-ment, for instance, can be explained without postulating that similarthings instantiate the same property. Likewise, general reference andconceptual representation can be accounted for without introducinguniversal entities in the world, for instance by providing a good theoryof conceptual and semantic generalization.

eir common strategy aside, nominalists are at variance about howexactly nominalism should be construed. One important pole of con-troversy is worth mentioning in this context. A particularly austereform of nominalism maintains that there are no properties, but only

particular objects13. It is certainly true that concepts represent and pred-icates apply to pluralities of objects: many things fall under the conceptredand as many are rightly associated with the predicate red. is,however, obtains not in virtue of some properties, be they universal orparticular, that objects possess, but rather in virtue of features of ourconceptual and linguistic apparatus. Admittedly, to explain how con-cepts represent things and how predicates apply to them may turn outto be a rather difficult task. is task, however, has nothing to do with

ontology, but rather with epistemology and semantics: once concept-formation and predicate-application are clarified, the problem of uni-versals is simply dissolved. Other, less radical nominalists maintain, by

For a survey see A a, pp. -; L a, pp. -. See Q .


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13 Introduction

contrast, that there are properties, but also insist that they are as par-

ticular as the objects of which they are the properties: thus the red of aparticular pen is itself particular and numerically distinct from the redof all the other objects in that it is the red of one particular object andnot of another. us, there are no universal entities, but things are pro-vided with an array of unrepeatable and unsharable property instanc-es, which are oen labelled by contemporary philosophers tropes14.It may be useful to see how the two varieties of nominalism differ interms of metaphysical explanation. Take the phenomenon of attribute

agreement: why are all red things red? Generally, nominalists appeal toresemblance or similarity: it is simply a fact about the world a primi-tive fact that cannot further be explained that things resemble eachother and so can be grouped together in accordance with their resem-blance relationships. It is important to realize, however, that differentthings enter into resemblance relationships depending on the form ofnominalism one chooses to endorse. For austere nominalists, it is theobjects themselves that resemble each other. e world is populated bycollections (or classes, if one believes in them) of similar objects. eproperty red, therefore, either does not exist at all or is just a collectionof similar things. For trope-theorists, by contrast, resemblance rela-tions obtain, strictly speaking and primarily, among tropes, i.e. amongparticular properties. us, on this view, the property redis a collec-tion of similar tropes, i.e. a collection of all the tropes of red. Certainly,objects too are similar in virtue of possessing similar tropes, but it isprimarily among tropes that the similarity relationship obtains.

What is ancient nominalism like? Generally speaking, the view that

there are simply no properties is not a particularly appealing one formany ancient philosophers. But there are some interesting excep-tions or partial exceptions. Mauro Bonazzi, for instance, presents anextreme form of nominalism, which can be aptly labelled particular-ism and is characteristic of the Sophists. Although the Sophists donot represent a sufficiently homogeneous movement and differ fromone another on a number of crucial issues, they all seem to share a cer-tain view about reality: the world in itself is a cluster of unconnected

and ever-changing particulars and so there is no structure of realityor intrinsic unity independently of the perceiving subject. Protagorasseems to have interpreted this general assumption in a rather relativ-

For the notion of a trope see the classical W . See also C

; S .


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istic way. Since reality is never objective or absolute, but is always the

result of the interaction between objects and individual subjects, eachindividual subject ends up inhabiting a world of her own, distinct inprinciple from that of all the other perceiving subjects. Similar claimswere defended by Gorgias: reality is just an unconnected multiplicityof particulars, bere of any intrinsic unity or structure; it is only lan-guage that imposes unity and structure on reality. rough language,in other words, we try to carve reality at its joints, but the carving isnot the result of some structural isomorphism between predicates andreality. On this perspective, language has no descriptive function, butrather serves pragmatic purposes in orienting and facilitating the in-dividual and social life of human beings. Bonazzis reconstruction alsohas interesting consequences from a historical point of view: ratherthan a development of Socrates thoughts about universals, Platostheory of Forms would thus be a conscious response to the views heldby the Sophists.

Another interesting example is best understood if we make use,once again, of Aristotles distinction between substantial universals

(or kinds) and accidental universals (or properties in the strict sense).Chiaradonna reconstructs the debate between two Aristotelian com-mentators, Boethus of Sidon and Alexander of Aphrodisias, on thestatus of substantial universals, i.e. species and genera. For Alexander,cospecific and cogeneric particulars are grouped together on the basisof a common essence, that is an immanent universal that is commonto all individuals of the same species or genus. Boethus, by contrast,denies that there are any common essences or natures, and maintains

that species and genera are just collections of individuals. It is Boethusview that is of interest to us. From what we know, it is unlikely thatBoethus extended his irrealist position to accidental properties as well.us, Socrates particular paleness or particular height should be asreal as Socrates himself. But certainly Boethus believed that there areno natural kinds in reality and provided an extensional and reductiveaccount of kinds in terms of collections of particulars. Presumably,Boethus collections are nothing over above their members and so can

hardly be understood as classes in the modern sense. What matters,however, is that on Boethus view the fact that a certain group of par-ticulars belong to a natural kind is grounded on primitive facts of simi-larity among the particulars in the group and not on some universalsthe particulars in question somehow share.

Unlike austere nominalists, many ancient philosophers believe thatthere are particular properties and it is on the basis of particular prop-


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15 Introduction

erties that they account for general concepts and terms. Does this im-

ply that a good number of ancient nominalists were trope-theoristsante litteram? Not quite. In order to clarify matters it may be usefulto distinguish between the belief in trope-like entities such as particu-lar properties and the endorsement of a full-fledged trope-theory. ereason for the distinction is that most, albeit not all, trope-theoristscombine a nominalist stance on the traditional problem of univer-sals with a certain view about the metaphysical structure of materialobjects, according to which these are nothing but bundles of tropes.us, for many trope-theorists, particular properties hang togetherwithout inhering in any particular substance or even any materialsubstratum. Now, this view on the structure of material objects is notpopular among ancient philosophers who believe in particular prop-erties. Aristotle, for instance, is a good example of the distinction weare trying to make. According to the traditional interpretation (seeMarianis paper), Aristotle admits, at least in the Categories, particu-lar and unsharable property instances: Socrates paleness is peculiarto Socrates and is numerically distinct from, say, Platos. But Aristotle

hardly counts as a trope-theorist. For one thing, he also accepts uni-versal properties alongside property instances: so there is a universalpaleness of which both the particular paleness of Socrates and the par-ticular paleness of Plato are instances. For another, property instancesfor Aristotle clearly need a substratum to inhere in; what is more, theyneed an independently identifiable substance to inhere in.

is being said, the bundle theory is not uninstantiated, as it were,in ancient thought. Bronowskis contribution shows that Epicurus, be-

sides endorsing a nominalist position on the problem of universals, al-so provided an account of the structure of material objects that closelyresembles a bundle theory. Indeed, Epicurus advances two distinct yetcompatible accounts of material objects, a physical account in termsof material constitution and a metaphysical account in terms of par-ticular properties. On the physical account, objects, i.e. bodies, are justaggregates of atoms or aggregates of aggregates of atoms. e physicalperspective, however, does not tell the whole story. For a material ob-

ject can also be regarded, from a metaphysical perspective, as a wholemade up of its properties or at least of all properties that accompany aparticular object as long as it exists. Epicurus insistence that proper-ties do not need a substratum to hold together, as well as his use ofmereological terminology (whole) to characterize bodies in generalmake his intuition very close to the claim that material objects are bun-dles of their particular properties.


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As said, Epicurus took a nominalist position on the problem of

universals, which is best understood as a variety of conceptualism orconcept nominalism. Conceptualism seems to have been the favouriteview among ancient nominalists. For the Stoics too defend a form ofconceptualism about universals. On this view, everything in the worldis particular and generality is just a product of our conceptual appa-ratus, i.e. of the capacity of our mind to generalize over a plurality ofparticular objects or property instances. Epicurus, for example, pro-vides us with a detailed and naturalistic account of how our percep-tions of particular objects progressively give rise to general concepts.ere is a crucial difference, however, between the Epicurean and theStoic forms of conceptualism, which Bronoswki illustrates in her con-tribution. Epicurus does not distinguish between the concept taken asa mental act and a property of the (material) mind and the concept inthe sense of the contentof a mental act. e distinction, by contrast,is explicitly introduced by the Stoics, who identified universals withthe contents of mental acts. e motivation behind the distinction isthat for the Stoics mental acts are as real as any other corporeal en-

tity: since concepts are modifications of the mind, which is corporeal,they must be corporeal just like all other individual properties. econtents of mental acts, by contrast, are radically mind-dependententities, products of the mind devoid of any significant ontologicalstatus. e Stoics did not go as far as to say that conceptual contentsare absolutely nothing. Aer all, we have a plurality of conceptu-al contents and there is no plurality of things that are nothing. Buttheir characterization of conceptual contents as non-somethings is

intended to mark their status as radically dependent and derivativeentities. Interestingly, as Adamson shows, a mild form of conceptual-ism looked attractive to some Neoplatonists as well, at least in so far asthe sensible world is concerned. Porphyry, for instance, seems to haveflirted with the view that, since true natures are intelligible naturesand hence sensible objects possess no natures of their own, there is noneed to posit Aristotle-style immanent universals. e characteristicsof sensible objects can be explained by having exclusive recourse to

the relationship between material substrata and intelligible natures.Why not conclude, therefore, that in the sensible world universals arejust concepts in the mind?

V. Traditional disputes about the status of universals are not the onlyareas where the question of generality is crucial for the developmentof ancient thought. It is one of the objectives of the present volume to


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17 Introduction

show that the significance of the problem of universals extends much

beyond the boundaries of standard ontological controversies.We have seen that Platonist universals are usually thought of as ab-stract entities and that we have good reasons to believe that this wasactually the view held by the historical Plato. ere is however anothersense in which Platonism is involved with abstract entities. Contem-porary philosophers oen use the expression abstract entities to re-fer to a broad class of things which are usually taken to exist outsidespace and time, if they indeed do exist: numbers, geometrical entities,

sets and propositions are standard examples of things belonging to theclass of abstract entities. e issue of abstract entities is so prominentin contemporary metaphysics that one influential tradition (wrongly)equates the problem of universals and the issue of abstract entities15. Inhis paper, Marwan Rashed provides a detailed analysis of Platos math-ematical ontology in the Timaeus. He shows that Plato actually intro-duced mathematical and geometrical entities as intermediate betweensensible objects and Forms a view Aristotle repeatedly credits Platowith. What is more, Plato posited different classes of intermediate andhierarchically ordered entities, from the objects of pure arithmetic(mathematical ratios) to those of stereometry (mathematical solids).On Rasheds view, the metaphysical function of intermediate objects isthat of solving a crucial problem le open by Platos Parmenides: howcan Forms, which are unique and undivided, be participated in by aplurality of particular objects, which are many and divided one fromanother? Mathematical entities solve the problem of participation inthat they share in the nature of both Forms and sensible objects and

so literally mediate between them: like Forms, mathematical entitiesare intelligible, eternal and stable; like sensible objects, they are non-unique and multiplied. On this view, therefore, participation consistsin some sort of mathematical and geometrical ordering of the sensi-ble world. Platos solution is made easier by his late view that Formsthemselves should be conceived as numbers, i.e. ideal Numbers that,unlike mathematical entities, are unique and unmultiplied. us, inbeing mathematically ordered the sensible world actually becomes just

like the Forms.Peter Adamson and Riccardo Chiaradonna show how considerations

about the relationship between universals and particulars play a cru-cial role in two areas that seem, at a first glance, rather unrelated to the

See the entry Class vs. Propertyin Q .


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problem of universals, i.e. metaphysical cosmology and medicine. Ad-

amson takes up a particularly difficult problem for ancient metaphys-ics, i.e. unique instantiations: cases, in other words, in which a univer-sal has only one instance. e trouble with unique instantiation is thatuniversals are oen postulated to explain how it is possible for manythings to agree in their fundamental attributes. is general principlemay make it look otiose or useless to postulate universals in the case ofparticulars that are literally one of a kind. e problem is made evenmore acute by the fact that, for ancient philosophers, the only genuineexamples of unique instantiations the sun, the moon, the heavenlybodies in general, and the universe as a whole are things that arenecessarily unique: for ancient philosophers, in other words, it is im-possible, both physically and metaphysically, that there be more thanone sun or moon etc. Adamson highlights two different approaches tounique instantiation. Aristotle and Alexander take multiple instantia-tion to be the normative case and hence are mainly concerned withpreserving the distinction between universal and particular even in thecase of unique instances. Aristotle, for example, argues that a defini-

tion is always in principle applicable to a plurality of objects, even if itshould be applied in fact to just one. us, we can distinguish betweenthe kind sun, which is captured by the definition, and the individualsun, which is the unique instance of the kind sun. Plotinus and Por-phyry, by contrast, somehow reverse the picture and go out of theirway to prove that it is unique instantiation that represents the norma-tive case. ey both argue, on different grounds and with different nu-ances, that, since heavenly bodies as well as the universe that contains

them are divine particulars and thus the best possible sensible objects,there is no need for their species to be multiplied into a plurality of in-stances. On this view, therefore, the multiple instantiation that is char-acteristic of the species of sublunary objects is a mark of imperfection:ideally, universals should not be instantiated more than once.

Ancient medicine is another battlefield where the question of gen-erality becomes pivotal. e theoretical problem with understandingthe status of medicine can be phrased in the following terms. Medical

practice deals with individuals: it is individual patients that a doctortries to heal. But is there any knowledge of individuals? And if not,i.e. if knowledge is always of universals and kinds, what is the use ofmedical knowledge in medical practice? Famously, Aristotle maintainsthat individuals as such are unknowable: we always know the kinds towhich individuals belong and not individuals as such. Medical knowl-edge too, therefore, is about general and universal features and not


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19 Introduction

about individuals: at best, a doctor will be able to know certain kindsof

disease and certain kindsof bodily constitution, and to provide reme-dies on the basis of the regular connection between them. Admittedly,Aristotle also believes that experience and medical practice can helpdoctors to apply universal knowledge to individual cases. e fact re-mains, however, that Aristotles view threatens to split medicine intoa body of knowledge devoid of applicability and a medical practicewithout any theoretical status. Against the background of Aristotlesposition, Chiaradonna reconstructs the Hellenistic and post-Hellen-istic debate over the status of medicine. ere are basically three solu-tions to Aristotles dilemma: (i) to marginalize the role of experienceat the expenses of medical theorizing and conjecturing (the Rational-ist School); (ii) to abandon all talk of hidden causes and general con-nections in favour of an entirely experiential approach (the EmpiricistSchool); (iii) to break the traditional connection between knowledgeand universality and argue that individuals are knowable, aer all(Galen). Position (iii), i.e. Galens position, is particularly noteworthyfrom a theoretical point of view. Galen holds that, through the use of

the method of division and definition, a doctor could at least in prin-ciple know the individual nature of the patient and put such a knowl-edge to full use in her medical practice. Galen, therefore, bridges thegap between medical knowledge and medical practice by insisting that,at least in ideal conditions, medical practice should be guided by theknowledge of individual features and not only of universal ones. Foranother thing, Galens talk of individual natures as well as his assimi-lation of an individuals properties to specific differentiaeprefigure a

quasi-Leibnizian view of individuals, according to which concepts areable, at least in principle, to grasp not only the kind an individual be-longs to, but also the individual as such.

As Joahnnes Zachhubers chapter plainly shows, the problem of uni-versals plays a major role in the theological thinking of the ChurchFathers. Even though Church Fathers did not intend to expressly dealwith the problem of universals, various accounts of the relationshipbetween universals and particulars were advanced in an attempt to

defend and elucidate both Trinitarian and Christological issues. Za-chhuber presents an unprecedented survey of the Christian Fathersviews on universals, from the beginnings of Christian theology to Johnof Damascus (eighth century). One particular incident in Zachubersnarrative is particularly worth recalling in this context. In his attemptto explain and defend the consubstantiality between the Father andthe Son established in the Nicene Creed ( CE), Gregory of Nyssa


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elaborated a robustly realist theory of universals, which progressively

became the standard view among Church Fathers. According to thistheory, the nature corresponding to a certain species is numericallyone in all the individuals of the species: all human beings for instanceshare literally one human nature and are distinct from one another onaccount of accidental properties that fall outside their common nature.Moreover, although it is true that a nature needs individuals to exist, itremains undivided in the individuals. e result is that individuals arenot particular substances in addition to their common nature, sincethe latter expresses their whole substance. is model can easily be ap-plied to the case of the Trinity. e divine nature is literally one in allthe three persons or hypostases, which are distinct on the basis of theirpersonal properties. Moreover, although the divine nature only existsin the hypostases, it remains undivided with the result that the Fa-ther, the Son and the Holy Spirit are just one God and not three Gods,since the divine nature expresses the whole substance of the individualhypostases. Zachhuber shows how this standard view on universals,which was devised to account for the issue of consubstantiality, proved

to be less adequate to explain the Chalcedonian dogma ( CE) ac-cording to which in Christ there are two natures in one hypostasis. Asthe opponents of the Chalcedonian dogma immediately pointed out,the standard doctrine seemed to have two unwelcome consequences:that Incarnation concerns the whole Trinity and not only the Son; thatthe Son assumed the entire human nature. e debate between op-ponents and advocates of Chalcedonian Christology led to a substan-tial revision and adaptation of the Christian Fathers standard view on

universals.

***

is volume is part of a large scholarly and editorial project on theproblem of universals in the history of philosophy, conceived andcoordinated by Francesco Del Punta. First of all, we wish to warmlythank Francesco for his constant and unceasing support in all phases

of the project. Without him, the volume could not have been broughtto completion.

Although this book has been thought of right from the start as anindependent study of the problem of universals in ancient philosophy,provisional versions of the chapters were discussed in Pisa in Septem-ber on the occasion of a workshop jointly organized by the ScuolaNormale Superiore and the University of Roma . We are very grate-


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21 Introduction

ful to both institutions for their financial support, which has made it

possible to substantially improve early versions of the contributions.In particular, this volume has been prepared within the frameworkof the PRIN MIUR Projects La costruzione delle tradizioni filosofiche.Platonismo e Aristotelismo in et post-ellenistica() and Le filosofiepost-ellenistiche da Antioco a Plotino().

e volume was submitted to the Edizioni della Scuola Normalein June and subsequently peer-reviewed. We wish to thank theEdizioni for their interest in our project as well as for their help and

assistance. Finally, our gratefulness also goes to Sergio Knipe, who hasrevised the English of non-native speakers and given precious adviceon the editorial aspects of the volume.

R C, G G

chiaradonna universals ancient philosophy introduction-libre

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