Chapter 5

The Rational Theory of Social Act ion

5.1 The h n c t i o n r of Communicatiw Competence

With the relentla attack on the 'eubjectivity', which ha been shown to be "infiltrated with the worldw in ~ u e b a way that the "otherness is carried to the very heart of seIfhwdw, philmophy has bean deprieved of its last vestige of the poat of high prieat of cul- ture. Such a vitriolic attack on the aspiratiom of moderai~m, of a rationalized society, threw up qumtio& re8ardin.g the p n e r d mcid theory. Being anything other than a hiatoriciatic contemplation of variety of forms of life of the past or a herlneneutic dialogue with other culturea,and epochs about the common concerns of human life, a social theory was inconceivable. Habermas' aim is to provide an account of communicatiou that ia both tllcoretical iu~d norma- tive, that goes beyond a pure hermeneutics without beiug reducible to a etrictly empirical-analytical science. Habermas supplants the paradigm shift from that of consciousness to that of language in his own language-in-use or speech. Thus, a categorical framework and a normative foundation have been laid in the form of a general theory of wmu~uuicative actiou. Ile see8 coruuiuuicatio~r ae ou~~~iprese~rt i~r all walks of life. McC:arlLy wri~eu:"llabetu~aa' argument is, siu~ply, that the goal of critical theory-a form of life free from unnecessary domination in its forms-is inherent in the notion of truth: it is anticipated in every act of commuuicatio~~.~"

In the modern perepective, the subject has two f u n c t i o ~ with reference to the world of objects. They are: 1) repreantation and 2) ackiou. Using the "wgnitiveinstru~~~cr~~tal rationalityn, a aubject is capable of gaining knowledge. And, by the use of intellect, oue ia capable of putting the knowledge acquired into effective we in adapt-

ing to and manipulating the environment. Haberrnaa arguea that all goal-orienkd actions of all individuab converge in socially oriented actions. The communicative model of action doea not epusts ac- tion with communication. Language ia a meana of communication. It mvea in forging mutual underatending among the wauthom of communicative activity who pursue their individual aim. The social action ie balanced upon the calculation of utility and the mcially integrating norms and values enshrined in cultural traditions and eocialization in reaching an underatanding employing the method of hermeneutiw.

Since the paradigm shift is from the telwlogical to the communica- tive, the baaia must be language which is the only medium shared by all humans an the avenue for communicating their deairas, emotions, and ideaa. Habermas draws heavily on linguiaticu, philosop4y of l a - guage, and on the wglljtive developmexltal psychology. Habermae argues that the ability to coni~uunica~e is univernally preaeut aud the basic structures and fundamental rules sre maatered by subjects who speak the Isnguage. Habermas, acwrding to McCartb, anticipated the universal pragmatics to undertake the rational reconstruction of general etructurea that appear regularly and in their backdrop in- terpret the specific types of linguistic utterance8 and thus them is an ideal in practice and a practicable ideal. Thus they aasume the character of l o r d - p r a g u a ~ i u . IIabcrmae says, "The separation of the two analytical le~eb:~language" and "speech," cannot be made iu such a way that the pragmatic dimension of language b left to an ex- clusively empirid analysis."' Commu~cative competence involves more thau luere wmmur~icrrLiuri of idew. 11. eucolupasees tile wlrolc g u u t of h w relationship, interpersoad, external, looking into

it deeply, the ahility to uuderstand the yearninga, inteutione, and emotions of one's own and that of others, nlaking validity claims r e garding truth and knowledge. Tu be a participant in communication, the speaker must have(in addition to linguistic competence) 'basic

of speech and eymbolic interaction (rolebehaviour), which we may call communicative ~mpe tence . '~ Even soci* politi- cal and historical relationships have been eatablished only byexer- cizing communicative competence for otherwise, without expressing oneself humane are as good as a corpaes. Since man reacts for or against the expreenion of emotions, intentions, and deairea and since man has the ability to alter the degrees of reaction by applying the power of his rational choice, Habermas looks up to the concept of ratiouality where there is no coercior~ arid wl~ere there ia delllocracy and freedom of choice.

Tlie process of reaching understa~~diug( Verslandigurcg ) ie inter- subjective in gaining recoguition k r criticizable validity claim. The validity claims can be criticized on three accounts: 1) claims to propositional truth, 2) effectiveness of means for attaining the en&, and 3) the context which is referred to for the fightneas or wrong- ness of action or the sincerity of one's utteranw.' It is possible to arrive at an agreement amongst the debstors through argumenta- tion or a critique. Argumentation is a relatively e k t i v e practice of hamutering out solutions, without reeortiug tu coercion, aud a prime exmple of conlll~unicative activity. Haber~rras calls it the "rellec- tiw mediumn. Hnhermnq f a c ~ the prohlvnl of irretllrcihlr pltrrnlit,y of hietorical, cultural and social life-worltl r'3.1~cturea duo to which the standards of rationality are also bound to vary. Ile colrcedw that even though the concept of wmn~unicative ratiouality baa uni-

vernal significance, the claim is verifiable only in the course of the empirical-theoretical research program which foster the "construc- tion of a formal-pragmatics of language and the reconstruction of the ontogenesis of communicative competence to the development of theory of anthropogenwie and social evoluti~n.~

The aim of reconstruction, writes McCartb, is to unveil the t l~e innate competence of the huruana to apply to practice their ekill of reasoning, grammatical correctness, and exhibit a 4 theoretical knowledge without ever having introspectively and reflectively ma- lyzed them. He further says that the rational reconstruction does not stop with surface structuren but plunges below the eurfece to the 'deep structure' and reveals the rules underlying the produc- tion of meaningful symbolic copfigurations which form the domain of rational reconstruction. Thw it is an endeavour to know what makw the competences univereal. The most important difference between the natural and the reconntructive science is tllat in tile latter the actual practice prwidea the experimental fremework for the theoretical formulationa. McCartlty citw chomsky who says that the speaker-hearer intuition is the ultiluate standard for determia- ing the accuracy of linguistic propwale. Since all knowledge cannot be readily adlable M a pretheoretical lurowledge Habermsa recom- mends a meutic prowss which grill8 the subjact with ry temat idy arranged examples and the responses are taken into account in de- vising the rules. In their claim to u~~iversnlity the reco~~etrt~ctive aciencee are waentialietic. McCarthy says that there are two dimen- eions to the reconstruction: one is the uhorizo~~trJ" dit~~caeio~i which r a u a l r u c b lh fu~bdiur~el~lal cot11l)cknm ultl 'vcrliurl" tli~nc~~wiot~ of reco~~structioo ol tlre logic of develo1~11u.11~ ol ~ h w e w r ~ r ~ ~ e ~ e r ~ c c ~ . ~

When Habermas discusses how language is used as a medium of reaching an understanding in a situation, he aays:

A definition of the situation eatahliahes an ordw ... A aitu- ation definition by anothw party that prima facie divwges from one'# own prewnts a problem of peculiar aort; for in cooperative proceases of interpretation no participant has a monopoly on correct interpretation.'

Thus linguistic mastery alone is not enough uid the expertise in sit- uating a sentence in a speech act in the more inrportmt of the two because it serves as the "relations to reality", for Habermas. Another problem one has to face in such a communicative action ie that of unbiased judgement whicb is next to impoeeible. The participants in a debate aa well aa the observers are all actors either wnacioualy or unconedously. However reflective an observer may be, he has to take a position either tupporting or opposing the topic of debate. There fore, even a judgement is the validation of the pwitiou of ntreugth in a debate. The reference point is the context of discussion. Even such a reference point has to be validated in relation to some other. Thus, the paradigm of a apeech act is only consensual. It i e not above scrutiny from the conditions of validity attached to it. Here, Habermas aeeke to assert the importance of the hearer. Otherwise, there can be no intersubjective communication. He further empha- sizes the dependency of the semantic content of the speech act8 on the action coutext.

Whik interpreting a text, if the speaker has to antidpate what &he author would have thougirt, Ll~e speaker call ollly criticidly ansma the clainta in hin own fra~nc! of lnil~tl. Ilal~er~~~rur atrictly aays tllat

m u "cannot be described in the attitude of the third psreon", and ' one can understand reasons to the extent that one under- stands why they are and why they are not sound."' By expanding the truthconditional approach to setl~autiul into a uet~eral tl~eory ol iukrual relationehips bctwccu meaning and validity, Habermas hae shifted the paradigm to pragmatics from semantics. A social scientist can gain access to social objects which are the domain of social inquiry only by interpretative underetandng(Sinnveratehen). These social objecte are found in eocial actions as well as in texts, traditione, cultural artefact8 and in other aystem and inetitutions in sedimented forms. Habermas argues that the changes in social struc- tures cannot be comprehended from external and contingent factors. 'There are featurea of social evolution that must be underetood as advances in different types of 'kno~ledge'."~ Learning processes hsve to be explained with the help of empirical mechanisms and they are 'conceived at the same time as problem solutionsw, which can be recowtructed from the angle of participauts. Habermas laya down the wmbination of conceptual and enlpirical analysis as the criteria, for the claim to the heritage of philosophy as a theory of rationality.

Habermaa envisions a new equation between philosophy and oci- en-. Habermas, here, finds the combinatiou between conceptual analysis aud empirical appliurtioue where one ueed not lay clailxtn to foundational authority mtd utlivereal validity without exmples which cannot be tested for proof. Here lies the much nceded abridge- ment of the 'philosophid and the 'scientific'. 'Ib quote McCarthy:

Hie conception of universal pragmatia r w b on the con- tention that not only phonetic, syntactic, and semantic fen- turea of sentences but eleo uttemnces -that is not only lan- guage but epsach, not only linguistic competence but 'com- municative competanceW-admit rational mnmtruction in univereal terma.1°

6.2 R a t i o n a l i t i o n after Enlightenment

As edence was rapidly leaping one barrier over the other, it was widely believed that there would not only be an improvement in the productive form arid in administratiorl techniques, but also in the cultural context of life. The emancipation from superstitiom, prejudices, and social evils were taken as good auguries for more de- velopment. Such developments and the aeceudauce of reason reemed to reverberate in tbe political, social, and economic spheres. In course of time, all the dreams turned into nightmares. Max Weber waa the firet claseical eocid theorist to doubt the oympathetical de- velopment in morality with the Enlighheument faith in reaeon m d progrws. For Weber, the niodernietic co~~ception of rationality was purpogive(Zwechtiona1iiai). He contended that no new center of meaning that could replace the old one like tradition, culture, and religion was to be expected that could ituprove the lot of the eoci- ety. T l ~ e uDiseudia~~trl~et~t of the world" ol~ly engendered u~~spirituel and material attitude which devalued any meaning and unity to life. The valuea gave way to control and this resulted in the "subjectivize- tion" of the ultimate ends and tlie unity of the world is destroyed.

Weber pointed out the influence of aentiuenb and faith in digion. Values, for Weber, are chwen and through this people attach signifi- cance and meaning to the disenchanted world. According to Weber, even in politics, the power of authority, and not the reason, played the all ilnportant role. Weber expressed eiuilar views on social aud economic spherea. He pointed out that with the domination of pur- pwive rationality, of technique and calculation, if organization and administration, there could be only a reigu of impersonal economic forces and bureaucratically organized admidstratiow. Weber raid in a classical statement that the realization of reason which wss en- visioned, by eighteenth century philosophers, aa the kingdom of God on earth has turned out to be an 'iron cage" in which we were hence forth w n d m e d to live.ll

Weber'a peaaimiam was fuellcd by hie view of rationalization not na a communal mcial action(Gen~ai~chajta1~andeln) but as a ratio~lally regulated action(GesellirchnffshnndPIn). Hrherrn~s nays that the lrt- ter is too narrow to encapsulate various strauds of everyday practices. While the action oriented towarda understanding have language aa the mechanism for coordinating action, the instrumental action t h e ory irr steered by the compulsory ansociation(Anstdten) like money and power. Habermae is critical of Weber for his failure to see the normative link (moral-practical foundation and legal order) between the economic syeteu and the ad~~liuistrative syakm. He further w u - miseratea that the communicative action IIM been bequeathed with the unenviable t ~ k of mediating between everyday intarsubjactive communication, of which language is an irreplaceable part, and the s u b - e y s b of puryooive r a t i d actim which are driven by the hunger for nlooey and power. Thua, wnrmur~icatiw actio~l improvw

with the increaeing rationalization of the lifeworld. This further9 sct cial integration."

The turn of events in Europe and America wiped put any enthwi- mm that Adorno and Horkheimer could have had for any change for better in the society. The rise of Fascism, Stalinism, and the spine- leaa assimilation of Ameriean populace into what waa an inueaeiugly capitalistic aociety only made their tank impoosihle. Adorno and Horkheimer thought that this WM engineered by the instrumental rationality so vividly portrayed by Weber. But Habermaa refused to accept defeat lyiug down. He sought for a change in paradigm from teleological to communication in the lifeworld which is dialogical. He went further by recommending a nexus between lifeworld and syatema theory. Habermas, while developing his theory he reposes more faith in the individuation which, he argues, is simultaneously aocialisation. That is:

the motivations and repertoires of behaviour are aymboli- cally restructured in the course of identity formation, that individual intentions and intereta, desires and feelings are not essentially private but tied to language and culture and thus inherently susceptible to interpretation, discussion and change. l 3

The ideas of lreedolll and recouciliatiou which appear utoyiau is very much further ingrained in every individual and it is further r e i n f o r d by the natural urge for socialization. Habumas supports Mead's notion of universal discourse. 'Reconciliation" is identified with mutual underatanding and free recognition, 'Freedom" h temu of an identity in such an interaubjectivity, i.e. mciation witbut re-

„ mi on. The idea, here, is to combine the universalism in social- ization a d the paticularism in individuation. The idea of univerrral discourse presages the existence of an ideal community where the individuals are at ease adjusting to their dual roles of u n i m a l and particular players. Each person hse to develope an attitude, towards others, se morally equal subject6 and in that of being inkrsubjective and unique. Mead aeeribea both autonomy and the power of oponts- neaw development to people who free themselves from the shackles of reified form of life. h Hegeljan terms, a member of such an ideal community can eaaily don the role of both universal and individual playere. Habermas attempts to give reason the role of a critic to refiect upon one's own attituda and nature tlrereby prepariu one- self for a wueciow iutegration iuto the uuiversal mailutrearu. In his acwunt of 'the linguistification of the sacredn, Habermaa say8 that the normative archaic views cau be dinsolved by the rationalization of world-views provided the rational potential latent in the c o w u - nicative actiou is unearthed.

While tracing the rhifting emphwlr from dogmatic r i t d ~ t l c prnc- tic@ to the rellectlve comuiunicative actlon, Habermaa discerue au increaeing sublimation. The emotionaly binding form of religiou dogmatism gives way to the rationally binding force of wmmunies- tive action. This "communicative liqwfaction" went a long way to- wards fastering u d e n l t a n d i ~ ~ ~ iu cultural reproduction, social iute- gration ar~d personality foru1rrLio11. An the dincurnive attitude to-

wards the traditional bantianr of nuthority incrc-, the diilerence in individual identitia grows and so ale0 the permnal autonomy. Cousequeully, the weolututuricakive raliouality w u m w illore signifi- cance in the sphere of intersubjective recoguition of norlur for the

procesees of .societal reproduction. 'A8 Ilalrermes aums up, the lin. guistificatmn of the sacred means a rationabeation of the life~orld."~' The idea of lifeworld (Lebenuwelt) l inks the society and the concept of communicative action. Lifeworld is the "context-forming horimn" of social wtiom. Habermas opine that lifeworld ia beat represented aa a "culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock of in- terpretative patterm." Thia reservoir of implicit knowledge through "culture" and 'language" suppliea the materiala needed for taking decieiom in varioue situations which need common definition. Life world, putting it laconically, is the frame of referencs and beyond objectification.16

1b develop a more exhaustive framework for inwrporati~~g in- stitutional ordem and personal structurca. Hober~uas returm to ev- eryday wnununication. IIe sees a kind of reciprocal relatiotlship between the actors and the factors which are the mesliiug giving horizons of the lifeworld like culture, tradition, and languqe. The actors pick up their thread of argument from the cultural tredition from which they attain meaning for their actions and, in turn, they reinforce the aocial fabric of the group by being the members. Chil- dmn imbiba the nluw end acquire bsnerdiwd upabilltia of action by interacting with wmpetent elders who act as reference permns. To quote Habermas:

... Uuder the functional aspect of maching understanding , wmmunicatiw action serves the tra~lemiaeion s l ~ d renewal of cultural knowledge; undcr tho wpwt of cwnfitding ac- twn, it d a l integration and the ertablihment of ~ r o u p solidarity; under the aspect of roeiclliwtwnit serve8

the formation of pereonal identitiea.(2:208)'

As illustrated in the above quotation, the com~nunicati~~ actioii per- forllls various fuuctiolls reproduciug the lifeworld symbolically. If these functione are tampered with, a crisis ens~es:~lrns of meaning, withdrawal of legitimation, confusion of orientations, momie data- hihation of collective identities, ajenation,payehologies, breakdowns k tradition, withdrawal of motivatiou.""

IIabrrnaa arguea that thc concept of co~n~iiu~iicative action coni- ~)lcnicirbcd by the concept of lifcworld ciu~ bc used ~s tlie frlunework for a general social tlieory. 'I'be 11re-judgen~erital given way to the communicative and rational due to the ever-increasing of the actors to interpret and decide on tlic criticizable validity claim througli nu- tual understandiq. This leads lo "reflective refractiou" of processen of eymboljc reproduction iu science, law, art, democractic institu- tiow, and educational systems etc. In the case of developmental dy- namics, one has to observe historical conditiow, mdo-cultural trans- formatione and also the material production. Habermas, here, speaks of an important distinction between the lifeworld and the system. In tlre former, the twciety is coriceptuali7ed as a aocinl group wliicli coordinated through shared action orientatione. In the latter, the society is a self-regulated systelli intcrco~inected and puelled forward by action consequencee. Habermaa wants to combine the iuterualjetic perspectives of the participants and the externalistic perspectives of the obeerver, i.e. the structural aualysis of the hermeneutic with the theoretical analysia of the oystem. Only then will it be possible to integrate the social with the systematic. The functional social tiyetem n d the help of communicatiou to bring out the symbolic reproduc-

tiou. Since there are validiry claims in-built into that medi1u11, they have eocial significance. In the lifeworld approach, the problem of "herloeneutic idealism" ariees where the partidyants and their per- spectives garuer all the attention aud those outside the purview of the epeaker-hearer ambit are h the dauger of being neglected. Too much emphasis on everyday language in also undesirable.

Another bottleneck in the lifeworld approach is the utopian as- sumption of a kind of ideal democracy which p e d w all discursive activity. The absence of systematic distortion is a foregone conclu- sion. Here, the physical forces whidi sustain the forward march of a society are conveniently forgotleo. HaLerlnaa forgea a l i d between these two approach@ as a "system that haa to satisfy the conditions of maintenmce of socio-cultural lifcworlds', or aa a 'systcmntically stabilized nexus action of socially iutegrated group." " It is only through the communicative action that the lifeworld is reproduced in all ita multi-dimen~ional grandeur. But MRX Weber's empirical approach visualized social rationalization only through a cognitive instrumental rationality, otherwise known M purposive rationality.

6.3 Weber'r One Dimemional Rationality

Haberlnaa avers that wl~er~ actio~ln are reduced b purpoeive rn- tional, only meensend relation surf-, which is too narrow for a social theory. In the caee of communicative action, a eoordi118ted social activity is presuppwd. IIere, language, though importaut, is only a via-media for various social actions aimed at achieving un-

derstanding. Unlike internal semantics, in a communicstive activity the actors have pre-recognized ~neanirlgs and expressions which ren- ders understanding easy. Language and, in that, speech acts an the carders of aqy ideas. "A speech act is not a symbol, word, or sen- tence, or even the token of a symbol, word, or wntance; it is the production or iesuance of a sentence token under certain conditions, the employment of a sentence in an uttoran~e."'~ When the acton are many, historical and social elements abound in the process of understanding. While quoting Karl Buhler, Habermas speaks,about three functionn of linguistic signe. They arem:

1) It is a synbol in virtue of being correlated withobjects and stat- of affairs,

2) a syacptoti(iudicatiun, index) in virtue of its dependeuce 011 the setidrr, w l ~ o ~ e subjectivity i t exprweea, u d

3) a signahu virtue of its appeal to the hearer, whose external or internal behaviour it steers like other traffic aigua.

One point which Habermas stresses time and again is that the d m of cementing an intereubjective relationship ie to make the wmmunice tive action a social action with an intent to reach an understanding. Here the word 'understanding' itself aignifiea objectivatlng what ia subjective and vice versa. Charles Peirce's pragmaticism went a long way in cryptically eliminatil~g Meinongian object-statements, which would have embarassed the linguistic analysts, by pitting the wor& agai~wl actiuua, or tltnlcs ul allairs, l.\cgc, lakr Wittgcttslcill, Auetiu, and Searle were instrumental iu introducing the speech acts ae the pavigator responding k, various crests and troughs thrown up by the linguistic exprcwionn. Hnhcrmm, not sntirfied with the un- due importance giwn to the states of sffain to the detriment of the

exprwiva .nd the lrppsllatiw huea of Isngulye, devlled a unlveraal pragmatics.

Austin pioneered the difference between the semantic and preg- matic levels, the former pertaining to the sentences and the latter to the utteranm. For Austin, a pheme is the unit of lwuage and a rhen~e is the unit of speech acts. He wan wncerned with action8 w utterances, as speech acts. Habermas traine his ideaa on illocution- ary and perlocutionary speech acts of Awtin as t h m two facilitate argumentation regarding validity claims raised by performative ut- terancea. IUocutionary force in an utterance strika a similar chord in the hearer whereby the intent ae well ae the wntent ir traurmittsd and received aa diatortionlcee as possible because of ' a mtionally mo- tivated binding (Bindung) Jorce.' Thus auy couimunicative activity presuppose a columou groulid u d a co~uluou medium of com~uuui- cation. One c a ~ discern truth, truthfulness, and sincerity in validity clsima which wuid be the guiding principle. Habermas wishes to separate appellative function of language in Buhler into regulative and imperative functions. 111 tlie foa~er, ~~orluative validity claims are discussed in the horizon of a c o ~ o u social world and in the latter, a speaker-hearer interactioll is induced by a validity clair~i regarding the states of affnirs.

5.4 Habermacl' Critique of Weber'r Action Theory

Haberuw quota, Y I I u n ~ ~ i behaviour be iL external or iuterual activity, o~nissiou or acquience~ice-will be called "action" in so far as

the actor attaches a subjective meaning to it." la He dud- that Weber concentrates more on the subjective aspect of communica- tion, i.e. on intentions and belids of the actorn iutead of the more objective language and meaning. Habermas opim:

A language community is represented in the ideal-typical, 'purposive-rational' limit case by numerous individual acts ... which are oriented to the expectation of gaining 'under- standillg' from others for an intended nreani~lg.~

The wmunicative, theoretical, practical, and wcial activities are only afTectual whereas only teleological action ie the basic activity for Weber. In order to propound a social action theory, Weber had to counter two kinds of orientatione: 1) behavioural orientation towards other's action and 2) rdexjve and reciprocal orientation towards various acting eubjects.

6.4.1 W e b e r ' ~ Divieion of Action

Weber divides action orientation into purposive retional, value- rational, affectual and traditional action. H a b e r m krlue thin clas- sification aa utilitarian, value-related, and dectual go&. Weber explains them M follows:" Social action can be dekrmimd

1) Purposive rationally throughexpectatio~ as to the behaviour of objects in the external world and of other men, wiug these expectations aa "wnditions" or as "luea~" for one'r own end8 ...

2) Value rationally through wnscious belief in ... the intrinuic d u e of a certain mode of behaviour ... independently of success,

3) effectually eepecially emotioncrlly ... 4) Traditionally through the habituation of long practice.

The above actions are represented in a tabular column.

T h c Ollicinl '&pology of A c l i o t ~ - 'I')y)cs 01 ac t iu l~ i ~ t cluscct~rlit~g t~rilcr ill rcrliurlnlily

I'urporivc~ralional

Valuc.ralio~tnl

A l lcc lu~ l

Subjeclive nlcaninp eovcrr l l ~ c lol lowi~~g C~CIIIC~I~I:

Mcanr

+ +

+ -- 'Iradilioo~a: i + .

Conscque~~cer

+ - - -

EIIJS

t

. t + -

. Vnlucr

+ + - ...

Though moral consdousnese csn be acwmodated under value- rational, Habermas seems to think that ita function is more of a restrictive leseh M, that the action do not o m step the legal and m- cial norma and rules. He a h wnknda that Weber'e intentiom wwe not for an interpersonal-conseneual action orientation which in the paradigm for any theoretical diswume. H h a a triw to pick out instances of social action in the unofRdal m i o n of Weber's action types. It hes b&n said that Weber distinguished wcid action from individual action by dimming the intelltiom embedded in the lat- ter i.e. whether the actions are interest oriented or oriented toward8 normative agreement. Thus, Weber diferentiatea 'the sheer factidty of an economic order from the social validity (Gcltunp) of a legal order.' It is true that both iuterest positions an d an norma- tive consideratione are involved in coordinating an action. "It is by way of conventional rules that merely factual regulartien of action - that ia, mere custom - are uormally tramformed into binding norw, guaranteed primarily by peychological coe rc io~ . "~ On the baais of rational transformation from custom to a legitimak convention, an alternate typology of action is proposed. Though Weber has a role for the normative dimension, it is only within the ambit of law and not from the point of view of the moral-practical which makes the action only wmmunitarian and not eocial. Habermaa sayc

... action in eociety (Geselbchaftshandeln) is distinguished from action in community (Gemei~chaflshandeln) not tluough puryosive-rational action orientations of the participants, but through higher, namely, post-conventional stage of mord- practical rationality. "

6.4.2. Typm of Action and their End-aim8

Besically, a purpogive or an instrumental action can be likened to prudential action of Kant in that the end-objective of the action solely rests on the individual and the success or failure of the action affects only the individual since, the individual perfom the action not with an eye on the social fall-out. Habermas subtly differentiates instrumental and strategic actions. While performing an inatrumen- t d action, the agent is interested in carrying out an action according to the rules and aims at extracting maximum efficiency from it. A strategic action, on the other hand, has at the back of the mind the rational influence of an opponent's will by insinuating the proe and cons of accepting the proposition presented. The intention here, though rational, is definitely not social. But, there is a latent po- tency in the strategic action to be developed into a communicative action. The communicative action which is a co-ordinative activity aims at an understanding based on a common paradigm for argu- mentation in which even definition forluatione take place. IIaberruas has illustrated the action or ienta t i~ns .~~ Haberluas does not want to segregate strategic arld con~municative rution on the bwis of atti- tudes behind them, i.e. pragmatic or under~tanding oriented. But, he is afraid that this peychological viewpoint would once again lead to the internalization of the objective eflecte of the social actions. Obviously, Haberm-' aiul is to desubjectivize and objectivize the attitudes that underlie the actio~ur as well as the manifest etIecta by verbalizing the actione and makiug the whole procees diecursive. HaLwlllaa introduces the apeech acts of Austin as the model of ar- gumentation io ordinlrry laoguqe.

6.6. Austin'r Speech Acts

~uet in ' s speech acts came in l~andy for Habermas' interpretation of genuine communicative action. Habermas holds, 'Resching under- standing(Verrtondigung) is considered to be a procsss of reaching agreement(Einigung) among speaking and acting subjects."" This is why, Habermas says that the verbal linguistic structure should be agreed upon before embarking upon any communicative activity because agreement(Einverstandnis), which is the culmination of un- derstanding, is feasible only through propositional utterancan. Ite argues that a speech w t in itaelf is pregnant with dormant power of criticizability of validity claims raised through them. He further dwells upon the formal-pragmatic potentialities of communicative action which itself is an unfettered manifestation of coalmunicative competence focussed towards an understandiug which ie the logical and psychical attribute of any rational being.

Habermas foresees the problelus aboundiug in fitting in the sdetne of things the speech acts which originally describe the states of affairs and utilizing them to aerve the cause of cornmunicative action. Since there can be no other alternative for, any other form of expreseiou does not have the proximity to intentioo, objectivity, criticizability and a mutually agreed upon structure. In order to achieve 'unwn- strained conaenaue' an ideal speech situation ia inescapable. Roderick lists the three requirements as follows: 1) 'unrestricted discuaiou' in which it in pwnible k, 'develop slrategiw for readillg uwuntraiued consensus'; 2) mutual 'unimpaired self- preuentation' in which it i8 possibk to lachieve aubtle nearnesa with inviolable distance among the partners and that m e w commuuicaLion under conditions of ex-

treme individuation'; 3) 'full complementation.of expectations' which makes possible 'the claim of uniwrsal understanding' and universal- ized norma.' For Habermae, "theae t h e ~ymmetriea reprswnt ... a linguistic conceptualization for that which we t r d t i a n d y appro- hand ee the ideas of truth, freedom, and j ~ t i c e . ' ~ To the detriment of the speech acts the inherent force of expression is more often than not is very successful in influencing the nnponent's view and bringing him around to the proponents view. The power of the speech acts lies in their superior success rate in changing the views of the hearer. People form opinions and beliefs more on hearing what is being told rather than from any concerted rationalizi~lr: efforts. The faith r e posed in the speaker aud iu his credeutials bewitch the luiuds of the people and only a handful weigh the merita of the content or the text of his speech. There is a definite advantage for the speaker that his message will carry through. On the other hand, at lcaat theoretically, there is every possibility that the ailus way be contested. Habermaa in his evaluation of Austin's speech act8 is primarily concerned with the parasitic effects. Austin ~penks of locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary speech acts which respectively perform the functions of swing, in saying, and by saying something?' While locutionary act describes the states of affairs, au illocutionary act establishes the mode of the aentence by displaying the mood of the speaker. It can be of the form: "I hereby (promise you, apologize to you, et. a1 ) that p." While Austin himself d o w e leeway for any wanton or inadvertent distortions, since he is not wucerned with the practical import of the speech acts and since he is concerned only with the configuration of the performative utterances, the evanescent line between illocution- ary and perlocutionary speech acta disappears. But, for Habemas, the perlocutjojmry act csll wreak havoc iu the d u d of the hearer

implanting unwanted notions about tlre inteutions of the speaker thereby imperilling the whole process of dialogue. Therefon, Haber- mas sea intentions only as expressed in the illocutionary speech acts and not which haa uot been expressed, i.e. taking the word at it8 face value. Habarmas succinctly yuta it ae follows: 'As the maaning of what is said is constitutive for illocutionary acts, the intention of the ageut is woetitutive for teleological actions."sa It ie ironical that the intentions of both the speaker and the hearer are preconceived to be overflowing with conunuuicative intent. An Habermes claims regarding the rational frame of mind of tlte practitioners of nrgumcn- tation the coupeteuce to djsceru the iucougruity of an utterance aud its inteutiou should be vested wiLh the adhereuts theruselvea and uot ou the utterances. Only those intentiow that the proponent wilb to follow are translated into speech act8 and only those speech actu which the opponent deems sincere are abstracted of inteutions by the hearer. Apart from this fact, the iutcrlocultors have to bury their hatchet to be involved in a practical discourse. So, even in a debate there are causes for infelicities and abuses. A debater debates know- ing fully well that if he baa to arrive at an unbiaaed agreement he has to ignore his likes aud dislikes which arc nothing but the ycr- locu~iouary ellorta. The euotive yerloculiouary force is trauuluru~ed into an illocutionary force in tlie c u e of illocutiou~vy speech acts. Otherwise, abjuration, for example, which can be brought under il- locutionary speech acts lome their sting and credibility. It ia unfair on the part of Habermaa Lo have relegated perlocutiouary act to tile ignominiou instrumental a c ~ s because the origin of s p ~ h act8 is p8y&ological, i.e., the urge to communicate and ahare thoughto and fee l iw cannot be otherwise. To join the debate, it can be argued that a w-unicative activity carried out through an iUocutiouu~

speech act is an exalted purposive activity with a mom honourable end M intention, i.e. the rational consensus in definition formation on all multitudw. Furthermore, if capriciowneas and looseness can be attributed to perlocutionary as well as locutionary acts becauee the contexts are the breeding ground of all idem and it is the same for illocutionary speech acts. As various coloun and various hands can paint variegated picturea in the canvas, likewise the subjective fears are to be blamed for any misapprehension and not the speech acts. In the case of the illocutionary speech acts, the intentious to be conveyed are identified with then1 thereby eliminnting any dis- crepancy. But, it is to be observed that the ulterior motives and the iute~llious verbalized in Ll~e speeclr acls are never always tlie s u e . If Habermas has to make use of illocutiouary acts the intentiow are to be reduced to what ie purported in the speecb acts.

Habermas delineatea four criteria for the differentiation of illocu- tionary from perlocutionary acts. They are recapitulated briefly as f0ll0ws:~

a) Self-identifying nature of the speech acts in which the hearer ia made known the intentiou of the speaker thread-barely meens of voicing requests, commands, greetings, warnings etc.

b) The auceeas of an illocutionary act is not the guarantee for ac- complishing perlocutionary succeas.

Habermaa takes pains to emphasize the extra-linguistic and strategic import of perlocutiooary acts through some examples. They are 8s

follows:

1) S awerted to H that 11e gave notice to hie firn~.

2) H warned S not to give notice to hi8 Rrm.

3) Through informing H that he had given notiw to hir Arm, S gave H a fright(= he intended to do).

4) H upset S with the warning agailrst giving notice to his form.

Haberman points out to (1) and (2) and says that there can be no second opinion regarding the effects of these speech acts in the niinds of the speaker and the hearer. On the contrary, Habermaa views (3) and (4) more prone towards bringing about a change of otance on the parta of both the speaker as well an the hearer. Therafore the intent ia strategic.

All the four acts are to be viewed as aerial acts. When 9 warned H, he would have done it only with trepidation of auccws or failure. On his part H would Lave had mixed reaction about the warning of S and his own repoete. Hence the enauing steps (3) and (4). Just became of the vagaries of rcactiona the reduction of linguistic ap- paratus to illocutionary acts alol~e caullot waive the impondcrablca. Apart from tba, Iiaber~uas in Ilia 'wn~ruunicative ethics' etaunchly advocates the n d for an illocutionary force about which Auatin also speaks. The force inatills the corresponding reaction in the hearer which makes the speaker appear wnvinciug and sincere in his expo- sition. For Auelin, speech acts were mere modes of expreasiou wed in interpersonal linguistic communication. For Haberman, language and interpermnal commu~lication are the bedrock0 of mcid critique. While discussing happy performatiw, for example, solemnization of marriage Austin chooses to supply more weight to the catch words that go towards making a marriage happy rather than the spiritual and inward feelinga which go towards, in the first place, setting up

the oceaeion. Therefore, it is dear that Auetin is more concerned with the conetruction, circumstances and conventiw of the speech acts. But Habermae has to encapeulate both the inward M well as the outward aspecte. Even if, as Habermas says, perlocutionary acts are only sub-acts of illocutionary acte, the illocutionary acts do have the responsibility of tempering infractious perlocutionary acts be cause, in the end they are bound to affect the judgements of both the speaker and the hearer.

An illocutionary act might run into rough weather if the ratiollale behind the meanings adduced to words are scrutinized. Ae Austin remarks in paeeing, they are 'act to words' phrases. Consider the following example: 1) I order my slave to execute x . ~ Habernlas intends to use illocutionary speech acte in hi8 commu- nicative action which are out and out rational ill character. The afore given example which entaila the slave to obey the command in, generally, non-rational. Reasons can be adduced for this. A master or a slave does not conduct a rational analysis of the commando. The commission of the Inaster presua~e~ the subulisaion of the alnve and dce wcraa. The illocut,io~~ary to be succeslrful 11- to in- still the fear of retribution from the master if the nlam disobeys. Here, the same speaker-hearer equatiou is not purely illocutionary in character. Even if the equatiolls between the master and the slave were rational, the feelings, in course of time became numbed ~ n d the notion of rationality is forgotten. Only the conventional utter- ances and the reactions are impregnated in the speech acts and this is strengthened by illstitutioualiziu~ tlre circulustances, procedure8 and intended consequences. What is left ia only the reified forms of

speaker-hearer linguistic interaction. Haberman can awmount this ~ r o b k m through di~cursive nature of the validity claim. The moot point h e n is whether perlocutionary speech acts are dmya negative in evoking reactions so as to prevent the partidpants from rational critique. And just because the emcacy of the illocutionary acts stem from the incontrovertibility of catch phrasee which constitute the acts, are they undainted in contributing towarde misunderstanding?

6.6 Communicative Action Through

Illocutionary Speech Actr

On account of eliciting a response of this same vein, of the speaker, from the hearer Habermas considers illocutionary acta as the prime candidate for a 'consensual coordination' in a communicative activ- ity. He says, "I have called the type of interaction in which dl the participaute harmonize their individual p l w of action with oue au- ohher and thue pursue their illocutionary aims without nrervcltion 'communicative action'.n36 Habermas suggests that to embark upon an argumentation, the following conditions are to be agreed upon: 1) speech act offer, 2) content of an utterance, 3) guaranteer lmmauent to speech acts, 4) certain obligations relevant to the wquel of inter- action. In all the afore digcussed conditionalitk, the perfonnative utterances considered are only the explicit performative utterances. It is tn\e, as Habermas points out, that Austin's illocutiouary or perlocutiouary force ntelns fro111 llle eol~texl of it~atihutio~~ally bouud form of expression unlike that of coluruunicative aetiou, wl~ose force

of conviction sprouts from the h a l force (G&w) of noma which, in turn, am conkstable validity claim. ha berm^ tr- three typa of reactions which ensue out of a speech act. They a#:

1) The hearer beare the utterance and wdemhmb the d.imr raiaed.

2) The hearer matea a decision to venture into a dialogue or neg- the offer, i.e. ( t k a poritwn).

3) On Miviag at an m a t , the hesrsr dim& hi0 sctiow te wards concrcntionall~ bed oblipotionc.

Progmoiidevel-+ Semontideuel -+ Empirieollctrel At the Pregmatic lewl there is agreemat, at the Sammtic l a d there is understanding, and at the Empirical level then is further develop ment. According to Habermas, the meaning and the validity of the utteranm are brought about by the nexw between the t h m lev& mentioned above which props up the need of formal oemantics. In formal eemantiur, meaning (Bdeutung ) of the m k n m and mean- ing(Meinung ) of a speaker are demarcated. Awth dimtioguimkm between a pheme the unit of lanyqe,i.e.eentenm, and a rheme the unit of speech. Some how, Auetin seems to attribute a reference to make rhetic act8 a step ahead of the phatic acts. Both H a b e m w and A w t h emphasize the rtandard wnditionr under which commu- nicative activity ie to be carried out. Haberm~ diva some exampla of iUocutionary speech acts like:

1) I (hereby) promise you that I shall come tomorrow.

2) You are requested to stop ~moking.

The replien anticipated from the hearer are :

1) Yes, I shall depend upon it.

T W (2) not of tho fim~ M d d b e d by Aurtin, ir, p- ~ . e t l v e , ~ W c c m & i v e t r a r b ' n p & * h . ~ ~ b d l i -

A u i % f n h b p d b k m - v g p r r f o r - - lirb rix conditioJM lib aonvsntiaarl p d w a , u-, *t-, intsnth, a o m ~ ~ b i l i t y ~ and the will to WOW the accepted c ~ ~ v e n t i ~ . ~ An i l b c u t h u y .ct ir dtbg bppy w + p ~ b e u u w , t h e - a n t i c ~ r r s i l ~ t h e W ~ deace with one mother without lrsy equivocality w d i & , & least, at the moment of utterance. Habsrmcul visrn the i l b e u t h - sry aped acta M the conducive o m to engage the r p d e z and the hearer in agreement oriented ugumenktion. The collditioru of their prior knowledge of the memage to be i n b d m g d m M

Auatin s l l u m m for hie p w f o d v e ~t temmm.~ H- con- ddm two * in arriving at m a g m m n t and u n h b r r l n g in an argumentation p r ~ . One b the r t y e of utirt.ction w h the conditwn, ofrotbjactwn in runmtic krmr which will detail the term for interaction m d the othar ir the 'awaruma of the oondi- tiow of the qmtmeni thol Bra gmumb cldlienncc b the ob&atiow to the interaction m q ~ e l . ~ The vein or tcmor of the rperl41 rhould be comprehewible to the hewer, bdq r a t W nrbj&t. The r e join& from the dde of the heuar can eitbar be podtivg w ega t im but what b imperative ir the willingtar on ths part of the hauer to -t m d ~ U I I the i m m with the mpeuker without bk lq the o m - of the r p h w IUI &nt. E v s ~ tho* tbs deb.ta CU- bed m t on ~ I M contentiour claim m i m W , the r a t i d d e hy to be &ended to the d i v e truth drimr. Hrbannu e i h .n s u m p h for rimpb imperativs comman6 W W ~ .

I am (hereby) requathg that You

The rraponsa of the hecutr ahell be: Yes, I shell do what ir required of mc. The atbramid dialogue resb on the awumption that each d the psr- ticipsnb mognbe snd d m querim mmtim Wrm. T b norms r a f d to can be either legal or m o d . The legal, bslm ba ing codifhi and made rtatutory, is widdy diacurwd but akr being made a law ody adherence is expected any murmur of proteat is sti- fled in the name of law. But, in the caw of normatiw validity chima, which are moral, are evaluated, rescinded if found unacceptable and constantly debatad. Ib etrength ir the contiguous diacuraive char- acter and no opinionn an, barred from being aired. And rbtiorul consideration of such opinions an, compukny, Thua, the ground8 and reasons are internally connected with a validity clslor.

A speaker dionolly motiwtcs the hearer by indicating the hepa- rable naxue between the validity, validity dajm and the redemption of the validity claim. Hi8 warranty(Geoahr ) ir the ~ W I U dduced to convince the hemre. Thw the apeaka bin& (binden& ) the hamr with the force of hb fervent speech. All upeach .ctr i d u - W I U ~

tive, expmive, and regulative, presuppare lome eonrlrtoncy on the part of the 8pede.r in action and from the hsarsr, when he accepk the propceal. Habermas says that only the expmive r p d r r k divulge the p ~ t and previoua eetions of the rpeakcr. T h it mhibik the obbation to prove the trushrthinerr(Beoahrmq~ocrpfiichtrnpcn ) and the power to w r y 011 the argumentation." IIabermtu in of the opinbn that the imparativar i d of being e x p r d M intan- tion mteneer, if they are rpelt out M the d h t b n of i-tiom, then they can be accepted into the fold of ilhutionrvy 6psseh act@. Only & t M k validity ddme have the i x h m t power to draw the

houar to .eespt tha 0%- of ugumenbtkm without any extem.1 godly. H.komarckirmthatintbecumafptxhcutjowy~ lrcb the heam esnnot d m mmte wmmuaiutim ofIbr and m he cannot take aqy poeition -ding the validity claim. Cmsb quently, the latent potential of the r e a ~ ~ ~ to hind mmhu untended.

51.1 Right-, P u t h f u h a m and P u t h of Speech Act

When a awake# utters a wntenca he mdracl a W t y dPim .bout mrnething in the &and world(tnre or fabe ~tatcmanb), inwr red- ity(the rpesker'e own world to which one csn be truthful or untruth- ful), or the shared &aI mrld(afconventions, norm and rula which can be right or wrong). But, h t , the speaker'^ utb~ancm ahould be couched in a comprehennihle linguistic form, i.e. grsmmstically correct sentences. This in the only "language-imant* while the other three of truth, truthfulnese, and dghtneaa u e extrs-linguirtic for Habarmas. But these three daim are broached only through linguistic expreaaiom by which a competent penon can profar hie experience or relate something in the external world with a truth ddm; up- birr intentions, opinio~, feeliqa and derirea etc. ; to engage in a debate on norms, rules, or wnventio~ which guide a permno behaviour in the mcicty."

Habermae dtea the example of a proferwor ad&-& a ~tudent with a request which ie w f o h p :

1 ) P h bring me a glaaa of w. The m p n m of the rtudant can be:

1') No, You cant treat me like one of your empbyaa.

1") No, Yoy really only want to put me in a bad li& in h n t of the other eeminar partidpanb.

1"') No, the nest water tap in oo far awqy that I couldn't get back before the and of the -ion.

The fimt one is the quation of validity or the normative rlshtnear of the request. The llecond one in the contention of the rubjectiva truthfulneM of the utterance and the third one ir the truth of the exietentid pmuppoaition of the rpeskar which he can deny. Thw any communicative action can be contented on rightnear, truthful- ness, and truth of the validity claims.

Habermas compares the aforementioned wpecb with Buhlar's modal. The term W n g undentandiq'' (Vmfandigang ) aaourner two conversing subjects nharing common modea of linybtic interaction. Both the speaker and the hearer rhodd poww a rchama of pra cwditbnn for sccepth en offer of a deb& aimed t o r r u b under- s t d i n g (uer8hndnb ). The argument ( E i n d n l n b ) towarb

to &t a validity daim eabiL t L a a t k t h of

Context - Normative context

Subjective experienced Exintentid pmaupposition

Aspect Rightnag

truthfulnwa truth

three aqmts which ere the rightnccu of a daim in which the s p e d act perfamed in right in the normative context, the truth in being correct exiakntial preauppot?itiona which wid lure the speaker k, ac- cept an offar and ind&lnea of the intenti-, bslisl, fedhgo lrod Wee etc. exp& by the opeaker in the speech rck. S p e d Pet,

BQYO:

(a) to eatablieh and renew intarpersod nlationa, whereby the speaker taka up a nlatim to mmething in the world of legitimate(eocia1) ordere; (b) to r e p m t ( o r pmuppae) ataka and events whereby the speaker taka up a relation to something in the world of the existing statas of &aim; (c) to manifest experience - that ie, to npraent oneself, whereby the speaker taka up a relation to llomething in the subjective world to which he has a privileged ucamU

If a speech act is unsuccessful the followii relationship have not bean established: "With the world of legitimately ordered interper- sonal relationships, or with the world of exirting at- of &aim, or with the ~pe&am own world of rubjective experiena."" Hsbermcu u p b the relation between the validity e l a h md the speech actr by which e p e h can convey his intentiona without diltOrti0~ whicb ie explained with the help of a tabular column. The t h speech acb mentimed above reveal the objectiwting attitude, the c s p m i o c at- titude and the non o o n f o d i o c attitude.

Habermaa taka up the objcctiona of Leirt, %endhat arrd oth- era for hk programme of wmmunicati~ action through the speech ecte theory. Leist wnknda that any illocutionary speech act ori- urtsd toffu& undembmbg, whicb L inrtitutiody unbound and

pmpgitionally differantiatmi, requinr mutual u n h w m d ~II- tdligibility, truthfuleesr and d n d t y if the narrrm of the actr rn to be correct and uttsrancea are to be true. Habsnn~ r e p h (o

thie contention by #crying that he d i f f e ren th stragetic and corn mnnicative action in which only the latter leads to undsn~.nd&. hkad of 'mutual knowledge' Habermas prefem 'urmmon suppod- tione'. The apeakem and the h e m are not forcibly dm,gd into a debate but willingly accept the conditions which gmm a ra t ie nal debate. Habermas aeee the required conditione of Leirt M p m - euriring and inatead opts for a genard condition which could be brought under the communicative competence. H ~ M d d d a that the recrewations expreened are on the bwic of that, (a) them are three validity claim regarding any speech act oriented b~prda underatanding; (b) the validity claims can be distinguirhed from one another; and (c) the validity claim have to be approached in formal- pragmatic t e r n of communicative action."

Habermas argues strongly that the constative ~ p d acb directly express opinions regarding the etatea of affairs, and therefom, EUV. ex- p d propositionally. The comtative speech act~ vnrt the truth about llomething happening in the world like propaitbn p. In the caw of e x p d v e and regulative speech lrctr the lpslrLsr haa in the backdrop the etatea of &airs when he wnfwm or WIIUMII& r e spectively. The propoeitiond attitude in the n o n a n n t a t i ~ ope& acts is one of connection between exirtentld prauppaitim lrod the propositional component of the speech acts. So, the proporitiona form be giw even to non-eonatatiw a p e d acts end hence, they lay a dsim to truth, thougb indirectly Habermer rlro giver . wi& berth for abbreviated illocutionary speech act4 Uks "heb" utterad pr

a greeting eatirfying the social norm about conveying the mmsgs of well-being of the ddmKlsa. Even the daim to ri@nep, H ~ ~ C I W I my, b univsrsel and not confined only to ragulativs s p e d rcb. Speech acta can go wrong in eliciting raaet io~. 'Communicationr can be 'inappropriatem, reports aout of place", c o n f e u ~ h 'awk- w d , didowes uoffenaive"."T Conetative and expwive apesch acts too contribute towards cementing i n t a p m o d r s l a tb rd ip being a product of the social world.

6.6.3. RsIMrvationr E x p r e e ~ d on the Se6regation

of Tru th and truthful^

Habermaa captured the eaaence of the objection lu "to expect of 9 that he is speaking the truth in any other eenoe than that S wants kr speak the truth and this maans nothing elaa than being truthful."* H a w suppoMa that the objection applim mom to the utkprrur containing cognitive verb like I how, and I belim &. In the dom deecribed cases, it will only result in eelf-eation if tbe uttsrlvlca and the intentione differ. G.E.Moore, while commentin$ about 8ucl-1 uttwaum, dismiseed any second tho* while u t k n g I believe or I know. When one says that one bows, the truth of one's belief is affirmed beyond doubt. There is no lwmy given to may that I do not know for certain because, the statement becomes null and void.

'I know but I don't believe' ir paradrmid and mutudly exdurlve.

1) It ir raining now. If the hearer dieegrees then it becoma

2) NO, that isn't true and

3) No, you don't mesn what you sre h n g .

The w n d utterance in conatative and itr drim to truth cur be w- ified empirically and externally and the third on the other haad h verifiable only through the verbal exposition d the speaker. Habar- mas citea the example of a murderer confeaaing truthfully what he me- but inadvvtently he may say thing8 untrue and vice car In thia connection, E m t Tugendhat a p p h Wittgenetsin'r private language argument to the uiteria of truth and t r u W e m ~ of a vs- lidity claim. Habermas gives two examples for this: (1) I am in pain and (2) I am afraid of being raped. The above two aentsnca be ing firet-person prompts the following sentences are given to be the third person pronouns. (1a)He is in pain and (2a) She ir afraid of being raped. Tugendhat feela that a negation of ( I ) and (2) simi- larly resu1t.a in the negation of (la) and (28). Wittgemtan denlea a separate statue to the statements which expm in m r & thow mun& or cries which are uttered. "Wittppatein wuma t h t there is a continuity between both non-cognitive f o m of expreasily pain, the gesture and the eentenee." On the other hand, Tugendhat does not question the verifiability of the sentenca deauibing a ges- ture but the gesture itself ie beyond scsutiqy and verification. As in W i t t g e the sentenced are non-cognitive. T h , the uiterion of truth or falsity which b applicable for the mknca of both (1) and (la) type makea Tugendhat what to decide that there exinb a ~ ~ r y symmetrf not on their truth or falrehaod but on their

adherence to the rules of mantier. Sentence (1) ir darer to truth and incorrigibility than (la) and, hence, if the former is t m , m .Lo the latter. Tugendhat'n e m p h b on wmsntier dor not Ave the problem of the link between the r t rk. of d.in .ad truth or f.W$ of the propoeitbna describing them. Haberma~ that truth or falsity can be attributed only to eogniti~ kmwledgs. Aarsrtiw sentancee expreaa cognition of an act. Exprea~ive nentanea portrw the subjective intentione of the apeaker and hence the verilahility of the sentenan is taken sr, the guarantee for its trutbhood. In the caee of (1) and (la), a hearer who heam. (la) from the speaker, h.s to secertain (1) from the speaker. The formu cannot be seuibed a cognitive stat- unlike the latter can be, no, both are necsllaary and serve their purpoeea. T h , Habermae say8 that truthfuhesr sr a uitaion is not encapsulated in truth. In order to wriggle out of Tugendhat's dilemma, Habermaa suggests a way out, i.e., to deal with speech acta inetead of sentences and g i m nome examples."

1) I have to confeaa (to you) that I have been in pain for dws.

2) I can tell you that he haa been in pain for dayr.

If (1) is invalid, it resulte in deception and if (2) is invalid, it resulta in falsehood. Taking a paradigm case of confession H a b m ~ sayr, ... It residea rather in the special wwquences which ura be drawn from a wnfeaaion whose truth is guaranteed by the #pedal criteria of truthfulness." "

Regardins another objection about the need for a p-c t h e ory of speech acts inatead of m t e n m for nchievinl~ the illocutionary aim, H&maa strongly defend hb thab of w d u t i v e action through & acts. The auuirtency and the exmwtnm b u b b k

in a ewd act can alone mave the hema to act in an inter- sub- jective communication in which the d i d v e n s t m of the N t y chima themdrn prompt the continuow d e w of the condith~ 8weming them. Michael Dummett diatinyisha betwenu the urn- ditione for awxbric eentencee to be d i d and the konwladgs, of a speaker, about t hee wnditionrr, which a h determine the meaning of the sentam. H a b m m , further, explain8 that the cww of auch ewumption is the unrssllstic idea of having eibctim p d w a for truth eonditione for each eentence which can be verified. The obmr- v a t i o d link between the act and language is an idea of ernpiriciob which fails miserably in the theory of verification. Haberman tracas the difficulty as: "the difficulty arise8 becam natural w a g e 18

full of eentancee which are not effectively decidable, ones for which thare exists no effective procedure for determining whether or not their truth eonditiona are f ~ l f u k d . " ~

Michael Dummett plumpe for knowing the pow& on which a sentence ie fec0gnize.d as true. Grounds, unlike conditiool, cau be used diseuteively to redeem claim. Be arguw that the grounb can be drcumecribed only through argumentation in lsnyege.

5.7 H a b e r m on Spclsch Acts

Hab- rightly holds that Austin give, a clear cut idea only of &ivea while dividing rpeech act8 inb verdictim, exardtiw~, commimirn, beh&hitivea, and exporitiw. The d t m d in the wormiscliw to carry out a threat of the fulfilment of a pmmlw forma

a normative bond between the speaker and h m . hub in 8 mow to otrsamliea Auotin'm c h d c a t k n p r o m wail ddned h . k c o m p ~ h g of amdw (wrutativs), comrniwiw, directivs, deck.- tive, and expre~ive speech a&. EPch speech act expromo different moo&. Asautives - reporting, stating, narrating, etc. Commisuivea - promiees, undertakings, vows, wntracto, etc. Directives - order, commend, requeat, =king, prsying, entreating, etc. Declaratiw - appointing, abdicating, dedariry war, md giving rn tica, etc. Expreseiw - confeasiona, revelations, didousures, apologiw, ex- pressing gratitude, etc. Habennas wmplaine that though the exprwivw have ikutionary thrust Sssrle hw omitted avow&, didoaursr and ravelatiaru. But Searle's explanation of the illocutionsry force with varyiq dimm- siow like the purpose of the speech act, wntext of the debate, difler- e n m in psychological states, force of the utkrawm, the status of the speaker-heam, inkrest of the speaker-hearer, catch worda added to score a point like 'however', difference in propositional content, acb which can or neednot be speech acts like 'daseify', speech acta which require extralinguistic authority like 'I bless', non- performatiw i h cutionary acts, and the style of performance of an iUocutionary act like 'confiding' and 'announcing'is quite thorough and the knowledge of t h e factor8 is a necessity for one who in involved in a debate whom sole aim is emancipation. Only if the participant8 tremcend all the intra and interperllonal limitations a n there be any meaning- ful dialogue. In his Ezpression And Meaning (1979) he $so vividly axplains how illocutionary verbs are &&rent from iuocutionery acb

giving examplea like 'intend' and 'mean to'. Tho* H d m ~ is not happy with k l e ' 8 abestion of illocutionary vsrb to the rwpectiw s p e d acts bessd on hi8 rinesrity conditionr, comuni~&ivs com- peten= demands that the inkrlocuton interpret the speech offm in many ways an k 1 e haa listed and M he says, the iLbcutionrry pointa are many and m $80 illocutionary form depending upon the contextan Habermas daime that the demarcating line between m i - ow speech acte is very thin UI in Austin. Searle's e f k t e led to the split into two vmiow, one being his own ontologicpl grounding for the five typea of speech acts and the seeond being empirid p r q - matic stand point facilitating every day language in communicatinr practice.

The linguistic network facilitates communicative action is the il- locutionary speech act wwisting of:

'performative verbs, sentence particles, lentence intonatio~, and the like provide schemata for eatabbhing i n k p a n o d relations. The illocutionary force wwtitute the knots in the network of communicative miation (Vecpuelbchqft- tug); the illocutionary lexicon is, as it were, the eectiond plane in which the language and the institution4 order of the society

The caprices of life situations are mirrored by the creativity and adroitnear of lingahtic innovation. The rpeech acts haw three di- mensiow namely, temporal dimension, social dimension and dimen- lion of wntent. In the tempord dimmion, the iduence of the factor like orientstion of the partiupsatr toward, future, p r d or past. In the d d dimension, the obU@io~ of the participant#

dealt with. Finally the dimemion of the content, the problem of what w~llrtituten the epicentn of communicatiw activity, the object or the action or the actors. Habarma quotes M.Krsdrel who c l ~ s i - fied everyday communication b a d on t h pragamatic indicators,

Habermaa seem to favour this approach bacslw, the aboM made hi f ica t iona are situational and hence act M a guida for ethno- linguistic and socio-linguistic system. Though ill~utionary points are more subjective they are alao a vital cog in the machine of speech, which is the bridge between the subjective and objective npherm of action. But Haberm- feel8 that an advantage praented by the ty- pological dasaifications like the semantic Lid between the laryump and the state of afiain, experiential disclosured, and interparsonel re latione is sacrificed if one opts for the former. Haberrnw opinas that speech acts that are inductively constructed to rruit the pragmatic indicatorn la& the intuitive ingredient because of the paucity of the- oretical power. Searle moves towarda ' a theont id ly motivated ty- pology of speech acb' by giving an ontological characterization of the illocutionary aim and the propositional attitudes when the partici- pants perform a speech act. This invariably 1 4 to the dichotomy between the actor and the world and there are two shada to the rela- tionship, one cognitive and the other telalogical. Then, the question of matching the world to the word and word to the world d s m , in Searle's phrawology. The aesertive force in the assertive speech act and the imperative force in the imperative speecb act8 reprewnt the attitudes of thinking, believing, supporting and the Like and that of wanting, desiring, intending, etc. respectively. The former is linked to a truth daim and the latter to a power claim in which the speaker wishes to make the hearer ect in the way he deairea. ha berm^ while spproving the approacb of Searle regarding the wertoric end

directive (or imperative) sentences points out Searle'8 neglect of an intsrpenond ralationehip in the d i ~ m i v e m d d i l i t y of nlidity claim and arriving at a wnaenaus.

Habsrmes & conaidera the c a m of oommissiva which instill a m e of normative obligation; the conditions of the reliability of intentions are different from that of a satidachy act of the per- former. It is neceseary that for h i e to differentiate wnditioru of validity from the wnditiona of satiufaction. Hab- io slro keen to separate normatively authorized imperativen from mem imperativen. Searle, then, had to accomodate declarations for institutionalirsd procedures like signing a bill, declaration of war etc., which are not states of affair9 but mially accepted procedures. Expressive speech acts belong to the domain of subject-mdety relatio~hip character- ized in terms of intentions limited by normative trdta which forter interaubjective recognition of validity claims, especially moral, for Habennes. T h e chi& in the armour of Searle's driven Haberum to include truthfulnwo and rightness dong with truth u wnditionr to be satisfied for validity claims. He lists four rpeech ack namely, impemtives , which desire a state of affaire to be brought,oonatatiueu , which refers to state of affairs, ngulatiw , which inhabit inkr- subjective social practices, and findy, the ezpnuioo , which maka public the eubjective intentions of the rpeaker. Apart from those mentimed &we, Habermas set8 a ide commnnicutiv,u , which or- &* the speech in the form d wnveraation like quationin8 and amwering, a d b e i n g , objecting and M, on. Communiatlven a h in- clude affirmimg, denying, =#wing, confirming, etc. Habermaa & b i f l a s opcratiou, which the apply the genurtive nrla of yun- mar, logic, and mathematia like inferring, d c u l e t q , M f y i n g ,

predicth,etc. Operatives though m a any coauudcotive iutmt ex- plain the g e n d v e ,ruled while aymbolicdly expramiw intentiom. He strives to s u b e wmmi~ivw, dda ra t im , imtitutionally bound 8pcech bcts (betting, marrying, oath-taking) and mti8factivw ( e x c w , apologia for norm violations and reparations). H a b e n w arguar that it is a difficult task to develop a well defined taxonolqy of apeech acta in everyday language. The basic pointem a u l d only be the pragmatic indicators like iutitutioual legithntiion of a p e d acts, orientation to past, the thematic focur, tha hand, md the eonditionn attached to the validity daim like truth, truthful- neaa, and rightnms, on the othu. Haberrnaa nays, "Only on empir- ical pragmatics that is theoretically guided will be able to develop speech-act taxonomies ...'67

Habermaa wants to create typologice of linguintic interaction mod- elled on the lines of language-in-we oriented towards uuderstandiug. While he doea reserve a place for both regulative and expressive speech acts aa they a play vital roles in the normatively mgulskd and dramaturgical action, he h sees a place for the wwtatives in the scheme of things in the communicative activity in which the purpoeive activity t convening and the theme of umvenation is only darultory and the focus is on the stability of the wnver~ation. Habermas gives conversation the pride of a place in hi8 communica- tive action which he darifie aa convenation, normatively regulakd action, dramaturgical action."

Habermaa hm to weather severe criticizm for choosing the formal- pragmatic approach o m e m p i r i c d - p v t i c spproscb which in more

tangibk, belng grounded in everydqy communication unlike the for- m u which ia idedised through speech acts. He ddea that the aim of communicative action is to reach undemtsnding m d the orisnta- tion of actions am not the final and but the ~tmcturec of l i f m l d which ie the h&n of all our activitiee, pitting liqui~tically medi- ated interaction against the natural situation without encrificing the theoretical perepectivee by carefully reviewing idealizations imbed- ded in the communicative action. The h i f i ca t ion baspeeks of ide- alized componant of linguistically mediated interaction and Haber- mas seekn to caver the uopredictable angle of the nan-rkmdsrdioad factors like60 :

1) Uocutionary form of the culture specific net of p o ~ i b l e inter- personal relatione unique to every language;

2) Other forms of linguistic realization of speech acts;

3) Implicit uttersows, elliptically foreshortened, extraverbally sup- plemented in contingent contexts;

4) Indirect epeech acte, traaepoged, and smbiguou expreosions which are context dependent;

5) The widening focus to eequencee of speech acts, texts or convu- sations;

6) The performative attitude whicb relata to oomething in the ob- jective, social, and subjective worlds;

7) The communication is further strengthened by the indunion of communicative action;

8) Finally, all the aforesaid knowledge is reinforced by the resources provided by the background knowledge of the Liftrsorld whicb

supplies the fodder for interpretations.

Habermae wants to plug all the loopholes which could allow strata gic action to creep into the endeve of communicative action and abo to pick out the elementa of communicative action in the domain of strategic action. Cooperative interpretative activity p w e d in com- municative action in dect ive and deliberate and not indirect.

An empirical- pragmatics is the repository of all that in objective and external. It is for the purpose of d n g unh tand ing that Habermaa introduces formal-pragmatics to discern different leveb of reality, the manifatation of communicative pathologiar, or the development of decentered underatanding of the world. At a meta- communicative level, the speaker should be able to detect ironies, paradoxes, fictitiou conetructions, wit, humour, and alluaiow which another participant is sure to reaort to, to win the debate though vic- tory or defeat does not matter in communjcative action. It in here that the formal-pragmatics, with the rigorous training activity and stringent conditions for a valid communicative activity without any room for manipulating the debate, intervenes. Thir dearly annihi- lates the shrouds of confusion by illuminating the fountain-haad of doubt namely, the overlapping of the subjective, objective, and mid spheres. While the debstor can be wilfully strategic in his aim and a skillful hearer can very easily d e f w his intentiow with his com- petence whereas an unconecious ryatematic dirtortiom remain d e kctable which hampers communication at both 'intrepychk and inter -personal l e ~ e l s , ~ 'h carry out social actions in variou do- maim we need varioua forma of argumentation to concentrate upon the end to be reached. When critical intent is added to the srgu-

mentation, it ie called a diecourae. The theoreti4 alscourse d d with the st& of affairs whereas a practical d i a u r w wrvas M a tool in normatively regulated actions, i.e. in the moral arenk Dre meturgid action expounds eubjective deains and emotiom and ir explored by therapeutic and aesthetic critique as in the worh of art. Thw, the rational propeneitiea are given in a tabular column below?' Habermas says that the wide spectrum of ~ p s c t s of ratio- nality of action mwt give the participant the repertoire to grasp the whole breadth of mdal rationalization. Still, the implicit eompo- nent of our everyday language remains unidentifkd as in the caoe of pre-reflective wsumptiona about the shared lifewrld. Meanings are adduced to actions by the context and the collective backgrounds. Such a shift to the unspecified and ineffable could queer the pitch and hence the speech conditions to lend mlidarity.

Searle triea to squeem in both the literal as well as contextual m&np into the summation of eocid activity through rpeech acta. His opinion rhould not be misconstrued as one of relativism for, in any eincere wmmunicative or an interpretative activity, the utter- ancea gain velidity inetantaneouely but in couree of time, as meaning# are diecavered in all their multihued eplendour. ha berm^, while delving upon the implicit and unconsciou framework characterizing every activity quotea Wittgenstein: " ... anchored in all my quaations and anam, m anchored that I cannot touch (them)."" Lifemrld is the cradle on which the entire gamut of cognitive, wmmuuica- tive, and all other social and materialistic relationships are born and reared. It is unproblcmatic. IIahrmae adcptly sutue up: "l'he cou- cept of society hae to be linked to a concept of the lifeworld that is complementary to the concept of communicative action.*

NOTES

1) Thomas McCarthy, The Criticd Theoy of Jiirgen E o b e ~ , Cambridge : Polity P m , 1984. p. 273. 2) ibid., 274. 3) Rick Roderick, Habenncu and Fovndatioru 01 Criticd Theoy, Baeingetroke : Mnrmillan, 1986. p. 77. Cited from inquiry, Vol. 13, 1970, p, 363. 4) Jiirgen Habermas, Theory o[ Communiatiw Action, Vol. 1. Ra- son and Rationalization of the Society; 'bans. Thomas McCarthy, Boaton : Beacon presa, 1984. p. xii. 5) ibid, p. i v . 6 ) McCartb, op. cit., pp. 277-278. 7) Habermas, op. cit., p. xv. 8) ibid, p. mi. 9) ibid, p. xvii. 10) McCarthy, op. c t , p. 274. 11) Habermae, op. cit., p. xi%. 12) ibid, pp. 339-432. 13) aid,, p. d. 14) ibid, p. xxv. 15) a i d , p. xxv. 16) ibid, p. &. 17) ibid, p, xxvii. 18) i b d , p. xxix. 19) McCarth, op. cS., p. 275. 20) Habennae, op. c i l , p. 275. 21) ibid,, p. 278. 22) ibid, p. 279.

116

23) ibid, p. 280. 24) ibid, p. 282. 25) aid, p. 283. 26) aid, p. 283. A h , refer to fig.13. 27) ibid., p. 284. 28) Bid, p. 285. A h d e r to fig. 14. 29) ibid, p. 286. 30) Roderick, op. cit., p. 78. 31) J.L. Austin, How to do things with Wonb, Oxford : Oxford uni- versity Press, 1975. p. 94. 32) Habermaa, op. cik, p. 289. 33) $id, p. 290. 34) The Cambridge Companion to Habermu, Ed. Stephen K . White, Cambridge : Cambridge University press, 1995. Georgia Warnke refera in her esaay uCommunicatin Rationality and Cultural Val- ues" to Habermas' differentiates the orientation of perlocutionary epeech acts in three ways: 1. grammatidy affective, 2. not ad a grammatically regulated act, nor as a speech act offer but without disturbing the understanding and 3. not grammatical, but decting the underatanding and M a speech act offer. The h t mentioned faile as a linruieticslly well-defined effect but it is full of wmmunicative intent. it ap- aa though Haberman deliberately played down the effect. Warnke ausstiono the compartmentalization of illoeutionary and perlocution& speech acts for ;he latter's strategic slant. ~ a b e i - m a doe say that the communicative action abdicatee any strategic intent by assuming the ideal speech situation. But if that is the caue no practical is ever possible. pp. 121-122. 35) Habermas, op. cit., p. 294. 38) ibid, p. 297.

37) ibid, p. 296. 38) Austin, op.cit., pp. 14-38. 39) ibid., pp. 4-11. 40) Habermas, op. cU, p. 296. 41) ibid., pp. 298-305. 42) McCarthy, op. cit., p. 280. 43) Habermas, op. cit., p. 306. 44) ibid., p. 308. 45) ibid., p. 308. 46) ibid., p. 310. 47) ibid., p. 311. 48) ibid., p. 312. 49) ibid, pp. 312-315. 50) ibid., p. 314. 51) ibid., p. 315. 52) ibid., p. 315. 53) ibid, 317. Cited., M. Dummett, "What is a Theory of Mean- ing?" p.81. 54) John Searle, Ezpre~ion and meaning, Cambridge : Cambri+e University Press, fp. 1979, 1989. pp. 2-11. 55) Habermas, op. cit., p. 321. 56) ibid., p. 322. Refer to fig. 15. 57) ibid., pp. 319-327. 58) ibid., p. 329. Rder fig. 16. 59) ibid., p. 330. 60) ibid., p. 332. 01) ibid., p. 334. Refer fig. 19. 62) ibid., p. 336. 03) ibid., p. 337.