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Chapter 45 Antitrust Law

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Page 1: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

Chapter 45Antitrust Law

Chapter 45Antitrust Law

Page 2: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

Introduction

Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition.

Embodied almost entirely in:The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.The Clayton Act of 1914.

Page 3: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

§ 1: The Sherman Antitrust Act § 1: The Sherman Antitrust Act

Section 1 and 2 contain the main provisions of the Sherman Act.Section 1:

• Requires two or more persons, as a person cannot contract, combine, or conspire alone.

• Concerned with finding an agreement.

Section 2: • Applies both to an individual person and to several people,

because it refers to every person.

• Deals with the structure of monopolies in the marketplace.

Page 4: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

§ 2: Section 1 of the Sherman Act § 2: Section 1 of the Sherman Act

Section 1 regulates what are called “horizontal” and “vertical” restraints.

Page 5: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

Horizontal RestraintsHorizontal restraints are agreements among Sellers (or Buyers) that restrain competition between rival firms competing in the same market .

Page 6: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

Price FixingPrice Fixing

An agreement between competing firms in the market to set an established price for the goods or services they offer.

Price fixing is a per se violation of the Act.

Page 7: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

Group BoycottsGroup Boycotts

Agreement between two or more sellers to refuse to deal with a particular person or firm.

Group boycotts are per se violations of the Act.

Page 8: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

Horizontal Market DivisionHorizontal Market Division

Occurs when competitors in the same market agree that each will have exclusive rights to operate in a particular geographic area.

Horizontal market divisions are per se violations of the Act.

Page 9: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

Trade AssociationsTrade Associations

Trade Associations are industry specific organizations created to provide for the exchange of information, representation of the business interests before governmental bodies, advertising campaigns, and setting of regulatory standards to govern their industry or profession.

Rule of reason is applied to determine if a violation of the Act has occurred.

Page 10: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

Joint VenturesJoint Ventures

A joint venture is an undertaking by two or more individuals or firms for a specific purpose.

The rule of reason is applied to analyze the agreement if the venture has first been found not to involve price fixing or market divisions.

Page 11: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

Vertical RestraintsVertical Restraints

Vertical restraints are per se anticompetitive agreements imposed by Sellers upon Buyers (or vice versa) that may include affiliates in the entire supply chain of production.

Page 12: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

Vertical Restraints [2]Vertical Restraints [2]

Agreements between firms at different levels of the manufacturing and distribution process.

Vertical restraints may restrain competition among firms that occupy the same level in chain.

Vertical restraints that significantly affect competition may be per se violations.

Page 13: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

Territorial or Customer Restrictions

Territorial or Customer Restrictions

Imposed by manufacturers on the sellers of the products, to insulate dealers from direct competition with each other.

Territorial and customer restrictions are judged under the rule of reason.

Page 14: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

Resale Price Maintenance Agreements

Resale Price Maintenance Agreements

An agreements between a manufacturer and a distributor or retailer in which the manufacturer specifies the retail price at which retailers must sell products furnished by the manufacturer or distributor.

This is a type of vertical restraint and is normally a per se violation.

Page 15: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

Refusals to DealRefusals to Deal

Unlike a group boycott, a refusal to deal is an action by one firm against another, and this is usually legal, unless:the firm refusing to deal has, or is likely to

acquire, monopoly power, andthe refusal is likely to have an anticompetitive

effect on a particular market.

Page 16: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

§ 3: Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act§ 3: Section 2 of the

Sherman Antitrust Act

Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act deals with:Monopolization.Attempts to monopolize.

Predatory pricing.Attempt by a firm to drive its competitor from

the market by selling its product at prices substantially below the normal costs of production.

Page 17: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

MonopolizationMonopolization

Monopolization in violation of the act requires two elements:The possession of monopoly power andThe willful acquisition and maintenance of the

power.

Page 18: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

Monopoly PowerMonopoly Power

Exists when one firm has sufficient market power to control prices and exclude competition.

Market power is often assessed by the use of the Market-Share Test.As a rule of thumb, if a firm has 70% or more

of a relevant market, it is regarded as having monopoly power.

Page 19: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

The Intent RequirementThe Intent Requirement

The intent to monopolize is difficult to prove.

Intent may be inferred from evidence that the firm had monopoly power and engaged in anticompetitive behavior.

Page 20: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

Attempts to MonopolizeAttempts to Monopolize

Firm actions are scrutinized to determine whether they were intended to exclude competitors and garner monopoly power and had a “dangerous” probability of success.

Page 21: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

§ 4: The Clayton Act§ 4: The Clayton Act

The Clayton Act deals with:Price Discrimination.Exclusionary Practices.Mergers.Interlocking Directorates.

Page 22: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

Price DiscriminationPrice Discrimination

Price discrimination is the charging of different prices to competing buyers for identical goods.

Exceptions:Charge of lower price was temporary and in good faith

to meet another seller’s equally low price to the buyer’s competitor.

A particular buyer’s purchases saved the seller costs in producing and selling the good.

Page 23: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

Exclusionary PracticesExclusionary Practices

Exclusive Dealing Contracts.A contract under which a seller forbids to purchase

products from the seller’s competitors. Prohibited if the effect of the contract is to

“substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.”

Tying Arrangements.The conditioning of the sale of a product on the buyer’s

agreement to purchase another product produces or distributed by the same seller.

Page 24: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

MergersMergersHorizontal Mergers occur between firms at the same level in the production and distribution chain.Vertical Mergers occur between firms at different levels in the production and distribution chain.Conglomerate Mergers occur when a firm seeks to:Extend its product into a new market by merging with a firm

in that market.Diversify by acquiring a firm that deals in unrelated products.

Page 25: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

Interlocking DirectoratesInterlocking Directorates

Occurs when an individual serves on the board of directors of two or more competing companies simultaneously.

These are prohibited if the two firms meet certain size requirements.

Page 26: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

§ 5: The Federal Trade Commission Act

§ 5: The Federal Trade Commission Act

FTCA provides that:“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting

commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce are hereby declared illegal.”

The Federal Trade Commission enforces the FTCA.

Page 27: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

§ 6: Enforcement of Antitrust Laws

§ 6: Enforcement of Antitrust Laws

Federal agencies that enforce the antitrust laws are:U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).Federal Trade Commission (FTC).

Page 28: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

§ 7: U.S. Antitrust Laws in a Global Context

§ 7: U.S. Antitrust Laws in a Global Context

U.S. laws apply to U.S. companies doing business in foreign nations.Foreign persons may have the right to sue in U.S. court for violations of antitrust law.Extraterritorial violations by U.S. companies will give rise to antitrust violations if there is a “substantial effect” on U.S. interstate commerce.

Page 29: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

§ 8: Exemption from Antitrust Laws

§ 8: Exemption from Antitrust Laws

Most statutory exemptions to the antitrust laws apply to the following areas:

• Labor.• Agricultural associations and fisheries.• Insurance.• Foreign trade.• Professional baseball.• Cooperative research and production• Joint efforts y businesspersons to obtain legislative or

executive action.• And Others.

Page 30: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

Case 45.1: Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania

(Vertical Restraints)

Case 45.1: Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania

(Vertical Restraints)

FACTS:Sylvania sold its televisions directly to franchised

retailers which did not include an exclusive territory. Sylvania retained the discretion to increase the number of retailers in an area.

Continental, a Sylvania franchisee, withheld all payments due for Sylvania products when the manufacturer licensed a franchisee in close proximity.

Sylvania sued Continental for damages and return of secured merchandise.

Page 31: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

HELD: FOR SYLVANIA.U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the legality of

all similar restraints would be subject to the rule of reason.

Vertical restrictions reduce intrabrand competition by limiting the number of sellers of a particular product competing for the business of a given group of buyers, but promote interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve efficiencies in the distribution of products.

Case 45.1: Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania

(Vertical Restraints)

Case 45.1: Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania

(Vertical Restraints)

Page 32: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

Case 45.2: State Oil v. Khan(Vertical Restraints)

Case 45.2: State Oil v. Khan(Vertical Restraints)

FACTS:Khan leased a gas station under a contract

with State Oil which also supplied gas to Khan for resale.

State Oil set suggested retail prices and sold gas to Khan for 3.25 cents per gallon less. Khan could sell the gas at a higher price, but he would have to pay State Oil the difference.

State Oil terminated the contract and Khan sued for price fixing.

Page 33: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

HELD: FOR STATE OIL.U.S. Supreme Court vacated the

decision of the appellate court and remanded.

The Court held that vertical price-fixing is not a per se violation of the Sherman Act but should be evaluated under the rule of reason.

Case 45.2: State Oil v. Khan(Vertical Restraints)

Case 45.2: State Oil v. Khan(Vertical Restraints)

Page 34: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

Case 45.3: U.S. v. Microsoft(Monopolization)

Case 45.3: U.S. v. Microsoft(Monopolization)

FACTS:In 1994, Netscape began marketing

Navigator, the first popular graphical Internet browser. Navigator worked with Sun Microsystems, Inc.’s Java technology.

Java technology enabled applications to run on a variety of platforms, which meant that users did not need Windows.

Microsoft Corporation perceived a threat to its dominance of the operating system market and developed a competing browser, Internet Explorer (Explorer).

Page 35: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

FACTS (cont’d)Microsoft required computer makers who

wanted to install Windows to also install Explorer and exclude Navigator.

Microsoft commingled browser code and other code in Windows so that deleting files containing Explorer would cripple the operating system.

Microsoft offered to promote and pay Internet service providers to distribute Explorer and exclude Navigator.

Case 45.3: U.S. v. Microsoft(Monopolization)

Case 45.3: U.S. v. Microsoft(Monopolization)

Page 36: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

FACTS (cont’d)Microsoft also developed its own Java

code which would only run on windows. The U.S. Department of Justice and a

number of state attorneys general filed a suit in a federal district court against Microsoft, alleging, in part, monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

Case 45.3: U.S. v. Microsoft(Monopolization)

Case 45.3: U.S. v. Microsoft(Monopolization)

Page 37: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

HELD: The court ruled against Microsoft. Microsoft

appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

The Court of Appeals rejected Microsoft’s arguments. The court responded, “Microsoft’s pattern of exclusionary conduct could only be rational if the firm knew that it possessed monopoly power.” This conduct included Microsoft’s restrictions on the computer makers’ Windows licenses.

Case 45.3: U.S. v. Microsoft(Monopolization)

Case 45.3: U.S. v. Microsoft(Monopolization)

Page 38: Chapter 45 Antitrust Law. Introduction Common law actions intended to limit restrains on trade and regulate economic competition. Embodied almost entirely

HELD (cont’d)“Microsoft’s efforts to gain market share in one

market (browsers) served to meet the threat to Microsoft’s monopoly in another market (operating systems) by keeping rival browsers from gaining the critical mass of users necessary to attract developer attention away from Windows as the platform for software development.”

This also included Microsoft’s other actions welding Explorer to Windows. In part, the court reasoned that the commingling of the browsing and other code deters computer makers “from pre-installing rival browsers, thereby reducing the rivals’ usage share and, hence, developers’ interest in rivals’ [operating systems].”

Case 45.3: U.S. v. Microsoft(Monopolization)

Case 45.3: U.S. v. Microsoft(Monopolization)