chapter-ii dowry: its socio cultural...

Chapter-II : Dowry: Its Socio Cultural Dimensions 25

Department of Sociology, University of Jammu 2011

CHAPTER-II DOWRY: ITS SOCIO CULTURAL DIMENSIONS

Babul ki duyaen leti ja,

tujhko sukhi sansar mile,

Maike ki kabhi na yaad ayepameer,

Sasural mein itna pyar mele.

Take your father‘s blessing/prayer as you go;

Go, and [may you] get a happy household;

May you never remember your mother‘s home;

[Because of] all the love you receive at your in-laws‘ place.

his chapter visions dowry from the socio-cultural dimensions as it shows the

history of dowry i.e. how it started in India as well as outside, the reasons for

giving and taking dowry, whether people want to give or take it and do they support

this custom? Besides dowry as a form of custom and sanction, the chapter also

focuses on bride price, which could have taken place where the sex ratio favoured

females and as there were a large number of males for every female, polyandry and

bride-price could have been the result. Bride price in Indian society sanctifies a

negative connotation and therefore any opportunity to give it up and accept dowry

instead is immediately taken up. The chapter further emphasis on how dowry

becomes power for one and a source of subordination for some other. The daughter

becomes a source of affection at one time and a source of anxiety at some other.

Besides this, dowry is also discussed here as a crime according to Indian Penal Code.

Since British rule till date dowry system persists in all its aspects everywhere

in country. It is no more confined to one or two states of north India but gained roots

in the soil of Southern as well as Eastern states too. It has made its way to all sections,

classes, castes, societies and communities. It permeated even to tribal societies known

for primitive egalitarianism and gender equality and to Muslim communities too.

Strong legislation, laws and women‘s movements, every attempt to resist it has been

thwarted by the wide social sanction accorded to this practice. Roots of dowry date

back to the time when man started living a civilized life. Originally it intended just to

give a support and security to new couples that start their married life. It also signified

an alternative to inheritance for woman. In course of time it got distorted as people

began demanding dowry and started harassing brides, in case they did not bring

sufficient dowry. Many times parents pass their whole life under debt to pay dowry in

T



the marriages of their daughters which also results in murders and suicides of the

daughters.

Dowry, or some form of marriage payment, is hardly unique to India. Of the

563 societies listed by George P Murdock, 24 (four per cent) are associated with

dowry systems, 226 with bride wealth (grooms' families making payments to brides'

families), and 63 with bride service (grooms contributing labor to brides' families in

lieu of money). Anthropologists have suggested that marriage payments are one of the

ways in which cultures expand social relations between communities by exchanging

gifts. Other explanations are that marriage payments help secure labor rights, or that

they provide occasions for display of social status. Jack Goody (1973) claimed that

European dowries were a way for families to pass on pre-mortem inheritance to their

daughters.

The International Standard Bible Encyclopedia gives the definition of dowry

as, dou'-ri: In all Hebrew marriages, the dowry held an important place. The dowry

sealed the betrothal. It took several forms. The bridegroom presented gifts to the

bride. There was the mohar, "dowry" as distinguished from mattan, "gifts to the

members of the family". The price paid to the father or brothers of the bride was

probably a survival of the early custom of purchasing wives. There was frequently

much negotiation and bargaining as to the size of dowry. The dowry would generally

be according to the wealth and standing of the bride. It might consist of money,

jewelry or other valuable effects. Occasionally a bride received a dowry from her

father; sometimes in the shape of land, and of cities. In later Jewish history a written

marriage contract definitely arranged for the nature and size of the dowry.

Dowry in legal terminology means any property or valuable security given or

agreed to be given either directly or indirectly (a) by one party to the marriage to the

other party to the marriage (b) by the parents of either party to the marriage or by any

other person to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before any

time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does

not include dower or mehr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law

(shariat) applies (Basu, 2005: Xxii).



Theories, offered by Gary Becker (1981) to explain dowry in general are:

First, he argued that dowries act as an insurance against divorce, thus serving

to protect women's marriage-specific investments such as childbearing. The groom is

aware that in deserting or ill-treating the woman, he stands at risk of losing the dowry.

For example, the Muslim institution of mahr or mehr, does perform the insurance

function more effectively; mahr, once given belongs to the wife. In the Indian case,

the legal non-recognition and the handshake nature of the contact makes its recovery

uncertain under any circumstances (Sen, 1998: 79).

A look at a major old study on the position of the women in India shows this

at once. Altekar (1978: 71-72) wrote:

In ordinary families, however, the amount of dowry was a nominal one. It was

a voluntary gift of pure affection and presented no impediment in the settlement of the

daughter's marriage till the middle of the 19th century. It is only during the last 50 or

60 years that the amount of dowry has begun to assume scandalous proportions...

It is now high time for Hindu society to put an end to the evil custom, which

has driven many an innocent maiden to commit suicide. There are signs to show that

this custom is becoming unpopular and odious, but public opinion must assert itself

more emphatically. The youth must rise in rebellion against it (Menski, 1998: 37-38).

This text, originally written in 1938, shows that the problem discussed in the

late 1990s had already excited the public opinion decades ago and that the definition

of the dowry itself has not been quite clear. Is it, as Altekar seems to suggest, the case

that voluntary gifts of affection are causing the dowry problem? (Ibid: 38).

In essence most writing uses 'dowry' in at least three senses. The first is in the

form of gifts or presents like jewellery, household goods and other property taken by

the bride to her new house or given to her during the marriage rituals. These are the

items to be used by her, or by the couple, as a sort of foundation for the nuclear

household unit or sub-unit being established, either on its own or within the context of

a larger, joint family unit. It is also seen as a form of pre-mortem inheritance for the

daughter, which has given rise to a long, complicated debate about female property

rights (Ibid: 41).

The second form of dowry may be constituted by what families, particularly

the bride's family, conspicuously consume on the occasion of the marriage



celebrations. In this respect Srinivas (1984) stated unequivocally that 'Indian

weddings are the occasions for conspicuous spending and this is related to the

maintenance of what is to be believed to be the status of the family'. Such expenditure

on the marriage only benefits the couple indirectly, probably in status terms rather

than directly in the financial sense.

The third type of dowry, the really problematic aspect of the phenomenon is

dowry as property expected or even demanded by the husband, more often by his

family, either as a condition of marriage itself, or at a later stage. This is the

'consideration' for the marriage that the legal textbooks, and Indian anti-dowry law

itself, talk about (Menski, 1998:42).

Traditionally, dowry has been broadly defined to include the totality of assets

transferred to the groom's family from the bride's family at the time of marriage. It has

played two roles, that of a vehicle for property transfer to the woman, and that of a

'marriage payment' (Basu, 1996). Authors such as Sambrani and Sambrani (1983),

Narayan (1993) and Oldenburg (1993) have argued that in a patrilineal society, with

women prohibited from directly inheriting parental property the primary role of

dowry was to provide a vehicle whereby part of a woman‘s parental property could be

transferred to her affinal home, thereby increasing her own standard of living.

Therefore, they claim, the woman‘s parents in essence gave dowry voluntarily.

Nonetheless, there must have been considerable scope for extortion, where a groom‘s

family could appropriate a more than fair, or voluntarily given, share of wealth from

the bride's family as part of the marriage payment. This scope was provided by the

strong societal and religious dictates that demanded a girl's marriage to a man of

appropriate caste and class before she attained puberty. The imbalance of bargaining

power in the marriage market was created and dowry probably became the maximum

price a family was willing to pay in order to safeguard both social standing and

economic livelihood by procuring suitable husbands for their daughters. Among many

others, Rabindranath Tagore commented on this in a passage in 'Lok Sahitya‘ (in

Bengali), published in Vol. 13 [1961] of Rabindra Rachanavali:

We are compelled by society's dictates to marry off our daughters by a given

age, and within a limited circle. Such an exaggerated compulsion by itself artificially



hikes up the value of a groom; his virtues, attributes or economic prowess become of

little consequence (Sen, 1999: 76-77).

One of the ‘ancient and respected customs’ often referred to as a putatively

positive original form of contemporary dowry is the idea of stridhanam, gifts at

marriage, which were regarded as brides own property. Stridhan, as per Hindu

customary practice, is that portion of wealth, which is the exclusive property of

women and passes from mother to daughter. It includes gifts of money, property,

jewelry or a share in a family business given to a woman as a daughter, sister, wife or

daughter-in-law. It also covers wealth generated through her own enterprise or any

other wealth accruing to her due to her own effort or by inheritance. It includes, but is

not limited to, gifts or wealth given to a daughter at the time of her marriage. It also

includes gifts given to her by her in-laws. A key-defining characteristic of stridhan is

that no one in the family can touch it, except if the woman concerned voluntarily gifts

a portion to someone. In the natural course, stridhan passes from mother to daughter

and if in a contingency a male member uses a part of a woman's stridhan, he is

expected to return it with interest.

The traditional stridhan largely associated with the higher castes given at the

time of a daughter's marriage was determined by predictable norms within each

community and was more in the nature of pre-mortem inheritance for the daughter

that usually included items such as gold, cows or even a piece of land, along with a

few clothes and utensils.

Sukumari Bhattacharji designates the categories that constituted as stridhanam

in ancient texts - ‗pana, with which the bride was purchased; yautuka, gifts given to

the girl at marriage by her relations and friends, and saudayika, gifts given to the girl

or to the couple, either at her or his place by respective friends and relations‘ plus a

portion of mother‘s stridhanam and a sort of penalty paid to an earlier wife when the

husband married again but is careful to point out that the readings of the scholars like

Yajnavalkya might suggest that there were several extenuating circumstances in

which the husband could use and claim this property. The notion of stridhanam as

incipient property also corresponds with Goody and Tambiah‘s formulation of dowry

as a‘ pre-mortem inheritance‘, as a fund acquired at marriage and controlled partly by

the woman: the idea fits well in Europe milieus where families alienated land and



other productive resources upon a daughter‘s marriage, and where this practice faded

away as married women began to be able to own their own property; but the

equivalence with inheritance portions in the Indian context is not very tenable (Basu,

2005:Xvi-xvii).

Traditional stridhan gives women stronger and inalienable rights to a portion

of wealth in both parental and marital families. By contrast, dowry is a device for

disinheriting daughters from parental property. Modern inheritance laws also fall

short of stridhan because they allow daughters and wives to be disinherited at will. As

previously discussed, the provision of 'free will' was included in the Hindu Succession

Act of 1956 specifically with a view to giving the power to fathers to disinherit their

daughter. Therefore misplaced hostility to traditional cultural norms, including those

like stridhan that gave women strong rights, results in ill-conceived campaigns that

cause further harm to women. Punishment for such a poorly defined and

conceptualized law is heavy and draconian; and therefore the anti dowry law is being

widely misused by unscrupulous families, policemen and lawyers.

It has been seen that dowry is practised in other religions and castes too. It is

seen that in Aggarwal community too much dowry is given which can be analysed

from a respondent Anju in the present research who belongs to Uttar Pradesh (U.P.)

and married in Jammu. Her family of orientation belongs to Aggarwal, vaishya

community. As a part of marriage they have tilak ceremony in which cash is given to

the bridegroom. Her parents gave ` 2,50,000 cash to her husband which he handed

over to his elder brother. Anju got seven sarees from her parents which had cost

` 1,00,000; jewellery of ` 1.5 lakhs; bed, almirah, sofa, dressing table etc. of

` 50,000; fridge, T.V and air conditioner of ` 80,000 and motorcycle of ` 70,000.

About ` 7,00,000 were spent in dowry in her marriage (Interviewed on 5.5.2010 in

Jammu).

In the daily English Newspaper, Times of India dated 11.9.2007, it was

reported that dowry is now seen in the Muslim religion also. The statistics show an

upswing in dowry among Muslims, the number of cases filed before the Allahabad

bench in 2004 was 50, while in 2005 it jumped to 57. This does not include 32 cases

of torture related with dowry demand. Craze for a vehicle is also proving to be too

hazardous for Muslim girls. For instance, 23 year old Tasneem Khannam, married to



Zafar from Jaunpur in U.P, had to pay the price for bringing along a Maruti 800

instead of a Cielo. Zafar felt that Tasneem‘s father who has shares in a Dubai

shopping mall had not married his daughter befitting his status. The girl was doused

with kerosene and set aflame six months after the marriage.

UBIQUITY OF DOWRY: ITS PREVALENCE OUTSIDE INDIA

Dowry is present in India and outside it also in many regions, communities

etc. Today, traditional wedding observances are losing ground all over the world.

However, some traditional cultures, including gypsies, many Hindus, and certain

African societies, continue to see dowries as a usual part of marriage.

Dinka perform the dowry dance

In the African nation of Sudan, Dinka tribesmen celebrate an engagement with

a party. During the dowry dance, men try to impress the family of the bride by

jumping as high as possible.

Traditionally, the family of the groom has offered cattle, often as many as 100

animals, to the family of the bride. Families of men competing for the affection of one

young woman would try to outdo each other by offering more cattle than their rivals.

However, the brutal civil war that has been raging in Sudan for the past 40 years has

so disrupted agriculture that cattle are rarely given. Instead, families pledge to give

cattle once the war is over and they are again able to do so.

Chinese observed "Three Letters and Six Etiquette"

Traditionally, Chinese courtships and weddings followed complicated

traditions, known as "Three Letters and Six Etiquette." The engagement became

official when the groom's family presented betrothal presents, also known as "tea

gifts," to the bride's family. These might have included a fruit basket, dried seafood,

tea, a roast suckling pig, tobacco, and wine. The bride's family sent a dowry-clothes,

jewelry, household decorations, linen, or kitchen utensils-to the groom's family

shortly before, or at, the wedding ceremony.

Jewish brides wore their dowries

Historically, Sephardic Jewish brides in the Middle East received gifts of

jewelry both from their own and their husband's families. The sole property of the

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bride, this jewelry was an insurance policy in the event of a divorce or hard times.

Well-off women were sometimes literally bedecked from head to toe with hair

ornaments, bracelets, rings, toe rings, and pendants of gold and precious stones.

Some jewelry served a dual purpose. Certain designs and stones were also amulets, to

ward off disease or evil. Women generally wore their wealth constantly, since it was

safer than storing it at home. In public, the jewelry was hidden behind voluminous

scarves. In fact, some anthropologists believe the custom of the veil originated

because women wanted to hide their finery from preying eyes. These customs

generally died out in the 20th century.

Eastern Europeans painted the bridal furniture

During and after the Middle Ages, young Eastern European girls in rural areas

typically received a dowry bed when she turned 12, followed by a wardrobe the next

year. Furniture was often painted with designs representing family history and

specific regions. Brides often entered marriage with enough goods to set up a

household. Grooms received livestock and tools, so they could begin farming .

Dowry in Ireland

Dowry (generally called ‗fortune‘; spré in Irish) is money or property brought

by a bride to her husband at marriage. It was an important matter in nineteenth-

century Ireland. There were new trends in marriage rates after the famine. In 1845, the

average male age at marriage was 25, the average female age 21. However, by 1914

the typical male married at 33, and the female at 28. In 1851 only 12% of women

between the ages 25 and 54 did not marry but in 1911 this had increased to 26%.

Parents now left their farms to one son, and the others had the choice of marrying a

female who inherited a farm (and this meant a financial settlement), moving to the

city or town, taking up a profession, emigrating, or joining a religious order. Heirs

tended to postpone marriage until parents died and were generally unwilling to make

dowry-less marriages that would worsen their financial position or lower their status.

It became increasingly difficult to marry outside one‘s own social class. Before the

famine it was quite usual for well-off farmers to bring in matchmakers to ensure that

their children married well; but after the Famine most families did this. The dowry

became a chief consideration when choosing a partner and farmers‘ children preferred




not to marry rather than marry beneath them. The dowry was often paid directly to the

groom or to his father, sometimes to the groom‘s siblings. It did not guarantee the

material welfare of the bride (as in many societies) and her husband‘s family might

dispose it off as it pleased, for example, to provide a dowry for her sister-in law.

Though some brides married without dowries, payment could be substantial

for others. If a girl married into a large farm, a large dowry to match it was expected.

At one time the average dowry payment was £3 an acre. The need for such large sums

helped parents to control their children‘s choice of marriage partner. Not surprisingly,

dowries were often the cause of disputes, particularly because they were sometimes

paid by installments or full payment was delayed. The law limited women‘s property

rights. Until the Married Women‘s Property Acts (1882–93) a married woman had no

right to property independent of her husband, whether acquired by gift, inheritance, or

by her own earnings, and this included her dowry. The Court of Chancery enabled

divorced women to apply for an unreturned dowry but this had no practical

application for most people.

Emigration often provided an escape from the dowry system. Most Irish

female emigrants to Australia tended to marry: only 10% of women who died in 1891

were unmarried; and they married at an earlier age than in Ireland, 24 or 25. The

improved marriage opportunities for Irish women, whose choices were restricted at

home by the dowry system, and who had a chance to better their social position

through paid employment, was a strong ‗pull factor‘ in female migration.

No land and no dowry usually meant no marriage and no prospects. Most

families dealt with this pragmatically, if harshly. One son inherited the farm; and a

daughter or two might get a dowry. The rest had to fend for themselves: remain at

home unmarried or emigrate. Even those entering a convent needed a dowry. In a land

where industrialisation was very limited outside North-East, there were few

opportunities at home. The better-off farmers and others with some funds could and

did send children into the religious life and this fitted well with Archbishop Cullen‘s

plans for the Catholic Church.

HISTORY OF DOWRY

The above analysis was made to show that dowry is not unique to Hindus in

India but has been prevailed all over the world. A dowry-the money or property a



bride brings to her husband at marriage—was common throughout much of the

ancient world, and also flourished in medieval Europe.

In many places around the world, weddings were formal occasions,

accompanied by much gift giving and ritual. The practice of dowries apparently

originated when a bride's parents gave her presents. As time went on, the dowry

developed various functions. A dowry of household goods often helped the

newlyweds set up their own home. A dowry of property or jewelry would help the

wife support herself if her husband died. Generally, the husband returned the dowry to

his in-laws if he and his wife divorced or if his wife died childless.

Sometimes, the groom's family paid for the bride, often to compensate her

family for the money spent raising her. If the bride had been a valuable worker, her

family was sometimes compensated for the loss of her economic support.

Romans, who had complicated traditions governing marriages, had specific

dowry laws. Traditional Chinese and Hindu engagements and weddings were also

governed by specific rules and considerable ritual.

The confusion that ‗dowry‘ is a concept of Hindu Law has arisen from the

concept of „Varadakshina‟ (a token of gift given to the bride-groom by the bride‘s

father) that was associated with a Hindu marriage considered as ‗Kanyadan‟ (gift of

bride given to the bride-groom‘s father by the bride‘s father). The Dharamshastras,

the ancient Hindu Law texts laid down the detailed qualifications and qualities that

the bridegroom must possess and to whom the presents in cash or kind known as

‗Varadakshina‘ were to be given. Both Kanyadan and Vardakshina were considered

as meritorious acts. Varadakshina was given voluntarily to the groom and there was

no compulsion. Obviously it was his property. The modern concept of dowry had no

resemblance to the original concept of dowry contained in Hindu Law as it originated

in ancient times. In fact it is the manifestation of the political, economic, and cultural

insignificance of woman both at her natal family and the family where she enters after

her marriage. Dowry has to be given so as to compensate this non-productive being,

even when the woman is educated and has her own job. The dowry has now

permeated even in those communities where it was not prevalent earlier; it is so to

achieve social mobility and status (Jethmlani, 1995:38-39).



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The ancient law-giver ―Manu‖ proclaimed about women that, ―where they are

honoured, there the God rejoice, and that where they are not honoured, there all rights

are fruitless.‖ The Dhamashastra nowhere mentions the giving and taking of dowry

and it is doubtful if there is sanction for burning and torture of widows. The

Mahabharat says, ―He who sells his son or gives his daughter for a price, goes to

hell.‖ The idea of Dharampatni cannot obviously imply bondage or subservience for

the wife. It means the pursuit together of a whole life (Sharma, 1998:587).

Dowry is not of very ancient origin. It assumed abnormal proportion only in

later times. Among the ancient Hindu, the custom of dowry did exist in simpler form

though under different names. This custom of giving presents at the time of marriage

prevails in India unheeded. Parents of the girl give presents to their girl. The rational

behind this presenting of gifts is the affection of the parents towards their children but

in due course of time the said custom has grown rigid and became associated with the

social status and family prestige leading to a great social evil (Ibid: 587-588).

Sheel in her classic work has analyzed that the modern form of dowry with its

forced demands for gift-giving, emanates from the colonial reinvention of a tradition

and customs were selectively appropriated and deployed. Among the eight forms of

marriage viz. Brahma, Daiva, Arsha, Prajapatya, Asura, Gandharva, Raksha and

Pisachas the first four were considered dharmya or socio-culturally acceptable, and

the latter four adharmya or against socio-cultural norms. The most important

characteristic of the dharmya forms of marriage was greater emphasis on the bride‘s

father who was required to arrange the marriage and bestow the gift of daughter

according to the prescribed rituals for each form (Sheel, 1999:40).

The significance of gift-giving as exemplified and eulogized in the ancient

scriptures is pertinent to comprehend evolving linkage of dowry with dharma

marriages. As a symbol of affection and also having definite moral and religious

merit, gift-giving came to be observed at first among the established classes. It came

to signify ‗better social and ritual status‘. The Epics and the Puranas are full of

references to large-scale gift-giving, the dowry accompanying Sita on her marriage to

Rama being a typical example of such luxurious expenditure among the propertied

classes (Ibid:41).



Yet, it was the kanyadan form of marriage to which the cultural and religious

genesis of dowry and its emergence as an institution can be traced. The most ideal of

this form of marriage, i.e. the Brahmavivah, is marked by the voluntary giving away

of daughter to an honourable man after having decked her with ornaments. This

reflects that the dowry in a palpable form was an essential part of the kanyadan form

of marriages. The obligation to bestow dowry was on the father or the guardian of the

bride (Ibid: 44).

Evidences of the historical roots of modern dowry thus can be seen in both the

kanyadan and Asura form of marriages. It was, however, more the culturally and

ideologically predominant kanyadan form, requiring the father to bestow the daughter

in marriage with gifts, property, hypergamy and caste restrictions inherent in it,

gradually gained currency. This prompted the institutionalization of dowry system

and facilitated its evolution as an all pervading part of the modern marriage system,

yet the fact that the dowry did not assume a menacing proportion in pre-modern times

can be attributed in two factors. First, the institutionalization of kanyadan form of

marriage did not mean an end to, or denial of, other form of marriages that continues

to exist till modern time, often in symbolic replica of the older custom in tribal

societies. This resulted in several options in marriage forms available and greater

variation in rites and rituals in spite of the efforts by the dharmshastra- writers for

standardization. Second, because of the fact that the kanyadan form was prescribed

especially for the hierarchically upper castes and the elites in the society, the customs

of dowry remained limited to a numerically small group. This was also the group that

could afford gift-giving because of its status. It was only when its status role began to

change or decline that dowry along with other factors also became a burden (Ibid: 44-

46).

In the late 19th and early 20

th century, dowry was not the enemy but rather an

ally of women, acting as an economic safety net in a setting where women always

married outside their natal villages (village exogamy is still almost mandatory) and

where they did not normally inherit land. Women for women invented this institution

and the resources that were given to the daughter were substantially under their direct

control. Items for a daughter‘s dowry were accumulated gradually for each daughter

by the entire village and not just by her family. The villagers shared the items in an



intricate web of reciprocal obligations; very few items were purchased, since most of

them were produced at home, bartered, or received as part of reciprocal gift exchange

among village families. The dowry was viewed by the woman‘s natal family not only

as a matter of pride but also a means of securing for her the best possible match, while

providing her with recourse in an emergency (Ram, 2003:284).

In case of Punjab, when the British encountered the practice of dowry, they

collected the opinions on the nature of the custom. None of the reports described

dowry as gifts that could be demanded by the groom‘s family. They found it as the

collection of the gifts of cloths, jewellery, household goods and cash bestowed on the

bride by family and friends at the time of wedding. Nowhere was it treated as the

prerogative of the groom and his family to demand specific consumer goods and large

sums of cash for the groom‘s business, education or mobility; it was voluntary and

depended on the pecuniary circumstances of the bride‘s parents (Ibid: 286-87).

Swidden and wet rice cultivation, with a high demand for female labour in

South India, leads to inclusion of females in property holding and being given as

dowry, giving women the social advantages of being in work force, which leads to an

(emotional?) appreciation of daughters and balanced juvenile sex ratios. The opposite

is true. In dry-field plough cultivation areas in the north, where women are excluded

from production (which is patently inaccurate) and given dowries of movable

property only (Ibid: 290-91).

The British had pioneered the permanent settlement in Bengal Presidency in

1793, its revolutionary feature was that it transformed land, in which all classes and

castes of people had varying rights and shared unequally in its produce, into private

property that could be brought, sold, or mortgaged. This created (very crudely and

quickly) a class of zamindars with immense holdings on the one hand and landless

peasants on the other. This is because the revenue payments were fixed in perpetuity

and due date was after every quarter. This date did not consider the weather

conditions.

The opening of the Western Jumna Canal in 1840-41 for example raised the

water table and made some of the contiguous eastern districts as Panipat, and Karnal

where the water logged and saline land that looked like ‗snow-covered Fields‘. For 30

years, the appeals from the distressed peasants were not heard and there was no



resurvey or reassessment of land revenue. The immigration to the fertile land and

bonded labour became routine. This eliminated the difference between the security of

rights in land that the sons inherited and the ‗movable property‘ that daughter

inherited as a dowry (Ram, 2003: 293).

The dowry became price for men as much as their inherited rights in the land

had been. If anything, a dowry was more versatile in a situation where land was

barren. The other unfortunate effect of the canal was the rise of the water and vermin-

borne diseases, such as malaria and typhoid etc. It undermined the peasants to pay

their dues at the fixed time. So, indebtedness and poverty grew in the midst of the new

prosperity. The water table also went below the surface, causing the tract of land to

become totally barren. In Punjab this desperation built pressure to exploit customary

ways of obtaining cash or gold or silver to buy land elsewhere, or to replenish a herd-

and dowry was a logical place to look.

The voluntary aspects of dowry, it‘s meaning as a mark of love for the

daughter, gradually evaporates. Dowry became dreaded payment on demand that

accompany and follow the marriage of a daughter. The social effects of this

indebtedness were enormous. It made the raising of daughters into a kind of economic

burden that never existed before the revenue settlements. Wedding expenses of both

males and females were curtailed and so could be funeral expenses, but dowry

became a lever that a woman‘s affine grasped with tenacity.

The crucial fact, however, was that neither daughter‘s weddings nor funerals

could wait; other ritual events could be postponed, particularly the son‘s betrothal or

wedding day. So it was not the cost of the wedding but the constraints of time that

matter a daughter‘s exploitable condition in early colonial times. A daughter‘s

marriage, therefore, necessitated a loan more often than a son‘s; and a possible

demand for a bigger dowry from her in-laws would occasion an even bigger loan. In

desegregating a farmer‘s debt, the amounts that pertained to a daughter‘s dowry were

seen as inexcusable improvidence. This kind of circumstantial evidence against dowry

finally indicated as the killer.

The most extravagant dowry in the history was in Mumbai when the city was

given to King Charles II, by the king of Portugal as a dowry for his sister's marriage.

The king however did not find much use of the city, and gave it on lease to the



infamous "East India Company", for a meager annual rent of 10 pounds. The

Company slowly but surely understood the importance of the city, and by the end of

their tenure, they had moulded and matured the city. Once the British Empire took

over, Mumbai had become an important trading port for them, and was of the major

revenue maker city of the nation. Even after independence, Mumbai continues to

prosper India single handed, and is more than ready to look any major city of the

world in the eye."

Srinivas (1984) regards modern dowry as the product of the forces let loose by

British rule such as monetization, education and the introduction of the organized

sector. The attempt to equate the huge sums of cash, jewellery, clothing and furniture

demanded of the bride‘s kin by the groom‘s to dakshina is to legitimize a modern

monstrosity by linking it with an ancient and respected custom, a common enough

and hoary Indian device (Basu,2005: Xvi).

‗Sanskritisation‘ as Srinivas has pointed out, ‗enabled low castes which has

acquired wealth or political power to shed their low ritual status and be included

among the high castes … while the traditional system allowed individual castes to

move up or down, the system remained unaltered. In other words, there was only

positional change, not structural change.‘ Thus the states-sponsored shift in the social,

political and economic structure of pre-modern India did not lead to the replacement

of the dowry-linked marriages by such ‗modern‘ forms which are associated with rise

in women‘s status and authority.

DOWRY AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION

Dowry generally refers to those gifts that are given with the bride to be taken

to her conjugal household at marriage. These however, constitute a part of the series

of presentations that are made on various occasions and take complex forms in

different cultures. The collection of gifts given to the bride by her parents and

different relatives including her mother-in-law was regarded as woman‘s stridhana or

her property. This is different from the modern concept of dowry.

According to M.N. Srinivas, the dowry as prevalent, especially among higher

castes today is a totally new phenomenon and ought not be mixed up with traditional

ideas such as Kanyadan and Stridhan (Srinivas, 1984:1). The gift of the bride,

kanayadan, is accompanied by a subsidiary cash, gift or dakshina and stridhan refers



to the gifts given to a woman by different relatives from either side. ‗But modern

dowry is not dakshina or stridhan‟ insists Srinivas, and this attempt to connect the

two is to ‗legitimize a modern monstrosity by linking it up with the ancient and

respected custom, a common enough and hoary Indian device‘ (Ibid:13). Leela Dube

is also of the view that, ‗stridhan , a woman‘s movable property in the form of various

kinds of gifts has been common all over India, but the woman control over it has

varied. Sadly in recent years dowry seems to have replaced the traditional stridhan‟

(Dube, 1997:41). Veronique Benei, calls this change ‗a negative perception of dowry

which is particularly perceptible amongst the urban middle classes‘, but has also

‗began to emerge amongst the lower middle classes, and in rural areas‘ (Benei,

1995:6). She notes that in Maharashtra, the gift made amongst all non-Brahmin Hindu

castes up to the 1960s and 70s called dyaj has today been replaced by a form of hunda

or dowry, given by the bride‘s family to the groom‘s (Ibid:5). In a study of Christians

in Madras City, Caplan distinguishes between dowry and dowry-stridhanam of siir.

He maintains that in general, in South India, the practice of making cash offerings to

the bride groom‘s family is a comparatively new phenomenon (Chauhan, 1999:127 ).

Among some people, though immovable property does not devolve on

women, they own immovable property or stridhan given to them at marriage. Yuko

Nishimura (1998) has shown that among the Nagarattars of Tamil Nadu, the

ownership of the stridhan is well protected so that every piece of bridal goods is

regarded as part of women‘s savings. Gifts given by relatives are all considered to

belong to her, which are to be handed down to her daughter. The other examples

given by her show a tremendous difference in the ways the dowry system is practised.

Whereas Gujarati Jains and Modh Baniyas claim that cash payment to the groom‘s

family used to be non-existent, and the stridhan used to be given mostly in kind, i.e.

jewellery from both sides, among the mercantile Jain community in Rajasthan,

stridhan as woman‘s property seems to be almost non-existent and the bride is

expected to bring a large amount of property to be handed over to her mother-in-law.

Drawing on data collected during field work in Punjab and Himachal Pradesh in

1977-78, Ursula Sharma, regards dowry as consisting of ‗movable property made

over to the husband‘s family, or to the newly married pair at or soon after marriage‘,

and in relation of dowry to women‘s position she says that, ‗as brides women have



little control over the way in which dowry is given and received‘ (Sharma, 1984:62-

63).

Nishimura gives yet another example of a different form of stridhan practice.

The komutti Chettiyars, a mercantile caste in South India, acknowledge the stridhan

to an extent, not entirely as woman‘s property, but in a different form. In-marrying

women‘s properties are jointly held under the custody of the eldest female. But she is

supposed to hand over each female member‘s property in the course of time.

Nishimura is of the view that in order to discuss modern ‗dowry‘ it is necessary to

differentiate the three situations. One, in which the ownership belongs to the bride

entirely (the Nagarattar case), second in which the bride temporarily entrusts it to the

eldest female member in the family (Komutti Chettiyar case) and third, where the

ownership is immediately transferred to the mother-in-law (Marwari case)

(Nishimura, 1998:47). However, in practise there are many more variations in the

ways in which dowry is transferred customarily and in combination with the new

practice. In the patrilineal communities of south even where dowry is given and taken,

it does not result in asymmetrical and hierarchical relationship as the kinship system

favours preferential cross-cousin and exchange marriages. In many patrilineal poor

communities of the north, dowry in this form was not prevalent and even among some

‗higher‘ castes women‘s ‗stridhan‘ was recognized and handed over to her to be

passed on either to the daughter or the daughter-in-law (Chauhan, 1999:129).

It is these reasons which makes dowry a social institution and a persisting

system, even though its evil effects are largely condemned. A social and legal

understanding of phenomenon is necessary to curb the menace of dowry-related

crimes. However, a socially legitimate institution cannot be crushed by legal measures

alone. But whereas the legal measures can assist to restrict the evil effects of dowry,

socially it can take a new dimension, for instance inheritance of property like‘

stridhan but unlike it-not necessarily related to marriage.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENTS

It is well known fact that the socio-economic background of an individual plays

important role in formation of his/her values. Aristotle, the Greek philosopher while

speaking about physics, said ―Here and elsewhere we shall not obtain the best insight

into the things until we actually see them growing from beginning‖. Therefore it is



important to know the socio-economic profile of the respondents. For this some

important variables like caste, family, age, education, occupation, income etc. of the

respondents in the sample for study are took into consideration.

Age composition: Age is an important factor for understanding the attitude of

the respondents regarding dowry and property rights. The point of view differs with

the difference in age group.

Table 2.1: Age composition of the respondents

Area

Age

Talab Tillo Muthi Domana

Female Male Total Female Male Total

18-40 years 40

(50%)

10

(50%) 50

(50%)

40

(50%)

10

(50%) 50

(50%)

Above 40 years 40

(50%)

10

(50%) 50

(50%)

40

(50%)

10

(50%) 50

(50%)

Total 80

(100%)

20

(100%)

100

(100%)

80

(100%)

20

(100%)

100

(100%)

Source: Data collected from the Field

In the Table above it is seen that in Talab Tillo and Muthi Domana, 80%

female respondents fall in the age group 18-40 years and above 40 years each while

20% male respondents fall in the age group 18-40 years and above 40 years each.

Caste composition: Caste is so firmly rooted in the Indian cultural pattern that

it is not unique to India. It plays a great importance in the demographic structure of

society. As Najma Khan (1986) has remarked, ―in spite of legal equality of

opportunity the institution of caste continues to exist as a decisive influence on the

socio-economic and political spheres‖. Below is the Table which gives caste

background of the women respondents:



Table 2.2: Caste of the respondents

Area

Caste



General 60

(75%)

17

(85%) 77

(77%)

28

(35%)

13

(65%) 41

(41%)

Scheduled Caste 12

(15%)

3

(15%) 15

(15%)

46

(57.50%)

4

(20%) 50

(50%)

Other Backward Classes 8

(10%)

0

(0%) 8

(8%)

6

(7.50%)

3

(15%) 9

(9%)

Total 80

(100%)

20

(100%)

100

(100%)

80

(100%)

20

(100%)

100

(100%)


This Table shows the sample number and percentage of respondent‘s caste. In

case of Talab Tillo, maximum respondents belong to General category i.e. 77% and

minimum belong to OBC i.e. 8% where as in Muthi Domana, maximum respondents

belong to SC category i.e. 50 % and minimum to OBC i.e.9%. This substantiates the

view that dowry is prevalent in all communities and its ramifications are visible

across different sections of society.

Marital status: The marital status also has influence on the issues like dowry

and property rights. The married have their own perspectives and on the other hand

the unmarried have their own views as they have not gone through the practical aspect

of it.

Table 2.3: Marital status of the respondents

Area

Marital

Status

Talab Tillo

Muthi Domana


Married 50

(50%)

18

(90%) 68

(68%)

60

(75%)

18

(90%) 78

(78%)

Unmarried 10

(10%)

2

(10%) 12

(12%)

1

(1%)

2

(10%) 3

(3%)

Widow/

Divorcee

20

(20%)

0

(0%) 20

(20%)

19

(9%)

0

(0%) 19

(19%)

Total 80

(80%)

20

(20%)

100

(50%)

80

(80%)

20

(20%)

100

(100%)




From the Table above it is evident that in Talab Tillo 68% respondents are

married, 12% unmarried and 20% are widow/ divorcee; where as in Muthi Domana

78% respondents are married, 3% unmarried and 19% are widow/ divorcee. So

maximum are married and minimum are unmarried respondents.

Education: Education is one of the key socio-economic progress meter of

modern society and important aspect of Indian society. It has been accepted that

educational institutions are the first place where people come together in pursuit of

common interest. It is a way that opens the doors of life, which is essentially social in

character. The educational level of people is an important indicator for understanding

their social status. As per latest Indian Population Census 2011, India's literacy rate

stands at 74.04%, an increase of 9.2% from the last decade. The literacy rate of

Jammu and Kashmir has increased to 13.22% from past, in 2001 it was 55.52% and in

2011 it is 68.74%. If the people are literate they can understand their rights better.

Table 2.4: Educational level of the respondents


Area

Education



Illiterate 8

(10%)

1

(5%)

9

(9%)

32

(40%)

3

(15%)

35

(%)

Primary level 4

(5%)

0

(0%)

4

(4%)

11

(13.75%)

3

(15%)

14

(14%)

6-10th

30

(37.50%)

5

(25%)

35

(35%)

30

(37.50%)

11

(55%)

41

(41%)

10+2 14

(17.50%)

5

(25%)

19

(19%)

4

(5%)

0

(0%)

4

(4%)

Graduation 14

(17.50%)

5

(25%)

19

(19%)

3

(3.75%)

2

(10%)

5

(5%)

PG 7

(8.75%)

1

(5%)

8

(8%)

0

(0%)

1

(5%)

1

(1%)

Professional 3

(3.75%)

3

(15%)

6

(6%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

Total 80

(100%)

20

(100%)

100

(100%)

80

(100%)

20

(100%)

100

(100%)



Thus it is clear from the Table 2.4 that in case of Talab Tillo 35% respondents

fall in the category of attaining education from 6-10th class and 6% respondents have

some sort of professional qualification. On the other hand in Muthi Domana 41%

respondents fall in the category of 6-10th

and only 1% respondent is post graduate. As

far as the illiteracy is concerned in Muthi Domana respondents are more illiterate i.e.

35% than in Talab Tillo which is 9%, the former being rural area.

Income: Income clearly indicates the economic status of the respondents. It

reflects the amount of dowry they can give in their daughters‘ marriage as well as

their capability to give her property rights also. The Table below reflects the income

of the respondents:

Table 2.5: Monthly income of the family of respondents

Area

Monthly income (`)


Less than 3,000 18 (18%) 46 (46%)

3,000-10,000 40 (40%) 29 (29%)

10,000-30,000 20 (20%) 25 (25%)

30,000-50,000 12 (12%) 0 (0%)

50,000-1,00000 7 (7%) 0 (0%)

Above 1,00000 3 (3%) 0 (0%)

Total 100 (100%) 100 (100%)


From the Table it is clear that maximum respondents i.e. 40% fall in the

category of income group ` 3,000-10,000 and minimum respondents i.e. 3% have

income above ` 1,00000 per month. In Muthi Domana, maximum respondents i.e.

46% fall in the category of income group ` 3,000-10,000 and minimum respondents

i.e. 25% have income from ` 10,000-30,000 per month. So it can be analysed that the

respondents of Muthi Domana are poorer than the respondents of Talab Tillo.



Size of the family: Family is the basic institution of the society, through

which an individual is socialized. The Sociology of the family examines the family, as

an institution and a unit of socialisation, through various sociological perspectives,

particularly with regard to the relationship between the nuclear family and industrial

capitalism, and the distinct gender roles and concepts of childhood which arose with

it. The family in which one is living helps to formulate the ideas and perceptions of an

individual. Size of the family indicates the basic necessities provided to the children

by their parents as smaller is the size more necessities of life are provided.

Table 2.6: Family size of the respondents

Area

Family size

(No. of persons) Talab Tillo Muthi Domana

2-4 51 (51%) 43 (43%)

5-7 39 (39%) 49 (49%)

8-10 9 (9%) 4 (4%)

11-14 1 (1%) 4 (4%)

Total 100 (100%) 100 (100%)


It is seen from the above Table that in Talab Tillo 51% respondents have

family size 2-4 and 1% respondent have 11-14. In case of Muthi Domana 49%

respondents have family size 5-7 and 4% respondents have 11-14. This indicates the

family size of Muthi Domana is more than that of Talab Tillo.

Occupation: Occupation means an activity which serves the purpose to earn

livelihood of a person. Occupational status is accompanied with academic

background. It in one way or the other influences the economic and social status of a

person. As it is related with the status so it one is concerned with the give and take of

dowry or property to his/her girl child. The following Table shows distribution of

respondents on the basis of occupation:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Family

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institution

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialisation

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sociology

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_family

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industry

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capitalism

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gender_roles

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Childhood



Table 2.7: Occupation of the respondents


It is evident from this Table that in Talab Tillo and Muthi Domana majority of

the females are house wives i.e.53.75% in former and 81.25% in the latter whereas

majority of males 16.25% in former have their own business and 30% each are

businessmen and wage earner.

In all it can be concluded from the above tables that the differences in the two

localities i.e. Talab Tillo and Muthi Domana reflect differences of urban and rural

areas. Comparatively with rural area goes more illiteracy, large family size, more

household work etc. and in urban area, the literacy level is higher, family size is lower

and more women are engaged in non-agricultural occupations. To what extent the

rural life or urbanity of the place determines taking and giving of dowry and dowry

related violence is explored in this study.

DOWRY: PRESTIGE AND PREJUDICE

Dowry is seen as prestige in some aspects and in some other it is viewed as a

prejudice. It may cement favourable community ties helpful for the economic

expansion of both families. Tambiah (1989) views that the dowry aims at increasing

the resources and status of the groom‘s joint family, from which the couple and

thence the woman may ultimately derive a share. This focus on the groom‘s family:

‗at the wedding, both families‘ expenses seem to be directed towards increasing assets

Area

Occupation



Service 11

(13.75%)

5

(25%)

16

(16%)

6

(7.50%)

4

(20%)

10

(10%)

Business 13

(16.25%)

13

(65%)

26

(26%)

4

(5%)

6

(30%)

10

(10%)

Wage earner 7

(8.75%)

2

(10%) 9

(9%)

0

(0%)

6

(30%) 6

(6%)

House wife 43

(53.75%)

0

(0%)

43

(43%)

65

(81.25%)

1

(5%)

66

(66%)

Student

6

(7.50%)

0

(0%)

6

(6%)

3

(3.75%)

1

(5%)

4

(4%)

Agriculture 0(0%) 0

(0%) 0

(0%)

2

(2.50%)

2

(10%) 4

(4%)

Total

80

(100%)

20

(100%)

100

(100%)

80

(100%)

20

(100%)

100

(100%)



(through gifts) and status (through hospitality) of groom‘s family, which is supposed

to be the ‗joint family‘ into which the wife merges, and whose continued prosperity

makes it less likely that the daughter will turn to the natal family for help or property

share later. Simultaneously, the bride‘s family also enhances its own position/ status

by displaying due propriety in ceremonies and prestations‘ (Basu, 2005: Xiv).

In case of hypergamy its major consequence is status asymmetry between

affinal groups, the boy‘s kin being higher than the girl‘s kin. The latter improve their

status through marriage. Marriott (1955), in his study of village Kishan Garhi in U.P

is of the view that to secure good treatment of a girl, the lavish hospitality must be

offered and gifts should be made to her husband‘s family throughout life. One quarter

of all milk animals are obtained as gifts from marital relatives and about one quarter

of all debt is incurred to fulfill marriage demands.

The Status asymmetry between affinal groups is however absent in South

(except Kerala). Marriages are basically isogamous here and this is further reinforced

by the preference for a cross cousin, and cross uncle and niece, marriages. The custom

of brideprice, which was universal in the South Indian castes, resulted in, a tilt in

favour of the brides kin as far as the relations between the affines are concerned. In a

study by Srinivas of two Okkaliga kin-groups in Rampura in Karnataka, he found that

in 1948 in the wedding negotiations the bride‘s kin were listing their demands about

sarees and jewellery, which the groom‘s parents had to provide during the marriage to

them. Now in the South also the dowry has introduced status asymmetry between

affinal groups like in the North.

If a newly married girl has brought along sufficient dowry, she is treated well

without difference in her husband‘s house. On the other hand, if she has brought a

minimum dowry, she is treated differently. These principles seems in line with

Tambiah‘s (1989) contention that in North Indian weddings, prestations from the

brides‘ families add to the resources of the joint family that the bride is joining, from

which the conjugal units gets a share only if the joint family is split. In contrast to the

European model where the dowry and trousseau build up the resources base of the

couple, here the groom‘s entire household/family is the focus of gift giving. It is seen

that in the wedding, both families‘ expenses seem to be directed toward increasing the

assets (through gifts) and status (through hospitality) of the groom‘s family, which is



supposed to be the ―joint‖ family into which the bride merges, and whose continued

prosperity makes it less likely that the daughter will turn to the natal family for later

help or property shares. Simultaneously, the bride‘s family also enhances its own

position/status by displaying due propriety in ceremonies and prestations (Basu,

1999:96).

Goody and Tambiah (1973), characterized dowry as the woman‘s equitable

share of property that was given to her at marriage, over which she had some measure

of control, and which often served as a starting economic base for the couple.

Numerous scholars question the relevance of this definition in the North Indian

context. Tambiah points to evidence such as the difference in dowries between sisters

and variations according to the status of the groom. Tambiah‘s revised concept is that

the Indian model of dowry may best be visualized as ―double transmission‖ (not

equal) of property through sons and daughters, with the woman‘s dowry/property

share contributing to the joint family unit and coming to the conjugal unit only if joint

family resources are divided. Furthermore, such dowry may be viewed as the means

by which the groom‘s family acquires upward socioeconomic mobility (lbid: 255).

Reasons for Dowry

In Indian society, so much importance is placed in getting a girl married that

parents of unmarried girl are willing to meet any demand in order to get their daughter

married. For a woman, marriage is a passport to even such a basic thing as being

acknowledged as worthy individual. In this study the respondents were asked about

their views regarding the various reasons for persistence of dowry. Their responses

are given in the Table below:



Table 2.8: Reasons for Dowry

Area

Sex Reasons for Dowry

To

increase

status

Custom To

marry

in rich

family

A way of

taking

property

To live

happily

Not

brought/

given

Total

Talab

Tillo

F 1

(1.25%)

48

(60%)

0

(0%)

2

(2.5%)

7

(8.75%)

22

(27.50%)

80

(100%)

M 0

(0%)

8

(10%)

0

(0%)

1

(5%)

3

(15%)

8

(40%)

20

(100%)

Total 1

(1%)

56

(56%)

0

(0%)

3

(3%)

10

(10%)

30

(30%)

100

(100%)

Muthi

Domana

F 2

(2.5%)

63

(78.75%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

8

(10%)

7

(8.75%)

80

(100%)

M 0

(0%)

13

(65%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

4

(20%)

3

(15%)

20

(100%)

Total 2

(2%)

76

(76%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

12

(12%)

10

(10%)

100

(100%)


Note: Here, F stands for females and M stands for males

Out of 100 respondents in Talab Tillo i.e. 40 men and 60 women, 1 (1.25%)

women and 0% men said that dowry increases status of the girl‘s parents, 48 (60%)

women and 8 (10%) men said that dowry is a custom, no woman and man think the

reason for dowry is to marry girl in a rich family, 2 (2.25%) women and 1 (5%) man

believe dowry is a way of taking property, 7 (8.75%) women and 3 (15%) men said

that dowry is given to live happily and 22 (27.50%) women and 8 (40%) men

married dowryless.

Out of 100 respondents in Muthi Domana i.e. 40 men and 60 women, 2 (2.5%)

women and 0% men said that dowry increases status of the girl‘s parents, 63 (78.75%)

women and 13 (65%) men said that dowry is a custom, no woman or man think the

reason for dowry is to marry girl in a rich family and dowry is a way of taking

property, 8 (10%) women and 4 (20%) men said that dowry is given to live happily

and 7 (8.75%) women and 3 (15%) men married dowryless.

From this Table it is extracted that maximum respondents i.e. 56% in Talab

Tillo and 76% in Muthi Domana believe that dowry is persisting because it is a

custom in their society. But some respondents i.e. 1% in Talab Tillo and 2% in Muthi

Domana think that dowry enhances the status of the women in her in-laws‘ home.



How people justify dowry

Some of the commonly expressed justifications for dowry run as follows:

Since daughters in most cases are disinherited by their parents after marriage, their

main security lies in strengthening their economic rights in their husband's family.

However, if they go 'empty-handed' to their husband's home, how can they expect that

they will be treated as equal partners? The dowry is, therefore, in part an 'investment'

made by parents to secure a share for their daughter in her husband's family property.

Of all these respondents, 2 respondents in the present study said so.

The respondents believe that when women go as new brides, their in-laws are

also expected to provide them with expensive new clothes and jewelry. How can gift

giving be one-way? Why should women's parents not give gifts to their husband's

relatives as a goodwill gesture when the bride is expected to become a claimant in the

husband's income and property?

On the issue of marital violence and abuse due to dowry demands many have

responded with the counter question: "Are you suggesting that women get beaten,

abused and murdered only in India, and that too only among communities that give

dowry? Don't women in America, Europe, Australia, the Philippines, and Africa also

get beaten and killed, even though in these countries dowry giving is not an issue?"

Most women are in favour of a reasonable amount of dowry being given provided the

groom's family does not put undue pressure on her natal family with additional

extortionate demands.

The respondents said that when a young woman enters a new family, she feels

diffident to ask for basic things she needs for her daily use. If she goes to her marital

home without anything to call her own, her dependence on her in-laws and husband

increases, unless she has a reasonable income of her own, which most women do not?

Therefore, all the household goods and clothes parents provide their daughters are

supposed to help them feel that they have something to call their own in their new

home.

In the present research when the respondents were asked about their wish to

give and take dowry when their marriage took/take place, most of them i.e. 60% in

Talab Tillo and 65% in Muthi Domana said, they wanted/want dowry. The details of

their desire for/against dowry are given in the Table below:



Table 2.9: Respondents’ desire of giving/taking dowry in their marriage D

esir

e of

Giv

ing a

nd

T

ak

ing

Do

wry

Desire Reasons

Area


Females Males Total Females Males Total

Yes

Custom

35

(43.75%)

4

(20%)

39

(39%)

40

(50%)

6

(30%)

46

(46%)

Parents

gave/took

25

(31.25%)

2

(10%)

27

(27%)

14

(17.5%)

5

(25%)

19

(16%)

Total

60

(75%)

6

(30%)

66

(66%)

54

(67.5%)

11

(55%)

65

(65%)

No

No need

0

(0%)

8

(40%)

8

(8%)

20

(25%)

5

(25%)

25

(25%)

Only girl is

required

10

(12.5%)

5

(25%)

15

(15%)

0

(0%)

2

(10%)

2

(2%)

Poverty of

givers

7

(8.75%)

0

(0%)

7

(7%)

2

(2.5%)

2

(10%)

4

(4%)

Total

17

(21%)

13

(65%)

30

(30%)

22

(27.5%)

9

(45%)

31

(31%)

No, s

till

gave Parents

gave/took

1

(1.25%)

1

(5%)

2

(2%)

2

(2.5%)

0

(0%)

2

(2%)

Custom

2

(2.5%)

0

(0%)

2

(2%)

2

(2.5%)

0

(0%)

2

(2%)

Total 3

(3.75%)

1

(5%)

4

(4%)

4

(5%)

0

(0%) 4

(4%)

Grand Total

80

(100%)

20

(100%)

100

(100%)

80

(100%)

20

(100%)

100

(100%)


The Table 2.9 shows the desire of respondents in giving/taking dowry in their

marriage. In Talab Tillo 66% respondents and in Muthi-Domana 65% respondents

said they want/wanted to give/take dowry in their marriage, out of which 35(43.75%)

females and 4(20%) males in Talab Tillo and 40(50%) females and 6(30%) males in

Muthi Domana regard that dowry is a custom; 25(31.25%) females and 2(10%) males

in Talab Tillo and 14(17.5%) females and 5(25%) males in Muthi Domana said their

parents gave/took dowry in their marriage so they also gave/took. In Talab Tillo 30%

respondents and in Muthi–Domana 31% respondents said they do/did not

want/wanted dowry in their marriage, out of which none female and 8(40%) males in

Talab Tillo and 20(25%) females and 5(25%) males in Muthi Domana believe that

there is no need of dowry to them; 10(12.5%) females and 5(25%) males in Talab

Tillo and no female and 2(10%) males in Muthi Domana said only girl is required;



7(8.75%) females and no male in Talab Tillo and 2(2.5%) females and 2(10%) males

in Muthi Domana said their in-laws were poor so they did not take dowry. 4%

respondents in Talab Tillo and Muthi–Domana each said they did not want dowry in

their marriage but still they gave/took it, out of which 1(1.25%) female and 1(5%)

male in Talab Tillo and 2(2.5%) females and no male in Muthi Domana said they

gave/took due to the will of their parents; 2(2.5%) females and no male in Talab Tillo

and 2(2.5%) females and no male in Muthi Domana said they gave as it is a custom so

they were helpless.

Thus from this Table it is analysed that the respondents wanted to give/take

dowry in their marriage due to various reasons. So, more respondents were/are

interested in justifying the trend of dowry.

The dowry culture is increasing day by day as the rich are giving more dowry

to their daughters and spending lavishly in their marriages. In a study by Madhu

Kishwar, a feminist and editor of journal ‗Manushi‟, she put forth that the rapid

upward mobility made possible due to opening of new opportunities for urban

educated middle and upper class men, whose earning potential has increased

exponentially, has meant that such grooms are avidly sought after. For most women

upward mobility comes through the man they marry rather than their own

employment. Most families try getting higher status grooms in the belief that their

daughters will find it easier to adjust in such families than if they were to marry below

their status, apart from the benefits accruing in the long run to the girl's family by

forging an alliance with a well-connected kinship network; the demand for such

upwardly mobile men is far in excess of supply (Kishwar, 2005).

There is no escaping of the fact that ugly tussles are becoming commonplace

over dowry payments. An important reason for growing cash demands and expensive

gifts for the groom's family is that parents see this as their main, if not the only

chance, to be compensated for the big bonanza they are offering the bride in the form

of an earning son. They feel they should be recompensed for their investment in his

education and upbringing since after marriage his wife may influence him not to

support his own parents. As long as joint families were the norm and most parents

could count on their sons to support them in old age and treat their income as

belonging to a common pool, dowry demands were not as much of an issue. However,



with increasing breakdown of joint families and reluctance of many women to stay

with in-laws, the insecurity of parents in many families takes the form of trying to

extract what they can from the bride's family at the time of their son's marriage.

An important reason for the increase in domestic conflicts, rising dowry

demands and the transformation of dowry from stridhan to groom price is that our

legal enactments, administrative interventions and state policies are forcing the

nuclearisation of families without due attention to the fact that the only or main old

age security for the vast majority of people in India are their children, especially their

sons. Parents invest all they can in their son's education and career building in the

hope and expectation that sons will get jobs or other forms of earning opportunities

bringing about upward mobility for the whole family. Sons are expected to contribute

to the education and marriage costs of younger siblings as well as take care of parents

in their old age. In societies where there is near total absence of any other form of

social or old age security, this is an understandable expectation.

Daughter, a source of anxiety and affection

In his article, ‗Dowry is an evil to be eradicated anyhow‘ Asgar Ali, wrote

―The parents of the groom openly specify the amount and items of dowry they want

from the bride‘s family. No qualms or no clemency is shown to the bride‘s parents in

accepting rather extorting dowry. There is an element of truth that a father of two or

more girls is considered as unlucky, over loaded and pitiable man because such

persons often find themselves economically smashed and mentally wrecked in the

end. Dowry system has made the lives of millions of persons full of care and drudgery

and relegated the girl child to a much inferior position to her male counterpart‖

(Greater Kashmir, 2007). Surely the daughter in early times, as even now, is a source

of anxiety, in as much as she is to be given away in marriage. Her future and

happiness depends entirely on the character and ability of her future husband. It is a

great worry for the parents to find a suitable husband, obviously a more difficult task

in an age when the daughter too may have had a voice in the matter.

The dowry continues to be a symbol of the devaluation of the woman in Indian

society is also evident from the celebratory tone of son-preference rituals. There are

dangers of the propagation of such rituals today, when aggressive Hindutva seeks to

include the practice of Hindu rituals in the educational curriculum. Many of these



rituals and so-called traditions have a strong gender bias and they also 'emphasize son

preference'. There are certain rituals when the husband and wife pray for the birth of a

son. The birth of a son is celebrated because it cancels all the debts of the father and

takes him straight to heaven. Similar concern and care for the mother's entry into

heaven are, of course, not visible in any of these rituals. Such is the force of these

beliefs that, even in contemporary times, it is believed that the death of an ox is a

misfortune while that of a girl brings good luck! For example, from the Vedas,

Shastras and the sayings of important sages, which are all used to justify retrogressive

beliefs and practices (Agnihotri, 2003:310-311).

It could also be argued that dowry offers itself as a singularly unique example

to describe what Marx, in the course of writing on commodity fetishism, referred to as

the commercialization and commoditization of social relations. The

'commercialization' of social relations within India, as it moves at a fast pace towards

becoming a modern capitalist economy, exemplifies what Marx observed was the

peculiarity of capitalism: the establishment of material relations between human

beings and social relations between material objects. (Ibid: 317). It can be analysed in

a study by Lakshmi, ―On Kidneys and Dowry‖ where she puts forth that, a young

cousin of the family, aged 14, needed a kidney transplant. The donor whose blood and

tissue group matched with hers was a supervisor in a factory. His monthly income

was ` 2,000. Asked why he wanted to donate a kidney, he said that he had three

daughters and that he needed money for their dowry. He wanted ` 10,000 deposited in

the bank in each of his daughter‘s names. The daughters were 6, 4 and 3 years old. He

said that the money in the bank will take care of their dowry when they grow up. On

the day of the operation, when his kidney was removed, one of the attendants came to

the waiting room and told his wife, ―it has been removed successfully‖. Removed?

Removed?‖ She asked in a choking voice, turned towards the wall, put one end of her

saree over her face and began to weep quietly. That is what dowry means to most

(Lakshmi, 2005:291). Thus a father starts thinking of arranging dowry at a very early

age of her daughter even to the extent by selling his own body parts.

At times the girls are first harassed and then killed by their in-laws. In Jammu

district, such a case was in news, “In Bishnah in-laws killed a 25 years old Manjeet

Kumari w/o Kishore Kumar for the want of dowry. The girl went to her parental



house earlier but was brought back by the village Numberdar, Panch and husband.

After some days she got killed (Amar Ujala, 15.06.2007). When such cases take place

then the people get scared in case the same thing will happen with their daughters

then what they will do? People want this menace of dowry should not be present in

the society. When asked from the respondents about their support to the dowry

system, maximum number of them said that they do not support it which can be seen

from the Table below:

Table 2.10: View of respondents regarding supporting dowry

Yes

Reasons

Talab Tillo Muthi-Domana

Females

(%)

Males

(%)

Total

(%)

Females

(%)

Males

(%)

Total

(%)

Girl uses dowry 17

(21.25%)

2

(10%) 19

(19%)

25

(31.25%)

2

(10%) 27

(27%)

Dowry is symbol of

parents’ love

12

(15%)

1

(5%) 13

(13%)

1

(1.25%)

0

(0%) 1

(1%)

Demand is dowry 0

(0%)

0

(0%) 0

(0%)

0

(0%)

1

(5%) 1

(1%)

One’s will 0

(0%)

1

(5%)

1

(1%)

1

(1.25%)

1

(5%)

2

(2%)

Custom 3

(3.7%)

0

(0%)

3

(3%)

5

(6.25%)

0

(0%)

5

(5%)

Limited dowry 0

(0%)

1

(5%)

19

(19%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

Form of property 2

(2.50%)

1

(5%)

3

(3%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

Total 34

(42.50%)

6

(30%)

40

(40%)

32

(40%)

4

(20%)

36

(36%)

No

Dowry leads to greed 2

(2.50%)

3

(15%) 5

(5%)

0

(0%)

2

(10%) 2

(2%)

Poor suffer 29

(36.25%)

0

(0%)

29

(29%)

26

(32.50%)

10

(50%) 36

(36%)

Middle class suffers 7

(8.75%)

0

(0%) 7

(7%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%) 0

(0%)

Girl should be good 2

(2.50%)

2

(10%) 4

(4%)

4

(5%)

4

(20%) 8

(8%)

Girl should be qualified 0

(0%)

1

(5%) 1

(1%)

4

(5%)

0

(0%) 4

(4%)

Leads to problem in

family having more girl

1

(1.2%)

0

(0%) 1

(1%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%) 0

(0%)

Burden on parents 1

(1.25%)

0

(0%) 1

(1%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%) 0

(0%)

Leads to harassments 2

(2.50%)

0

(0%)

2

(2%)

5

(6.25%)

0

(0%)

5

(5%)

Dowry is a disease 0

(0%)

4

(20%)

4

(4%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

Boys should give dowry 1

(1.25%)

1

(5%)

2

(2%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)



Boys should make

household goods

0

(0%)

3

(15%)

3

(3%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

Total 45

(56.25%)

14

(70%)

59

(59%)

39

(48.75%)

16

(80%)

55

(55%)

Bo

th

Rich should give and not

poor

1

(1.25%)

0

(0%) 1

(1%)

9

(11.25%)

0

(0%) 9

(9%)

Total 1

(1.25%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

9

(11.2%)

0

(0%)

9

(9%)

Grand Total 80

(100%)

20

(100%)

100

(100%)

80

(100%)

20

(100%)

100

(100%)


The Table 2.10 throws light on the view of the male and female respondents

regarding dowry. 40% respondents in Talab Tillo and 20% in Muthi Domana support

dowry, out of which in Talab Tillo, 17 (21.25%) females and 2 (10%) males and in

Muthi Domana 25 (31.25%) females and 2 (10%) males said girl uses dowry; 12

(15%) females and 1 (5%) males in Talab Tillo and in Muthi Domana 1 (5%) females

and no male believe dowry is the symbol of parents‘ love towards girl; no one in

Talab Tillo and only 1 (5%) male in Muthi Domana is of view that only demand of

items is considered as dowry; no female and 1 (5%) in Talab Tillo and only 1 (5%)

female and male each in Muthi Domana are of view that dowry is given according to

the will of the parents; 3 (3.75%) females and no male in Talab Tillo and in Muthi

Domana 5 (6.25%) females and no male believe dowry is custom; no female and 1

(5%) male in Talab Tillo and no one in Muthi Domana support limited dowry only; 2

(2.50%) females and 1 (5%) male in Talab Tillo and no one in Muthi Domana

believe that dowry is a form of property.

In all 59% respondents in Talab Tillo and 80% in Muthi Domana do not

support dowry out of which in Talab Tillo, 2 (2.50%) females and 3 (15%) males and

in Muthi Domana no female and 2 (10%) males said dowry leads to greed; 29

(36.25%) females and no male in Talab Tillo and in Muthi Domana 26 (32.50%)

females and 10 (50%) males believe poor suffer while giving dowry; only 7 (8.75%)

females and no one else in Talab and in Muthi Domana said middle class suffers in

giving dowry; 2 (2.50%) females and 2 (10%) males in Talab Tillo and in Muthi

Domana 4 (5%) females and 4 (20%) males believe that girl should be good; no

female and 1 (5%) male in Talab Tillo and in Muthi Domana 4 (5%) females and

0(0%) male believe that girl should be qualified; except 1 (1.25%) female in Talab

Tillo and no one else in Muthi Domana think dowry leads to problem in the family



having more girls; except 1 (1.25%) female in Talab Tillo and no one else in Muthi

Domana view dowry is burden on parents; 2 (2.50%) females and no male in Talab

Tillo and in Muthi Domana 5 (6.25%) females and 0 (0%) male believe dowry as a

disease; except 1 (1.25%) female in Talab Tillo and no one else in Muthi Domana

said that boys should give dowry; except 3 (15%) males in Talab Tillo and no one else

in Muthi Domana said boys should make household goods.

1% respondent in Talab Tillo and 11.25% in Muthi Domana believe both in

supporting and not supporting dowry out of which in Talab Tillo, 1 (1.25%) female

and no male and in Muthi Domana 9 (11.25%) females and 0 (0%) male believe rich

should give dowry and not poor.

Thus it is analysed from this Table that majority of the respondents do not

support dowry. More people in Talab Tillo which is an urban area do not support than

people in the rural area of Muthi Domana. They say that this evil should be eradicated

from the society but they are still helpless as the parents of the girl have no other

option than to give in their daughters‘ marriage because of such custom.

In a study, ‗The Tangled Tale of Twisting a Safety Net into a Noose‟ (2005) by

Veena Oldenburg, she contends that dowry among Punjabis had commonly

functioned as a property fund for women, ‗one of few indigenous, women-centered

institutions in an overwhelming patriarchal and agrarian society‘, put together by the

bride‘s female relatives over numerous years, paid for through a complex system of

community reciprocity called as neonda. The colonial concerns about the rising

dowry payments, infanticide linked to the Hindu concerns about not being able to pay

dowry, and the attempt to control marriage expenses to diminish the impoverishment

attributed to dowry, were all scapegoating attempts that caste Hindu culture as a

problem and justified colonial paternalist domination. Oldenburg not only refutes the

evidence that infanticide was a high-caste Hindu problem, and that dowry was

suddenly extortionate, but turns the culpability back upon the colonial state and

argues that the growing impoverishment had a far greater correlation with colonial

land and revenue policies and the suppression of modern industry, and increasing son-

preference correlated highly with colonial construction of males as property owners

and the creation of lucrative wage jobs in military (Basu, 2005: xvii-xviii).



Major H.B. Edwardes, the Deputy Commissioner of Jullundur, had made it his

business to explore the custom of dowry payments in his now familiar report on

female infanticide. After setting out with a very different premise, he had been forced

to conclude that, with the exception of the Khatris of Lahore, the custom of dowry

among upper-caste Hindus did not appear to be the cause for alarm it was elsewhere

in the Indian empire, although wedding expenses certainly were. The most gratifying

portion of his report for him was his ability to persuade the people of Jullundur and

Rahon to submit voluntarily a schedule of expenses ―that was drawn by the people

themselves in their own homes, in consultation with the females of their own families,

stimulated by the opportunities afforded them by this enquiry‖. This is probably the

first written account of marriage expenses and dowry compiled in the colonial period

in the Punjab, and perhaps represented the only time that women‘s knowledge of such

matters was incorporated into a colonial report (Oldenburg, 2005: 228).

The expenses are noted under five heads, with the expenditure on the first or

the ―lugun‖ (or lagan, literally auspicious date), milni, the occasion when the

bridegroom‘s procession arrives at the house and the two fathers embrace. The third

head of expenditure is the fee of the Brahmin priest, fourth is the ―Meeta bhat; for two

days all sorts of sweetmeats and fruits mixed up together are set before the assembly,

and ―Duheys (dahej); or as it is called in the Punjab the ‗Khut‘. This is one-fourth or

one-fifth more than the ‗Lugun‘: and consists of gifts of all house-hold requisites,

from water vessels down to a sweeper‘s broom‖. The average expense for a

daughter‘s wedding would therefore have been within five hundred rupees, a not

inconsiderable amount (Ibid: 228). The wedding, however, was another matter; the

bride‘s father felt his honour to be at stake and was ruining himself on this occasion.

Thus daughters became family calamities and more than one or two were seldom

allowed to live.

The Khatris, the educated and wealthier section of the population who had

traditionally served the government and the army as officers, and who were also

commonly involved in farming, trade, and even shop keeping and money lending

operations. They were also the community widely accused of committing infanticide

in all districts of the Punjab. This urges to probe whether a daughter‘s wedding

entailed expenses ―ruinous‖ enough to warrant her elimination in infancy. Were sons



so obviously preferred because their weddings cost less? Is this the past we need in

order to understand the present.

Edwardes declares that the practice of dowry was bound by rules of honour

and mutual respect between bridetakers and bridegivers in the Punjab of 1850s. This

recognition that Punjabi dowry giving did not induce infanticide is a remarkable

internal contradiction of the official case. Is that why this shift is noticed everywhere

today, along with the change from bride-price to dowry. What gained uniform

acceptance as the cause for the destruction of infant daughters was the high cost of

what a daughter must be given (or what may be demanded) at the time of marriage,

and in the annual cycle of festivals and auspicious occasions for the rest of her

parents‘ live (Oldenburg, 2005: 230- 231)?

The specific agreements signed by the representatives of a wide range of

castes and clans-from the Bedis of Dera Baba Nanak, the Rajput princes of Kangra

and other hill districts, and the Khatris and Brahmins of a dozen districts in joint

agreements with the urban and rural Muslims of Lahore-suggest that no community

tried to refute the blanket accusation that wedding expenses and dowry were among

the chief causes of infanticide. Rather, they promised to respect the new sumptuary

regulations they had expressly gathered to draw up. All of the agreements stipulated

that marriage expenses-separated into dowry and wedding celebrations-must be

reduced and regulated, but some of the agreements were clearly more negotiated than

others. They ranged from curiously perfunctory and spare to highly detailed. Some

groups were content to sign agreements that mentioned only the prescribed maximum

spending limits, without differentiated allocations imposed on high, middle, and lower

classes (Ibid: 232).

The (notorious) Bedis, who had made of Major Edwardes a minor hero and

erudite social scientists for the establishment, had already gathered under his auspices

at Jullundur and produced the exemplary agreement that was upheld as a model in

Amritsar. Higher Kahtri tribes agreed to abandon their hypergamous ways and caste

pride by pledging to intermarry with the lower ranks of Khatris, including the lowest

Bhunjaees. The ceilings adopted for expenses for four classes of weddings were ` 500

for the first class, ` 200 for the second, ` 125 for the third, and a single rupee for the

fourth (Ibid: 232- 233).



Thus it has shown how the radical restructuring of land ownership and the

revenue system soon after the British tookover, the accelerated monetization of the

agrarian economy, urban growth, and emergent middle-class values all worked to

transform the dowry system itself.

On the other hand daughters are also source of affection, the life of daughters

and even adopted daughters at their parental homes proves that they were brought up

with great care, and were never to be displaced. Some fathers feel equal affection for

the sons and daughters. The example of Devayani indicates that sometimes fathers

were so fond of their daughters that they even spoilt them. Such was the power of

Devayani over her father and the tenderness felt by him for her that the Devas instruct

Kacha to please her in order to gain the knowledge of Sanjivini from Sukracharya and

he acts accordingly.

In some cases when the girl says no dowry will be given in her marriage to the

groom‘s side then her parents feel relieved. In this research, Rita and her friend Smita

were against dowry. They thought they will not marry with a person if they have to

take dowry in his home. Both friends thought to live together but not give dowry. But

fortunately Rita‟s husband also didn‘t like that his wife should bring dowry, so she

married him. Rita believes as she is an accountant she is herself a dowry because she

is earning handsome amount from her job. Thus daughter is regarded as a source of

happiness if she gets a good human being as her husband who respects her and not the

materialistic goods which she will bring as dowry.

On the other hand, the parents feel happy to have a daughter in case of

dowryless marriage of her. At this point of time she is regarded equal to their sons. In

the present study 40 dowryless marriages took place, out of which 30 were in Talab

Tillo and 10 in Muthi Domana. The reasons for it are shown in the graph and its

related Table below:



Figure 2.1: Graph showing reasons for dowry less marriage

Table 2.11: Reasons for dowry less marriage


The Figure 2.11 shows the reasons for dowry less marriage by the respondents

as in Talab Tillo 12 respondents and in Muthi Domana 3 respondents were unmarried,

the in-laws of 8 respondents in Talab Tillo and 4 respondents in Muthi Domana

refused to take dowry, 6 respondents in Talab Tillo and 3 respondents in Muthi

Domana did dowry less marriage due to poverty, in 3 cases in Talab Tillo and no

such case in Muthi Domana the boy denied to take dowry and only 1 such case in

Talab Tillo only where the girl refused to give dowry but this was a love marriage. So

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Unmarried In-laws refused Poverty Boy denied Girl denied


Reasons for dowry less marriage Talab Tillo Muthi-Domana

Unmarried 12 3

In-laws refused 8 4

Poverty 6 3

Boy denied 3 -

Girl denied 1 -

Total 30 10



in Talab Tillo 30 respondents and in Muthi Domana 10 respondents did dowry less

marriage. It is analysed that mostly people did dowry less marriages because of

poverty even at times the in-laws of the girl refused to take dowry as they thought

girls‘ parents to be too poor to give it.

On being asked the parents of these girls said they were very happy when

their daughters were married without any dowry, it is just like the marriage of a son

when there is no tension to arrange huge money to give dowry. This is particularly felt

by those from the poorer families as giving dowry entails a lot of expenses. Change

would be substantial when well off people refuse to give and take dowry. Thus in

such cases the parents feel proud to bear daughters. They also feel relaxed as they

know that law has considered dowry as a crime. If groom‘s parents will demand

dowry they can approach to the law.

WEDDING CEREMONIES: THE FRAMEWORK FOR DOWRY

In the Indian context, the form of wedding gifts clearly reflects

transformations in the political economy connected to the world-wide migration of

white-collar and blue-collar workers from India, a huge rise in conspicuous

consumption standards particularly among the middle class, and the dominance of

market-driven agendas and development ideologies in shaping the lives of people,

even those living in the remotest of areas. With greater educational opportunities and

salaried jobs becoming available, as well as an apparent oversupply of marriageable

women, amounts of ―dowry‖ and ―groomprice‖ have increased in several

communities, and have even displaced bridewealth. In contrast to studies that

continue to relate marriage prestations to socioeconomic hierarchies, dowry appears

ubiquitous in all classes (Basu, 1999: 87).

In a Hindu wedding with Vedic rites, for example, one of the central

ceremonies of kanyadan is characterized by a token payment or varadakshina to the

groom during the ceremony-that is, these payments from the bride‘s family are

interpreted as being part of scriptural prescriptions. Stridhanam / stridhan, or

women‘s wealth, is supposed to be part of the wedding payments as well, typically

visualized as jewelry or vessels given to the bride herself as a personal fund, though

not necessarily portrayed as an equal inheritance share. The situation is further



complicated by the fact that in most Hindu weddings both families do exchange gifts

despite the disproportionate expenses by the bride‘s family (Ibid: 88).

Data for total costs of weddings in the respondents‘ families was difficult to

obtain. In this research, when asked the respondents to estimate the cost of their own

or recent family weddings most women could not provide specific amounts because

they claimed it was too difficult to calculate the total amount, especially when

considering that some major items like jewelry might have been bought years earlier,

that relatives might have contributed some clothing, jewelry, or furniture as gifts, and

that no tallies of expenses for various occasions were retained. Many were

uninformed about the actual cash required even when they knew about the expenses,

especially if they had no income or credit sources of their own and relied on income

earners (often males) in the family for money. They were particularly in the dark

about expenses for their own weddings, either because they had been too young at the

time of marriage to comprehend the transactions, or because the seniors in the family

(often parents) had handled the disbursements directly even if they had been married

when in their twenties and in paid employment. The disjunction from financial

awareness was partly related to age and parental responsibility for handling weddings

(even for grooms), but gendered notions of women‘s dissociation from direct fiscal

resources undoubtedly also played a part in their ignorance of expenses.

Table 2.12: Monthly income and dowry

Are

a Monthly Income

(`)

Dowry (`)

Til

l 1000

1000-5

000

5,0

00

-10,0

00

10,0

00

-20,0

00

20,0

00

-50,0

00

50,0

00

-1 l

acs

1 l

k-2

lacs

2lk

-3 l

acs

3 l

k-4

lacs

4lk

-5la

c

Ab

ove

5la

c

No

dow

ry

Un

marr

ied

To

tal

Tala

b T

illo

> 3000 - - - 5 10 1 - 1 - - - 4 2 23

3000-10,000 - - - 3 3 7 6 2 - - 2 7 4 34

10,000-30,000 - - - - 2 4 2 1 - - - 6 3 18

30,000-50,000 - - - - 1 - 3 1 - - 1 6 1 13

50,000-1,00000 - - - 1 - - 1 - 1 - - 5 2 10

<1,00000 - - - - - - - - - - - 2 - 2

Total - - - 9 16 12 12 5 1 - 3 30 12 100



Mu

thi

Dom

an

a

> 3000 3 3 7 4 13 5 2 - - - - 3 1 41

3000-10,000 - 5 3 1 8 5 2 - - - - 4 1 29

10,000-30,000 4 3 1 2 7 5 3 - - - - 2 1 28

30,000-50,000 - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1 - 2

50,000-1,00000 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

< 1,00000 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Total 7 11 11 8 28 15 7 - - - - 10 3 100


The above Table draws a contrast between monthly income of the respondent

and dowry given/taken in their marriage. In Talab Tillo out of 23 respondents having

monthly income less than ` 3,000 no one gave dowry till ` 10,000, 5 respondents

gave from ` 10,000 - 20,000, 10 respondents fall between 20,000 - 50,000, 1

respondent falls in 50,000 - 1,00000 category, no one falls in 1,000000 - 2,00000, 1

respondent falls in 2,00000 - 3,00000 category, no one falls in 3,00000-4,00000,

4,00000-5,00000 and above 5,00000, 4 respondents did not give/take dowry, 2

respondents are unmarried; out of 34 respondents having monthly income from

` 3,000-10,000 no one gave dowry till ` 1,000, 1000 - 5000 and 5,000 - 10,000, 3

respondents fall from ` 10,000 - 20,000 category and 20,000 - 50,000 category, 7

respondents fall in 50,000 - 1,00000 category, 6 respondents fall in 1,000000 -

2,00000, 2 respondents fall in 2,00000 - 3,00000 category, no one falls in 3,00000 -

4,00000 and 4,00000 - 5,00000, 2 respondents fall in above 5,00000 category, 7

respondents did not give/take dowry, 4 respondents are unmarried; out of 18

respondents having monthly income from ` 10,000-30,000 no one gave dowry till

` 1,000, 1000-5000, 5,000-10,000 and 10,000 - 20,000, 2 respondents fall in 20,000-

50,000 category, 4 respondents fall in 50,000 - 1,00000 category, 2 respondents fall

in 1,000000 - 2,00000, 1 respondent falls in 2,00000 - 3,00000 category, no one falls

in 3,00000 - 4,00000, 4,00000 - 5,00000 and above 5,00000, 6 respondents did not

give/take dowry, 3 respondents are unmarried; out of 13 respondents having monthly

income from ` 30,000-50,000 no one gave dowry till ` 1,000, 1000 - 5000, 5,000 -

10,000 and 10,000 - 20,000,1 respondent falls in 20,000 - 50,000 category, no

respondent falls in 50,000 - 1,00000 category, 3 respondents fall in 1,000000 -

2,00000, 1 respondent falls in 2,00000 - 3,00000 category, no one falls in 3,00000 -



4,00000 and 4,00000 - 5,00000, 1 respondent falls above 5,00000, 6 respondents did

not give/take dowry and 1 respondent is unmarried; out of 10 respondents having

monthly income from ` 50,000 - 1,00000 no one gave dowry till ` 1,000, 1000 -

5000 and 5,000-10,000, 1 respondent falls in 10,000 - 20,000,no respondent falls in

20,000 - 50,000 and 50,000 - 1,00000 category, 1 respondent falls in 1,000000 -

2,00000, no respondent falls in 2,00000 - 3,00000 category, 1 falls in 3,00000 -

4,00000, no one falls in 4,00000 - 5,00000 and above 5,00000 category, 10

respondents did not give/ take dowry and 3 respondents are unmarried; out of 2

respondents having monthly income above 1,00000 no one gave any dowry.

In case of Muthi- Domana out of 41 respondents having monthly income less

than ` 3,000,3 respondents gave dowry till ` 1,000 and 1,000 - 5,000 each, 7

respondents fall in the category of 5,000 - 10,000, 4 respondents gave from ` 10,000 -

20,000, 13 respondents gave from 20,000 - 50,000, 5 respondents fall in 50,000 -

1,00000 category, 2 respondents fall in 1,000000 - 2,00000,none respondent falls in

2,00000 - 3,00000, 3,00000 - 4,00000, 4,00000 - 5,00000 and above 5,00000

category, 3 respondents did not give/ take dowry, 1 respondent is unmarried; out of

29 respondents having monthly income from ` 3,000 - 10,000 no one gave dowry till

` 1,000, 5 respondents fall in 1,000 - 5,000, 3 respondents fall in 5,000 - 10,000, 1

respondent falls from ` 10,000 - 20,000 category, 8 respondents fall in 20,000 -

50,000 category, 5 respondents fall in 50,000 - 1,00000 category, 2 respondents fall

in 1,000000 - 2,00000, no one falls in 2,00000 - 3,00000, 3,00000 - 4,00000, 4,00000

- 5,00000 and above 5,00000, 4 respondents did not give/take dowry and 1

respondent is unmarried; out of 28 respondents having monthly income from

` 10,000 - 30,000, 4 respondents fall in dowry till ` 1,000, 3 respondents fall in 1000-

5000, 1 respondent falls in 5,000 - 10,000, 2 respondents fall in 10,000 - 20,000, 7

respondents fall in 20,000 - 50,000 category, 5 respondents fall in 50,000 - 1,00000

category, 3 respondents fall in 1,000000 - 2,00000, no one falls in 2,00000 - 3,00000

category, 3,00000 - 4,00000, 4,00000 - 5,00000 and above 5,00000, 2 respondents

did not give / take dowry and 1 respondent is unmarried; out of 2 respondents having

monthly income from ` 30,000 - 50,000 no one gave dowry till ` 1,000, 1000 - 5000

and 5,000 - 10,000, 1 respondent falls in the category 10,000 - 20,000, no respondent

falls in 20,000 - 50,000, 50,000 - 1,00000, 1,000000 - 2,00000, 2,00000 - 3,00000



category, 3,00000 - 4,00000, 4,00000 - 5,00000 and above 5,00000, 1 respondent did

not gave/took dowry and no respondent is unmarried; no respondent falls in the

category having monthly income from ` 50,000 - 1,00000 and above 5,00000 who

gave/took dowry.

It is analysed that maximum respondents, 40% in Talab Tillo and 61% in

Muthi Domana, whose monthly income is upto ` 10,000 gave/took dowry in their

marriage. In Talab Tillo 9% respondents gave/took dowry from 2 lakh to 5 lakh and

above whereas this is not seen in case of Muthi Domana. In case of Talab Tillo

(urban) no respondent is found who gave/took dowry up to ` 10,000 as all of them

gave more than this amount, whereas in case of Muthi Domana (rural) 27%

respondents fall in this category. This indicates that people spend more money in

dowry in urban areas but dowry is prevalent even in rural areas and also among the

lower income groups.

One of Kishwar‘s crucial contributions to the analysis of dowry has been to

point out that brides themselves are far from averse to wedding prestations: in

response to Kishwar‘s own call for strengthening inheritance rights, many women told

her that with scant chance of receiving property shares, dowry was the only thing they

could realistically expect from their natal families. These attitudes are echoed in other

studies including different classes, educational levels, and age groups that show

women‘s enthusiastic support for dowries, particularly with regard to items for

themselves and the conjugal home, even though high demands for dowry are

frequently seen as a social evil. Perhaps even more importantly, the gifts appear to be

deeply linked to women‘s pleasures, to feelings of being done right by and of being

loved by the natal family, to being for once the sole vehicle of the family‘s

expenditure and status. Disturbing as these criteria seem to be as markers of self-

esteem for women, they represent women‘s scant hold over resources and emotional

wealth, and are extremely difficult to erase through legal proscriptions (Basu,

1999:98).

The phrase, ―ladkiwale ko to dena hi parta hai” (―the woman‘s family has to

give things, of course‖), juxtaposed by several women against the notion that it was

indeed unseemly to ask for things, reveals the ambivalent meaning of ―demand‖ and

contested definitions of what constitutes acceptable forms of dowry. The very silences



of leaving demands unarticulated speak of the need for the bride‘s family to give a

certain expected amount. The idea of jo dena hota hai (what has to be given) or

customary gifts are powerfully formless signifiers, with an apparently unspecified

content but an immanently readable from that families seem to have no difficulty

materializing. Such gifts, commonly perceived to be uncoerced, are variously

interpreted as expressions of the brides‘ families‘ wealth or a reflection of the

groom‘s ―value‖ (Ibid: 98).

Changed practices

Furthermore, in north India, land was not given in dowry. In the context of

patrilineal inheritance and the exclusion of daughters from ancestral property, this

ensured the separation of the outgoing woman from the material symbol of the

preeminent social group, the family, as well as from the most valuable economic

resources. The linkage between dowry and hypergamy also points to an inherent

tendency, intensified in later periods, of continuous inflation in the amount of dowry,

and of the possibility that the demands of the bridegroom‘s family rather than custom

determined the amount and kind of gifts to be given. Thus while dowry was an

indication of the status of the family uniting in marriage, it was also symptomatic of

the control and dependence of ‗high‘ caste women (Parliwala, 2005:281).

As Srinivas notes, contemporary dowry practices are quite different from

earlier patterns. Five dimensions of this change may be noted. First, dowry has spread

to all castes, communities, religions and regions. It is practiced in all classes to

varying degrees as was also seen while analyzing the socio-economic background of

the respondents. Second, the ‗voluntary‘ character of the ‗gifts‘ is disappearing. The

‗gifts‘ are dictated by the demands of the groom‘s family as well as the status symbols

of the groups within which the natal and marital family wish to project themselves,

rather than ‗tradition‘. Indulgence of the bride and her choice has little to do with the

dowry ‗gifts‘, except among upper class and upper middle class household. Third, the

money value of dowry has increased and there has been a qualitative change in the

goods given, following on from the above. Often the dowry is worth significantly

more than a daughter‘s equal share in her father‘s property, leading to resentment on

the part of the other members of the family and a disinclination for further support.

The inflationary cycle continues as families are pressured to recuperate economically



from a daughter‘s dowry through the marriage of a son. Fourth, dowry has come to

encompass the entire marital relationship and customary gift exchange between

affines. Truly there is ‗extended dowry‘! Demands begin at the engagement and may

continue at frequent intervals and on special occasions during the life of the marriage.

Gifts given directly to the married daughter are but a portion of what is transferred.

The women‘s parents comply with the continuing demands - made on the grounds of

alleged inadequacy in the dowry at the wedding - in the hope of ‗saving their

daughter‘s home‘. Finally, while the extent to which women ever have had control of

the major portion of their dowries is questionable, their lack of control in

contemporary times has been intensified. This has been a result both of the changing

nature of gifts, its raising value and, more significantly, the overall change in

women‘s position (Ibid: 281- 282).

After all, despite the ideology of patrilineality, the mother‘s natal family may

make a substantial contribution to the child‘s birthday party, held at the mother‘s

marital home, as part of extended dowry (Ibid:283).

In addition with rising costs of living and increasing unemployment, dowry

has become a means of obtaining the necessities of life and achieving upward

economic mobility for the husband‘s family. Further, the need to accumulate a

daughter‘s dowry is often given as the reason why an individual starts accepting

bribes.

Thus this chapter has discussed dowry in its various forms, as an institution,

subordination, as power and as a crime. It has shown dowry from different

perspectives and not just one aspect of it. This system is prevalent in many societies in

India and abroad too. The chapter has also shown that people justify dowry. This

chapter shows on the one hand that giving dowry is important as it provides prestige

to the bride and her parents. In some form it is still women‘s property (stridhan) and

helps women to start her new life. It structures her life in her conjugal household and

makes the continuity of a patriarchal structure of Hindu culture. On the other hand,

where it is demanded or forcefully exhorted, where girls are harassed and tortured for

not bringing the sufficient amount, it acquires the status of ‗crime‘ and the law exists

to sufficiently take care of it as seen in later chapters (5 and 6). Amidst the two

whatever are the survival issues that women live out in their day to day lives as not all



dowry brings happiness and not every incident becomes a ‗case‘; how they handle,

deal and negotiate such issues are dealt with in the Case Studies concerned in the

study. Of importance however is, to understand to what extent dowry strengthens

women‘s position. And if the dowry does not do it comprehensively, what should be

the role of women‘s property rights? The next chapter looks into the issue of women

and property rights of Hindus in greater depth.



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chapter-ii dowry: its socio cultural...

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