Chapter- VI

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Chapter- VI

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The Iran-Iraq war became a matter of grave

international concern, appalling human consequences in

terms of casualties, physical destruction and social

disruption. Since the war was taking place in a highly

strategic and economically important area of the world,

the war became an important test of the capacity of

United Nations to maintain international peace and

security. Peace initiatives were also taken by the Non­

Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Organization of Islamic

Conference (OIC).

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

Immediately after the outbreak of Iran-Iraq war,

the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned countries

decided in New York on 21 October 1980, on the

initiative of the Palestine Liberation Organization

(PLO) , to form a mediation committee to seek a

228

set·t:lement of the Iran-Iraq conflict .• The decision was

made~ after hearing a report from the Cuban Foreign

Minister, Isidere Malmierca, on the result of the peace

effort which took him to Baghdad and Teheran where he

met President Saddam Hussein and Abolhasan Bani-Sadr.

The mediation committee was formed of Foreign Ministers

of Algeria, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, Zambia

and the PLO. After visiting Iran and Iraq, the committee

found no willingness from either of the countries to

negotiate, save that each combatant demanded the

expulsion of the other from the NAM.•

The Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers' Conference held

in New Delhi on 9-13 February 1981, declared:

While expressing their profound regret at the five-month old Iran-Iraq war and at the damage to lives and property it has caused to the two parties, as well as the threat it poses to the Movement of the Non-Aligned countries, the Ministers reiterated and emphasized the principles of the Movement of the Non-Aligned countries that no state should acquire or occupy territories by the use of force, that whatever territories had been acquired in this way should be returned, that no act of aggression should be committed against any state, that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states should be respected, that no state should try to interfere or intervene in the internal

'Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1981 (London), vol.27, pp.3104-15.

"Majid Khadduri, The Gulf War: The origins and Implications of the Iran-Iraq Conflict (New York, 1988), p.100.

affairs of other states, and that all differences or claims which may exist between states should be settled by peaceful means in order that peaceful relations should prevail among member states. •

229

The New Delhi conference replaced the seven-member

committee with a four-member committee. • The seven-

mE~mber committee could not take off primarily because of

Iraq's opposition to Algeria, Iran's reservations about

Pakistan and Iraq's displeasure with Yugoslavia's mode

o:E functioning. The four-member committee consisted of

Cuba, India, Zambia and the PLO.

The mediation committee frequently visited both

Iran and Iraq to ease the difference between them and

to ask for an end to the conflict by peaceful means.

Foreign Ministers of India, Zambia and the Head of the

PLO's political department visited Baghdad on 6 April

and on 11 April 1981.• But they could not achieve any

progress, because of the attitudes of Iran and Iraq

towards a peaceful settlement. The Non-Aligned mediation

committee admitted on 18 April 1981 that it had been

unable to reconcile the conflicting demands of the two

'Twenty Five Years of the Non-Aligned Movement: Documents of th~ Gatherings of the Noll-Ali:;Tned Countries, vol. I: 1961-1982 (New Delhi, 1986) , p. 508.

•patriot (New Delhi), 15 February 1981.

'Keesing's, n.1, p.31015.

230

sides.• Once again the Committee visited Teheran on 10

May and Baghdad on 11 May 1981, and again it was

confronted with mutual recriminations between Iran and

Iraq.' Further, the Committee visited Teheran on 6

August and Baghdad on 8 August 1981. The Iranian Prime

Minister Rajai, told the delegation that the mission had

" ... not been very useful in clarifying the stance of

aggressor and the situation of the nation against which

that aggression has taken place". • Iraqi President

Saddam Hussein, however, told the delegation that Iraq

would cooperate and receive it any time " ... regardless

of the stand adopted by the Iranians". •

In Havana, during the Ministerial Meeting of the

Coordinating Bureau of the NAM, the mediation committee

held separate meetings with Foreign Ministers of Iran

and Iraq. On 5 June 1982, the committee met and

concluded that appropriate conditions did not exist for

it to undertake any new initiative in pursuance of its

mandate. The Committee subsequently met in Geneva on 10-

·xeesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.28, 1982, p.31852.

'Keesing's, n.1, p.31015.

'Keesing's, n.2, p.31524.

'Ibid.

231

11 July 1982.w It had a detailed exchange of views on

the Iran-Iraq conflict and its implications for peace

a,nd security in the region. In July 1982, the committee

met the Minister of Youth and Sports of Iraq and the

Foreign Minister of Iran."During these separate

meetings, the Ministers of Iran and Iraq reiterated the

positions of their respective countries. The Committee

assessed the results of the meetings and came to the

conclusion that the positions of the parties to the

conflict were still wide apart. It was also the view of

the Committee that there was danger of further

intensification of the hostilities.

The question came up before the Seventh summit

Conference of the Head of the State or Governments of

Non-Aligned Countries, held in New Delhi on 7-12 March

1983. The summit was originally planned in Baghdad but

Iran opposed the venue. Iran stated that unless Iraq

paid reparations to Iran for the war and unless its

President Saddam Hussein, was removed, the movement

should not hold its summit there.n Iran's aim certainly

was to politically humiliate Baghdad by forcing it to

cancel the meet.

••uN Doc. A/37 /540-S/15454.

"Ibid.

uTimes of India (New Delhi), 24 July 1982.

232

In the New Delhi summit, on the issue of conflict

between members of non-aligned countries, a formula was

proposed by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar

and UAE. It called for an immediate ceasefire in the

Iran-Iraq war and withdrawal to pre-war boundaries, with

UN involvement in peacekeeping and a suggestion that UN

should impose sanctions on either country if the formula

was not accepted. u This was the first time that the

notion of UN peacekeeping operations for the Iran-Iraq

war discussed at an international forum. Teheran

rejected the NAM resolution, while Baghdad, increasingly

feeling the burden of a costly conflict, expressed a

desire to negotiate a peaceful settlement.

In April 1984 another peace plan was initiated by

Egypt and forwarded by India, as Chairperson of NAM, to

Teheran. The elements of peace plan were: an immediate

ceasefire, return to international borders by the

combatants, stationing of an international force to

supervise ceasefire, NAl-1 Commission to determine who

started the war and who prolonged it, and setting up of

the Islamic Reconstruction Fund to finance

reconstruction of the war-damaged zones of both

uKeesing's, vol.29, 1983, p.32351.

233

countries.w The plan was welcomed by Iraq but dismissed

by the Iranian side.

Finally, after intense negotiations conducted by

the Indian Ambassador Natarajan Krishnan with the envoys

of the two concerned countries, a draft acceptable to

both sides was hammered out on 4 October 1984. The draft

finally accepted by Iran and Iraq said:

need to exert all possible efforts to contribute to the implementation of the principles of non-alignment with regard to the conflict between Iran and Iraq in order to find a peaceful, just and honourable solution to this unfortunate conflict in accordance with the charter of the UN and principles of non-alignment which would bring durable peace and security to the region.~

The Iranian amendment wanted the meeting to deplore the

alleged use of chemical weapons by Iraq, while Iraq

sought disapproval of Iran sending children to the war

front. Iran also brought to the NAM its complaints

against Iraq's use of chemical weapons on several

occasions since 1983. But, it was sidetracked by arguing

that it was pointless focussing on just one aspect of

the war when Iran was rebuffing all efforts to end it.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India, in his first

major initia~ive as Chairman of the Non-Aligned

.. Dilip Hiro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs (London, 1985) 1 p.236.

uThe statesman (Calcutta), 6 October 1984.

234

Movement, on 18 March 1985, appealed to Iran and Iraq

not to escalate their 53-month old war. He said that it

could jeopardize the stability of the region. He also

despatched special envoys, J.S. Teja and A.P.

Venkateswaran, to Iran and Iraq ... The special envoys met

President Ali Khameini and Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz,

and conveyed the Non-Aligned Movement's concern at the

intensified fighting. The Presidents of both Iran and

Iraq replied to the messages sent to them by Rajiv

Gandhi calling on them to put an end to the bombing of

the civilian areas as a prelude to a de-escalation of

the internecine war that was raging between them.'7

The Ministerial meeting of the Coordinating Bureau

of Non-Aligned countries held in New Delhi on 16-19

April 1986, reaffirmed the applicability of the

principle of non-use of force in international relations

with regard to the conflict between Iran and Iraq." The

Iranian delegation walked out of the meeting, taking the

view that Iran and Iraq had been equated, whereas the

latter should have been condemned for starting the war

and for using chemical weapons. Iran said that it would

"Times of .India, 9 March 1985.

npatriot, 20 March 1985.

"1956-1989, Documents of the Gatherings of Non­Aligned countries (Beograd, 1989), vol.II, p.698.

235

oppose any such appeal at all future non-aligned and

other gatherings.~ The Chairman of the NAM in the key-

note address, said,

the commencement of the fratricidal war between Iran and Iraq, its continuation, escalation and violations of international humanitarian law, have caused deep distress to all of us in the Non-Aligned Movement. Tragically neither our efforts, nor those of others, have yet succeeded in bringing about any de-escalation or cessation of hostilities. 20

In July 1987, when the permanent members of t.he

Security Council agreed on a resolution which called for

a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops to international

boundaries and exchange of prisoners of wars," the non-

aligned members of the Security Council proposed

amendments to the draft resolution agreed upon by the

:five permanent members. One of the amendments which non-

alignment insisted upon was that the draft resolution

should propose for UN observer to monitor the ceasefire.

The other amendment deplored the use of chemical weapons

in the war. 22 -

~Times of India, 21 April 1986.

"'~enty Five Years of Lhe Non-Aligned Movem.:mt, n.3, vol.II : 1982-1986, p.284.

"The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 16 July 1987.

22Indian Express (New Delhi), 16 July 1987.

236

After Iran and Iraq accepted the Security Council

Resolution 598, and the hostilities came to an end, the

Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned countries,

held in Nicosia from 5-10 September 1988, expressed

great satisfaction on the decision of Iran and Iraq to

accept the implementation of Security Council Resolution

598 on the termination of the Iran-Iraq war and in

particular cessation of hostilities as from 20 August

1988 and the commencement of direct talks under the

auspices of UN Secretary-General with a view to reaching

a comprehensive, just, honourable and durable solution

to the conflict.u

Organization of Islamic conference (OIC)

The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) also

made several attempts to find a settlement between Iran

and Iraq in order to end the war. On 26 September 1980,

the OIC Foreign Ministers decided in New York to charge

the Pakistan President, Zia ul-Haq, to head a good

offices committee to Iran and Iraq."' The team consisting

of President Zia ul-Haq, Habib Chatti, Secretary-General

"1956-1989, Documents of the Gatherings of Non­Aligned Countries, n.18, p.848.

"'Dawn (Karachi), 30 September 1980.

237

of OIC and Yasser Arafat, held talks with President

Bztni -Sadr and President Saddam Hussein. The ultimate

purpose of this mission was to establish a peaceful

settlement in the spirit of Islamic solidarity. The

Iraqi government responded positively towards the good

offices of OIC for a negotiated settlement. But the

Iranian government stated that it was "going to fight

until the last Iraqi soldier is off Iranian soil., ...

The extraordinary session of the Islamic Foreign

Ministers Conference was held in the United Nations on

1-2 October 1980. During the meeting, the Iraqi Foreign

Minister Saddoun Hamrnadi told President Zia-ul-Haq that

it would offer ceasefire unilaterally from 5 to 8

October 1980.» Iran rejected it on the ground that there

was no such thing as a unilateral ceasefire. Further

efforts were made by the Secretary-General of OIC, Habib

Chatti, to end the conflict between them. He visited

Baghdad and Teheran, on 16-20 October 1980, to bring

peace between them. President Saddam Hussein of Iraq was

ready to cease hostilities and to begin negotiations

with Iran on condition that they were based on the

recognition of Iraqi sovereignty over Shatt al-Arab.~

~xeesing's, n.1, p.31014.

•xeesing's, n.1, p.31014.

~Ibid.

238

Further, the Iraqi Foreign Minister added that Iran

would have to undertake to refrain from any interference

in Iraq's internal affairs.n The proposal for a

c'easef ire made by Habib Chatti was rejected by Iran. The

Iranian Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali Rajai, told the

Secretary-General that Iran would hold no talks on its

conflict with Iraq until Iraqi troops had withdrawn from

Iranian territory.~

The Third OIC summit conference was held in Taif,

Saudi Arabia, 25-29 January 1981. The Iraqi President

told the summit that he was ready to return land

occupied in the war with Iran. He added, "but land and

rights which Iran has usurped by force should be

restored to their lawful owners" ... Iran boycotted the

su:mmi t because of the presence of Saddam Hussein.

However, the summit decided to enlarge the good offices

committee and also to set up an Islamic force to

implement ceasefire if necessary." The Committee visited

Iran and Iraq between 28 February to 1 March 1981. The

"Ibid.

~Indian Express, 23 October 1980.

~Times of India, 29 January 1981.

uKeesing's, n.1, p.31014.

239

OIC Peace Committee in its proposals~ suggested that a

truce should be observed from 5 March to 12 March,

conclude a ceasefire on 13 March, followed by a

withdrawal of Iraqi forces on 20 March - "the withdrawal

to be completed within four weeks". These measures would

take place under the supervision of military observers

from the Islamic Conference states acceptable to both

parties. The question of the Shatt al-Arab would be

submitted to a committee of members of the Islamic

conference. Negotiations would be held following the

withdrawal to find peaceful solutions to other

differences.

Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini ruled

out any Iranian compromise with Iraq when he met the

me~diation committee of ore. He told the Committee, "In

Islam compromise with the enemy has no sense" ...

Basically, the Iranian government wanted that Iraq's

aggression should be acknowledged internationally and

all Iraqi forces sho4ld be withdrawn from Iranian

tE~rri tory. Radio Teheran quoted Prime Minister Rajai as

saying, after the second round of negotiations with the

Islamic mediation committee, on 4 March: "We shall

»Institute for Defence studies and Analysis (IDSA) News Review on West Asia, April 1981, p.11.

"Patriot, 2 March 1981.

240

cont.inue resisting and struggling as long as the

aggressor is not identified and punished .•. The war will

continue until there is a complete assurance of the

termination of aggression and obliteration of its

vestiges".,.

President Saddam Hussein had made the withdrawal of

Iraqi troops conditional on Iran's recognition of Iraq's

sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab and other disputed

territories. The Iraqi News Agency reported on 4 March:

President Saddam stressed that any solution which did not take into account the reasons for the war, including Iraq's sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab and its lands, could not be just and logical solution. During the meeting between the Iraqi side and the good offices Committee ... the President said that there could not be any withdrawal before Iran's recognition of those rights and before Iraq's acquisition of practical and legal guarantees."

The Iranian President Bani-Sadr, on the other hand,

declared on 5 March that Iran could not accept solutions

outside the 1975 Algiers Agreement, that a cease-fire

and the withdrawal of Iraq's army must be simultaneous;

and that an international delegation should be

established to "investigate the aggression".,. Similarly,

.. IDSA News Review on West Asia, n.32, p.ll.

"Ibid. I p. 12.

~Keesing's, n.l, p.31014.

241

Iran's Supreme Defence Council rejected on 6 March the

peace plan proposed by the Islamic goodwill mission to

halt the war. Iran said that it rejected the proposals

as they did not meet its demands for unconditional

withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Iranian territory and

the declaration of Iraq as the aggressor in the war.n

Once again the Committee met Saddam Hussein in

Baghdad on 31 March 1981. There was no positive

development. Consequently, President Sekou Toure said

that pending responses from both the sides the Committee

had "suspended peacekeeping shuttles at the summit

level"." The Islamic Foreign Ministers conference met in

Baghdad on 1-5 June 1981. The summit appealed to both

Iran and Iraq to end the bloodshed and to endeavour to

reach a just, peaceful and honourable solution to their

conflict. Saddam Hussein while addressing the summit

said that Iraq was willing to reach a "peaceful, just

and honourable" solution to war with Iran. Iran

boycotted the meeting.•

After the failure in June 1981, no further attempts

were made by OIC until March 1982. Renewed efforts were

nThe Statesman, 8 March 1981.

"Keesings, n.1, p.31014.

»Indian Express, 3 June 1981.

242

made by a five-member mission of ore, led by President

Sekou Toure. The Committee visited Baghdad and Teheran

on 7-8 March 1982. The mission failed once again in

bringing both parties to a peaceful settlement, but the

Committee said that it would continue its peace

efforts ...

The fourth summit of the ore was held in

Casablanca, Morocco, on 16-19 January 1984. Iran

boycotted the summit, charging that a resolution adopted

last December at the fourteenth conference of Islamic

Foreign Ministers favoured Iraq.~ The Islamic mediation

committee met on 19 July 1984 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,

in a renewed bid to muster pan-Islamic pressure on Iran

to accept a negotiated end to its war with Iraq. But

hardly was the session underway when in Teheran Foreign

Ministry issued a statement indicating that Ayatollah

Khomeini had rejected mediation ... Since Iran persisted

on removal of Saddam as a condition for termin-ating war

with Iraq, no solution could be reached.

The Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference was held

in San' aa in December 1984. The resolution of the

.. Keesing's, n.6 1 p.31524 .

.. Beijing Review 1 vol. 27 1 No. 5-6, 3 o January 1984, p.12 .

.. Patriot, 20 July 1984.

243

meeting as reported by the Iraqi news agency, "called on

Iran and Iraq to cooperate fully and sincerely" with the

Committee and appealed to the two sides to observe the

rules of the Sharia, the Geneva Convention on Prisoners

of War {POWs) and the Geneva Protocol on Chemical

Weapons. The agency also quoted Tariq Aziz as saying,

"it was obvious to everyone that it was Iran that had

obstructed the committee's work" and added, "Teheran

should issue a clear official affirmation of its

acceptance of and abidance by the resolution", so that

conclusion can be drawn.u Iran dashed the short-lived

hopes that the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in

San'aa that had achieved a breakthrough in efforts to

bring the 51-month old war to a halt. "A ceasefire is

out of question", Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar

Velayati told a news conference in Teheran on 22

December 1984. "We will continue the war until we

achieve the victory". He accused the OIC and Islamic

Mediation Committee of being pro-Iraq, reiterating that

Iran would not respond to these mediators until Iran

ascertained their impartiality.~

.. IDSA News Review on West Asia, December 1984, pp.483-84.

~IDSA News Review on West Asia, January 1985, pp.l0-11.

244

The Islamic Mediation Committee again met in Jeddah

on 11-12 September 1985.~ The Secretary-General, Syed

Shariffudin Pirzada, proposed a comprehensive peace

plan, called for an immediate ceasefire, cessation of

attacks on civilian and economic targets, end to the use

of chemical weapons, withdrawal of forces to the pre-war

positions and exchange of POWs. He also suggested that

a force be deployed to monitor the peace and

negotiations between the two countries should be held

under the auspices of the OIC ... The Iraqi government

accepted the peace offer, but Iran rejected it. The

mediation committee's effort to stop the war between

Iran and Iraq were in vain since it could not be assured

of any favourable responses from both the countries. The

Secretary-General, Pirzada, summed up the impasse by

saying, "Let's not lose hope ... let 1 s pray to Allah. It 1 s

a difficult situation but we are trying ... fights and

quarrels happens among family members ... and it could

take a long time before other members can help solve

it"."

The Fifth Summit of the OIC was held in Kuwait on

26-29 January 1987. The final resolution called upon

tiBangladesh Times (Dhaka), 13 September 1985.

*Ibid., 14 September 1985.

"Saudi Gazette (Riyadh), 24 February 1986.

245

Iran to agree to end the war by peaceful means. It

reaffirmed " ..• the need for an immediate ceasefire and

a withdrawal to internationally recognized borders and

an exchange of all prisoners within a short time after

cessation of hostilities, to be followed by negotiations

for peace" ... Iran boycotted the summit on the ground

that the host country Kuwait was an "unsafe venue" and

it was supporting Iraq in the war... President Ali

Kharneini refused to receive an Islamic goodwill mission,

and said that such a visit would be useless as long as

the ore did not condemn Iraq as the aggressor.•

United Nations

The UN effort to end hostilities began with the

Secretary-General's appeal to both the parties on 22

September 1980 to refrain from the use of force. He also

offered his good offices to resolve the conflict. The

following day, in a letter to Presidents of Iran and

Iraq, he called upon each government to " ... heed the

appeals addressed to you with a view to assisting the

.. Ibid., 30 January 1987.

~Beijing Review, vol.30, no.5-6, S February 1987, p.13.

,.Ursula Braun, "The Gulf Cooperation Council", in Hanns W. Maull and Otto Pick, eds., The Gulf War : Regional and International Dimensions (London, 1989), p.95.

246

two governments to resolve their differences by peaceful

means" .•• The President of the Security Council, in

another appeal on behalf of the members of the Security

Council, asked the two states to " ... desist, as a first

step towards a solution of the conflict, from all armed

activity and all acts that may worsen the present

dangerous situation and to settle their dispute by

peaceful means"." The Iraqi government responded to the

Secretary-General's appeal and clarified its position,

while the Iranian government remained silent.~

On 28 September 1980, the Security Council

unanimously adopted Resolution 479 calling for an

immediate end to hostilities, peaceful settlement of the

dispute and urged other countries to refrain from any

act that might lead to further escalation. The Security

Council called the conflict between Iran and Iraq a

"situation", while refraining from calling it "war", in

order to avoid a discussion of "aggression" which might

consequently lead to the possibility of invoking

punitive actions under Chapter 7 of the United Nations

charter. Nor did Iran and Iraq declare a state of war

between them. They had not even severed diplomatic

"UN Doc.S/14193.

"Ibid.

"UN Doc.S/14191 and S/14192.

247

relations; the embassy of each country was officially in

existence in the capital of the other, although the

ambassador of each had been recalled, relegating their

powers to a charge d'affaires. The Iraqi Ambassador, who

participated in the Security Council meeting, accepted

in his speech that the resolution basically called for

a ceasefire.,. Iran, which had boycotted the m~eting,

informed Secretary-General on 1 October 1980, that it

did not see any use in discussing the conflict, as long

as Iraq occupied Iranian territory.»

Between 26 September-24 October 1980, the Security

Council met six times to discuss the Iran-Iraq war ... The

Council did not publicly meet to discuss the war from

the end of October 1980 until July 1982. However, the

Secretary-General, over the following years, made a

number of attempts to either end the fighting or to

reduce the intensity of the hostilities. In November

1980, the Secretary-General appointed Olof Palme of

Sweden as the UN Special Representative and was asked to

,.UN Doc.S/PV.2248.

"UN Doc.S/14206 .

.. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability (Boulder, 1984), p.645.

248

visit Iran and Iraq and explore the possibility of a

peaceful settlement.n

Olof Palme visited Iran and Iraq five times, once

in 1980, thrice in 1981 and once in 1982, and met

officials in both the countries. During his visit, he

outlined various UN plans for a ceasefire and troop

withdrawals. Unfortunately, Palme' s efforts were largely

unsuccessful. While the Iranians demanded the withdrawal

of all forces before they would enter into any

negotiation, the Iraqis insisted that withdrawal be

included in the negotiations after the acceptance of a

ceasefire. Palme stated that he had made every possible

effort to end the war, but he did not see any

possibility for progress as long as lack of willingness

among the parties prevailed.R

On 12 July 1982, the Security Council passed

Resolution 514, just as Iran had managed to push the

Iraqi forces almost back ~o the pre-war borders and in

one area into Iraqi territory. The Resolution 514,

differed from the previous one on an important point

i.e., it requested a withdrawal to international

"Anthony Clark Arend, "The Role of the United Nations in the Iran-Iraq War" in Christopher c. Joyner ed., The Persian Gulf War: Lessons for strategy, Law and Diplomacy (New York, 1990), p.193.

"UN Doc.S/15471.

249

boundaries and a ceasef ire. Iran rejected the

resolution. It stated that the Security Council had

deliberately failed to recognize that armed aggression

and occupation had taken place, to condemn the

aggressor, to demand restoration of previous conditions

and to recognize Iran's right to punish the war

criminals responsible for the destruction and misery

caused by Iraqi aggression.~ Two months later the

Security Council met on 4 october 1982, and passed

Resolution 522. Resolution 522 basically repeated 514,

but added that Security Council welcomed that one of the

parties (Iraq} already had expressed willingness to

implement Resolution 514.

The Security Council passed Resolution 540 on 31

October 1983. Besides reaffirming the previous

resolutions, it condemned the violations of 1925 Geneva

Protocol and attacks on civilian targets.~ While Iraq

welcomed the resolution, Iran rejected the resolution

and used the argument that the Security Council still

had remained in the same unbalanced tradition it had

followed since the beginning of Iraq's war of

aggression. Hence Iran had no alternative but to

'"UN Doc.S/15292.

~UN Doc.S/16092.

250

continue to dissociate itself from the resolution.~ The

Council passed Resolution 552 on 1 June 1984. It

condemned the attacks on merchant ships in the Gulf and

affirmed the rights to free navigation in the Gulf. This

resolution was passed after the tanker war had escalated

considerably. It also stated that the council would meet

to consider more effective measures if the attacks

continued ...

The next Security Council resolution was passed as

a consequence of the dramatic changes on the battlefield

in February 1986. As the Iranian forces crossed the

Shatt al-Arab and seized the Fao peninsula, a new and

threatening military situation emerged. Resolution 582

was adopted on 24 February 1986. It called for an

immediate ceasefire, a cessation of hostilities, the

withdrawal of troops to internationally recognized

boundaries, a comprehensive exchange of POWs and, Iran

and Iraq to submit all aspects of the conflict to

mediation. Despite the fact that the resolution had no

impact on the ongoing fighting, it marked an interesting

shift, as Iran for the first time noted that it was "a

positive step towards condemning Iraq as the aggressor

"UN Doc.S/16213.

"'UN Doc.fS/16594.

251

and towards a just conclusion to the war"... Iraq

expressed readiness to implement the resolution in good

faith provided Iran was ready to do the same."

In October 1986, the UN Security Council adopted

Resolution 588, by which it called on the parties to

inplement its Resolution 582 without delay. Iran

rejected the resolution stating that it fell short of

explicitly identifying Iraq as the aggressor, or of

measures to prevent Iraq from further using chemical

weapons, attacking civilians and third-party vessels,

threatening civil aviation and otherwise violating

international law.u The resolutions passed in 1986 did

not lead anywhere. It became increasingly more evident.

that the Council had to take a more determined approach.

It also needs to be noted in this context that the Cold

War was giving way to the new detente and USSR was

bending backwards to accommodate USA. Soviet policy was

changing in Afghanistan. Similarly, USSR was gradually

withdrawing its protective political cover vis-a-vis

Iran in the Security Council. That strengthened the

position of USA and also pro-US regimes in the Gulf.

Iraq benefitted from this change to a large extent.

"'UN Doc.S/17864 .

.. UN Doc.S/17897.

"'UN Doc.S/18480.

252

The UN's role in the Iran-Iraq war changed

considerably with the Resolution 598 of 20 July 1987. It

was a strongly worded resolution and demanded an

immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of forces to the

internationally recognized boundaries. The Secretary­

General was requested to send observers to supervise

this and to continue his mediating efforts in order to

achieve a comprehensive, just and honourable settlement.

The resolution also urged the exchange of POWs without

delay and requested the Secretary-General to consult

with the parties in order to establish an impartial body

to inquire into the responsibility of the conflict.

Iran, which did not participate in the meeting, declared

on 22 July that the resolution suffered from fundamental

defects and incongruities, and lacked the minimum

balance necessary for future constructive activities.­

Iran detailed its official position on Resolution 598 on

11 August, charging that it had been formulated by the

us with the explicit intention of intervening in the

Persian Gulf; that it reflected the Iraqi formula for

settling the conflict and, therefore, it could not be

considered impartial or practical. It warned that the

failure to resolve the crisis would precipitate the

.. UN Doc.S/18993.

253

conflict's expansion to unpredictable dimensions."' Iraq,

on its part, welcomed the resolution and expressed its

readiness to fulfill its obligations in its

implementation. Iraq also expressed willingness to

engage in consultations with the Secretary-General

concerning the inquiry into the responsibility for the

conflict."

Resolution 598, however, made no immediate and

direct impact on the War. Despite the Secretary­

Genera 1' s frequent meetings with the representatives

from Iran and Iraq, and numerous informal consultations

with the Security Council, no substantive progress was

made during the following months. Finally, Iran accepted

the ceasefire on 17 July 1988, when Iranian President

Ali Khameini sent a letter to Secretary-General

indicating Iran's willingness to accept Security Council

Resolution 598 as a framework for ending the war.

Iran's acceptance came after battlefield setbacks

in early 1988, and its isolation, which was clearly

manifested when USS Vinceness shot down an Iranian

Airbus. Iran was also threatened by the prospects of an

e~bargo, and the Security Council underlined its

'"'UN Doc. Sf 19031.

"UN Doc.S/19045.

254

determination "to consider further effective steps" if

the parties did not comply with Resolution 598... 'rhe

ceasefire, as proposed under Resolution 598 of 20 August

1987, came into effect on 20 August 1988. It took the UN

eight long years, 11 Security Council resolutions,

numerous presidential statements and a long series of

nediating attempts by the Secretary-General before the

ceasefire came into effect.

Chemical Weapons

Use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War

caused great international concern. The Secretary­

General dispatched missions to investigate allegations

by Iran and Iraq of the use of chemical weapon in March

1984, April 1985, February-March 1986, April-May 1987,

March-April 1988, and twice in July 1988. Iran claimed

since August 1983 that Iraq had used chemical weapons.

However, it was only in November 1983, that the

government of Iran formally alleged for the first time,

in a communication to the UN, that chemical weapons were

used by Iraq.,. Iran invited the Secretary-General to

send an expert to look into the claims. Iraq on its side

~uN Doc.SjPV 2798.

"'UN Doc. S/16128.

255

rejected the alleged use of poison gas by calling it

Iranian propaganda."

In February 1984, Iran again charged Iraq of using

chemical weapons against its forces and requested the

Secretary-General to investigate the use of chemical

weapons by Iraq. n Specialists visited Iran on 13-19

March 19 8 4 and submitted a report to the Secretary­

General 9n 21 March 1984. The report concluded that

chemical weapons were used, but without naming Iraq as

the violator.n In a response to the report, Iraq stated

that it did not consider itself concerned, because it

had not used chemical weapons.,. The Security counci 1

strongly condemned the use of chemical weapons reported

by the mission of specialists; reaffirmed the need to

abide strictly by provisions of Geneva Protocol of 1925

and condemn all violations of international humanitarian

law."

Following repeated Iranian claims of Iraqi use of

poison gas, the Secretary-General decided to send a

"UN Doc.S/16193.

nuN Doc.S/16378, S/16380, & S/16397.

"UN Doc.S/16438.

"Ibid.

nuN Doc.S/PV.2524.

256

specialist to examine Iranian soldiers who were sent to

European hospitals for treatment of injuries allegedly

caused by chemical weapons. Manuel Dominguez, a

specialist in Atomic, Biological and Chemical weapons

visited, from 1-5 April 1985, Iranian patients

hospitalized in Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom.

The expert concluded that chemical weapons were used

during 1985 in the war between Iran and Iraq.'" A

presidential statement was issued that strongly

condemned the use of chemical weapons in the war,

without mentioning Iraq as the violator.n

After another year of similar complaints from Iran,

the Secretary-General once again sent a mission to Iran

in 1986. The mission visited Iran from 26 February-3

March 1986. The report concluded that the combined

clinical and analytical data proved beyond doubt that

chemical weapons were used on many occasions against

Iranian forces by the Iraqis. 11 The Government of Iran

thanked Secretary-General for dispatching the mission

and for its well-balanced and fair report . .,. Iraq's

response was that Council "clearly lacked the required

MUN Doc.S/17127 & Add.1.

77UN Doc.S/17130.

11UN Doc.S/17911 & Corr.1 & Add 1 & 2.

,.UN Doc.S/17925.

257

degree of balance". For the first time Iraq was

condemned for its use of chemical weapon against Iran in

the statement by the President of the Security Council.~

The Iranian offensive in early 1987, led to a new

upsurge in Iranian complaints. The UN mission visited

Iran and Iraq from 22 April-3 May 1987 and submitted a

report to the Secretary-General on 6 May 1987. The

report confirmed that Iraq continued to use such weapons

and civilians had been victims." This resulted in

another Presidential statement that again condemned Iraq

for its use of poison gas. Iraq, this time, did not

reject the charge that it had used chemical weapons, but

complained that the report had not sufficiently

emphasized the "evidence" of Iranian use of similar

weapons... Iran regretted that except for a few minor

changes in wording, the Security Counc i 1 deemed it

sufficient in its statement simply to repeat its

statement of 21 March 1986."

During the Iranian offensive in Kurdistan in March

1988, renewed complaints and evidence of the use of

.,UN Doc.S/17932.

"UN Doc.S/18852.

"UN Doc.S/18870.

"UN Doc.S/18876.

258

chemical weapons were again produced by Iran. The

mission visited Iran and Iraq from 28 March-11 April

1988. The reported stated that chemical weapons had been

used against Iranian forces and civilians in Iran, and

also military personnel in Iraq had been affected by

it.M The Secretary-General sent two new investigatory

missions during the last months of the war. The mission

visited Iran and Iraq, twice in July 1988. These two

missions were dispatched after the Security Council

Resolution 612 {1988) was passed. It reaffirmed the

urgent necessity of strict observance of the protocol

for the prohibition of the use in war of Asphyxiating,

Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological methods

of warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925. It

expected both parties to refrain from the use, in

future, of chemical weapon in accordance with their

obligation under the Protocol. It called upon all states

to continue to apply or to establish strict control of

the export to the parties to the conflict of chemical

products serving for the production of chemical

weapons."

.. UN Doc.S/19823.

"'UN Doc.S/20134.

259

Factors Underlying Iran's Acceptance of Ceasefire Resolution

Three sets of events persuaded Iran to agree to a

ceasefire in mid-1988. First was the intensive use by

Iraq of long-range missiles on cities and use of

chemical weapons on the front. Second was a change in

the military balance of power on the ground and

particularly the collapse of the morale of Iranian

forces. Third factor was Iran's increasing isolation.

Iraq launched the war of the cities at the end of

February 1988.• Unlike earlier aerial raids on Iranian

urban centres, Iraq used this time long-range missiles

acquired from the Soviet Union that could be fired from

Iraqi bases at targets over 300 kms away, deep inside

Iran. For the next six weeks Teheran and other major

cities and towns were targets of intense missile

attacks. Iraq fired more than 200 missiles at the

Iranian capital, all of which fell randomly, causing

great consternation and led to the flight of nearly half

the population. About six million residents took refuge

in more distant areas . ., The effect of these

.. Gary Sick, "Trial by Error: Reflections on the Iran-Iraq War", Middle East Journal (Washington, D.C.), vol.43, no.2, 1989, p.241.

"'Eric Hooglund, "The Islamic Republic at War and Peace", Middle East Report, no.186, January-February 1989, p.10.

260

indiscriminate terror attacks was to instill panic in

the urban population. After the war, Rafsanjani was to

claim that of a total of 133,000 Iranians killed, 10-

11,000 deaths were attributed to air and missile attacks

on cities.a

In April 1988 Iraq went on the offensive, using

brutal but effective tactics to put pressure upon Iran

to finally accept the ceasefire. Well-planned and

coordinated attacks by Iraqis led to the recapture of

all the territories that Iranians had earlier seized

from them. Iraq's series of military victories began

with the recapture of the Southern Fao Peninsula in

April 1988. The Peninsula had been occupied by Iran for

more than two years. A month later, Iraq drove Iranian

forces out of the Shalamoleh area east of Basra, before

going on to recapture in June the oil rich Majnoon

islands and in July the Zubeidat area in the North

East.w Finally, the Iraqi army drove into Iranian

territory, where it destroyed the cohesion of Iranian

forces and carried back to Iraq massive amount of

Iranian equipment. In this offensive Iraq also took

"Shahram ~hubin, 11 The Last Phase of the Iran-Ira"! War: From Stalemate to Ceasefire 11 , Third World Quarterly (London), vol.11, no.12, April 1989, p.11.

wsunday Observer (London), 24 July 1988.

261

additional Iranian prisoners of war partially to offset

Iraq's POWs held in Iran.•

The string of Iraqi military victories hastened

Iranian leaders to get Khomeini's approval for Iran's

acceptance of a ceasef ire. In some of these Iraqi

offensives chemical weapons were used. Rafsanjani was

later to tell the Revolutionary Guards that the war had

shown chemical and biological weapons to be 'very

decisive', and that "all the moral teachings of the

world are not very effective when war reaches a serious

position" .••

Iran's isolation, both political and military, and

the threat of future comprehensive arms embargo

increased the psychological pressure on Iran. The

Operation staunch, in existence since 1984, was taken

more seriously by the us which appeared to be in a

vengeful mood after the 'Irangate' revelations. European

governments also began to take the issue more seriously.

Thus, Iran's access to arms was being curtailed at

precisely the time when its strategy called for more

.. Phebe Marr, "The Iran-Iraq War : The View from Iraq", in Christopher c. Joyner, ed., The Persian Gulf r·lar : Lessons for Strategy, Law and Diplomacy (Nevi York, 1990) 1 P• 68 •

~chubin, n.88, p.l2.

262

resources and when existing stocks could no longer be

revised to serve as improvised replacements.

The destruction of an Iranian civilian Airbus by a

missile of a US naval vessel in early July 1988 provided

a convenient occasion for the announcement of the

acceptance of ceasefire. The World's lukewarm response

to the shooting down of their airliner was a clear

signal to the Iranians that their isolation in the

international community was virtually complete. Despite

the enormity of the mistake, Iran was unable to muster

sufficient support at the UN to condemn the US action.

Its isolation and weakness were never more apparent. As

Rafsanjani noted just before the Airbus incident, 'we

created enemies for ourselves' in the international

communities. 'We have not spent enough time seeing that

they become friends'.n The Airbus incident was preceded

by US taking military action against Iranian naval

installations and warships in the Gulf. These two

incidents gave clear indication of possible direct US

military involvement in the war against Iran. Iran was

not prepared to take on USA as well. Hence, it opted for

the ceasef ire that the UN had proposed about a year

back .

.,Gary Sick, "The United States and the Persian Gulf" in Hanns W. Maull and Otto Pick eds., The Gulf War : Regional and International Dimensions (London, 1989) , p.135.

263

UN Mediated Peace Efforts for Implementation of Security council Resolution 598 and its failure

The Secretary-General announced on 9 August 1988

that the two countries would observe ceasefire from 20

August and begin "direct talks" five days later in

Geneva to implement Resolution 598. According to the

terms of that resolution the ceasefire should be

followed by a withdrawal of all Iranian and Iraqi armed

forces to their own territories, and by negotiations

leading to a permanent peace treaty. While the cease-

fire was maintained, no progress was made on other

issues. Shatt al-Arab river, which forms the common

border between Iran and Iraq, immediately emerged as the

major issue dividing the two countries. Other issues

also proved to be equally intractable: withdrawal of

Iraqi forces from Iranian territory, exchange of POWs,

the fate of Iraqi Kurds who had fled to Iran during the

war, status of Iraqi nationals of Iranian origin who had

been expelled into Iran, reparations, and Iran's

insistence on the right to search for contraband on

vessels bound to and from Iraq.

UN mediated talks held in Geneva on 25 August 1988

under the cr.airmans[lip of UN Secretary-General, socn

reached a deadlock over the Shatt al-Arab issue.•• Iraq

"Liesl Garz, "Struck in the Sludge", Middle East International (London), no.333, 9 September 1988, p.5.

264

felt that it deserved more than a return to the status

quo ante. For Iraq, a simultaneous implementation of all

aspects of Resolution 598 was unfavourable for Iraq

since it would have to give up conquered Iranian

territory and deal with an impartial body designed to

determine the aggressor in the war, which could have led

to costly reparations (paragraph 6 of the resolution).

Iraqis also called on Iran to cease its interception of

Gulf shipping. They requested an immediate exchange of

POWs, since Iran had roughly twice as many as Iraq. Iran

did not give in to Iraqi pressure and, insisted on

complete Iraqi withdrawal before a comprehensive, rather

than sequential, implementation of Resolution 598 could

occur ... Negotia-tions were adjourned on 13 September

1988 and were resumed briefly in New York on 1 October

1988.

The second round of negotiations that began in New

York made little progress. It began with Secretary-

General, Perez de Cuellar, presenting a compromise plan

to break the deadlock. He asked Iran to guarantee the

right of passage for Iraqi shipping in the Gulf and to

allow Shatt al-Arab waterway to be reopened, and called

on both sides to follow through on mutual withdrawal of

.. Liesl Garz, "Sour Stalemate", Middle East International, no.334, 23 September 1988, pp.11-12.

265

occupation forces.~ Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz,

addressing the UN on 6 October told that Iraq would

withdraw from Iranian territory only after Iran had

agreed to clear Shatt al-Arab and cease its searches of

Iraqi ships in the Strait of Hormuz.• Iran tentatively

agreed that it would halt these searches.

The deadlock in the September deliberation gave way

to third round of talks that were held in Geneva. The

third round commenced on 1 November 1988. It ended in a

stalemate on 5 November, after having failed to agree on

troops withdrawal or on exchange of POWs. At the

conclusion of the peace talks, the UN Special

Representative, Jan K. Eliasson, admitted that on

substantive issues there was no breakthrough or any

major progress.~ The only tangible result of this round

of talks was an agreement reached in discussions with

ICRC to exchange sick POWs but not the 100,000 who were

well. An agreement was reached on 11 November, on the

exchang~ of sick and wounded prisoners. The two parties

"Charles G. MacDonald, "Iran, Iraq and the Ceasefire Negotiations : Contemporary Legal Issues", in Christopher c. Joyner, ed., The Persian Gulf War: Lessons for strategy, Law and Diplomacy (New York, 1990) 1 p.213.

-Foreign Broadcast Information Services-Near East and South Asia (FBIS-NES), 6 October 1988, pp.26-36.

~The Hindu, 12 November 1988.

266

agreed to a proposal by the ICRC to exchange 1158 sick

and wounded Iraqis for 411 Iranian POWs, all to be

repatriated during a three-week period beginning 20

November 1988." Finally, Iran unilaterally released 80

sick POWs in February 1989.w

The fourth round of negotiations began on 20 April

1989 and ended within three days because of conflicting

views over the dredging of the Shatt al-Arab and Iraqi

troop withdrawal from Iranian territory. The Secretary-

General presented a four-point proposal:~

(a) Withdrawal to international boundaries based on 1975 accord;

(b) Iran's self-restraint in searching ships;

(c) Mutual exchange of POWs; and

(d) Opening of the Shatt al-Arab.

He also suggested a new timetable that called for troop

withdrawals within 15 days and exchange of POWs within

60 days. The Iraqi Foreign Minister reportedly indicated

that withdrawal was not possible:until the dredging of

Shatt al-Arab was completed.'•' Iran maintained that the

"The Statesman, 13 November 1988.

"Liesl Garz, "Sigr..s of RisiEg Confidence", Middle East International, no.349, 28 April 1989, p.13.

~FBIS-NES, 24 April 1989, p.69.

101 Ib id. I p. 17 .

impasse was due to Iraq's obstinate, unacceptable claim

to sovereignty over the entire Shatt al-Arab. It also

complained that Iraq's reluctance to implement

Resolution 598 stemmed from the lack of resolve by

Security Council members to apply pressure on Iraq,

since they were concerned with their own political

interests than with the implementation of justice.=

The deadlock in the talks was carried over into the

Summer of 1989 with no breakthrough in sight. Both the

parties persisted in calling for the implementation of

Resolution 598, but with fundamental disagreement on the

applicability of the 1975 Algiers Accord concerning the

boundary of Shatt al-Arab. In November 1989, the UN

Special Envoy, Jan Eliassen, began a 16-day mission of

shuttle diplomacy between Iran and Iraq, to break the

deadlock.m However, Iraq did not compromise its

position on the Shatt al-Arab issue, and no positive

result came from the mission.

In order to break the deadlock 1 Saddam Hussein came

out with a proposal. In his Army Day speech on 5 January

1990, Saddam Hussein offered alternate meetings in

~FBIS-NES, 4 May 1989, p.52 .

.... Andrew T. Parasli ti, "Iran and Iraq : Changing Relations and Future Prospects", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar 1 eds. 1 Iran and the Arab World (London, 1993}, p.226.

268

Teheran and Baghdad under UN auspices, an immediate

exchange of sick POWs, and the reopening of airline

offices in both the countries for exchange of religious

groups to each country 1 s holy places.,.. Iran did not

reject this proposal, but responded favourably to a

Soviet offer of mediation. Iran's Ambassador to the UN

clearly stated that his country's acceptance of the

Soviet offer was conditional on its content. He said

that the Iran-Iraq talks that were expected to be held

in Moscow must pursue the implementation of Resolution

598 and also be based on the premise of the Algiers

Accord which lays down the Iran-Iraq boundary .••• This

initiative did not progress any further due to

complications over the Shatt al-Arab and POWs issues.

Prior to the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq launched a

major peace initiative with Iran in the Spring of 1990.

Saddam Hussein in his letter to Rafsanjani on 21 April

1990, proposed direct meetings between the Iranian and

Iraqi leadership, mediated by King Fahd of Saudi

Arabia.~ In responding to Saddam 1 s letter, Rafsanjani

stressed Iran 1 s desire for a "lasting peace in the

framework of Resolution 598, and this absolutely was not

------------------------- ---·--~FBIS-NES, 5 January 1990, p.17.

""The Hindu, 17 January 1990.

~FBIS-NES, 1 November 1990, p.40.

269

a tactic". He declared that the "continued occupation of

part of our land could stop our movement to achieve

peace".,., Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, Ali Mohammed

Besharati, said, "Iran is ready to have direct talks

with Iraq under the supervision of the United

Nations" .... Iran continued to stress the importance of

Resolution 598 and the role of the United Nations. Its

main concern was that Iraq would use direct talks to

undermine a UN sponsored dialogue. However, Saddam

Hussein did encourage secret meetings at the United

Nations in Geneva between the Iranian and Iraqi

ambassadors and was happy about Rafsanjani's implicit

acceptance of direct talks.~

The final statement of the Baghdad Arab Summit, in

May 1990, called for resuming direct talks between Iran

and Iraq under the UN Secretary General, 'in a manner

which ensures Iraq's rights and sovereignty over its

territory, particularly its historic right over the

Shatt al-Arab. The Iranian Foreign Ministry declared the

summit declaration to be in contradiction with Iraq's

peace gestures."" President Rafsanjani said that the

~Ibid., pp.40-41.

*FBIS-NES, 10 May 1990, p.41.

•FBIS-NES, 19 May 1990, pp.41-43.

""Parasliti, n.l03, p.230.

270

"resolution of the Baghdad summit discouraged us in our

assumption that the Iraqis are serious in the

establishment of peace" •11' Further in a letter dated 18

June 1990 to Saddam Hussein, he maintained his country's

interests in involving the United Nations, "confining

the peace process to direct talks will be avoided and we

will not close off other paths to ourselves, including

the main road which has already been partly

travelled". •u

On 1 July 1990, Saddam Hussein publicly revealed

that Iranian and Iraqi representatives were meeting

directly; a reference to secret talks in Geneva.m For

the first time the Foreign Ministers of Iran and Iraq

met face-to-face on 3 July 1990 since the ceasefire. The

first round of expert talks were set up in Geneva under

the supervision of UN Special Envoy Jan Eliasson. A

statement was issued stressing their commitment to

Resolution 598 and the importance of mediating role by

the United Nations.~ How~ver, it failed. Iran insisted

that Iraq should first withdraw its troops from Iranian

territory. But, Iraq said that the two sides should

"'FBIS-NES, 6 June 199J, pp.43-44.

'"FBIS-NES, 18 June 1990, pp.43-45.

'uFBIS-NES, 3 July 1990, p.20.

"'FBIS-NES, 5 July 1990, pp.12-13.

271

first agree to clear war debris in the Shatt al-Arab.

Iraq also wanted a quick exchange of POWs. •u

Saddam Hussein's letter on 16 July 1990 probably,

reflected his feeling of urgency in conciliating Iran

before invading Kuwait. He offered to send a special

Iraqi envoy to Iran to sort out the difference between

them. Further, on 30 July 1990, he tendered a new

proposal which offered troop withdrawal and POWs

repatriation within two months. Diplomatic relations

would be re-established and the section of Resolution

598 dealing with culpability for the war would be

disregarded. However, Saddam Hussein did not offer any

real shift on the Shatt al-Arab issue.',.

Kuwaiti Crisis and its impact upon Iran-Iraq relations

The situation changed abruptly when Iraq attacked

Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and annexed it. While strongly

condemning Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait,

Iran's neutral stance during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis led

to closer relations between Iran and Gulf Arab states.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry said,

Iran rejects any form of resor~ing to force a solution to regional problems. It considers

"'New Strait Times (Kuala Lumpur), 5 July 1990.

"6FBIS-NES, 1 November 1990, pp.45-47.

Iraq's military action against Kuwait contrary to stability and security in the Persian Gulf region and condemns it ... Iran calls for the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops to recognized international borders and for a peaceful solution to the dispute.'"

-)

Though condemning the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, Iran

was totally opposed to massive build-up of Western

forces in the Gulf. The condemnation of Iraq presented

Teheran with an opportunity to improve its ties with the

outside world.

Saddam Hussein, in his letter to Rafsanjani on 3

August 1990, emphasized Iraq's "interest in peace as

soon as possible so that we can keep the two countries

out of the whirlwind of change in the region"."' On 15

August 1990, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein unilaterally

conceded the three major points of contention with Iran.

He agreed to accept the Shatt al-Arab boundary as

defined by the 1975 Algiers Accord, to evacuate the

occupied Iranian territory within a week and to

implement an exchange of POWs. ... On 17 August 1990,

Iraqi troops started withdrawing from Iranian territory

leaving only police and border security guards on the

frontier. Iraqi President's decision to withdraw his

""FBIS-NES, 3 August 1990, pp.47-48.

'"FBIS-NES, 1 November 1990, pp.47-48.

"•International Herald Tribune (Paris), 16 August 1990.

273

troops from Iranian territory was apparently meant to

deploy them against Western and Arab forces along the

Saudi border with Kuwait. Regarding the withdrawal of

Iraqi troops from Iran, the Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar

Velayati, told Radio Teheran, "this was the biggest

victory of the Islamic Republic of Iran throughout its

history". 120

Iran's rapproachment with Iraq, was motivated by a

desire to resolve the outstanding conflicts with its

neighbour to Iran's advantage. During his visit to

Teheran on 10 September 1990, Iraqi Foreign Minister

Tariq Aziz officially proposed to normalize relations

between them. The two foreign ministers agreed to set up

a joint committee, meeting alternately in Teheran and

Baghdad, to oversee repatriation of all POWs.m By the

time Iraq had withdrawn completely from Iran more than

half of the POWs had returned home. He offered a peace

treaty and non-aggression pact to Iran.w

The two countries decided to re-establish

diplomatic links. In his visit to Iran on 10 October

llOibid.

11'Times of India, 10 September 1990.

112Dilip Hiro, "The Iran-Iraq War" in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar, eds., Iran and the Arab World (London, 1993}, p.66.

274

1990, Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister, Wisam al-Zahawis,

re-established diplomatic relations on 14 October and

also signed an agreement to set up a Joint Military

Committee to deal with border issues.w Iraq reportedly

offered to expel the Mojaheddin-e-khalq, the main

Iranian opposition group, from Iraq in order to appease

Iran.~ The border issue was discussed during the visit

of Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council Vice-Chairman,

Izzat Ibrahim, to Iran in January 1991. Iran and Iraq

agreed on half-a-mile wide border buffer zone. Thus, ten

years after the outbreak of the war, mutual relations

returned to normalcy. But there was a difference. While

in September 1980 the Iranian government was isolated

and insecure, a decade later the regime in Baghdad found

itself in a similar situation.

The Kuwaiti crisis not only isolated Iraq, but the

Security Council resolutions also enabled the so-called

coalition forces under the US leadership to attack Iraq,

to liberate Kuwait. Iraq came under air attack. The

arrival of over 100 Iraqi aircrafts in Iran in January­

February 1991 also posed a potential dilemma for Iran's

'neutrality' during the Kuwaiti crisis. Iran declared

that these aircrafts were to be impounded until after

wFBIS-NES, 19 October 1990, p.51.

~Parasliti, n.103, p.235.

275

the war, and there was even some speculation that Iran

might hold on to the aircrafts as reparations from Iraq.

Rafsanj ani apparently rejected a request by Iraqi Deputy

Prime Minister Saddoun Hammadi that the aircrafts be

released in the event of an attack by Israel on Iraq.w

However, on 23 February 1991, the day on which US-led

military forces began their ground offensive to liberate

Kuwait, Foreign Minister Velayati said, "an Israeli

attack on any Muslim country is unbearable for us, and

in that case we will not be neutral"."' Iran's conduct

during the war was designed to maximize its political

advantages. It refused to be drawn into an alliance with

Iraq, and held on to the aircrafts.

The military defeat of Iraq in 1991 and the

subsequent civil war in that country caused Iran to

abandon its neutral stance and in effect side with the

anti-Iraq coalition forces in calling for Saddam

Hussein's overthrow. The damages inflicted on the holy

Shii shrines in Iraqi cities of Najaf and Karbala during

Baghdad government's attack to contain the Shii

uprisings in the south further alienated the Iranian

authorities and caused Iran to encourage the Shii

uprisings. Although Iran's interests dictate that Iraq

'"Ibid. I p.238.

126lbid.

remain intact

government be

leadership was

and that a

established

well aware

276

stable and non-hostile

in Baghdad, the Iranian

that a stable and non-

threatening Iraq must empower its large Shii population

and its Kurdish minority. That is why President

Rafsanjani in his speech on 8 March 1991 urged Saddam

Hussein to "step down and give in to the will of the

people of Iraq".m It was a reflection of Iran's desire

to maintain Iraq's territorial cohesion while

undermining its nemesis - the ruling Baath Party in

Baghdad and Saddam Hussein.

Prisoners of War (POWs}

The Prisoners of War (POWs) issues has been a

contentious point between Iran and Iraq, since the

ceasefire agreement was reached. Article 3 of the

Resolution 598 "urges the POWs be released and

repatriated without delay after the cessation of active

hostilities in accordance with the Third Geneva

Convention of 12 August 1949". Since the hostilities

ended with the ceasefire taking effect on 20 August

1988, the International Committee of the Red Cross

(ICRC) , on 23 August 1988, sent a letter to both

countries stressing the obligation to return the POWs.

minternational Herald Tribune, 9 March 1991.

277

According to UN report on POWs on 1 September 1988, Iran

held approximately 70,000 Iraqis and Iraq held about

35,000 Iranians. In addition to those POWs identified by

the UN, Iraq claims that Iran holds "more than 30,000 11

Iraqi POWs who have not been registered by the ICRC.m

Iran also claimed that Iraq had seized 700 Iranians

after the ceasefire agreement had been reached.~

The ICRC sent a memorandum on 4 October 1988, to

each country that called for the release of POWs under

Article 118 of the 1949 Geneva Convention concerning

POWs, and also under Resolution 598. Iraq consented to

the ICRC proposals,w but Iran refused, maintaining that

cessation of hostilities would remain in question until

Iraq withdrew from all Iranian territory.m During the

third round of talks between Iran and Iraq, an agreement

was reached on ICRC's proposal to exchange sick and

wounded prisoners on proportional basis. The November

1988 agreement called for 1,158 Iraqi prisoners to be

released by Iran in return for 411 Iranians. The

exchange was supposed to take ten days, with 115 Iraqis

and 41 Iranians released each day. The exchange of POWs

wFBIS-NES, 19 April 1989, p.19.

wFBIS-NES, 9 May 1989, p.53.

""UN Doc. S/20888.

mFBIS-NES, 7 February 1989, p.21.

278

began on 24 November, but was suspended by Iran on 27

November 1988.~ Iran asserted that Iraq was not

returning the requisite number of POWs and therefore it

stopped the exchange.... However, Iran had sent three

groups of 52, 51 and 52, while Iraqis had sent groups of

19, 18 and 19. The result was the release of 155 Iraqis

and 56 Iranians.

While the agreement on the return of sick and

wounded POWs was honoured only in part, both Iran and

Iraq have released a considerable number of such

prisoners unilaterally. Although figures vary

considerably, Iran in 19 stages has released 1, 346

disabled Iraqi POWs, but Iraq has only freed 949 Iranian

POWs, including 459 civilians .... Iran claimed, since

October 1984, that it had arranged monthly family visits

of POWs. Also, it released 1,456 sick and wounded POWs,

as well as 49 non-Iraqi captives ....

UNITED NATIONS IRAN-IRAQ MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP (UNIIMOG)

The acceptance of Resolution 598 by Iran on 17 July

1988, paved the way for the Secretary-General to decide

wFBIS-NES, 26 January 1989, p.60 .

.... Ibid.

,..FBIS-NES, 11 April 1989, p.51.

wuN Doc. S/21078.

279

that ceasefire would begin on 20 August 1988. The first

task for the United Nations was the establishment of a

peacekeeping force to monitor the ceasefire. on 9 August

1988, the Security Council adopted Resolution 619, by

which it decided to set up United Nations Iran-Iraq

Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG). Two days later, Perez

de Cuellar named Major General Slavko Jovic of

Yugoslavia to head UNIIMOG as its Chief Military

Observer. Both countries announced ceasef ire, which went

into effect at 0300 hrs GMT on 20 August 1988, silencing

the guns along their 1,200 km war front after almost

eight years of fighting that had killed upto a million

people. A 350-man force of blue-berets from 24 countries

took up positions along the border to monitor the

ceasef ire."' It was entrusted with the task of

establishing ceasefire lines, monitoring compliance with

ceasefire and supervising the withdrawal of all forces

to the internationally recognized boundaries.

The Secretary-General's report on 25 October

1988, stated that the patrols had the double task of

verifying the Forward Defence Lines (FDLs) occupied by

the two sides when the ceasefire came into effect and of

defusing confrontations resulting from actual or alleged

~Times (London), 11 August 1988.

280

breaches of the ceasefire.m By February 1989, a total

of 409 UN military observers had been stationed in the

area. This included 350 ground observers, 18 members of

an air unit, 37 military police, and 4 medical

personnel. There were also 117 international civilian

staff members and 41 local staff members. The main

functions of these forces have been to monitor the

ceasefire and facilitate troop withdrawal. According to

the Secretary-General's report of 2 February 1989, "As

of January 1989, UNIIMOG had received 1,960 complaints

of alleged ceasefire violations".... He explained that

"ceasefire violations have generally consisted of the

movement of troops or the establishment of observation

posts {OPs) or other portions of FDLs and engineering

works to strengthen defensive positions".~

Resolution 642 of 29 September 1989, extended the

mandate of UNIIMOG until 31 March 1990. The Secretary­

General's report of 22 March 1990 stated that the

UNIIMOG had successfully monitored the compliance with

ceasefire. He explained that, "As the withdrawal of

forces to internationally recognized border has not yet

taken place, parts of UNIIMOG mandate remain

"'UN Doc. S/20242

"'Ibid.

"•Ibid.

281

unimplemented".~ On 29 March 1990, the Council adopted

Resolution 651 which extended the mandate of UNIIMOG

until 30 September 1990.

The situation changed drastically with the Iraqi

occupation of Kuwait in August 1990. Iraq started the

withdrawal of its troops on 17 August 1990. UNIIMOG's

operations have been confined primarily to monitoring

the withdrawal of all forces to the internationally

recognized boundaries as mandated by the Security

Council. The main problem experienced in the withdrawal

process has been the danger of mines. Following the

withdrawal, UNIIMOG proposed to both parties for the

establishment of areas of separation and of arms

limitations along the internationally recognized

boundaries. In particular, it proposed that neither side

should deploy military forces closer than one kilometre

to the boundaries."'' In his report, the Secretary­

General stated that UNIIMOG concentrat2d its efforts on

supervising, verify:ing and confirming the withdrawal of

the two sides' forces and their assumption of new

positions on or close to the border. It defused any

local tensions that occurred. However, on 20 November

1990 there were still 18 Iraqi positions that UNIIMOG

~UN Doc., S/21200.

•••UN Doc., S/21803.

282

judged to be on the Iranian side of the border and 24

Iranian positions that were judged to be on the Iraqi

side.~ Further, on 28 October 1990, the Chief Military

Observer convened the first meeting of the Mixed

Military Working Group. However, it was cancelled due to

certain difficulties of political nature that could not

be solved at the technical and military level.w

With the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in August 1990,

the Secretary-General called for a reduction of UNIIMOG

forces in the region.' .. He also recommended UNIIMOG to

resolve the remaining problems on the border and try to

arrange an exchange of information on unmarked mine

fields.w According to report of Secretary-General on 28

January 1991, the activities of UNIIMOG were

considerably affected by the developments in the Persian

Gulf region. The outbreak of hostilities in the area

effectively prevented UNIIMOG from continuing its

operations in Iraq and all UNIIMOG personnel in Iraq had

to be temporarily relocated.' .. The majority of them were

moved either to Cyprus or to Iran. As on 26 January

... UN Doc., S/21960 .

"'l!)id.

... UN Doc., S/21960 .

... Ibid.

... UN Doc., S/22148 .

283

1991, Iran had withdrawn from 13 out of 17 disputed

positions and Iraq had withdrawn from 23 out of 29 such

positions."'

In a technical meeting between military delegation

of both parties, held at Teheran on 6 January 1991,

substantive agreement was reached on matters relating to

UNIIMOG's task. The two parties reached agreements on

the question of disputed positions along the

internationally recognized boundaries. It was agreed

that they would all be removed by 22 January 1991 and

that UNIIMOG would then verify and confirm the

completion of the withdrawal of all forces to the

internationally recognized boundaries in accordance with

13 June 1975 border agreement.~ On 20 February 1991,

UNIIMOG was able to confirm that the last of the

disputed positions along the internationally recognized

boundaries had been withdrawn. This enabled UNIIMOG to

complete verification and confirmation of the withdrawal

in accordance with its mandate deriving from Para 1&2 of

Security Council Resolution 598 (1987) .~

"'Ibid.

-uN Doc., S/22148.

-uN Doc., S/22263.

284

The Secretary-General established a UN Office of

the Secretary-General in Iran (UNOSGI) and in Iraq (also

referred to as UNOSGI). The legal status, privileges and

immunities of the office at Teheran and Baghdad, was

concluded on 3 June and 27 June 1991, respectively, with

both the governments.~ Six military observers, provided

by six different states, were attached to UNOSGI, three

of them based at Baghdad and other three at Teheran.w

Both, Iran and Iraq, alleged ceasefire violations by the

other. UNOSGI at Baghdad was able to respond to 37 Iraqi

requests for investigation. In 30 of these 37 instances

the investigations carried out by the military observers

led to the conclusion that the alleged violations should

be confirmed. UNOSGI at Teheran carried out 11

investigations at the request of Iranian authorities, as

a result of which it confirmed eight ceasefire

violations.w However, the operations of UNIIMOG came to

an end by February 1991. The Secretary-General

recommended the Council not to extend the mandate of

UNIIMOG beyond 28 February 1991 .... The same day the

~Doc., S/23246.

'"Ibid.

"'Ibid.

''-'UN Doc . , s I 2 2 2 6 3 .

285

Security Council confirmed the recommendation of

Secretary-General.~

The Iran-Iraq war had its impact not only in the

regional level, but also at global level. Peace

initiatives taken by International Organizations, like

NAM and ore, did not materialize. They passed resolution

after resolution, and offered peace plans, without any

effect on the belligerents. The UN which mediated right

from the beg inning of the war, was able to bring a

ceasefire between Iran and Iraq only in 1988. Rather, it

reflected the spirit of co-operation between the

Permanent Members of the Security Council to seek an end

to the conflict. Iran's acceptance of Resolution 598

followed after a number of setbacks on the battlefield

and also after the united States had showed its

willingness to fire at Iranian targets. This led to Iran

to accept the UN ceasefire resolution on 18 July 1988

and ceasefire came into effect on 20 August 1988. UN

military observers were deployed between the Iranian and

Iraqi border in order to verify their compliance with

the ceasef ire agreement negotiated by the UN Secretary·­

General on the basis of Security Council Resolution

~uN Doc., S/22280.

286

598.m Although ceasefire brought peace, bitterness

remained. The deadlock in the talks remained till July

1990 with no breakthrough in sight. The situation

changed with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August

1990. Iraq withdrew all its troops to international

border and agreed to abide by the 1975 Algiers accord.

Though the crisis has been contained, yet, there is no

sign that the conflict will be resolved in the near

future, as both the parties are yet to sign a peace

treaty between them.

l»For the complete text of UN Resolution 598 see Appendix-IV.