chase, hill y kennedy - pivotal states and u.s. strategy

7/14/2019 Chase, Hill y Kennedy - Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/chase-hill-y-kennedy-pivotal-states-and-us-strategy 1/20

Pivotal States and U.S. StrategyAuthor(s): Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill and Paul KennedySource: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 1996), pp. 33-51Published by: Council on Foreign Relations

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20047466 .

Accessed: 28/05/2013 16:11

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Council on Foreign Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Foreign

Affairs.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 142.150.190.39 on Tue, 28 May 2013 16:11:37 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cfr

http://www.jstor.org/stable/20047466?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp





http://www.jstor.org/stable/20047466?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cfr



Pivotal States

and U.S.Strategy

Robert S. Chase Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy

THE NEW DOMINOES

Half a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, American

policymakers and intellectuals are still seekingnew

principleson

which to base national strategy. The current debate over the future of

the international order?including predictions of the "end of history,"a "clash of civilizations," a

"coming anarchy,"or a "borderless

world"?has failed to generate agreement on what shape U.S. policyshould take.

However,

a

single overarchingframework

maybe

inappropriate for understanding today's disorderly and decentralized

world. Americas securityno

longer hangson the success or failure of

containing communism. The challengesare more diffuse and numer

ous. As apriority, the United States must manage its delicate rela

tionships with Europe, Japan, Russia, and China, the other major

players inworld affairs. However, Americas national interest also re

quires stability in important parts of the developing world. Despite

congressional pressure

to reduce or eliminate overseas assistance, it is

vital that America focus its efforts on a small number of countries

whose fate is uncertain and whose future will profoundly affect their

surrounding regions. These are the pivotalstates.

The idea of apivotal

state?a hot spot that could notonly deter

mine the fate of its region but also affect international stability?hasa distinguished pedigree reaching back to theBritish geographer Sir

Robert S. Chase is a Ph.D. candidate in economics at Yale Univer

sity. Emily B. Hill is a Ph.D. candidate in historyatYale University.

Paul Kennedy is Professor of Historyat Yale University.

[33]







Robert S. Chase, EmilyB. Hill, and Paul

Kennedy

Haiford Mackinder in the 1900s and earlier. The classic example of

apivotal

statethroughout the nineteenth century was

Turkey, the

epicenter of the so-called Eastern Question; because of Turkey'sstrategic position, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire poseda

perennial problem for British and Russian policymakers.

Twentieth-century American policymakers employed their own

version of apivotal

statestheory. Statesmen from Eisenhower and

Acheson to Nixon and Kissinger continually referred to acountry

succumbingto communism as a

potential "rotten applein a barrel" or

a"falling domino." Although the domino theory

was never

sufficientlydiscriminative?it worsened America's

strategicoverex

tension?its core was about supporting pivotalstates to prevent their

fall to communism and the consequent fall of neighboringstates.

Because the U.S. obsession with faltering dominoes led to ques

tionable policies from Vietnam to El Salvador, the theorynow has

a bad reputation. But the idea itself?that of identifying specificcountries asmore

important than others, for both regional stabilityand American interests?is sensible. The United States should

adopta discriminative

policytoward the

developing world,concen

trating its energieson

pivotalstates rather than spreading its attention

and resources over the globe.

Indeed, the domino theory may now fit U.S. strategic needs bet

ter than it did during the Cold War. The new dominoes, orpivotal

states, nolonger need assistance against

an external threat from a

hostile political system; rather, the danger is that they will fall preyto internal disorder. A decade ago, when the main threat toAmeri

can interests in the

developing

world was the

possibility

that nations

would align with the Soviets, the United States faced a clear-cut

enemy. This enemy captured the American imagination in a way

that impending disorder does not. Yet chaos and instability may

prove agreater and more insidious threat toAmerican interests than

communism ever was. With its migratory outflows, increasingconflict due to the breakdown of political structures, and disruptionsin trade patterns, chaos undoubtedly affects bordering

states. React

ing with interventionist measuresonly after a crisis in one state

threatens animportant region is simply

too late. Further, Congressand the American public would likely

not accept such actions, grave

[34]FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Volume 75N0.1







Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy

though the consequences might be to U.S. interests. Preventive as

sistance topivotal

states to reduce the chance of collapse would bet

ter serve American interests.

A strategy of rigorously discriminate assistance to the develop

ing world would benefit American foreign policyin a number of

ways. First, as the world's richest nation, with vast overseas hold

ings and the most to lose from global in- _

stability, the United States needs a conser

vative strategy. Like the British Empire in

the nineteenth and early twentieth cen

turies,the interests of the United States lie

in the status quo. Such astrategy places the

highest importanceon relations with the

other great powers: decisions about the ex

The United States

has the most to lose-,

thus, its interests liein the status quo.

pansion of nato orpreserving amicable relations with Russia,

China, Japan, and the major European powers must remain pri

mary. The United States must also safeguard several special allies,

such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, South Korea, and Israel, for strate

gic

and domestic

political

reasons.

Second, apivotal

statespolicy would help U.S. policymakers deal

with what SirMichael Howard, in another context, nicely described as

"the heavy and ominous breathing of aparsimonious and pacific elec

torate." American policymakers, themselves less and less willingto

contemplate foreign obligations,are

acutelyaware that the public is ex

tremely cautious about and even hostile toward overseas engagements.While the American public may not

reject all such commitments, it

does resist intervention in areas that appearperipheral

toU.S. interests.

A majority also believes, without knowing the relatively small percent

ages involved, that foreign aid is amajor drain on the federal budget

and often wasted through fraud, duplication, and high operatingcosts.

Few U.S. politiciansare

willingto risk unpopularity by contesting such

opinions, and many Republican critics have playedto this mood by

at

tacking government policies that imply commitments abroad. States

menresponsible for outlining U.S. foreign policy might have a better

chance of persuadingamajority of Congress and the American

publicthat apolicy of selective engagement is both necessary and feasible.

Finally,a

pivotalstates strategy might help bridge the conceptual

FOREIGN AFFAIRS January/February 1996 [35]








Kennedy

and political divide in the national debate between "old" and "new"

security issues. The mainstream in policy circles still considers new

securityissues

peripheral; conversely,those who focus on

migration,overpopulation,

or environmental degradation resist the realist em

phasison power and military and political security.

In truth, neither the old nor the newapproach will suffice. The

traditional realist stress onmilitary and political security is simply in

adequate?it does not pay sufficient attention to the new threats to

American national interests. The threats to the pivotalstates are not

communism oraggression but rather overpopulation, migration,

en

vironmental

degradation,

ethnic

conflict,

and economic

instability,all phenomena that traditional security forces find hard to address.

The "dirty" industrialization of the developing world, unchecked

population growth and attendant migratory pressures, the rise of

powerful drug cartels, the flow of illegal arms, the eruption of ethnic

conflict, the flourishing of terrorist groups, the spread of deadlynew

viruses, and turbulence in emerging markets?a laundry list of newer

problems?must also concern Americans, if only because their

spillover

effects can hurt U.S. interests.

Yet the newinterpretation of security, with its emphasis

on holis

tic and global issues, is also inadequate. Those who pointto such new

threats to international stability often place secondary importance (if

that) on U.S. interests; indeed, theyare

usually opposedto

invokingthe national interest to further their cause. For example, those who

criticized the Clinton administration in the summer of 1994 for not

becomingmore

engagedin the Rwandan crisis paid little attention to

the relative insignificance of Rwanda's stability for American inter

ests. The universal approachcommon to many advocates of global

environmental protectionor human rights, commendable in princi

ple, does not discriminate between human rights abuses in Haiti,

where proximity and internal instability made intervention possibleand even necessary, and similar abuses in Somalia, where the United

States had few concrete interests.

Furthermore, the newsecurity approach

cannot make a com

pellingcase to the American public for an internationalist foreign

policy. The public does not sense the danger in environmental and

demographic pressures that erode stabilityover an extended period,

[36]FOREIGN AFFAIRS- Volume7SNo. 1








even if currentpolicies,

or lack thereof, make this erosion inexorable

and at somepoint irreversible. Finally, the global

nature of the new

securitythreats makes it

temptingto

downplaynational

governmentsas ameans toachieving solutions.

A pivotalstates strategy, in contrast, would encourage integration

of newsecurity issues into a traditional, state-centered framework and

lend greater clarityto the making of foreign policy. This integration

may make somelong-term consequences of the new

security threats

moretangible and manageable. And itwould confirm the importance

of working chiefly throughstate governments to ensure

stability while

addressing

the new

security

issues that make these states

pivotal.

HOW TO IDENTIFY A PIVOT

According to which criteria should the pivotalstates be selected?

A large population and animportant geographical location are two

requirements. Economic potential is also critical, asrecognized by

the U.S. Commerce Department'srecent identification of the "big

emerging

markets" that offer the most

promise

toAmerican business.

Physical size is a necessary but not sufficient condition: Zaire com

prisesan extensive tract, but its fate is not vital to the United States.

What really defines apivotal

states is its capacityto affect regional

and international stability. A pivotalstate is so

important regionallythat its collapse would spell transboundary mayhem: migration,

com

munal violence, pollution, disease, and so on. Apivotal state's steady

economic progress and stability,on the other hand, would bolster its re

gion's

economic vitality and

political

soundness and benefit American

trade and investment.

For the present, the following should be considered pivotalstates:

Mexico andBrazil;Algeria, Egypt, and South Africa; Turkey; India

and Pakistan; and Indonesia. These states' prospects vary widely.India's potential for success, for example, is considerably greater than

Algeria's; Egypt's potential for chaos is greater than Brazil's. But all

face aprecarious future, and their success or failure will powerfully

influence the future of the surroundingareas and affect American in

terests. This theory of pivotalstates must not become amantra, as the

domino theory did, and the list of states could change. But the con

FOREIGN AFFAIRS January/February996 [37]







1 hCS^hmA brazil i"*

States W??ta

0cean

.Wssr AMERICA

cept itself canprovide

a necessary and useful framework for devisingAmerican strategy toward the

developing

world.

A WORLD TURNING ON PIVOTS

To understand this idea in concrete terms, consider theMexican

crisis a year ago. Mexico's modernization has created strains between

the central and local governments and difficulties with the unions and

the poorest groups in the countryside, and it has damaged the envi

ronment. Like the other pivotal states, Mexico is delicately balanced

between progress and turmoil.

Given the publicity and political debate surrounding the Clinton

[38] FOREIGN AFFAIRS- Volume75No.1







^^^ AUSTRALIA ^S

IbOhlsson forFOREIGNAFFAIRS

administration's rescueplan forMexico, most Americans probably

understood that their southern

neighbor

is

special,

even if

they

were

disturbed by the meansemployed

to rescue it.A collapse of the peso

and the consequent ruin of the Mexican economy would have

weakened the U.S. dollar, hurt exports, and caused convulsions

throughout Latin America's Southern Cone Common Market and

other emerging markets. Dramatically illustrating the potency of

newsecurity threats to the United States, economic devastation in

Mexico would have increased the northward flow of illegal immi

grants and further strained the United States' overstretched educa

tional and social services. Violent social chaos inMexico could spillover into this country. As many bankers remarked during the peso








Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and PaulKennedy

crisis, Mexico's troubles demonstrated the impossibility of separat

ing "there" from "here."

Because of Mexico'sproximity

and itsincreasing

links with the

United States, American policymakers clearly needed togive it spe

cial attention. As evidenced by the North American Free Trade

Agreement, they have. But other select states also require close

American attention.

EGYPT

Egypt's location hashistorically

made itsstability

andpolitical

alignment critical to both regional development and relationships be

tween the great powers. In recent decades, its proximityto

importantoil regions and its involvement in theArab-Israeli peace process, which

is important for the prosperity of many industrialized countries, has

enhanced its contribution to stability in theMiddle East and North

Africa. Furthermore, the government of President Muhammad Hosni

Mubarak has provideda bulwark against perhaps the most

significant

long-termthreat in the

region?radicalIslamic fundamentalism.

The collapse of the currentEgyptian regime might damage Amer

ican interests more than the Iranian revolution did. The Arab-Israeli

peace process, the key plank of U.S. foreign policy in this region for

the past 20 years, would suffer serious, perhaps irreparable, harm. An

unstable Egypt would undermine the American diplomatic plan of

isolating fundamentalist "rogue"states in the region and encourage

extremist oppositionto governments everywhere from Algeria

to

Turkey.The fall of theMubarak

governmentcould well lead Saudi

Arabia to reevaluate its pro-Westernstance. Under such conditions,

any replay of Operation Desert Storm or similar military interven

tion in theMiddle East on behalf of friendly countries such asKuwait

or Jordanwould be extremely difficult, ifnot impossible. Finally, the

effect on oil and financial markets worldwide could be enormous.

Egypt's future is notonly vital, but very uncertain. While some

signs pointto

increasing prosperity and stability?birthrates have

declined,the United States

recently forgave $7billion of

debt,and

Egypt's international reserves reached $16 billion in 1995?the pre

ponderance of evidence paintsa dimmer picture. Jealously guarding

[40]FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Volume 75No. 1








its power base and wary that further privatization would produce

large numbers of resentful former stateemployees, the government

fearslosing

control over theeconomy.

Growth rates lurchfitfully

upward, and although reform has improvedmost basic economic in

dicators, it has also widened the gap between rich and poor.

Roughly one-third of the populationnow lives in poverty, up from

20-25 percent in 1990.

A harsh crackdown on fundamentalism has reduced the most seri

ous short-term threat to theMubarak regime, but along-term solution

may prove more elusive. The government's brutal attack on the fun

damentalist movementmay ultimately

fuel Islam's causeby alienatingthe professional middle class; such a

policy has already greatly

strengthened the more moderate Muslim Brotherhood and radical

ized the extremist fringe.Environmental and population problems

aregrowing. Despite the

gradually decreasing birthrate, the population is increasing by about

one million every nine months, straining the country's natural re

sources, and is forecast to reach about 94 million by 2025.

Recognizing Egypt's significanceand

fragility,successive U.S. ad

ministrations have made special provisionsto maintain its stability.

In 1995 Egypt received $2.4 billion from the U.S. government, mak

ing it the second-largest recipient of American assistance, after Israel.

That allocation is primarily the result of the Camp David accords and

confirms Egypt's continuing importance inU.S. Middle East policy.Current attempts by American isolationists to cut these funds should

be strongly resisted. On the other hand, the U.S. government and

Congress

should

seriously

consider

redirecting

American aid. F-16

fighters can do little to help Egypt handle its internal difficulties, but

assistance toimprove infrastructure, education, and the social fabric

would ease the country's troubles.

INDONESIA

While Egypt's prospects for stabilityare tenuous, Indonesia's fu

ture appears brighter. By exercising considerable control over the

population and the economy for the last several decades, Indonesia's

authoritarian regime has engineered dramatic economic growth,now

FOREIGN AFFAIRS January/February996 [41]







RobertS. Chase, EmilyB. Hill, and Paul

Kennedy

expectedto be about 7 percent annually for the rest of the decade.

Poverty rates have dropped drastically, and a solid middle class has

emerged.At

first glance, Indonesia's development has beena

startlingsuccess. However, the government now confronts strains generated

by its own efforts.

Along with incomes, education levels, and health status, Indonesia's

population is increasing dramatically With the fourth-largest population in the world and an extra three million people added each year, the

_country is projected

to reach 260 million in

habitants by 2025. The main island of Java,one of the most

densely populated placeson

earth, canscarcely accommodate the new

bodies. In response, the government is forcing

many citizens tomigrate

to other islands.

If Indonesia falls into

chaos, it ishard to see

its region prospering.

This resettlement program is the focal pointfor a host of other tensions concerning human rights and the treatment

of minorities. The government's brutal handling of the separatistmovement in East Timor continues to hinder its efforts to

gain inter

nationalrespect.

President Suharto'sregime

has made apoint

ofcoop

erating with Chinese entrepreneurs to boost economic expansion, but

ethnic differences remain entrenched. Finally, the government's favor

ing of specific businesses has produced deep-rooted corruption.Because of the government's tight control, it can maintain stabil

ityeven while pursuing these questionable approaches

tohandling

its people. However, as amoresophisticated middle class emerges,

Indonesians are less willingto accept the existing concentration of

economic andpolitical power.

Theseopposing forces,

one for contin

ued central control and one for moredispersed political power, will

clash when Suharto leaves office, probably after the 1998 elections.

A reasonable scenario for Indonesia would be the election of a

government that shares power morebroadly, with greater respect

for human rights and press freedoms. The newregime would main

tain Indonesia's openness toforeign trade and investment, and it

would end favoritism toward certain companies. Better educated,

betterpaid,

and urbanized for a

generation,Indonesians would

have fewer children per family. Indonesia would continue its lead

ership role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (asean)

[42] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume7sNo.i








and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (apec), helpingfoster regional growth and stability.

The possibility remains, however, that the transfer of power inJakarta could trigger political and economic instability, as it did in

1965 at the end of President Sukarno's rule. A newregime might find

itmore difficult to overawe the people while privately profiting from

the economy. Elements of the electorate could lash out in frustration.

Riots would then jeopardize Indonesia's growth and regional leader

ship, and by that stage the United States could do nothingmore than

attempt to rescue its citizens from the chaos.

Instabilityin

Indonesia would affect peace and prosperityacross

Southeast Asia. Its archipelago stretches acrosskey shipping lanes, its

oil and other businesses attractJapanese and U.S. investment, and its

stable economic condictions and open trade policiesset an

example for

asean, apec, and the regionas awhole. If Indonesia, as Southeast Asia's

fulcrum, falls into chaos, it is hard toenvisage the region prospering. It

is equally hard toimagine general distress if Indonesia booms econom

icallyandmaintains political stability.

Despite the difficulty, the United Statesmust

havea

strategy forencouraging Indonesia's stability. Part of this will involve close cooperation with Japan, which is by far the largest donor to Indonesian

development. A more sensitive aspect of the strategy will be encour

aging the regimeto respect human rights and ethnic differences. The

strategy also calls for calibrated pressure on Indonesia to decrease its

widespread corruption, which in any case is requiredto achieve the

country's full integration into the international business world.

BRAZIL

Brazil borders every country in South America except Ecuador

and Chile, and its physical size, complex society, and huge populationof 155million people

aremore than enoughto

qualify it as apivotal

state.

Brazil's economy appears to be recovering from its 1980s crisis, al

though the indicators for the future are inconsistent. President

FernandoHenrique

Cardoso'sproposals

for economicreform,which include deregulation and increased openness to

foreign in

vestment inkey industries, have advanced in Brazil's congress. Many

FOREIGN AFFAIRS -January/February996 [43]








Kennedy

basic social and economic indexes pointto a

generally improving

quality of life, including the highest industrial growth since the 1970s

(6.4 percentin

1994), declining birth and death rates, increasing lifeexpectancy, and an

expanding urban infrastructure. In the longer

term, however, Brazil must address extreme economic inequality,

poor educational standards, and extensive malnutrition. These reali

ties, together with aburgeoning

current account deficit and post-peso

crisis skittishness, help diminish investor confidence.

Were Brazil to founder, the consequences from both an environ

mental and an economic point of view would be grave. The Amazon

basin contains thelargest tropical

rain forest in theworld, boasting

unequaled biodiversity. Apart from aesthetic regrets about its de

struction, the practical consequences are serious. The array of plantsand trees in the Amazon is an

importantsource of natural pharma

ceuticals; deforestation may also spread diseases as the natural hosts

of viruses and bacteria aredisplaced

to other regions.A social and political collapse would directly affect significant U.S.

economic interests and American investors. Brazil's fate is inextrica

blylinked to that of the entire South American

region,a

regionthat

before its debt and inflation crises in the 1970s bought largeamounts

of U.S. goods and is nowpotentially the fastest-growing market for

American business over the decades to come. In sum, were Brazil to

succeed instabilizing

over the long term, reducing the massive gap

between its rich and poor, further opening itsmarkets, and privatiz

ing often inefficient state-run industries, it could be apowerful

en

gine for the regional economy and a stimulus toU.S. prosperity. Were

it to

fail,

Americans would feel the

consequences.

SOUTH AFRICA

Apartheid's end makes South Africa's transition particularlydra

matic. So far, President Nelson Mandela's reconciliation government

has set aninspiring example of respect for ethnic differences, good

governance, and prudent nurturing of the country's economic poten

tial. In contrast to other conflicts, in which different

groups

have

treated each other with somuch acrimony that they could not nego

tiate, the administration has successfullyovercome some of its politi

[44] FOREIGN AFFAIRS -VolumesNo. 1








cal divisions: it includes both former apartheid president Frederik

Willem de Klerk andZulu Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Moreover,South Africa is blessed with a

strong infrastructure,a sound

currency,and vast natural resources. These assets make its economy larger and

more vital than any other on the continent, accounting for a colossal

75 percent of the southern African regions economic output. No

longeran international pariah, it isworking

todevelop robust trade

and financial links around the region and the globe. A hub for these

connections, South Africa could stimulate growth throughout the

southern cone of Africa.

There are

indications, however,that South Africa could succumb to

political instability, ethnic strife, and economic stagnation. Power-shar

ingat the cabinet level belies deep ethnic di- _

visions. Anyone of several fissures could col

lapse this collaboration, plunging the countryinto civilwar. Afrikaner militias may grow in

creasingly intransigent, traditional tribal

leaders could raise armsagainst their dimin

ished influence, and when Mandela no

South Africa can

show other ethnically

tortured nations the

way to democracy.

longer leads the African National Congress,the party may abandon its commitment to ethnic reconciliation.

As Mandela's government strugglesto

improve black livingstan

dards and soothe ethnic tensions, the legacy of apartheidcreates a

peculiar dilemma. It will be hard to meet understandable black ex

pectations of equity inwages, education, and health, given the coun

try's budget deficits and unstable tax base. As racial inequalities per

sist, blacks are

likely

to growimpatient.

Yet ifwhites feel

they

are

payinga

disproportionate share for improved services for blacks,

they might flee the country, taking with them the prospects for in

creased foreign direct investment.

While the primary threats to South Africa's stabilityare internal,

its effectiveness in containing them will have repercussions beyond its

borders. Even before apartheid ended, South Africa had enormous

influence over the region's political and economicdevelopment, from

supporting insurgencies throughout the "front-line states" toprovid

ing mining jobs for migrant workers from those same countries. If

SouthAfrica achieves the economic and political potential within its

FOREIGN AFFAIRS >January/February 1996 [45]







RobertS. Chase, EmilyB. Hill, and Paul

Kennedy

grasp, itwill be awellspring of regional political stability and eco

nomic growth. If it prospers, it can demonstrate to other ethnicallytortured

regionsa

pathto

stability through democratization,recon

ciliation, and steadily increasing living standards. Alternatively, if it

fails to handle its many challenges, itwill suck its neighbors into a

whirlpoolof self-defeating conflict.

Although controlling the sea-lanes around the Cape of Good

Hope would be important, especiallyifwidespread trouble were to

erupt in theMiddle East, American strategic interests are not other

wise endangered in southern Africa. Yet because South Africa is the

United States'largest trading partner

in Africa andpossesses

vast

economic potential,its fate would affect American trading and finan

cial interests that have invested there. It would also destabilize key

commodity prices, especiallyin the gold, diamond, and ore markets.

More generally, instability in South Africa, as in Brazil and Indone

sia, would cast alarge shadow over confidence in emerging markets.

American policy toward South Africa should reflect its importanceas a

pivotalstate.While recognizing South Africa's desire to solve its

problemswithout external

interference,the United States should

promote South Africa's economic and political stability. Of $10.5 billion

inAmerican economic aid given in 1995, amere one percent ($135mil

lion) was for South Africa. A strategy that acknowledges this nation's

importancetoAmerican interests would surely be less parsimonious.

ALGERIA AND TURKEY

Algeria's

geographical position

makes its

political

future of greatconcern toAmerican allies in Europe, especially France and Spain. A

civil war and the replacement of the present regime by extremists

would affect the security of the Mediterranean sea-lanes, interna

tional oil and gas markets, and, as in the case of Egypt, the struggle

between moderate and radical elements in the Islamic world. All the

familiar pressures of rapid population growthand drift to the coastal

cities, environmental damage, increasing dependenceon food im

ports,

and

extremely high youth unemployment

are evident. Levels

of violence remain highas

Algerian government forces struggleto

crush the Islamist guerrillamovement.

[46] FOREIGN AFFAIRS-Volume7sNo. 1








While amoderate Islamist government might prove less disturb

ing than theWest fears, abloody civil war or the accession of a radi

cal,anti-Western

regimewould be

veryserious.

Spain, Italy,and

France depend heavilyon

Algerian oil and gas and would sorely miss

their investments, and the resulting turbulence in the energy markets

would certainly affect American consumers. The flood of middle

class, secular Algerians attemptingto escape the bloodshed and enter

France or other parts of southern Europe would further test immi

gration policies of the European Union (eu). The effects onAlgeria's

neighbors, Morocco and Tunisia, would be even more severe and en

courageradical Islamic elements

everywhere.Could

Egyptsurvive if

Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, andMuammar al-Qaddafi's Libya collab

orated to achieve fundamentalist goals? Rumors of anAlgerian

atomic bomb areprobably premature, but the collapse of the existing

regime would undoubtedly reduce security in the entire western

Mediterranean. All the more reason for the United States to buttress

the efforts of the International Monetary Fund and for the Europeansto

improve Algeria's well-being and encourage apolitical settlement.

Although Turkey

is not as

politically

or

economically fragile

as

Algeria, its strategic importance may be evengreater. At amultifold

crossroads between East andWest, North and South, Christendom

and Islam, Turkey has the potentialto influence countries thousands

of miles from the Bosporus. The southeast keystone of natoduring

the Cold War and an early (if repeatedly postponed) applicant to en

largedeu

membership, Turkey enjoys solid economic growth and

middle-class prosperity. However, it also shows many of the difficul

ties that worry other

pivotal

states:

population

and environmental

pressures, severe ethnic minority challenges, and the revival of radi

cal Islamic fundamentalism, all of which test the country's youngdemocratic institutions and assumptions. There are also a slew of ex

ternal problems, ranging from bitter rivalries with Greece over

Cyprus, various nearby islands' territorial boundaries, andMacedonia,to the developing quarrel with Syria and Iraq

over control of the

Euphrateswater

supply,to delicate relationships with theMuslim

dominated states of Central Asia. A prosperous, democratic, tolerant

Turkey is a beacon for the entire region; aTurkey engulfed by civil

wars and racial and religious hatreds, ornursing ambitions to inter

FOREIGN AFFAIRS-January/February 1996







Robert S. Chasey EmilyB. Hill, and Paul

Kennedy

fere abroad, would hurt American interests in innumerable ways and

concern everyone from pro-NATO strategiststo friends of Israel.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Considered separately, the challenges facing the two great states of

South Asia aredaunting enough. Each confronts a

population surge that

is forecast to take Pakistan's total (123million in 1990) to276million by

2025, and India's (853million in 1990) to astaggering 1.45 billion, thus

equaling China's projected population. While such growthtaxes rural

environments by causing the farming of marginal lands, deforestation,and depletion ofwater resources, the urban population explosion is even

more worrisome. With 46 percent of Pakistan's and 35 percent of India's

population under 15years old, accordingto 1990 census

figures,tens of

millions of young peopleenter the jobmarket each year; the inadequate

opportunities for them further strain the social fabric. All this forms an

ominous backdropto

rising tensions, asmilitant Hindus andMuslims,

togethera full fifth of the population, challenge India's democratic tra

ditions, and Islamic forces stoke nationalist passionsacross

Pakistan.The shared borders and deep-rooted rivalry of India and Pakistan

place these pivotalstates in amore

precarious position than, for exam

ple, Brazil or South Africa. With three wars between them since each

gained independence, each continues to armagainst the other and

quarrel fiercelyover Kashmir, Pakistan's potential nuclear capabilities

and missile programs, and other issues. This jostling fuels their mutual

ethnic-cum-religious fears and could produce another bloody conflict

that neithergovernment

could control. What effect a full-scale war

would have on the Pakistan-China entente is hard topredict, but the

impact of such a contest would likely spread from Kashmir into

Afghanistan and farther afield, and Pakistan could find support in the

Muslim world. For many reasons, and perhaps especially the nuclear

weapons stakes, the United States has a vital interest in encouragingSouth Asia's internal stability and external peace.

Could this short list of importantstates in the developing and emerg

ing-markets regions

of the

globe

include others?

Possibly.

This selection

of pivotalstates is not carved in stone, and new candidates could emerge

over the next decades. Havingan exact list is less important than initi

[48]FOREIGN AFFAIRS-Volume 75No. 1







Pivotal States and US.Strategy

atinga debate over

why, from the standpoint of U.S. national interests,

some states in the developing world are moreimportant than others.

better wise than wide

The United States needs apolicy toward the developing world

that does notspread American energies, attention, and resources too

thinlyacross the globe, but rejects isolationist calls towrite it off. This

is a realistic policy, both strategically and politically. Strategically, it

would permit the United States, as the country that can make the

greatestcontribution toworld

security,to focus on

supporting pivotalstates.Politically, given the jaundiced view of Americans and their

representatives toward overseas engagements, astrategy of discrimi

nation is the strongest argument againstan even greater withdrawal

from the developing world than is now threatened.

As the above case studies suggest, each pivotalstate

grapples with

an intricate set of interrelated problems. In such an environment, the

United States has few clear-cut ways tohelp pivotal

states succeed.

Therefore,itmust

develop

a

subtle, comprehensive strategy,

encom

passing all aspects of American interaction with each one. Those

strategies should include appropriate focusing of U.S. Agency for In

ternational Development assistance, promoting trade and invest

ment, strengthening relationships with the country's leaders, bolster

ing country-specific intelligence capabilities and foreign service

expertise, and coordinating the actions of government agencies that

can influence foreign policy. In short, the United States must use all

the resources at its

disposal

to buttress the

stability

of

key

states

around the globe, workingto prevent calamity rather than react to it.

Apart from avoidinga

great-power war, nothingin

foreign policycould be more

important.This focus on the pivotal

statesinevitably

means that developingstates not deemed pivotal would receive diminished attention, energy,and resources. This will seem unfair tomany, since each of the pivotalstates examined above enjoys

ahigher per capita

gdp than extremely

poor nations likeMali and Ethiopia. Ideally, U.S. assistance to the en

tire developing world would significantly increase, but that will not

happensoon. A pragmatic refocusing of American aid is better than

FOREIGN AFFAIRS-January/February 1996 [49]







Robert S. Chase, EmilyB. Hill, and Paul Kennedy

nothingat all being given

to the developing world, which may happenif the isolationist mood intensifies.

Sucha

refocusing could improve the American public's confidencethat itsmoney can be used effectively abroad. Relative to what other

statesgive for development, the American contribution is declining.

By continuingto

spread those resources across a broad swath of devel

oping countries, the United States might further diminish the impact_ of its assistance in many countries. In con

A pragmatic refocusing

of aid isbetter than no

aid at all.

trast, concentratingon a few pivotal

states

would increase American influence in them

andimprove

thechances

ofconvincing the

publicto

spendresources overseas.

Current patterns of assistance to devel

oping and emerging countries do not reflect

American global security interests and inmany cases seemglaringly

inconsistent with U.S. strategic priorities. While conceding that byfar the largest

amounts of American aid will go to Israel and Egypt,is it not curious that India, like South Africa, receives less than one

percentof total U.S. assistance? Pakistan receives

virtually nothing.Algeria receives nothing. Brazil is given one-fifth of the aid

awarded to Bolivia. Turkey gets less than Ethiopia (although, like

Egypt, Ankara is givena

largeamount of military assistance that is

hard toexplain in the post-Cold War environment). Surely this re

quires serious examination?

In changing these patterns, diplomatic and political objectionswill be inevitable. Questions will arise about countries not on the list,

particularlywhen one of them faces a crisis. Some will

pleadthat ex

ceptions be made for states that have been encouragedto undertake

internal political changes, likeHaiti, El Salvador, and the Philippines.

Foreign service professionals will caution against making this strat

egy part of the declared policy of theUnited States, for that could in

dicate likely American reactions in a crisis. The more critics raise

these problems, the more controversial this idea will become.

However, the pivotalstates strategy merits such a debate, and it is

hightime for such a

policydiscussion to

begin.As Mackinder

pointed out, democracies find it difficult to think strategically in

times of peace. All the above-mentioned problems and reservations,

[50]FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Volume 75No. 1








far from weakening the case for helping pivotal states, pointto the

importance of identifying how better to order U.S. policiesin

differentparts

of the world. A debate overpivotal

states would also

provideaway of checking the extent towhich American agencies al

ready carry out a discriminative strategy and the degreetowhich they

recognize that the traditional types of external threats are not the onlysources of danger

to countries importanttoU.S. interests.

Would this formula solve allofAmerica's foreign policy challenges?

Byno means.

Priority, should always be givento

managing relations

with the other great powers. In view of the international convulsions

of the

past

10

years,who would be rash

enough

to

predictAmerican

relations with Russia, Japan, and China a decade or more hence and

the dire implications if they go badly? Yet even if those countries re

main ourprimary concern, the developing world still needs a

place in

U.S. global strategy. By identifying pivotalstates to

Congress and the

public and providing the greatest possible support to those countries,

this strategy has agreater chance of coherence and predictability than

vague and indiscriminate assurances of good will to alldeveloping

countries,large

and small. America's concern about traditional secu

rity threats would then be joined bya

heightenedawareness of the

newer, nonmilitary dangersto

important countries in the developingworld and the serious

repercussions of their collapse. Whichever ad

ministration steers the United States into the next century, American

priorities would be ordered, and itsforeign policy toward the devel

oping world would have a focus?that ofsupporting those pivotal

states whose future affects the fate of much of the planet.?


chase, hill y kennedy - pivotal states and u.s. strategy

Documents

jstor terms

jstor archive

terms conditions of

pmall use subject

world affairs

paul kennedysource

strategy robert

conditionspivotal states