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CHAPTER-III

NYĀYA VIEW ON TRUTH AND ERROR

3. Origin of Nyāya :

Nyāya is one of the six Hindu systems of thought and is very old. The

word ‘nyāya’ is derived from the Sanskrit root ‘i’ which means ‘to reach’, ‘to

arrive at’, which the prefix ‘ni’ which indicates certainty or rule. Originally it

was founded by Gautama who is also known as Akṣapāda. Ānviksikī Vidya

(science of criticism), Nyāya Darśana, Nyāya Sāstra, Tarka Śāstra, Pramāṇa

Śāstra, Hetu vidyā, Vāda vidyā, Gautamīya Śāstra, Akṣapāda Darśana , etc. are

some of its names in the long history . But in the present time there are two

very important branches of Nyāya, one is called prācina (the ancient one) and

the other is called navina (the modern or navya nyāya).

Nyāya literally means ‘going into a subject’, i.e., that analytical

reasoning by which the mind is led to a conclusion. The word ‘nyāya’

popularly connotes ‘right’ or ‘Justice’ and hence the Nyāya system is known

as the science of right judgement or true reasoning.1 Technically the word

‘nyāya’ means a syllogism2 (or a speech of five parts). It is a science of right

knowledge, pramāṇa sāstra.

3.1 Sixteen Philosophical topics of the Nyāya-sūtra :

The aim of the Nyāya to win the field of truth and then to secure it with

the fence3 of dialectics against the encroachment of error and sophistry. The

Nyāya philosophy deals with the heightened interest of the external world. It is

called a realistic school as it accepts sixteen categories or padārthas. Through

these categories their philosophy has developed. Vaiśeṣika recognizes seven

categories, and classifies all reals under them, the Nyāya recognizes sixteen

categories and includes all the seven categories of the vaiśeṣika Nyāya mostly

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accepts the Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. In the Nyāya system, the knowledge of the

sixteen categories was explained as a prerequisite for apavarga (liberation).

The term ‘category’ (padārtha) means here philosophical topic. Gautama, in

his Nyāya-sūtra, mentions a scheme of sixteen philosophical topics, these are –

1. The first category is pramāṇa. It is the way in which we come to know

anything truly and objectively.

2. Prameya is anything that can be known truly and objectively (or simply,

the knowable).

3. Saṁśaya is doubt or lack of certainty in which the mind oscillates

between the two alternatives.

4. Motive (prayojana) is the end of voluntary actions, which is the

attainment of good or the rejection of evil.

5. Dṛṣṭānta is any fact or state of affairs concerning which there is no

dispute, and which therefore serves as an instance of a general truth,

principle or rule.

6. Siddhānta is a theory or doctrine which is upheld by a person or school.

7. Avayava is a part, member, or organ of the Nyāya syllogism; an avayava

may be either a premise or conclusion of a syllogism.

8. Hypothetical reasoning (tarka) favours one of the two alternative

hypotheses by showing the absurd consequences of the other.

9. Nirṇaya is true and certain knowledge arrived at by the application of

only the legitimate and permissible means and method of knowledge.

10. Discussion (vāda) is a logical debate between a disputant and an opponent

with the help of five-membered inferences for the ascertainment of truth

without a desire for victory.

11. Wrangle (jalpa) is a seeming dispute or argument in which one or other of

the parties engages with the aim not of arriving at truth but merely of

winning the argument.

12. Cavil (vitaṇḍā) is a wrangle in which a person merely refutes disputant’s

thesis but does not establish his antithesis.

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13. Hetvābhāsa is something that is offered as a valid reason but is in fact not

so.

14. Quibble (chala) is refutation of an argument by taking a word in a sense

different from what is intended by the speaker.

15. Futility (jāti) is the employment of false and inappropriate analogies to

defend one’s own position or refute that of others.

16. Ground of defeat (nigrahasthāna) is the basis on which an argument is

lost, so in the course of an argument, one party demands that the other

concede defeat by showing that the latter has either grossly misunderstood

its own position (or that of the former) or is unaware of the implications

of its own thesis (or that of the former).

The Naiyāyika’s view is that by a thorough knowledge of these the

highest good (niḥśreyasa) is attained or supreme happiness is obtained by

knowledge of the above sixteen categories. The Nyāya holds that truth is

extrinsic to knowledge. They hold that the truth of our ideal depends on their

relations to facts and points out that this relation is one of agreement or

correspondence. The Vedānta and the Mimāṁsā theory is known as the theory

that truth is svataḥ whereas falsity is parataḥ. In contrast to this theory, we

have the Nyāya theory that both truth and falsity are parataḥ. Svataḥ and

parataḥ literally means ‘from within’ and ‘from without’ respectively.

Mimāṁsā-Vedānta theory holds that truth is intrinsic to knowledge. It may

mean on the one hand that the originating conditions of the truth of knowledge

are exactly the same as the originating conditions of the knowledge itself. It

also holds that the knowledge and its truth are apprehended together. Hence

‘intrinsic’ means both ‘intrinsic with regard to origin’ and ‘intrinsic with regard

to apprehension’, both utpattitaḥ and jñāptitaḥ. Knowledge arises as a result of

contact between the self and the non-self.4 According to Nyāya, knowledge is

not an essential but only an adventitious property of the self.5 Nyāya’s

fundamental definition of ‘knowledge is cognition, apprehension,

consciousness or manifestation of objects. It compares knowledge to the light

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of the lamp which reveals the lamp as well as the objects around it. That, light

is different from the lamp and the objects. Like, Nyāya also divides knowledge

into two broad sorts: preventative and representative.

3.2 Forms of svataḥprāmāṇya theory :

There are different forms of the svataḥprāmāṇya theory. It has mainly

two parts-one is concerned with the origin of truth and the other its

apprehension. Though they all agree that truth of a knowledge originates

precisely from those causal conditions which also give rise to the knowledge,

the different advocates of the svataḥprāmāṇya theory notwithstanding differ

amongst themselves as to the nature of the apprehension of the truth. So there

are differences among four different forms of the theory-the Prābhākara, the

Bhāṭṭa, the Miśra, and the Vedānta.

i) In Prābhākara theory, there is no positive error. Truly speaking, the

problem of truth and error is simply meaningless on his theory. On the

cognitive side all knowledge is true. But Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā

distinguishes three levels of truth and error :

In the broadest sense, the meaning of the term ‘truth’, is all awareness,

so all knowledge is true. In a narrower sense of the term, all awareness

other than memory is true. In a still narrower sense of the term, only

those knowledge’s are true that lead to successful practice whereas those

that lead to unsuccessful practice are false. According to Rāmanujācārya

there are three different kinds of truth: yathārtha, prāmāṇya and

samyakta. Yathārtha belongs to all awareness6 (including memory and

what ordinarily passes for erroneous apprehension), prāmaṇya to all

awareness7 excepting memory (but including even the so called

erroneous apprehension) and samyaktva only to such knowledge other

than memory which leads to successful practice.8

ii) Though Bhāṭṭa school agrees in the fundamental point of

svataḥprāmāṇya but there are difference also from the Prābhākaras. The

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Bhāṭṭa regards knowledge as an imperceptible activity and not as

something self-luminous. On the Bhāṭṭa theory, we come to know about

our knowledge through an inferential process. According to the Bhāṭṭas,

truth is apprehended svataḥ in the sense that the same inference from the

jñātata which makes us aware of a knowledge also makes us aware of

the truth of that knowledge. In the same factors of course, truth has its

origin which also give us rise to the knowledge but like the knowledge

its truth also remains unknown at the beginning.

There may arised a question here. What does the Bhāṭṭa mean by

‘prāmāṇya’? But Kumārila has not given anywhere a precise definition

of it. We could only fall back on the line : “tasmād bodhātmakatvena

svatahḥ prāptā pramāṇatā”9 which suggests the conjecture10 that also

for Kumārila, as for the Prabhākara, prāmāṇya is the same as

awareness-of-the-object (bodhātmakatva). In this sense, it is clear that

every knowledge is intrinsically true.

iii) The third form is the Miśra theory. It is ascribed to the school of

Mīmāṁsā associated with the name of Murāri Miśra none of whose

writings is handed down to us but who is mentioned in Nyāya and

Mīmāṁsā treatises.11 This school is represented as combining the Nyāya

doctrine of anuvyavasāya with the Mīmāṁsā theory of intrinsic truth.

There is no difference as to the origin of truth; in which all the three

Mīmāṁsā schools agree.

iv) Another form of the svataḥprāmāṇya theory is the vedantic theory. The

vedāntin’s conception of knowledge varies from the Mīmāṁsāka’s. In

the Advaita system, ‘knowledge’ means four things (a) a modification of

the inner sense (antaḥkaraṇavṛtti) or (b) consciousness as limited by a

modification of the inner sense (antaḥkaranavṛttyavacchinnacaitanya)

(c) the witness self (sākṣī) and at last (d) the pure undifferentiated

consciousness free from all limiting adjuncts and determinations.

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In the vedāntic theory, svataḥprāmāṇya means that the truth of a

knowledge is apprehended through the same sākṣī awareness through which

the knowledge itself is apprehended. However there is really a pertinent

question-what does the vedāntin mean by ‘prāmāṇya’?

The usual definition of ‘prāmāṇya’ are in terms of the uncontradicted

character (abādhitatvam) and the originality (anadhigatatvam) of a

knowledge.12 The Advaitin’s opinion is that tadvati tatprakārakatva is common

to both right knowledge and error and so does not constitute the sense of ‘truth’

in which all knowledge is intrinsically true (but not intrinsically false).

Madhusūdana is however emphatically clear on this point.13 The exact sense of

‘prāmānya’ in which the Advaitin could speak both of ‘svataḥprāmāṇya’ and

‘parataḥprāmāṇya’ to be specified in some other manner. There are two

suggestions-the one give us psychological account and saves the theory; the

other suggests a definition and renders the theory valid but analytically trivial.

Gaṅgeśa considers tadvatitatprakarakatva as the feature which distinguishes

right knowledge from error. On the otherhand, Madhusūdana and many

Advaita writers regard that it belongs to all apprehensions not excluding error.

There is reason, therefore, to suspect that the Naiyāyika and the Vedāntin do

not mean quite the same by ‘tadvatitatprakarakatva. One reason for this may

be that the Advaitin admits a false object which is the object of false

apprehension, so that e.g., the false silver does possess the generic character of

silverhood.

3.3 Theory of Parataḥprāmānya :

The theory of parataḥprāmāṇya, specially is upheld by the Nyāya

school. The notions of jñāna and prāmāṇya are the parts of the Nyāya theory

of parataḥ-prāmāṇya.

The Nyāya system gives us an elaborate discussion regarding the nature

of truth (pramā) and the means of such knowledge is pramāṇa. According to

the Naiyāyikas prama is a definite and assured knowledge of an object which is

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true and presentational in character. Various schools of Indian philosophy have

expressed divergent opinions with regard to the nature of pramā. Prof. D. M.

Datta seems to be perfectly right in his observation that “pramā is generally

defined as a cognition having two-fold characteristics of truth and novelty

(abādhitatva or yathārthatava and anadhigatatva), and that as regards the first

characteristic-truth-all schools of India philosophy are unanimous.”14 In second

characteristics, there is a difference of opinion. However, it is to be seen that

even those who hold truth as an essential criterion of knowledge differ amongst

themselves regarding the meaning of truth. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is of the view that

pramā is that knowledge of objects which is free from doubt and illusion.15

Gaṅgeśa maintains that pramā is that which informs us of the existence of

something in a place where it really exists.16 For Śivāditya, it is the experience

of the real nature of things.17 Udayana in his Tātparypariśuddhi says “cognition

of the real nature of things is pramā, and the means of such knowledge is

pramāṇa” (yathārthanubhavaḥ pramā tatsādhanam ca pramāṇaṁ).

If we compare the Nyāya view of pramā with western thinking it is

similar to the correspondence theory of western Realists. In the West, this view

is termed as the pragmatic theory of knowledge. The Nyāya theory affirms the

correspondence theory of truth. Correspondence theory is that according to

which our knowledge of a given object is valid. According to it, the truth of

knowledge consists in its correspondence with objective facts (the real nature

of the object). In the Nyāya truth of all knowledge is a correspondence of

relations (tadvati tatprakāra). To know a thing is to judge it as having such-

and-such a character. By contrast, invalid knowledge lacks in such agreement

and correspondence. According to Nyāya, action and behaviour based on valid

knowledge lead to success and fulfillment. In addition while those based on

invalid knowledge lead to failure and disappointment. On the otherhand,

according to the Naiyāyika both truth and error can be proved only by fulfilled

and unfulfilled activity respectively. It might lead one into thinking that the

Nyāya theory of truth is also pragmatic. For example - I have the knowledge of

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milk as white in colour and ice as cold now my knowledge of milk as white and

ice as cold will be true if milk is really white and ice is really cold in the

objective world. The view that the existence and characteristics of external

objects are independent of the experiencing subject, the correspondence

between knowledge and the object of knowledge is in no way dependent upon

the knower.

The Naiyāyikas accept the view that every true awareness produces

successful action or that every false awareness produces unsuccessful action.

They hold that successful action can be produced only by a true awareness.

Hence, ‘being the producer of a successful action’ is a reliable mark from

which the truth of the awareness may be inferred. To sum up, it is clear that

Nyāya is realistic with respect to the nature of truth and pragmatic with respect

to the test or criterion of truth.

The value of the Nyāya system lies specially in its methodology or

theory of knowledge on which it builds its philosophy. One of the charges

against Indian philosophy is that it is based on religious authority and is

therefore, dogmatic. The theory of knowledge, formulated by Nyāya, is made

the basis not only of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika but also of other Indian systems with

slight modifications.

The Nyāya school of philosophical speculation is based on texts known

as the Nyāya-sūtra, which were written by Akṣapāda from around the second

century. The most important contribution made by the Nyāya school to modern

Hindu thought is its methodology to prove existence of God, based on the

Vedas. This methodology is based on a system of logic that, subsequently has

been adopted by majority of the other Indian schools whether orthodox or

heterodox.

3.4 Jñāna in Nyāya system :

In the Nyāya philosophy, knowledge is understood in a very wide sense.

Gautama does not find any difference between buddhi, upalabdhi and jñāna.18

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In this regard, Gautama suggests that knowledge stands for any conscious

determinate state and not necessarily referring to correct awareness alone. In

forms of determinate judgment, all knowledge must be expressible. It is

possible by the invariable association of jñāna and vyāvahara. It is the

conceptualised judgement which is of interest for the Naiyāyikas, Non-

conceptualised knowledge is not accepted as an independent form of

knowledge anywhere in Nyāya Philosophy. Gautama, Vātsyāyana and

Uddyotakara do not refer to this kind of knowledge. But, only Vācaspati in his

Tātparyaṭīkā traces the distinction between savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka jñāna

by interpreting the two words avyapadeśyam and vyavasāyātmakam contained

in the sūtra (1.1.4) to mean respectively nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka

perceptions.

The non-conceptualised stage is not a matter of perception or of direct

awareness.19 Therefore, to later Naiyāyikas, nirvikalpaka jñāna “is neither

pratyakṣa nor anumiti nor any other kind of anubhava, and can hardly come

under buddhi itself, as it gives rise to no vyavahāra. It can be neither pramā nor

apramā, for as it has no prakāratā neither the definition tadvati tat

prakārakatvam nor atadvati tatprakārakatvam applies to it.20

The Nyāya epistemology considers knowledge (jñāna) or cognition

(buddhi) as apprehension (upalabdhi) or consciousness (anubhava).

Knowledge may be valid or invalid. According to the Nyāya, knowledge is just

the manifestation (prakāśa) of objects. A knowledge is true when it

corresponds to the real nature and relations of its object, if not, it becomes

false. In the Nyāya system, the validity of knowledge is due to the efficiency of

the conditions of knowledge (karaṇaguṇa), while its invalidity is due to some

deficiency in those conditions (karaṇadoṣa). The efficiency or deficiency of

the conditions is constituted by certain positive factors. We cannot say that the

efficiency of the conditions of knowledge is simply the absence of defects in

them (doṣābhāva), or that their deficiency means only the absence of efficient

conditions (guṇābhāva). Hence efficiency and deficiency both stand for certain

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special positive conditions which modify the general conditions of knowledge

and make it true and false respectively.

3.5 Types of Correct Knowledge in the Nyāya School :

The Naiyāyikas accept four valid means (pramā) for obtaining valid

knowledge. All knowledge implies the subject (pramātā), the resulting

cognition (pramiti), and the means of knowledge (pramāṇa). Nyāya deals with

the highest state of knowledge. The Nyāya teaches that the highest good is

attainable only through the highest knowledge. Therefore, it is that the problem

of knowledge that finds an important place in the Nyāya philosophy. In the

Nyāya system, the four pramāṇas by which correct knowledge can be gained

are perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony.

3.5.1 Perception (pratyakṣa) :

Perception is the knowledge resulting from ‘sense-object’. It a very

important part of Gautama’s definition of perception. The object here signifies

substance (dravya), such as a table, a pot, a chair etc. It also signifies quality

(guṇa) such as colour (rūpa), hard or soft (sparśa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha)

and sound (sabda). The ‘object’ also includes pleasure and pain (sukha and

dukha) are directly cognized or perceived by us without the help of any sense

organ. The cognition of substance like a table and of quality like colour is an

External perception, but the cognition of pleasure or pain is an Internal or

mental perception.21

Pratyakṣa (perception) occupies the foremost position in the Nyāya

epistemology. Perception is defined by Akṣapāda Gautama in his Nyāya sūtra

(1, i.4) as a non erroneous cognition which is produced by the intercourse of

sense organs with the objects. Of course, the presence of the self, its contact

with the mind (manas), and the contact of the mind with the sense organs are

necessary factors, but the contact of the sense-organs with the appropriate

objects of the sense is the most essential factor in perception. Again perception

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is of two kinds, i.e., (i) laukika, ordinary or worldly and (ii) alaukika,

extraordinary or supernormal. The laukika perception is of six kinds, revealing

the objects having the five sensory qualities sound, touch, form, taste and smell

and the feelings of pleasure and pain (apprehended by mind). The alaukika

perception is of three kinds viz, sāmānyalakṣaṇa jñānalakṣaṇa and yogaja. In

sāmānyalakṣaṇa perception we become aware not only of the specific nature

of the object perceived but also of the nature of its genus which is not confined

to it. For example, when we are aware of the fire in a hearth, we also become

aware of the general nature of fire wherever else it may be present. In

Jñānalakṣaṇa perception we are not only aware of the particular sensory

quality in contact with our particular sense but also of some other quality of

another sense closely associated with which we are in contact. Viz, while

seeing a white piece of ice with our eyes we also actually feel the coolness of

it. The yogaja perception is another kind of alaukika perception. It is the

extraordinary and supernormal perception of a yogi who can directly, without

actual sensory contact perceive distant and hidden objects.

The founder of the Nyāya philosophy, Gautama or Akṣapada defines

perception as the knowledge which is produced by the intercourse of an object

with a sense organ, undefinable, determinate and in harmony with its object.

Pratyakṣa or perception (direct knowledge) is defined in Nyāyasūtra; 1.1.4:

“indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri

vyaavasāyātmakaṁ pratyakṣam”. This definition includes the following

factors:

1. Perception is a cognition (jñāna). According to Gautama, ‘perception is a

cognition’ i.e., the cognition of an object.

2. It arises from the sense-object contact (indriyārthasannikarṣā).

3. It is not due to words that is, it is inexpressible in words (avyapadeśya).

4. It is invariably related to the object that is, it is not erroneous

(avyabhicāri).

5. It is well defined or definite (vyavasāyātmaka).

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The specific feature of the definition of perception is the sense-object-

contact, which is accepted by many philosophical systems. We see that in the

Vaiśeṣika system, perception is described as knowledge which is conditioned

by the senses. The same view is expressed in Sāṁkhya system as “perception is

the direct cognition of an object by a sense-organ when the two come in contact

with each other”. In the Yoga system it is held that perception is especially a

cognition of the particularity of an object. For it, perception is ‘a mental

modification produced by sense impressions and mainly related to the specific

characters entering into the nature of the individual object of perception’. In

Mīmāṁsā system, perception is defined as ‘the cognition which is produced by

the efficient contact of the senses with their objects’. From all these definitions

of perception given by different philosophical systems, we see that the sense-

object-contact is the essential nature of perception.

3.5.2 Inference (anumāna) :

Inference (anumāna) is the second source of valid knowledge in the

Nyāya system. Inference is the means of knowing something through the

medium of the knowledge of some mark (liṅga) by virtue of a relation of

invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between the two.22

It is defined as that

cognition which presupposes some other cognition. It is knowledge which

arises after (anu) other knowledge. Indian logicians attach much importance to

inference mainly because it is accepted as a means of valid knowledge by all

the systems except Cārvāka.

Inference (anumāna) is said to be the source of anumiti (inferential

knowledge). Its another name is parāmarśa (consideration). Parāmarśa is

defined as knowledge of pakṣadharmatā with vyāpti. Pakṣadharmatā means

the quality of being a pakṣa. Pakṣa is that place or thing where some such

thing (sign) is present and indicates the presence of something else, which is

not actually perceived. The Nyāya system makes the valuable contribution to

inference. Gautama does not give any definition of inference. But Vātsyāyana

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gives an etymological definition of inference. According to Vatsyāyana, “It is

the knowledge of an object due to a previous knowledge of some sign”.23

This

view is also accepted by Jayanta24

and Gaṅgeśa.25

Inference is called anumāna because it is a kind of knowledge (māna)

which we get after (anu) some other knowledge i.e perception.26 It is mediate

knowledge of an object (e.g., a fire) derived through the medium of the

knowledge of a mark (e.g., a smoke) by virtue of the relation of invariable

concomitance between them. Inference is accepted by most of the Indian

philosophical systems. According to Buddhists, inference consists in the

perception of that which is known to be inseparably connected with another

thing. The Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Mimāṃsā and Vedānta systems also explain

inference as the knowledge of one term of a relation, which is not perceived,

through the knowledge of the other term which is perceived and is clearly

understood as invariably related to the first term. But according to Cārvāka,

inference cannot give us the validity of knowledge. It gives us probable

knowledge, so there remains a doubt. According to them all inferences are

doubtful.

There are three kinds of inference according to Gautama, i) pūrvavat, ii)

śeṣavat and iii) sāmānyatodṛṣṭa. But he has not define them anywhere in the

Nyāya-sūtra. Vātsyāyana offers two alternative interpretations of these terms.

i) A pūrvavat inference is the inference of an unperceived effect from a

perceived cause, e.g., the inference of future rain from the appearance of

dark heavy clouds in the sky.

ii) A śeṣavat inference is the inference of an unperceived cause from a

perceived effect; i.e., the inference of the fall of rain in the upper regions

of a river from seeing the river in spate. In this manner, these two kinds

of inference are based on the casual relation. But sāmānyatodṛṣṭa is

based on non-causal relation.

iii) A sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference is the inference of an imperceptible object

from a perceived mark, which is known to be uniformly related to it.

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The movement of the sun is inferred from its different positions in the

sky, which are perceived, even as the movement of a person is inferred

from his different positions on earth. Uddyotakara and Viśvanātha

remark that sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference is not based on the uniformity of

causation but on the non-causal uniformity.

Gaṅgeśa also accepts three kinds of inference (a) ānvayavyatireki, (b)

kevalanvayi and (c) kevalavyātireki.

(a) In anvayavyatireki inference, there is a universal affirmative relation of

the reason with the predicate as well as a universal negative relation

between them. For example-yatra dhūmaḥ, tatra vahniḥ as in the

mahānasa (kitchen); and if this is proved through negative example, as

yatra vahnir-nāsti, tatra dhūmo’pi nāsti, as in a lake, then this is called

anvayavyātireki anumāna. Here the vyāpti is established both positively

and negatively.

(b) In kevalānvayi where anvaya-vyāpti alone is possible and no vyatireka,

that is called kevalānvayi. In kevalānvayi inference, the reason (hetu)

has affirmative uniform relation with the presence of the predicate

(sādhya). It has an affirmative reason (anvayi hetu) which exists in all

similar instances (sapakṣa), and has no dissimilar instances (vipakṣa).

‘The jar is nameable, because it is knowable’. The reason ‘knowability’

exists in all nameable objects.

(c) Another inference, where only negative is possible and no positive, is

called kevalavyatireki. It depends upon a negative invariable

concomitance (vyatirekavyāpti) or uniform relation between the

absence of the reason with the absence of the predicate, which is

established by the method of agreement in absence. For example-what

is not different from the other elements has no smell. The earth has

smell. Therefore, the earth is different from the other elements. In this

inference, the reason ‘smell’ is the uncommon attribute of the subject

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‘earth’, it is co-extensive with the subject, there is no similar instance in

which it may exist. That is why it is called kevalavyātireki.

According to Annaṁbhaṭṭa, inference is of two kinds, viz, (a) inference

for oneself (svārtha) and (b) inference for others (parārtha).

(a) Svārtha, for oneself. It is meant to convince one’s own self about the

existence of an object. It is a mental process; i.e., a person happens to

see with his own eyes in kitchens and other common places smoke

always accompanied by fire, for which he comes to a conclusion that

wherever there is smoke, there is fire. Thus this is the psychological

process of inference for one’s own sake.

(b) Parārthānumāna is the inference for another. It is a logical process in

which we try to convince others of its truth by stating all the members

of a syllogism in a formal manner. There are five members of the

Nyāya syllogism, these are-pratijñā (proposition) the logical statement

which is to be proved e.g., the hill is on fire.27

Hetu is the second member of the syllogism. It states the reason for the

establishment of the proposition, i.e., ‘because the hill has smoke’.

Udāharaṇa is the third member of the syllogism which is a universal

proposition showing the invariable concomitance between hetu and sādhya;

e.g., wherever there is smoke there is fire as in the kitchen.

The fourth member upanaya is the application of the universal

concomitance to the present case, e.g., same kind of smoke which is

accompanied by fire.

In the last, nigamana is the conclusion drawn from the preceding

propositions, ‘the hill is on fire’.

These five parts make up a perfect demonstrative inference and leave no

doubt in the mind of the person. The above mentioned parts are accepted in

Sāṁkhya28 and Vaiśeṣika

29 systems also.

3.5.3 Comparison (upamāna) :

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Comparison (upamāna) is an independent source of valid knowledge. In

the Nyāya system, it is the third source of valid knowledge accepted by some

Indian systems like Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and Advaita vedānta. When a new object

not seen or known before is recognised by perceiving a similarity in it with

something else known before and pointed out by somebody else in the past,

then this process is called upamāna accepted by Nyāya. It is the relation

between the names and the objects denoted by them. According to

Annambhaṭṭa: “upamāna is the source of our knowledge about the relation

between a word and its denotation”.

Comparison is the means of knowing an unknown object through its

resemblance with another well-known object.30 For example-one has seen dogs

but not a wolf, and he has been told that a wolf is similar in appearance to a

dog. So when he sees an animal in the forest which looks like a dog but it isn’t

one, and he surmises that it must be a wolf. Perception of similarity plays an

important part in upamāna. There are two factors involved in an argument by

comparison (1) the knowledge of the object to be known, (2) the perception of

similarity. According to Naiyāyikas, the first factor is the principal cause of the

knowledge, While the Navya Naiyāyikas regard perception of similarity more

important. But Uddyotakāra and Vācaspati’s view is that, in upamāna the new

knowledge takes place through the recognition not only of similarity but also of

dissimilarity. Gaṅgeśa also accepts these two kinds of comparison when he

defines comparison as “the knowledge that a word denotes the generic

character of an unfamiliar object which co-exists with its similarity or

dissimilarity with a known object”. Gautama says that upamāna as a distinct

and independent means of knowledge. But some systems of Indian philosophy

do not accept it as an independent source of knowledge. According to Cārvāka,

upamāna is not a pramāṇa at all, it cannot give us true knowledge about the

denotation of words as maintained by the Naiyāyikas.

On the nature of upamāna, the Mīmāṁsā and the Nyāya views are

fundamentally different. There is a minor difference between the Prābhākara

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and the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṁsā. According to Prabhākara, similarity or

sādṛśya which is the object of upamāna, is an independent category, not

reducible to substance, quality, action and universal etc. on the otherhand,

according to Kumārila, it is nothing but an assemblage of common features. Of

course, the Advaita Vedānta view is identical with the Bhāṭṭas.

The Naiyāyikas define comparison (upamāna) as the knowledge of

similarity of an unknown object like a wild cow with a known object like a

cow. The knowledge is that the perceived wild cow is like the remembered

cow. The Mīmāṁsakas reject this statement of comparison. They point out that

the knowledge of the relation between a word and the object denoted by that

word is derived by verbal authority and not by upamāna.

Śabara defines upamāna as resemblance which brings about the

cognition of an object not in contact with the senses.31 Kumārila explains it as

the knowledge of similarity subsisting in a remembered object (e.g., a cow)

with an object (i.e., a wild cow) perceived. It is the meaning only-the ‘cow’

which was perceived by me in the past in a town is similar to this wild cow

perceived in a forest at present.32 The Prabhākaras remark that upamāna as the

knowledge of similarity as subsisting in an object not in contact with the sense-

organs brought about by the perception of similarity in some other object which

is perceived by the senses. The knowledge of similarity of the remembered cow

with the perceived wild cow is upamāna. Prabhākara’s view of upamāna is

identical with the view of Kumārila.

The Nyāya says that upamāna does not depend upon the quantity of

similarity, but it depends upon perceived similarity of an unknown object with

a well known object. The Naiyāyikas do not deny that upamāna sometimes

leads to false judgement. Hence we conclude with the Naiyāyikas view that

upamāna is an independent source of our knowledge of the denotaion of words.

But Bauddhas, Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāmkhyaits do not accept upamāna as an

independent source of valid knowledge.

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3.5.4 Testimony (śabda) :

Testimony is an important source of knowledge. It has been defined by

Gautama as ‘āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ’ which means the assertion of a reliable

person is what is meant by śabda.33

Śabda is defined by Nyāya as a statement

uttered by a trustworthy person (āpta). A trustworthy person is one who always

speaks truth. A trustworthy person may be a man or God who is always

trustworthy.

The Vedas are considered as authoritative because they are regarded by

the Naiyāyikas to be the words of God. In the same way the statements of any

wordly person will be authoritative when it is certain that the person is a

trustworthy one. Therefore, the validity of śabda pramāṇa depends on its being

based on the statement of a trustworthy person, human or divine. Annaṁbhaṭṭa

points out that śabda as a source of valid knowledge, it consists in

understanding the meaning of the statement of a trustworthy person.34

Gautama has rightly said that testimony (śabda) is of two kinds, these

are-dṛṣṭārtha or that relating to perceptible objects and adṛṣṭārtha or that

relating to imperceptible objects. Dṛṣṭārtha-these objects are found in this

world; and adṛṣṭārtha-these objects are found in the next world, such as

heaven, hell, transmigration etc. According to navya Naiyāyikas, testimony is

of two kinds-secular (laukika) testimony and scriptural (vaidika) testimony.

Secular testimony is the testimony of human beings, therefore may be true or

false. In vaidika testimony, we have the words of God. The Vedas are not

impersonal but personal, and these are created by God. So, valid on all points.

Hence all Naiyāyikas agree that śabda must be based on the words of

trustworthy persons, human or divine. All other systems of Indian philosophy

accept testimony as an independent source of valid knowledge, except the

Cārvāka, the Buddha and the Vaiśeṣika schools.

Among the four means of valid knowledge that Nayāya acknowledges

for the right cognition of the above mentioned prameya’s i.e., pratyakṣa

(perception), anumāna (inference), upamāna (comparison) and śadba (verbal

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testimony). Perception is considered to be the most important ‘because it alone

is self sufficient to allay doubt’.35

In the above four pramāṇas of Nyāya system, we find that testimony is

the knowledge of words while perception is due to sense-object-contact,

inference or anumāna to be the knowledge of invariable concomitance and

upamāna to the perception of similarity or dissimilarity. Now it is quite clear

that Nyāya system accepts the above four means of knowledge as distinct and

independent.

3.6 Stage of indefinite knowledge in the Nyāya Philosophy :

Besides these, Nyāya explains the nature of doubt, fallacy, truth and

error. Saṁśaya or doubt is a state of uncertainty. It is a form of invalid

knowledge. It is an indefinite knowledge which characterizes an object in

mutually conflicting ways. It arises from confusion of common qualities or

recognition of properties not common, conflicting testimony, irregularity of

perception as between a pool and a mirage, irregularity of non-perception, or a

lapse of memory. According to Gautama, saṁśaya or doubt is a conflicting

judgment on the precise character of an object.36

For example-some tall thing is

perceived, but one cannot decide whether it is a man or a post. The opinion of

the Naiyāyikas is that doubt is neither a true cognition nor a false one.

Vātsyāyana asserts that it is a wavering judgement where characters common

to many objects are discerned, but none of them is specific. Vātsyāyana

classifies doubt into five kinds. The first kind of doubt is the contradictory

knowledge (vimarśa) about the same object due to the apprehension of

common characteristics (samāna-dharma), i.e., when we perceive a tall object

at a distance and we are not sure if it is a man or a post or a tree-trunk; because

tallness is common to all of them. Secondly, it may arise from the cognition of

a peculiar and unique property; as when the cognition of sound makes us doubt

whether it is eternal or non-eternal because it is not found in eternal objects like

the soul nor in non-eternal objects like water. The third, form of doubt may be

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due to conflicting testimony, e.g., when the different philosophical theories of

the soul leave us in doubt as to the real nature of the soul. In fourth, it may be

caused due to the irregularity of perception. As for example; we perceive water

in the tank where it really exists but it appears also to exist in the mirage where

it really does not exist. Hence it leads to a doubt whether water is perceived

only when it actually exists or it does not. The fifth kind of doubt or lastly, it

may arise from the irregularity of non-perception, i.e., when we are not sure if

the thing we cannot see now really exists or not, since the existent also is not

perceived under certain conditions.37

With regard to the types of doubt, there is a difference of opinion.

Uddyotakāra and Vācaspati differ with Gautama and Vātsyāyana on this point.

The former two favour only three types of doubt. According to Gaṅgeśa, there

are only two sources of doubt; whereas Keśavamisra speaks of three sources of

doubt. In all cases of doubt, there is either the perception of common properties

or the cognition of something quite new and uncommon.

The Naiyāyika’s view is that doubt is neither a true cognition nor a false

one. As a mental state, doubt is shown to be different from both belief and

disbelief. It only raises a problem for thought. However, in doubt, we think of

two or more alternatives in regard to the same thing.

The Naiyāyika maintains that truth and falsehood both are extrinsic to

knowledge in respect of genesis as well as of ascertainment. The Nyāya theory

agrees partly with the Buddhist (in respect of the extrinsic nature of truth) and

partly with the Bhāṭṭa (in respect of the extrinsic nature of falsehood).

Truth and falsehood are specific qualities of cognition. A cognition is

the manifestation of some object, which depends on certain causal conditions.

The ascertainment of truth depends on some extraneous considerations just as

its production depends on some extraneous factors. There is no knowledge of

its truth or falsehood at the time of the origination of a cognition. When the

cognition of a blue object arises, the object is known to be blue; but the truth of

the cognition is not known at that time, and subsequently when it is known it is

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not known independently because such knowledge depends on fruitful activity

(pravṛttisāmarthya). Fruitful activity is the test of truth and fruitless activity

(pravṛttivisaṃvāda) is the test of falsehood.

All knowledge is a means to some practical end and from this place it

needs to be tested in order to attain practical success. When practical success

has been achieved one feels no doubt about it, because doubt is the motive

behind the ascertainment of truth. In the case of the first knowledge of water,

when water is seen, we expect that it will quench our thirst and if the expected

thing actually happens, e.g., if the cognition leads to a successful action it is

proved to be true and there is no cause for doubting the truth of the visual

cognition of water. In a general way, a visual perception of water reveals the

form of water and if the visual perception of water is verified by touching,

washing, bathing etc. then the perceived water is real. Even after a vigorous

and careful search we do not find any defect in the conditions, we can believe

that our volitional experience of successful activity is true.

3.7 Nyāya view of erroneous cognition :

The Nyāya account of error has been expounded by a galaxy of thinkers

beginning from Gautama (about 3rd century BC). The Nyāya theory of error or

illusion is known as the anyathākhyātivāda. The word ‘anyathā’ means

‘elsewise’ and ‘elsewhere’ and both these meanings are brought out in error.

The presented object is perceived elsewise and the represented object exists

elsewhere. They further maintain that knowledge is not intrinsically valid but

becomes so on account of extraneous conditions (parataḥ prāmāṇya) during

both validity and invalidity. According to this theory, an illusion manifests a

real object in the form of different object which is also real. An error or illusion

is the apprehension (khyāti) of an object as otherwise (anyathā) or as a

different object; it is misperception of an object (i.e., a nacre) as another object

(i.e., silver). Another name of this theory is viparītakhyāti or the theory of

erroneous cognition.

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According to Nyāya, an illusion is a misplaced fact. All the factors of an

illusory perception are real and perceived facts, but they are brought into a

wrong relation. For example, in the illusory perception of silver, we have an

actual perception of a certain locus and some silver, both as real facts. Here

error arises because the silver perceived at a different time and place, and

occupied by the perceived locus, namely, the shell. According to Alexander,

‘error consists in wrongly combining the elements of reality’.

According to Naiyāyika, the concept of error is logically not committed

to explain the perceptual error but is to show how error as such is nothing but

mere false characterisation. Nyāya points out that error is mere false

characterisation. The Navya Naiyāyika like Vācaspati, while discussing error,

refer to the instances of erroneous perception like shell and silver yet their

account of error as mistaking one for another (sadantaraṁ sadantarāt manā

gṛhyate)38

clearly indicates the logical implication of the theory.

In the Nyāya school, in illusion, something is perceived as other than

what it is, e.g., the nacre is apprehended as silver. It happens in this way; due to

defective eyesight, or insufficient light, or some other causes of person fails to

cognise a nacre as nacre and apprehends it as something bright as silver. It is

the manifestation of a real object in the form of a different object. The error lies

not in the indeterminate perception of the given but in the determinate

perception of it as worked up and modified by some representative elements.39

When we perceive the qualities of silver in a nacre, we have an illusion;

which is a single cognition of a perceptual character. A nacre in intercourse

with the visual organ vitiated by a defect and aided by the recollection of silver

is actually perceived as silver. There is first contact of sense with something

present before it. Due to some defects, the sense apprehends such general

features of the thing as its brightness, etc. but fails to discern its peculiar and

distinctive features. On the other hand, the general features being associated

with some other thing (e.g., silver) recall the memory images of the peculiar

properties of that other thing. The recollection of silver is owing to the revival

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of its impression by the perception of similarity (i.e., brightness). The Navya or

modern Nyāya explains it by jñānalakṣanasannikarṣa. So, in the case of

illusion, Naiyāyika accepts the jñānalakṣaṇapratyakṣa. There is an extra

ordinary intercourse through the medium of the idea of silver revived in

memory. The error comes in and the illusion arises when the silver that is

perceived elsewhere is referred as a predicate to the ‘this’ as its subject. It is the

determinate knowledge as qualified by ‘silverness’ (viśiṣṭajñāna).

In recognition (pratyabhijñā) in which we say ‘This must be the same

man who helped me in the tramcar yesterday. We see how certain presentative

and representative elements join together to make up one single perception. It

is also one kind of perception qualified by past perception. We see an object

and recognize it as having been perceived on a previous occasion, giving us a

knowledge of present objects qualified by the past.40

In it, we know

immediately that the thing we cognise is the same as that which was cognised

before. It is produced by memory and perception. Any ordinary valid

perception explains how a given sensum combines with associated ideas to

make up one percept. In illusion, the relation between the perceived ‘this’ and

‘silver’ is not objectively real. It is contradicted and sublated. So, it is clear that

the error lies not in the presentations concerned in the perception but in the

determination of one presentation by another given through association and

memory (jātyasaṁskārāt).

Jayanta Bhāṭṭa, a Naiyāyika, advocates viparītakhyāti theory of error.

According to him, mistake or error consists in misinterpreting a thing. It is to

be identical with the anyathākhyāti considered by other Naiyāyikas. While

refuting the Prābhākaras’ theory of akhyāti, he presents this theory. He

observes that an illusion is a single cognition of the nature of a positive false

knowledge. It is the false perception of one thing as a different thing. This

theory involved in an error is the manifestation of a real object in the form of a

different object.41

It is not a negation of discrimination between two cognitions.

It is a positive misperception. For example, a mother-of-pearl shell which has

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been mistaken for a piece of silver, and this knowledge is expressed as “This is

silver”. Now the question is, how such an illusion arises? According to the

older Naiyāyikas what we first perceive in the shell silver illusion is ‘those

qualities of nacre which are common to both nacre and silver’. Owing to the

perversion of the visual organ, we fail to perceive the peculiar qualities of the

nacre, then the perception of these common qualities reminds us of the peculiar

qualities of silver by association.42 Due to some perversion of the mind, the

recollection of silver produces the perception of silver; in contact with the

visual organ.

Some later Naiyāyikas (modern or Navya Naiyāyikas) introduced a

complicated form of perception for explaining illusion. They hold that the

“visual perception of silver in a nacre depends upon the extraordinary

intercourse through the idea of silver revived in memory by association”.

Through this intercourse, “the idea of silver reproduce in memory by

association produce the visual perception of silver.43

In explaining perceptual

illusion Gaṅgeśa finds a constant in memory providing the predication content,

the qualificational material. Gaṅgeśa analyses non-veridical sensory awareness

as a cognition whose predication content does not qualify the object connected

to the sense organ. According to Navya Naiyāyikas, in illusion the conch-shell

is mistaken for silver which exists some-where else and is perceived where

actually shell is present. Gaṅgeśa, the founder of the Neo-Naiyāyika School,

also advocates the doctrine of anyathākhyāti. He explains how a real object

existing elsewhere appears in consciousness in an illusion. According to him

there is an extra-ordinary intercourse with the visual organ and produces the

illusory perception of silver in a nacre. It is also complicated perception

through association. Gaṅgeśa’s opinion is that this extraordinary intercourse

through association (jñānalakṣaṇa-saṇnikarṣa). This is the only point how an

illusion is misperception of an object as a different object. The Nyāya explains

it by jñānalakṣaṇāpratyāsatti which means a kind of sense-object contact

brought about by the revival of the idea of past experience of an object.

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The school of the later Nyāya shows great ingenuity to explain the

perceptual character of illusory experience. That there is the attribution (āropa)

of false character to a perceived fact is true in illusion no doubt. But the

questions that arise are: how do we come to ascribe the false character? How

does this false character appears as something actually perceived in illusion?

The Nyāya maintains that an illusory experience is a single perception. It is not

a complex of perception and recollection with their distinction blurred by

obscuration of memory as Prabhākara thinks. Dr. S. C. chatterjee rightly points

out that “when we have the illusion of silver in a shell, we no doubt attribute

silverness to that shell which is not its proper locus, but at the same time it is

equally doubtless that the silver is somehow perceived and not merely

remembered in illusion.”44

This is also pointed out by A.C. Ewing. He maintains that, “the

difficulty in the case of perception is not the mere fact of error, but the demand

that we should hold both that what we immediately perceived numerically

identical with a physical object or a part of such an object and yet that it is

quite different.45 Therefore, we have to explain the perceptual character of

illusion to explain illusion. We should not try to explain it away.

It is a presentative cognition or perception and not a representative

cognition or recollection, the representative character of which has lapsed

owing to lapse of memory as Prabhākara holds.46 Kaṇāda defines false

knowledge (avidyā) as due to the defects of the sense organs and the defects of

impressions.47 Saṁkara Miśra illustrates the aphorism thus: false knowledge or

illusion is due to the sense organs tainted bodily by humours, and impressions

of past experience corrupted by the nonperception of the distinctive characters

of an object. Such the Vaiśeṣika also advocates the doctrine of anyathākhyāti

or viparītakhyāti.

Patañjali defines an illusion as false knowledge, which does not remain

uncontradicted.48 Nescience (avidyā) is a metaphysical error and consists in

knowing the non-eternal as eternal, the painful as the pleasant, the impure as

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pure, and the not-self as the self. Vācaspati Miśra also explains it as another

cognition opposed to a valid cognition and not a mere negation of it.49

The

Yoga maintains that a form of cognition is wrongly attributed to an external

object whereas the Nyāya-Vaśeṣika maintains that another external object is

wrongly attributed to an external object present to a sense-organ. The cognition

of silver is wrongly attributed to a nacre which is present to the visual organ in

the illusion of silver according to the Yoga.50 Thus Patañjali advocates the

doctrine of anyathākhyāti.

Pārthasārathi Miśra also advocates the doctrine of anyathākhyāti. He

explains the nature of illusion in the following way. The illusion of silver in a

nacre is not produced by the intercourse of a nacre with the visual organ. A

nacre is perceived as a bright object owing to its intercourse with the visual

organ, brightness being common to a nacre and a piece of silver; the peculiar

qualities of a nacre are not perceived due to the weakness of the visual organ,

then silver is remembered owing to the revival of the subconscious impression

of silver, then the nacre is perceived as silver which is only remembered owing

to some defect. Thus an illusion is produced by the intercourse of an object

with a sense-organ aided by the recollection of another object to which it is

similar.51

So we can decide that among the theories of perceptual error or

illusion the Nyāya theory of anyathākhyāti seems to be more acceptable than

any other.

This chapter concludes that Nyāya admits error only in the descriptive

sphere. In our discussion, we have seen that truth and error are two species of

knowledge. There is no knowledge in general; there is either true knowledge or

false knowledge. There is no man in general; therefore, there is either an

American or an Australian. Where there is neither guṇa nor doṣa there is not

even the causes of knowledge. So, there must be a specific factor which gives

rise to either truth or error. In this sense we can say that Nyāya theory of truth

and error is quite desirable. Nyāya attempts to give some solutions to the

problem of truth and error. The contribution of the Nyāya theory of

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epistemology is not inferior to any other theory of Indian philosophy. It must

be said Nyāya has definitely made a great contribution to this problem. Hence

it may be concluded that the Nyāya view on truth and error is the most

convincing theory than the other.

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References :

1. S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, History of Indian Logic, p.40

2. Ibid

3. It is interesting to note that the same figure was used by the stoics also.

NS, IV. ii. 50

4. NS, I.2.4

5. R. Puligandla, Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy, p.184

6. “tasya sarvasaṁvitśadhāraṇatvāt.” (loc. Cit; p.2)

7. “anūbhūtiḥ pramāṇam.” (loc cit; p.2)

8. “yatra tu na (vyāvahāravisaṁvādaḥ) tatra samyaktvam.” (loc. cit; p-3).

9. Ślokavārtika, 2.53. 10. Sastri, loc. Cit; 68-9

11. Compare Gaṅgeśa in Prāmāṇyavāda, Gāgā Bhaṭṭa’s Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi,

Viśvanātha’s Siddhāntamuktāvalī etc., as quoted from “Gaṅgeśa’s

Theory of Truth, by J. N. Mohanty. p.11

12. Thuse,……… for……….. example,……… Vācaspati……… Miśra: “abādhitanadhigatāsandigdhabodhajanakatvaṃ hi pramāṇatvaṃ

pramāṇanām” (Bhāmatī, 1.4)

13. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Advaitaratnarakṣaṇam (Advaitasiddhi edn, p.

29-30) compare also a modern writer Anantakrishna Sastri: s“Yadyapi

Vedāntinām mate tadvati tatprakarakatvarupaṁ prāmāṇyam

bhramasādhāraṇameva, tathāpi saṁvādipravṛttijanakatvaviśiṣṭaṃ tat

na tatsadhāraṇamiti (Paribhāṣāprakāśika on Vedāntaparibhāṣā

(Calcutta 1927, p .263).

14. D. M. Dutta, Six ways of knowing. p.20 (cal.1960)

15. avyabhicāriṇīmasandigdhāmarthopalabdhiṁ vidadhati; NM, 1-20

16. yatra yadasti tatra tasyānubhavaḥ, TC

17. tattvānubhavaḥ pramā, S. P.; p.101

18. buddhirupalabdhirjñānamityanarthāntaram, NS. 1.1.15

19. Viśvanātha pañcānana : Siddhānta-Muktāvali “Nirvikalpaka na

Pratyakṣaṁ Vaiśiṣṭyanavagāhijñānasya Pratyakṣam,” Nirṇaya Sagara

Edn; p.58

20. Y. B. Athalya: notes on TS, pp.218-219.Viśvanātha, in his Bhāṣā

Pariccheda, makes a similar comment, “non-conceptualised knowledge

is neither valid nor erroneous” (na pramā nāpi bhramaḥ syān

nirvikalpakam-St.135) vide. Also T.C, “Non-conceptualised knowledge

being beyond validity and invalidity, is rather practically useless” (

nirvikalpakañca pramāpramābahirbhūtameva, vyavahārāṇamgatvāt)-

pratyakṣa khaṇḍa, p.402.

21. indriyārtha-sannikarṣatpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri

vyaavasāyātmakam; G.N. Jha-Indian Thought, vol. I, Allahabad, 1915,

p.39.

22. Gautama, Nyāya-sūtra, 1.1.5

23. Vātsyāyana, Nyāya Bhāṣya, 1.1.3

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24. Jayanta, Nyāya-Mañjarī, p.109

25. Gaṅgeśa, Tattvacintāmaṇi, Anumānakhaṇḍa, p.1-2

26. NBh; i 1.1, 5; NSār., PP; p. 2, 5; TSN., p.47.

27. Vātsyāyana, Nyāya-bhāṣya, 1.1.39.

28. Kapila, Sāṁkhya-sūtra, 5.27

29. Padārthadharma-Saṁgraha, p.114. (Praśastapāda, however, mentions

pratijñā, apadeśa, nidarśana, anusamdhāna and pratyamnaya).

30. prasiddhasādharmyāt Sādhyasādhanam upamānam. N.S., i.1.6.

31. upamānamapi sādṛśyasannikṛṣṭe rthe buddhimutpādayati. SB, p.37

under MS. 1.1.5

32. tasmādyat smaryate tatsyāt sādṛśyena viśeṣitam/prayemupamānasya

sādṛaśyam vātadanvitam// SV, upamāna, 37.

33. Gautama, Nyāya-sūtra, I.1.7.

34. Annaṁ Bhāṭṭa, Tarkasaṁgraha, p.73.

35. Vide, EIP, op.cit; p.222

36. N.S.; N.V., 1.1.23

37. NB. 1.1.23

38. Vide, S. Kuppuswamy Sastri, op.cit; p.132

39. NVT; 1.1.4

40. Nyāyamañjarī, PP; p.448-459. Suggested by Radhakrishnan, Iph, Vol.II,

p.70

41. N.M; I-166

42. Devaraja N.K. An introduction of Saṅkara’s Theory of knowledge. p.127

43. Ibid p.128

44. Chatterjee, S. C. The Nyāya theory of knowledge. p.35

45. Ewing, A.C. Mind, April, 1930, p.149

46. J. N. Sinha, Indian Psychology, vol-III, p.110

47. rajatam ity-anubhava eva na pramuṣita-smṛtiḥ. NM., p.182

48. viparyayo mithyājñānam atad-rūpa pratiṣṭham. Ys., i.8.

49. J. N. Sinha, Indian Psychology, Vol-III, p.112

50. Bhrama-sthale jñānā-kārasyaiva viṣaye samāropa iti bhāvaḥ, as quoted

from “Indian Psychology”; by Jadunath Sinha, p.112.

51. Ś D, Bombay, 1915, p.49

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