chapter iv the monroe doctrine, allied...

CHAPTER IV

THE MONROE DOCTRINE, ALLIED DOCTRINES, ANDINTERVENTION

French intervention in Mexico—Chile and Mexico on the Monroe Doctrine—Theboundary dispute between Venezuela and Great Britain—Hispanic-American approvalof Cleveland's policy—Interiention in Cuba—The Blockade of Venezuela by Europeanpowers—The Calvo and Drago Doctrines—The 'Roosevelt corollary of the MonroeDoctrine—Fiscal intervention by the United States in the Dominican Republic—TheSecond Hague Conference and the forcible collection of public debts—The Tnbar Doc-trine—The Central American Peace Conference of 1907—Interposition in CentralAmerica—The Magdalena Bay Resolution—Garcia Calderon and Oliveira Lima on inter.vention and the Monroe Doctrine—"Watchful waiting" and the Mexican imbroglio

Formany years alter the Old World and the New were startledby the Monroe Doctrine no occasion arose which imperativelydemanded the application of that doctrine to Hispanic America.Yet from time to time American statesmen expressed theiropinions concerning its scope and content. After the middle ofthe nineteenth century some significant interpretations andapplications of that elastic doctrine were made. In this chapterwe shalt devote some attention to the reactions which thoseapplications produced in hispanic-American states- A signifi-cant case that involved an application of the Monroe Doctrineresulted front policy which three European powers adoptedtoward Mexico when the United States was being torn by theCivil War.

It was with an appreciation of historic values that the giftedAmerican cartoonist, Thomas Nast, depicted Napoleon IIIattired in the discarded clothes of Napoleon I. European inter-vention in Mexico took its origins from an attempt by France,in conjunction with England and Spain, to enforce the paymentof troublesome pecuniary claims. In July, 1861, at the close ofa civil war, the Mexican government decided that it would sus-pend payments on its foreign "debts" for two years- Some of

101

102 HISPANIC—AMERICAN RELATIONS

those debts were exorbitant or fraudulent. The most notoriouswas the claim of Jeeker and Company for fifteen million dollarswhich was represented by bonds received for a cash payment ofseven hundred and fifty thousand dollars to an ephemeral Mexi-can government. Apparently both the English and the FrenchGovernments had in prospect the ultimate participation by theiragents in the collection of Mexico's customs duties.'

In October, 1186:1, England, France, and Spain signed a con-vention by which they agreed to dispatch a joint expedition toAmerica in order to seize some fortresses upon the Mexicancoast. This convention stipulated that in the use of coercivemeasures the contracting parties would neither seek to acquireany territory or special advantage, nor would they interfere inthe internal affairs of the government of Mexico. 2 As she alsohad claims against Mexico, the United States was invited to jointhe expedition; but Secretary of State Seward declined to par-ticipate in the use of force against a friendly neighbor. Heinformed the allied governments that the United States had a"deep interest" that no territory should be acquired as theresult of intervention in Mexico and that no change should takeplace which would impair the right of the Mexicans to selecttheir own form of government.3 After capturing Vera Cruz, theEnglish and the Spanish commanders adjusted their respectiveclaims with the Mexican Government and withdrew theirsoldiers. France declined to make a similar settlement: thecourse of events amply demonstrated that Napoleon Ill aimedto supplant the Mexican president, Benito Juárez, by a mon-archy supported by French bayonets.

In June, 1863, the invading army captured the city of Mexico.The French commander soon convoked a subservient junta ofnotables, which decided that a monarchy should be establishedin Mexico and that Archduke Maximilian of Austria should beinvited to occupy the throne. Hence, on September 26, 1863,

Secretary Seward instructed the American minister in Paris toinform the French Government that its policy in Mexico was dis-

Bancrnft, Ilutory of Mcneo, voL vT, pp 18, 35-38first ash and Forrign State Papers, vol. u, pp. 63-05.The Present Condition of Mezi, pp. 390, 391, 395.

MONROE DOCTRINE AND INTERVENTION 103

pleasing to the United States; Seward expressed his opinion thatthe Mexican people preferred a republican and domestic govern-ment to foreign institutions; and he warned France that theUnited States would not be likely to neglect such measures asmight be necessary for the safety of a sovereign state. 4 OnApril 4, 1864, the House of Representatives adopted a resolu-tion which declared that it did not accord "with the policy ofthe United States to acknowledge any monarchical governmenterected on the ruins of any republican government in Americaunder the auspices of any European Power. " 6 In the followingJuly Maximilian was seated upon the Mexican throne, whilePresident Juârez had transferred his government to El Paso delNorte (JuIrez).

The United States Government consistently declined to recog-nize Emperor Maximilian and treated President Juárez as thehead of the true government of Mexico. After General Lee'ssoldiers had laid down their arms at Appomattox Court House,Secretary Seward made stronger and stronger representations toFrance against her intervention in Mexico. On November 6,1865, the American minister in Paris was instructed to informthe French minister of foreign affairs that the "presence andoperations of a French army in Mexico, and its maintenance ofan authority there, resting upon force and not the free will ofthe people of Mexico" was "a cause of serious concern to theUnited States. "0 About six weeks later Seward transmittedthe warning that the prosecution by French soldiers of a designto establish a "foreign monarchy" upon the ruins of a "domes-tic republican government" in Mexico would inevitably jeop-ardize the friendly relations which the United States earnestlydesired to cultivate with France.? That secretary's insistentobjections to the pressure of French troops in Mexico—whichwere probably reenforced by the French Emperor's convictionthat his soldiers might be needed in Europe—ultimately induced

'Message of the President of the United States to Congress at the Commencement of thePint Session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress, pt it, pp. 782,782.

'Congrcsnond Globe, vol xxxiv, jfl it, p. 1408Message of the President of the United States of March EO, 1860, relating to the Condi-

tion of Affairs in Mexico in ans,oerto a resolution of the House of December!!, !866,p. 487.Ubid.,p 490

104 HISPANIC–AMERICAN RELATIONS

Napoleon III to withdraw them completely. The last detach-ments sailed from Vera Cruz in the spring of 1867. Seward'swarnings transmitted through the American minister at Viennathat the United States could not view "with unconcern" Aus-trian support of Mexico's invaders evidently influenced Austriato discourage the enlistment of volunteers for the support ofthe hapless Maximilian. 8 In the meantime Republican soldiersdecisively defeated Imperialistic soldiers in Mexico. Maxi-milian, who still remained in Mexico, was captured by thefollowers of Juarez and court-martialled. He was shot at Que-rétaro on June 19, 1867. President Juárez soon entered the cityof Mexico amid the acclamations of the populace.

Although Secretary Seward did not evoke the Monroe Doc-trine by name, yet certain phrases which occur in his dispatches,as well as the logic of the situation, suggest that this doctrinewas not altogether unconnected with his opinion that Frenchusurpations in Mexico were a menace to his country. Promi-nent Mexicans were grateful for the influence thus exerted bytheir northern neighbor, but they did not forget that the UnitedStates had acquired large territories from them in 1848 as theresult of a war—an event the consideration of which is excludedfrom the scope of this volume. Opinions may differ regardingthe exact amount of influence which the policy of the UnitedStates had upon the French debacle in Mexico, yet the truthremains that in the eyes of many publicists the Monroe Doctrinehad scored it triumph.

French intervention in Mexico precipitated a discussion con-cerning the Monroe Doctrine in certain countries of HispanicAmerica. In the Chilean chamber of deputies, on July 30, 1864,when a motion to the effect that Chile would not recognizeMaximilian was being discussed, José V. Lastarria introduced abill containing one article:

The republic of Chile does not recognize as being in conformity withAmerican international law the acts of European intervention in Amer-ica, or the governments established as a result of such intervention,

'Message of the President of the United States of March 80, 1866, relating to the Condi-tion of Affairs in 3f extra in answer to a resolution of the House of December 11, 1865. p. 565.


even though such action may have been solicited. This republic doesnot recognize any agreement for a protectorate, a cession, a sale, orwhatsoever arrangement that impairs the sovereignty or the independ-ence of an American state in favor of European nations, or which hasas its object to establish a form of government antagonistic to therepublican, representative form adopted in Spanish America.2

In the debates upon this proposal Miguel L. Amunátcgui de-clared that it was the expression of a sentiment which was "deeplyrooted in the Chilean heart."bO Benjamin Vicufla Mackennadeclared that he favored the entire acceptance of Lastarria'smotion. The chamber of deputies approved the bill, only twovotes being cast against the proposed declaration."

On April 10, 1896, yielding to persons who desired an expres-sion of opinion about the Monroe Doctrine, the Mexican presi-dent said to congress that Mexico could not do less than showherself "the partisan of a, doctrine" that condemned as "con-trary to the established order any attack of monarchical Europeagainst the republics of America. . . . The course of our his-tory, especially the struggle of our people to cast off the yokeof an exotic empire of European origin and form and elements—as shown by the torrents of blood which were spilt in that rudeconflict—furnishes testimony to the world of our love for inde-pendence and our hatred for all foreign intervention."12

Those remarks were provoked by the Anglo Venezuelan con-troversy. In 1895 a boundary dispute which had been wagedfor a half century between the republic of Venezuela and GreatBritain about the ownership of valuable territory reached amost acute stage. Expanding front "the establishment of Deme-rara, Essequibo, and Bernice"—which they had secured bytreaty from Holland in 1814—the British had gradually pene-trated into territory that was claimed by Venezuela. TheBritish were the heirs of the Dutch, who were considered by theSpaniards as interlopers. At root the controversy was dtLc to aconflict between two different pri4ciples concerning the properbasis for territorial claims: the principle, inherited by the

'Senones del congrcso naeia,ict do 1864, p 352o Ibid, p 356 u bid, PP 358, 359.

12 As quoted in La lpo.o, June 2, 1896


Spanish Americans from Spain, that territorial claims couldproperly be based upon discovery, exploration, and vagueroyal grants; and the modern principle which rested territorialclaims mainly upon the actual settlement of the disputedterritory.

As early as 1822 the government of Great Colombia had in-structed its agent in London to direct the attention of the BritishGovernment to the necessity of determining the boundary linebetween Colombia and British Guiana, declaring that colonistsfrom Demerara and Bernice had occupied territory upon thebanks of the Essequibo River which rightly belonged to it.'In 1841, on behalf of the English Government, Robert H.Sehoinburgk explored Guiana and left boundary marks alongthe courses of the rivers Amacura and Cuyuni. Through herminister in London, Alejo Fortique, Venezuela protested againstthis action, and proposed in 1844 that the boundary line shouldbe the Essequibo River. The Fortique and Sehomburgk linesrepresented the extreme pretensions of the contending govern-ments at that juncture. From time to time the chancelleriesof those governments proposed various compromise lines. In1844 Lord Aberdeen proposed a line. Secretary Rojas of Ven-ezuela sketched a line in 1881. And, in the same year, LordGranville drew a compromise boundary. But the contendingparties could make no adjustment. From 1884 to 1886 theBritish extended their claims beyond the Sehomburgk line toinclude mining lands in the interior. On February 20, 1887,after vainly asking the British to evacuate valuable territorywhich they had occupied near the Orinoco's mouth, Venezuelaannounced that she had suspended diplomatic relations withGreat Britain; she protested against the acts of spoliation com-mitted by that government, and declared that she had in vainproposed to submit the controversy to arbitration."

As early as 1884 Venezuela had asked the United States tocheek the alleged encroachments of the British upon her soil.'Subsequently, the Venezuelan minister in Washington appealed

" Cadena. Ar,o!e, dip!om&icos de Cokm&,o. p. 442." Fornqn Relations of the United States. 1894, p SOS."Moore, Digest of Internal,onal Law, vol. Ni, pp. 540, 541.


to Secretary of State Bayard to facilitate the adjustment of thedispute by arbitration, declaring that "the doctrine of the im-mortal Monroe should possess all the vitality that the alarmingcircumstances" demanded." In January, 1894, the Venezue-lan minister at Washington called attention to the fact thatEngland had refused to arbitrate the controversy and pointedlyreferred to the declaration of the United States that the nationsof the American continent . . were not subject to coloniza-tion by any European power." From January to July of thatyear there were published in the Thar-io de Caracas a series ofarticles concerning the Guiana boundary which invoked theMonroe Doctrine. In discussing the question as to whether ornot that doctrine was applicable to the controversy this journaldeclared that upon one notable occasion the United States hadraised her voice against armed intervention in America therebyfrustrating the anti-republican designs of European powers."

The United States opposes the establishment of new colonies uponAmerican soil. The expansion of Demerara at the expense of Venezuelais equivalent to another acquisition of territory by Great Britain;and consequently it is to be condemned. The United States does notpermit that the form of government which the American republicshave adopted shall be altered. But in this case that is being done.For the districts which are taken from the Venezuelan republic are bythat transaction made possessions of monarchical England."

While this discussion was going on in the press of Caracas, aproffer of good offices and a proposal by the United States thatthe controversy should be submitted to arbitration was declinedby Great Britain. 20 In February, 1895, President Clevelandsigned a joint resolution favoring friendly arbitration."

On July 90, 1895, Secretary of State Richard Olney sent atrenchant dispatch to the American minister in London in whichhe protested concerning the extension of British power and in-fluence in derogation of the rights and wishes of Venezuela.

11 Cleveland. The Venezuelan Boundary Controversy. p 71.!lflj,j,, p 83."Limztes do Guayana, p. 3i Diana de Caracas, as quoted in Lhnüe, do Guayana, p 49."Cleveland, pp 84-8921 Congressional Record, vol xxvii, pt is, p 183. 1144, pt. in, p 262


Olney referred to the Monroe Doctrine by name as applicable tothis controersy and gave to that doctrine a most broad inter-pretation. He declared that the Monroe Doctrine had onlyone purpose and object: that "no European power or combina-tion of European powers shall forcibly deprive an Americanstate of the right and power of self-government and of shapingfor itself its own political fortunes and destinies." 22 After afew months' delay Lord Salisbury replied to assert that GreatBritain was neither imposing a " 'system' upon Venezuela" norwas she "concerning herself in any way with the nature of thepolitical institutions" under which the Venezuelans might preferto live. "The disputed frontier of Venezuela has nothing to dowith any of the questions dealt with by President Monroe."Salisbury repeated the declaration that, with regard to a cer-tain part of the disputed territory, England would not submither claims to arbitration. 23 President Cleveland apparentlythought that Great Britain viewed the Monroe Doctrine as a"mere plaything."" On December 17, 1895, he sent a specialmessage to Congress expounding the view that the extension ofboundaries by a European power so as to take possession of theterritory of a Hispanic-American state against her will consti-tuted a case under the Monroe Doctrine. He recommendedthat Congress make an appropriation for a commission to inves-tigate the facts and to report. He said:

When such report is made and accepted, it will in my opinion be theduty of the United States to resist by every means in its power as awillful aggression upon its rights and interests, the appropriation byGreat Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdictionover any territory which alter investigation we have determined ofright belongs to Venezuela.0

Notice should be taken that he was reported to have said inprivate conversation that this was "a peace message, the onlyway to prevent a probable collision between the two nations."28

" Moore, Digest of Jn/cr,iaho,ial !,au', vol 'i, p 519.nThd,p .56i' Cleveland, p . 107.

Moore, Digest of International Law, vol. Vi, p 67926 Rhodes, 'Cleveland's Adnilnistrations," in &ribiier's Maganiie, vol i,, p 611-


Denounced from some pulpits in the United States, criticizedvigorously by certain English journalists, Cleveland's belligerentmessage was greeted with joy in Venezuela. On March 9, 1896,both houses of the Venezuelan congress adopted a declarationthat the President of the United States as the advocate of "theterritorial integrity of the independent nations of the NewWorld," had "acquired a special claim to the gratitude of thepeoples of this continent"; that by its response to "the nobleideas of the Supreme Magistrate" the Congress of the UnitedStates had "opened new and hopeful vistas in a dispute," whichhad been confined "to the narrow sphere of fruitless discussionwith peril to the general interests of the continent"; and that,because of these actions, the supreme magistrates of the UnitedStates deserved "in a singular manner, an expression of affec-tion" which embodied "all the grateful sentiments of thisrepublic towards the glorious fatherland of Washington andMonroe!" The Venezuelan congress accordingly resolved to"bestow upon the honorable Congress of the United States ofAmerica and upon the most excellent President of that nation,as a special vote of Venezuela, an homage of gratitude for theeminent service which they have rendered to the other inde-pendent peoples of the New World, and especially to this people,by the policy of promoting the peaceful and decorous settlementof the boundary controversy with British Guiana in a mannerconsonant with international justice l"27

In the same month that Cleveland's famous message waspenned, Congress passed a bill providing for the appointment ofa commission "to investigate and report upon the true divisionalline between the Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana?"23A commission of eminent Americans was soon appointed. Itselected certain historical experts to search in Dutch andSpanish archives for documents concerning the disputed bound-ary. By November, 1896, before the commission made itsreport, England, influenced perhaps by startling events con-nected with the Transvaal, decided to submit the dispute to

27 Acuerdo dci congreso do to, E,tado, Undo., do Venezuela, dietado ci 9 de Alarzo do1896, pp. 7-9

"Statute, at Large of the United State,, vol xxix. p. 1.


arbitration, stipulating, however, that "adverse holding or pre-scription during a period of fifty years" should constitute agood title. On February £, 1897, British and Venezuelan repre-sentatives at Washington signed a treaty providing for thechoice of arbitrators to determine the boundary line betweenBritish Guiana and Venezuela." The arbitrators, chosen bythe highest judicial tribunals in England and the United Statesand presided over by a jurist chosen by themselves, assembledat Paris in January, 1899. A large amount of documentarymaterial and an atlas prepared by the American commissionwere laid before the arbitrators. On October 8, 1899, thosearbitrators announced a decision which partook of the nature ofa compromise. England obtained a large portion of the interiorterritory which was in dispute, while Venezuela's right to acomparatively small but valuable portion of territory at theOrinoco's mouth was confirmed.'°

We have already noticed the approval of the policy of theUnited States by the governments of Mexico and Venezuela.Further the Brazilian congress unanimously adopted a motionapproving Cleveland's policy. The upper house of that congresssent greetings to the United States Senate about the message ofCleveland, declaring that he had guarded "the dignity, thesovereignty, and the freedom of the American nations."

Prominent newspapers in various countries of Spanish Amer-ica expressed their approval of Cleveland's policy in no uncer-tain terms. Elferrocarrll of Sonsata in Salvador praised Cleve-land and Monroe thus:

Monroe has opened to Cleveland the doors of the temple. In histurn Cleveland, if possible, has conferred greater immortality uponMonroe. The message of Cleveland . . . has been the complementof American independence; or rather this state paper, which has madeeffective and practical a saving doctrine that for many years was con-sidered platonic and theoretical, has had the effect of a moral andpolitical victory!"

Foreign Relations of the United Stoles, 1890, pp. 254, 256; La Fontaine, Pasievitieintei'nolionnie, pp. 554-50.

"British and Foreign Stale Papers, vol. xcii. pp. 100-62."Foreign Relations of the United Stoles. 189$, vol. x, pp. 75, 70.

Robertson, "Hispanic American Appreciations of the Monroe Doctrine," in His-panic American Historical Review, vol ni PP. 10, 11.


In Guayaquil, Ecuador, El ticimpo published an article entitled"International Questions," declaring that the attitude assumedby the United States in the boundary dispute had profoundlyaffected the minds of Spanish Americans: "Every person nowfeels that the saving Doctrine of Monroe will cease to be a purelyspeculative principle or a principle of merely historic value, asit has been designated, and that it will become a formula of ourpublic international law." 33 On January 4, 1896, La êpoca ofBogota published an editorial entitled "The Practice of theMonroe Doctrine," asserting that England by an abuse of forcehad attempted to make herself the judge of the dispute. "Con-fronted by such a display of force and such scandalous injus-tice the land of Washington has shocked Europe by constitutingherself,—in the name of justice and the New World, an arbitra-tor between the strong nation and the weak nation for the adju-dication of the controversy." On January 9 El lieraldo of thesame city contained an editorial which expressed the followingsentiments: "Admirable is the role which the Great Republicfounded by the virtuous Washington plays in the Guiana con-troversy! By the side of Washington there will figure honor-ably in history Monroe and Cleveland, his worthy successors."On January 13, 1896, the Diarlo de Caracas, the official organ ofthe Venezuelan Government, declared:

Propitious winds now blow from one extreme of the continent to theother. The right of preservation prevails over every other considers-tion; and the Monroe Doctrine, based upon this right which is vital forindividuals and for organizations, now assumes the character of aformidable principle—it is a formula that will preserve the existenceof our incipient democracies.

On February 7 that journal made this comment:President Monroe furnished a formula in the celebrated message

that bears his name; Cleveland and the United States congress haveamplified it in connection with our dispute with England, and even-tually there is spreading from the Hudson River to Cape Horn theconception of a grand American alliance as the most expeditious and

"Robertson, "Hispanic American Appreciations of the Monroe Doctrine." toe. ca ,vol. ii:. P. 10.


imperative measure for the salvation of the rights and the sovereigntiesof our young republics

It is within the bounds of truth to say that the foreign policyof the United States evoked more approbation in HispanicAmerica in 1895 and 1896 than at any other time since the daysof President Monroe.'

The war between the United States and Spain in 1898, whichwas caused by the intervention of the American Governmentto end the deplorable conditions that existed in Cuba, was signifi-cant for many reasons. Here such reasons only will be noticedas have a relation to our general theme. The close of that warmarked the end of Spanish rule in the New World. Porto Rico,Guam, and the Philippines passed under the control of theUnited States, while Cuba was eventually given freedom underthe tutelage of that government. The acquisition of insularpossessions forced the United States to take a deeper interest inthe West Indies and in Isthmian communications. As Spanishlaw was deeply rooted in Porto Rico, there soon occurred onthat island a curious blending of Spanish and North Americanlegal ideas. The civilization of the United States was engraftedupon a Spanish-American trunk." An important precedentwas established in 1901 in the Platt Amendment defining thefuture relations between the United States and Cuba; for thisamendment stipulated that Cuba should not incur excessivedebts and that the United States should have the "right tointervene in that island" to preserve Cuban independence, andto maintain "a government adequate for the protection of life,property, and individual liberty.""

About four years after the Cuban republic was launched inter-vention became necessary. In August, 1906, after the reelectionof President Estrada Palma, a revolt took place against his gov-ernment. President Roosevelt accordingly decided to sendSecretary of War Taft and Assistant Secretary of State Bacon

See further, Robertson, "Hispanic American Appreciations of the Monroe Doe.triue," toe cU ,vol. iii, pp 1-16.

On the results in Porto Rico, see Jones. The Cerrabbean Interests of the United States.chap. vi'.

Statutes a! Large of tiee Unsfrd States, vol. xxxi, pp. 897, 898


to Habana to reconcile the contending factions. This missionfailed in its purpose; for the president resigned, and the Cubancongress adjourned without filling the vacancy. Hence Taftproclaimed a provisional government to restore order, peace,and confidence, and to reestablish a permanent Cuban govern-ment. Soon afterwards the duties of provisional governor wereassumed by Charles FL Magoon and United States troops werestationed in Cuba. On December 3, 1906, President Rooseveltdeclared in his message to Congress that it was "absolutely outof the question that the Island should continue independent,"if the "insurrectionary habit" should become confirmed.'During the occupation by the United States, which lasted abouttwo years, a good peace was maintained in the island, publicimprovements were introduced into several towns and cities, andthe criminal and electoral laws were revised. In his message toCongress on December 3, 1907, Roosevelt declared that peaceand prosperity had been restored to Cuba. 38 On November Q4,1909, a general election was held; members of a new congresswere chosen; and General José Miguel Gônicz was elected presi-dent. Early in the following year the Cuban congress assembled,the government was soon entrusted to Cuban officials, and thearmy of occupation was withdrawn. The guardianship of theUnited States had been amply justified.

Just as the industrial history of Hispanic America is in somepart the story of its exploitation by foreigners, so is its diplomacyin considerable part an account of foreign claims. No morestriking illustration of that statement can be found than theclaims urged by European nations against Venezuela in 190%-1903. At that time ten foreign nations made demands uponthe Venezuelan Government for the payment of debts due totheir citizens.

Of those nationsEngland and Germany may serve as examples.On December?, 1902, the English minister at Caracas addressedto the Venezuelan secretary of foreign relations a note express-ing the dissatisfaction of his government with Venezuela's atti-

Fore*gn E4ajiona of the United States, 1906, pt i, P. xlv."Ibid., 1907, pt ,, p. lxiv.


tudc toward the payment of claims presented byEngland. TheEnglish minister declared that those claims had arisen largelybecause of civil wars in Venezuela, because of the maltreatmentor unjust imprisonment of English subjects and interferencewith English commerce, and because of an adjustment ofVenezuela's external debt. He expressed the hope that Venezuelawould yield to the demands and not compel his governmentto take steps to obtain satisfaction. He added that the Englishgovernment had been informed of the claims of the GermanGovernment against Venezuela, and "that these two govern-merits had agreed to act jointly in order to obtain an adjustmentof all their claims.""

On December 7the German minister at Caracas also addresseda note to the Venezuelan Government expressing his dissatis-faction at its attitude toward claims presented by his govern-inent. He expressed the hope that Venezuela "would satisfythe just demands of Germany" and would not compel hisgovernment to see that those claims were satisfied. He alsomentioned the agreement for joint action between England andGermany." It appears that, after inditing those notes, thetwo protesting ministers proceeded to La Guaira and embarkedon vessels of their respective squadrons which were stationedthere.41

On December 11, 1901, the German ambassador at Wash-ington left at the State Department a memorandum concern-ing his government's claims against Venezuela. His memoran-dum explained that there were unpaid claims due to a Germancompany because of engagements undertaken by Venezuela inconnection with the construction or a railway amounting to sixmillion bolivares; and that there were other claims against Ven-ezuela arising from injuries to German citizens during the civilwars which had raged in that country amounting to two millionbolivares. The German ambassador declared that the policy ofVenezuela, which had decreed that those claims should be passedupon by a Venezuelan commission, was "a frivolous attempt to

Venezuela an/eel conflate con la., potcnczas diode,, vol.1, p 22.40 ibiS, P. 20. "Ibid., p. ).


avoid just obligations." He served notice that it was Germany'sintention to take coercive measures against Venezuela and toemploy a pacific blockade which would affect neutral vessels.But his memorandum stated that "wider no circumstances"would the Imperial government consider" the acquisition or thepermanent occupation of Venezuelan territory." 41 In his reply,five days latez,$ccretary of State May referred to the iacL thatthe German ambassa3or upon his recent return from Berlin hadconveyed the assurance of the German Emperor to the govern-ment of the United States that the Imperial government had nointention to make even the smallest acquisition of territory onthe South American continent or the islands adjacent. Secre-tary Hay said that, in view of this assurance and of the declara-tions in the memorandum, the President did not regard himselfas "called upon to enter into the consideration of the claims inquestion." On November 13, 1902, the English ambassadorat Washington had informed Hay of his government's intentionto use coercive measures against Venezuela for the collection ofclaims. Hay's response was "that the United Stales Govern-ment, although they regretted that European powers shoiilff useforce against Central and South American countries, could notobject to their taking steps to obtain redress for injuries sufferedby their subjects, provided that no acquisition of territorfwascontemplated.""

In this manner did the United States receive the decision ofEngland and Germany to take forcible measures againstVenezuela. On December 9, 1902, President Castro was in-formed by a telegram from La Guaira that, by the aid of menfrom an English frigate, Captain Eckerinann commanding thefrigate Panther of the German navy had seized four Venezuelanvessels by force." Castro at once issued a proclamation to hiscompatriots indignantly announcing that the insolent feet offoreigners had profaned the sacred soil of the father1and. 6 OnDecember 10, 1902, LOpez Baralt, the Venezuelan secretary of

"Moore, Digest of I,dgrnation il Law, vol. vi, pp. 580-80.p. 590. 44 Ibid-, p. 5fl.

45 Venauda ante 6 conflicto can las pol antics diada, vol.i, p, 5-9. 40, 45."Ibid. p 6.


foreign relations, addressed to the states friendly to Venezuelathat did not have legations in Caracas a formal protest affirmingthat English and German warships which had been anchored atLa Guaira had "committed an act of aggression against Vene-zuela which was contrary to the most elementary customs ofcivilized nations." The Venezuelan secretary averred thatthere were "no antecedents" to justify the act; for the diplo-matic representatives of England and Germany had justaddressed to the Venezuelan government a special communica-tion in regard to the controversy, "without setting a limit to thetime within which the reply should be made." He declared thatafter this reply was dispatched, "but before it had reached itsdestination and hence without knowledge of its scope or content,those diplomats set military forces into operation in a mannermanifestly hostile to Venezuela. After having seized Venezuela'swar vessels that were anchored in the harbor of La Guaira.various bands of armed soldiers had disembarked."' Using asa pretext an alleged insult offered to the Union Jack, on Decem-ber 13, 1902, the English frigate Charybdis and the German frig-ate Vineta bombarded forts at Puerto Cabello and capturedthe castle commanding that port. 48 President Castro immedi-ately issued a proclamation denouncing this bombardmentwhich had taken place without any of the formalities customaryin such cases. 4 ' On December 15 Venezuela's secretary offoreign relations addressed to the states friendly to Venezuelawhich did not have legations at Caracas a solemn protest againstthose "successive violations of international law that wereextremely perilous for international life.""

The apparent desire of Germany to establish it so-calledpacific blocade of Venezuela's coast was thwarted, for the UnitedStates made a diplomatic protest against any extension of thedoctrine of pacific blockade which would affect neutrals. Aformal blockade was announced by England and Germany onDecember 20, 1002; that announcement established a status ofbelligerency.' Two days later, by order of the Emperor, the

47 fInd., pp. 41,42 "fInd.. pp. 58-41."Ibid., pp . 65-66 "ibid • pp. 71, 72.61 Moore. Digest of International Law. vol vlr. pp 140. 141.


German commodore announced a blockade of Puerto Cabelloand i\[araeaibo. 52 Italian war vessels subsequently joined theblockading squadron.

The aggressions of the associated powers caused much agita-tion in Venezuela. Newspaper articles were printed denounc-ing the policy of Germany and her associates. Tomfi.s Michel-ena stigmatized them as "filibusters, pirates, and buccaneers."Prominent Venezuelan writers expressed the opinion that aconfederation of American states should be formed for armedprotection against European aggression. Manuel C. Urbaneja,a former Venezuelan secretary of foreign relations, expressedthe hope that a congress of delegates might be assembled inPanama to consider the formation of a league of Spanish-Ameri-can states as well as to discuss the relations between those statesand Europe. He expressed doubt concerning the applicability

the Monroe Doctrine to infractions of international law.That doctrine, he maintained, was merely a principle of theforeign policy of the United States, the application of whichdepended upon the exigencies of her policy."

But other Venezuelan writers manifested their intentions torely upon that doctrine. General Francisco Testa Garciaexpressed the opinion that the United States Government couldnot view, with arms folded, the European aggressions in SouthAmerica. That government could not abandon the cardinalprinciple of her policy and allow Venezuela to be sacrificed inthis hour of proof.54 Aristides Tellcria expressed his opinionthat the unexpected aggressions of European powers againstVenezuela should be considered as nothing else than a crucialtest of the Monroe Doctrine by old nations which were jealousof the expanding power of the Colossus of the North." In anarticle in El constitucional entitled "The Doctrine of Monroeand Teuton Pride" General Bermódez asked if the pride of Ger-many had tried "to play a trick upon the Doctrine of Monroe,"or if forcible intervention was "merely a move of Jewish avariceupon the part of the kaiser."st Another writer ironically inter-preted the affair in these words:

•' Ver,cz,,eIr, anic ci co,ificto can ins pot mans at,adcs, vol. iT. p 321."lEnd., pp. 189. 100. SI lEnd.. pp. 129, 130. 0 lEnd., P. 143. 16 lEnd.. V. 24a.


After great preliminary labors by Imperial diplomacy in order tolull the suspicions of the United States assured of the humiliatingcooperation of England. Germany bombarded Puerto Cabello in anHomeric combat in which only one man was wounded, a German, andone war vessel damaged, the Vineta; and the blockade of the Venezue-lan coasts was divided between uncle and nephew.... History willsay that in the first adventure undertaken by the kaiser he was de-feated, and that the check given to his marines at the entrance to LakeMaracaibo was followed by the slap administered to his diplomats atWashington .57

In the meantime diplomats of the United States were attempt-ing to promote the adjustment of the dispute beaceful means.That government shortly announced that Venezuela had re-quested it to transmit an offer of mediation to Berlin and Lon-don." Eoithis purpose the Venezuelan Government conferredfull powers upon the United States minister at Caracas, Herbert\V. Bowen." According to the biographer of John Hay, who hadaccess to inedited manuscripts, it was not until after PresidentRoosevelt had vigorously threatened to send Admiral Dewey'sfleet to the coast of Venezuela to end the blockade, that theGerman Emperor yielded to the proposal to arbitrate."

Certain it is that, after Minister Bowen had negotiated withthe blockading powers on behalf of Venezuela, on February 13,1903, the blockade was raised. At the same time tentativeagreements were reached between Venezuela and each of thosepowers by which the Venezuelan Government recognized inprinciple the justice of the claims and by which the powersagreed to submit their claims to mixed commissions. Shortlyafterward similar protocols were signed between Venezuela, onthe one hand, and the United States, Mexico, France, Holland,Belgium, Norway and Sweden, and Spain, on the other hand.As the blockading powers demanded that their claims should bepaid first, while Venezuela proposed to treat all her creditorsalike, by mutual consent the demand for preferential treatment

• ibid. pp R90,29358 Moore, Dtgeet of Iniernatzonal Law, vol. vi, p. 590."Venesuela ante ci eonflteto can las potencias ahadae. vol r. pp. 100, 103.

Thayer, The Life and Letters of John Hay, vol. xi, pp. 256-85.

no HISPANIC—AMERICAN RELATIONS

was referred to the Hague Tribunal." In accordance with theprotocols, in June, 1908, ten mixed commissions sat at Caracasto adjudicate the claims,—commissions which reduced the aggre-gate amount due the ten powers to about one-fifth of theiroriginal claims. 62 The United States received over two and aquarter million dollars on behalf of the claims of her citizensagainst Venezuela. On February 92,1904, the Hague TribunaldeEMed that the three blockading powers werbentitled to pref-erential treatment, declhring that after 1901 the VerrezuelanGovernment had categorically refused to submit its controversywith England and Germany to arbitration and that during thediplomatic negotiations Venezuela had always made a distinc-tion between "the allied powers" and "the neutral or pacificpowers." In it message to congress in 1904 President Castrothus expressed his appreciation of the policy of theUnited States:

We should remember, as a proof of that harmony and cordiality, theinterest which the President and the people of the American Unionshowed toward Venezuela in the unfortunate days of our internationaldisturbance. The good offices of the First Magistrate of that friendlynation were interposed more than once to obtain a, pacific solution andavoid the action which was then threatened against us.TM

More significant perhaps than the results achieved by thearbitration of the claims against Venezuela were the reactionsproduced by the attempt of European powers to collect by force.One reaction was President Roosevelt's categorical declaration;in his annual message of December, 1901, that the coercion of aHispanic-American state was not contrary to the Monroe Doc-trine, provided that such punishment did "not take the form ofthe acquisition of territory by any non-American power." Ayear later Roosevelt declared that each state should "maintainAorder within its own borders," and "discharge its just obligations

It Venanela ante el confliato con las potencies aliadas, vol. 1, pp 105-13, 157-84, TheVenezuelan Arbitration before the Hague Tribunal, 1903, pp. 25-43; Malloy, Treaties,Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements between the United States andOther Powers. vol. ii, pp. 1872-78

"Foreign Relations of the United States, 1904, p. 871, Latane, America as a WorldPower, p 275

The Venezuelan Arbitration before the Vague Tribunal, 1903, pp. 108. 109"Foreign Relations of the United States, 1904, pp. 871, 871.


to foreigners." He said that when this was done they couldrest assured "that, be they strong or weak, they have nothingto dread from outside interference.""

These statements, as well as the blockade of Venezuela becauseof her failure to pay certain claims, some of which were basedupon obligations assumed by the Venezuelan state, provokedthe enunciation of the Drago Doetripe, which may be designateda South American coroffliry --of the Monroe Doctrine. TheDrago Doctrine was, in the main, a restatement of the CalvoDoctrine which should first be understood. In his treatise oninternational law, the third edition of which was published in1880, Carlos Calvo, an eminent Argentine publicist, declaredthat "according to strict international right the recovery ofdebts and the pursuit of private claims does not justify do piano

the armed intervention of governments, and, since Europeanstates invariably follow this rule in their reciprocal relations,there is no reason why they should not impose it upon themselvesin their relations with the nations of the New World."" ThisArgentine publicist denied the responsibility of states for injuriessuffered by foreigners in internal disturbances; for to admit theprinciple of indemnity in such eases, said Calvo, "would be tocreate an exorbitant and fatal privilege essentially favorable topowerful states and injurious to weaker nations, and to estab-lish an unjustifiable equality between citizens and foreigners."He declared that to sanction such a doctrine would be to coun-tenance an attack upon the territorial jurisdiction of a state,—"a constituent element of national independence."

On December 29, 1902, in a note to Garcia lVlIérou, Argentina'sminister in Washington, Luis M. Drago, the Argentine secre-tary of foreign relations, formulated the doctrine which bearshis name. That secretary purposely omitted from the purviewof his doctrine claims arising from revolts and wars. In his ownwords, Drago presented 'some considerations with reference tothe forcible collection of the public debt suggested by the eventswhich have taken place." He declared that with regard to

"Moore, Digest of Intenioiionol Law, vol. Ni, p. 594."Celvo, Le droit ,ntcn,a1aonai, vol. ,, p. SOS.i find.. p 434

in HISPANIC—AMERICAN RELATIONS

loans made to a foreign state, a capitalist necessarily consideredthe attendant circumstances which would affect repayment andmade the terms correspondingly hard. With emphasis he main-tained that proceedings could not properly be instituted againsta sovereign state: a state was bound to meet her obligations;but she had the right "to choose the manner and the time ofpayment." The cardinal principle which he enunciated wasthat the public debt of a Hispanic-American nation could "notoccasion armed intervention nor even the actual occupation ofthe territory of American nations by a European power."Evidently the Argentine Government feared that forcible inter-vention for the collection of public debts might lead to the sub-version of Spanish-American governments by European mon-archies."

As compared with the original Monroe Doctrine, the Calvoand Drago Doctrines were much narrower. Both collateraldoctrines were protests against certain practices which had beenpursued by European nations in the collection of debts in His-panic America. In his treatise Calvo argued against the use offorce by those nations to collect private debts. Drago's famousnote was an official protest against armed intervention by Euro-pean nations for the collection of debts incurred by a Hispanic-American state."

What was the attitude of the United States Governmenttoward Drago's note? In Secretary Hay's response, datedFebruary 17, 1903, he did not express either "assent to or dis-sent from the propositions ably set forth" in that note andstated that "the general position of the Government of theUnited States in the matter" had been "indicated in recentmessages of the President," referring specifically to the annualmessages of 1901 and 1902.' But on December 5, 1905, in hismessage to Congress President Roosevelt took the view thatattempts of foreign nations to collect by force contract debts

0 Forn0n Relations of the United States. 1903, pp. 1-5."See further, Dmgo, "State Loans in their Relation to International Policy," in

Amerman Journal of International Low, vol.i, pt. ii, pp. 708,709.'° Hershey, "The Calvo and Drago Doctrine,," in American Journal of Inteniationtil

Law, vol i, p. 31.71 Moore, Digest of International Law. vol. vi. pp. 593, 59.


which were due by Hispanic-American republics to citizens ofthe collecting nations would embarrass the United States as theresult might be the permanent acquisition of American territory.He expressed the desire that "all foreign governments wouldtake the same view" as the United States government andwould refuse "to enforce such contractual obligations" on behalfof their citizens "by an appeal to arms,"72

In connection with these statements should be noticed thePresident's significant declaration in the previous year. OnDecember 6, 1904, in his message to Congress, Roosevelt said:

Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a generalloosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere,ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and, in theWestern Hemisphere, the adherence of the United States to the Mon-roe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, inflagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of aninternational police power.73

That declaration, which was designated the "Roosevelt Corol-lary of the Monroe Doctrine," soon beckoned logical statesmeninto endless vistas of diplomatic action.

The first state to invite the application of this corollary was aCaribbean republic. Revolts, dictatorships, peculation, andanarchy had reduced the Dominican Republic to a condition ofchronic and apparently hopeless bankruptcy. In September,1904, the Dominican debt was estimated at a little over thirty-two million dollars. Over one-half of the indebtedness washeld by citizens of Belgium, England, France, Germany, andSpain, while a relatively small part of it was held by citizens ofthe United States. 'I'he Dominican annual revenue was esti-mated at one million eight hundred and fifty thousand dollars,white the annual expenditures, including payments on theindebtedness and arrearages, amounted to three million ninehundred thousand dollars. 14 Early in 1905 fears were enter-tained in the city of Santo Domingo that an attempt might be

"Foreign Relations of the Unacd State,. 1003, p. xniv,"Moore, Digest of InteracA tonal Law, vol vi, pp 396, 597." Pore,qn Rein/loris of the United Stales, 1905, p. 302.


made to collect the debts by force.' It seemed possible thatEuropean creditor nations might seize Dominican ports to act-minister the customs:—the forcible collection of debts mightlead to the occupation of territory for an indefinite period.Secretary Hay cabled Minister Dawson in the city of SantoDomingo instructing him to ascertain the sentiments of theDominican Government with regard to aid from the UnitedStates. To this inquiry that government made a favorableresponse.

After negotiations by Minister Dawson and Captain Dilling-ham for Secretary Hay and by Secretaries Sanchez and Velás-quez for the Dominican Republic, a protocol was signed in Feb-ruary, 1905. This protocol provided that the United StatesGovernment should adjust all debts of the Dominican Govern-ment and should fix the amount of outstanding claims. TheUnited States should take charge of all custom houses of the in-solvent government; she should deliver to the Dominican Re-public forty-five per cent of the customs receipts for the pay-ment of current expenses. With the remaining revenue theUnited States was to meet the expenses of customs adnunistra-tion, as well as those payments which might be due of the inter-est and principal of the Dominican debt. There should be novital changes in duties and taxes without the consent of theUnited States. That government was to furnish such otherassistance as might be proper to restore the credit, maintain theorder, and promote the welfare of the Dominican Republic."

That protocol, however, was not ratified by the Senate. Butan informal arrangement embodying the main fiscal provisionsof the protocol was sanctioned by ROOSeVelt.78 In champion-ing that executive agieeint Sr. Velasquez, Dominican secre-tary of commerce, aptly declared that if his nation did not payher creditors there would come a day on which, "tired of waitingand pleading, the European governments will occupy our ens-

"Foreign Relathuza of the Un,ted Seas, 1905, pp 208, 355, 557, 358." Ibid., pp 298, 300"Ibid. pp. 342, 353. See also Hollander, "The Convention ot 1007 between the

United States and the Dominican Republic," in Amencan Journal of Iulcr,,ationalLaw. Vol. I, pt I, pp. 289, 290.

"Foreip. Relations of the Unseal States, 1905, pp. 865, 366


toms houses to get those debts and perhaps part of our territory.If that time should come, the American Government will eitherhave to back down in its foreign policy, confessing that theMonroe Doctrine is a laughable phantasm, or undertake a warwith powerful nations, or pay those debts, or guarantee theirpayment, charging itself with their collection.""

President Roosevelt put the executive agreement into forceearly in April, 1905. George R. Colton was placed in charge ofthe administration of Dominican customs, with the right tochoose his own subordinates. 60 On July 1, 1905, MinisterDawson summarized the results of the new system as follows:active plotting against the Dominican Government had ceased;abandoned plantations had been again placed under cultivation;the Dominican Republic had more money than ever before; shewas not compelled to make any more short time loans; she wasno longer in danger of seizure by foreign powers; and she couldnegotiate equitable terms for the liquidation of her indebted-ness. 8 ' In his annual message to the Dominican congress on Feb-ruary 27, 1906, speaking of the operation of the modus vivendi,President Cáceres said: "Peculation and extraordinary militaryexpenditures have been the bottomless pits in which the nation'swealth has disappeared. To chaos has succeeded regularity.During the last year our receipts have covered the appropria-tions made by the law of public expenditures, and on December81, 1905, the deposit in the National Bank of New Yorkamounted to $815,027.18 gold—a sum destined to the paymentof the interest and amortization of our debts.""

The general improvement in conditions in the DominicanRepublic under the modus vivendi reenforced sentiment in theUnited States in favor of a more permanent arrangement. OnFebruary 8, 1907, a convention was signed providing for "theAssistance of the United States in the Collection and Applica-tion of the Customs Revenues of the Dominican Republic." 83

quoted From Deschamps, La Repdblzca Dorninteana, by Jones, Caribbean Interestsof the United States, p. 115

" Foreign Relations of the United States, 1905, p- 367."Ibid • pp 379-8I ' Ibid., p. 569.

Malloy, Treaties, vol. I, pp 418-20


This treaty, proclaimed on July 25, provided, in brief, that theGovernment of the United States should administer the customsof the Dominican Republic through officials appointed by itsPresident for the service of her debt as adjusted and bonded byit." The article in the proposed treaty of 1905 which author-ized the United States to furnish that republic such furtherassistance as might be necessary, interpreted to mean a virtualprotectorate, was not included in this treaty.

The results of the administration of Dominican customs bythe United States benefited that republic greatly. Althoughrevolutions have not ceased, yet the republic has been relativelyquiet. Customs receipts during the first year of the modusvivendi amounted to more than two and one-half million dollars,the largest receipts that had been recorded in Dominican history,an amount which exceeded the receipts for the preceding yearby six hundred and fifty thousand dollars." Between 1905 and1914 imports into the Dominican Republic more than doubled,while the exports increased about one-half.' The methodsused in the collection of the revenue were improved: smugglingevidently decreased. Cert.aip public utilities, as telephonesand electric light, were widely introduced, and harbors havebeen improved. The Dominican debt was much reduced bypayments from the customs revenues and also through the read-justments promoted by a restored credit, 81 By the action oftheir government those creditors who were citizens of the UnitedStates received the same treatment as citizens of the Europeannations which threatened to intervene. Intervention by Euro-pean nations was made unnecessary, while the territorial integ-rity of the Dominican Republic was preserved." More recently,however, the military occupation of that republic by the UnitedStates forces has deprived her of political autonomy.

The Doctrine of Monroe when used to justify intervention"Malloy, vol. r,pp 418-20: Hollander. "The Dominican Convention and Its Les-

sons," in Journal of Race Development, vol iv, p. 899.SI Animal Report, Dominican Customs Recciccrshsp under the An,erican-Domsnican Con-

rention, 1907, P. 11."See statistics in Jones, p. 118.

See especially. Annual Report, Dom,n,can Customs Receivership, 1907, pp 4-18;ibid. 1906. pp . 10-29.

Hollander, "The Dominican Convention and Its Lessons," toe cit., vol. 'v.p 408.


alarmed the publicists of thspanic America. In 1905 a Vene-zuelan writer, Domingo B. Castillo thus voiced his fears:

According to the latest interpretation given to the elastic MonroeDoctrine, the New World is the property of the United States.The new interpreters of Monroeism entertain with respect to SouthAmerica a vast evolutionary project,—remote in its realization anduncertain in its results, but nevertheless they cherish it. And theymove toward the realization of their ideal with the tenacity of theirrace without considering the rights of another race or the violence thatwould be necessary to consummate their colossal ambitions. In theface of these facts, it is the duty of South American governments andstatesmen to consider the magnitude of the peril that threatens us.In a shameful manner the United States dreams of her national aggran-dizement and believes that she can execute her plans without obstaclesby the aid of the Platt Amendment which is fastened upon Cuba byvirtue of the law of conquest. That law is the useful formula of thecolonial policy of the United States. The Dominican Republic hasjust succumbed to it and by such a singular event the governmentof that republic has been placed under the authority of a foreignpower."

While the United States was preventing forcible interventionby European nations in the Dominican Republic, in conjunctionwith certain nations of hispanic America she was exercisingan influence upon the Peace Conference at The Hague. At theFirst Hague Conference in 1899 New World interests were rep-resented only by delegates from Mexico and the United States.In 1907 delegates appeared from all the important Americanstates. The tentative program for that conference, preparedby the chancellor of Russia, mentioned that the United StatesGovernment had reserved the right of submitting a proposal"to observe some limitations upon the use of force for the col-lection of ordinary public debts arising out of contracts."

On behalf of the United States Genera! Porter presented tothe Conference a proposition that when there were contractualdebts owing from one nation to the citizens of another nation,the powers represented would agree "not to have recourse to

Castillo, Venezuelapel .3fonroe,snio, pp. 5, 6."Scott, Teats of the Fence Conferences at the Hague. p. 109


armed force for the collection of such contractual debts." Thisagreement was not to be operative, however, when the debtorstate declined an offer of arbitration, or failed to comply with anarbitral award, or made a compromise impossible." While themain principle embodied in the Porter proposition was approvedby many delegates, yet there were sonic delegates who thoughtthat it was too radical, and others who thought that it wasunduly conservative. Drago, who was a delegate from Argen-tina, made three objections to the project: that it did not limitthe arbitration of debts arising from ordinary contracts exclu-sively to cases in which the courts of the debtor country hadrefused to dispense justice; that it seemed to include publicdebts as subject to arbitration; and that it did not absolutelyexclude the use of force or the occupation of American soil as theresult of disputes concerning public debts. 92 Upon one or an-other of his objections Drago secured support from delegates ofhispanic-American states. Perez Triana of Colombia took amore extreme position than Drago, arguing that military aggres-sion should not be employed in ease of any pecuniary disputeunder any circumstances whatsoever." But the prominentBrazilian publicist, Buy Barbosa, opposed those arguments.This publicist maintained that Drago's Doctrine was "the the-ory of the abuse of sovereignty"; and that "by making a highappeal to the Monroe Doctrine," it would compromise thatdoctrine."

The Porter proposition was finally approved by thirty-ninedelegations." Among the Spanish-American republics whichvoted affirmatively nine made reservations about its interpre-tation.° Through the joint action of the United States andsome Spanish-American nations a formal disapproval of mili-tary aggression for the collection of certain contractual debtswas thus inscribed upon the records of the Second Hague Con-ference.

In 1007 a South American diplomat formulated a new doctrine"Hull, Two Hague Conference, p 552.

Ibid., pp 358, 359. "Id, p. 364. 24 Jbid, pp 361. 362."Ibid., p. 370; Scott, pp 193-98"Scott, pp- 541-43


—not altogether unrelated to the l\roiwoe Doctrine—which wasdestined to be of some influence in Hispanic America. Thediplomat who thus made his name famous in international lifewas Carlos R. Tobar, who had represented Ecuador as ministerat various capitals and had also served as secretary of foreignaffairs for that republic.

PromBareelona, on March 15,1907, CarlosE. Tobaraddressedan open letter to the Bolivian consul at Brussels. In that letterTobar expressed satisfaction at the conditions existing in theHispanic-American nations. He was pleased that Bolivia wasno longer suffering from militarism; that the rulers of Brazil hada desire to progress peacefully which was in proportion to thesize of her territory; that the cosmopolitan Argentine peoplewere ruled not by the sword but by intelligence and talent; thatChileans had always refused to elect barrack room soldiers tothe presidency; that Peru, chastened by adversity, had begun toadvance marvellously; and that, in a reaction from the throes ofrevolution, Colombia was directing her energies into the arts ofpeace. With regard to the other states of Hispanic America,he declared that, except a few unfortunate nations, they werehappy; for intelligence was being substituted for force. "happy,a thousand times happy! They begin to occupy themselveswith a future which is not obscured by the barbarous smoke ofpowder r"97

Tobarsaid that Europe and theunited States no longer viewedwith disdain peoples who had previously been characterized asungovernable. Various matters concerning the progress andculture of the Hispanic-American peoples had been discussed insessions of Pan-American congresses. At none of those meet-ings, however, had there been considered a topic of cardinalimportance for those nations; unfortunately there had not beenpresented for the sanction of a Pan-American congress a doc-trine which would put an end to revolutions in Hispanic Amer-ica. The Ecuadorian diplomat formulated his doctrine in thefollowing words:

°' As quoted by Garcia, "Estud jo sobre la doctrina Tobar,' in Trabajo, old cuartotong ,no cientffico, vol )O(, p. $27.

ISO HISPANIC—AMERICAN RELATIONS

The American republics, for the good name and credit of them all, ifnot because of humanitarian and "altruistic' considerations, ought tointervene, at least in a mediatory and indirect manner, in the internaldissensions of the republics of the continent. Such intervention couldat least refuse recognition to de facto governments that had beenestablished by revolutions against the constitutional regimc.°°

This publicist argued that the doctrine of intervention wasnot without some support from eminent writers upon interna-tional law. He maintained that wise philanthropists were usingall the resources of science to cheek tuberculosis, to secure theprotection of women and children, and to promote the welfareof the fanner and time laborer. In time sanguinary conflicts ofnation against nation, said Tobar, the artist could find themesfor pictures and statues; but in the struggles between brothersthe philosopher could find only such degrading practices asespionage and vengeance. He asked why a peace conference atThe Hague or a Pan—American congress should not consider themeans of preventing internecine war. In particular, he de-clared, were the leading Hispanic-American republics interestedin bringing to an end the scandals which had provoked certainpersons to apply to Spanish America the adjectives "ungovern-able," "revolutionary," and "savagel"95

Tobar's proposal that the American republics should adopt apolicy of joint intervention in order to check internal dissensionsnaturally provoked discussion. In particular was it criticizedas being Utopian, and as containing a threat against the inde-pendence and sovereignty of Hispanic-American states. 100 Itembodied a doctrine, however, that had already been expressedin a milder form by other Spanish-American publicists.'°The applicability of this doctrine to certain republics was recog-nized in the very year that Tobar's letter was published. Forcircumstances affording a chance to apply the so-called ToharDoctrine arose in stormy Central America.

A war which broke out between Nicaragua and Salvadorbefore Tobar formulated that doctrine was ended largely by the

"Garcia, "Estudio sobre Ia doctrina Tobar.' toe cit , 'ol xx, p 327."Ibid. pp 328,329 iO*I&id,p 529

101 International American Conference, vol. Iv, p. 175; Tones Caicedo, Untthi lalino-anencano, pp 131,132


good offices of Mexico and the United States. In April, 1907,the belligerents signed a convention which provided that, pend-ing the adoption of a general arbitration treaty by the CentralAmerican nations, differences arising between them should besettled by the arbitration of the Presidents of Mexico and theUnited States. Thus the principle that it was the duty of theUnited States to preserve peace in Central America was ap-parently sanctioned by Nicaragua. 102 Shortly afterwards, inview of threatened war between Nicaragua and Salvador, Presi-dents Din and Roosevelt proposed a Peace Conference of allthe states of Central America. 103 A preliminary meeting ofthe ministers of the Central American states and representativesof the United States and Mexico was held at Washington inSeptember, 1907. At that meeting the Central American re-publics agreed to send delegates to a conference at Washingtonin order to discuss the measures which were necessary to ad-just any differences that existed between those republics andto conclude "a Treaty which shall define their general rela-tions."104

Accordingly, an invitation to attend such a conference wassoon extended to the republics of Central America by PresidentsDin and Roosevelt. Each of the five republics accepted theinvitation and appointed delegates. In November and Decem-ber, 1907, those delegates, as well as representatives of Mexicoand the United States, assembled at Washington. They werecalled to order by Secretary of State Elihu Root, who made anaddress suggesting the need of "some practical methods" bywhich to execute agreements. 105 Several conventions werearranged concerning peace and amity, extradition, communi-cations, and future conferences; while other conventions madeprovision for a Central American court of justice, a pedagogicalinstitute, and a Central American bureau.106

The last mentioned convention stipulated that the five repub-no Fore,9,, Rein! ion.s of the United States. 1907, vol. a, pt. ii, pp 033, 634"Ibid. p 633. On the joint mediation of the United States and Mexico in Central

America ,n1006, seep. 153, infra°Monthty Bullet,,, of the Internot,o,,oi Bureau of the America,, Republics, vol. xxv,

no 6, p. 1335.'"Ibid., pp 1337-39. " Ibid., pp. 1345-08


lies should establish a bureau composed of one delegate fromeach republic, the expenses to be borne equally by the signatorypowers. This bureau was to promote the interests of CentralAmerica: peace, education, commerce, and agriculture; as wellas to encourage uniform civil, criminal, and commercial legisla-tion. It was to maintain an organ of publicity; and it was alsoto serve as a medium of intelligence.107

Article I of the treaty of peace and amity declared that oneof the first duties of the contracting parties was "the mainte-nance of peace"; that they bound themselves to preserve har-mony; and that they would decide in the Central Americancourt of justice any difficulties which might arise between them.Another article provided that the citizens of each state were toenjoy the same civil rights as citizens in the other states andwere to be exempt from loans, extraordinary contributions, andforced military service. When properly authenticated, publicinstruments executed in one republic were to be valid in theothers. To encourage coastwise commerce among the fiverepublics, each of them agreed to promote a national merchantmarine. It was stipulated thatthc territory of Honduras shouldbe absolutely neutral. Revolutionary chieftains should not beallowed to live in regions adjacent to a country whose peacethey might disturb. 103 A supplementary convention providedthat the five governments should promote a reform by whichtheir presidents could not be reelected. This convention alsostipulated that no republic should recognize any governmentthat came into existence by revolution until the freely electedrepresentatives of the people should constitutionally reorganizethe country. No Central American government should inter-vene in favor of either of the contending parties in a republicwhich was torn by civil war.109

The convention respecting a Central American court of jus-tice declared that the five republics had established that courtin order to avoid appeals to force. A permanent tribunal shouldbe established at Cartago in Costa Rica composed of one judge

107 Monthly Bulletin of the International Bureau of the American Republics, vol xxv,no. 6, pp. 1304-06.

'°' Ibid.. pp 1346-60. 00$ ibid., pp. 1350, 1351.


from each state, to hold office for five years. That tribunal wasto have jurisdiction over controversies concerning which therespective chancelleries could not agree. It was to take cogni-zance of controversies between a citizen of a Central Americanstate and the government of another state. It was also to con-skier disputes submitted by common consent of the contractinggovernments, as well as cases submitted by special agreementbetween a contracting state and a foreign state. The contract-ing republics agreed to enforce the court's decrees."" Dele-gates from Honduras and Nicaragua urged that such a court wasnot enough to satisfy the desires of the Central American peopleand that a more intimate relationship was desirable. A Hon-duran delegate avowed that the union of the five states into onefederal republic was necessary. But delegates from other statesheld that a Central American republic was little more than anoble aspiration.",

In the convention supplementary to the general treaty ofpeace and amity the delegates of the contracting republics madeimportant provisions about their international relations.Article I of this convention provided that the contracting gov-ernments should not recognize any other government thatmight "come into power in any of the five Republics in conse-quence of a coup d'etat, or of a revolution against the recognizedGovernment, so long as the representatives of the people, freelyelected," had not reorganized that nation in a constitutionalmanner. There was a stipulation in the second article that incase a civil war broke out in any Central American state noother republic should intervene either for or against the govern-ment of the distracted republic. The third article recommendedthat the republics of Central America should endeavor to pro-cure a constitutional reform by prohibiting the reelection of thepresident and by promoting the practice of alternation in office.'"Whether they were aware of it or not, in the first of those arti-cles—as well as in certain articles of the general treaty—the

'° Ibid., pp 1351, 1357"' Fore;gn Re? aho,', of the United Stater, 1907, pt. it, pp. 670-72.

Monthly JItdtelin qjr the lniern&,onol Bureou of the American Rep,thtice, Vol. XX",pp. 1350, 1351.


Central Americans had embodied the essential principle of theTobar Doctrine."

The Peace Conference of 1907 seemed to form a bright pagein the annals of Central America. On May Q, 1908, in thepresence of commissioners from Mexico and the United States,the court of justice was inaugurated at Cartago.114 With fundsfurnished by Andrew Carnegie, a beautiful "temple of peace"was erected for its use. Not only was this court significantbecause of the broad powers assigned to it as an arbiter, but alsobecause it constituted a definite step toward unity—the truesolution for many Central American ills. In December, 1908,this court rendered a verdict in a case where the allegation wasmade that Guatemala and Salvador were instigating a revolu-tion in Honduras." The attitude of the court evidently wasnot without influence in checking interference by one or morestates in the affairs of a neighbor; but despite the extraordinaryjurisdiction which it at times exercised revolutions in CentralAmerica did not cease."°

In February, 1909, President J05e Santos Ways, the dictatorof Nicaragua, promoted a filibustering expedition against Sal-vador. To promote the observance of the conventions of 1907the United States Government sent warships to Central Amer-ica. A formidable revolt broke out in Nicaragua in October,1909; and in December of that year Secretary of State Knoxhanded the Nicaraguan chargé at Washington his passports,declaring that Zelaya had kept Central America in turmoil,that he had flagrantly violated the provisions of the Washing-ton conventions, and had sought to discredit "those sacredinternational obligations" to the disadvantage of other CentralAmerican governments which had attempted to observe them.'"

When General Madriz, who succeeded Zelaya, passed frompower, the government of Nicaragua, profiting by the exampleof the Dominican Republic, appealed to the United States foradvice about its fiscal and political reorganization. In October,

"Garcia. "Estudjo sabre la doctrine, Tobar," icc. ca. vol. xx, pp 330. 383"'World Peace Foundation, pamphlet ser,cq , vol. vii, no 1, TheNcw Pan Americanism,

Pt. iii. p 131116 Ibid. pp. 130, 187. " find, pp 187-44"'Foreign Relation, of the United Stake. 1909. p. 455.


1910, an agreement was reached between the United States andNicaragua which provided for a constitutional convention thatwas to elect Provisional President Estrada as president. Thisagreement also provided that Nicaragua should take steps torehabilitate her finances; she was to negotiate a loan that shouldbe secured by her customs duties. Unliquidated claims againstthe Central American republic should be adjusted in accordancewith a plan to be concerted by the United States andNicaragua."

By a decree of March 9,1911, provision was made for the estab-lishment of the Nicaraguan Mixed Claims Commission. Thecommission was composed of one Nicaraguan and two citizensof the United States, Judge Otto Schoenrich of the district courtof Mayaguez, Porto Rico, being designated its president by theState Department at Washington. This commission heldregular sessions at Managua from the beginning of 1912 untilFebruary, 1915. It early decided upon equitable rules to deter-mine the amount and validity of the claims, which arose fromlosses suffered during wars or from losses that resulted becauseof the failure of the Nicaraguan Government to adhere to con-cessions and contracts which were sometimes unconstitulional.The claims against that government amounted to $13,808,161;but the commission awarded to the claimants only $1,840,-432.31 119

In the meantime an attempt was made to initiate the financialsupervision of the United States in Central America, as it hadbeen established in the Dominican Republic. On January 10,1911, Secretary Knox signed a loan convention with Honduras,and on June 6 following he signed a similar treaty with Nica-ragua. In brief, the Nicaraguan treaty provided for the refund-ing of the national debt of Nicaragua and for a loan to thatrepublic by United States bankers which was to be secured byher customs receipts. The collection of Nicaraguan customswas to be supervised by a collector general selected from a listapproved by the President of the United States. If circum-

Ibid , 1910, pp 763-66U Schoenrich, 'The Nicaraguan Mixed Claims Commission." in American Journal

of Iriter,iational Law, vol ix, pp 855-69.

136 HISPANIC—AMflhICAN RELATIONS

stances should demand, that government was to furnish therequisite protection. 120 Secretary Knox justified this policyin an address, declaring that the peace and prosperity of CentralAmerica and the Caribbean zone, where "the malady of revolu-tions and financial collapse" was most acute, were of "para-mount interest" to the United States. "It would not be sane,"said he, "to uphold a great policy like the Monroe Doctrine andto repudiate its necessary corollaries and neglect the sensiblemeasures which reason dictates as safeguards.""' However,the Nicaraguan and Honduran treaties, embodying what hasbeen called "dollar diplomacy," both failed of ratification inthe United States Senate.

Honduras sought another remedy for her financial ills; butNicaragua turned the supervision of her customs over to a col-lector who was selected by the United States according to anarrangement which resembled that of 1905 with the DominicanRepublic. 122 On August 5, 1914, a treaty was signed by Nica-ragua and the United States which promoted the financial re-habilitation of that Central American republic. The UnitedStates Government agreed to pay Nicaragua three million dol-lars, the expenditure of which it was to supervise. In returnthe United States was granted the exclusive right to constructand maintain an interoceanic canal across Nicaragua, and shewas conceded a lease of Great and Little Corn Islands, near theeastern terminus of the Panama Canal. Because of objectionswhich had been made to this treaty by Costa Rica, Honduras,and Salvador, when ratifying it on February 18, 1916, the UnitedStates Senate adopted a. declaration that no provision thereinwas intended to affect any existing right of any of these states."

In recent years the United States Government has pursued apolicy of interposition toward certain Hispanic-American re-publics. That government sent a special commission to pro-mote the pacification of the Dominican Republic. 114 Interven-tion by the United States in Nicaragua precipitated the down-

" American Journal of International Law, Supplement, vol. v, pp. £91-93."' Ibid. Supplement, Vol. Vt, p. 497.Z See further, Munro, The Five Republics of Central America, pp 258-42.

124 Congressional Record, vol. mit, pp 2770, 2711"Annnat Report, Dominican Customs Receivership, 1913, pp. 27. 28.


fall of President Zelaya. 126 In Honduras, the United States,cooperating with England, landed marines who oceupiedterri-tory and secured the establishment of an orderly government.126The policy of forcible intervention or military occupationadopted by the government of the United States toward CentralAmerica and the Dominican Republic is not in accordance withthe commonly accepted principle of the equality of sovereignstates.

What was popularly viewed as a. new application or interpre-tation of the elastic Monroe Doctrine was made during theadministration of President Taft. In 1911 the creditors of aUnited States company which had secured from Mexico a largetract of land on Magdalena Bay upon the western coast of LowerCalifornia tried to sell its rights to certain Japanese subjects.There were persons who suspected that the Mikado's govern-ment designed to secure a foothold in Magdalena Bay. Sena-tor Lodge felt keenly upon the subject. He introduced intothe Senate and that body adopted on August 2, 1912, by a voteof 51 to 4, a resolution as follows:

That when any harbor or other place in the American continents isso situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposesmight threaten the communication or the safety of the United States,the government of the United States could not see, without graveconcern, the possession of such harbor or other place by any corpora-tion or association which has such a relation to another government.not American, as to give that government practical power of controlfor naval or military purposes "I

Thus the Senate placed itself on record as being opposed tothe acquisition of a naval station upon the coast of HispanicAmerica by an Asiatic power.

The continued application of the Monroe Doctrine to casesconcerning which Monroe could seareelyhave dreamed, naturallyprovoked fresh apprehensions among South American thinkers.Two illustrations must here suffice. In 1912a Peruvian Jittéra-

2I Fore,n Relation, of the United States, 1910, pp. 738-67.' brown. "American Intervention in central America," in Joan,o! of Race Derdap,

merit, vol IV. p. 412."Senate Journal, Rd Cong., 9d Sc,,., p 511.


teur, Francisco Garcia CaMcrón, wrote about the " North Ameri-can peril" and said;

The Monroe Doctrine has undergone essential transformations: ithas passed successively from the defensive to intervention and thenceto the offensive. ...Interventions have become more frequent withthe expansion of frontiers: the United States has recently intervened

at Panamk to develop a province and to construct a canal; inCuba, under cover of the Platt Amendment, to maintain order in theinterior; in Santo Domingo to supervise the customhouses; in Vene-zuela, and in Central America, to impose upon these nations, torn byintestine disorders, the political and financial tutelage of the Imperialdemocracy. ...The Monroe Doctrine takes an aggressive formwith Mr Roosevelt, the politician of the "big stick" and intervention aoutrance)5It should be noticed that Garcia Calderon tends to confusethe Monroe Doctrine with the Hispanic-American policy of theUnited States, a tendency from which indeed some writers inthe United States have not been altogether free.

A few years later in an address to citizens of the United Statesa Brazilian diplomat and historian, Manoel de Oliveira Lima,interestingly expressed his views about intervention and theMonroe Doctrine, as follows:

Intervention always implies protection even when it takes place inopposition to the designs of a third party. With or without reason,our people see in intervention a road leading to annexation. Are theHispanic-American countries doing an injustice to the United Statesby displaying these jealousies? If you continue to annex isles nearthe Caribbean Sea and to take possession of canal zones as you havedone in the last twenty years, how canyou abstain from securing landupon the northern coast of South America? . . . The Isthmushaving disappeared, you may make a jump for the other side of theCaribbean and take a seat at the head of our table. Will not Hispanic.American cooperation some day be necessary to check so great anexpansive force, or, in other words, to honor a guest who has thus creptinto our house? . . . Cooperation would possess the great advantageof uniting dissevered forces under the same management; and the smallnations of America, which by virtue of their own forces are unable to

"'Garda Caldetha, Les d4mocraues latines de i'A.n/Mque, pp. 280, 281.


offer a suitable resistance, would secure the protection that was neces-sary to their proper existence, . . The small nations of the NewWorld simply desire the same treatment which is deemed just andhonest toward the small European nations: they are the Belgiums, theMontenegros, and the Servias of our continent, although indeed with-out the political progress of the first, or the picturesque history of thesecond, or the tragic memories of the third,—for if dictators have beenassassinated in Hispanic America, yet their wives have been spared.U9

When Woodrow Wilson became President, Mexico was in thethroes of revolution. Francisco I. Madero had led a successfulrevolution against the Mexican Government, and the enforcedresignation of President Diaz had been followed by a deluge.A counter-revolution led by a nephew of the ex-president andby General Huerta, a disciple of Diaz, deposed President Maderoand, shortly afterwards, the deposed president was assassinated.

Huerta, who had proclaimed himself provisional president,became, in reality, a dictator. On March 4, 1913, a seriousproblem confronted President Wilson, Should Huerta's govern-ment be recognized? Wilson's government decided to refuserecognition largely because Huerta was suspected of havingconnived at Madero's murder. Thus the test which PresidentWilson applied to the government of Buena was not that of theexpediency of recognition, or that of the existence of a do factogovernment, but that of the morality of governmental officials.The recognition of President Huerta by other nations did notaffect the decision of Wilson's government to pursue a policy of"watchful waiting."°

The failure of the United States to recognize Huerta naturallyencouraged his enemies. In northern Mexico the forces of theconstitutional party led by General Carranza and FranciscoVilla gained in strength. After the United States ambassadorto Mexico resigned, that government sent there a special agent,John Lind, who proposed to Buerta an adjustment involving apledge by the latter that he would not become a candidate forelection as president. This proposal Huerta disdainfully re-

°' Oliveira Lana, 'A doutno. de Monroe," In Revista do"Brasil, vol. ii, pp. l £, IS."Fish, Amorwan Dipiomacp, pp. 484, 485.


jccted.'' Mexico was torn by dissensions between his friendsand his enemies. Property belonging to foreign capitalists waswantonly destroyed. Many citizens of the United States andcitizens of European nations lost their lives. Warships of cer-tain European powers hovered about the Mexican Gull. Therewere rumors of the intervention of European powers for the pro-tection of their citizens residing in the distracted republic.Prominent nations of South America beheld the specter of inter-vention by the United States in Mexico with its logical sequel ofannexation. Under such circumstances any policy adopted bythe United States Government was destined to provoke dissatis-faction. A crisis was precipitated because of an affront toUnited States sailors at Tampico.

For that affront Admiral Mayo promptly demanded anapology from iluerta in the form of a salute to the flag of theUnited States. This was refused. Marines from Americanwarships consequently took possession of Vera Cruz, Congressby joint resolution disclaiming any intention to make war uponthe Mexican people. 132 Amid the indignation of certain Mexi-cans, the A B C powers, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, proposedto mediate in the differences between the United States andMexico. That proposal was accepted by both parties. On MayiO, 1914, ministers of the mediators at Washington signed aprotocol providing for the establishment of a provisional govern-ment in Mexico." Soon afterwards Huerta resigned, and Gen-eral Carranza became the ruler. Nevertheless, civil war soonbroke out again between Mexican factions. In September,1915, diplomatic representatives of six Hispanic-American statesat Washington recommended that Carranza's governmentshould be recognized. Such recognition was soon accorded bythe United States and by several other American republics."Relations between the United States and her southern neighborwere soon complicated again because of Villa's jealousy of Car-ranza. After a party of bandits led by Villa had in March, 1916,

'3' World Peace Foundation, pamphlet series, vol. vi, no I, The ?s'no Pan Amencaninn,pt ,,pp. 16-19

332 Ibid. no. 2, The New Pan Americanism, pt Jr. pp. 26. 27 '"IWd.. pp. 27-36."4 Ibid., no. 1, The New Pan Amenean,ani fr pt. i, pp. 71, 88, 89.


stealthily crossed the border and attacked Columbus, NewMexico, the Government of the United States decided to senda military force in pursuit of Villa's followers. Carranza'sgovernment objected to this policy, especially after a second"punitive expedition" crossed the border in pursuit of theelusive Villa.135

No satisfactory solution of the Mexican problem had beenfound. This imbroglio had, however, afforded the A B C powersan opportunity to mediate between Mexico and the UnitedStates. Huerta had been forced out. The United States hadtried to avoid injuring the susceptibilities of South Americanpeoples. At some cost she had refrained from adopting a policyof forcible intervention in Mexico.

As contrasted with those years when the foundations of diplo-matic intercourse were being laid between the United Statesand the Hispanic-American nations, the period extending from1861 to the present day was marked by the application of theMonroe Doctrine to disputes arising under circumstances thatwere more or less different from the historic circumstances whichprovoked that doctrine. While greeting with applause theapplication of the Monroe Doctrine to cases in which the forcibleintervention of European powers threatened to deprive a His-panic-American state of her territory or her political autonomy,Hispanic-American publicists and writers have occasionallybeen inclined to resent the exercise of an authority by the UnitedStates which was obviously not in strict accordance with theoriginal Doctrine. Three Hispanic-American diplomats, Calve,Drago, and Tobar, proposed doctrines which may be consideredas collateral to the Doctrine of Monroe.

During this period the United States Government intervenedin Cuba. Intervention in that island was significant because itestablished a precedent with regard to the attitude of the UnitedStates toward the affairs of a Hispanic-American nation. Ad-herence to the Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine ledto intervention by the United States in the affairs of the Do-minican Republic. A policy of fiscal intervention, which Seere-

"5 See further. Moore, The Principle: of American Diplomacy. pp. 217-38.


tary Knox viewed as not unrelated to the Monroe Doctrine, hasalso been applied in recent years to Central America. Duringthe present century the United States has developed a specialinterest in Nicaragua, Panama, Cuba, and the republics uponthe island of Santo Domingo, an interest which has inducedcareful students to declare that she exercises a protectorate overthose nations. That relation has been viewedwith increasingconcern by some statesmen of Hispanic America.

chapter iv the monroe doctrine, allied...

Documents