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Military Operations Other Than WarThis chapter discusses Army MOOTW—operations in two states

of the range of military operations: peacetime and conflict. Peacetimeis a state in which diplomatic, economic, informational, and militarypowers of the nation are employed to achieve national objectives.Since peacetime is the preferred state of affairs (as opposed to conflictor war), how well the Army and other services accomplish theirmissions in peacetime is vital to US national interests.

Conflict is a unique environment in which the ARFORcommander works closely with diplomatic leaders to controlhostilities, with the goal of returning to peacetime conditions. Inconflict, the military, as an element of national power, takes on amore prominent role than in peacetime. The Army participates inconflict as a component of a joint organization that is usually anelement of a multinational structure. Other US Governmentagencies, NGOs, PVOs, and international organizations (IOs) oftenparticipate.

FUNDAMENTALS OF MOOTW Army warfighting doctrine is based on well-

established principles of war. MOOTW arebased on similar principles that guide theforce’s actions. The principles of war apply forthose actions that involve our forces in combat.For MOOTW that do not require direct combat,the principles are objective, unity of effort,legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security.FMs 100-5 and 100-23 describe these principlesand their application. These principles are notimmutable, but serve as guides for action.Commanders must balance these principlesagainst the specific missions and nature of theoperation.

In planning for military operations inpeacetime and conflict, commanders must tailora force that is suitable for the mission.Suitability is the measure of a force’s capabilityagainst possible threats and the diplomaticacceptability of the chosen force. Acceptability isbased on the force’s appropriateness, givendiplomatic considerations, and qualities thatare consistent with accomplishment of nationalinterests and objectives. The commander’sacceptability of the force includes theperceptions of the indigenous population,the international community, and theAmerican public. Force capability is the

measure of a unit’s ability to counter anexpected threat and execute a mission. A forcemust have the capability to accomplish amilitary mission by virtue of its training,equipment, and structure.

The force composition for MOOTW must beproportionate to the stated goals of thesponsoring authority and provide sufficientcapability to complete the mission and protectthe force. The perception that the forceemployed exceeds the limits of its mandatelessens legitimacy with the internationalcommunity, the US public, and the indigenouspopulation. Capability and acceptability arenot constants but vary based upon the threat,the intensity of operations, the missions to beperformed, and changing internationalperceptions.

The composition of the force should reflectthe commander’s consideration of the militaryend state, METT-T, mission-specific trainingrequirements, strategic lift, pre-positionedassets, joint and multinational militaryforces, reserve component forces, nonmilitaryUS agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and host nationsforces. The nature of MOOTW is such that CSand CSS units may have an equal if not greaterrole than combat units.

RESPONSIBILITIES IN PEACETIME The Army’s responsibilities in peacetime During peacetime, senior army commanders

are as important as its traditional combat roles. are always postured to present a deterrent to

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internal or external threats to US nationalinterests. They do this by conducting routinepeacetime operations and nonhostile activities.

UNIFIED COMMANDERS At the direction of national leaders, CINCs

may use ARFOR to perform noncombatmissions that support diplomatic initiatives.Army leaders then carry out these activities aspart of the overall unified command plan.These activities may include job trainingexercises, peace support operations, nationassistance activities, disaster relief andhumanitarian assistance, security assistance,shows of force, and support for counterdrugoperations.

The commander of a unified command,such as PACOM and ACOM, may control andcoordinate military support to domesticemergencies in the states of Alaska and Hawaiiand territories and possessions of the US.CINCs must continuously assess their regionsto identify the strategic situation andsituations requiring military forces fornoncombat missions. Armed forces may betasked with direct responsibility, or they mayconduct operations that support other USGovernment agencies.

SENIOR ARMY COMMANDERS The Army’s role in peacetime is to support

the regional CINC’s efforts to prevent unstablesituations from developing into the loss of localcontrol or open conflict. Senior armycommanders may do this by conducting routineactivities that maintain the potential ofARFOR to conduct major operations. Thispotential may serve as a deterrent, or it canenhance the capability to react in emergencies.Army component forces may turn this potentialinto actual mission execution to actively controla situation. As ASCCs or other senior armycommanders respond to the regional CINC,they may be required to conduct peacetimeoperations in one region while simultaneouslyconducting conflict and/or war operations inothers.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES COMMANDERS

In peacetime, SOF help attain peacetimemilitary objectives and may promote regionalstability by advising, training, and assistingallies. SOF peacetime activities could be theconduct of US humanitarian assistance

programs, security assistance programs, andmultinational training exercises. Likeconventional forces, SOF are a deterrent. Inmultinational operations, SOF involvementwith allies worldwide contributes to deterrenceand provides a low-visibility means ofextending US influence.

Due to extensive unconventional warfare(UW) training, SOF are well-suited to conductvarious peacetime operations and providevarious types of support. SOF should beconsidered the force of choice for peacetimemissions. General-purpose forces may also becalled for their particular specialties or whenthe scope of operations is so vast thatconventional forces are required.

ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDER

The operational-level functions discussedhere are used as a starting point to discuss theASCC in peacetime. Some systems, such asoperational fires, may not have extensivepeacetime applications. Still, the operational-level commander and his staff need to analyzeeach function and its correspondingsubfunctions, augmenting or deleting asnecessary to ensure the proper integration andsynchronization of all peacetime operationsand activities.

Movement and ManeuverThe CINC may use armored, light, or

special operations Army forces and theircorresponding CS or CSS structures availablewithin the region. Some situations requiredeployment of additional units via strategiclift. The MCA provides for the orderly flow ofthese forces and resources. The ASCC receivesand prepares incoming units for operations.Since peacetime operations are normallyconducted in a permissive environment, CS orCSS units may be the predominant elementsand deploy early to prepare to support thearrival of other units.

The CINC may assign operating forces aJOA, but he generally uses few boundaries orother special control measures. Normally, theASCC, a subordinate Army commander, or aJFC employs these forces to execute a specificMOOTW mission. Each operation is discrete inresponse to a specific situation, though it maybe sequenced with past and future operations.Execution focuses on near-term operations.Peacetime operations often require special

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engineer, legal, CA, PSYOP, and PAconsiderations. Once the operating forcecompletes its mission, it redeploys to its homestation or continues peacetime activities intheater with little requirement forconsolidation operations or other transitionefforts.

ProtectionProtecting forces and resources from a wide

range of threats is an important responsibilityfor all senior commanders. In force-projectioncontingency operations, the threat of the use ofWMD must be continually tracked to precludeunacceptable risk to the force. Options forprotection from these weapons encompass thepolitico-military range and include diplomaticdefusing and deterrence through NBCreadiness, active and passive defense, airdefense, and WMD reduction. The ASCCdirects measures in peacetime to conservemilitary potential so that it can be applied at adecisive place and time.

Protecting the force depends on current,accurate intelligence for I&W of possibleobstacles or threats. Protection includesconducting antiterrorism measures,maintaining discipline and order, andproviding limited deception measures. As partof protecting the force, the ASCC issues thepeacetime ROE established by the regionalcommander in coordination with JCS, the hostnation, and the ambassador. Through anoperational risk assessment, the ASCC ensuresthe conservation and safety of the force.Providing air defense of the force and selectedgeopolitical assets has a deterrent value. It alsohas an advantage that it is seen as anonescalatory measure.

Conducting AntiterrorismMeasures

Terrorist acts overseas are a constantthreat to US armed forces, civilians, andfacilities. The ASCC presumes civil authoritiesand host governments will implementcounterterrorism procedures to protect peoplewithin their territory. The CINC ensurescoordination of all local antiterrorist policiesand measures for protecting DOD facilities,equipment, personnel, and family membersabroad. The ASCC may assist in implementingspecific antiterrorist actions called for byterrorist threat conditions (THREATCONs)discussed later in this chapter. The theatercommander’s peacetime ROE provide a flexible

self-defense and deterrent posture. These rulesdeal with terrorist and other threats.

MaintainingDiscipline and Order

Good order and discipline are instrumentalfor conserving military potential. The ASCCestablishes a command climate conducive tothis end. He ensures the maintenance of properliaison with DOD police organizations as wellas with local or host nation, allied, andinteragency police agencies. Within Armyorganizations, the ASCC facilitates Army MPand Criminal Investigation Commandelements investigating offenses. In addition,the ASCC enforces the policies of the seniorarmy commanders. The ASCC may provideprisoner confinement facilities for those whoviolate good order and discipline.

Providing LimitedDeception Measures

Peacetime operations usually require littledeception beyond normal OPSEC. OPSEC, orthe information measures the ASCC uses,must be consistent with established guidelinesand may require interagency coordination.

FiresA major challenge for any force taking part

in peacetime operations is to be organized toaccomplish the goals of the sponsoringauthority and provide sufficient capability toprotect the force. The committed ARFOR mustbe sufficiently lethal and survivable to protectitself, deter possible aggression, andaccomplish its mission. This specialized forcemust be capable of performing both hostile andnonhostile actions simultaneously throughoutits AO. The ASCC must always have availableand continuously plan for the employment of ajoint or multinational force suite of fire supportsystems. A credible operational fires capabilitydeters aggression and increases the optionsavailable to the commander to accomplish hismission and protect the force.

Fire support units provide more than lethaland nonlethal fires during MOOTW. Firesupport coordinators and operational-levelplanners must establish liaison early to startplanning and coordinating targeting functions(operational IPB, high-payoff target selection,target acquisition and attack system selection/tasking, and BDA planning) should fires beneeded. The organization and equipment of fire

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support units can augment the C3I collectionand other capabilities of the joint ormultinational force.

Doctrine for fires and the basic tasks of firesupport do not change during MOOTW. Still,the MOOTW environment presents uniquechallenges that affect tactics, techniques, andprocedures for fires and require the meticulousattention of planners. Planners must considerthe characteristics of the MOOTW threat andtheir impact on both operational fires and firesupport.

The MOOTW AO typically presents threatsthat do not conform to linear operations.Threats are diverse and may manifestthemselves anywhere at any time, makingthem difficult to predict. Threat personnel andactivities may be indistinguishable fromfriendly until hostilities are initiated. Theprevalent threat in MOOTW is from hostileterrorist, guerilla, or partisan activities.Additionally, environmental factors (weather,disease) pose a serious threat. In somescenarios, they will be the prevalent threat.Normally, MOOTW threats do not involve asophisticated military force unless hostilitieshave escalated to the realm of conflict or thethreat is capable of rapidly massing anddispersing military or paramilitary force toachieve its objectives. MOOTW threatactivities include hit and run harassing tacticssuch as attacks and raids, mining and boobytraps, sabotage, deception, and psychologicalwarfare designed to embarrass and demoralizefriendly governments and forces.

External support from other nations for theindigenous MOOTW threat and adaptation offriendly operations to the local geographycompound the problem. External support of thethreat extends the problem to the internationaldiplomatic arena, usually increasing therestrictions and constraints on militaryoptions. The extremes in geography requireorganizations to prepare for and adapt tovariations in terrain and vegetation and theimpact of seasonal weather changes.

All of these aspects of the MOOTW threatimpact planning and execution of operationalfires. The range of threats in an MOOTWenvironment impact both operational fires andfire support. First, all friendly forces arevulnerable. No rear area enjoys relativesecurity. This vulnerability requiresestablishment of integrated base defenses witha mutually supporting fires capability. Fires

must first support the increased securityrequirements for both position defense andmovement. Second, planners must recognizethe restrictions and constraints of ROE on theapplication of force. Planners must thenconsider indirect and nonlethal fires, inaddition to direct fire systems, when theywrite ROE. ROE should address appropriateresponses to various expected threat actionsand force protection. The diversity of availablefire support systems, including those ofcoalition forces, requires that ROE includeweapon system and munition selection as well.At all echelons of command, ROE significantlyimpact all aspects of fire planning, targetacquisition, and attack. Finally, the nonspecificnature of MOOTW threats requires continuousplanning. Consideration must be given tomutual support between adjacent units orbases and even AOs.

The fleeting nature of the threat requiresnear real-time target acquisition and sensor-to-shooter links. Target acquisition systems mustbe capable of distinguishing between friendlyand threat activity. This capability increasesthe importance of HUMINT and IMINTsources, which provide real time eyes on targetssuch as patrols, police, SOF, UAV/RPV(remotely piloted vehicle), and J-STARS (jointsurveillance target and attack radar system).Ground surveillance, countermortar, andcounterbattery radars are equally importantand have special employment considerations inthe MOOTW environment. Electronicintelligence (ELINT) systems may providevaluable situation development information,but the need to verify target descriptions limitsELINT responsiveness and utility as a targetacquisition system for triggering target attack.

These considerations highlight the need forclose coordination among joint, multinational,and coalition force operations; intelligence; andfires representatives at the ASCCheadquarters. Although these considerationsare not all-inclusive, they may appear to focusfire support at lower echelons rather thanoperational fires. Still, the MOOTWenvironment forces the ASCC/ARFOR to planmeticulously, coordinate, and executeapplication of force.

To expedite fire support coordination, fireplanning, and clearance of fires, specialarrangements are required with the hostnation military, allied nations, joint services,and national and local civilian authorities.These arrangements include determining

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communication requirements, identifyingliaison personnel, and establishingprocedures—all focused on the interoperabilityof the multinational force effort to supportpeacekeeping objectives.

Within NATO and the ABCA (American,British, Canadian, Australian) quadripartiteworking group, special agreements exist whichfacilitate fire support operations. These areNATO standardization agreements(STANAGs) and quadripartite standardizationagreements (QSTAGs). Many countries thatthe US may support have no bilateral firesupport agreements. Action may be required,based on the situation, to establishagreements. Support in these efforts may bearranged through the appropriate DOSagencies and country teams. This increase incentralized C2 of fires is needed for civil-military cooperation, developing and adheringto ROE, establishing appropriate proceduresfor clearance of fires, and establishing anappropriate joint/multinational force staffstructure to plan, coordinate, and, whennecessary, control operational fires.

Command and ControlPeacetime operations contribute to

stability and conflict prevention in order tocomplement diplomatic initiatives. The ASCCmay conduct a wide range of peacetimeoperations that directly or indirectly stabilize asituation or contribute to the general welfare.Contingency force-projection operationsdevelop through CAP (see Chapter 6). Theseactions may evolve into longer-termcommitments such as regional peacekeepingoperations. Other peacetime operations maybegin as long-term commitments that mayrequire deliberate planning. Examples includeovert PSYOP programs, nation assistance, andsecurity assistance.

Command relationships in peacetime arenormally based on the in-place theaterstructure that conducts routine peacetimeactivities. These peacetime relationshipsrequire special sensitivity to and coordinationwith nonmilitary organizations. As a result,operational-level command relationships andunity of command may be clouded.

The AmbassadorThe ambassador is responsible for the

direction, coordination, and supervision of allUS Government interagency activities within aparticular country. The ASCC’s staff, under the

direction of the unified commander’sdiplomatic-military staff element, mayintegrate ARFOR to support the ambassador.Military commanders must work closely withthe ambassador and his country team to assureeffective exchange of information andcoordination. Sometimes, the militarycommander may be a part of the country teamand directly advise the ambassador.

The Commander in ChiefThe CINC may use forward-deployed Army

units in theater when the NCA directs. In sucha case, command relationships change littlefrom routine peacetime activities. The ASCCcontrols ARFOR operations and recommendsand coordinates the use of contingency forcesand mobilization of reserve forces from outsidethe theater. In such a case, the CINC may useexisting command relationships, or, if themission requires forces of multiple services, hemay establish a JTF. The ASCC may advise theCINC to integrate reserve component forceseither in a training status or brought to activeduty for an extended period to assist inexecuting operations.

IntelligenceThe ASCC needs high-quality, timely

intelligence to conduct peacetime operations.The ACE serves as the clearinghouse for all-source intelligence. The ACE maintains lists ofI&W that the ASCC uses to anticipatepeacetime operations. The ACE producesintelligence information and disseminates it tocommanders and staff agencies for use. Thisintelligence effort must address diplomatic andeconomic information as well as informationrelated to potential natural disasters. Based onthese indicators and CINC guidance, the ASCCfocuses the collection and processing of information on specific peacetime operations.

Intelligence provides a basis for all USplans and operations in MOOTW. The natureof MOOTW is one of heavy involvement withthe host nation populace, government, andmilitary. Due to this heavy involvement withthe host nation, most activities in MOOTW areHUMINT-intensive. HUMINT operationsprovide valuable intelligence, as well as I&Won threat activities and operations. HUMINTprovides timely information on threatcapabilities and intentions. HUMINT collectsinformation by interrogation, observation,elicitation of personnel, and exploitation ofdocuments and material. HUMINT is also the

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most effective intelligence discipline availableto the threat. Consequently, counter-HUMINToperations are the key to the success of anyactivity in MOOTW. Counter-HUMINToperations are used to degrade or neutralizethreat espionage, sabotage, and subversioncapabilities.

Close liaison with a variety of US and hostnation military and civil organizations iscritical to the success of any MOOTW activity.This liaison is imperative for coordination,intelligence collecting, and informationsharing. CI personnel are uniquely suited tothis task. As a minimum, CI personnel mustcoordinate with members of the US countryteam, US MI units, US MP units, CA units,PSYOP units, HN regional and urban areacoordination centers, HN intelligence andsecurity forces, and HN military, paramilitary,and police.

Battle SpaceIn MOOTW, commanders seek to counter

the threat’s effects in a given battle space. Thethreats in MOOTW will vary between eachMOOTW activity. Battle space is a physicalvolume that expands or contracts in relation tothe ability to influence and counter the threat.A higher commander does not assign battlespace, which extends beyond the limits of thecommander’s AO. Battle space is based on thepremise that the commander’s thinkingexpands to develop a vision for countering thethreat before any mental constraints areemplaced, such as boundaries, legal mandates,or terms of reference (TOR).

Battle space includes all friendly assetsavailable to counter the threat. In MOOTW,pure combat power is only a small portion ofthe true battle space. Other assets may includethe diplomatic efforts of embassy officials,liaisons with host nation governments andmilitary agencies, as well as the efforts ofNGOs, PVOs, and IOs.

Unity of effort is essential to operationswithin a given battle space. Ownership ofassets is less important than application oftheir effects toward countering the threat. Anunderstanding of battle space allowscommanders to keep their options open,synchronize all friendly assets, and counter thethreat. As the commander considers themission, as well as any perceived mission creep,he can visualize his battle space throughoutthe operation and how the battle space maychange as he moves to counter the threat.

Area studies provide host nation weatherand geographical information, as well as basicintelligence (seaports, airports, transportationsystems, water storage, POL storage, buildingmaterials availability) helpful in preparing fornatural disasters and other contingency-typeoperations. Forward presence, both throughpermanent stationing and periodic deploymentof CONUS-based HUMINT resources, isessential to this effort.

The theater-level MI organizationcontinuously develops and refines indicatorlists. These lists allow the ASCC to monitordiplomatic, military, and economic conditionsin the area. Army intelligence sources providethe necessary information and intelligence toidentify and predict potential threats. All-source intelligence analysis provides the ASCCwith the necessary information to protect hisforces, noncombatants, and resources. It alsoallows him to prepare for future operationswhile minimizing the probability of surprisefrom a potential threat.

LogisticsThe ASCC is responsible for developing

and providing the elements of sustainment forARFOR within a region and for other services,based on executive agent responsibilities forcommon servicing. Unless directed by nationalauthority, NGOs and PVOs will provide theirrespective support. Strategic logistics supportis projected from CONUS and other OCONUSsites, using all national resources, includingUSAMC, DLA, other services, and commercialsources. The ASCC provides logistics,direction, and prioritization. The ASCC staffmonitors all support activities to ensuresmooth, daily sustainment of the force. TheASCC seeks to conserve Army resourceswhenever possible by using contractors, thehost nation, or other viable sources of support.In peacetime, the CONUS support basecontinues to project logistics support fromnational resources. The ASCC monitors thesupport of the soldier as well.

The Army personnel system and trainingbase provide a supply of qualified soldiers intoforward-deployed/forward-presence theaters orto units that may deploy into any region. Thefollowing agencies provide daily support tosoldiers and their family members:

•Defense Finance and Accounting Service.•Legal Services Agency.•Chaplaincy Service Support Agency.

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•Community and Family Support Center.•Other Army staff field operating agencies.

The ASCC may coordinate augmentation ofthis support through other services or allies.

Combat health support (CHS) of soldiersincludes all services performed, provided, orarranged by the Army Medical Department topromote, conserve, or restore the mental orphysical well-being of personnel in the Armyand, as directed, in other services, agencies,and organizations. The surgeon general hasoverall worldwide responsibility for Armyhealth care. Senior army commanders andservice components must ensure their soldiersand their soldiers’ family members receivethese services effectively. In theater, the CHSsystem provides care in Echelons I through IV,ultimately leading to treatment in the US.Senior commanders ensure that the Armyhealth care system provides preventivemeasures, progressive treatment,hospitalization, and evacuation of servicemembers and their families. In developedtheaters the support structure is available tosupport peacetime operations. This structureincludes host nation, contract, and interservicesupport agreements. Forces conductingpeacetime operations integrate theiroperations into this structure.

When operating forces require support notpresent in theater or operate in an austeretheater, the ASCC plans and coordinatessupport arrangements either unilaterally orwith joint support agencies. Army commandersdevelop tailored support packages to provideessential support for the ARFOR. This couldinclude functional and area army commands toprovide large-scale or long-term support. Theseconsiderations provide operational-levelcommanders with general synchronizationrequirements applicable to most peacetimeoperations.

TrainingTraining for war is the Army’s top priority.

The ASCC provides the direction, purpose, andnecessary motivation to his subordinates tosuccessfully accomplish the training mission.The ASCC outlines his intent and then ensuresthat his subordinates focus on mission-essential task lists (METLs). Most missionsduring peacetime can be accomplished by adisciplined force proficient in METL tasks.Subordinate METLs must support the CINC’stheater strategy.

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The ASCC goes beyond these fundamentaltraining considerations. Since much of theoperational-level EAC support structureresides in the reserve components, the ASCCmust be involved with active and reservecomponent training as well as with jointrequirements and potentially multinationaltraining. Training during peacetime mustprepare ARFOR for missions across the rangeof military operations and support the national

defense policy of strategic deterrence. Trainingfor leaders may be much broader than thesubordinate METL indicate to ensure theleader flexibility required for conducting bothwarfighting and MOOTW missions. Peacetimeoperations take advantage of the establishedsupport structure and capabilities of thesupport and service support elements thatsustain the routine peacetime activities.

OPERATIONS IN PEACETIME ASCC peacetime operations include, but

are not limited to, security assistance, nationassistance, search and rescue, CA, NEO,peacekeeping, shows of force, support tocounterdrug operations, and humanitarianassistance and disaster relief.

SECURITY ASSISTANCEThe Army conducts security assistance

operations to provide military articles,training, and defense-related servicesauthorized by statute law. Security assistanceis a key element of US foreign policy, with DOSas the lead agent supported by DOD. Theseoperations are strictly controlled by theForeign Assistance Act of 1961, which dealswith international military education andtraining (IMET), or the Arms Export ControlAct of 1976, which deals with foreign militarysales. The US Government provides securityassistance on a credit or cash basis to the hostnation. Senior army commanders must becareful not to commit the US Government toproviding any assistance that could beconstrued as security assistance withoutfollowing the statutory requirements.

The in-country security assistance office(SAO) is the military focal point forformulating, planning, and executing theseprograms. Theater CINCs make significantcontributions, to include supervision, support,selection, and command of SAOs. The ASCCcontributes to developing assistancerequirements. CONUS-based units are usuallycalled on to provide security assistancetraining teams. Still, in-theater or OCONUS-based units could also provide the training.Training provides the most lasting militarycontribution for security assistance efforts.Security assistance officials, in rarecircumstances, may direct the Army to transfermilitary hardware or materiel to foreign

nations in response to a crisis requiring a surgeof military support.

NATION ASSISTANCENation assistance programs promote

stability and orderly progress, thuscontributing to the prevention of conflict. Ifinternal conflict has begun, the goal of nationassistance is to aid in removing its root causes.Nation assistance becomes a primary means ofbringing the conflict to a successful resolutionaccording to the internal defense anddevelopment strategy. Nation assistanceconsists of general missions such as assistingwith development-related infrastructureprojects, training health care workers, andimproving the professionalism of nationalmilitary forces. Nation assistance missions cangenerate useful good will toward the US andassist friendly governments.

SEARCH AND RESCUE Search and rescue operations are

sophisticated actions requiring preciseexecution. They may be clandestine or overt.They may include the rescue of US or foreignnationals or items critical to US nationalsecurity. Rescue operations require timelyintelligence and detailed planning. Theyusually involve highly trained special units butmay be supported by general-purpose forces.Search and rescue operations may be requiredin peacetime as well as in conflict and war.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION NEOs are normally conducted to evacuate

US civilian noncombatants and nonessentialUS military personnel from locations in aforeign (host) nation to a safe haven, preferablythe US. An NEO is normally conducted toevacuate US citizens whose lives are in danger

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from a hostile environment or natural disaster.NEOs may also include the selectiveevacuation of citizens of the host nation andthird-country nationals.

NEOs involve swift, temporary occupancyof an objective, perhaps using temporarilydisabling technologies to minimize casualtiesand end with planned withdrawals. They mayinclude the use of force. Under idealcircumstances, little or no opposition to theoperation exists. Still, commanders mustanticipate and plan for possible hostilities. Ifmilitary forces are employed in an NEO, theyusually comprise units from more than oneservice. The regional CINC, on being ordered tosupport an NEO, designates a JFC to exerciseoverall control of the operations involved in theNEO.

Evacuation operations differ from othermilitary operations, since direction of theoperation may remain with the Americanambassador at the time of the evacuation.Further, the order to evacuate is a diplomatic—rather than a military—decision, withextensive ramifications. FM 90-29 providesdetails on NEO operations.

PEACEKEEPING Military peacekeeping operations support

diplomatic efforts to achieve or maintain peacein areas of potential or actual conflict. Thesingle, most important requirement of apeacekeeping operation is consent to theoperation by all the parties to the dispute. Suchconsent represents an explicit agreement,permitting the introduction of a neutral thirdparty.

The US may participate in peacekeepingoperations under the sponsorship of the UN orother IOs, such as the Organization ofAmerican States, or in cooperation with othercountries. The UN has been the most frequentsponsor of peacekeeping operations.Peacekeeping often involves ambiguoussituations that require the peacekeeping forceto deal with extreme tension and violencewithout becoming a participant. Based on thepeacekeeping mandate and the stationingagreement, specific TOR, follow-on commanddirectives, and ROE are established.

SHOWS OF FORCE Shows of force lend credibility to the

nation’s promises and commitments, increaseits regional influence, and demonstrate resolve.

These operations can influence othergovernments or politico-military organizationsto respect US interests and international law.These operations can take the form of aircraftand ship visits, multinational trainingexercises, forward deployment of militaryforces, and introduction or buildup of militaryforces in a region. The appearance of a credible,trained military force underscores nationalpolicy interests and commitment, improveshost-nation military readiness and morale, andprovides an insight into US values.

COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS Support to counterdrug operations

complies with the national drug controlstrategy, complements the efforts of lawenforcement agencies, and supports foreigngovernments. At the level of national strategy,the NCA places increasing importance on therole of DOD in controlling the flow of drugsacross US borders. The objective of militarycounterdrug efforts is to reduce the flow ofillegal drugs into the US. Military support istherefore a balanced effort to attack the flow ofillegal drugs at the source, while in transit, andduring distribution in the US. Militarycounterdrug activities may also be used tosupport insurgences and counterinsurgenciesand to combat terrorism.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF

Humanitarian assistance and disasterrelief operations are unique peacetimeoperations because they could be conductedwithin CONUS. Recent examples in the UShave included assistance rendered in thenorthwest states to contain forest fires andrelief operations following Hurricanes Hugo in1989 and Andrew in 1992. These operations fallwithin the category of support to domestic civilauthorities. Examples of in-theater operationsinclude famine relief efforts in Somalia andhurricane relief operations in Hawaii followingHurricane Iniki.

Humanitarian assistance and disasterrelief operations provide emergency relief tovictims of natural or man-made disasters.These operations may include refugeeassistance, food preparation and distributionprograms, medical treatment and care, damageassessment and control, forensic identification,maintenance of law and order, reestablishment

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of communications networks, and sanitation/water facilities.

ARFOR are committed to these operationswhen localities become overwhelmed by theextent of the situation and can no longerprovide basic human needs and protection. Theability to respond on short notice with a widearray of capabilities is a unique attribute of theArmy. The length of commitment is normallylimited to the time that communities and othergovernment and private agencies can handlecontinued operations by themselves. Whenproperly executed, military participation inhumanitarian assistance and disaster reliefoperations has long-term positive effects.Overseas, such participation demonstratesgood will and engenders mutual respect. Athome, it provides soldiers the opportunity todemonstrate their skills while helping theirfellow citizens.

CIVIL AFFAIRS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Although not a peacetime operation, CAand PSYOP are critical operations that aidcommanders in accomplishing their peacetimeobjectives. Commanders at all levels mustunderstand the depth and capabilities of CAand psychological support found throughoutany given command. Commanders mustunderstand the CA and PSYOP ability tosupport US and allied armed forces.

Civil AffairsARFOR execute CA programs to support

the unified commander. During peacetime, CAsupport is often provided as an ancillarybenefit to deployments for training. CA units

are suited to both short-term and longer-terminvolvement. To be effective in short-termoperations, these programs require continuouspreparation, regional expertise, and consistentcoordination between civil and militaryauthorities. This preparation is best achievedthrough peacetime involvement in the theater.

Psychological OperationsARFOR PSYOP forces execute PSYOP to

support the unified commander and USnational interests. Throughout the range ofmilitary operations, PSYOP is a vital forceemployed to optimize the influence of USnational policy on foreign target audiences,whether neutral, hostile, or friendly. InMOOTW, PSYOP provides the commanderwith the capability to project the purpose andmission of US forces and to influence targetaudience behavior to support the commander’smission.

PSYOP is a force multiplier, providinglong-range, mid- to long-term support of theunified commander’s intent. While classified asSOF, PSYOP is a general force multiplier. Thissupport exists at all levels of command andoperations—from strategic to tactical. PSYOPunits are regionally focused and maintainextensive historical research and expertise onthe sociological, economical, and religiouspractices and on the languages of a given AO.ARFOR PSYOP support US Army, Navy,Marine Corps, Air Force, and allied forces.Except for PSYOP-unique equipment andmilitary occupational specialties (MOS), theunit of attachment sustains PSYOP elements.For PSYOP to achieve maximum effectiveness,planners must include it in the planningprocess early.

TRANSITION TO HOSTILITIES Operations conducted in peacetime are The theater CINC organizes his AOR for

designed to preclude the onset of conflict. Due orderly and rapid transition from a peacetimeto factors that may not be controlled, conflict posture to different levels of hostility. Thismay evolve. Because the transition to conflict process is sequential and sufficiently flexible tomay occur in a gradual or abrupt manner, the respond to any situation. The transitionARFOR commander must prepare for either process must be responsive enough toeventuality. The operational METT-T diplomatic initiatives to be halted or reversedassessment provides the mental process for the once it has begun. The CINC must be sensitivecontinuing reevaluation of the operational to the fact that a prolonged state of heightenedenvironment. That reevaluation aids the readiness for combat without action may drainidentification of needed Army capabilities in resources and adversely affect morale.the event of conflict. Such identification assistsnational-level decision makers in determining The ASCC translates mission orders frommobilization requirements. the CINC into plans and military operations. If

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mobilization is required, AMOPES—the Armysystem that supports JOPES—provides adisciplined planning procedure for conductingArmy mobilization, deployment, planning, andexecution (see also FM 100-17). The ASCC andappropriate Army commanders review themobilization requirements established inAMOPES, CONPLANs, and OPLANs to meetthe situation. C2 relationships are likely tochange as levels of hostility and militaryinvolvement increase.

Commanders participate in joint andmultinational planning efforts and coordinateand prepare ARFOR for deployment andemployment. Finally, commanders contributeARFOR ready to meet joint and multinationaloperational requirements and to establish alogistical base to support fielded Army units.

RESPONSIBILITIES IN CONFLICT

The theater CINC, with concurrence fromthe NCA, determines when all or part of hisAOR is in a state of conflict. Conflict is a stateof hostile opposition among organized partiesor groups within a nation, or between or amongnations, and usually involves irregular forcesto achieve limited diplomatic or militaryobjectives. Conflict is often protracted, andirregular forces often dominate.

Military actions may be confined togeographic areas. When US Army units aredirectly engaged in conflict, they can expectguidelines on weaponry and the degree of forceauthorized. Diplomatic leaders will likely limitobjectives to those achievable with short,focused, and direct application of militaryforce. Even though limited in scope, these shortapplications of force may be part of a campaignor major operation phased over an extendedperiod. The NCA or the CINC may further limitthe conduct of military operations to a specificgeographic area.

The Army’s RoleThe Army’s role in conflict is to assist a JFC

in gaining control, deterring escalation, andrestoring order. Conflict operations arechallenging because they require a measuredapplication of military force sufficient toaccomplish the designated objectives.Typically, conflict occurs in diplomatically—charged situations within specific legalboundaries. ARFOR operate in a hostileenvironment with a high probability of physical

confrontation; though sometimes, combatoperations may not occur. Army leaders mayconduct operations very similar to operationsduring war but execute them with bothrestraints and constraints placed on the use offirepower and maneuver.

FactorsSenior army commanders must keep four

factors in mind when considering operations inconflict: coordination, balance, planning foruncertainty, and identification of risk.

CoordinationCoordination is critical to establishing the

basis for the operations being conducted. TheArmy must cooperate with other governmentagencies, services, and nations to dealeffectively with the diplomatically sensitivesituations present in conflict.

BalanceCommanders must balance the combat

posture and readiness of their soldiers againstthe volatile environment in which theyfunction. A balance must also be struckbetween diplomatic goals and the scale,intensity, and nature of Army operationssupporting those goals.

Planning for UncertaintyCommanders must build flexibility into

their plans and operations. Conflict situationsare full of uncertainty as presented by both thethreat and the diplomatic conditions that limitArmy options.

Identification of RiskCommanders must seek to increase their

options while limiting the enemy’s options.Successful commanders do not run out ofoptions. Risks and gambles are part of optiondecisions. The decision to take risks is weighedagainst the mission, probability of success,available intelligence, and as many otherfactors as are available to the commander inhis decision cycle.

ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT FUNCTIONS IN CONFLICT

Operations during conflict present achallenge to Army leadership. The military, asone of four elements of national power, may notdominate events but may adapt its operationsto fit those of other lead agencies. In coalition

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and interagency operations, the ASCC mustachieve unity of effort through cooperation,liaison, negotiation, and compromise. Wherepracticable, agreements should be formalizedin writing as TOR, memorandums ofunderstanding (MOUs), or similarinstruments. Tasks required of the ARFOR willvary relative to the success of returning thearea in conflict to a state of peace. ARFOR mustbe flexible enough to meet a wide range ofoperational requirements. The conflictenvironment will challenge the versatility ofthe force.

Movement and ManeuverMovement and maneuver in conflict are

characterized by planning that reflects therestrictions and constraints placed on militaryoperations. These restrictions and constraintsform a set of requirements and prohibitionsimposed by the NCA. They usually have adiplomatic basis that outweighs militarilypreferred alternatives. The NCA articulatesthese restrictions and constraints in differentmanners.

ROE are the translation of circumstancesand limitations for the initiation and conduct ofengagements with hostile forces. Personnelceiling caps restrict the level of forces that canbecome involved in a conflict within prescribedgeographical boundaries. Designated AOsdefine restrictions on the commander’s battlespace. These factors combine to influence themovement of forces into the AO. After thatmovement, maneuver is influenced by thesesame factors.

Army ForceIn conflict, the Army force needed is a key

consideration. Often the presence ofoverwhelming force in the conflict areadiscourages enemy actions. Senior armycommanders must forthrightly articulate theresources required to achieve quick anddecisive victory with minimum casualties.Based upon the diplomatic situation and othercompeting priorities, the Army commandermay have to achieve his goals withconsiderably fewer resources than he desires.The sequencing of major operations in thisenvironment requires patience and a clearunderstanding of the diplomatic realities thatapply to the particular conflict.

Forcible EntryConditions may require a forcible entry.

This capability requires the staging of forces

over time and space. Chapter 6 addresses someconsiderations for forcible entry. Among thekey considerations is the element of force mix.Combat forces are key to seizing the lodgmentarea, but support forces become immediatelycritical thereafter. Strategic planners and forcecommanders must ensure that logistics forcesand sustainment resources are deployed intheater as soon as possible to enable combatforces to conduct continuous operations.

Reception and OnwardMovement

The mission of reception and onwardmovement is to integrate rapidly arrivingforces and supplies into the theater withoutdisrupting the operation’s tempo. This missionmust be balanced against support to currentoperations, as both are logistically intensive.Accordingly, the ASCC must carefully plan andexecute reception and onward movement tomaintain the proper balance to supportarriving forces and the operation’s tempo.Early base development efforts are keyconsiderations for the Army commander. Unitsand facilities for the reception of forces arecritical, especially in the initial phase and in anundeveloped theater.

Disposition of ForcesThe final consideration for maneuver

during conflict is the disposition of forces.Deployment of forces into their initial positionsis critical. This positioning must support bothcurrent and subsequent operations asenvisioned by the Army commanders. ARFORmay operate from noncontiguous bases thatrequire the Army commander to develop linesof operation and support with a minimumamount of protection. To be able to rapidlymass his forces and prevent the enemy fromgaining the initiative, the commander musthave a finely tuned intelligence capability, adetailed understanding of the physicaldisposition of friendly forces, and a high degreeof operational-level mobility.

FiresOperational-level fires during conflict

revolve around two key considerations: ROEand coordination of joint fires. The types of firespermitted are likely to be limited, and the firesused will require a higher level of precision andgreater reliance on temporary disablingtechniques and technology. Collateral damageis less tolerable in conflict. Failure to control

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and limit collateral damage can endanger thelong-term effects supporting stability.

The Army may find itself in a supportedrole in the area of operational fires. Forinstance, the precision and depth of the firesrequired may dictate a predominant Air Forcerole. To achieve his operational objectives andcomplement the JFC’s plan, the Armycommander selects targets for Army resourcesto attack and nominates targets for otherresources to attack. The joint coordinationprocess is critical to ensuring that resourcesare not wasted and that fires create asynergistic effect.

The Army operational-level commandermust have an organic staff capability to planand coordinate operational-level fires. Thisstaff element is the DOCC. His staff must alsohave the capability to augment the joint stafffor planning and coordinating joint operationalfires. Because of potential restraints andconstraints caused by concerns over collateraldamages, other systems may take on a role ofgreater utility. Other systems’ fires aredesigned to impair, disrupt, or delay theperformance of enemy operational forces,functions, and facilities. PSYOP, SOF, EW(jamming), and other C2 countermeasures areall disabling fire options.

ProtectionProtection of the force requires heightened

awareness as conditions move toward directconfrontation. As the likelihood ofconfrontation increases, so does thevulnerability of the force, unless additionalprotection measures are implemented.Protection conserves the fighting potential of aforce and is every soldier’s responsibility.Protection has four components.

•The first component includes OPSEC anddeception operations. Successful executionof this component prevents the enemy fromlocating and causing harm to friendly forces.

•The second component supports keepingsoldiers healthy and maintaining theirfighting morale. It includes protecting theirequipment and supplies and taking care oftheir basic needs.

•The third component is safety. It is aprincipal element and must be an integralpart of all military operations. Soldiersconducting military operations are placed atrisk; still, commanders must ensure that

soldiers are not placed in an undue risksituation. Strong command and levels ofdiscipline and training lessen those risks.Training in peacetime must be realistic andequate to requirements for fighting in war.

•The fourth component is avoidingfratricide— the unintentional killing orwounding of friendly personnel by fire.Commanders must maintain situationalawareness of the enemy and theirpersonnel. This situational awareness,along with strong command presence,disciplined operations, and anticipation offuture operations helps limit probabilityand occurrences of fratricide.

Commanders implement theTHREATCON system. Table 8-1 brieflydescribes THREATCONs Normal, Alpha,Bravo, Charlie, and Delta. The implementationdecision is based upon—

•The threat assessment.•Personnel and facility criticality andvulnerabilities.

•Resource availability.•Operations and morale impacts.•Damage control considerations.•International relations.•Possible terrorist retaliatory responses.

The commander must recognize thatinformation on the threat is difficult to obtainprior to an incident. Army Regulation 525-13discusses the combatting terrorism program indetail. The identification of friendly forcevulnerabilities and geopolitical assets are keysteps in protection. Essential facilities must beidentified. Communications must be protectedfrom interference and interception. While thebasic principles for deception hold true duringconflict, they are often more difficult to apply.

OPSEC is significantly harder to sustain inan open society where national survival is notat stake. Deception is more difficult to achievewhen the operational-level objectives havemore diplomatic content than militarysignificance. The Army commander mustensure that his deception plans support theunified command’s plans and are notcompromised by information leaks. Theenvironment of conflict often appears peaceful,requiring commanders to remain vigilant to

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guard against complacency. Terrorism is mosteffective when the threat is not highly visibleand surprise is likely to be achieved.

Command and ControlDuring conflict, the ASCC contributes to

the CINC’s theater strategy of limitinghostilities. These efforts often involve directuse of military power to complement diplomaticinitiatives. The principal C2 problem is how tointegrate US military actions with leadagencies of our own or foreign governments.The Army has a variety of operations to selectfrom in supporting conflict situations, all ofwhich have some common C2 considerations.

StructureMilitary leaders conduct conflict operations

without a declaration of war. The absence ofthis declaration restricts the structuring of thetheater for operations. In MOOTW, the CINCdoes not establish a theater of war or theatersof operation unless it is a major conflict.Normally, he establishes smaller areas, such asa JOA, for conducting operations. Diplomaticconsiderations predominate over purelymilitary requirements and constrain C2. Thesenior military leader has a greater level offreedom than in peacetime but must coordinateclosely with nonmilitary agencies. Whateverthe geographic organization, the ASCC mustestablish clear C2 structures for conductingoperations in conflict.

Command RelationshipsCommand relationships and structure

usually begin with existing peacetimearrangements that require a degree of

transition to a state of conflict footing. Conflictplanners may have to consider combinedrelationships. The level of internationalintegration will affect C2. The unified commandstructure serves as the C2 structure to buildupon. C2 may emanate straight from thenational level if operations include actions ofdirect strategic importance.

As operations in theater transition toconflict, in-theater forces and existing C2

relationships may be adequate to accomplishthe mission. ARFOR from CONUS or othertheaters could increase the complexity, scope,and level of forces executing operations beyondthe capabilities of the normal theaterstructure. This would thereby requireaugmentation or restructuring. In austeretheaters, an Army force may have to arrive intheater prepared to support itself and executeoperations unassisted. Later, the theaterASCC may control all operations, or the CINCcould task the ASCC to support operationswhile he directly controls the execution ofoperations through a separate operationalchain of command.

PlanningArmy operational-level commanders are

active participants in the development of allconflict plans. They may participate indeliberate planning (JOPES, Volume VI) toprepare for anticipated or potential actions.Unanticipated or rapidly developing situationsmay require operational-level commanders toconduct CAP. Planning for conflict, especiallyat the operational level, is a continuousprocess. Rapidly changing diplomatic

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conditions may change the desired objective,composition, and sequencing of conflictoperations. Planners must prepare multiplebranches and sequels to enhance their abilityto provide timely support. Senior armycommanders require a flexible force structureto enable their organization to achieve thedesired strategic end.

IntelligenceEarly establishment of an ACE is critical

for successful operations. ACE operationsshould commence within the theater ofoperations before hostilities. Intelligencecommunications established between thetheater intelligence center and the nationalsystems provide the critical intelligence thatUS military forces require immediately uponarrival and until tactical intelligence flow isestablished.

Operational intelligence must support thetargeting effort of operational fires and/orset the stage for operational-level maneuver.Success requires sound IPB. In conflict, IPBmay follow the process used for a conventionalbattlefield or a modified process that focuses onnonmilitary information. Civilian trends areoften as important as operational information.Weather analysis remains an important part ofIPB. Doctrinal templates for guerrillas,surrogates, and narcotics traffickers do notexist.

Intelligence personnel need differentcollection techniques and backgroundinformation, which may require continuousupdating. The process must react to thedynamics of the specific situation it supports,as well as to the worldwide situation.Intelligence agencies must exploit the fullrange of both US and host nation intelligenceand counterintelligence productioncapabilities. This includes the collection andanalysis of SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT,which are particularly valuable in determininghostile intentions.

The ASCC provides theater-specificintelligence integration for the Armyoperational-level commander. The Armycommander develops his picture of theoperational area, based upon the threat hefaces and the information gathered by theintelligence system. Intelligence should be thebasis for all action.

During foreign internal defense operations,the Army’s intelligence organization works

closely with the host government to developand improve the intelligence capabilities of allsecurity forces. During counterinsurgencyoperations, intelligence provides the basis forall US and host nation plans. Prior tocommitment, US military forces providespecific intelligence requirements to the USnational intelligence community. This ensuresthat national-level collection focuses on forcerequirements. Cooperative or multinational MIactivities at the operational level are integralto effective intelligence collection andproduction. Army intelligence units providetechnical expertise, management, and advice todevelop host nation intelligence capabilities.They help establish objectives and, wheredesirable and feasible, develop commonprocedures.

The Army can provide tactical intelligencesupport in conflict situations. ARFOR cancontribute experience and expertise toestablish and manage all-source intelligenceoperations and enhance overall management ofthe intelligence effort. This management ofintelligence information includes data oninternal unrest, on external support forinsurgencies, and on host nation militarycapabilities, including intelligence andcounterintelligence.

The threat of sabotage, terrorism, andsubversion requires MI staffs to focus theircounterintelligence collection efforts. Theseefforts require close coordination with hostnation police and legal officials. In countrieswhere cooperative or multinational intelligencesystems already exist, newly arrived Armytactical units normally work with the areaitelligence elements on a mutual supportbasis. When the situation forces Army units tomove frequently, they should not assumeresponsibility for long-term, area-orientedintelligence programs. Still, they maycontribute significantly to short-term collectionand production efforts. All Army personnelduring conflict provide information which,when tied into the data-gathering system, canproduce useful intelligence.

LogisticsIn conflict, the ASCC tailors logistics to

provide basic requirements in an austeresituation. He stages logistics and usesintermediate support bases, leading to full basedevelopment if necessary. He does this with theuse of HNS. Early deployment of the LSE fromUSAMC ensures a positive link from the

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deploying units to the national logistics systemand may be required to fill gaps in the TOElogistics infrastructure or projected selectedelements of the national/industrial base intotheater. The LSE could provide an initial C2

structure to orchestrate USAMC resources andthe logistics efforts of contractors and HNS.The degree of development of the host nation’sinfrastructure has a significant influence uponthe Army commander’s long-range logisticsoperations. In an austere environment,logistics operations can take precedence overnear-term combat operations.

organizations. These logistics responsibilitiesinclude—

•Patient evacuation and medical regulation.•Hospitalization.•Health service Iogistics/blood management.•Preventive medicine, dental, veterinary,medical laboratory, and combat stresscontrol services.

•Area medical support.•Command, control, and communications(C3).

The Army commander takes a long-range Logistics operations may become theview of the conflict situation and plans hislogistics for the anticipated duration of combat

primary Army weapon in conflict. Criticallogistical skills supplied by the Army may

operations, plus a transition period. He is allow the host nation to focus on combatresponsible for providing HSS to ARFOR and, requirements in the particular conflict, withas directed, to other services, agencies, and little or no US Army participation.

OPERATIONS IN CONFLICT In conflict, the ASCC executes a variety of a terrorist act. Antiterrorism includes those

operations that contribute to the achievement of defensive measures that reduce thetheater-strategic goals. These may include the vulnerability of individuals and property. Thecontinuation and expansion of the full range of extent of these defensive measures variespreviously discussed operations begun in based on assessment of the local threat. Thesepeacetime, as well as attacks, raids, UW, measures include—support of insurgences and •Being personally aware and knowledgeablecounterinsurgencies, peacemaking, securityassistance surges, and operations to combat of personal protection techniques.terrorism. Sometimes operations are in •Implementing crime and physical securityresponse to a crisis or other rapidly developing programs to harden the target.situation. At other times operations may call forlong-term planning and sequenced execution to •Making installations and personnel lesssupport theater goals. Chapter 4 provides Army appealing as terrorist targets.planning and deployment considerations forcrisis situations. FM 100-17 addresses Armyplanning and deployment considerations acrossthe range of military operations.

TERRORISM Terrorism is the calculated use of violence

or the threat of violence to inculcate fear.Terrorism is intended to coerce or intimidategovernments or societies pursuing goals thatare generally diplomatic, religious, orideological. Combatting terrorism consists ofdefensive (antiterrorism) and offensive(counterterrorism) actions.

Antiterrorism

Counterterrorism Counterterrorism includes the full range of

offensive measures to prevent, deter, andrespond to terrorism. These measures arenormally carried out by SOF under thedirection of the NCA. Local measures includeonly those actions taken to terminate anincident or apprehend individuals responsiblefor terrorist acts. Other countermeasures—preemption, intervention, or retaliation withspecialized forces operating under the directionof the NCA—have the characteristics of attacksor raids.

The Army commander may conduct actionsbefore, during, or after a terrorist incident.

Antiterrorism includes all measures that Although DOS has the lead in combattinginstallations, units, and individuals take to OCONUS terrorism, the Army commander andreduce the probability of their falling victim to his staff must understand the threat and its

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tactics, as well as current US policies, whendealing with terrorists. The Army may be thelead or a supporting force in an effort to combatterrorism during a specific operation.

ATTACKS AND RAIDS Attacks and raids can support rescue or

recovery operations to destroy or seizeequipment or facilities that demonstrablythreaten national collective security interests.They can also support counterdrug operationsby destroying narcotics production ortransshipment facilities (if authorized by theNCA) or by supporting a host government’sactions in this regard. The principles of combatoperations directly apply.

Attacks by ground, air, and naval forcesdamage or destroy high-value targets ordemonstrate the capability to do so. Raids areusually small-scale operations involving swiftpenetration of hostile territory to secureinformation, seize an objective, or destroytargets. Attacks and raids end with awithdrawal. Successful attacks and raids cancreate situations that permit seizing andmaintaining the diplomatic initiative. To besuccessful, they require the proper focus ofplanning, organization, training, andequipment. Attacks and raids may involveconventional forces and SOF. The JFC usuallyplays a larger role than the Army operational-level commander in planning and executingthese types of operations.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE UW is a series of military and paramilitary

operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled, or diplomatically sensitive territory.UW includes, but is not limited to, guerrillawarfare, evasion and escape, subversion,sabotage, and other operations of a lowvisibility, covert, or clandestine nature. USmilitary support to UW operations can includethe use of both conventional forces and SOF.UW is usually a long-term effort.

Techniques and tactics for certain UWoperations are similar to those employed insupport of insurgences. However, support forinsurgency differs from that for UW.Insurgency accomplishes strategic goalsdirectly, whereas UW typically supportsconventional operations. The difference affectsthe operational and strategic design of theoperation. For example, operations in supportof insurgences give priority to infrastructure

and diplomatic development, while UWemphasizes military actions.

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Insurgency and counterinsurgency are twoaspects of the same process. However, theydiffer in execution. Insurgents assume thatappropriate change within the existing systemis not possible or likely. Insurgency thereforefocuses on radical change in diplomatic controland requires extensive use of covertinstruments and methods. Counterinsurgencyuses principally overt methods and assumesappropriate change within the existing systemis possible and likely. The US supports selectedinsurgences that oppose oppressive regimeswhich work against US interests. Sincesupport for insurgences is often covert, manyoperations connected with them are specialactivities. Because of their extensive UWtraining, SOF are well-suited to provide suchsupport.

Conventional forces may be called on whenthe situation requires their functionalspecialties. Their tasks may include supportand advice. The CINC may direct the ASCC toprovide equipment, training, and services toinsurgent forces. In the following types ofoperations, ARFOR can assist insurgents:

•Recruiting, organizing, training, andequipping forces to perform unconventionalor guerrilla warfare.

•PSYOP.•Institutional and infrastructure

development.•Intelligence-gathering.•Surreptitious insertion.•Linkups.•Evasion and escape of combatants.•Subversion.•Sabotage.•Resupply.

The US uses its military resources toprovide support to a host nation’scounterinsurgency operations in the context offoreign internal defense (FID). FID is theparticipation by civilian and military agenciesin any of the action programs anothergovernment takes to free its society from

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subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. TheUS ambassador, through his country team,provides the focal point for interagencycoordination and supervision of FID.

Military support to FID is providedthrough the unified CINC. Military resourcesprovide materiel, advisors, trainers, andsecurity assistance forces to support the hostnation government’s counterinsurgencyoperations through SAOs. ARFOR operationsthat support a host nation conducting acounterinsurgency may include, but are notlimited to, intelligence-gathering, joint andcombined exercises, civil-military operations,humanitarian or civic assistance, logisticalsupport operations, populace and resourcecontrol operations, drug-interdictionoperations, and tactical operations.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT (OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER)

When in the national interest to stop aviolent conflict and force a return to diplomaticmethods, the US conducts peace enforcement(PE) operations with its military forces. The UStypically undertakes PE operations at therequest of appropriate national authorities in aforeign state or to protect US citizens as part ofan international multilateral or unilateraloperation. The PE force does not represent awholly disinterested power or such a drasticcommitment would not be made. However, theinterests of the country or countries thatprovide forces for these operations are servedbest by a cessation of violence and a negotiatedsettlement.

Conflict within a given area eventuallyaffects adjacent areas. These effects are seldomdesirable and can include refugee movements,arms marketing, proliferation of weapons, andenvironmental contamination. A furtherpotential exists for the expansion of the conflictbeyond its original boundaries.

The long-range goals of a PE operation aretwo-fold. The first goal is to contain the conflictto prevent the destabilization of adjacent areas.The second goal is the agreement to anegotiated settlement by the parties to theconflict. This settlement must resolve the basisfor the conflict and establish the foundation forthe transition to peacekeeping operations andpeacetime operations. The diplomaticcomplexities of operations to restore orderrequire that available force be sufficient but itsuse be applied with discretion. The operationalso requires that the forces be appropriate tothe environment.

The senior army commander mustunderstand the constraints and diplomaticsensitivities of this environment and recognizethat local law and customs often influence hisactions. PE operations require continuousmission analysis, clear C2 relationships,effective communications facilities, joint andmultinational force liaison, and effective publicdiplomacy and PSYOP.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES

The US accelerates security assistancewhen a friendly or allied nation faces imminentthreat. In these surges, operations usuallyfocus on logistical support. Geography, themagnitude of the logistics effort, and timelimitations determine airlift and sealiftrequirements. US support to Israel during the1973 Arab-Israeli War illustrates this kind ofoperation. The Yom Kippur War demonstratesthe importance of airlift in the initial stages ofconflict and the follow-on strength of sealift.The CINC may direct the senior armycommander to provide equipment from hiscommand as part of security assistance surges.The senior army commander may also providesome of the logistical support (port operationand line haul units) needed to transfer surgeequipment to the friendly nation.

TRANSITION TO PEACETIME OR WAR

The successful termination of conflict operations and prepare the way for the use ofoperations leads to a return to peacetime. The diplomatic, informational, and economicunsuccessful termination of conflict endangers elements of power in a peacetime environment.US interests or threatens a possible transition As the level of hostility lessens, the ASCCto war. In either case, the ASCC must be changes the composition of his force. Heprepared for these outcomes. The ASCC plans replaces those combat arms forces—essentialconsolidation operations to terminate combat during combat operations—with CS and CSS

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forces as hostilities subside. Finally, he and reconstitution of forces, which facilitates apositions nation-assistance forces to complete return to peacetime activities. As a part ofthe transition to peacetime operations. postoperation reporting, the commander

develops lessons learned for incorporation intoThe ASCC plans an orderly redeployment training during peacetime activities.of forces. This redeployment includes recovery

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Appendix D

Digitization of the Battlefield

The concept for information operations describes the explosion ininformation technology and the effects on Army operations. It relatesthe importance of information and how to win the information war inmilitary operations, now and into the twenty-first century. Theability to manipulate, isolate, or negate portions of informationinfrastructure systems (electromagnetic spectrum, computers, and soforth) will be key element of future military operations—in war andMOOTW. Disrupting an opponent’s ability to effectively use thesesystems, while protecting our own, will prove crucial in the future.

INFORMATION AGE TECHNOLOGY Information Age technology will provide

the means to control and dominate the battlespace in any situation. The Army of today andinto the twenty-first century will meet thechallenges of the Information Age by achievingforce coherence through shared knowledge,instead of through traditional means such asgraphic control measures or geographicaldemarcations. Joint Pub 3-13 and FM 100-6establish doctrine for this new domain.Information operations provide commandersthe METT-T-specific knowledge, coupled witha rapid and precise vision of the battlefield, togain dominance in a battle space and controlthe tempo of operations.

Rapid advances in automated C2 systemsrequire commanders and soldiers to operatehighly sophisticated equipment to functioneffectively on the battlefield. Information aboutthe adversary and friendly formations will be

distributed among all committed forces—land,sea, air, and space-to create a common view ofthe battle space and a shared situationalawareness across the force. This sharedsituational awareness, coupled with the abilityto conduct continuous operations, will allowForce XXI armies to observe, decide, and actfaster, more correctly, and more precisely thantheir adversaries.

Soldiers do not gain advantage over theenemy by simply using automated equipment.Soldiers achieve and exploit the advantagewhen they optimize information presented bydigital systems. Optimizing the use ofautomated information begins with discretionin the use of digital reporting. Digital reportingand the digital display are not substitutes forhard copy reports or maps; they are aids inmanaging and presenting information for thepurpose of decision making.

THE DIGITIZED FORCE Future information technology will provide conventionally-equipped predecessor. The

the means to collect, process, disseminate, and digitized force has an improved capability todisplay information in unparalleled volume, achieve the agility, depth, and synchronizationspeed, and accuracy. Digitization of the that characterize successful Army operationsbattlefield provides common formats, rapid through the use of shared collective unitprocessing, and timely transmission of data. images.The ASCC/ARFOR commander must beconcerned with asymmetrical capabilities Collective unit images form a battle spacewithin the force. While modernizing the force, framework. This framework is based on sharedhe must be cognizant of units that are real-time awareness of the arrangement ofmaintaining current capabilities—not only forces in the battle space, instead of a rigidARFOR but also joint and multinational as framework of battlefield geometry such aswell. The digitized force has capabilities and phase lines, objectives, and battle positions.limitations distinctly separate from its Digitization of the force permits commanders

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FM 100-7

at every level to share a common, relevantpicture of the battlefield scaled to their level ofinterest and tailored to their specific needs.Commanders of digitized units at the sameechelon share a perspective (situationalawareness) of their position in relation toadjacent units. Combat, CS, and CSS leaders,horizontally linked by common information,visualize how they will conduct and supportmajor operations, battles, and engagements.Their execution is integrated by a shared visionof the battle space.

The commander of a digitized force hassignificant advantages over commanders ofconventionally-equipped forces. The mostsignificant advantages are-

•An increased situational awareness.•Enhancement of the planning and preparation of orders and the distributionprocess.

•Digital aids that enhance the timeliness andaccuracy of the reporting process and employment of assets.

•An improved capability to achieve mass atthe decisive point. (This includes theachievement of mass of CS and CSS assetsas well).

•Digitization and automation of reports,

which provide the capability to shareinformation at each level of the chain ofcommand. The recipient of a report can lookat the location of the reported enemyelement and compare it to his operationalgraphics and friendly unit locations. Thiscomparison allows the recipient todetermine potential problems with thedisposition or orientation of friendly unitsand adjust accordingly.

In offensive operations, automatedreporting is useful in synchronizing the schemeof maneuver during unexpected contingenciessuch as identifying enemy obstacles. Thisexchange of automated combat informationprovides the commander and his staff criticalinformation necessary to maintain and exploitthe initiative during offensive operations. Indefensive operations, automated reportsenable commanders of digital units to transmitall information on enemy activity in sector inone digital spot report, instead of in manyseparate spot reports. With the increasedreliance on digital technology comes thelimitations of the hardware and softwareassociated with the systems. Limitations incomputer memory and communicationscapabilities address the requirement tomaintain conventional control methods forunits.

NONDIGITAL UNIT INTEGRATION The integration of digitally-equipped

elements with conventionally-equipped(nondigital) elements into the force presentsspecial challenges for the commander and staff.The commander must ensure that both digitaland nondigital procedures are available forcommunicating and supporting. The ASCC/ARFOR commander must establish provisionsto receive automated information from digitalunits. Control measures used by digital unitsare identical to hard-copy overlays.

SUPPORTING Application of information operations

(electronic management and informationsystems) necessitates the formation of strategicalliances between Army logistics mechanismsin theater and civilian industry. This forgedlinkage between the sustainment base and theASCC/ARFOR commander will negate the

The ASCC/ARFOR commander must useliaison officers or establish other positivecontrol measures to ensure proper coordinationbetween digital and nondigital units. TheASCC/ARFOR commander must establishprocedures that specify which reports will becommunicated digitally, by voice, or in hardcopy. Digital information will be processed fordistribution to nondigital units.

THE FORCE requirement for Army-managed, in-theaterstockpiles and incorporate split-basedoperations. Because of situational awareness(the shared knowledge on the digitizedbattlefield between combat, CS, and CSSunits), CSS units can maintain an on-timeinventory of supplies and deliver the supplies

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Appendix D

more efficiently. CSS units will push requiredsupport forward—to the right units at the righttime.

Digitization of the battlefield will increaseawareness and coordination over a wide area,enabling the commander to obtain the nearreal-time information he needs in the mostefficient and effective format. This digitizationprovides the commander with—

•A common view of the battlefield.•Situational awareness.•Battlefield synchronization.

•C2 on the move.

•Horizontal integration.

•Combat identification.

•Fratricide prevention.

To effectively plan the application andemployment of these new technologies withinthe force, the ASCC/ARFOR commander mustbe aware of their advantages anddisadvantages. Synchronizing digitized andnondigitized units will be a major task.

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