chapter-ill coalition governments and the nuclear...
TRANSCRIPT
Chapter- Ill
Coalition Governments and the Nuclear Issue
India's policy on nuclear issues was ambiguous and shrouded in secrecy
from independence upto Pokhran II nuclear tests of May 1998. The architect of
modern India and the first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, realised the
importance of "nuclear power"5 and aspired to possess it for the larger interest of
the people. He was also cautious of its constructive and destructive roles in
causing havoc and prosperity to mankind. During the Second World War the
Allied Powers led by the United States of America (US) dropped nuclear bombs
on two cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki-of Japan in 1945, causing immense
damage to the people of Japan. The total number of people killed in this tragedy
is not known exactly. However, it is estimated that it the numbers killed exceeds
two hundred and fifty thousand. Eventually Japan surrendered to the Allied
Powers.2 This action of Allied Powers was widely condemned across the world
by the pacifists and philanthropists. At this juncture, the Indian National Congress
that was striving to gain independence for India from the British criticised bitterly
the Allied Powers' action vis-a-vis Japan. Mahatma Gandhi who was a
philanthropist, humanist, pacifist and apostle of peace and non-violence led the
India's national movement, and he worked for the greatest good of mankind. For
5 The word "nuclear power" has multiple meanings. It connotes the production of electricity as well as state possessing nuclear weapons. Vide George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. IJ.
" Frank Barnaby, "The Effect of The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki" in Holdstock and Frank Barnaby (eds.), Hiroshima and Nagasaki Retrospect and Prospect (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p.2. Vide Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage caused by the Atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Eisei Ishikawa and David L. Swan, Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical and Social £.fleets o,lthe Atomic Bombings (New York: Basic Books, 1981 ).
63
instance, he launched a satyagrah a in South Africa against the racist colonial
regime of South Africa and subsequently took up the cause of India's freedom by
adopting the non-violent approach. He wished and appealed to the people of
world for peacefully resolving the differences at the international level. Jawaharlal
Nehru while speaking on the issue of disarmament described Gandhi's
contribution thus: "In India during the last quarter of a century and more
Mahatma Gandhi made an outstanding contribution not only to the freedom of
India but to the cause of world peace. He taught us the doctrine of non-violence,
not as a passive submission to evil, but as an active and positive instrument for
the peaceful solution of international differences."3 Jawaharlal Nehru, a heir to
the Gandhian tradition, was wise enough to carry on the tradition of non-violence
and peace. He was also well aware of the positive side of acquisition of nuclear
power, which has opened up limitless avenues and boundaries for human
prosperity and development. Nehru noted, "On the one hand, the nuclear bomb
and the destruction of Nagasaki and Hiroshima illustrates the horrendous
revolution that has taken place in military technology and on the other, the
application of nuclear energy to peaceful and constructive purpose has opened
limitless possibilities for human development, prosperity and over abundance.
This major challenge confronts our times with a choice between co-destruction
and co-prosperity and makes it imperative for the world to outlaw war, particularly
nuclear war."4
·1
Jawaharlal Nehru. India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches. September /946- April /96/ (New Delhi: Publication Division, tvlinistry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961 ), p. 182. "Nehru is quoted, in Perkovich, op. cit., no. I, P. 15.
64
Apart from the destructive role of nuclear power, the development of
nuclear energy is directly linked with the foreign policy of India, which had just
gained independence from Britain in 1947. At this time, the world was getting
divided into power blocs-US led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and
Communist dominated Soviet Union led Eastern Europe. The US and Soviet
Union that had aspiration for super power position at international level viewed
nuclear weapons as symbols of status in international level and their strategy
was to blackmail each other by possessing nuclear weapons. The competition
between these two powers went on for a long period and left fears and
uncertainty of a nuclear war at the international level. This context, appealing to
US and USSR Nehru said, "I venture to appeal to the great leaders of the United
States of America and the Soviet Union. I do so in all humility, but with great
earnestness.... But I am overwhelmed by the thought of the crisis in civilization
which the world is facing today, the like of which it has not known ever before. I
believe that it is in the power of America and Russia to solve this crisis and save
humanity from the ultimate disaster which faces it." Further he says, "I appeal to
them to stop all nuclear test explosions and thus show to the world that they are
determined to end this menace, ... to bring about effective disarmament."5
It is against the backdrop of the above-mentioned international scenario
that Nehru devised the policy of non-alignment, which was the cardinal principle
of India's foreign policy. It was through this policy that Nehru wanted to pacify
and reconcile the rivals (US and USSR) and gain the massive economic and
5 Nehru op. cit., no. 3, p. 202.
65
technological aid from both the powers to being change and development in
India. In this connection, while addressing the California University students,
Nehru said, "It is a positive and vital policy that flows from our struggle for
freedom .... The very process of marshalling the world into two hostile camps
precipitates the conflict which it has sought to avoid."6 In addition to this policy of
non-alignment helped India, in pursuance of national interest in terms of the
expansion of developmental programmes initiated by Nehru in 1950s. 7
Besides this, the pressing domestic needs forced Nehru to define India's
policy vis-a-vis nuclear-bomb and disarmament. As mentioned above, Nehru
viewed the nuclear bomb as a threat to the survival of mankind. Therefore, he
called for a ban on the manufacture, storage and use of weapons of mass
destruction. He stood for complete abolition of nuclear weapons. He says
"disarmament must include the prohibition of the manufacture, storage and use
of weapons of mass destruction as well as the progressive limitation of
conventional weapons".8 He rightly did so inspite of the fact that the nuclear
infrastructure was ready for generating nuclear energy and the same could have
been utilized for making bombs by 1964. Because the US agreed in the late
1950s to India's peaceful nuclear programme under the scheme of Canada -
India, US research reactor (CIRUS) through which the US and Canada donated
the heavy water to start this Canadian designed 40 MW thermal reactor to India.
<• Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected Speeches, Vol. II, (New Delhi: Publicity Division Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Government of India, 1957), pp. 394-395. 7
Achin Vanaik, India in a Changing World: Tractsj(Jr the Times (New Delhi: Oril!nt Longman, 1995), pp. 19-20. 8 Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy /963-1964 (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1964), p. 220.
66
CIRUS was meant to be operated for peaceful purposes only, albeit there was no
mechanism to ensure this. It is this loophole that has been utilised by Homi
Jahangir Bhabha to produce plutonium usable in making the bomb. Bhabha not
only used this opportunity but also shown keen interest in acquiring capability
after India's defeat at the hands of China in 1962 war with it. Praful Bidwai and
Achin Vaniak point this out, "There is evidence that Bhabha shifted towards
active acquisition of weapons capability after India's defeat in the China war of
1962. In his speech ... he says India too can conduct a test in 18 months. But
such changes are not articulated at policy level."9 Nehru remained committed to
the cause of disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy. When he was
forced to pronounce the policy vis-a-vis nuclear programme he said, "I do not
know how you are to distinguish between (them) .... of course if we are compelled
to use (atomic energy) for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiments of any of
us will stop the nation from using it that way. But I do hope that our outlook in
regard to this atomic energy is going to be a peaceful one ... and not one of war
and hatred."10 This policy stand of Nehru vis-a-vis the nuclear bomb and
disarmament would later become the guiding principle for the foreign policy of
India upto the 1990s. Moreover, it was directly linked with technological
development at home and disarmament at the international level in the context of
the Cold War. Besides this it was directly related to the development of Indian
economy because India was largely dependent on foreign aid in 1950s and
" Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik. South Asia on Short Fuse: Nuclear Politics and Future of Global Disarmament (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 67-68. 10 Quoted in !tty Abraham. The Making ofthe Indian Atomic Bomh (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1998), pp. 48-49.
67
1960s. Thus, it was directly related to the foreign policy of India i.e. policy of non-
alignment. It is in this context that Shyam Bhatia discusses the pros and cons of
the possession of nuclear infrastructure that was directly related to the foreign
policy of India in the 1950s. In this connection he writes, "Nuclear issues impinge
on Indian foreign policy in two principal ways. First, the Indian government was
forced to define its policies in relations to the arms control and disarmament talks
from 1945 onwards, in which the Western bloc and communist nations were
ranged on opposite sides of negotiating table, and where the control of nuclear
weapons was arguably the most important issue under discussion. Second,
ideas for peaceful use of nuclear energy, such as those contained in President
Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace Plan of 1953, also required a suitable response
from New Delhi." 11 As discussed above, the policy of non-alignment was devised
to pacify the warring parties-the US led NATO and Soviet Union-while seeking to
develop technological and financial strength for the development of industrial and
nuclear infrastructure. In this context, Nehru while participating in the debate on
defence issues in Parliament, said, "The right approach to defence is to avoid
having unfriendly relations with other countries." Further he says, "The equation
of defence is your defence forces plus your industrial and technological
-. background, plus, thirdly, the economy of the country and fourthly, the spirit of
the people." 12 It indicates that Nehru's belief was in strengthening country's
industrial bases for development and that in turn will strengthen nation's overall
well being.
11 Shy am, Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), p. 37. 1 ~ Jawaharlal Nehru, Speeches: 1953-57 Vol. 3, (New Delhi: Publicity Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1957), pp. 40-41.
68
· It is in the context that India's nuclear policy is primarily intended for
peaceful purpose, generating electric power and for other multiple research
activities. Thus, India's policy on the nuclear issue, as Nehru viewed, is for
peaceful purpose and global disarmament. The successive governments in India
adopted the same as policy approach, i.e. use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes and advocated global nuclear disarmament while retaining the option of
acquiring the nuclear bombs.
The successive governments in India constantly maintained that India
would not acquire nuclear bomb but would keep its nuclear option open. They did
it even in the wake of Chinese attack in 1962 and subsequent nuclear tests in
1964 that posed a grave security threat to India. Besides this, in 1974 the Indira
Gandhi government got tested the first nuclear device and termed the same for
peaceful purpose. That is consistent with the policies adopted by Nehru. In the
1980s China and Pakistan's overt and covert proliferation of nuclear arsenal was
taking place at a time when the country was beset by insurgency in Punjab,
Kashmir and Northeastern states. The government in New Delhi, instead,
advocated total global disarmament while keeping an option for nuclear
weapons. Meanwhile, the political parties such as Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
and the Shiv Sena an ally of BJP held a view that India should possess the
nuclear weapons in response to Chinese and Pakistan's nuclear proliferation.
This policy stand of various governments during the Cold War and in the
1990s had origins in number of factors that directly affect the nuclear policy of
India. The prominent factors are as follows: the global regimes such as Non-
69
Proliferation Treaty of 1968 (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of
1992; the deteriorating security environment in the South Asian region; India's
relations with super powers in the international system; and domestic political
structure, political parties, and ideological variables are responsible for the policy
outcome. Ashley J. Tellis concurred with this view: "there are four variables that
will influence the direction, extent, and patterns of change in India's nuclear
posture overtime: the character of the global regime; the demands imposed by
regional security and in particular of India's bilateral relations with key powers in
international system; and opportunities offered by indigenous performance and
capabilities in the context of domestic political debates about nuclearisation."13
It is in the context the NPT, CTBT and the American pressure, and the
security threat perceptions of India emanated from Pakistan and Chinese
collusion in developing the nuclear arsenal constituted the causal variables for
India's nuclear programme since 1980s. This threat perception became more
serious in 1990s. Hence, the above-mentioned factors are examined so as to
ascertain the primacy and urgency given to the nuclear issues by the various
coalition governments in 1990s. Besides this, the corresponding national interest,
perceptions and pressures vis-a-vis the nature and scope of decisions making of
various coalition governments in India in the 1990s will be assessed.
l.1 Ashley J. Tellis. India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Pittsburgh (US): RAND, 200 I), p. 20. .
70
Disarmament, NPT and CTBT
India since 1950s took steps either individually or collectively at the UN to
halt the process of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. By that time US,
United Kingdom, USSR, France and China had acquired the nuclear know-how
and tested the same underground, over ground and under sea for verification of
the authenticity of weapons. In this situation, the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)
was adopted in 1963 in UN and to some extent the treaty yielded the result, and
the over ground explosion of nuclear devices was stopped. Boosted by this
achievement the super powers adopted the non-proliferation treaty through UN,
enacted it in 1968 and brought into force in 1970. 14 The essence of treaty is the
division of world into "haves" and "have nots". 15 These "haves" states are those
states that have conducted nuclear tests or possessed nuclear weapons before 1
January 1967, and they are also called "P5"states. 16 They are members of
exclusive nuclear club the US, USSR, UK, France and China. The provisions of
NPT are discriminatory and deprive other countries of possessing or acquiring
nuclear weapons. The provisions of the treaty give superior position to "haves"
States by entitling them to possess weapons. The NPT does not explicitly say
that the existing weapons must be destroyed.
This discriminatory nature of the treaty made India reject it out rightly.
India refused to endorse it in the following review conferences as envisioned by
14 N. Ram, Riding the Nuclear Tiger (New Delhi: Leftward Books, 1999), p.49. 15 Stephen P. Cohen. India Emerging Power (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 200 I), p. 173. I<> Ibid, p. I 73.
71
Article VIII of the NPT Treaty. 17 By refusing to endorse the treaty India remained
outside the purview of NPT. The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission
(UNAEC) 18 and later the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) established
in 1957 inspect and regulate the peaceful nuclear programmes of member
countries. 19 It also reports to UN Security Council if any nuclear weapons
programme is under consideration of the member countries. The Indian
governments even refused to put Indian nuclear programme under "full-scope
safe guards"20 of IAEA, which is directly related to NPT. Thus, this policy stand of
governments during the Cold War was deemed to be morally right. The
governments adopted this stand while preparing and developing infrastructure for
nuclear bombs. Meantime the various governments adopted and propounded
views for global disarmament in during cold war. It is this policy stand of the
governments that sent conflicting signals, especially after the 197 4 test at
Pokhran, to international community and put the successive government in
dilemma in post-Cold War era.
The Post-Cold War Era and Indian Security
The 1990s has been a tumultuous period for the Indian government.
Because of the disintegration of former USSR the Cold War between the US and
USSR came to an end. The power politics at the international level ceased to be
relevant and economic factors became prominent. At this juncture, massive
changes were taking place in Asia and Eastern Europe. The dismantling of the
17 N. Ram, op. cit., no. 14, p. 49. 18 Vide Shy am Bhatia, op.cit. no. I 0, p. 39. 1q IAEA 's World Atom Internet Services at http://www.iaea.org.
20 N .Ram, op.cit., no. 14 p. 50.
72
Cold War structure in its military, strategic as well as politico-ideological
dimensions, which left uncertainty and unpredictability at the international level.
Many realist observers attempted to define the end of Cold War phase" Unipolar
World Order" and some others termed it as a "Multi-polar" world. Characteristics
of both unipolar and multipolar world could be seen from the arguments of realist
observers. Charles Krauthammer, a realist, views the end of the Cold War era as
the end of bipolarity in international politics, the US as the sole super power in
international politics, which would continue to maintain its hegemony in years to
come. He sums it up as, "the unipolar moment has the potential to last longer,
say for a total of twenty to thirty years."21 He means to say that the US has the
potential of achieving international peace and disarmament because it is far
ahead of all other countries of the world from any angle be it the information
technology, military capability, stable economy, strong polity and strong
intelligence network across the world. Therefore, American hegemony will
continue for the next thirty years to come. Michael Mastanduno further
substantiates this as, "The unipolar model best characterises contemporary
international relations. Its durability will depend significantly on the effectiveness
of US statecraft."22
Some other realists view the emerging structure in the post-Cold War
world as a "multi-polar" world. The US strategic analyst Henry Kissinger being
the most outstanding advocate of this view, has suggested that: "The
cl Quoted in Michael Mastanduno, "A Realist View: Three Images ofComing International Order" in T.V. Paul and John A. Hall (eds.), International Order and the Future oft he World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p .19. "" Ibid, p.37.
73
international system of twenty-first century will be marked by a seeming
contradiction: on the one hand, fragmentation; on the other, growing
globalization. On the level of the relations among states, the new order will be
more like the European state system of the 18th and 19th centuries than the rigid
pattern of the cold war. It will contain at least six major powers the United States,
Europe, China, Japan, Russia and probably lndia."23
An inference could be drawn from the above arguments that a unipolar
world depicts an American centred international order, in which the United States
will play a role of maintaining world peace and order. A multi-polar world
highlights economic competition among major industrial powers as the central
feature of the post-war environment.
In a multipolar world order, economic factors assume importance and
expand the horizon of international relations because the world economy is
operating in all continents and the communication revolution is buttressing them.
It is in this context that "international relations have become truly global for the
first time. Communications are instantaneous; the world economy operates on all
continents simultaneously. A whole set of issue has surfaced that can only be
dealt with on a world-wide basis, such as nuclear proliferation, ... and economic
interdependence."24 At this juncture it can be said that the US is militarily a sole
super power (unipolar) and all major industrial countries are also dominant
23 Quoted by Sanjay Baru, "The Economic Dimension of India's Foreign Policy", World Affairs, Vol.2,
no.2, April/June 1998, p.97. ~-~ Ibid, p.97
74
economic powers (Multi-Polar) in the post-Cold War era. India is neither a major
military nor a major economic power as yet.
As discussed above, the US has the potential of restoring peace in the
world by taking up the cause of disarmament at the international level. True to
this, the US really made the non-proliferation issue as a key point in its foreign
policy, which Haider K. Nizamani says that it is a "Curse to lndia"25 because India
is vulnerable to US pressure on account of its nuclear programme. India hitherto
rejected the NPT on the ground that it is a discriminatory but in the 1990s the US
was really determined to halt the process of proliferation of weapons across the
world i.e., prevention of horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. But it was not
concerned about the vertical spread of nuclear weapons which P5 states
continued to add to their arsenals. Besides this, the US was preventing the
manufacturing and launching of missiles and as a part of this policy strategy the
US blocked the supply of cryogenic rocket components from Russia to lndia.26
Meanwhile, Chinese-Pakistani overt and covert proliferation activities
continued. 27 It is these developments vis-a-vis nuclear issues that are directly
related to India's national security in the 1990s.
India's National Security: The Threat Perception in the 1990s
The national security is one of the primary duties of the Indian State to
protect the property and lives of the people of India as guaranteed by the
25 Haider K. Nizamani, The Roots of Rhetoric: Politics ofNudear Weapons in India and Pakistan (New Delhi: Indian Press. 2001 ), p59. 2" Government of India, Ministry of Defence, India, Annual Report /994, p. 7.
27 See Zafar Iqbal Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Policies: Attitudes and Postures" in P.R. Chari, Pervaiz
Iqbal Cheema and lftekharuzzaman (eds.), Nuclear Non-Prolileration in India and Pakistan: South Asian Perspectives (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1996), pp. I OJ-130.
75
Constitution of India. It is in this connection that the Annual Report of Ministry of
Defence, Government of India stated the national security objectives as, "India's
national security objectives are served by: Defending the country's borders as
defined by law and enshrined in the Constitution; and protecting the lives and
property of its citizens against terrorism and insurgencies."28
India's national security threats emanate from its territorial links and
geographical contiguity with Pakistan, China and other South Asian neighbours.
Pakistan attacked India in 1947 to occupy Kashmir by force. So did China in
1962 in the northern and eastern sectors of India tore-demarcate the border (i.e.
Mac Mohan Line) between India and China. Besides this, Pakistan fought three
wars with India. The latest one is the Kargil war in 1999. In this context Indian
security threat is directly linked with territory as defined from military point of view
since independence. Verghese Koithara discusses it broadly as, "Independent
India, non-nuclear and with modest trading interests, had from the beginning
defined military thre-ats principally in territorial terms. Pakistan's attack on
Kashmir two months after independence has contributed to the territorial focus.
That by China in 1962 reinforced it." Besides this, India is beset by insurgencies
in the Northeast, Punjab and Kashmir since the 1950s. The separatist
movements in India gained momentum in the 1980s and 1990s. They are
allegedly aided and abetted by Pakistan and China in achieving their
secessionist objectives. This has posed a serious security challenge to India in
the 1990s. Further, Verghese Koithara says, "Insurgencies in the Northern,
28 Government oflndia, Ministry of Defence India, Annual Report 1998-1999, p. 3.
76
Punjab and Kashmir were also seen as territorial threats as they had secession
as their objectives."29
Pakistan and China not only constitute a security threat to India but also
carry deep-rooted animosity towards India. Pakistan is a creation of British
colonialism from the Indian sub-continent on the basis of "Two-Nation-
Theory"(the Hindus and the Muslims are two Nations)30 in 1947. It views
Kashmir, a Muslim majority-State in India and rightfully being a part of Pakistan.
India, too, views Kashmir as a symbol of secularism and equal right guaranteed
by the Constitution of India, which is more than history and geography. Surjit
Mansingh explains it as, "For India, too, Kashmir came to represent more than
history, geography and the ancestral home of Nehru family. It was a symbol of
the legalities of the treaties because Jammu & Kashmir joined the Indian union
by an Act of Accession signed by the ruler. It was symbol of the democratic
process because elected governments in the state confirmed the accession. It
was symbol of secularism and equal rights in a multi-religious state."31
In this context Pakistan has locked horns with India three times, the latest
one in Kargil sector and has ambition of acquiring it by force. China defeated
India in 1962 and carries the territorial ambitions in the northeaster states of
India. Moreover, they are colluding with each other in the region against India
~o Verghese Koithara, Society, State and Security: The Indian Experience (New Delhi: Sage Publication, 1999), p. 250. 30 M.A. Jinnah, the advocate of"Two-Nations-Theory" in during India's freedom movement against the secular Nationalism preached and practiced by Gandhi and Nehru vide. Stanely, Wolpert, Jinnah (?f Pakistan: A political Biography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), and see Jim Masselos, Struggling and Ruling: The Indian National Congressl885-1985 (New Delhi: Sterling, 1986). 31
Surj it, Mansingh, India's Search for Power: Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy 1966-1981 (New Delhi: Sage Publication, 1984), p.l95.
77
and have overtly and covertly possessed the nuclear bombs. In the 1990s it
become quite clear that Pakistan was developing its missile and nuclear bombs
with the assistance of China. The Ministry of Defence Annual Reports recorded,
"the evolving security environment in the region is: China has supplied M-11
missiles to Pakistan and aiding with technology and manpower as well in the
development of its indigenous Missile programme. There are also credible
reports about China continuing to assist Pakistan in its clandestine nuclear
weapons programme."32
Not only Pakistani-Chinese overt or covert development of nuclear bombs
posed serious threat to the Indian security but also the stationing of the foreign
fleets in the Indian Ocean (Diego Gracia) posed a challenge to the Indian
security. Besides this, as discussed in the preceding paragraph the US made
non-proliferation issue a key point in its foreign policy agenda in the post-Cold
War era to build pressure on the "nuclear threshold countries" (including India) to
endorse the NPT while perpetuating the possession of nuclear weapons by a few
countries. These developments in the vicinity of India and at the global level
impinge upon the India's security calculations. The Annual Report of Ministry of
Defence, Government of India reported, "China's nuclear weapons status,
Pakistan's self acknowledged nuclear capability, acquired through covert means,
and the presence of nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean are factors that
impinge on India's security calculations."33
J~ Government of India, Ministry of Defence, Annual Report: /996-/997, pp. 6-7. 33
Government of India. Ministry of Defence, Annual Report: /997-98. p.G.
78
It is these developments in the 1990s that added technical aspects to the
Indian nuclear programme at home and a policy response to the NPT by the
governments in New Delhi. India opposed NPT since its inception on moral,
political and diplomatic grounds because NPT is discriminatory in nature and
does not advocate complete elimination of exiting weapons. So, the threat to
mankind remains, which is against the moral tradition of India inherited from
Gandhian non-violence. But, in the 1990s it became technical. Kanti Bajpai
described it as, "If the most of the opposition to the NPT or the regional route to
abstinence has so far been ethical, diplomatic and political, it is now becoming
increasingly technical."34 Because the nuclear programme of India upto 1980s
has political and ethical considerations but India kept the nuclear option open for
larger diplomatic purposes. In the 1990s it became technical because of the overt
and covert Chinese Pakistani nuclear programme on the one hand and the
flawed non- proliferation regimes such as Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) and other non- proliferation regimes on the other. Besides this there was
constant pressure from the West on India to keep its nuclear infrastructure open
for IAEA inspection. If India accedes to such demands and sign the CTBT then
Pakistan may utilise the loopholes in the non proliferation regimes and
clandestinely prepare bombs with assistance of China and may pose security
threat to India. Thus in this context India kept its option open which is quite
technical to handle the above developments that are challenging to India's
security and nuclear programme in the 1990s.
14 Kanti P. Bajpai, "Abstaining: The Nuclear option", in David Contright and Amitabh Mattoo,(eds.), India
and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Option (New Delhi: Bahrisons, 1996), p.33.
7Q
The Domestic Scenario of India In The 1990s
At this stage of development at the international level vis-a-vis NPT and
the India's security the Indian domestic scene was equally or more challenging.
The economy was on the verge of facing bankruptcy, and the security
environment had deteriorated badly with insurgencies in Jammu and Kashmir
a~d the Northeastern States; the risk of conflict with Pakistan was high.
Moreover, the era of Congress party domination was over and the 1990s saw a
succession of minority or coalition governments in New Delhi. As a result the era
of political instability had commenced. The first coalition government headed by
V.P. Singh and Chandra Shekhar as its Prime Ministers in 1989-91.
Subsequently, the minority Congress government headed by P.V. Narasimha
Rao was succeeded in 1996 by two United Front governments under the
leadership of H.D. Oeve Gowda and I.K. Gujral in 1996-97.
The UF coalition government was a reincarnation of the National Front
coalition government and had, apart from Janata Dal as the main party, socialists
and leftists as its coalition partners such as Communist Party of India (CPI), CPI
(Marxist), Assom Gana Parishad (AGP), Oravida Munnetra Kazhagam (OMK),
Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK), Telugu Oesam Party
(TOP), Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) and National Conference (NC) of
Jammu & Kashmir.
The UF ran the government on the basis of support extended by the
Congress party from outside. These governments were followed by the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) headed by A.B.
80
Vajpayee 1998 and 1999. The BJP/NDA coalition consists of right wing parties
(BJP and Shiv Sena who derive extremist ideology of culture nationalism of
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), 3 cultural organisation which advocates
one nation, one people, and one culture 35 on the one hand, and the socialist
secular parties such as Samata Party, Trinamool Congress, All India Anna
Ora vida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), later MDMK and DMK joined hand with
BJP, Shiromani Akali Dal of Punjab, Biju Janata Dal (BJD), Janata Dal (JD),
Janata Dal United (U), an offshoot of the old Janata Party and the National
Conference on the other hand. The TOP and National Conference of Jammu and
Kashmir that supported NDA were also members of UF coalition government. It
is these parties that made alliances and re-alliances with the national level
parties the Congress, the Janata Dal and the BJP.
Most of these political parties are regionally based and have their plans
and programme concerning to their states and regional autonomy under the
scheme of Indian federal structure. Paul Brass described this phenomenon as;
"these single-state parties are distinguished by their adoption of a regional
nationalist perspective, by their political desire for greater regional autonomy of
states in Indian Union, for their focus on issues specific to their states or for their
religious base within a religious minority."36 Not only these political parties based
their programme and plans concerning to their states, but they have also
35 The RSS was established in 1925 by Dr. Hedgewar in order to inpire Hindu youth to protect and honour
the Hindu Religion. The BJP and its outfits believe in the same. Vide, Christopher Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalism Movement in India (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1996); See Walter Andersen, and Shiridhar Damle. The Brotherhood ofSqffron (Boulder, Columbia: Westview Press, 1987); and Partha S. Ghosh, The BJP and the Evolution of Hindu Nationalism: From Periphe1y to Center, (New Delhi: Shipra Publication, 200 I). 3
" Paul R.Brass, Politics of India Since Independence (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 200 I), p.89.
81
appealed to the ethnic populism in their bid to win elections at their states and
hoped to form the government in alliance with other parties at the central level.
The focus of these regional parties on foreign policy issue was not concrete
either at the time of election or in government. This was happening at a time
when the debate on NPT was seriously taken up at the international level and it
was becoming increasingly a sensitive issue vis-a-vis India's nuclear programme
and India's national security. Robert Bradnock points out this tendency amongst
the political parties as, "with the· exception of the Communist Party of India
(Marx1st) in West Bengal and Kerala, tile BJP, tile Janata Dal, most of the
Congress Party's opponents at regional level based their programmes on the
appe?l of ethnic populism.... Nevertheless these interests were largely
concerned with domestic issues, and no consistently distinctive stance on foreign
policy was taken by any of the non-Congress parties."37
In addition to this. the debate on the character and nature of state
surfaced along with NPT. This was due to the spread of insurgency across the
country which was abetted and aided by the Communist regime of China and
Pakistan's Islamic fundamentalism. India was perceived to be a soft target as
BJP alleged in the wake of election and gained ground in the electoral politics of
lndia. 38 The BJP convinced the voters that if it were elected to power it will go for
testing the nuclear weapons, abolish the Sharia law, a provision for regulation of
Muslim marriages and divorces. The BJP also advocated openly that if it ment
sent to power it would abolish Article 370 of the Constitution of India which
37 Robert R. Bradnock, Jndia'sforeignpolicysince 1971 (London; Pinter publishers, 1990), p.25. 18
Partha S. Ghosh, The BJP and the Evolution of Hindu Nationalism: .fi·om PeriphetJ' to Center (New Delhi: IV!anohar, 1991).
82
guaranteed a special status to the Jammu and Kashmir state. Thus, the BJP
stood for the "Cultural Nationalism"39 as preached and practiced by Hedgewar,
Golvalkar, Veer Savarkar. They viewed entire India "one Nation, one culture, and
one people",40 in contrast with the secular and socialist policies defined and
articulated by Gandhi-Nehru led Congress Party and put in practice in post-
independence India's polity.
Political Parties and Nuclear Issues in 1990s
Political parties in India adopted different views and approaches to nuclear
disarmament and India's nuclear programme. The close examination of national
parties stand and programmes vis-a-vis nuclear issue from the point of view of
their electoral manifestos reveals that parties such as Janata Dal and the
Com·munist parties irrespective of their opposition to Congress at the domestic
front had viewed nuclear disarmament as a major policy approach vis-a-vis NPT.
As far as India's security is concerned the National Front manifesto stated as,
"while committing itself to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, India cannot
ignore the proximity of nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons power in the
region and must take into account in evolving her security doctrine and it must
keep its option open while working for removal of discriminatory clauses."41 It
indicates that the National Front had adopted the stand on this issue which was
largely consistent with the Congress Party's stand on disarmament.
'9 C.P. Bhambri, Bharatiya Janata Party: Periphe1y to Center (New Delhi Shipra, 200 I), p.l58.
40 This is manifested in the writings of Guru Golvakar, We or our Nationhood Defined (Nagpur: P.N. Indurkar, 1939). He also viewed the entire sub-continent before 1947 as Motherland Karmabhoomi of Hindus only. Also, see N.M. Khilanani, "What is Wrong with the Concept of the Hindu State", Organiser Vol. 39, No. 32, 24 Jan I 988, p. 19. 41 Election Manifesto of National Front, General Election, 1989, p. 36.
83
The Congress, true to its traditional and ideological stand vis-a-vis NPT
was committed to the policy of total global universal nuclear disarmament a
policy initiated by Rajiv Gandhi in 1980s.42 The BJP favoured that India should
acquire the bomb. The manifesto says, "we must go for nuclear option."43 The
BJP repeated the same bit aggressively in subsequent election. The Manifesto
reads it as, "the BJP will give our defence force "nuclear teeth."44 However, the
National Front and Left front and Congress repeated the same in consistent to
their past policies and political stands.
In the 1996 General Elections, the ruling Congress Party manifesto said
that India was committed to total global universal disarmament while taking into
consideration the prevailing security situation in the region. It says, "We are
deeply concerned that Pakistan is developing nuclear weapons unabated. They
. have already inflicted four wars upon India. In case Pakistan persists in the
development and deployment of nuclear weapons, India will be constrained to
review her policy to meet the threat."45 Similarly, the Janata Dal and Left
opposition parties have reflected the same position vis-a-vis NPT, total universal
disarmament, and the India's security. 46 At this juncture the NPT was under
discussion in the UN and at the domestic level as well. All the political parties
unanimously rejected the NPT, they had also unanimity in keeping India's
nuclear option open. No political party contemplated foreclosing of the nuclear
option. Despite this, the political parties differed on India acquiring nuclear
42 Election Mnnifesto of Indian Nntional Congress, General Election 1989. 4 _~ BJP Election Manifesto, Gei1eral Election in I 989. 44 Election Manifesto of BJP, General Election, 199 I. 45 Election Manifesto of Indian National Congress, General Election. 1996. p.32. 4
" Vide Election Manifestos of Jan at a Dal and Lett Pnrties. General Election 1996.
84
bombs. Parties such as Congress, Left and Janata Dal, at least publicly rejected
the idea of acquiring nuclear bombs while the BJP openly pleaded that India
should acquire nuclear bombs. Even its predecessor Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS)
and Hindu Maha Sabha ideologue Veer Savarkar publicly called for India
acquiring the bombs. 47 Thus the two powerful political arguments based on
ideological orientation surfaced in the 1990s. On the one hand Congress and
socialist parties stood by the principle of non-violence and internationalism. They
viewed nuclear bomb as a perverted notion of great power status as perceived
by the Western powers. On the other hand, parties such as the BJP and its sister
organizations RSS, VHP and allies Shiv Sena and some socialists like George
Fernandes favoured the idea of India acquiring the nuclear bomb the former in
order to demonstrate the superiority of Indian civilisation. Thus, these two
different views, ideas, values and goals in India played a vital role in shaping the
nuclear policy of India. They seem contradictory and have different ideological
mores. Stephen Cohen characterises them as, "two powerful political arguments,
deeply anchored in Indian values and goals, favoured an Indian nuclear
programme. Viewed separately, they seem contradictory."48
Not only did the political parties differ on the idea of India acquiring
nuclear weapons, so too did the Indian elites who the viewed nuclear bomb in
terms of national prestige. The Joan B. Krock Institute for International Peace
Studies, in co-operation with Fourth Freedom Forum conducted a comprehensive
survey in which half of the interviewees felt that nuclear weapons can only
~ 7 Stuart Corbridge, "The Militarization of all Hindustani'? The Bharatiya Janata Party, The Bomb and the Political Spaces of Hindu Nationalism", Economy and Society, Vol. 28, No.2, May 1999, p. 227. ~s Stephen P. Cohen, op.cit., no. 15, p.l68.
85
counter nuclear weapons and will enhance India's prestige. They viewed them
keeping in mind the Chinese and Pakistani nuclear programmes and the
hostility/animosity of these two countries towards India. Besides this, they held
that the nuclear weapons would enhance "National Prestige" since they are the
"Currency of Power". Varun Sahni writes in this connection as, "The other big
motivation for India going nuclear relates not to national security but to national
prestige."49 Thus, the public opinion survey divulges that half of the elites,
besides the political parties, favoured nuclear weapons. In addition to this, the
people and political parties alike boasted of India's superiority vis-a-vis its
neighbours, and by possessing nuclear weapons India would join the group of
"P5" states, and gain respect at international level. This could be seen in the Kroc
Institute Survey that 18 per cent of pro-bomb lobby advocates have identified
themselves with BJP which stands for India acquiring the bomb. 5° The BJP or its
predecessor BJS not only advocated India acquiring the nuclear bomb but also
wanted to project India as a dominant power in South Asia and beyond. Stephen
Cohen points out, "the BJP leadership speak of the moral defensive, Indian
weapons programme, their primary prospective is that these devices bring status,
power and military capability to India vis-a-vis its neighbours and other states,
especially the United States."51
In spite of this bomb lobby at home 46 per cent in the survey opposed the
nuclear weapons on moral grounds and advocated that India should renounce
~9 Varun Salmi, "Going Nuclear: Establishing an Overt Nuclear Weapons Capability", in David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, (eds.), op. cit., no. 34, p. 88. 50 Ibid. p. 89. 51
Stephen P. Cohen, "Why did India Go Nuclear?" in Raju G.C Thomas and Am it Gupta (eds.), India's Nuclear Security (New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 200 I), p. 19.
86
them. Kanti Bajpai analysing the Kroc Institute Survey said, "Gandhians believe
that the development of weapons of mass destruction could never fit within the
Mahatma's strict philosophy of absolute non-violence." Further the anti-bomb
lobbies oppose nuclear weapons on the economic and ecological ground
because the preparation of bomb costs the exchequer at the cost of common
people, and will create imbalance in the eco-system. In this connection, Kanti
Bajpai further points out the view of anti- bomb lobby as, "Abstinence is also
supported by some socialists who, on economic and ecological grounds, oppose
bombs .... Seventy five per cent of nuclear opponents cited economic and
ecological ground for foregoing nuclear weapons."52 Thus, the perception and
views vis-a-vis nuclear issues and India's nuclear bombs are varied in the 1990s.
The actual policy of the coalition governments is seen in the backdrop of above
mentioned arguments and developments.
The Actual Policies of the Coalition Governments
As discussed above, the governments and political parties unanimously
rejected the NPT since its inception and differed on the question of India
acquiring nuclear bombs. These differences amongst the political parties and
governments remained ambiguous till 1998. Meanwhile the governments
conceded testing of nuclear bombs, especially in the 1990s and assuring the pro
bomb lobby that India would not forgo the nuclear option and the anti-bomb lobby
that India would struggle to bring the disarmament at international level. Despite
this the nuclear policy of India is still uncertain because India had neither signed
the NPT and CTBT nor conducted nuclear tests, and remained ambivalent
5" Kanti P. Bajpai, op. cit., no. 34, pp. 25-26.
87
advocating morality and idealism. Stephen P. Cohen describes this approach as,
" ... for thirty years, the nuclear option obscured the differences between these
very different position. The hawks could be assured that work would continue on
the bomb and the doves could hope that diplomatic progress would make the
bomb unnecessary."53
lnspite of this, the governments in New Delhi remained committed to
disarmament and abstained from nuclear weapons till1998. They also advocated
and held a view that NPT treaty is "nuclear apartheid",54 because it allows a
handful of countries to possess and augment the nuclear weapons and by
depriving others of their sovereign right to do the same. The governments in New
Delhi also stood for complete disarmament and viewed that if the nuclear
weapons are evil, then the NPT initiative taken by the nuclear weapon states
were also evil, because they themselves do not destroy the nuclear weapons.
Thus, the policy stand of governments in New Delhi was based on idealism,
morality, realpolitik and self-interest. By endorsing this sort of move vis-a-vis
disarmament India did not want to risk its security, because China and Pakistan
overtly and covertly possessed nuclear weapons. This policy stand is well
described by Stephen Cohen as, "While affirming India's concerns with the
welfare of all nations, the Indian program could be justified on the grounds of
morality and realpolitik, Idealism and self interest". Further he says, "This logic
could also be applied to the various schemes for disarmament proposed by the
sJ Stephen P.Cohen, op. cit. no. 15, P.l69 (As discussed above the BJP and its sister organisations had hawkish approach vis-a-vis nuclear bomb and Congress, Socialists and Communist represent the dovish approach vis-a-vis nuclear bomb. See Kanti Bajpai, op cit., no. 34. 54 V.C. Trivedi, Speech quoted in B.M.Jain, Nuclear India, Vo/.2 (New Delhi: Radiant 1974), pp. 192-93.
88
superpowers and other nuclear states (such as the NPT and eventually the
CTBT). If nuclear weapons were evil, then the so-called disarmament plans of
the nuclear weapons states (whose hands were dirtied by their use and threat of
use of nuclear weapons) were also evil, and as such could be opposed on moral
grounds conveniently leaving open the possibility of a morally sound Indian
nuclear programme."55 This policy provided a space of moral grounds to the
Indian governments, who continued to rely upon it upto 1990.
Meanwhile the differences on nuclear bomb amongst the political parties
remained a matter of debate, which directly or indirectly influenced the
government's policy from 1964 onwards. This became more specific in the
1990s when India was in a dilemma both at the national and international levels
when the Cold War came to an end. This is coincided by societal disturbance,
low growth of the Indian economy and the political instability created as a result
of decline of the Congress Party (which had ruled India at a stretch for forty years
except 1977-79) in terms of electoral politics. The political instability is due to the
fragile nature of coalition governments formed by the socialists, leftists, and
rightist parties, besides the regional parties, who came to occupy the power at
the centre without any specific agenda in the 1990s. These parties made
alliances and counter alliances to form coalition governments without specific
direction on the nuclear issues.
As discussed above the NPT appeared more intently in the 1990s with the
backing of the sole super power US at the international level and the threat to
55 Stephen P. Cohen, op.cit., no. 15, p. 169.
89
India's national security became serious. Besides this, the insurgency, ethnic
resurgence, extremism, caste clashes and other crises threatened the unity and
integrity of the country. According to some reports 200 of the 535 districts of India
were affected by it. 56 In this situation, the risk of conflict with Pakistan was
imminent and centred around the nuclear bomb. V.P. Singh's National Front
coalition government came to power with the outside support from the leftists and
rightist party BJP, who have contradictory views on the nuclear issue. The Left
parties such as CPI and CPI (M) viewed that the renunciations of nuclear
weapons could be achieved by remaining obstinate vis-a-vis NPT and CTBT
while maintaining India's nuclear option open. The BJP firmly stood for the bomb.
It not only stood for the bomb but also launched a formidable movement to bring
change in socio-economic and politico-strategic horizon of India by transforming
India into a "Hindu Rashtra," in contrast to the ideals of Gandhi-Nehru. It carried
on the Rath Yatra in order to mobilise Hindus to rebuild a Ram Temple at
Ayodhya by demolishing the mosque. It is in this situation that the V.P. Singh led
coalition government reaffirmed India's stand in consistent with past policies of
opposing the treaty and kept the nuclear option open., Prime Minister V.P. Singh
said in this respect as, "The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, however ignored
vertical proliferation and sought to impose discriminatory and inequitable
obligations on non-nuclear weapons state."57 It indicates that supporting parties
to the coalition have not had any role in decision making of the V.P. Singh
coalition government but had indirectly affected the government's handling of
5'' Stephen P. Cohen, op.cit., no. 15, p. 116.
57 V.P.Singh, "India's Contribution to International Peace" (memorial lecture on 1-5-1990), Strategic
Digest, Vol. 20, No., July 1990, p. 2591
90
security threat and nuclear blackmail from Pakistan. When ex-Pakistan Army
Chief issued a statement that Pakistan will use nuclear bomb to settle Kashmir
dispute, the response of the government was reactive, ad-hoc and unorganised.
Bharat Karnad described it as, "more disturbing from the Indian military's point of
view is the sheer state of disorganisation in government and ad hoc decision
making by Prime Minister V.P. Singh."58 This is because of pulls and pressures of
the supporting parties to the coalition who opposed the government on the
Mandai issue and Mandir-Masjid imbroglio. Eventually the BJP withdrew support
from the V.P. Singh coalition government on the Mandir issue at a critical phase
that India was passing through both at the national and international level.
The National Front coalition was followed by P.V. Narasimha Rao led
minority Congress government from 1991 to June 1996. Strictly, speaking
Narasimha Rao government was not a coalition government but it is important in
analysing the nuclear policy because it came to power at a crucial phase of India.
When the economy was on the verge of collapse, security and sovereignty of the
country was under threat, and the NPTreview conferences were taking important
steps to stop India acquiring the nuclear know-how even for peaceful purposes.
Therefore, it is necessary to focus upon the actual policy of Narasimha Rao
government vis-a-vis nuclear issues.
As discussed earlier, NPT became technical because of India's security
situation in the region and the important ingredient of US foreign policy agenda in
the 1990s. If India refused to sign the NPT it would have faced the US economic
58 Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), p.368.
91
sanctions. If India undertook tests, still it would have faced more stringent
sanctions. If India g(:lve up the nuclear option it would risk the security of the
country and would have been subjected to Pakistan-Chinese nuclear blackmail.
In this situation, the Narasimha Rao government firmly opposed the NPT
on the ground of its discriminatory nature and convinced the US that India has
security threat perception from nuclear China and Pakistan's proxy-war, and
collusion with China on nuclear enterprise. Meanwhile the government allegedly
considered to undertake tests but backtracked from going in for tests under US
pressure. J.N. Dixit former Foreign Secretary admits in verbal communication
with Bharat Karnad as the latter recapitulated it as, "These tests, Dixit reveals,
were first postponed to 1994 and then rescheduled for some time in 1995, but
were never carried out during Rao's tenure because of his aversion."59
Whatever be the consideration of the Narasimha Rao government in refraining
from going in for tests an inference could be drawn that this policy approach
stems from Congress Party's normative ideology that was inherited from Gandhi
Nehruvian legacy of normative aversion to the weapons of mass destruction.
The above view of J.N. Dixit is contested by Iyengar, who was the
Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission upto 1993. His views are
summarised by Bharat Karnad as, "He is of the view that Rao was deterred
from testing for fear of the effects of the Western sanctions on the economic
reforms and liberalisation programme he had inaugurated by 1992-93". Further
Karnad says that "Certainly, there is little doubt that this was a major
'"Ibid. p.370.
92
consideration in Prime Minister's mind."60 The inferences that could be drawn
from the decision of Narasimha Rao government vis-a-vis testing is that it did not
want to be held responsible for the adverse fallout of the test at domestic political
front, because he was running the minority government. At international level, he
did not want to provoke America and draw the ire of international community on
this issue. The last factor that Karnad points out is economic development and
stabilisation programme that has influenced the decisions of Rao government in
backtracking the allegedly ordered tests at National Test Site Pokharan. J.N.
Dixit concurred with this view and said, "Conducting the test (nuclear test) in the
middle of these discussions was considered but then the tests were cancelled."61
Besides this, the normative aversion to the nuclear bomb attitude/orientation of
the Congress Party tremendously influenced the decision of the Narasimha Rao
government for not going in for the tests. 62 It all happened inspite of the fact that
the BJP as principal opposition party demanded the government of the day to
defy the Western countries, conduct the tests and declare India a nuclear
weapons state.
It all exactly happened at a time when the debates on NPT and CTBT
were going on in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In this context the
Left, the Rights and socialist parties such as Janata Dal and Samata Party stood
firmly by government in opposing the move of NPT and CTBT. The government
took policy decisions for opposing the NPT and CTBT in consultation with the
''" Ibid, p.3 70 ''
1 An interview with J.N. Dixit, former Foreign Secretary of India, on I7 February 2004. to~ Vide Congress Marches Ahead January I995-December I995 (New Delhi: AICC. 24 Akbar Road, 1997), pp.l72-175.
93
opposition parties. Arundhati Ghose expressed the same in the Conference on
Disarmament, "Global nuclear disarmament has been a major objective of India's
Foreign policy since independence. We are also conscious that disarmament
cannot be achieved while proliferation continues."63 Further, regarding CTBT
Ghose said, "We continue to believe in a truly Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty-
that is a Treaty which bans all kinds of nuclear weapons testing."64 Thus, the
Narasimha Rao government handled the issues of NPT and CTBT Treaties and
remained unaffected by the Western pressure.
During this stage of development at both the levels-domestic and
international the eleventh Lok Sabha elections were declared and conducted.
They gave a fractured mandate to the political parties in Parliament. In the
election campaign too, the nuclear issues did not figure substantially but the BJP
stood by the principle of India acquiring the bomb. Soon after the election, the
BJP formed the government as the single largest party at the centre but could not
muster the support in the Lok Sabha to prove its majority, and resigned paving
the way to the United Front coalition to form the government.
The United Front coalition under the leadership of H.D. Dewe Gowda of
the Janata Dal formed the government with the support of the Congress and CPI
(M) from outside. Besides this, the UF had regional parties such as AGP from
Assam. National Conference (NC) from Jammu and Kashmir, DMK and MDMK
from Tamil Nadu, Tamil Maanila Congress (TMC), IUML from Kerala and TOP
''3 Arundhati Ghose, Speech in UN General Assembly on Conference on Disarmament, Jan 25, 1996,
Strategic Digest, Vo1.26, No.4, Feb.l996, p. 304. 64 Ibid, p.305.
94
>m Andhra Pradesh as its coalition partners. These regional parties, as
:;cussed in preceding pages, had fought election and were successful in
nning against the Congress party on domestic issues. Though, the main
nstituents of the coalitions-Janata Dal and Left parties articulated their political
md on foreign policy and nuclear policy but they did not provide alternative
I icy framework to that of the Congress. The regional parties did not at all touch
on the sensitive nuclear issue during the elections and even after the formation
government. The post of Defence Minister was allocated to the Samajwadi
rty leader Mulayam Singh Yadav of U.P.
As has already been pointed out, the threat to India's security was
·iously. The Chinese-Pakistani collusion vis-a-vis India and its nuclear
1gramme created a threat perception in the country. Moreover, the NPT was
efinitely extended for further consideration and the CTBT was taken up in the
nference on Disarmament for preventing the countries to undertake tests
jerground, over ground and in the laboratories. It all went on when India was
ler going elections and engaged in the formation of government. The UF
ilition confronted with this issue as soon as it came to power. The UF
tlition's highest decision-making body the UF Steering Committee in
sultation with the Congress and BJP decided that CTBT is discriminatory and
erves to be rejected. Eventually, the UF coalition's Ministers for External
lirs and later Prime Minister I.K. Gujral rejected the Treaty citing security
:;ons. Speaking in this connection, Gujral assured the House (Lok Sabha),
r nuclear policy, as expressed in the CTBT negotiation is intimately linked
95
with our national security concerns. We have never accepted the notion that it
can be considered legitimate for some countries to rely on nuclear weapons for
their security while denying this right to others. This has been a consistent policy,
also rejected in our rejection of the NPT." Actually CTBT negotiations were going
on in Geneva in June 1996. India's representative to UN, Arundhati Ghose had
already rejected the Treaty on the same ground. Further Gujral explains about
the Treaty as, "We are unable to accept any obligations which affect our
sovereign right of decision-making."65
The UF government rejected it while keeping the nuclear "option open".
The political parties and the strategic enclave in New Delhi viewed the CTBT
imbroglio differently. The BJP true to its stand pressed hard for the government
to go for the nuclear bomb. Because, the BJP viewed that the indefinite
extension of NPT and CTBT for further consideration might gain a momentum
worldwide and the world opinion may finally put enormous pressure on India to
forgo the nuclear option and sign the Treaty. The Communists viewed that the
retention of "nuclear option" while rejecting the Treaty might bring all the
countries towards complete de-nuclearisation and disarmament. 56 Perhaps this
might have been the consideration of the UF coalition government in rejecting the
treaty while retaining the "nuclear option." As analysed earlier, all parties
unanimously rejected the Treaties and stood by the government of the day. At
this moment, the nuclear issue became a political tool to play with the aggressive
''5 India, Parliamentm~l' Uehates: Lok Sabha II'" Series, Second Session, Vol. Ill, No.4, 15 July 1996,
column 2. '''' Praful Bidwai and !\chin Vanaik, ''An Open Letter to the Left", Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. \:XXII. "io. 3 . .Jan 18, 1997. p. 72.
96
nationalist sentiments. 67 The nuclear "haves" versus "have nots" feeling also
played a vital role in keeping India's nuclear option open. Political parties were
fearful of an electoral backlash if they favoured the endorsement of the CTBT.
Therefore, no political parties contemplated of foreclosing the nuclear option.
Consequences of India's Refusal to Sign CTBT
India refused to endorse the treaties, maintained the nuclear option for
security reasons and at the same time did not declare itself as a nuclear state
since 1974 in spite of its nuclear capability. This ambivalent approach has been
the declaratory policy of all the successive governments upto 1997.68 When UF
coalition government refused to sign and endorse the CTBT in 1996 the world
community became apprehensive of India's motives in not signing the treaty,
maintaining the nuclear option open and continuing with nuclear programme,
while preaching morality. In 1996 it had an adverse impact on India's reputation
as a non-violent and non-aligned country, a moral force at the international level.
This legacy is bequeathed to Indians by Gandhi-Nehruvian philosophy of non-
violence and internationalism. Thus, India lost its moral force in international
relations by 1996-97 because of its ambivalent stand in domestic politics vis-a-vis
treaties and its nuclear programme. This sent conflicting signals to the
international community.
This policy stand of various governments including UF coalition in 1996-97
had an adverse impact, apart from economic and technological embargo, on the
,,; St~phen P. Cohen. op.cit., no. 15. p.l73. ,.s T.T. Poulose, The CTBT am/ The Rise <!/'Nuclear Nalionulism inlndiu (New Delhi: Lancer Books, 1996), p.l81.
97
political stand of India in UN. For instance, when India contested elections for to
the post of non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council for the Asian
seat, it lost the election to Japan in November 1996. The reasons attributed to
the debacle are that India rejected the NPT and CTBT in the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva in UN. The External Affairs Minister and later Prime
Minister of United Front Coalition, I.K. Gujral indirectly admits it and answers in a
written reply to the Members of Lok Sabha as, "In a secret ballot of this kind
voting intentions of countries are not fully disclosed and no precise reasons can
be adduced for the lack of support. However, it can be concluded that India's
firm and principled position on the CTBT had a bearing on the outcome."69
Despite this, I.K. Gujral views the rejection of NPT, CTBT and Western pressure
as a 'moral choice' against evil, and further links it up with the "Passive
Resistance" idea of Gandhiji and a morally principled stand of Nehru vis-a-vis
strategic and nuclear issues. 70 He further says that Indians would not mind it
even if its consequences were adverse to Indian interests in the short term. It
implies that Indian government would withstand the Western sanctions and
would not compromise on the long-term goal of India i.e., total global nuclear
disarmament. At this stage of development the people and political parties were
agitating and pleading for India to acquire nuclear weapons. At the same time the
US and other Western countries were pressing hard on Indian governments to
accede to the treaties. They were even contemplating of taking a tough stand by
blocking all economic aid from the international financial institutions. US well
''"India. ParliamentaiJ' Debates: Lok Sabha ll'h series, 3'" Session Vol.6 No.8, (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, Monday Dec 2, 1996), column 7. :u I.K. Gujral, A Foreign Po/iqfi)/' India (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1998), p.SO.
98
before 1997 took this policy stand against India's missile progamme. It advised
Russia not to supply cryogenic engine to the Indian missile programme. In the
aftermath of 1996 and 1997 CTBT negotiations it became more vigilant on the
Indian nuclear programmes.
Meanwhile the security of India was getting endangered day by day. The
option that had been preserved as a policy choice for decades would have been
the easy target of the West. It would have had an adverse impact on the national
security. In this connection, Jaswant Singh explains this issue as, "The range of
option for India had, by then, narrowed critically. India had to take necessary
steps to ensure that the country's nuclear option developed and safeguarded
over decades was not permitted to erode by self-imposed restraint. Indeed, such
erosion would have resulted in an irremediably adverse impact on national
security. Thus, the government of India was faced with a difficult decision."71
Thus, the moral stand of Indian governments on the nuclear issue had not
convinced the Western world or the people of India. Though, in the long run it
woulci have a moral force against the evil of possessing nuclear bombs but the
last 50 years policy of India has not paid a dividend. This stand was subjected to
a number of questions in the domestic political circle centred o the following
proposition. If possession of bomb is good for Western countries then how is it
bad for India? Thus, this policy stand of Indian governments was seen and
weighed from this perspective.
71 .laswant Singh, Delending India (Bangalore: Macmillan, 2000), p. 326.
99
Moreover, it became a populist issue. This is well described by Jaswant
Singh as, "An examination of the first fifty years of Indian independence reveals
that the country's moralistic nuclear policy and restraint did not really pay any
measurable dividends. Consequently, this resulted in resentment within the
country; a feeling grew that India was being discriminated against. In the political
rr:drt\el fJiace or indra, nuclear weapon1sation garned currency and the- plank of.
disarmament began to appear as both unproductive and unrealistic. It began to
be argued that if the Permanent Five's possession of nuclear weapons is good,
confers security to their respective countries, then how is the possession of
nuclear weapons by India not good". 72 At this juncture, the United Front Coalition
lost support and majority in the Lok Sabha as a result of withdraw! a of support
by the Congress party and subsequently elections were declared to the twelfth
Lok Sabha.
In the run up to 1998 elections the political parties formed and emerged as
three groups-the ruling United Front, the Congress, the BJP and allies Shiv
Sena, AIADMK and Samata Party. The election campaign .revolved around
domestic politics and economic issues. The election manifestos of these main
political parties, which are contenders of power, do not explicitly dwell upon
about India's nuclear policy but ambiguously touched upon the nuclear issues.
The Congress announced, "Our nuclear policy will continue to be for peaceful
developmental purposes. But we will not be found wanting in case of any threat
7' Ibid. pp. 326-27.
100
by hostile forces." 73 The United Front and Left parties reaffirmed the traditional
stand vis-a-vis NPT and CTBT but did not focus on nuclear programme in the
domestic front. As discussed above the CTBT, the US pressure, and India's
nuclear programme remained vital in the election campaign inspite of the fact
that UF and Congress attached importance to the past policies (the principled
stand of Indian government towards this disarmament). This is because the BJP
was whipping up the nationalist frenzy in the context of CTBT and nuclear bomb
for India. Even then, the BJP's electoral manifesto vaguely referred to nuclear
issues. It reads:, "The BJP will re-evaluate the country's nuclear policy and
exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons."74 It is in the same voice the
BJP's foreign policy spokesman Brijesh Mishra, who became later the Principal
Secretary to the Prime Minister A B. Vajpayee well before election hinted that the
BJP would go for exercising nuclear option. 75 The BJP kept repeating the same
in the campaign to placate the voters. In reaction to this, the former Defence
Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav issued a press statement that they would have
gone in for the explosion but election intervened.76 Thus, the nuclear issue
figured in the electoral campaign.
The twelfth Lok Sabha election again threw up the hung Parliament and
the small regional parties gained few seats to the Lok Sabha. None of the pre-
poll alliances got a clear-cut majority in the Lok Sabha to form the government.
The BJP emerged as the largest single party and hurriedly coalesced the alliance
73 Congress Election Manifesto, General Election, 1998, p.5<i.
~·The Bharatiya Janata Party: Election Manifesto, 1998, p.31 · lhe Hindu. (New Delhi). 14 January 1998.
;,. The Times of India, (New Delhi), I Oth March 1998.
1 () 1
with the small regional parties such as AIADMK, Trinamool Congress from West
Bengal, Samata Party, Akali Dal of Punjab, Shiv Sena from Maharashtra, Biju
Janata Dal from Orissa, Janata Dal (United) and other small parties. Besides
this, it sought support from TOP of Andhra Pradesh by softening its aggressive
posture towards country's minorities (The BJP set aside one of its poll planks the
revocation of 'Muslim Personal Law' that regulates the marriage and divorce of
Muslims). It has also softened its approach on Article 370, which it wanted to
revoke as soon as it came to power. 77 Moreover, the BJP adhered to the
principles of Constitution of India by putting behind the agenda of "Cultural
Nationalism" which it had nurtured since its formation and which had even figured
111 ns election manifesto. 78 Thus, the BJP coalesced ihe National Democratic
Alliance under the leadership of A.B. Vaypayee, by adhering to common
programmes and issues satisfactory to the alliance partners.
It adopted National Agenda for Governance (NAG) in this connection for
the governance purposes. The NAG states that "We establish National Security
Council. ... undertake india's Strategic Defence Review". Further it states "We will
reevaluate the nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear
weapons."79 Meanwhile there were pulls and pressures in the newly formed
coalition government on issues of domestic politics. The AIADMK chief J.
Jayalalitha demanded the Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee to dismiss the Tamil
77 The 13JP had adopted revocation of Article 370, revocation of 'Muslim Personal Law' by enacting
L"uifurm ci\·il cod.: and the exercising the nuclear option and there by pl!rsisting with culture Nationalism ~,genda as its poll planks which it whipped up in the 1990s to gain strength in the electoral politics. ·· The BJ P Manifesto, op.cit., no. p. 4. i" National Agenda.fin· Governance (New Delhi: BJP & Alliance partners, 1998), p.6.
102
Nadu State government by its rival Dravidian party DMK. She even issued a
statement saying that she will withdraw support from A.B. Vajpayee government.
It is in this situation that the BJP led NDA coalition government conducted
the nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998 in the Pokhran desert (Pokhran-11) and
declared India, in contrast to the past policies of the previous governments, a
nuclear weapons state. Subsequently, participating in the Parliamentary Debates
Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee said, "India is a nuclear weapon state. This is a
reality that cannot be denied. It is not a conferment that we seek; nor is it a status
for others to grant .... It is India's due, the right of one sixth of humankind."80 The
~v\/i;:;iiliiierit subsequently to the May 11 and 13 tests declared voluntarily
moratorium on nuclear tests and implicitly said that it is ready to accede to NPT,
CTBT and FMCT. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee ·speaking in the
Parliament said in this regard, "Since 11 May, the Government has taken certain
initiatives, which I am going to enlist here. 1) We are already observing a
voluntary moratorium and are ready to consider and discuss converting it into a
cJe ;ure commitment. 2.) We have volunteered to engage in negotiation on FMCT".
Further he said regarding disarmament, as "India will undertake stringent controls
on nuclear and missile related technologies as well as those relating to other
weapons of mass destruction."81
Thus, the action and the policy decision of the BJP/NDA coalition
yuvcl rliJienl vis-ci-vis nuclear bomb and the international treaties NPT, CTBT,
so India. Parliamemw:\' Debate: Lok Sabha: 12'11 series, lind session, vol.2 No.I, (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat. 27' 11 l\-1ay 1998), column 284. ~~ India. ParliamentaiJ' Debates: Lok Sabha, 12'11 seri~s, vol. 2, no. 3, (New Delhi : Lok Sabha Secretariat, Friday i\·1ay 29, 1998), column 394.
103
and FMCT has reversed the long-standing policy of Indian governments since
independence who maintained the nuclear infrastructure while remaining
obstinately against the nuclear bomb. They adopted this policy in spite of the fact
that it had short-term costs for of the foreign policy of India. The long-term goal of
India's foreign policy was to bring nuclear weapon countries towards
disarmament, which has been the cherished goal of India, because India
embodies the principle of morality and idealism. This has been preached and
practiced by Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru.
The opposition parties, though, greeted the scientists and countrymen for
having demonstrated the capability of India in manufacturing bombs but
subjected to criticism the BJP led NDA government's policy decision on strategic
and moral grounds. They said that India possessed nuclear capability since 194 7
but governments remained obstinate on strategic and mo(al grounds. The
strategic reason that has guided the policies of various governments up to 1998 is
that India remained obstinate while refusing to endorse the discriminatory
treaties. This is to bring nuclear weapons countries towards the goal of
disarmament. This is the policy through which India has been pleading since
1950s that there should be complete disarmament. Since 1950s this has been an
important factor and guided the policies of governments upto 1997.82
Governments in New Delhi time and again reiterated the same. Even I.K. Gujral
preferred this view to nuclear bomb. Thus, India, under BJP/NDA government,
S' - George Perkovich. op.cit. no. I, pp. 448-49.
104
has lost both the grounds by demonstrating the tests in Pokhran desert on 11
and 13 May 1998.
The government put fourth the argument that India's security environment
deteriorated badly in the 1980s and 1990s. The insensitivity of the nuclear
weapons countries towards India's security clearly manifested in their stand vis-
a-vis NPT and CTBT treaties. Besides this, the Indian governments since 1954
moved various resolutions regarding annihilation of weapon of mass destruction.
India's stand vis-a-vis disarmament is firm and based on moral principles.
Instead, the nuclear weapons countries and the international community imposed
unjust and discriminatory treaties upon India. India's moralistic nuclear policy and
restraint did not pay any measurable dividends. 83 Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee
justified the government's decision to test nuclear weapons in the difficult
situation prevailing around India and India's nuclear policy. Speaking in the
Parliament he elaborated it at length as, "under such circumstances, India was
left with little choice. It had to take necessary steps to ensure that the country's
nuclear option, developed and safeguarded over decades not be permitted to
erode by a voluntary self-imposed restraints. Indeed, such an erosion would have
had an irremediably adverse impact on our security. The government was thus
faced with an adverse impact on our security. The government was thus faced
with a difficult decision. The only touchstone that guided it was national
security."84
s.1 J as want Singh. op.cit., no. 71, p.328. s~ I 1· P 1· I S '11 nc 1a. artctmenlmy Dehates: Lo.; abha: 12 series, II Session, vol2 No. I, (1'\ew Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 27'11 May, 1998), columns 283-284.
105
At this moment, the media circulated a story that the decision was taken in
consultation with the extra-constitutional authority, the RSS Chief Professor
Rajendra Singh. The alliance partners were not informed of the decision. Stuart
Corbridge corroborated this view as, "It is also believed that the first three men to
know about the tests were Atal Behari Vajpayee, Lal Krishna Advani and Prof.
Rajendra Singh, an RSS officer; and Defence Minister was informed in the
eleventh hour."85 The opposition parties also made a scathing attack on the
government in the Parliament that it involved the extra-Constitution authority in
taking decisions on sensitive issues. It is in this context that the Home Minister
responded on the rumours that the extra-constitutional authority was part of the
decision making process. In this context he says that Prime Minister took
decision on his own in the capacity of Prime Minister and he did not involve
anybody else. He said, "In this case I would give all credit to Shri Vajpayee. He
has executed this entire programme in manner in which it ought to have been
executed." He further says, "I am not aware of it .... but I do know that even the
Raksha Mantri or myself, or those who came to know of it came to know only
when it was necessary for him to communicate it." Further he appreciates the
Prime Minister as, "So, I would say that he has conducted this entire process in
an exemplary manner: in a manner in which the Prime Minister of a country
ought to have done it."86
Following this the government undertook damage control measure at the
international level by evolving a coherent approach to the international treaties
ss Stuart, Corbridge, op.cit., no. 45, p.241. 8'' India. Parliamenfm:J' Debates: Lok Sabha, 12'h series II nd Session vol.2, No.2, (New Delhi: Lok Sabha
secretariat 28'h ~lay, 19lJ8), Column 341.
106
and India's nuclear assets. Besides this, the government also set up the National
Security Council under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister with the Cabinet
Ministers as members, besides the Nat1onal Security Council expand Advisor
secretary Brijesh Mishra who was the also Principal secretary to the Prime
Minister. In addition to this, the NSC has professionals from Army, Foreign
Service, academia and journalists as advisors. The NSC was tasked with the
responsibility of reviewing the entire nuclear policy and evolving the coherent
'nuclear doctrine' for management of India's security with nuclear bombs.
The NSC while highlighting the failure of non-proliferation regime has
viewed India's stand on nuclear issue in the aftermath of nuclear tests in 1998
that became India's declared policy of nuclear bomb and the non-proliferation
treaties. This policy as reported by the Ministry of External Affairs reads: "India
has announced that the following would constitute its nuclear doctrine.
• India will maintain a minimum and credible nuclear deterrent;
• India has no intention of engaging in an open ended programme or an
arms race;
• India subscribes to a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons and by
implication, non-use with regards to non nuclear weapons states;
• A moratorium on nuclear testing was announced on May 13, 1998.
India is now engaged in discussions with key interlocutors on a range
of issues, including the CTBT. It is prepared to bring these discussions
to a successful conclusion So that the entry into force of the CTBT is
107
not delayed beyond September 1999. India expects that other
countries, as specified in Article XIV of the CTBT will adhere to the
treaty without conditions;
• India is engaged in negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament on
a treaty banning the production of Missile Material for nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices in good faith;
• India shall not transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear material and
technology and will maintain a stringent system of export controls to
demonstrate her commitments to non-proliferation;
• India's nuclear arsenal is under civilian command control;
• A National Security Council has been established and tasked to
undertake a Strategic Defence Review".
Further the report says, having harmonised its national imperative and
security obligations and decisions of continuing to co-operate with international
community."87 It implies that India has attained a computer simulation capability
for further testing of nuclear devices in case of its security compulsions. It also
implies that India has achieved its objectives and met the security requirement by
testing nuclear devices. In reality security threat has not disappeared for India
from Pakistani-Chinese collusion and the animosity against India continued even
after the 1998 tests.
''Government of India. Ministry of External Amlirs,Annua/ Report: I 'Jl.J8-l.JCJ, p. 74.
108
Fall Out Of Pokhran II Tests
They fall out of the 1998 nuclear tests at Pokhran carried out by the BJP
led NDA government affected India's relations with neighbours and Indo-US
relations (which would be analysed in subsequent chapters), the Indian economy
as a result of sanctions imposed by US and G-8 countries in the aftermath of
1998 tests. The US besides pressurising India to sign and ratify the treaties NPT,
CTBT and FMCT imposed economic sanctions upon India. It asked the G-8
countries to follow the suit. The sanctions were meant to prevent India from
further pursuing testing and to halt the economic backup to such plans. It also
withheld 143 million dollar aid to India and postponed one billion dollar worth
loans, which had multiple effects on the country's economy. This could be seen
from the testimony of US Assistant Secretary of State Karl lnderfurth before the
House of International Relations Committee as quoted by P.M. Kamath, "More
than $1 billion (dollar) worth loans have been postponed ... having triple affect in
the Indian economy and resulting in decreased investor confidence."88 Following
suit, the Canadian government also cancelled $29 million loan assistance to
India, besides the, recalling of its Ambassador. Similarly, Japan and Germany
followed suit in condemning India's nuclear tests. 89
The sanctions discouraged foreign investors and multinational companies
(MNCs) from investing in India. This led to massive inflation that jumped from 5
to 7 per cent within a span of 2 months (from June to August 1998), which half of
ss P.i\·1. Kamath, ··An analysis of US and Canadian Responses", in Major (Retd.) Sulakshan Mohan (cd.). India's Nuclear Leap (New Delhi : Indian Publishers, 2000). p.235. S" Ibid. pp. ~35-236.
1()9
the Indians could not bear. It was a1so apprehended that country's foreign
exchange would exhaust and country would be forced to crawl before the World
Bank according to its terms and conditions.
Despite this, resilient nature of Indian economy stabilized the deterioration
in the growth of economy. Thi sis because India holds a large market to the
foreign investors and businessmen after China in the aftermath of globalisation of
Indian economy since 1991. In this context, participating in the debate in
Parliament on confidence motion moved by the Prime Minister, the then Finance
Minister Yashwant Sinha said, "When world faced problem Indian economy had
resilience that inspite of the economic sanctions it retained minimum growth".
Further he substantiated it by referring to the World Bank report 1998-99 as,
"India, the dominant economy, in the region, was protected by its large domestic
markets and capital account restrictions that dampened the effects of turbulence
in international capital markets. The recent estimates suggest that a growth of
5.8 percent may be achieved during the fiscal year 1 998-99."90
Similarly, Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee compared this growth rate with
previous rate while speaking in Confidence Motion moved by his government in
April 1999 as, "Blaming us for that state of affairs would indeed be doing injustice
to us." Further he gives a picture of the economic growth as, "When we had
taken over, the economic condition of the country was in a very bad shape. Can
any body deny the fact that the economic condition of the country has registered
an improvement? No.one can do it. Even if we choose to criticise by adopting a
''" I d. I' t· D I •h • • n 1a, ar Wllli!ntm:v e wtes: Lok Sabha, 12 Senes, Vol. I X, No. 19, (New Dd !11: Lok Sabha Secretariat: April 15'" 1999). column 224.
110
narrow approach, we would have to accept the fact that the situation has
improved during tl1e last six months - GOP (Gross Domestic Product) is 5.8
percent, reserve (Foreign Exchange Reserve) is 32 billion and inflation is 4.6
percent This can be managed. Then, an atmosphere of political uncertainty is
created which has an adverse effect on our economy."91 This implies that
sanctions did not affect the country's economy; instead, political instability has
affected the economy.
The inferences could be drawn from the above analysis that the coalition
governments in the 1990s have differed in their perceptions and policies vis-a-vis
nuclear issues because of their politico-ideological differences. But they
unanimously rejected the NPT, CTBT, and FMCT on moral and security grounds,
though they differed on the question of India's nuclear option that has been
preserved, maintained and safeguarded over the decades by the Congress
governments. In the 1990s the non-Congress coalition governments (the
National Front and the United Front) and even the Narasimha Rao led Congress
government remained obstinate vis-a-vis India's nuclear option while rejecting
the treaties rarely the NPT and CTBT on security and moral grounds. They did it
despite of the fact that the treaties on the one hand and prevailing security threat·
environment in the region on the other hand seriously posed a threat to India's
security and foreign policy. The UF and NF coalition governments advanced the
arguments that nuclear abstinence is a strategic one in order to bring all nuclear
weapons countries towards disarmament for securing world peace. Moreover,
''' India. Purli,llllt.!IIIUI)' Dehutcs: Lok Sabha; 12'11 S\:rics Vol. X, Nu. 21, (l'\ew Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat. .-\pril 17'11
, 1999), column II.
I I I
India's moral normative tradition inherited from Gandhi and Nel1ru has been a
beacon light for the nuclear policy of India up to 1997-98. In the context Aabha
Dixit while analysing Kroc Institute Survey said, "India's early nuclear policy
continued to be premised upon: a sense of idealism that drew sustenance from
Gandhi's belief that war and violence are morally repugnant and that the way to
truth is through nonviolence; an understanding that nuclear weapons are an
extension of the philosophy of violence and therefore need to be countered by
nuclear disarmament; a belief that the peaceful uses of nuclear technology can
benefit the community and therefore should be pursued with zeal."92 Even the
United Front Prime Minister Gujral emphasised on this aspect while rejecting the
treaties. He sincerely hoped that India's moral stand vis-a-vis nuclear issues
would yield the fruitful result in the long run in bringing all the countries of the
world towards disarmament. 93 But in reality, the treaties are redundant because
of their discriminatory nature. Moreover, China and France carried out the tests
in the 1990s while the NPT and CTBT were taken up for negotiation in order to
implement them across the globe. China not only conducted the tests but also
supplied the nuclear know how to Pakistan. However, the policy stand of the NF
and UF coalition governments is consistent with the past policies of the Congress
governments since 1950s.
In contrast, the BJP led NDA coalition government tested the nuclear
devices and declared India as a nuclear weapons state. The argument it
.,, :\ahh<l Dixit. "Status <)uu: ~daintaining Nuclear Ambiguity" in David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo ( eds. ). op. cit. no. :14. p. 56. Vide Minutes of Congress working committe~: meeting 15'11 and 16'" May, 1998 in Congress A/arches Ahead: .JanuwJ' I YY8-December /998 (New Delhi: A ICC, 24 Akbar Road, "' I.K. Gujral, op.cit., no. 70, p.50.
112
advanced in justification of its policy decision was that India's security was under
threat. The government also pointed out the insensitivity of the nuclear weapon
countries towards India's concerns and the technicality associated with India's
nuclear programme. If India does not exercise its option then it would have been
deprived of its sovereign right and security because the nuclear P5 countries had
indefinitely extended NPT and CTBT for further consideration. This would have
gained world public opinion against India's retention of nuclear option. Eventually
India would have been forced by the P5 countries and world public opinion to
accede to the treaties and for go India's nuclear option. In order to ward off this
probability the BJP led NDA government exercised the option and declared India
a nuclear weapons state, albeit it is de facto. The government also stated that
country's moral stand vis-a-vis nuclear issues, as it has been advocated by the
Congress government and by non-Congress and non BJP coalition governments,
has not paid any measurable dividend since 1950s, more particularly in the
1990s.
These differences of perceptions and the policies of the coalition
governments in the 1990s can be attributed to the politico-ideological basis of the
parties in power. The Janata Dal, the Congress and the Communists have varied
politico-ideological bases at domestic politico-economic front but converge on
nuclear issues, and followed the policies in 1990s in consistent with the past
policies of the Congress governments. In contrast, the BJP stood for India
acquiring the nuclear bomb and so also its outfits Shiv Sena, RSS and VHP.
They not only differed with Congress, the socialist-Janata Dal, and the
113
;omrnunists on this issue but also on nature and character of the Indian state. It
; in this connection that they launched a powerful movement in 1990 so as to
. ~ring about a change in socio-cultural, politico-economic and strategic
nvironment of the country by changing the Hindu psyche. Besides this, they
reached hatred against its own people, the country's minorities. In addition to
lis, they took masculine pride in acquiring nuclear bomb for intimidating the
eighbours and gaining the respect of foreign powers. They adopted this
pproach in contrast to the Gandhi Nehruvian traditions of secularism and
ocialism. It is in this context that the t::oalition governments differed in their
erceptions and policies vis-a-vis nuclear issues.
Thus, India's nuclear policy is affected by the politico-ideological factors
ut not the pulls and pressures of coalition partners in the given situation in the
990s. These policies of coalition governments vis-a-vis nuclear issues neither
elped India in getting rid of the threat to the country's security nor projected
1dia as strong military-state in the given situations in the 1990s.
114