chapter 9 the health care market copyright © 2010 by the mcgraw-hill companies, inc. all rights...
TRANSCRIPT
CHAPTER 9
The Health Care Market
Copyright © 2010 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.McGraw-Hill/Irwin
9-2
U.S. Expenditures of Selected Goods and Services as Share of GDP (1960-2007)
Source: US Bureau of the Census [2009, pp. 95, 425], and National Income and Product Accounts
9-3
Social Insurance
• Social insurance - government programs that provide insurance to protect against adverse events
• Examples– Medicaid– Medicare– Social Security– Unemployment Compensation
9-4
How Health Insurance Works
• Insurance premium
• Expected Value– Expected value (EV) = probability of outcome 1) *
(Payout in outcome 1) + probability of outcome 2)*(Payout in outcome 2) + … + (probability of outcome n)*(Payout in outcome n)
9-5
Expected Value Computation
Draw cards from deck of cards
Draw heart and receive $12
Draw spade, diamond or club and lose $4
Probability of drawing heart = 13/52 = ¼
Probability of drawing spade, diamond or club = 39/52 = ¾
EV = (1/4)($12) + (3/4)(-$4) = $0
9-6
Why Buy Insurance?
Insurance Options
Income Probability of Staying Healthy
Probability of Getting
Sick
Lost Income if She Gets
Sick
(A) (B) (C)
Income if She Stays
HealthyIncome if She Gets
Sick
Expected Value
Option 1: No Insurance
$50,000 9 in 10 1 in 10 $30,000 $50,000 $20,000 $47,000
Option 2: Full Insurance ($3,000
premium to cover $30,000 in
losses
$50,000 9 in 10 1 in 10 $30,000 $47,000 $47,000 $47,000
Actuarially Fair Insurance Policy
9-7
Why People Buy Insurance
Income
Util
ity
20,000 47,000 50,000
UA
UC
UD
UBD
C
B
A
• Expected Utility
• Risk Smoothing
9-9
The Role of Risk Pooling
• Insurance in a small population
• Insurance in a large population
• Law of large numbers
9-11
Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Expected Benefit Expected Benefit Expected Benefit
Probability of Lost Income Expected Minus Premium Minus Premium Minus Premium
Insurance Buyer Getting Sick if Sick Lost Income(Differential Premiums) (Premium = $3,000) (Premium = $4,500)
Emily 1 in 5 (High Risk) $30,000 $6,000 $0 $3,000 $1,500
Jacob 1 in 5 (High Risk) $30,000 $6,000 $0 $3,000 $1,500
Emma 1 in 5 (High Risk) $30,000 $6,000 $0 $3,000 $1,500
Michael 1 in 5 (High Risk) $30,000 $6,000 $0 $3,000 $1,500
Madison 1 in 5 (High Risk) $30,000 $6,000 $0 $3,000 $1,500
Joshua 1 in 10 (Low Risk) $30,000 $3,000 $0 $0 -$1,500
Olivia 1 in 10 (Low Risk) $30,000 $3,000 $0 $0 -$1,500
Matthew 1 in 10 (Low Risk) $30,000 $3,000 $0 $0 -$1,500
Hannah 1 in 10 (Low Risk) $30,000 $3,000 $0 $0 -$1,500
Ethan 1 in 10 (Low Risk) $30,000 $3,000 $0 $0 -$1,500
Insurer's Net Profits $0 -$15,000 $0
9-12
Does Adverse Selection Justify Government Intervention?
• Experience rating
• Experience rating and equity
• Community rating
9-14
Moral Hazard
Medical services per year
Pric
e pe
r un
it
Dm
Sm
M1M00
P0
.2P0
a b
h
deadweight loss
Flat-of-the-curve medicine
9-15
Additional Considerations
• The Elasticity of Demand for Medical Services
• Does Moral Hazard Justify Government Intervention?– Third Party Payment
9-17
Do We Want Efficient Provision of Health Care?
• Paternalism
• The Problem of the Uninsured– Who are the uninsured?– Does health insurance improve health?