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CHAPTER - I
INDIAN OCEAN THHOUGH THE PASSAGE OF THIE ~PACE RELI\TIONSHIP_li.ND_~EOJ?_Q]:,ITIC}\i-}:;RAf!E 1:JO:~K
The Indian Ocean~ like the Antarctic Ocean, is not
bounded by any major global power, although the potential
regional powers do border it. No regional power has been able
to exercise exclusive domain over its waters in the so far
knmvn-records. The vast majority of the Indian Ocean littoral
countries attained their independence from the colonial European
empires only after the end of the Second World War. .fv'Tost of
these countries were either colonies, trust territories or
protectorates under the British Empire, v.'hich controlled the
political, military and economic activities in this region till
recently. Soon after the war Indonesia declared their indepen-
dence which was crushed and delayed by the Dutch with the help
of the dominant maritime power, Great Britain, but it was finally
and formally granted in 1949o The Indian Sub-continent was
divided into India and Pakistan and given independence by Great
Britain in August 1947. So were Burma and Sri Lanka in 1948.
On the African littoral independence dawned with Sudan
in 1955, followed by Somalia in 1960, Tanganyika in 1961 and
Uganda in 1~62 and Kenya and Zanzibar in 1963, Zambia in 1964;
Lesotha and Botswana in 1966, and Swaziland in 1968. The French
colony of Madagascar "Vras granted independence in 1960o Hauri tius
Singapore, Malaysia, Aden also got their independence from Great
Britain in 1960s. Portugal granted independence to its colonies
in early sixties and seventies. Thailand, Ethiopia were annexed
by the Axis powers but regained control soon after the war.
Among other traditionally independent states were Yemen, Kuwait,
Muscat and Oman, but only in nameQ
The ovenihelrning majority of the littoral countries are
having republican and parliamentary system and there are few
constitutional monarchies, theocracies and self-proclaimed
scientific socialist countries also.
Even this day there are quite a few colonial vestiges
waiting and aspiring for independence but pitted against stra_
tegic moves of big powers. Their relative strategic and scatterec
locations and sparse populations are the heavy odds.
The economic, political and geopolitical anolysis of
the Indian Ocean region reveals an unparalleled and hetero-
genous nature of a community faced with various problems in
intra-regional and international politics. The relative depen
denceof these countries on the non-littoral big powers for
capital~ technological know-how and technology transfer and
manufactured (soft as well as hard-ware) goods is a very
important factor influencing their external behaviour and
retarding their economic and political well-beingo
The spatial relationship of the Indian Ocean is well
demarcated by the three continents of Asia, Africa and Australia
and a chain of islands and archipelagos and the straits and
approaches connecting this smallest of the three big Oceans
to other water bodies. The relative location of the Indian
Ocean in the geopolitical thinking has great significance in
any spatial calculation. In the Heartland Theory of Mackinder,
the Indian Ocean occupies a significant place in the outer or
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Insular Crescent just do~m south of the Inner or Marginal
Crescent surrounding the Pivot Area. 1 The fortress of Heart:_and
is located on the solid base of the Eurasian landmass. Here
the Indian Ocean occupies a very important place in the debate
over the controversial superiority of land power or that of
maritime power as it directly downward south of the Rimland
surrounding Heartland concept of Spykman in contrast to the
ideas of Mackinder. 2 In this age of technological advancement
both the concepts of Heartland and Rimland have undergone
overwhelming chan~e with the blue waters and the blue skies
gaining ever increasing importance in strategic focus, and there
are few indeed who will dare to survey the \vorld scene with
the majestic sweep of a Mackinder or the holistic view of a
Herbertson., 3
The earliest sea voyages of the Polynesians, for example,
or of the Indians, are shrouded by the veil of prehistoric
events. Only occasionally do archaeological discoveries or
place names establish an earlier connection between civili-
zations which could only have been made by crossing over the
blue waters. For instance, the name of the island of Socotra
in the Gulf of Aden, still bears the roots of its original
Sanskrit name, Dvipa SukhataTa. Socotra was established as an
Indian colony around 3000 B.Co and lasted until the late Roman
1. See Mackinder, H.J., Democratic Ideals and Reality (London: Constable & Co.), 1919.
2. See Spykman, H.J., The Geo~raphy of the Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 194 ).
3. House, John w., The GeograEher in a Turbulent Age(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p. 12.
5 . d 4 perlo •
Although in the writings of Mackinder greatest importance '!'*
was attached to the Heartland but after the Vlorld War II it is
the United States which has become the most powerful giant on
the globe.. The dynamics of spatial relationship has seen the
factors of accessibility , mobility and strategic distance
transforming with the passage of time marked with the technology
impact on logistics, accoustics and weapons systems. Mahan,
who devoted attention to offshoot campaigns in the Indian
Ocean also described Russia as a 11 vast uninterrupted mass" '
whose "centre cannot be broken 11 5 and regarded the Indicm Ocean
as the Ocean of the 21st century. But it is, in any event,
probably safe to say th::lt no over-simplified theory of the
historical process can be a trustworthy basis for predicting
the unpredictable. 6 In the strict terms of the dynamics of
spatial relationship the Atlantic, Indian and Arctic Oceans
are surrounded by trailing edges of continents movine; away
from them. 7
The existing information on the early and ancient phase
of the history of the Indian Ocean is most unreliable due to the
4.
5.
6.
7.
Neumann, Gerbard & Pierson, W.J. Jr., Principles of Physical Oceanography (Englewood Cliff, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1968 ), p. 2.
Mahan, A.T., The Problem of Asia (Boston, M.A., Little Brown Co., 1900), pp 24 & 26.
Potter, E~B., Sea Power: A Naval Histocr} (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 196~, p. 490.
Harry Hess of the Princeton University quoted by Behrman, Daniel, The New World of the Oceans (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1969), p. 209.
. 6
lack of evidence and proof pertaining to maritime explorations
apd adventures. According to Panikkar, partly perhaps as a
result of the monsoons, and partly as a result of the earlier
growth of civilization, the Indian Ocean was undoubtedly the
first centre of oceanic activity. The first naval and oceanic
tradition in fact grew up in the lands washed by the Arabian
sea. 8 According-to the Palermo Stone records, the Egyptian
Pharaoh Sahure of the Fifth Dynasty sent an expedition to Punt
(Somalia) which brought back 8,000 measures of myrrh, 6,000 •
units of gold and 2,600 staves of ebony.9
Pharaoh Pepi I of the Sixth Dynasty wa3 probably th~
first Egyptian King to send troops in nearby littoral countries
of the Indian Ocean to suppress the Bedouins. But the ancient
Egyptian, Sumerian and the Indus Valley civilizations were
continental in character and at the most they could think of
was the river navigation. It were the Egyptians who first
thought of joining the waters of the Red and Mediterranean Seas
through a canal; although the first non-littoral people to sail 1 into the Indian Ocean were the Phoenicians who covered the
shores of Europe , Asia and Africa for trade and cor.nnercial
purposes for more than two millenia, and assisted the Jews and
Assyrians in building and manning their war-fleets in the
northern India Ocean. 10 The Assyrian Kings Sennacherib (704-631-
B.C.) and Ashurbanipal (688-626 B.C.) ruled their far-flQ~g
----·-----8.
9.
}1 o.
Panikkar, K.M., India and the Indian_Ocean (Bombay:Geor~e Allen&Unwin,19?1), p. 2~. Iskandar, Zaky and Badawy, Alexander, Brief History of Ancient EgJEt (Cairo: . 19t>5),p.44. See Toussaint, Anguste, L'Histoire de 1' Ocean (Paris:Presses Univ. de France,l~J,
empire which was later overrun by the Persians, who took a
great interest both in land and maritime campaiens. They ~"
fought against the Hellenist world in the latter's islands and
the defeat of the Persians and Salamis revealed the Persian
warfare tActics. The Greeks probably learnt first tactical
lessons from the Orient. 11 The Hellenist period in this
region began with the defeat of the Persians at the hands o~
Alexander the Great in 331 B.c. 12 The maritime achievements
of Indians were very remarkable at this juncture of time as
India seems to have been the first Indian Ocean littoral country
to possess real battlefleets. The Iviaurya Emperor Chandragupta
(321-297 B.C.) had even during that period an actual Board
of Admiralty, with a Superintendent of ships at its head. 13
Egypt was at the vE'ry height of its power ·when Philopator came
to the throne. He found himself master of Ethiopia, Cyrene,
Phoenicia, Coele-Syria, part of upper Syria, Cyprus, Rhodes,
and the cities along the coast of Asia minor from Pamphilia to
Lysimachia, and the cities of Aenos and TvJaroned in Thrace. So
Egypt was the greatest naval power in the world, having the
command of the sea and the whole of the coast at the eastern
14 end of the Iviediterranean.
11 •
12.
13.
14.
11 Grand Larousse Encyclopedique"t Vol. 10, Tactique (Paris: Larousse, 1964).
McDowell, Carl E.~ and Gibbs, Helen M., Ocean Transportation(New York, 1954).
Toussaint, Auguste, Histor~ of t0e Indian Ocean (Tr. by June Guicharnand), (Lon on: Routledge & Kegar. Paul, (1966), p .. 72.
Rappoport, s., Risto~ of E~1 Vol. I, (London: Th~ Grolier Society PubllshGrs,~4), p. 178.
8
Again, except Ptolemy Philadelphes' futile effort to
reopen the canal linking the Mile to the R.ed Sea near the
tovm of Arsinoe, no great Egyptian maritime activities were
heard ofp About the maritim~ activittes of the Arabs, the
noted historian Hourani writes that in view of the flourishi:'1g
condition of the Minaeans and Sabaeans in the first milleniwn,
and in the light of what can be learnt of their nautical
activity in Hellenistic times, it is a sound conjecture that
Arabs were playing some parts in the sea-faring life of their
times for many centuries before Alexander the Great. 15 '
The Roman conquest of Dgypt (30 B.C.) only gave a new
stimulus to direct maritime relations with India, and it is
really at this point that we enter into the era of the great
. l d"t• 16 c ommerc la_. expe l l ons. The Roman striving for military
ascendancy and political hegemony was to encourage and develop
their ovm maritime trade by weakening the seafarinp, people
of Southern Arabia and help their rivals to establish the
Axumite kingdom in Ethiopia Rome's trade with India and the
states of sou·theast Asia ended with the ascendancy of Byzantine
in Egypt in 395 A.D., This was also the renaissance of the
Persian power under the Sassanids, who drove out the Axumites
from Arabia in 570 A.D. With the decline of the Byzantine and
the advent of Islam the militant Arab mobility increased like
lightening and the enterprising Arab traders penetrated lnto tt.e
coastal areas of East Africa and other islands in the Indian Ocean.
15.
16.
Hourani, G.T., Arab Seafari~g ip the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Time (Princeton: 1951),p.II.
Toussaint, op.cit., p. 34.
9
In the eastern region of the Indian Ocean the maritime
affairs and activity flourished durinz; the ~~Iauryan era. As '~'.
Coedes has remarked that after hnving been, at about the
bcginninr of the Christian era, the country of gold to'.vard
which the Hindu navigators steered th~ir course, Into-China
and more especially the Malay Archipelago became for the Arabs
and the Europeans, a few centuries later, the country of
spices, camphor, and aromatic woods, before establishing itself,
as it has recently done, as one of the most import8nt producer
of rubber, tin and oil. Furthermore, the position of the
Peninsula and Sunda Islands makes them an obligatory point of
call for navigators making their way from the ~est m1d fro~
IncHa, to China, and vice-versa; whence thr~ir importance for
maritime trade. 17
In the Medieval Ages the Arab dominance was over the
Arabian Peninsula, the East Africa and the islands and
archipelagos of the Indian Ocean, but the concept of thalasso
cracy was non-existent in this part of the world until the
European ascendancy by 16th century. The Arab dominance under
the Caliphate was at the peak of its glory during the 13th
century, spread over a vast expanse conquered by the Arab
rulers. Under its influence and control were the courtries
on the East African littoral and the islands of the Indian
Ocean including the Majapahit Empire in the East Indies. During
the Ming rule China became very active in maritime spt~e:::-·e and
sent important naval expeditions to the Indian Ocean. According
•. - - -·- ------------------17. Coedes, G., Les E 1 tats hindouise's d' Indo-Chine et d'
Indonesie (Paris---····------ 191~8),
DD. 1-2.
10
to Toussaint, the military conquest of India, begun early ~n
the eighth century and not brougnt to a close until the enc of
the sixteenth, was a long series of land operations on a limited
scale, in which the sea played no part. The conquest had no
influence on the organization of Indian trade, in which the
18 Noslem conquerors never had any part.
In the naval battles fought in and around the Indian
Ocean the Arabs were defeated and subjugated by the Soljuk Turks
and the Ottoman Turkey assumed the political and spiritual leader
ship of the Islamic world, and played a very important role
and restructured the geopolitical pattern of th:i s region.
The Turkish Empire indeed belonged to the transition :pe':"iod,
in which i~ developed alongwith the other so-c~lled European
Great Powers. 19 In the medieval ages the trade between the
Orient and the \'lest suffered heavy set-backs on accour.t of
the intermixture of religious factors in the East-West relations,
and the heinous activity of slave-trading had its day. Of
course, the slave trade, like piracy, had existed in the Indian
Ocean, but it was the Arabs who gave it its fir.al forn, and
became, as it were, specialists in it. 20 Ironically, just as
the only major oriental attempt to take to the seas dissipated,
WestE)rn Europe vms beginning its Oceanic age thn.t would dctcrrr.ine
overseas thrusts of the Portuguese, Dutch Spanish, English , and French. 21
18. Op.cit., p. 48. 19. fiJaull, Otto, Poli tische Geographie (Berlin:
1956).
20. Toussaint, op.cit., p. 58.
21. Reynolds, Clark G., Command of the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires (New York: William Forrow & Co., 1 97 4 ) ' p • + 1 04 •
The Arab and Turkish control and refusal of the land
routes to Orient took the then active European powers to
discover and try alternative route to the East. The subsequent
discovery of the Cape Route and the arrival of the Europem1
power into the Indian Ocean region did not make them the ma.sters
of this region~ It was only after the second seize of Vienna
in 1683 that they could seek the control and attempt the over-
land conquest of the Indian Subcontinent, Cathay, and the Far
East after the defeat of the Turkish might, and could the
thalassocracies hammer out international law upon the sea, and
the combined overseas thrust of all the maritime peoples acted 22 as a major force in the advance of the Western values.
According to Panikkar, it was an age of maritime power and of 2-
authority based on the control of the seas. )
Although the Dutch had established themselves here
firmly by the end of the seventeenth century, but the British
explorations, diplomatic marriages and the Anglo-Dutch commercial
treaties, the defeat of the Spanish Armada, the Anglo-Dutch
wars, and the Spanish war of succession, all resulted in the
British consolidation of power in this region. During the
eighteenth century the events in the Atlantic had far-reaching
repercussions on the European fortunes in other overseas
regions. The Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 went in favour of the
British. According to Godechot, in that century Atlantic was
22. Reynolds, op.cit., p. 110.
23. Panikkar, op.ci t., p. 13.
tz virtually an EneJ.ish lake. Of co ;,lrse, Enelish dominion had
its fluctuations. It was at its height between 1763 and 1775,
but at the beginning at the end of the century, the British
hold on the Ocean remained powerful, extensive and over_
h l . 24 w e m1ng.,
Britain's supremacy in India began with her victory at
Plassey in 1757 and it was assured of the domination of Indian
Ocean after thedefeat of the French at Trafalg~Jr. French took
possession of the Ile de France Ollauri tius) in 1775 and
established a strategic post at Saint-Marie on Madagascar in .
1750; discovered the Southern Indien Ocean islaDds of Kern;uelen
in 1734, Marion Dufresne in 1772, 3nd occupied the Seychelles
in 1744 and organized it for naval warfare operations in 1770.
The British got Penang from Kedah in 1786 and occupied the
strategic Malacca in 1795, Sri Lanka and 'f\~aldi ves in 1796; and
concluded a defence treaty against Napoleon with Muscat and
Oman in 1797, which was followed by a Peace Treaty with Turkey
at Dardanelles in 1809. 25 The British took rl!auri tius from
France in 1814 and took the Reunion island from France in 1810
only to return it back to France in 18 '15. v.Jit h the occupation
of South Africa in 1795, and the purchase of Cape Tovm in 1814,
and the founding of Sydney in 1788 and the colonization of
Tasmania in 1803, the British became the virtual masters of
24. Godechot, J., Histoire de 1' Atlantique, (Paris:Presses Univ. de France ,1947), p. 163.
25. Hertslet,Comrn.Treaties Series Treaties,(Amsterdam, 1971.
, Com:-'1ercial ) ' 2: 371 •
the Indian Ocean region. Britain was in possession of the
strategic post of Singapore while Jvlalacca and Java were under
the Dutch domination.
The industrial revolution of the nineteenth century gave
further impetus to the European colonial pov:ers to exploit the
natural resources and raw materials of this region ·which in
turn becar.Je an easy market for their finished goods. The
nineteenth century witnessed the arrival of steam ship and the
abolition of slavery and migration of populations worldwide.
The opening of the Suez Canal sank the distances greatly
and opened a new chapter in the geopolitical and oceanic
strategic relations of the region. Vli th the thwarting of the
Italian adventures in Northeast Africa, the British began the . 2r
acquisition of Aden, Egypt, the Sudan, Somalia Kenya, Uganda, J
' Zanzibar, Burma, the Cocos and Keeling and Christmas Islands.
Important technological advancement and inventions durine; the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries helped the
dominant Britain to consolidate its political, military power
and make safe and secure her sea-lanes of communications. The
discovery of petroleum in the .f\Uddle East, Burma and Indonesia
suddenly further enhanced the stratesic significance of the
Indian Ocean.
The early twentieth century witnessed the growing
nationalism questioning Britain's imperial role and colonial
26. "Great Britain and France: Declaration Frontier, Togoland (10.7.1919), State Papers, Vol. 11~. 828; Vol. 118, pp. 893, 1088.
14
policies, and the Empire's role in the First World War; which
was followed by signing of London and vJashington Naval parleys <r"'
and treaties, 27 that showed the growinp: competition in naval
matters. The policy of appeasement and Nazi quest for the
Lebensraum indicated to the formation of war clouds. The
British consolidation in the Middle East could check the Nazi
aspiration of entering the Indian Ocean littoral via the planned
Baghdad Railway Line. The British fleet and air force comple~ely
dominated the situation and any local chief who tended to
subordination could expect nothing but repression from the
British armed forces. 28
During the Second World War the dominant British sea
power aided by the army and air force commanded the destinies
of this region. The strategic naval and air bases of the
region were put to the best and urgent use denying access to t~e
Axis fleet and bombers to this region and expelling them
back. 29 The British diplomatic and military manoueuverings
succeeded in repelling the Axis aggression and culminated in
the signing of scores of treaties of war, peace and orders in
the council which all led to the ultimate defeat of the Axis
powers and the restauration of status quo anteo It is, therefore,
27. "Great Britain and France and Others. Treaty on Naval Armament Limitation, 6.2.1922, in State Paper~, vol. 117, p• 453.
28. Hirszowicz, Lukasz, The Third Reich and the Arab East (London: Longmans, 1966),p.9.
29. Great Britain Order in Council: Persian GulfStates: Emergency, in: State Papers, Vol. 143, p. 177.
15
obvious that since the defeat of the Fench squadron under ·
Admiral de Suffren in 1783, the Indian Ocean had been a purely ... (11
British lake where British control only being challenged once
by Japanese air attacks on Sri Lanka in 1942.3°
SEA-BORNE TRADE AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES
J Indian Ocean, one of the great oceans is surrounded by
the continents of Asia, Africa, Australia and is separated from
the Anarctic continent by the Antarctic Circle. It is t~e
smallest of the three big Oceans, covering an Oceanic area of
nearly 75 million square kilometres. Unlike the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans it does not cover the temperate zone of the
northern hemisphere. The greatest depth of the Indian Ocean
is over 24,000 feet in the Java Trench, and the averar,e depth
of 13,000 far exceeds that of the Atlantic Ocean. The Indus,
Ganges, Irrawaddy, Tigris-Euphrates, Zambezi and Limpopo are
the large rivers emptying into the Indian Ocean. The Arabian
Sea and the Bay of Bengal are its two major arms. 31
Given its geographical location ru~d coastal configu
rations, historically the northern expanse of the Indian Ocean
has always, since the known antiguity, been the theater of
human activity, as it is easily and comfortably accessible
from both.the west and east through the bottlenecks or choke
30.
31.
Watt, D.C., Britain and Indian Ocean: Diplomacy Before Defence, in: The Political Quarterl~ (London), Vol. 42, No. 3, Jul-Sept. 1971, p. 08.
Cowles Encyclopedia of Nations (New York: Cowles Efaucation ~orp8ration) 1968, p. 246.
16
points of the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, Strait of Malacca and
the Timor and Arafura Seas. In the northern region the
waters are warm and comparatively calm and predictable wind
motions, which make the navigation easy by sailing v1i th the
prevalent wind and oceanic currents systems. Therefore, the
coastal trade here was always sea-borne and flourished between
the nations of Asia and Africa 1ong before the advent of the
non-littoral Europeans here during the 15th century A.D.
Partly due to reasons of safety and economy the sea-
borne trade prevailed in the mediterranean, where the Phoeni-
cians, Carthagians, and Greeks carried it on from the main
trading centrP.s like Tyre as early as the 9th century B.C.
It was in the 4th century B.C. that the sea-borne trade began
expanding from Greece, Rome and Cathay (China) via lVJalaya, Java,
Sri Lanka, India, 32 and the trade routes across the Mediterranean
were only tributaries of the broad stream of commerce that
flowed in many channels between Africa, Asia and converged in
the Red Sea, the centre of world trade at thRt time. The
Mediterranean Sea lost its importance as the bastion of Europe's
overseas trade with the outside world with the spread of
Moslem dominance in the Red Sea and IVIediterranean region from
the 7th century A.D. onwards. This was tbe most important
turning point in European history ar.d Greece and Italy·never
recovered from the blow. The centre of European trade shifted
32. Wyetinsky, W.S., and E.S., World Commerce and Go,rernments: Trends and Outlook (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1955, P• 5.
17
northward from the Mediterranean to the areas along the
Atlantic coast. The Crusades and the great voyages of the
15th and 16th centuries which culminated in the discovery of
America and of routes to India, were Europe's response to the
challenge of the Moslem Kingdoms. 33 The foreign trade of that
time was somewhat like that of the ancient world - long
distance commerce in rare and valuable luxuries - like gold
from Ethiopia, silk from China and spices from the Indies.
In commerce with the East, the Europeans (Portuguese,
Spaniards, Dutch, English and the Hanseatic League) paid tribute
to the Arabs, who had a monopoly over the trade with India and
China. The Moslems haild all the main known routes to the
East. Hence, the European merchants and navigators became
convinced that the East could be reached by sea without passing
through waters and lands under I'-1oslem control; and a maritime
route to the Indies was their main objective, followed by
establishing direct trade links with the natives in order to
eliminate the middlemen. In this regard the year 1497-98 mark
the watershed. Thus by the end of the 15th century, Europe
had already broken the blockade and the whole world - Africa,
Asia, America - lay open to European trade and colonization,
although at that time Europe lagged behind Asia in industrial
skill, the superiority of Asian commerce, handicraft and
administration. 34
---·-- ------··-----33. Ibid., p. 7.
34. Ibidof P• 8.
18
The commanding importance of the northern portion of
the Indian Ocean has been well apprecia~ed al initio,due to .,.
its valuable and exotic merchandise and. the ever-increasing
competition among the overseas importers to avail it, be it
the gold and incense of Aksum and Ophir and Punt or the spices
and iron of Indian Subcontinent or the industrial fuel from
the Middle East or the precious metals and critical strategic
minerals from the Indian subcontinent, Southern Africa and
Australia or tbe rubber and tin of I'ilalaya and Indonesia.
The Suez Canal may not be absolutely essential, but
any interruption in its availability creates widespread
difficulties, 35 which was well demonstrated when it was
nationalized in 1956 and again when it was closc?d by Egypt
in 1967 waro
Inspite of north-western, southern and eastern approache:3
to the Indian Ocean the trade of the region has not yet been
diversified except th3.t with Japan othervlise it is still
dominated by the western industrial democracies. So far a
distinct Indian Ocean economic community has not emerged.
Intra-regional trade is very little. The technologic<-il
superiority which gave military supremacy to the Portuguese in
the 16th century today gives economic hegemony to the indus-
trialized countries, therefore, the continuing predominance
35. Cressey, G.B., Crossroads South-West Asia( 1~p. 23.
L&nd and Life in )
19
of trade links with countries beyond the Indian Ocean has
meant that the sea-approaches to the Ocean has retained their '1'"
earlier importance, 36 an opt-repeated plea for the justi-
fication of any political and military action by the non-
littoral industrialized big powers.
The appearance of super tankers necessitated the regular
cleaning and dredging of the approaching canals, especially
those of the eastern approaches and in fact there was a move
to dig a waten1ay in the Kra Isthmus of Thailand. Oil
resources, a major portion of international commerce traverse
the waters of the Indian Ocean more than any other single
trading commodity anywhere on the globe. Are the demographic I
and natural resources dimensions of the Indian Ocean region
simply inadequate to attain development to reach the economic
level of the.Western World? The result is unending frustration
and growing hostility toward the more fortunate countries of
the West. 37 Hence the Indian Ocean is of major and growing
importance to the non-littoral developed economic and milit3ry
powers. ~It is a fact that most of the world's population,
its workable raw materials and its transportation facilities
are found close to the coasts of the various continents, while
their interiors are comparatively empty. 38 This is very valid
in respect of some parts of the Indian Ocean.
36.
37.
38.
Burrell, R.M:, and Cottrell, Alvin J., eds., The Indian Ocean: A ...;onlference Report (\'lashington D.C., 1 J71).
Adie, Vv.A.C., Oil Politics and Sea Power: The Injian Ocean Vortex (Nevt York: ·-- ---- 1975), p. V.
So~ol 9 Ant~ony E.~ Sea Power in Nu~.1~~4Age (':!ashington D.c.: Publlc Affalrs Press, 1961), p. 5 •
20
In trade matters the Cap route aloncwith the coast
of South Africa has not declined in its importnnce. On the
contrary it has grown in importance siDce the Second \'Jorld War
as many strategically critical raw materirJ.ls, i.e. copper,
uranium etc., are routed through this highway for inter-
continental trade.
After the second Vlorld \var the new technological knowhovi
and skills have yielded unforeseen results in the economic
progress and advancement in nation-building. In context of
North-South situation also soma of the countries of this region,
particularly Australia, South Africa India and Israel have
attained the level and potential in terms of industrial and
economic gro-vrti1 and technological advancement. The rapid and
fluctuating economic growth in several littoral countries
resultant to the oil revenues has generated industrial develop-
ment and jobs in several couDtries. The uneven and contrasting
GNP and GDP levels of this region are underdeveloped or
developing ones.
In this predominantly agricultural economy of the~e
countries there are seve~·al drawbacks like the pressure of
overpopulation, non-availability of irrigation water, lack of
the application of rr.odern technological means and techniques of
cultivation. The consequences a1·e low yield and frequent crop
failures. The resultant great imbal::,nce between food production
and population growth is the main Characteristic phenomenon in a
majority of the developing countries of the Indian Ocean.
THESis"
341 . 75660954 04402 In
1111111111111111111111111 TH2082
Zl -' - - - .. __/.
Therefore most of the Indian Ocean countries export
their primary products, i.e. petroleum, agricultural products,
ferrous and non-ferrous ores and indus-'-rial minerals to the
developed market economies to buy technological and induscl.rial
and engineering products. Thus it is well evident thrt the
trade -·patterns in most cases are not in favour of the Indian
Ocean countries.
The most significent and interesting aspect of the whole
situation is t'"lat the export of strategically and industrially
critical minerals and fuels is routed through the shipping
routes and lanes to the industrialized cour.tries who in turn
invariably believe in the sanctity of maintainiY"lg the safety
of the sea-lanes of co:::munication, ~alibi for exertin.G
pressure and intervention in the region. Ovcrsimplific<i:ion
~ of the Japanese problem, because our primary objective lies O• •
elsewhere, is likely to be discour1t the enormous advantages
that will accrue to our enemies through conquest of India, tr.e
domination of the Indian Ocean, the severing of all lines
of British communications to tr.e Near Emd T-1iddle East and the
physical junction of our two principal enemies. 39 However,
in London the chiefs of stc.ff sav: the main strater;ic task of
the British Empire for 1942 as taking of the >:.'eight off Russia
and admitted that in India the British position was extremely
weak.. They agrPed and summed up ':d th the gloomiest warnj ng of
39.
---------------------- -----The chief of the War Plans Division of the US Arr:ry, .- _'; General Staff, General D. Eisenhower, quoted in: .ratJ_off, I·lf. and Sne 11, E .IV!., Strategic Planning for Coali -t {pn tw.-. Warfere 19lj-1-L~2, US Army in 'i.'orld ':I ;->r II \'lash in t<":J- • D .. C • , 1 9 53") , p " 1 52 " -- \ '·~r· _,
~\-\-~a&~ /
zz all: "We are in real danc:er of losing our Indian Empire :
with incalculable consequence to the future conduct of the
war 11 •40
After World War II durir1g the era of independence several
Indian Ocean littoral and island states have tried to maintain
their own navies instead of the former colonial/imperial naval
fleets in the Indian Ocean. The three-dimensional phenomenon
of the withdrawal of mainly the British naval fleets, the
emergence of the growing super power navies and the efforts
by some littoral and island states to have their own naval
forces has resulted in the simultaneous and spontaneous cry
for the exist of the big power presence in t~is region. The
adamant postures adopted by the non-littoral big pmvers not to
withdraw has further complicated the matter. This region has
witnessed the formation and dissolution of :nany a milit;:Ty
and semi-military pacts like CE:'-JTO and SEATO and the growth of
non-alignr:.1ent, since the early 1950s.
The Western industrialized nations' plea for the safety
of the sea-lanes of communication has become an alibi for a ~
gun-boat diplomacy in this region, which ~ns invariably
exploited by their adversary/adversaries detrimental to the
former's and the region 1 s own interests. UnlH;:e the Norwegian
Sea and the I-1edi terranean, the interests of the super powers
in the Indian Ocean area extend beyond mutual opposition. The
Soviet Union is concerned about its sea communications to the
40. Hauner, Milan, India in Axis Strategy(Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981), p. 442.
ZJ
Far Eastern front, as well as about the political threat from
China to its southern flank. The US is COiiCerned for the <:'.
security of its oil supplies in peace time. 41
Since most of the terrestrial oil resources are located
in this region, and a pretty good deal of international commerce
criss-crosses the waters of this Ocean and the enormous and
unprecedented wealth of the oil-producing countries in contrast
to the poverty and backwardness of other nations makes this
region a ground for mutual rivalries, conflicts, insurgencies
and intervention of the big powers. The Indian Ocean is, ./
therefore, an area of strategic competition first because it
is there; second because in the north-western corn2r is located
the principal world source of surplus oil; and thiru because
it includes major highways of international comri1erce and the
essential marit:..me route between the eastern and western
_parts of the Soviet Union. 42 The Western plea of safeguarding
the sea lanes of communication is demolished by one of the
ardent supporters of US presence in tie Indian Ocean Althout;h
the British expended much energy and effort on defense of the
route to India, no serious and sustained naval challenee was
ever presented which could have forced London to define, in hard
terms, the stratE·e;ic value of the Indian Ocean as a whole
which persisted even after the granting of independence to India
41.
42.
TJiccGwire, Hichael, Soviet-American Naval Arrr:s Control, in: Quester George H., ·Navies and A:rms control (New York~ Praeger, 1980), p. 84.
Millar, T.B., The East-West Strateeic Balance(London: Georce Allen ana Unwin, 1931 ), p. 134.
in 1947. The British decision to withdraw owed more to
domestic political and economic considerations rather than <.
any lessening in real strategic interests.4 3
GEOGRAPHICAL DIMENSION AND PHYSIOGtl.APHIC FEATUHES
Indian Ocean, the third largest of the world oceans, is
unique with respect to its shape, size and location. Unlike
the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean; the Indian Ocean waters do
not intermingle with those of the Arctic Ocean. Since the
vast, solid Eurasian landmass lies to its north, blocking its
reach to the Arctic waters. Of course, like the other two
larger Oceans, the Indian Ocean waters mix up with those of
the Antarctic Ocean. Nearly 40 sovereign independent states
of three continents are the littoral and insular entities here
alongwith 12 sovereign nations lying on the hinterland of
the Indian Ocean. Around 20 island are located in the southe~n
Indian Ocean. Of the littoral states three (namely the Republic
of South Africa, Egypt and Israel), have two ocean location.
I'-1eridian 20°E running through the Cape Agulhas, forms
the boundary between the Atlantic and Indian Ocean. The waters
of the Indian and Pacific Oceans are separated by the geometrical
line of 147°E (South-East Cape, Tasmania), the western exist
of the Bass S rai t, and the junctj on betv1een Northwest Austrc:lia L
and the Cape Talbot through Sing2pore, Timor, Sumba, Flores,
43. Burrell, R.M. & Cottrell, Alvin J., eds., op.cit., p. 64.
2.5
the Sunda Islands and Sumatra. Geographers and oceanographers
take the 60° S latitude as the boundary between the Indi::m c:nd
Antarctic Oceans. 44 The mixing up of the Indian Ocean waters
is more in respect to those of South Atlanti.c only after the
Antarctic Ocean, which could be attributed to its opening
towards South and the location of the mid-Oceanic Ridge clea~ly
influencing the course of the waters of the Indian Ocean.
The Arabian Sea, with its Red Sea, Persian Gulf and
the Hormuz and Tirana Straits; the Bay of Bengal, the Andaman
Sea, the Hozambique Channel, etc. make the total oceanic area
of the Indian Ocean is around 2.5 million square kms; which is
roughly equal to the combined area of the Asian and African
continents. The oceanic depth varies from 1793 m in the ncrth
Arabian Sea, and 2400 m in the Kerguelen Platean to 7010 m in
Sunda Trench (The Planet depth is 71~55 m) n('cli'Jy 250 krns. from
the Java Coast. The Indian Ocean islar.ds are irregul~r in
distribution and origin; and the basin formation by the mid-
Oceanic ridge is similar to that of the Atlantic Ocean, but is
shorter and wider.. The mid-Oceanic Ridge actually divides it
into three parts. From the Amsterdam Pateau (40°S) the ridge
runs through Chagos Archipelago, Maldives, Laccadives to the
northern portion of the Arabian Sea. Beyond 20°S, the mid
Oceanic Ridge runs southeast and its width is 320 kms. Unlike
the mid-Atlantic Ridge, it widens to 1600 kms. in the form of
44. Pell? Senator Claiborne, Challen (:e of the Seven Seas (New York: William Morrow & Co. Inc., 1966}, p. 27.
Z6
Amsterdam St. Paul Plateau, of which the northeastern extension
is actually known as Southeast Indian Ridge.
Beyond 50°S this plateau is divided into separate ridges,
namely the western part is Kergueleu-Gaussberge Ridge, and the
eastern one is the Indo-Antarctic Ridge which finally merges
into the Antarctic continental shelf. Like in south, the mid
Oceanic Ridge is bifurcated into several small ridges in the
northwestern region, where the Socotra-Chago Ridge runs through
the Gulf of Adan towards the Horn of Africa near Guardafui. L1
the southwest of the Seychelles - Mauritius is the rJlalagasy
Ridge, extending as the Prince Edward-Crozet Ridge. The
peculiar ridge in the Indian Ocean is the geometrical Ninety-
East Ridge running like a meridian from a point just west of
Obtrench projecting towards the Bay of Bengal. 45 The princ ipc:tl
topographical characteristic of the Indian Ocean is that it 1s
divided into two basins, like the Atlantic by a mid-oceanic
ridge.
The Indian Ocean deep waters are thus divided into
three large troughs by the mid-Oceanic Ridge: ( 1) the i'Torth-East,
the Central Indian and other small basins around Malagasy
(i.e. the Amirante, Mascarenes, Malgasy ond Natal basins);
( 2) the Southern Trough consists of the South-\'! est Ind i<m
Ocean Basin divided by the Crezet ~nd Kergucleau Ridges from
the Indian-Antarctic Basins; ( 3) the Wharton Basin is m~ar the
Sunda Trench. Other basins in the eastern trough are the
Andaman and Cocos-Keeling Basins.
----------------~----- ---·· •· .. - --- ·-- ------45. Sharma, R.C. Oceanogr,3)Qy_ _f:;:__r Geograph('rs_jAllahabad),
1970, p. 83.
27
Approximately eighty-six per cent of the total area
of the Indian Ocean is covered with the pelagic and the remaining
fourteen per cent with the hemipelagic and the littoral marine
sediments.
The continental shelf covers nearly 4.2 per cent of the
entire area of the Indian Ocean. It is wide in the Bay of
Bene;al, the Arabian Sea and in the northwestern coast of
Australia. The Persian Gulf is a shallow arm of the Arabian
Sea extending between Iran and Arabia. Along the African Coast,
the continental shelf is moderately wide but is consi(erably !
wide near I'vlalagasy. The continental shelf narrows do'..tn in the
eastern region of the Indian Ocean along the Sumatra <md Java
coasts.. The continental shelf, an area of steep slope cxtend:Lne
just after the continental shelf, covers 6.5 per cent of tte
total area of the Indian Ocean.
The deep Sea plain begins vthere the contit1enLol sht)lf
ends. Extending over the Oceanic depths and coverine the major
portions of the Oceanic relief, the deep sea plain spreads
over 80.1 per cent of the total area of the Indian Ocean.
There are two 't'le 11-marked deep sea plains in this Ocean:
( 1 ) the Ceylon Abyssal Plain in the northeastern region; and
(2) the Somali Abyssal Plain in the northeastern region.
The mid-Oceanic Ridge and the other smaller ridges are
abruptly cut at several points presenting a really interesting
scenic attraction in the Indian Ocean as well as a beautiful mapa
The important fracture zones are: the Ower., Rodrigues, IVIozambique,
Prince Edward, Malagasy, Amsterdani anJ Diamantina fracture
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zones. The principal trenches are: the Amirante, Kenya,
Mauritius and Java tenches. All these fracture zones and
tenches pass through the different islands and island groups
where from taking their respective names.
The submarine canyons of the non-gl8cial features a
unique phenomenon in the Indian Ocean, and are located on the
shelf and slopes of the continental platforms. The tenche.s
therein also project towards the coast starting from the beach-
heads. The trenches vary in length and width, and the slopes
of the continental shelves also varied according to tteir
respective location. These canyons might have been formed due
to the sub-aerial erosion of rivers during the Pleistocene
46 or earlier age.
The physiography of the mid-Oceanic ridges, continental
sheld, and the slope and deep-sea plains of the Indian Ocean
is the key to locating the Oceanic islc=mds therein. The very
fact that these islands are by and large located on the sheJf
and the mid-Oceanic ridges, attaches strategic signific:-,r:ce to
them. The archipelago concept attaches a unique significance
to them. The northern island belt comprises of the continuous
links in a chain spread between Timor and Maldive and the
Laccadives, Minieoy islands 9 Many of them are coral islets and
alolls, reefs. Many of them are simply the summits on a sub-
marine range.
46. Ibid., pp. 57-57 (quoted from Krishnan, 1960).
30
The central Indian Ocean islands belt consists of the
Malagasy, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Reunion, Comoros and the
Chagos Archipelago. The scattered Cocos or Keeling Islands
and Christmas Island also belong here. Some of these islands
are of valcanic origino The abrupt volcanic mass gave rise
to the islands in the southern Indian Ocean, mostly covered
with algae and glaciers.
The living and non-living resources of the Indian Ccean
are also not spread evenly all across it. The physiography of
the Ocean is primarily responsible for this situation, too.
' The realisation and exploitation of these resources al.so depend
on the technological advancement and the search for the sub-
stitute for the fast depleting resources in use. The exploration
and harnessing of these resources cause many problems and
creates conditions wherein engulf many issues pressing for
solution through the world Ocean, and the Indian Ocean is no
exception but may well prove to be even the focal point ir..
this regard.
NATURAL RESOURCES: MAGNITUDE AND PROBLEl\1S OF EXPLOITATION
Indian Ocean region is rich, both for resources on
surrounding lands and under water. Agricultural resources of
this region are diverse and dynamic. In terms of cereals this
region produces nearly one-fifth of the world's total cerEal
. LJ-7 product1on. India, Indonesia, Australia, Thailand, Bangladesh,
47. U.N. Statistical Yearbook 1981 (New York: UN, 1983), pp. 489-'+98.
31
Pakistan, South Africa and Burma are the main producers of
cereals. This region's yield of what is about 18% of the
world's total and comes mainly from India, Australia, Fakistan
and Iran, while the rice produced in India, Indonesia,
Banpiadesh and Burma amounts to approximately 45% of the total
world production. The main barley growing countries of this
region are Australia, India, Iran, Ethiopia and Iraq. The
barley produced here accounts for nearly 6 per cent of the·t9tal
worl<f production. South Africa, India, Indonesia, ThaiJ.and,
Egypt, Kenya, and Malwi produce nearly 9 per cent of thE~ world's '
total maize; while Australia and South Africa make this region's
share of nearly 4 per cent of the oats productiono
Among the major cash crops of this rer,ion art> groundnuts,
coffee, tea, tobacco, cotton, wool and sugar. Groundm.r: is
produced mainly in India, Indonesia, Sudan, :Surma, South Africa,
and tiJ"alawi and makes for nearly 47 per cent of the world 1 s
total groundnut yield. This re,sion's share (18 per cent)
of the world's total coffee production comes primarily from
Indonesia, Ethiopia, India, Uganda, l\1adagascar, Kenya and
Tanzania, while North Yemen is kno\vn for its super flnvour
Tv1ocha coffee. The other common beverage tea, the near-monopoly
of this region, makes for (76 per cent in 1970) 61 per cent
of the world's total. This region's share of world tobacco
production is almost 18 per cent and comes from India, Thailand,
Indonesia, Pakistan, Burma and Malawi. The cotton production
in region amounts to 24 per cent of the world total and comes
JZ
primarily from India, Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan ( whc:re its yield
is dwindled), and Israe1. 48
The Indian Ocean littoral produces nee:: rly 38 per cent
of world's total wool. Australia, South Africa, IndiC:J.,
P k . t I d I 'h · 1 ' · · · lt9 a ls-an, ran an raq are~ e ~a1n woo prouuc1ng coun~r1es.
One-fifth of the world's total sugar production comes from tte
Indian counties of India, Australia, South Africa, ThaiJand,
Indonesia, Pakistan, Mauritius and Egypt.5°
The geographical location of the Indian Ocean rec;ion
gives it a set physiographic attributes v1l1ich deteiT:ine its
contribution with respect to agricul t 1Jral and forest :?roduces.
This region 1 s forests provide nP:·rly 22 p-::r cent of tb0. world r s
total roundwood, mainly from India, Indonesia, Malays~a,
Thailand, Tanzania, the Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia 2~d Burma.
Natural rubber is the monopoly of this region. Peninsular
Malaysia 9 Indonesia, Thailand, India, Sii Lanka, and Bunna
produce 87 per cent of the world's total natural rubbero 51
In tenns of livestock, the Indian Ocean has 3'-1 per cent
cattle, 33 per cent sheep, 8 pPr cont horso;; .:-·ncl 38 pc·:· cr·nt
asses in the world.5 2
48. Ibid., pp. 505-513.
49. Ibid., p .. 558.
so. Ibid., pp. 643-6'-1-4.
51. Ibid., pp. 553-556.
52. Ibid., pp. 514-531.
Since no nation in the world is self-sufficient in
all the natural resources so the inter-depenJence53 for them
attaches a special significance to the Indian Ocem1 for its
strategic location and the mineral wealth. The base of
modern industries is steel and one-fifth of the world's tota1
iron-ore is produced in the Indian Ocean countries of Australia,
India, South Africa, Egypt, Iran, and Nalaysia; but except
India, Australia and South Africa no other iron-ore producing
country in this region has established basic heavy industries. 54
The Indian Ocean countries of Australia, India, Indo-
nesia, Malaysia and fv!ozambique produce 35 per cent of toe world's
bauxite for aluminium industries. Zambia, Australia, South
Africa, Indonesia, India, :tvlalays_La and Dotswaua produce 1 C pc r
cent of the world 1 s copper; vihile AustraliR, Zambia, Inm '
Burma, India and Thailand account for 16 per cent of lead;
and 13 per cent zinc ore production. 42 per cent of tbe world's
total chromium ore and 4 per cent of rnagnesi te is ,Toduced in
India, South Africa, Sudan, Mada~:;ascar, Pakistan, Iran and
Australia, while South Africa, India, Australia, Botswana,
Thailand, Indonesia and Iran produce nearly 41 per cent of
manganese ore in the world.
Nearly 19 per cent or the one-fifth of world's nickel
ore comes from Australia, Indonesia, South Africa, Botswana and
Burma. The phosphate rock production in South Africa, Israel,
53. Little, Arthur D, Inc., Dependence of the United States on Essential Imported Minerals, Year 2000~ Vol. 1, Table 1, pp. 13-14 (Vlashington D.c., 1974;.
54. UN Statistical Yearbook 1981, pp. 591-601.
34 Jordon, Christmas Island, Egypt, India, and Uganda, account
for the world's 8 per cent. Like tea, natural rubber, and
gold tin concentrate is also a monopoly of this region as th2
Southeast Asian countries of Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesi3,
Burma alongwi th Australia, South Africa, Uganda, Tanzania, a:1d
Zambia produce 71 per cent of the world's total tin concentrste.
In terms of production of the precious metals and
diamonds (both industrial and gem stores), the Indian Ocean
countries of Australia, South Africa, Zambia, Burma, India an,d
Indonesia produces one-tenth of the world's total siJver, while .
South Africa, Australia, India, Zambia, Indonesi8, Ethiopia,
Malaysia, Tanzania and Madagascar produce three-fourths of t3e
world's total gold. The production of industrial diamonds
in South Africa, Bots\·!Bna, Tanzania, India, Indonesia and
Lesotho increased from 19 per cent in 1970 to 31 per cent of
the world's total in 1980. South Africa, Botswana, Tanzania,
Lesotho, India and Indonesia produce nearly 42 per cent of t3e
world's total gem stores.55
According to the latest available fie;ures the uranium
reserves as at JanuaDr 1981 in Australia, South Africa end
India were 573000 metric tons, i.e. 32.8 per cent of the world
reserves; and its production in South Africa nnd AustraJ5a
was 21 .1 per cent of the world total. The loc2 ~,ion of this
critical strategic mineral enhances the importance of this r-;6 region and gen'erates complicated conflicts in certain areas.-
55. Ibid., p. 589.
56. Ibid., p. 590.
35
No major and significant break-through seems to have
been achieved with regard to the exploitati~n of marine(both
organic and nonorganic) resources by the littoral and island
states of the Indian Ocean. The total fish catches of the~;e
countries were 12.057 and 14.6 per cent of the world total
for the years 1972 and 1980 respectively. Perhaps, due to
growing worldwide protest against whaling activity, no figures
in this regard have been available by the leading whaling
states (by flag) of this region, namely South Africa, Australia
and Somalia for the year 1979/80. In 1970071 the total whaJ..e
catch by these three countries made up for 9 per cent of the
world total.
The Western Indian Ocean yield in terms of the pelagic
fish catch, which includes the red fishes, basses, congers,
sacks, mullets, sauries, tunas, bonitos, billfish, mackerels,
fnoeks, cutlass fish, sharks, rays, ratfish, shads, eels, salmon,
trout, sturgeon, !launders, halibuts, sole, cods, hakes,
hadocks, molluses, and crustaceans (crabs, orawns, lobrters e~tc,);
whereas the eastern Indian Ocean offers only herrings, sardines,
anchonies, and miscellaneous marine fishes. The total of
these fish landings is roughtly 4-5 per cent of the word
total, the fish catch has increased nearly 50 per cent from
1975 to 1985~ and the substantial earning from the sea fish
expert for India, Thailand, Bangladesh, Somalia, Madagascar
57. Ibid., pp. 557-562.
36 and South Africa have also increased. However, the fishery
gains have accrued Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, ,~
Burma, Bangladesh,South Africa and the French possession of
of Kerguelen islands due to the EEZ extension to 200 ncutical
miles.
The coastal physiography and the Oceanic conditions
determine the existence of the organic and inorganic marine
resources. The high potential for fish catch lies in the
shallow continental shelf of the western Indian Ocean, whereof
not even one-third is being exploited by the littoral countries,
i.e. by India, Pakistan, Oman, Sri Lanka, UAE, Tanzania,
Somalia, Iraq and Iran. These potential reserves are being
harvested to the maximum with comparatively little potential
for recuperation in yield in the temperate and sub-antarctic
waters of the Indian Ocean. The main countries carrying out
fish-catch activities in the eastern Indian Ocean are Burma,
India, Thailand, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Australia. Compared
to other countries the consumption of fish is very little
in India due to the food habits of the people. Nearly three
fourth of Thailands' total fish catch is from beyond its own
EEZ due to the loss of traditional fishing areas and the
depletion of its coastal ·fishery by heavy pollutants. Besides
the Indian Ocean littoral nations; Japan, South Korea, USSR,
East Germany, Romania and Spain venture into the Indian Ocean
for heavy and indiscriminate fish catches very regularly in
absence of an established and detailed fishery policy of the
local countries.
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Lately due.to the increasing economic significance of
fish, complex problems of fishing area manaEement and several ~
conflicts of interests have consequently arisen between the
littoral and the non-littoral states. Serious problems of
pollution and fish conservation have also become acutre as
the renewable marine fisheries are vulnerable to the toxic
pollutants deposited in the sea-waters.
The significant developments in Ocean engineering have
made it possible to locate and exploit the mineral wealth
deposited on the seabed. The nodules containing Copper '
Cobalt, nickel, iron were discovered, examined and now, are being
exploited for industrial production. The extraction of minerals
from the sea-water (eog. saltp bromine etc.), and the mining of
sea-bottom minerals by means of bucket dredges, and the drilling
of tbe sub-bottom minerals, (e.g. petroleum, natural gas etc.)
are the activities associ~ted with the operation of multinational
companies enjoying great privileges over the national companies
several littoral countries, on account of strong commercial
and strategic reasons. Some of the well-known multination
corporations presently engaged in the exploit•ation of the
sea-bed resources of oceans are the Kennecott group; the Ocean
Mining Associates (OMA), the Ocean Management, Incorporated
(OMI); the Ocean Minerals Company (OMCO); and the Association
Francaise Pour 1' Etude et la Recherche des Nodules, all are
mainly controlled by the American, British, Japanese, W.German,
Canadian, Belgian, Italian and Dutch and French multinational
companies.
39
Due to these technological developments and the
consequent capabilities acquired by the advanced industrialized
nations to exploit the organic and inorganic oceanic resources;
there has been a great deal of interest for nearly two decades
in the economic potential of the seabed resources of the Indian
Ocean, but the cost facet hinders the efforts for exploitation
of the sea-bed minerals, while the oil and natural gas drilling
has been successful. Even then, keeping in view the distant
possibility of a cartel being imposed by the metal-producing
countries; ·the industrially advanced nations are perfecting f
their technologies and making every effort to devise a mecha-
nism to extract metals from nodules at a comparatively cheap
cost considering the requirements of large investments,
heavy and precision equipments and consultancy services on a
long-term basis.
So far the sources of energy are concerned, it seems to
coexist with other ingredients of modern industries. South
Africa, Zambia, India, Iran, Pakistan and Australia produce
hard coal while the lignite brown coal is mined and India
and Australia who are the principal producers of coke. Arabia,
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates, Burma, Indonesia, alongwith India, Australia,
Malaysia and Egypt produce the other very m important non-
renewable source of energy which has mattered much in inter
national politics and security since 1973, the crude petroleum.
India, Singapbre South Africa, Indonesia, Australia, Thailand, '
40
Malaysia, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Egypt
and Zambia thermal and hydro-electric power.
In general, only those countries of this region who
have the infrastructure of modern heavy industries, like raw-
material, good transport systems, and sources of energy and
skilled manpower consisting of scientists, engineers and
technocrate engaged in actual industrial production and the
research and experimental development. India, Egypt, Australia,
South Africa, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Indonesia and Bangladesh
have a good number of scientists and engineers, some of them
working in the industrialized world, which is a serious
problem faced by a I!lajority of the developing countries. India,
Australia, South Africa and Egypt are leaders in general,
manufacturing (food, beverages~ tobacco, textiles, chemical,
coal and petroleum products, basic metals), electrical and
mining industries. South Africa has developed paper manu-
facturing industry also.
Others engaged in general industries are Israel, Iran,
Bangladesh, f-1alaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kenya and Zambia,
many of these alongwith Singapore and Malawi they have food,
beverages and textile manufacturing industries also. Basic
metals.are manufactured in Zambia and Bangladesh also. So
far the apparent consumption of crude steel (-if it is any
indicatidn of industrial growth) is concerned, South Africa,
India, Australia, I~an, a?d Egypt·are ahead of others. The
per capita consumption o.f natural rubber has been more than
doubled in India from 1970 to 1980, and there has been a
41
50 per cent increase in the consumption of synthetic rubber
during this period. Almost the same pattern is observed in
South Africa, while it has ...
been static in case of Australia. 58
Besides, the Indian Subcontinent, South Africa,
Australia, East Africa, Egypt, Thailand and Iran have good
railway network, for the movement of raw materials and good ,
to accelerate the pace of industrialization.59 An increase in
the productivity or exploitation of the natural resources
of this region has been to generate their export instead of
their use in establishing heavy and manufacturing industries ,
for nation-building development. Many countries exploit their
natural resources in collaboration with the industrialized
countries to generate export in order to service their debt.
Although, they have a great fund of knowledge and in many
sectors apply modern techniques in their productiono60
STRATEGIC OVERVIEW
Geopolitics studies space from the viewpoint of the
state and investigates the spatial-political entitity
primarily in relation to environment. It lends a systematic
framework for the study of a complex crisis area interpreting
the political development processes in relation to spatia
temporal factors. K.M.Panikkar, writing back in 1944, observed
58. Ibid., pp. 712-714.
59. Istitute Geographico de Agostini, Grands Atlante degli Oceani (Roma: Novara, 1977). .
60. Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy 1967 (Stockholm: IToyal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1968), New Series I: c. 17, p. 10.
that the spatial dynamics of the Indian Ocean area are of
speical importance to the British Empire and especially to
the future of India. 61 Obviously he was pondering on a
foreseeable scenario keeping the very geographical location,
natural resources and the spatial relationship of the then
British colony of India. His views were indirectly reflected
in the writings of Bammate. It is well-known that the Soviet
descent on the warm waters had always been hampered by the
conditions given rise to in Europe by Britain.62
The very geographical local and the coastline and the
economic resources of the Indian Ocean have always determined
the course of the political and strategic events in this
theatre to a considerable extent. Even in theory, the
defense of the Indian Oce~n remained a British responsibility
after the World War II, but thedays of the British thalassocracy
were over. 63 Since then the modern more geographically favoured
maritime power, the United States took up Britain's abandoned
imperial "burden 11 in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocea,
South Asia has become the centre of a perilous global confron
tation,6h and however, the basic facts of South Asian
61. Panikkar, K.M., The Strate ic Problems of the Indian Ocean (Allahabad: Kitabistan, 19 , p. 3.
62. Bammate, Haidar, Visages de 1' Islam (Paris: Payot, 1946), preface.
63. Toussaint, Auguste, Shifting power balance in the Indian Ocean, in: Cottrell, A.J. and Burrell, R.M., eds., The Indian Ocean: Its Political Economic and Militar Importance ew York: Praeger, 1 2 , p.
64. Wolpert, Stanley, Roots of Confrontation in Asia (New York: Oxford, 1982).
geopolitical, as well as cultural, reality appears to remain
almost as remote from modern American consciousness as the
vast subcontinent itself.
Geography has always dictated its terms with regard to
the political and strategic scenarios in the Indian Ocean as
elsewhere in the world. The locational spatial relationship
of the countries of this region and their shape, size and the
raw materials or natural resource base determined the role of
this region in world affairs. The main concern of strategic
geography are accessibility, mobility, visibility, communi
cability, availability, and vulnerability. 65 The margins of
the Indian Ocean have enormous political and military and
economic significance, whih has resulted in more than 15
territorial problem areas of disputed boundaries. As the
geography of any given region is contingent upon the geography
of other areas - some of them far removed from the region in
question, 66 and the geopolitical mistakes and achievements
are cumulative over a period of time. The very location of
the Indian Ocean in the so-called rimland sea, which, as the
name implies, is the scene of the greatest tension and possible
conflicts and the main area of contemporary and future
militarization. 57
65. Peltier, Louis c., and Pearey, G. Etzel, Military Geography (New Delhi: Affiliated East-West Press Pvt. rta., 19s1), P· 4s.
66. Pearcy, G.E., et al, World Political Geography, Thii~ Edition (New York: 1949},pp. 412-14.
67. Pavic, Randovic, The General Geostrategic Characteris'tics and Division of the World Seas, in: The Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), Vol. XXIII, March 5-20, 1972, p. 34.
The mineral wealth and the natural resources of the
region, comprising of the developing and developed countries,
has paved the way for the growing involvement of the big powers
in the local conflicts, generated by the imperial boundary
makings, and the so-called co-existence of differing socio
political systems in the region responsible for political
instability. Hence, the geopolitical considerations have led
to basic differences between the strategies of the United
States, and the Soviet navies in the Indian Ocean. 68 The fear
of the control of Oceans and the exploitation of their ' enormous and unprecedented resources poses various problems
of political, strategic, economic and legal nature, as the
advanced industrialized nations have already tempted to correct
Mahan and redefined sea power as the sum total of national uses
of the sea, 69 taking a clue from Edward \'lenk, to welf abstract
scientific and policy goals into an explicit concept designed
to interest and involve the entire domestic enterprise, to
elicit policy support from both the Democratic and Republican
Presidents, and to wash up on the shores of all coastal nations. 70
68. Hayward, Admiral Thomas, in: Military 1872 and HR 2575, Hearin before the of Representatives ommittee on Armed n.c., 1979), 96: 1 (1979), Part I, p.
69. Walsh, Don, National Organization for
H.R.
70. Wenk, Edward, Jr., The Politics of the Ocean (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), p. 213.
4S The unique British imperial mercantilist tradition
using the area and initiating naval and commercial ship ~·
ventures through the Indian Ocean basin after her loss of the
North American colonies, bears a better testimony for using the
geopolitical and geostrategic constraints of less competent
and alert adversaries to ones' own advantages.