chapter five: social contract theory and the motive to be moral chapter five: social contract theory...

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Chapter Five: Chapter Five: Social Contract Theory Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be and the Motive to Be Moral Moral Why is the institution of Why is the institution of morality justified? morality justified? Why should I have to do something Why should I have to do something if it does not appear to be in if it does not appear to be in my own self-interest? my own self-interest? Why bother to be moral? Why bother to be moral? What is in it for me? What is in it for me? What is in it for society? What is in it for society?

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Page 1: Chapter Five: Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral Chapter Five: Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral Why is the institution

Chapter Five:Chapter Five:Social Contract Theory Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be and the Motive to Be

MoralMoralWhy is the institution of morality justified?Why is the institution of morality justified?

Why should I have to do something if it does not Why should I have to do something if it does not appear to be in my own self-interest?appear to be in my own self-interest?

Why bother to be moral?Why bother to be moral?

What is in it for me?What is in it for me?

What is in it for society?What is in it for society?

Page 2: Chapter Five: Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral Chapter Five: Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral Why is the institution

Why Does Society NeedWhy Does Society NeedMoral Rules?Moral Rules?

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) believed human Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) believed human beings always act out of perceived self-interestbeings always act out of perceived self-interestEquality of ability to harm and desire to satisfy Equality of ability to harm and desire to satisfy our goals, leads to social instabilityour goals, leads to social instabilityOur Our state of naturestate of nature is one where there is no is one where there is no common ways of life, no enforced laws or moral common ways of life, no enforced laws or moral rules, and no justice or injustice. A state of rules, and no justice or injustice. A state of anarchy and chaosanarchy and chaos

Page 3: Chapter Five: Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral Chapter Five: Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral Why is the institution

Hobbes and the State of NatureHobbes and the State of NatureState of nature is in no one's interest and all are State of nature is in no one's interest and all are better if we compromise by giving up some of better if we compromise by giving up some of our natural libertyour natural libertySelfish yet rational people are therefore willing Selfish yet rational people are therefore willing to give up some liberty and agree to a to give up some liberty and agree to a social social contractcontract which sets up both rules and a which sets up both rules and a governing forcegoverning forceMorality arises from within this contract as a Morality arises from within this contract as a form of social controlform of social controlHobbes says without morality life is “solitary, Hobbes says without morality life is “solitary, poor, brutish and short”poor, brutish and short”

Page 4: Chapter Five: Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral Chapter Five: Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral Why is the institution

Hobbesian Morality andHobbesian Morality andLord of the FliesLord of the Flies

William Golding's novel Lord of the Flies William Golding's novel Lord of the Flies (1954) portrays the Hobbesian account of (1954) portrays the Hobbesian account of moralitymoralityGolding's view is that we need no external Golding's view is that we need no external devil to bring about evil but that we have found devil to bring about evil but that we have found the devil and he is usthe devil and he is usThemes illustrate Hobbesian views such as the Themes illustrate Hobbesian views such as the theme that civilization's power is weak and theme that civilization's power is weak and vulnerable to primitive, explosive passionsvulnerable to primitive, explosive passions

Page 5: Chapter Five: Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral Chapter Five: Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral Why is the institution

Social Order andSocial Order andthe Benefits of Moralitythe Benefits of Morality

Keep society from falling apartKeep society from falling apartReduce human sufferingReduce human sufferingPromote human flourishingPromote human flourishingResolve conflicts of interest in just and orderly Resolve conflicts of interest in just and orderly wayswaysAssign praise and blame, reward and Assign praise and blame, reward and punishment, and guiltpunishment, and guilt

Page 6: Chapter Five: Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral Chapter Five: Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral Why is the institution

Why Be Should I Be Moral?Why Be Should I Be Moral?The Story of Gyges from Plato's The Story of Gyges from Plato's The Republic:The Republic:

Shepherd stumbles upon a ring that Shepherd stumbles upon a ring that can make one invisible, allowing can make one invisible, allowing him to escape the restraints of him to escape the restraints of society, and he uses it to become society, and he uses it to become kingking

The life of Jim vs. the life of Jack, a modern The life of Jim vs. the life of Jack, a modern recast of the Gyges storyrecast of the Gyges storyShould choose the life of the “unsuccessful” Should choose the life of the “unsuccessful” just person because it is to our advantage to be just person because it is to our advantage to be moralmoral

Page 7: Chapter Five: Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral Chapter Five: Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral Why is the institution

Morality, Self-Interest, andMorality, Self-Interest, andGame TheoryGame Theory

Game theoryGame theory – presents situations in which – presents situations in which players make decisions that will bring each of players make decisions that will bring each of them the greatest benefit; these games then them the greatest benefit; these games then provide easy models for understanding more provide easy models for understanding more complex situations of social interaction in the complex situations of social interaction in the real worldreal worldGame 1: The Prisoner's DilemmaGame 1: The Prisoner's DilemmaGame 2: Cooperate or CheatGame 2: Cooperate or Cheat

Page 8: Chapter Five: Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral Chapter Five: Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral Why is the institution

The Motive to Always Be MoralThe Motive to Always Be MoralThe The paradox of morality and advantageparadox of morality and advantage::1. If an act is morally right, then it must be 1. If an act is morally right, then it must be

reasonable to do it.reasonable to do it.2. If it is reasonable to do the act, then it must be 2. If it is reasonable to do the act, then it must be

in my interest to do it.in my interest to do it.3. But sometimes the requirements of morality 3. But sometimes the requirements of morality

are incompatible with the requirements of self-are incompatible with the requirements of self-interest.interest.

4. Hence, a morally right act must be reasonable 4. Hence, a morally right act must be reasonable and need not be reasonable, which is a and need not be reasonable, which is a contradiction.contradiction.

Page 9: Chapter Five: Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral Chapter Five: Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral Why is the institution

The Modified Principle of The Modified Principle of Rational Self-InterestRational Self-Interest

If it is reasonable to choose a life plan L, which If it is reasonable to choose a life plan L, which includes the possibility of doing act A, then it includes the possibility of doing act A, then it must be in my interest (or at least not against must be in my interest (or at least not against it) to choose L, even though A itself may not it) to choose L, even though A itself may not be in my self-interest.be in my self-interest.