Graduate School of Development Studies

A Research Paper presented by:

Wuripe Alhassan[Ghana]

in partial fulfilment of the requirements for obtaining the degree of

MASTERS OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Specialization:[Public Policy and Management]

[PPM]

Members of the examining committee:

Dr. Sylvia Bergh [Supervisor]Dr. Barbara Lehmbruch [Reader]

The Influence of the Presidentially Appointed Councillors on Local Governance: The Case of Ac-

cra and Kumasi Metropolitan Assemblies in Ghana

The Hague, The NetherlandsNovember, 2011

ii

Disclaimer:

This document represents part of the author’s study pro-gramme while at the Institute of Social Studies. The views stated therein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Institute.

Inquiries:Postal address: Institute of Social Studies

P.O. Box 297762502 LT The HagueThe Netherlands

Location: Kortenaerkade 122518 AX The HagueThe Netherlands

Telephone: +31 70 426 0460Fax: +31 70 426 0799

iii

Dedication

This research paper is dedicated to my humble and lovely parents Adam Mahama Wuripe and Abiba Wuripe for their untiring effort to see me to this level

iv

Acknowledgement

Thanks and praises be to Almighty God for making this a success. To my supervisor, Dr. Sylvia Bergh, I say thank you for the patience, guidance and directions you gave me in this endeavour. You have imprinted an indelible mark on me and I will forever remain grateful. I would also like to thank my second reader, Dr. Barbara Lehmbruch for the in-valuable insights you offered throughout this study. I know I cannot repay you, all I would say is ‘Naawuni Ni Yo Sam veili’.

I also want to thank all professors and support stuff of ISS especially those of the PPM specialization for the know-ledge they have impacted to me, I have really learnt a lot. It was wonderful studying under your tutelage. To the entire PPM class of 2011, I say ‘dank u’ for the companionship we shared throughout the journey. I also want to acknowledge and thank ISS Ghanaian community for the wonderful friendship and love we shared during this insight journey.

To my Dad and Mom, thank you for the love, support and motivation. May the good lord shower abundant mer-cies and blessings on you. And to the entire Wuripe family, thank you for your prayers and support. Special thanks also go to Chief Alhaji Bingle and honourable Isaac B. Assah for the support during my field work.

I would like to also acknowledge and appreciate the Dutch Government who made it possible for me to under-take this course through the NUFFIC Fellowship Pro-gramme.

Last but not the least, to my brothers and friends; Ali, Ridwan Rufai, Sadiq, Wuni, Al-Jabbar Majeed (Abology) and Humaida thank you all for your love, support and encour-agement while I was away.

GOD BLESS US ALL

v

Contents

Disclaimer: iiDedication iiiAcknowledgement ivList of Tables viiiList of Figures viiiList of Maps viiiList of Acronyms ixAbstract x

Chapter 1 Introduction1

1.1 Background 11.2 Statement of the Research Problem 21.3 Objectives of the Research 41.4 Research Questions 41.5 Hypothesis: 51.6 Relevance and Justification 51.7 Research Methodology 5

1.7.1 Study Sites 51.7.2 Selection of Case Study 61.7.3 Respondents selection 61.7.4 Techniques employed to gather data 71.7.5 Secondary Data 91.7.6 Scope and Limitation 9

1.8 Organisation of the paper 9

Chapter 2 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework10

2.0 Introduction 102.1 Concept of Decentralization 102.2 Local Government, Local Governance and Local

Democracy 112.3 Accountability 122.4 Representation 132.5 Bicameral Legislatures 132.6 Gender Quota (GQ) 142.7 Literature Review on Electoral Systems and Ghana

Local Electoral System 15

vi

2.7 Conceptual and Framework 172.8 Conclusion 18

Chapter 3 Overview of Decentralisation and Local Gov-ernment Trajectory in Ghana 193.0 Introduction 193.1 Emergence of Local Governance in Ghana 19

3.1.1 Indirect Rule by British Colonial Authorities (BCA) 20

3.2 Decentralisation and LG under PNDC and the Fourth Republic: 1982 to date. 203.2.1 Decentralization & LG under PNDC: 1981-

1992 203.2.2 Decentralisation and LG under the Fourth Re-

public 213.3 The Structure of Ghana’s LG System 21

3.3.1 The Regional Coordinating Council 223.3.2 The Metropolitan, Municipal and District As-

semblies 223.3.3 The Sub-Metropolitan DAs 233.4.4 Urban Councils (UC) 233.3.5 Zonal Councils 233.3.6 Town/Area Councils 233.3.7 The Unit Committees 24

3.5 Profiles of AMA &KMA 243.5.0 Profile of Accra Metropolitan Assembly

263.5.1 Brief History of AMA 263.5.2 Institutional and Administrative Structure of

AMA 263.5.3 The People and Population 27

3.6.0 Profile of Kumasi Metropolis27

3.6.1 Historical Overview of KMA 273.6.2 Geography 283.6.3 Institutional and Administrative Structure of

KMA 283.6.4 The people and Population 28

3.7 Conclusion 29

Chapter 4 Research Findings of the Influence of Non Elected Councillors in AMA & KMA of Ghana 30

vii

4.0 Introduction 304.1 Process in the Picking of Non Elected DA Councillor 304.2 Accountability in Ghana’s Local Government 324.3 Appointed Councillors and Representation in

Ghana’s DAs 344.3.1 Impact of NEC on the Authority and

Autonomy of DAs 364.4 What are the Relations between Appointed and

Elected Councillors? 374.5 Women Empowerment and Promotion of Gender

Equality in Ghana’s LG 394.8 Conclusion 40

Chapter 5 Conclusion and Policy Considerations41

5.0 Introduction 415.1 Major Findings 41

5.1.1 NEC Nomination Process 415.1.2 Representation 415.1.3 Accountability 415.1.4 Underrepresentation of Women 425.1.5 Result of Hypothesis 42

5.2 Some Policy Directions 425.2.1 Nature of Nominations 425.2.2 Institute Effective Downward Accountable

System for NECs 435.2.3 Gender Quota 43

Appendices 44Appendix A Interview Guide used to Collect Primary

Data for this Paper 44A1 Questionnaires for District Chief Executive 44A2 Questions for Appointed Assembly Councillors 45A3 Questions for Elected Assembly Member 45

Appendix B General Assembly and Committees 46Meetings Observed 46References 47

viii

List of TablesTable 1.2: Categorisation of District based on scores to

determine level of development 6Table 1.3: Number of proposed sampled respondents to

be interviewed 7Table 1.4: Successful number of respondents Inter-

viewed 8

List of FiguresFigure 2.1: Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 17Figure 3.2: Institutional and Administrative framework

of AMA & KMA 29

List of MapsMap 3.1: Map of Ghana 25

ix

List of Acronyms

AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary CouncilAMA Accra Metropolitan AssemblyANC African National Congress partyBCA British Colonial AuthorityCDD Centre for Democratic DevelopmentCG Central GovernmentCoG Constitution of GhanaCSO Civil Society OrganisationDCE District Chief ExecutiveEC Elected CouncillorGA Government AppointeeIDEA International Institute of Democracy and Electoral AssistanceILGS Institute of Local Government StudiesLAA Local Administration ActLG Local GovernmentLGA Local Government ActKMA Kumasi Metropolitan AssemblyMA Metropolitan AssemblyMC Municipal CouncilMCE Metropolitan Chief ExecutiveMMDA Metropolitan, Municipal, District Assembly MUA Municipal AssemblyNA Native AuthorityNC Native CourtNDC National Democratic CongressNEC Non Elected CouncillorNJO Native Jurisdictional OrdinanceNLC National Liberation CouncilNPP New Patriotic PartyNRC National Redemption CouncilPADC Presidentially Appointed District CouncillorsPNDC Provisional National Defence CouncilRC Regional CouncilRCC Regional Coordinating CouncilSSA Sub-Saharan AfricaSMC Supreme Military CouncilSMDC Sub-Metropolitan District Council SMD Sub-Metropolitan DistrictTAC Town/Area CouncilTC Town CouncilTLG Traditional Local GovernmentTT Think TankUC Unit Committee

x

UNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeZC Zonal Council

xi

Abstract

Ghana embarked on a robust decentralization and LG re-forms aims at giving power to the people in order to evolve good democratic local governance. In this light this re-search sets out to find out the influence of the non elected councillors on local governance in Accra and Kumasi Metro-politan Assemblies. This study examines the participation of NECs in relation to representation, accountability, and wo-men underrepresentation in the District Assemblies. It high-lights the influence of NECs on the authority and autonomy of the DAs. And consequently test the argument that non-elected seats are reserved to nominate into the DAs persons with expertise and valuable experiences who can contribute to local development.

Relevance to Development StudiesDecentralization and local governance is currently popular and promoted across developing world after the gross fail-ure of centralization and also, the realisation that develop-ment is impossible without active involvement and particip-ation of the ordinary local people. It is therefore imperative to study the actors [who are acting on behalf of the local people] crucial in ensuring that the local people take their rightful positions in efforts to better and improve the liveli-hood of the ordinary local people; who unequivocally mat-ters most in development.

KeywordsDecentralization, Local Government/Governance, Local Democracy, Accountability, Representation, Bicameralism and Gender Quota

xii

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Background Globally, decentralization and local governance has re-ceived a lot of attention since its re-emergence in 1980s, and the interest in it shows no sign of waning in the near future (Rees and Hossain 2010). The interest in decentraliz-ation started unfolding after the glaring failure of central-ized planning which was vigorously pursued by countries in the post colonial period. Whilst there was scanty evidence that decentralization would succeed, there were large docu-mentations sufficing that centralization had foundered (Awortwi, 2010; World Bank, 1997 & 2000, Wunch & Oluwu, 1990).

Although the first wave of decentralization introduced in Asia and Africa in the 1950s and 1960s was considered to have largely failed (S. Bergh, 2004; Crook &Manor, 1998: 1), decentralization has increasingly become widespread and popular in developing countries especially Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) since 1980s. Awortwi (2010) notes that cur-rently over two thirds of countries in SSA have practiced one or more forms of decentralization as a reform strategy however, that the focus of which has changed over the years compared with earlier decentralization reforms. Many analysts argue that the current process is different from ef-forts of the 1960s and 1970s because it is taking place alongside broad economic and political reforms and with the support of donors (Awortwi, 2010; Abrahamsen, 2000; Romeo, 1996).

Theoretically the rationale for countries embarking on decentralization is that transfer of some Central Govern-ment (CG) powers, resources and responsibilities to the local level would provide greater transparency, accountabil-ity, responsiveness, probity, frugality, equity, and empower local people by placing governance at their door steps and ‘bring government closer to the people’ thereby giving them the chance to participate in development (Crook & Manor, 1998: 2). However in practice many developing countries including African countries adopt decentralization for various reasons such as shedding of CG economic bur-den set off ethnic-based political conflicts e.g.in Nigeria and Ethiopia (Olowu & Wunsch, 2004; Awortwi, 2010) which goes contrary to the theoretical underpinnings.

1

Like most SSA countries, Ghana embarked on decentralization in order to attain the benefits associated with decentralization reforms. This is seen explicitly in the policy guidelines of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC, 1988); which had come to power after the overthrow of a civilian government of Dr. Hilla Liman’s People’s National Party (PNP) in December 1981. The ‘coup makers’ claiming to have come to liberate the people from what they regarded as elite capture of the state promised to give back ‘power to the people’. It was therefore unsurprising that in the council’s first major policy document dubbed the “PNDC Policy guidelines” contained policy positions on local government and decentralization. It stated: “the urgent need for participatory democracy to ensure that the bane of remote government that had afflicted Ghanaians since independence is done away with effectively, to render governments truly responsive and accountable to the governed”. It further stated that “the assumption of power by the people cannot be complete unless a truly decentralized government system is introduced, that is CG, in all its manifestations, should empower LG councils to initiate, coordinate, manage and execute policies in all matters affecting them within their localities” (PNDC ‘policy guideline’, 1982; cited in K. Ahwoi, 2010: 1).

The PNDC in order to put into reality its rhetoric of giving ‘power to the people’ introduced a new decentralization policy in 1988 which was subsequently adopted and incorporated into the 1992 constitution when Ghana returned to constitutional rule in 1992. This decentralization policy recognised three types of decentralization which has long been categorized by scholars of public administration namely; Political (Devolution), Administrative (De-concentration) and Fiscal decentralization (Rondinelli et.al, 1984). Awortwi (2010), notes that Ghana’s decentralization reform was to achieve political/democratic decentralization (Devolution). In a nutshell the robust decentralisation initiated by Ghana broadly aims to enhance local governance and local democracy.

1.2 Statement of the Research ProblemLocal governance and local democracy are not new in de-veloping countries generally and Africa in particular (World Bank 1989a; (Olowu et al. 2004). Like any other developing country Ghana has made efforts to institute effective LG

2

system at the local level through decentralization. Accord-ing to Ayee (2008) this is witnessed by the number of com-missions and committees of enquiry appointed to fashion out LG system.

Although decentralized local governance started before independence, the current LG system has its beginnings in the PNDC law 207, 1988 which provided for the establish-ment of a LG structure grouped into Metropolitan, Muni-cipal, and District Assemblies (MMDAs)1. In order to em-power the local people to participate in decisions, a unique local government has been instituted which is based on non partisan electoral systems, with District Assemblies (DAs) as the highest decision making bodies at the local level with some deliberative, legislative and executive powers (CoG, 1992: 138).

For the purposes of decision making the constitution of Ghana (ibid: 138) stipulates that councillors to the DAs are to be recruited either by election or appointment. Seventy per cent (70%) of the members of the DAs is elective while the remaining thirty per cent (30%) is appointment by the president of the republic of Ghana. However, in view of the fact that Ghana decentralization agenda is or (aims at) De-volution (Awortwi, 2010), the quota2 to president to nomin-ate local councillors generates a lot of questions. Indeed the decentralization policy, if actually meant to devolve power to the people then the questions that manifest are; why the inclusion of the nominated councillors, in whose interest are they serving and what are they bringing to the DA?.

In this light the quota has been a subject of discourse and debates both by researchers and development practi-tioners. Some scholars and analyst justifies the nomination of one-third of the DA councillors on the grounds that it is to help balance inequalities3, get people with certain expert-ise or “well-respected community leaders who have valu-able contributions to make ” to the development of their local communities but put off by electoral processes (Crook & Manor, 1998: 226; Ofei-Aboagye 2004). Others observes a political motive, namely to build a locally-based ‘political class’ who will later become national politicians (Crook &

1 Herein referred to as the District Assembly2 The quota refers to the 30% allocation granted by the

constitution to the president of Ghana to appoint local coun-cillors.

3 Get women, minority/ marginalised groups into the DAs

3

Manor, 1998: 226; Gyimah Boadi, 1990; and the African Confidential, 14 April, 1989).

However on the critical side The World Bank (2003) in a policy document on Ghana’s decentralization queried the one-third nominated DA councillors and stated that this has the tendency of reverting power back to the centre after professing to undertake a decentralization reform (Devolu-tion).

Aside these debates, Ghana’s decentralization reform is often hailed by donors and scholars for steady progress since its creation in the late 1980s (Langseth, 1996; Nde-gwa 2002; Crook and Manor, 1998). However, Awortwi (2010) argues that there is the inclination to romanticize this progress without critically assessing and evaluating the quality of progress. Similarly, since human institutions are not fixed and stable with time, there is the need for a painstaking scrutiny of the structures and institutions espe-cially the local legislative organ of Ghana’s LG because of its importance in determining whether or not power is en-trusted to the people.

The last issue is the lower numbers of women in the local decision making bodies of Ghana. Women representa-tion at the local level is still below appreciable levels even though Ghana is a signatory to international instruments4 that requires countries to make conscious efforts to see sig-nificant representation of women at both national and local level. Available statistics (see table 1.1) depicts that wo-men numbers at the local level via the electoral system have declined within the last two elections even though there have been ardent campaigns by gender activist for the need to include and increase women in all facet of life especially in decision making.

It is against this backdrop of issues that a critical study of the local decision makers and representatives of the people of Ghana LG- specifically presidentially appointed district councillors - is relevant to empirically ascertain the kind of influence it has on the local governance system of Ghana.

4 The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Millennium De-claration of 2000 and the African Women’s Protocol adop-ted in 2003 in Maputo

4

Table 1.1: Statistics of women representation at the Local legislatures for the last two elections in Ghana

Year Total Number of seats

Local Level-District As-sembly

2006 5950? 478

2010 6150 418Source: Research’s own construction (Data gathered from the Electoral Commission Ghana)

1.3 Objectives of the Research The major aim of this study is to examine the influence of the presidentially appointed district councillors (PADCs) or Non Elected Councillors (NECs) on the quality of local governance of Ghana. Specifically the study sets out to do the following;

1. To examine the processes and criteria involved in the nomination and appointment of the non elected assembly members; that is, who are the actors behind the nominations and appointments and how do they do it;

2. To find out the kind of accountability that the non elected assembly members are subjected to;

3. To find out whom the non elected assembly members represent in the legislative body since they do not have constituencies and also to underscore the independence and autonomy of the DAs;

4. To examined the kind of relationship and interactions between the non elected assembly member councillors and the elected councillors and

5. To assess the readiness of the local level to allow women/gender quota in view of the dwindling numbers of women in Ghana decision making bodies especially at the local level.

1.4 Research QuestionsMain question: what has been the influence of non elected councillors or presidentially appointed members’ (Govern-ment appointees as popularly called in Ghana) participation on the quality of local governance of Ghana? The study will also be guided by the following specific questions:

1. What are the processes and criteria in the nomination and appointments of the non elected assembly mem-bers? Who fills the presidential quota and how?

5

2. Who are non-elected assembly members accountable to and how?

3. Whom and in whose interest do the non elected coun-cillors represent?

4. How do the Appointed District Assembly members and the elected District Assembly Members relate to each other within the DA?

5. Would local councillors support the creation and insti-tutionalization of women or gender quota at the local level?

1.5 Hypothesis:The following hypothesis is being tested in this study:The quota is reserved to get technocrats and respectable persons, with rich experiences to contribute to the development and advancement of the local area. This hypothesis is informed by the arguments justifying the inclusion of appointed members in the DAs.

1.6 Relevance and JustificationThis study is significant to both theory and policy. Theoret-ically the study is intended to expand the existing decent-ralization literature on Ghana since the study attempts to specifically analyse a provision in the constitution on a sec-tion of councillor of the DA in Ghana. In terms of policy the study is timely because Ghana is currently in the process of reviewing the decentralization policy as well as the consti-tution. It would produce evidence that could aid in the re-view of the local government system especially as there have been calls by gender activist and CSOs to reserve the quota allocated to the president for women or should be taken out.

1.7 Research MethodologyThe study is focused on the decentralization and local gov-ernance specifically on the Accra and Kumasi Metropolitan Assemblies (MA) of Ghana. To gain insights into these areas, the research employed both primary and secondary data. This section covers study sites, the various methods and techniques of data collection and analysis used to carry out this research.

6

As stated earlier, this research aims at assessing the in-fluence of NECs on the local governance of Ghana. And as such it becomes imperative to hear the experiences and views of the councillors who are involved in the system. To this end, the study is to a large extent qualitative since it tries to understand and explore what the presidentially ap-pointed councillors are bringing to bear on the local gov-ernment of Ghana. In addition, to get relevant and insight-ful information, the study considered different data collec-tion methods with the objective that the methods would complement each other. Thus, interviews, observations and documentations were employed during a fieldwork in Ghana.

1.7.1 Study SitesIn this research a case study approach was adopted and two MAs were selected, Accra and Kumasi MAs. Hence, this subsection gives a brief introduction of the areas of study (where I conducted the field work) and why they were se-lected among the 176 DAs in Ghana.

Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) is one of the 10 dis-tricts located in the Greater Accra region - the National Capital- of Ghana of which AMA is at the heart of the cap-ital city. Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA) on the other hand is also one of out of the twenty seven districts of the Ashanti region of Ghana. Both districts are amongst the old-est districts in Ghana and both serves as the central busi-ness districts of the respective regions. In terms of develop-ment both assemblies fall under the most developed dis-tricts according the criteria set by the Ghana’s Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. While AMA had a total score point of 78, that of Kumasi was 76 (see Table 1.2 below).

1.7.2 Selection of Case StudySelection of (a) case(s) depend on factors such as pragmat-ics, intrinsic interest, purposiveness (typical-extremely good/bad) and access (Z. O’leary, 2010:176-7; R. Yin 2003). Also the selection of two or more case allows for prediction of similar result (i.e. enforcing each other) or to contradict each other (. R. Yin 2003:53). With regard to this paper the selection of the case is based firstly on the fact that it is considered as typical (extremely good case). The two metro-polises are chosen because they possesses almost the same features such as level of development and with the rationale

7

for controlling for the influence of CG since they are the most developed and advanced DAs. Secondly based on the fact that information and data could be easily accessed since they would have better information management sys-tems and records. A detail Description and discussion of the two MAs is found in chapter three.

Table 1.2: Categorisation of District based on scores to determine level of develop-ment

Total Score Level of Development1 Less than 20 Most deprived/least developed2 20-39 Deprived3 40-59 Moderately developed4 60+ Developed

Source: Planning and Monitoring Division, Ministry of Local Government

1.7.3 Respondents selectionAll respondents who participated in the study were drawn from the two MAs – Accra and Kumasi; however, whilst the councillors were selected using simply random sampling, the two think tanks were purposively selected.

In both Accra and Kumasi MAs twenty (20) out of forty two persons serving as Government Appointee (GA) were sampled in order to find out more about their backgrounds, and to also learn directly about their experiences and opin-ions about the GA5. I also discussed and interacted with two prominent think tanks –the Centre for Democratic Develop-ment (CDD) and the Institute Local Government Studies (ILGS [which is an institution for training local government professionals and local councillors]). Both organizations were selected because of their involvement in the local gov-ernment affairs of the country and at such it was deemed that a range of diverse and heterogeneous point of views could be garnered from them in order to make triangulation of the data possible. Aside the above, I also interviewed five elected councillors each from the two MAs. These people were chosen because they were among the longest serving members in the assemblies. This was done with the help of the administrators of the DAs where a list of longest serving councillors was obtained and randomly sampled for inter-

5 Presidentially Appointed District Councillors; Govern-ment Appointee (GA) and Nominated/Non Elected Council-lor are used interchangeable.

8

view. Below is table 1.3, showing number of sampled re-spondents.

Table 1.3: Number of proposed sampled respondents to be interviewed

Respondents Accra

Kumasi

Nominated/Appointed DA Members

10 10

Elected DA Members 5 5 Metropolitan Chief Executive (MCE)

1 1

Governance Institutions: - - Centre for Democratic Governance (CDD)

1 -

Institute of Local Government Studies (ILGS)

1 -

Total 18 16Source: Researcher’s own construction

1.7.4 Techniques employed to gather dataThree different data collection methods- interviews, obser-vation and documentation were employed to gather Primary data from a field work in Accra and Kumasi MAs, Ghana from July 10 to August 25, 2011. In this section I will briefly discuss each technique and explain why it was chosen and how it was used to collect data.

According to Laws, Harper and Marcus an interview is “a conversation that has a structure and a purpose. It is more than the spontaneous everyday exchange of opinions; it is a way for the interviewer to receive a carefully tested knowledge. The respondent do not only answer formulated questions, but express in a dialogue, an understanding of his or her world”(2003:297).

In this research, the interview method was adopted firstly because I wanted to get rich, in-depth qualitative data by capturing people’s experiences or views about the issue under study, and secondly the interview method is flexible enough to allow me to probe further and explore tangents (Z. O’leary, 2010:196). One on one interviews were held with the appointed councillor, the elected mem-bers as well as the experts from the think tanks. All the in-terviews were conducted in an informal manner and semi-structured. This was done in order for me establish rapport, gain trust and to open up lines of communication to minim-ise any gulf between me (the interviewer) and the inter-viewee (ibid, 2010:195). In each case, interviewees were given the room to express their views and opinions on the

9

research topic. See Appendix ‘A’ for the interview guide used for the data collection.

Apart from the interviews, I also had the opportunity to sit through general assembly and some committees meet-ings (see appendix B) as a non participant observer in the two MAs. Throughout my being at the assemblies all my senses were put on the ground gathering pieces of informa-tion which I consider was relevant to my study, hence the use of the observation method. An observation is “a system-atic method of data collection that relies on a researcher’s ability to gather data through the use of the senses” (ibid, 2003:208). This offered me the chance to see, hear and feel how works of the assemblies are carried out.

Lastly I was also able to gather relevant documents about the decentralization and local government system of Ghana. These included the Local Government Act (LGA) of 2003, Act 656, profiles of the case studies and other policy documents.

As mentioned earlier, the primary data were collected in Ghana in Accra and Kumasi MAs within a spate of six weeks from 10th July to 25th August, 2011. The process of the field-work unfolded in the following; I spent the first three weeks in Accra and the last three in Kumasi. In Accra I used the first four days of my first week in negotiating access at the assembly and also making appointments with the two think tanks. On my fifth day I started holding interviews with the councillors which I continued on the second week. I used the third week alternating between the assembly, the think tanks and the Ministry of Local Government to gather docu-ments on decentralization and local government of Ghana.

Within the three week period, I had become acquainted to most of the councillors that I had the opportunity to travel with one of the GA in his private car to Kumasi, (my second destination for the data collection). On our way we discussed a lot about my research topic. He dropped me right in front of the gate of the Kumasi MA; called his friend6 and introduced me to him. I was not familiar with the terrain and was nervous initially however after my guest introduced me to the appropriate offices and proto-cols, I carried out my work successfully.

It is worth mentioning that not all respondents who were chosen were interviewed even though I called on them several times. In Accra MA two of the GA declined and these were a male and female, whilst in Kumasi MA three of

6 The head of the IT department of Kumasi metropolis10

the respondents that I could not interview were all females. Find below table (1.4) of successful interviews conducted.

Table 1.4: Successful number of respondents Interviewed

Respondents Accra

Kumasi

Nominated/Appointed DA Members

8 8

Elected DA Members 5 4 Metropolitan Chief Executive (MCE)

1 1

Governance Institutions:

- -

Centre for Democratic Governance (CDD)

1 -

Institute of Local Government Studies (ILGS)

1 -

Total 16 13Source: Researcher’s own construction

1.7.5 Secondary DataApart from the primary data, I also used secondary data col-lected from secondary sources i.e. from published and un-published government documents, 1992 constitution, acts and laws relating to decentralization and LG, reports, re-search works, journals and newspapers. Some information was also collected through internet browsing.

1.7.6 Scope and LimitationThis study is an academy study and as such works within a time frame and limited resources which could not allowed the research to cover the entire country or the 176 DAs. The study therefore adopted Two DAs – the Accra and Ku-masi metropolitan Assemblies as case study in order to do an in-depth studies and analysis. Thus, the findings of the research should not be generalised to the entire country, but rather should be taken as a microcosm of a bigger scen-ario and as something that may be useful for further re-search. In addition, the study is limited to the on-going ses-sion of the DAs. Apart from the above, the study en-countered other constraints. Notable amongst them were the refusal of some of the councillors in the two DAs to grant the researcher interview and discussions even though a letter of introduction spelling out clearly the mission of the research was presented to them. Some of those who de-clined were sceptical and even thought I was using the stu-dentship as coy to do some undercover journalistic work.

11

Said by one councillor “He will say he is a student and the next moment you hear your voice on the airwaves”. One of my key informants expressed willingness to participate in the research however he was indisposed on health grounds.

In spite of these constraints, considerable efforts were made, (firstly by changing my interview questions from structured to semi-structured to enable me to draw out more information from the interviewees and secondly, by collecting sufficient documents) not to allow these chal-lenges to compromise the quality of the study and also to ensure that the overall objectives and intended purposes is achieved.

1.8 Organisation of the paperThis paper has been organised into five chapters. The first chapter which is the introduction include the background, the statement of the research problem, objectives of the study, research questions, hypothesis, relevance of the study, methodology and scope and limitations. Chapter two presents the conceptual and theoretical framework of the research. Chapter three discusses the framework of the local government system of Ghana. Chapter four contains the presentation, analysis and interpretation of the findings and the last chapter concludes the study. The next chapter looks at the concepts and theories upon which this study is anchored.

12

Chapter 2 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

2.0 Introduction This chapter sets to clarify the concepts and theories that have been employed in this study, such as Decentralization, Local Government, Local Governance and Local Democracy, Local Accountability and Representation. I also draw on the principle of bicameralism (two- tier system) in order to bet-ter understand issues relating to the appointed members as the study seek to analyse the contribution of the presiden-tially appointed councillors’ contribution to the LG of Ghana. These concepts are discussed and operationalised in the study.

2.1 Concept of DecentralizationThe term decentralization has acquired popularity in both scholarly and policy circles especially in relation to develop-ing countries. But this popularity has seen the concept been given different meanings for different people by different people (Mawhood, 1983: 1; Conyers, 1985). Decentraliza-tion refers to the transfer of responsibility for planning, management and resource raising and allocation from the central government and its agencies to: (a) field units of central government ministries or agencies, (b) subordinate units or levels of government (Rondinelli 1981a), creating open, response and effective LG system for decision-making (United Nations Development Program [UNDP] 1998:4).

However for this study, I adopted a definition by United Nations, (Decentralization for National and Local Develop-ment [New York, 1965: 88/9]). Decentralization is elucid-ated in this document as the transfer of authority on geo-graphic basis, whether by deconcentration of authority to field units of the department or level of government, or by devolution of authority to local government units. This definition is taken here because it resonates well with the decentralization reform in Ghana. That is underscoring de-concentration and devolution. Although Ghana decentraliza-tion has the fiscal aspect as well but is it still in the format-ive stages; the structures are weak and most fiscal issues lies within the ambit of the CG. For instance, local authorit-ies would have to seek approval from the CG in order to levy taxes to raise resources for development.

13

In the literature three major types of decentralization (Deconcentration, Delegation and Devolution) have been re-cognised. These are succinctly explicated below.

De-concentration considered to be the weakest form of decentralization (Rondinelli 1999:2, S. Bergh, 2004) is the process by which the central government offload re-sponsibilities for certain services to its regional branch of-fices without involving any transfer of authority to lower levels of government (Litvack et al. 1998:4). Delegation refers to a situation in which the central government trans-fers responsibility for decision making and administration of public functions to local governments or to semi-autonomous organisations that are not wholly controlled by the central government but are ultimately accountable to it.

Devolution occurs when the central government trans-fers authority for decision making, financial allocations, and management to quasi-autonomous units of local govern-ment. Devolution usually transfers responsibilities for ser-vices to LGs that either elects their own mayors and coun-cils or appointed by CG, raise their own revenues, and have independent authority to make investment decisions (Lit-vack et al. 1998:5-6; S. Bergh, 2004). By definitions, only devolution can bring about local governance and for that matter this paper is to a large extent leaned toward this last typology of decentralization because it is the one that al-lows the establishment of a democratic decision making body with local representatives being in control of the local affairs.

2.2 Local Government, Local Governance and Local DemocracyLocal government level is the destination of whatever that is transferred from the CG and as such is the lower tier of multi-tier government. LG has no universally accepted meaning because there are many different kinds of LG as there are countries or nations, with each evolving its own LG systems (R. Wraith, 1964: 17; K. Ahwoi, 2010: 3). Thus in this study LG is conceptualised as a body below the CG with local authorities to carry out the functions of the local government.

Also, conceptually local governance has been explained by many scholars and policy analyst using different tools7.

7 This tools include: the UN Habitat and Transparency International Urban Governance Index (UGI) for cities (UN-Habitat 2004; CLGF 2004); the Local Governance Baro-

14

Here local governance is taken as a “rule governed process through which residents of a defined area participate in their own governance; are the key decision makers in de-termining their priority concerns and the responses. Rep-resentatives of these local people frequently will perform functions as agents of the people but they remain account-able (and removable by) the people” (Olowu et al. 2004).

With respect to democracy, there is no generally agreed conceptualization of democracy because is a value laden concept that cannot be precisely or easily define because of variations in its interpretation and usage by different people and class (Novacx, 1970). However the popular un-derstanding of democracy in contemporary discourses is in-formed by liberal democracy which states that democracy is a system of government where there is meaningful, extens-ive, regular and fair competition for all elected positions of government; a highly inclusive level of political participa-tion; and civil and political liberties8 enough to guarantee the integrity of political competition and participation (Kiy-aga-Nsubuga and Olum 2009). Conceived differently, demo-cracy can be defined in terms of institutions, procedures, formal rights and leadership responsiveness to the elector-ate. (ibid) Thus the defining features of democracy are in-dispensable in human relations to ensure social order and harmony.

Clearly the connection between local governance and decentralization, and LD is that the later reinforces LG by creating strong, organized and representative councils to improve efficiency and local development. And hence de-centralization by devolution of decision-making to the local levels is a fundamental for local democracy as it results in a more responsive organization and greater community ac-countability (ibid).

Also in the literature, it is agreed the main attributes of good local governance consist of the following principles: rule of law, constitutionalism, electoral and participatory democracy, representation, accountability, citizens’ parti-cipation in local decision making, respect for human rights, gender equity and transparency in public affairs (Kauzya 2002).

meter (LGB) 8 Freedom of expression, and to form and join organisa-

tion of ones will i.e. freedom of association15

2.3 AccountabilityAccountability is a broad concept which embodies many terms including oversight, monitoring, auditing, control, ex-posure and punishment (Schedler 1999). It denotes the ob-ligation of public officials and agencies to provide informa-tion about their actions and decisions and to justify them to the public. Essentially accountability connotes; answerabil-ity and enforceability. Accountability has become a key principle in LG because of the view that the local people are closer to their representatives and consequently can de-mand answers from their torch bearers who are in charge of their localities.

The concept of accountability in the literature has been distinguished into various forms such as Horizontal and ver-tical accountability of which the vertical is separated in to downward and upward. In this study the vertical is adopted for it is the type that allows elected/appointed representat-ives to be answerable to local citizens in the case of down-ward accountability while upward accountability is LG re-sponding to CG. According to Olowu & Wunsch (2004: 70) all these forms depends on the availability of information- something which is in serious short supply in most develop-ing countries, Ghana inclusive. In his study, Blair (2000:32) underscores different accountability mechanisms available to local citizens. These mechanisms include among others elections, political parties, civil society, the media, and pub-lic meetings. However he added that these mechanisms have each got its limitations. Many scholars and practition-ers notes that in the most cases it is the electoral mechan-ism that is pronounce and widely used (Olowu & Wunsch, 2004). In the context of Ghana and especially in relation to this study, the electoral aspect is not applicable as it is lim-ited to elected representatives however the focus of this study is on the non elected representatives. Also the polit-ical party’s method is also defeated because the LG system of Ghana prohibits partisan politics at the local level (CoG, 1992).

As pointed out by Olowu et al (2004) the stakeholders in the accountability equation are the citizen, the central gov-ernment and the representative, however they emphasised that the effectiveness of accountability depends on the first two stakeholders in order to make the third answerable.

16

2.4 RepresentationThe concept of representation has been a subject of conten-tion and debated within and amongst political theorist. The meaning of representation is notoriously contested and bey-ond the notion that representation connotes acting in the interest of the represented, there seems to be little else on which theorist agree. (Pitkins, 1974; Manin et al., 1999) Ac-cording to Samuel and Shugart (2003:33) representation is defined “as a relationship between citizens’ interest and political outcomes, in which rulers act in to meet the in-terest of the public.” When leaders take decisions that are clearly congruent with the peoples preferences, we con-sider them to be responsive and it is only when leaders are responsive that citizens are well represented (Powell 2004a). However I adopt a definition offered by (Ribot 2007) where representation is taken to mean a situation when leaders (in this case councillors) are both responsive and accountable to the local people, this definition is fa-voured in this study because it is in tandem with the theor-etical rationale why powers and authority are transferred to the local units of governments.

2.5 Bicameral LegislaturesThis section draws from the literature of bicameralism to explain the local decision making body of Ghana – LG- as in many respect it simulates the parliamentary pattern of the bicameral legislature. Bicameral legislature is system of le-gislature where there are two separate houses or chambers for making decisions. The basic features of bicameral legis-latures are; firstly, whilst the first chambers are popularly elected, the second chamber is appointed (e.g. the Cana-dian Senate) or elected indirectly (although increasingly most are been modified to be directly elective) Examples of these include; the German Bundesrat, the Irish Senate, and the French Senate. Secondly, members of the latter are of-ten fewer in number than the lower house members (Meg Russell, 2001). With regard to Ghana’s local government, there is only one chamber however it is composed of both elected and appointed members with the appointed mem-bers fewer than the elected members. The interest of this study lies on not the second chamber per say but on the members who make up the second chambers.

Turning to the reasons for the inclusion of the members of the second chambers, the reasons varies from country to country and this may include; representation of specialized

17

interest such as minorities, the less privilege in society and territorial representation. Also in view of the reality that modern legislative is burden, the members of the second chamber are drawn in to bring different perspective, know-ledge and experience to bear on decisions. (Jay M., 2007; Russell, 2001).

In spite of these supposed benefits, the second chamber has come under critical scrutiny and challenged. In his art-icle ‘What are Second Chambers for?’ (Russell 2001) ob-serves that whilst several countries such as UK, Canada, France and Spain are locked in a vigorous and sometimes protracted debate, about the reform of their second cham-ber with some countries considering its abolition, others such as New Zealand, Denmark and Sweden have scrapped it off already. But surprisingly, whilst some countries are taking away their second chambers, countries including; Poland, Czech Republic and South Africa have adopted bicameralism as part of their recent constitutional reforms. (Tsebelis and Money 1997)

In another vein it is worth mentioning that in jurisdic-tions where the upper chamber is purely by appointment, political interest has infiltrated the system diluting and de-feating the intended purposes for the inclusion of these crops of members. E.g. it is observed in Canada that the prime minister who has the mandate to nominate senators sometimes uses the senate appointments as a form of polit-ical patronage, selecting friends and allies of the governing political party. (Jay M., 2007)

2.6 Gender Quota (GQ)Gender quota, the latest tool crafted to ensure gender bal-ance in decision making/political institution has been touted for aiding in increasing the number of women representat-ives in decision making bodies across the world (D. Dahlerup, 2006:3). The core idea for the adoption of quota systems is to recruit women into political/decision making positions and to ensure that women are not a few tokens in political life. (IDEA, quota project, 2010) Apart from ad-dressing the under-representation of women, the quota sys-tem also aims at ensuring ‘Critical Mass’9 representation of women in decision making bodies (ibid).

9 The theory of critical mass states that women should constitute at least a number that can make an impact such as 30% and more.

18

According to Dahlerup, the quota mechanism is very flexible and can be applied at both national and local level. Three main typologies of gender quotas have been put forth in the literature on gender quota. These include; Legal Quota (Constitutional/legislative) where the quotas are mandated either by the constitution (e.g. Uganda, Mali and Phillipines) or by electoral law (like Belgium). The second type is the political party quota (also known as voluntary party quota). This is when parties decide to adopts quota for women based on the party agreement such as the ANC party in South Africa (IDEA, quota project: 2010). The vol-untary quota is not effective as it is not legally enforceable. For instance in Ghana, the NDC party stated in its mani-festo that it was going to appoint 40% of women in its gov-ernment, but this promise has not been fulfilled as the num-ber of women is less than 15%. However all the two types of GQs are based on elections (because of this some basic-ally called it electoral quota) and which sometime generates another kinds of problems. For instance elite women may capture the quota limiting the impact from trickling down to the ordinary woman. Nonetheless GQ is widely trum-peted because of its far reaching impact in uplifting women numbers (Dahlerup 2003). Quotas as noted work differently under different electoral systems and most are easily intro-duced in proportional representation electoral systems. However, quotas have also been implemented in some ma-jority electoral systems.

However in this study the GQ is operationalised to mean a special system of appointment for women, where the 30% prerogative granted to the president to appoint councillors into the DAs of Ghana would be legislated for women. Rather than based on elections (though between women) as done in other jurisdictions, here it would be purely based on appointment.

2.7 Literature Review on Electoral Systems and Ghana Local Electoral SystemAs mentioned in the premier chapter, the major objective of this paper is to examine the influence of presidentially ap-pointed district councillors on the local governance of Ghana. In this light this section reviews literature on elect-oral systems at the local level, as it has far reaching impact on the outcomes of developments at the local level (Packel 2008). Until recently local electoral systems had received less attention as far as democratisation at the local level is concerned. More studies on electoral systems are almost

19

entirely concerned with electoral rules at the national level with particular focus on the relationship between electoral systems and national party systems (IDEA 2002; Packel 2008).

As regards meaning of electoral system IDEA posits that“...... electoral systems translate the votes cast in a gen-eral election into seats won by parties and candidates” (IDEA 2002, 7). The choice of electoral system is one of the most crucial institutional decisions for any democracy. In almost all cases the choice of a particular electoral system has a profound effect on the future political life of the coun-try concerned, and electoral systems, once chosen, often re-main fairly constant as political interests solidify around and respond to the incentives presented by them. (ibid, 2002:1) The choices that are made may have consequences that are unforeseen as well as predicted effects. However in his democracy and elections Katz is among the most cau-tious who argues that the best electoral system for a coun-try depends on “who you are, where you are and you want to go (Katz, 2007:208).

Electoral system choice is a fundamentally political pro-cess, rather than a question to which independent technical experts can produce a single ‘correct answer’ (IDEA, 2002) The consideration of political advantage is almost always a factor in the choice of electoral systems. Calculations of short-term political interest can often obscure the longer-term consequences of a particular electoral system. For in-stance Awortwi (2010, 626/627) argues that the electoral system at the local level in Ghana was put in place to strengthen the PNDC regime at the time.

In the literature of LGs across the third world, one key institutions differences is the issues of partisan/non par-tisan in local elections. Proponents of non partisanship in local elections argue that issues of LG are matters of “bread and butter” and as such should not be based on partisan-ship which could create divisions (Olowu 2003, Packel 2008). Consequently, inclusion of parties at the local level risks allowing policy-making to become smeared with pat-ronage and clientelism. (Packel, 2008) Political pressures thus prevent policy-makers from retaining a focus purely on long-term benefits. LG in Ghana is purely on non partisan-ship (CoG, 1992). Also Uganda and India’s LG (panchayats) functions on non partisanship by legislation. On the other hand scholars advocating partisanship acknowledges the

20

link between LG and national. Examples of systems allow-ing partisanship in local elections are the recently decent-ralizing Latin American countries, including Bolivia, and Mexico. In Africa, prominent examples of party-based sys-tems of LG are Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Cote d’Ivoire, and Senegal (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Olowu 2003; Packel 2008).

In the electoral systems literature, large number of vari-ant electoral systems is currently in use and many more permutations on each form, but scholars have broadly cat-egorised electoral systems into “three broad families”: Pro-portional Representation (PR) systems, plurality/majority systems and mixed systems. (IDEA, 2002:3; (Norris 1997) PR is where voters generally vote for a party rather than a specific candidate. This system ensures that a political party’s degree of representation equally reflects the elect-oral support for the party. Majority or plurality system of voting within single member districts which is a major al-ternative to system of PR is where voters in a specific elect-oral district vote for a specific candidate. With only one rep-resentative per electoral district, voters have greater clarity of representation; they have no doubt who is directly charged with accounting for their interests (Packel, 2008:4). The mixed electoral system which is the third ma-jor type of electoral systems combines the majoritarian and proportional elements.

Indeed in Ghana, the Constitution established a system of democratic local elections premised on non-partisan basis in which candidates stands as individuals and not per-mitted to receive any form of help from political parties (COG, 1992). In terms of selection of councillors, the DAs have mixed representation with 7o% elected members and 30% presidential appointees with the candidates elected on ‘first-past-the-post’ basis to represent single-member con-stituencies (LGA, 1993).

21

2.7 Conceptual and FrameworkBased on the literature, figure 2.1 below shows the graph-ical presentation of the concepts and theories.

Figure 2.1: Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

Transfer of Authority and Power

from CG to LG

L evel

The figure above shows the transfer of authority, re-sources and power to LG and how the principles of demo-cracy combine to bring out democratic local government.

Central Government

Local Government Level

Good Demo-cratic Local Gov-ernance

Accountability

Equity- Gender

Free, Frequent and fair

Local Legislature-

Representa-

22

2.8 ConclusionThe chapter covered the theories and their conceptualisa-tions in relation to this paper. The Concepts reviewed under this chapter included decentralization, (including some of its typologies), LG, local Governance and local democracy highlighting linkages among these three concepts; Account-ability; Representation; Bicameralism and lastly gender quotas. The chapter also reviewed some literature on elect-oral system elaborating on the electoral system at the local level in Ghana. The next chapter looks at the local gov-ernance trajectory in Ghana from antiquity to the present.

23

Chapter 3 Overview of Decentralisation and Local Government Trajectory in Ghana

3.0 IntroductionThe preceding chapter discussed the concepts and theories; the lenses through which this study is analysed. In this chapter I would explore and discuss the decentralization and LG trajectories of Ghana giving a historical overview from the pre-independent/colonial era, leading to the present framework and structure. Also this section de-scribes in details the current LG structure of Ghana. Aside the above, the chapter also chronicle the profiles of the case study- AMA and KMA- which has been slightly de-scribed in chapter one.

3.1 Emergence of Local Governance in GhanaLocal governance is not a new invention in developing countries and to a significant extent Africa in particular (World Bank 1989; Olowu & Wunsch, 2004: 2). The history of local governance in Africa and in particular Ghana date as far back to the pre-independence era and even before the country Ghana was discovered. Ghanaians governed and ruled themselves via chiefs and traditional rulers since society was chiefly based on kingdoms and chiefdoms. The chiefs together with their council of elders represented the people and communities in various spheres such as militar-ily, social and economic. These chiefs or traditional leaders wielded Power and authority which could only be exercised by them or persons to whom it was delegated. In fact this empowered the rulers to undertake military, political, eco-nomic and social functions within their jurisdictional areas (K. Ahwoi, 2010:5). For instance, it was incumbent on the chief and the elders to protect and defend its subjects and territories against foreign invasion, ensure the survival of its people and modelling of the social life of its communit-ies. This system was part of the way of life; culture and her-itage of the people and remnants of this hitherto exist to date though without any significant powers since all powers and authority is now wielded by the central state.

As mentioned earlier, the chiefs and their council of eld-ers although were not elected by the people, they was a mu-

24

tual understanding and acceptance of them as legitimate representatives of the people. The mode of leadership suc-cession was by heir which is incongruent with modern democracy. Like modern local government, the chiefs and their councils constituted and provided legislative, execut-ive and judicial responsibilities for their community. They (chiefs and his council) enacted laws and regulations for the community. Whilst it was also the duty of the council to im-plement these laws, it was in addition responsible for the adjudication and dispensing of justice. Needless to say, this traditional system of governance was local in a sense that the people and the rulers were closer to the people and this provide avenue for the effective application of the ‘subsidi-arity’ principle even though the people could not hold them accountable. It is also to be noted that so important was this traditional local governance system that the British col-oniser upon their arrival recognised and adopted the sys-tem to rule the people. The coming of the British lead to the modification of the existing traditional local governance sys-tem into what later came to be known as the indirect rule which culminated in the establishment of the native author-ity.

3.1.1 Indirect Rule by British Colonial Authorities (BCA)

The native authority marks the premier form of organised and official institution of local government in Africa, which was a crucial feature of the indirect rule, a system through which the British imperial powers exercised their authority (Ayee, 2008). This native authority just like its predecessor shared the same features such as power being centred on chiefs and some units of local royalty, and the fact that it was undemocratic. The point of departure of the earlier (the traditional LG) and the Native authority was firstly, that while the TLG was purported to be representing the local people, the NAs were representatives of the British colonial authorities. Secondly, in the TLG chiefs or rulers were the ‘Alfa & Omega’ in their area of jurisdiction with absolute powers, however under NAs, the rulers were controlled and accountable to BCA rather than the local people. The major task of the chiefs under the NA was to help the British colonial government to administer law and order with limited involvement in local administration. (K. Ahwoi, 2010:9).

The BCAs after taken control of the country developed a LG system along two parallel lines (ibid). A series of Muni-

25

cipal Council Ordinances (MCO) regulated local govern-ment in the major municipalities including; Cape Coast, Ac-cra, Secondi-Takoradi and Kumasi. Equally a series of Nat-ive Jurisdiction Ordinances (NJO) were enacted to control the remaining LGs throughout the country. The state of LG though went through some reforms (during first, second and third republics), never received much attention until the PNDC introduced and prioritised decentralization & LG bringing significant changes.

3.2 Decentralisation and LG under PNDC and the Fourth Republic: 1982 to date.This subsection discusses the state and framework of LG in Ghana beginning from 1982 to present. I lump the PNDC and the FR together because the former served as the foundation and preparation phase upon which the latter was built. Also, I added decentralization to the heading be-cause it was during this period that the concept decentral-isation was widely articulated and popularised in Ghana.

3.2.1 Decentralization & LG under PNDC: 1981- 1992

The PNDC came to power with a political slogan of giving ‘Power to the People’. This marked the transformation of the slogan into the administrative concept of Decentraliza-tion. Indeed in March 1982, the DCs which exited in the third republic were dissolved “on the basis of their inability to deliver on the revolutionary aspirations of the time” (K. Awhoi, 2010:35). Instead an Interim Management Commit-tees were set up to replace the DCs. This was carried out through the LG (Interim Administration) Law 1982.

In 1983, the PNDC government formally embarked on the translation of its rhetoric of giving back ‘Power to the People’ into a concrete policy through its first ‘Policy Guidelines’. Contained in this document was the policy of decentralisation with a well elaborated system of LG. On the structure, a four-tier system of LG was favoured made up of Regional, District, Area and Town/village Councils. The DC was to be the basic unit of LG with the powers to make byelaws, levy taxes and rates and be responsible for development policy planning and implementation. The DCs were to be an all elected bodies premised on universal adult suffrage with staff of the Councils serving as ex-officio members on the Councils. This operated until 1988 when the regime enacted the Local Government Law, 207, 1988,

26

setting the legal framework for decentralisation under the PNDC, where a three-tier LG system was created with DA as the nerve centre of the system. This anchored the LG un-til the Fourth Republic came to force in 1992.

3.2.2 Decentralisation and LG under the Fourth Republic

The FR began in 1992 when the country in a referendum voted to return the nation onto a Constitutional path after 11 years of military rule. Like the other republics before, this also came with a Constitution. The decentralization and LG, started under the PNDC regime was adopted into the Constitution. The legal framework for decentralisation and LG is set out in chapter 20 of the 1992 Constitution; spe-cifically from Article 240-256. The Constitution prescribes that “Ghana shall have a system of local government and administration which, shall as far as practicable, be decent-ralised” (Article 204). The composition, power and duties of the MMDAs are enshrined in the LGA of 1993. The major aim of Ghana’s decentralisation policy is to devolve power to the governance structures closer to the people (CoG 1992). The coming section discussed the structure of the LG system.

3.3 The Structure of Ghana’s LG SystemGhana is a unitary state headed by a president with a cab-inet and an executive. (CoG, 1992) It is divided into 10 ad-ministrative regions.10 The structure of the LG system under ACT 462 is made up of a Regional Coordinating Council (RCC) and a Four-tier Metropolitan and three-tier Muni-cipal/District Assembly. (LGA, ACT 462) For a detailed Ad-ministrative structure see table 3.1 below.

Table 3.1: Administrative Structure of Local Government in Ghana

Level of Government

Political Authority

Role and Linkages

Management Institution

National Presidency, Cabinet,

National sector policy

Civil Service Operations

10 Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Central, Eastern, Greater Ac-cra, Northern, Upper East, Upper West, Volta and Western

27

Ministerial institutions and National Development Planning Commission (NDPC)

formulation, programming and budgeting, setting standards and monitoring ; sectoral evaluation of national projects

including the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLRD)

Regional Regional Coordinating Council

Harmonization and coordination and monitoring of national level policies and local level policies.

Local Government Service operating in Departments of the RCCs

District Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assembly

Local level policy formulation

Local Government Service operating in Departments of the

Town Urban, Zonal,Town/Area Council

Day to day administrative and management services

Local Government Service

Unit Unit Committee Mobilisation for participation in implementation and enforcement

Secretary (LI 1589.29i)

Source: Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. Decentralization in Ghana

Implementation Status and Proposed Future Directions, Ac-cra: 2002.(Offei-Aboagye)

3.3.1 The Regional Coordinating CouncilThe RCC is the at the apex of the LG structure of Ghana and composed of the Regional Minister (as chairperson) and his/her Deputy, the Presiding member and the DCE of each DA in a region, two Chiefs from the Regional House of Chiefs and the regional heads of departments of the RCC with voting rights. In sum there are 10 RCCs, i.e. one for each region (LGA, ACT 462)

28

3.3.2 The Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies

The Districts are the pivot and kingpin of the LG system in Ghana, which are located below the RCC and variously called MMDAs. It is designated as the highest political au-thority at the local level, with deliberative, legislative and executive powers (Article 214 (3) of the 1992 Constitution). For purposes of decision making the MMDAs composed of 70% elective councillors drawn from each electoral area within the district, the members of parliament for constitu-encies that fall within the district, the DCE appointment by the President and 30% nominated persons with in the dis-trict. In fact currently Ghana has 202 MMDAs made up of 6 MAs, 48 MUAs and 148 DAs. (ILGS) The categorisations into Metropolitan, Municipal and District depends on the population size of an area. See table 3.2 below for the cat-egorisation and list of MAs MUAs and DAs in Ghana (LGA [ACT 462])

Table 3.2: Categorization of Assemblies of Ghana

Type Population SizeMetropolitan Assembly, the highest unitMunicipal Assembly, Next lower unitDistrict Assembly, Local Council, lower units

250,000 and above 95,000 and above 75,000 and above

Source: Researcher’s own construction

3.3.3 The Sub-Metropolitan DAs The Sub-Metropolitan District Council (SMDC) is directly under the MA. The SMDC is created for settlement above 100,000 people. Membership comprised of not less than twenty-five and not more than thirty members. This is made up of all elected AMs of the Assembly in the SMD and as well as persons resident in the sub-metro. This emanated as a result of complex and peculiar socio-economic, urbanisa-tion and management problems that confronts the Metro-polises. The total number of SDMCs are over 30 but started with only 13 (LGA [ACT 462]).

3.4.4 Urban Councils (UC)Like the SMDC, the UC is created for settlement with popu-lation over 15000, and consists of not less than twenty-five

29

and not more than thirty members. The membership of UC is composed of not more than 8 persons elected from among members of the relevant district assemblies, not more than 12 representatives from the unit committees in the area of authority of the UC and not more than 10 per-sons ordinarily resident in the urban area.

3.3.5 Zonal CouncilsThe ZC is below the MUAs and consist of not less than fifteen persons and not more than twenty members made up of not more than 5 persons elected from among the members of the relevant MUA, not more than 10 representatives from the unit committee and not more than 5 persons ordinarily resident in the zone. (LGA [ACT 462], section 10[1])

3.3.6 Town/Area CouncilsThe TACs are rightly below MAs or DAs only and the com-position is, not less than fifteen persons and not more than twenty members made up of not more than 5 persons elec-ted from among the members of the relevant MUA, not more than 10 representatives from the unit committee and not more than 5 persons ordinarily resident in the zone. (ibid, section 17[1])

3.3.7 The Unit CommitteesThe UCOs are at the bottom of the system and are found under the various MMDAs. It consist of not more than fif-teen members made up of ten elected members ordinarily resident in the unit and not more than 5 other persons res-ident in the unit and nominated by the DCE acting on behalf of the president (ibid, section 24[1]).

Figure 3.1: Local Government Structure of Ghana

Regional Coordinating Council (10)

Municipal Assembly (48)

District Assembly (148)

Metropolitan Assembly (6)

Sub-Metropolitan Dis-trict Assembly (Over 30)

30

Source: Adopted from Training Manuel prepared by the Institute of Local Government Studies.

3.5 Profiles of AMA &KMAIn an attempt to understand the local governance pretty well using this study, I present the profiles of the two met-ropolises which this paper uses as case study. This section discusses the following; historical background of the two metros, demographic features, and other salient character-istics of the two MAs. Also to be highlighted is the level of development in the metros. See below a map of Ghana showing the case study.

Map 3.1: Map of Ghana

Urban/Town/Area Councils (34/250/826)

Town/Area Councils (58)

Zonal Councils (108)

Unit Committees (16000)

31

A map of Ghana depicting Accra and Kumasi Metropol-itan Assemblies

32

3.5.0 Profile of Accra Metropolitan Assembly

3.5.1 Brief History of AMAThe Accra Metropolitan is located at the heart of Ghana’s national capital where the seat of government is located As a coastal town, its outlets and inlets cover sea, air and land and hence links to the outside world and the other parts of the country are been created. AMA has a total land side of 200 square kilometres. (A.M.A. Medium Term Development Plan, 2006-2009)

Historically, the first attempt to set up a town council dates back to 1859 under an Ordinance, which was re-pealed in January 1861. In 1898, however, the Accra Town Council was formally established under the Town Council Ordinance of 1894.  The first meeting of the Council was held on 14th February of the same year. In 1943, the Accra Council was established under the Accra Town Council Or-dinance of the same year.

In 1944, a new Constitution came into being after the Accra Town Council had existed for 46 years with an elec-ted membership of seven – five appointed by the Govern-ment and two by the Ga Native Authority. The Constitution was again revised in September, 1953, thus increasing the membership from 14 – 31, and establishing the Accra Muni-cipal Council; 27 representatives for the Wards and four representing the Traditional Authority. After Ghana had at-tained Independence, an amendment to the 1953 constitu-tion removed traditional representation completely.  The Council thus became a wholly representative institution based on free and free election (ibid).

The Accra City Council was the first of the 58 District Councils to be integrated under the New Local Government System to promote efficiency in the administrative ma-chinery of the Council and to meet the ever-pressing de-mand for amenities and essential services by the rate pay-ers. On 29th June 1961, Accra was declared a City and the Council thus became the Accra City Council. The Accra City Council was dissolved in August 1964 and the Greater Ac-cra Assembly was created. It is the first to be integrated into the new local government system. (http://www.gha-nadistricts.com/districts/?r=1&_=3&sa=2995. Viewed on 10/10/2010)

33

3.5.2 Institutional and Administrative Structure of AMA

The AMA constitutes a body corporate and the highest political authority in the metropolis.  It guides, directs and oversees all other administrative authority in the city.  It is divided into 11 administrative Sub-Metro Council Areas11.   The Assembly itself is made up of 129 members with 87 of them elected and 42 appointed by the president.  A Metro Chief Executive who is the Mayor of Accra heads AMA. The functions of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly are outlined in the Legislative Instrument (L.I. 1500) which established the AMA. These functions are summarized as follows: Provi-sion of a sound sanitary and healthy environment; Provision of educational infrastructure for first and second cycle schools; Provision of markets and lorry parks within the Metropolis; The planning and development control of all in-frastructure within Accra; Activities bordering on the main-tenance of peace and security within the Metropolis and provision of public safety and comfort.(website, AMA)

It also composed of the Executive Committee and four-teen Sub-Committees through which the councillors func-tion. In terms of administrative work, the assembly has a Metropolitan Coordinating Director who heads the adminis-trative unit in the metropolis. The secretariat’s function is to implement the resolutions and policies of the Assembly, coordinating sector development programmes and manage-ment of assembly resource. The institutional structure of AMA secretariat is depicted in the figure 3 below.

3.5.3 The People and PopulationThe indigenous people of Accra are the Ga people, however because Accra is the capital it has received all sorts people that the Natives are confined to few areas with the rest been occupied by migrants. In terms of population trends, Accra which is Ghana’s capital since 1877 is today one of the most populated with a population of about 1,695,136 million people (2000 National Population Census) and fast growing Metropolis in Africa with an annual growth rate of 3.36%. The rapid industrialisation and expansion in the manufacturing and commercial sectors in some major areas within the metropolis has contributed to high immigration to Accra. Also the infrastructure already built in AMA will for a long time make it a more attractive place for unem-

11 11 sub-metros were created but 6 Six are operational. They are Ablekuma, Ashiedu Keteke, Kpeshie, Okaikwei, Osu-Klottey

34

ployed rural people as well as public servants, national and international investors (website, AMA). As regards political leanings, the AMA favours the current government party (NDC).

3.6.0 Profile of Kumasi Metropolis

3.6.1 Historical Overview of KMAThe city of Kumasi was founded in the 1680’s by King Osei Tutu I to serve as the capital of the Asante State (Fynn, 1971). Given its strategic location and political dominance, Kumasi as a matter of course, developed into a major com-mercial centre with all major trade routes converging on it (Dickson 1969). However, it came under the influence of the British rule in 1890 (Boahen 1965).  With time the city began to expand and grow thereby making it second only to Accra in terms of land area, population size, social life and economic activity.  Its strategic location has also endowed it with the status of the principal transport terminal and has assured its pivotal role in the vast and profitable distribu-tion of goods in the country and beyond (ghanadistricts.-com).

3.6.2 GeographyKumasi is located in the transitional forest zone and is about 270km north of the national capital, Accra. It has a land size of about 254 square kilometres. The unique cent-rality of the city as a traversing point from all parts of the country makes it a special place for many to migrate to. The metropolitan area shares boundaries with Kwabre East Dis-trict to the north, Atwima District to the west, Ejisu-Juaben Municipal to the east and Bosomtwe to the south. It’s beau-tiful layout and greenery has accorded it the accolade of be-ing the “Garden City of West Africa” (website KMA).

3.6.3 Institutional and Administrative Structure of KMA

Like AMA, the KMA constitutes the highest political author-ity in the metropolis.  It plans, directs and supervises all other administrative authority in the city.  It is made up of

35

ten administrative Sub-Metro Council Areas12. The As-sembly itself is made up of 144 members with 102 of them elected and 42 appointed by the president.  A Metro Chief Executive who is the Mayor of Kumasi heads KMA. See fig-ure 3 below for the administrative structure (ibid).

3.6.4 The people and PopulationKMA is at the hub of the Ashanti kingdom with the seat of their paramount chief located in the metropolis. The Native language is Twi, which is widely spoken in the metropolis. The Kumasi metropolis is the most populous district in the Ashanti Region next only to Accra.  During the 2000 Popula-tion Census it recorded a figure of 1,170,270. Kumasi has attracted such a large population partly because it is the re-gional capital, and also the most commercialised centre in the region.  Ashanti Region is currently the second most urbanised in the country, after Greater Accra (87.7%). In terms of political leanings, the KMA is the stronghold of the current leading opposition party (NPP) in the country.

Figure 3.2: Institutional and Administrative framework of AMA & KMA

12 10 sub-metros were created but 4 are operational, namely: Subin, Manhyia, Bantama and Asokwa.

General Assembly (Council-

Metro Chief Exec-

36

Source: adopted from AMA documents. The institutional structure is a generic structure in all the District Assemblies in Ghana that is, they are similar in all, but numbers of dept varies and. this depends on the size of the district).

3.7 ConclusionThe chapter discussed the beginnings local governance in Ghana from the pre-colonial, through colonial/post colonial to its present stage. Also it presented the framework and structures of the Ghana’s LG system from the 1992 to date. The profiles of the AMA and KMA have been discussed. The next chapter presents the empirical findings and addresses the research questions of this paper.

Executive Commit-

Sub-Commit-

Metro Co-ordinating

Internal

Central Admin-istration

Sub Metros

Finance Health Waste Management

Food & Agric

Town & Country Planning

Education Youth & Sport

37

Chapter 4 Research Findings of the Influence of Non Elected Councillors in AMA & KMA of Ghana

4.0 IntroductionUsing empirical findings from the field this chapter analyse examine and interpret the findings in the light of the re-search questions this study aims to address.

The chapter begins by analysing the processes and pro-cedures involved in the filling of the presidential quota bringing out the actors who recommend and those recom-mended for the appointments. Secondly the issue of repres-entation- who and in whose interest- are the NECs serving, is explored taking into consideration their impact on the autonomy and independence of the LG. Furthermore the is-sue of politics and LG of Ghana is examined. Included also in this section is laying out the kind of relationship and in-teractions between the appointed and elected councillors within the LG of Ghana and revealing whether the GAs are accountable. Lastly, the chapter slates the views of council-lors about the possible introduction of genders quotas in Ghana in view of the reality that elections do not favour wo-men and hence the decline in the number of women at the local level.

4.1 Process in the Picking of Non Elected DA Councillor This section answers the research question one of the study which is what are the processes in the nomination of the non elected assembly members and who fills the presiden-tial quota and how?. It attempts to ascertain empirically whether or not the processes as laid down in the constitu-tion is put into practice or that a convention has been evolved in the nomination and picking of the NECs to the DAs of Ghana. It is also to find out the actors behind these appointments and the process involved in the nomination process. According to article 242, paragraph (d) of the 1992 Constitution thirty percent (30%) of the member of the DAs shall be appointed by the president in consultation with the traditional authorities and other interest groups in the dis-trict.

38

Evidence gathered from the field (i.e. 25/29 inter-viewees including the one staff each of two think tanks [CDD & ILGS]) indicates that the laid down procedure is not adhered to in the process of appointing NECs. The pro-cess has been circumvented. It is argued that the appointed system was meant to get persons with expertise and useful experience to contribute to the development of the localit-ies. This is not the case as far as the current system is con-cerned. The quota is used by the government to appoint sympathiser and people associated with or share the ideo-logy of their political party.

“The quota to the president is a preserve for party members and ‘foot soldiers’ majority of whom cannot make any meaningful contribution as far as the development of the locality is concern. They don’t even know the system let alone to understand it. In our monitoring of the approval process of the MMDCs we were shocked to see that major-ity of the government appointee could not write their names and others had to do it for them” (Interview with a staff of TT ‘A’ July 15, 2011).

The question that is not farfetched is whether or not there are no competent people (i.e. people with know-how) in the localities? Or is it a purposive act by the government to put party people who can easily be manipulated. Also as regards the forces behind the appointments, this research found that the president has delegated the task of appoint-ing NECs to the Regional ministers who also passed it on to their party structures. The consultation as espoused by the constitution is not adhered to in the nomination process. No interest groups are consulted. Tellingly, a (NEC 001, AMA) who was asked to give an account of the procedures in-volved in the nomination process had this to say:

“In fact my brother let me tell you the constitutional ar-rangement is in theory; in reality what happen is that the GA traditional authority is requested to submit five people. Apart from that the rest are nominated by ward/branch party executives”.

This was concurred by an elected AM at the KMA (006) “to the best of my knowledge, normally in the nomination of the NECs, Otumfour (paramount chief of Ashantes) is give a number of people to submit, the DCE also bring some people, and the rest are handpicked by constituency party people”.

Following from the above, the actors in the nomination process includes; Chiefs, MMDCEs and political party exec-utives and stalwarts. On the process of nomination, no

39

standardised laid down procedure is adopted as evident from the two MAs.

“ I was there and I received a call from my party chair-man asking me whether I can fit do that assembly work and I say yes, and that was how I got my appointment ”13 recounted by an NEC (002, KMA).

Following the above it shows that NECs are not subjec-ted to any rigorous scrutiny, and this could explain to a large extent why the purpose for which the quota was insti-tuted is defeated. Although majority of NECs are just people to add up to the numbers, it is worth mentioning that some of them are people of high repute with expertise and valuable experience that when brought to bear on the work of the DAs would yield significant impacts. Virtually the process of nominating appointees was the same in both AMA and KMA. Interestingly, it came out that amongst the crop of appointees at the AMA are lots of technocrats and experienced persons than the KMA. Apparently this is not something to wander about because AMA is at the hub of the National capital-Accra- and could probably be the reason why it had more experienced people. In addition my own document review showed that majority (29/42) of the appointees at the AMA are persons who had been at the DAs before either as elected councillors or NECs. This was sharply the antithetic of KMA where 15/42 had been district AMs before their current appointment.

What also manifested strongly through my observation at the two assemblies which is worth highlighting is that, whilst majority of the GAs at AMA are indigenes of the place, the situation was different at the KMA. Large chunk of the NECs at KMA are not natives. They are settler people. A basic exposition to this could be that it is so be-cause it is the world bank14 of NPP, currently the lead op-position party in Ghana.

Ghana’s LG government is premised on non partisan system (CoG, 1992) where individuals has to seek member-ship to the DAs on individual basis, however the process ad-opted by the government to nominate the NECs as shown by this research (where the political party nominates the NECs) to a large extent brings in partisanship which de-feats the non partisanship logic.

13 This person had low educational background so he was speaking ‘pidgin English’.

14 A party strong hold in Ghana is called the World Bank of a political party

40

Advocates of non-partisanship in local elections posit that LG pertains to ‘bread and butter’ issues, on which there should be no division along party lines (Olowu, 2003). The inclusion of parties at the local level risks allowing policy-making to become contaminated by patronage and clientelism instead of focusing on long term benefits (Packel, 2008). The evidence of the nomination process re-veal here fits well with Heller (2001) findings in South Africa where he cites the ANC party control over local nom-ination as a cause and a symptom of a weak LG. Also Packel (2008) noted that both de jure and de facto national party control over nominations for local councils appear to have negative impacts for local democracy.

In sum the nomination process has been relegated to the political party and this skews the nominations in favour of loyal political party members within the metropolis.

4.2 Accountability in Ghana’s Local GovernmentThis part addresses the second research question; who are nominated or appointed members accountable to? It is noted that, amongst the cardinal pillars of democratic decentralization is accountability (Ribot 2007). Theoretically, accountability is underscored in LG because proponents believed that the ordinary people would be able to demand feedback and explanations from decision makers who are in charge of their localities in view of the proximity of local councillors instead of the CG which is sitting miles away from the local people and more so occupied with national issues at the expense of local matters (ibid).

Olowu & Wunsch (2004:) discerned that though African governments have made frantic efforts to put in place ac-countability mechanisms, the arrangements have not al-ways work because the supporting tools (such as informa-tion) that would aid in strengthening accountability are lacking.

In Ghana accountability (be it downward or upward) is weak. At the local level only elected councillors are subjec-ted to some sort of accountability via elections. The NECs who are nominated by the CG to participate in the policy formulation and decision making at the local level are not accountable to the local people. Empirical evidence garnered by the research reveals that NECs do not account even though mechanisms to promote accountability is laid down in the constitution of Ghana. This is the potential to revoke the mandate or appointment of a DA member/coun-

41

cillor. To remove an appointed or nominated councillor sec-tion 9 (6) of Act 462 stipulates that the president may re-voke the appointment of NEC either in the exercise of his discretion, or upon the recommendations of third-fourths of the members of the DA, or upon a complaint made by a re-gistered voter in the district on stated and proven grounds. But in reality, no local citizen has been able to initiate any action to remove an erring councillor (Ayee cited in Olowu & Wunsch, 2004:145) due to the cumbersome procedure involve, even though there were substantial evidence that some nominated DA members were not living up to expecta-tion (ibid).

This was ascertained when a question of accountability was asked by researcher to the NECs, appointing authorities as well as some governance institutions.

“What do we have to account for and to whom, we all fought for the party to come to power. We behave according to the dictates of our government, they tell us what do”. (NEC 007, AMA)

Reiterating this, a TT ‘B’ alluded that “the NECs do not account because the appointments are use to reward party people i.e. ‘Jobs for the Boys”.

He added that accountability measures are not instituted for the NECs and that even if they are, they do not function.

The issue of accountability has been widely acknow-ledged as crucial to successful democratic local Governance (Crawford 2009). Agrawal and Ribot (1999, 478) clearly state that ‘if powers are decentralized to actors who are not accountable to their constituents, or who are accountable only to themselves or to superior authorities within the structure of government, then decentralization is not likely to accomplish its stated aims. This means Ghana’s decent-ralization and LG is failing to achieve its objectives (of mak-ing democracy a reality [COG 19992]) in view of the fact that some power and authority has been devolved to actors (NECs) who are not downwardly accountable to the local people.

This also confirms Olowu et al. (2004, 71) observation that African countries have not made much progress in terms of accountability. Accountability most of the time is limited to the voice mechanism (elections) and this is in the case of elected representatives. They added that in spite of the fact that the voice mechanism (election) is at its infancy, it is fraught with elite capture and electoral

42

patronage weakening its potential as a mechanism of Accountability. In addition scholars have noted that local accountability systems are build around three actors-citizens, political leaders and councillors- of which the effectiveness of this mechanism depends on the influence exerted by first two actors. (Yilmaz et al. 2008). Thus in relation to Ghana, accountability in the case of non-elected councillors would succeed on the assertiveness of both citizens and political leaders. However citizens are ruled out in terms of demanding accountability from NECs for the reason that they lack the necessary information that would empower them to hold the appointed councillors to task. This means that the onus lies on the CG who appointed these people to hold them to account, however they do not because they use the nominations for political patronage (Packel, 2008).

Accountability which is answerability and enforceability is at the core of the relationship between councillors and the local people.(Schedler, 1999) While Answerability is the obligation of a councillor to inform the people about his/her conduct, enforceability is where the people have the power to interrogate, reward or punish the councillor (ibid). These principles (answerability and enforceability) do not apply in the case of NECs and local people because there is no system of accountability to connect the two actors.

4.3 Appointed Councillors and Representation in Ghana’s DAsLocal councillors are persons who are responsible for tak-ing decisions and policy planning at the local level. In Ghana these people are either elected directly by the local people or appointed by the president (CoG, 1992). For the elected councillors it is palpable that they are representing the interest and views of their constituencies at the as-sembly. But in the case of the non elected councillors, it is a puzzle as to whom and in whose interest they are particip-ating in the DAs even though some scholars have advanced some reasons; Firstly that although the appointed persons are supposed to bring expertise, (professional and tech-nical), to bear on the DAs, they are predictably loyal to the CG and to ensure the presence of the central government is felt in the DA forum and secondly that they are represent-ing minority groups in the DAs (Ofei-Aboagye, 2000; Awortwi, 2010).

This research found out that the NCEs to a large extent are representing the CG. In all their workings they pulled in

43

favour of the CG. Most of the GAs I interviewed admitted that they were there to pursue the interest of the govern-ment to ensure that the policies of the government are push through.

A nominated councillor (010, AMA) told the researcher that “the purpose for which I am at the DA is to help the government get its policies through at the local level, in other words to protect my government because many a time people we believe to be our people (some elected DA) get to the assembly and fail to fight for the government policies. So I as a government appointee, my sole aim is to protect the government and ensure the agenda of the gov-ernment is achieved”.

“I am here to protect the government interest; any policy, project or programme brought by the MCE to be im-plemented at the assembly whether due diligence has been done on it or not I will support it.” (NEC 010, AMA).

These evidence defeats the views that the appointments are to get minorities or representation of special interest (Mawhood, 1983:12) or as it were introduce some balancing mechanism into the operations of the DAs (Ofei-Aboagye, 2000). Also clearly the nominated DA members are not act-ing in the best interest of the local people as scholars of democratic decentralization postulates (Olowu et al, 2004). Ayee (2004) noted that although some NECs have lived up to their stature as providing expertise and technical know-ledge to the DAs, some also “have successfully confounded the public’s views of them as government stooges”.(Ayee in Olowu et al, 2004:143).

In addition using the definition of representation adop-ted in this research i.e. where leaders (in this case council-lors) are both responsive and accountable to the local people (Ribot, 2007), the non elected councillors do not leave up to expectation. The findings revealed that the NECs are not responsive to the needs of the local people who it is presume would be made better off by the devolu-tion of power and authority from the CG to the local level (ibid)

Also in the literature of local electoral systems non par-tisan posture of LG is defended by the argument that LG matters are issues of “bread-and-butter” on which partisan lines (which can entrench divisions) should be avoided. Moreover, it is thought that having a partisan LG could lead to situations where central governments could use its wide powers to settle political scores or victimise councils con-trolled by opposing parties (Olowu & Wunsch 2004, 68-70).

44

In Ghana two reasons for has been advanced by the PNDC government and the Committee of Experts that drafted the 1992 constitution for excluding partisan politics at the local level. First it argued that in the past, elected governments in Ghana cynically exerted influence on LG bodies to win political advantage and secondly that non partisanship at the local level would facilitates the mobilization of the people which is more conducive to consensus formation, which is for development at the grassroots (Republic of Ghana, 1991; also see Ayee in Olowu et al, 2004).

However the inclusion of NECs in the DAs has crept in partisan politics into Ghana’s DAs unofficially. Not unsur-prisingly I found that serious partisanship is going on in the two MAs. Almost all I interacted with alluded to partisan-ship being played at the DAs. As mentioned by a (NEC 008, AMA):

“We can’t separate politics from our work here, in any development project decision, we could have a non partisan discussion but the initiation and outcome of the decision is partisan because governments bring and site projects that would boost its ‘political capital’ to better its chances of re-taining power.

“They say its non partisan, but my brother I will tell you that is a lie; it is just on paper, it is purely partisan. If you are right, you know your people and if you are left too, you also know your members”. Opined by NEC (001, KMA)

Added by another elected councillor (EC 009, KMA); “secret party meetings are going on in this assembly. What even annoys me is that most of the appointees who are chairpersons of committees intentionally do not calls for meetings because they do not want to put financial burden on their government for the reason that the less meetings we have the less money they would expensed on sitting al-lowances but this allowance cannot fuel my car to run for two days. Moreover we are not paid salaries. When the as-sembly system began it was not like this, I wish the DA should be declared partisan because people are concern with their parties instead of us trying to better the lives of the local people on whose mandate we are here”.

Partisanship pervades Ghana’s DAs to the extent that elected councillors align and identify themselves to the two leading political parties15 in Ghana in order to win favours from the government. For instance, a councillor told me

15 The National Democratic party (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP)

45

that she together with some councillors, are minority in the assembly because their party is not in power. Another elec-ted councillor (007, AMA) affirmed the earlier councillor as-sertion saying:

“We are always sidelined and excluded from getting vital information and issues because we are seen as belonging to an opposition party even though we are elected by the people on non partisan basis”.

In the words of Ayee (Olowu & Wunsch, 2004:143) the inclusion of the nominated councillors in the DAs is Polit-ical: “it is meant to give the DAs some ‘political direction’ which serves as central government watchdogs”. This res-onates with an exposition give by a nominated DA member who claimed that they are in the assembly to be ‘watch-dogs’ for the government. The appointee says:

“We appointees, our duty is to ensure that government projects and policies in our constituencies are implemented smoothly. When a project is coming to the area where I reside, my task would be to monitor the project and the elected member to ensure the project is executed in order to boost the chances of my government.”

This lent credence to the politics of decentralization (Conyers 1983; Ayee, 2004: 143) which sees decentraliza-tion policies being use to further the broader political in-terest and or strategies of those in power. Conyers discerns that politics of decentralisation until recently was seldom discussed in the decentralisation literature.

In another stretch, in pointing out the dangers of de-centralization Bergh (2004:780) notes that even though de-volution of power, authority and responsibility to LGs are often framed as purely technical issues, that democratic de-centralization is “inherently a political process.” This mani-fest strongly in the decentralization reform of Ghana as CGs often used the LG to their advantage (Ayee 2008, Awortwi, 2010). For instance in a recent NDC party delegates con-gress to elect their presidential candidate for the 2012 gen-eral elections, the general secretary of the party categoric-ally mentioned that 70% of the DA councillors across the nation are their members and for that matter they have a strong grounding at the local level (Daily Guide, 13 July, 2011).4.3.1 Impact of NEC on the Authority and

Autonomy of DAsAside the above, the transfer of powers, responsibilities and resources from the CG to the LG is meant to make local

46

government independent in the tasks and responsibilities shifted to it by the CG. In this direction Ghana the DAs have been designated as the highest decision making bodies at the local level responsible for the planning, and develop-ment of the district. As a result of this the DAs have been given eighty –six functions that empower them to provide deconcentrated, delegated and devolved local public ser-vices (Olowu & wunsch, 2004:129) Ayee cited in Olowu et al (2004) underscores that some progress has been made towards devolution of authority to the DAs in Ghana non-etheless, he added that the DAs are constraint in exercising this authority. One key factor hampering this autonomy is the presence of the NECs in the DAs. These crops of DA members advocate and push issues in favour of the central government. When it comes to making decisions almost all nominated members submissions and choices are leaned to-wards the government’s option.

“None of the nominated DA members have voted against an issue or policy initiated by the MCE (of course who is the known representative of the CG) for my stay at the as-sembly here” said by a councillor (EC 004, KMA).

The power and authority transferred to the DAs is meant to empower DA members to initiate project, policies and programmes since they are closer to the localities and to enforce the ‘bottom-up’ precept of decision making ad-vocated by LG experts (Olowu et al, 2004). Many scholars on decentralization argue that the initiation and generation of policies from below would yield effective and efficient solutions to address local problems (K. Ahwoi, 2010:115; Olowu et al, 2004).

However, in reality majority of the DA members (espe-cially the elected) agreed that all policies, programmes and projects are initiated from the CG. The local legislature has been reduce to ‘rubber stamp’ and treated like appendage of the CG. The characteristic of local control and the prin-ciple of ‘subsidiarity’ 16 is trample upon by the stronger presence and control by the centre, which according to Mawhood is unacceptable to classical LG (1983:23). Re-counted by an elected councillor (005, AMA):

“It is a pity that every project or policy is from the above, instead of we (the DA members) proposing policies and projects based on our knowledge of our communities, the CG is rather doing it. Our duty is merely to beg or criti-cize what the CG presents”.

16 The principle that public decisions should be made at a level of government closest to citizens as possible

47

Many of the councillors tacitly agreed that the power that has been ceded to them to a large extent is usurped by the central government.

Indeed Ayee notes that one cannot but to acknowledge and admit the threat by the appointed members to the autonomy of the DA. To tell the power wielded by the ap-pointees, he states that in some DAs, decisions taken in the absence of some appointed members were revisited and sometimes reversed when they later showed up at meetings (Ayee 1994, 1996, and 2004).

Summarily the autonomy of decision making by local representatives is seriously undermined and virtually powers granted to local authorities has been recycled back to the CG which if steps are not taken would see the mani-festation of centralisation which failed the developing world in the post colonial period.

4.4 What are the Relations between Appointed and Elected Councillors?The objective of this section is to address the above ques-tion. Ghana’s DAs for the purposes of planning and making decision have councillors. These councillors composed of elected members who have their mandate from the people and for that matter represent them at the assembly and NECs who on the other hand ascertain their mandate to the DA by the appointment from the president. Unlike the ECs, the NECs do not have constituents to represent and as such might not be at the same wave length in terms of making certain decisions.

However it is to be noted that effective functioning of the assembly would depend on the ability of these two groups to coalesce when it comes to policy formulations and decision making, consequently, the interest to find out how these groups interacts in the operations of the District Assemblies. Have the two group pitched entrench camps against each other or there is some sort of lobbying and ca-joling each other in an attempt to win majority on policy de-cision.

Evidence gathered from the two assemblies upon which this study was conducted points to some mixture of smooth relations sometimes and strain relations at other times. All councillors interviewed (25) both the elected and nomin-ated alluded that the relation between the elected members and appointed members is easy going and that they see themselves as councillors. They do not have as it were

48

tagged ‘names’. As one of the councillors (NEC 009, AMA) succinctly put it:

“In this house we do not have appointed or elected, we see one another as councillors, we address one another as honourable member”.

Relations between councillors are regulated and guided by rules base on the realisation of how weak and defective institutional and operational rules can make it difficult to reach decisions, leading to policy failure and weakened local governance (Olowu et al. 2004):9), institutions has been design such that there are no distinctions between councillors. Moreover, coordination issues among council-lors can also impede activities of local councils, committees and sub-committees have been instituted through which councillors’ carry out their activities. Both appointed and elected councillors work in standing committees in the mak-ing of policies and taking decisions which is typical of bicameral legislatures where the two houses (lower and up-per chamber join in the formation of certain standing com-mittees for purpose of smooth decision making.

“We the elected and the appointed work together in different committees and no groupings based on elected or appointed comes to fore.” Say a councillor (EC 01, AMA).

In addition, in terms of relations in making taking de-cisions, councillors form coalitions in relation to the merits of the issue at stake. Voting on decisions operates on the principle of majority rule and for a bill to be approved by the council it must receive majority support, with each councillor having only one vote.

Nonetheless, it is to be noted that relations between elected and nominated is not always cosy, they sometimes go in opposite directions especially when it is clear to the elected members that the CG is introducing a policy to gain or boost its political capital. Also in terms of power rela-tions, both elected councillors and NCEs have the same power and therefore have equal power in making of policies. This is quite different from other jurisdictions where elected legislators have the final say in certain mat-ter.

4.5 Women Empowerment and Promotion of Gender Equality in Ghana’s LGIt order to assess and analyse the extent to which decision makers at the local level are prepare to help advance and

49

bring on board women, in view of the low numbers of wo-men at the local level, a question was posed as to whether local councillors would support the reservation of some seats for women at the local level since scholars argues that the local level is the closest and most accessible level of government to women, and for that matter steps could be taken to increase their numbers at that level (Ofei-Aboagye, 2000; Allah-Mensah 2004). To the dismay of the researcher majority (23/29) of the councillors were not in favour of the creation of a quota system as it is in other jurisdiction such as Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania ((IDEA, quota project, 2010). The following responses were worth noting:

“Creating women quota at the DAs to me is a funny idea, we always talk as if women are so fragile, so vulner-able, incapable and so weak. The earlier we discarded that notion the better for we men” opined an elected councillor (EC 005, AMA)

For me I would never support such a thing (referring to women quota) if we empower women we would be doomed17”. (EC 03, AMA).

He justified his assertion by saying that when you take a look at households where women are richer than their hus-bands’ peace vanish in those households. Probing further the researcher draws his attention to the countries which have instituted women/gender quota schemes yet those places are moving on well. “My brother I am speaking from experience” was all that he could add. Upon further probing I found out he is the husband of one of the outspoken wo-man in the Ghanaian political scene.

Aside these, what was even surprising was an elected woman councillor who was not in support of the instituting a women quota system. She (EC 05, KMA) said:

“Women would also have to struggle like the way we did to be here. When they (women) see you contesting and challenging men on political platforms they add in calling you names. So I would not support reserving a quota for women”.

Although the opponents of the idea of reserving seats for women were many, mostly men, others including some men stated it is a laudable idea and would help the nation if implemented. All the women I interviewed both the appoin-ted and elected with the exception of one, supported the

17 This word may appeared harsh but that was how the respondent said

50

idea. An elderly male councillor (NEC 01, KMA) had this to say:

“My son it is a good idea if the presidential quota is given to women, for women to take their rightful positions in society. Women are more than men in Ghana but when it comes to making decisions for the society they are nowhere to be found. I tell you, women are responsible for the liveli-hood and survival of most homes in our localities. They are the breadwinners of many homes.”

Another councillor stated: “when a women is leading she does it with an open heart.” She then made a compar-ison of committees in the assembly that are headed by men and those by women and said that those which women are chairpersons are doing better than those chaired by men”. (NEC 01, AMA).

In addition a staff each from the two research think tanks I interviewed also strongly agreed to the institution of the women quota at the LG level. From their perspective the democracy of Ghana cannot be achieve with the relega-tion of those who constitute the majority18 in the country. For them space should be created women for women start-ing from the Local level to the national level. This is particu-larly important given the arguments by some scholars that local level representation could serve as a training ground for the participation of women at DA level (Offie-Aboagye, 2000:3-4; Thomi et al, 2000:334).

Gender quota is advocated for the reason that it has helped in soaring the numbers of women in legislative bod-ies of countries (Dahlerup, 2006). Also it is stated that gender quota is flexible and thus can be instituted at any level (National or local), however it effectiveness depend on the type of quota chosen (ibid). For instance in Ghana vol-untary party quota is not yielding results because it is not enforceable. Hence what is needed is the legal quota which will be backed by a law.

In this regard it is presume that reserving the 30% pres-idential quota to nominate women would go a long way to increase the women in the DAs of Ghana. However the res-ult above shows that the local councillors are not ready to welcome the creation of reserve seats for women.

The observation of Ayee in the year 2000 which showed that men were “overwhelmed” at the DAs is confirmed by this research. My own perusal of documents of the two as-

18 51.3% according to the 2010 population and housing census. (accessed 15/10/11 on www.ghanaweb.com)

51

semblies reveals that men by far outweigh women in the two DAs. For example at AMA out of a total of 129 council-lors women are only 20. Like AMA, the situation was not different at KMA where women are 20 out of 144. This calls for an affirmative action such as a purely appointment as discussed in this paper.

4.8 Conclusion This chapter discussed and answered the research ques-tions presented in chapter one of this study. The next chapter which is the last chapter of this paper recaps the major findings of this research.

52

Chapter 5 Conclusion and Policy Considerations

5.0 IntroductionThe decentralization reforms as envisaged by Ghana’s con-stitution aims at empowering local people at the grassroot (as it is stated “give power to the people”) in order to evolve a robust local democracy and local governance. In-sights from concepts employed in this study revealed that in order to evolve good democratic local governance, a proper blend of downwardly accountable councillors combine with gender equity, and effective representation is indispens-able. This paper sets out to find out how the inclusion of NECs impact on the local democracy and local governance in Ghana and consequently to test the hypothesis that NECs are experts and technocrats with valuable experiences to contribute to the development at the local communities (Ofei-Aboagye 2000), 2000; Ayee 2008).

In this direction this chapter aims to synthesise the main findings of this study and to underscore the main find-ings as examined in the preceding chapters.

5.1 Major Findings5.1.1 NEC Nomination ProcessThis study shows that Ghana’s decentralization and LG though implemented for over two decades now could not have a standardised and transparent process and criteria for the nomination of NECs. The nominations are left at the mercy of party executive who determine who should be nominated (which mostly is reserve for party members) and this has subsequently chipped in partisan politics at the LG level which the constitution of Ghana frowns upon. 5.1.2 RepresentationAs regards representation, this research points to the effect that NECs weights are tilted in favour of the CG and for that matter act in the interest of the CG government and this dilutes the autonomy of the DAs as their presence brings into the assemblies the heavy presence of the CG. This has led scholars to state that the transfer of power and authority to the DAs is but a little with an ulterior motive of

53

unwillingness to relinquish power to the LGs (Ayee in Oluwu & Wunsch, 2004:152, (Antwi-Boasiako ).5.1.3 AccountabilityStrongly connected to the above is the issue of accountabil-ity which is also a crucial tenet of good democratic LG. This paper revealed that NECs are not downwardly accountable which implies it impacts adversely on democratic local gov-ernance. Although the NECs plans and take decisions on the behalf of the local people, the latter are disconnected from the former in that they do not participate in the choos-ing of NECs and consequently cannot hold them to account. Thus downward accountability which forms a major thrust of Local democracy and governance is sacrificed in favour of upward accountability.5.1.4 Underrepresentation of Women Not only the above, the paper also shows the state of wo-men representation at the LG level where scholars pre-sumed women can be effectively represented (Ofei Abo-agye, 2000; Allah Mensah, 2004). The findings reveal that even though women are underrepresented, local councillors are not in support of the institutionalization of a special quota to get women into the DAs. (i.e. supporting that the 30% president nominations should be reserve purposively to appoint only women).5.1.5 Result of HypothesisFollowing the evidence ascertained from the study, that the NECs advocates strongly for the CG, this paper rejects the hypothesis that non elected seats are reserved to introduce experts and experience people into local decision-making bodies. This is evident by NECs not accountable in any proper way and fact that NECs advocates strongly for the CG at the local level.

5.2 Some Policy DirectionsDecentralization and LG has become a major part of the general governance system of Ghana which has come to stay. For that matter it is only prudent that steps are taken to make it formidable. However, the above discussions points to the effect that some adjustments need to be made in order to attain good democratic local government which would make the local people the kingpins of local develop-ment as envisaged by experts and advocates of decentraliz-ation and local governance.

54

Following from the above findings, which points to the effect that the NEC seats are used by ruling governments to reward their party members; secondly, that no effective sys-tem of accountability is instituted to make PADCs down-wardly accountable to the local people and the fact women representation at the DAs is below appreciable levels, the study offers the following policy recommendations:5.2.1 Nature of NominationsIn view of the fact that nominations of NECs are used by CGs to advance their political agendas, this paper advoc-ates that the nominations should be made permanent in or-der to guard against governments using the nominations for political patronage. The tenure of office of the non-elected councillors should be longer such that changes in govern-ment would not affect their appointments. For instance NECs, once appointed must be mandated to serve until 70years. This would prevent governments from arbitrary dismissal NECs and more importantly it would allow NECs to gain relevant experience.

5.2.2 Institute Effective Downward Accountable System for NECs

Secondly, Institute a uniform mechanism to make NECs to be downwardly accountable to local people. For it is only when the local people can monitor, audit, and hold local councillors accountable that democratic decentralization would yield positive result.5.2.3 Gender QuotaApart from the above this research recommends the Institu-tionalization of Legal gender quotas at the local level in or-der to swell women numbers at the local legislatures, which must be based solely on nominations, since the voluntary party quotas adopted by the leading political parties has not been applied to the latter. This research advocates for legal gender quota based on nominations in order that govern-ments would be oblige to pursue it.

55

Appendices

Appendix A Interview Guide used to Collect Primary Data for this Paper

A1 Questionnaires for District Chief Executive1. What is the nomination process for the non-elected assembly mem-

bers?2. Who nominates the appointee?3. What are the criteria for appointment?4. What qualities are considered in the appointment?5. Are groups consulted in when appointment are being made as stated

in the constitution Yes/no?6. If yes, who are these groups?7. If not, why?8. Are appointments done to get experts and/ or minority groups into

the assembly?9. What kind of influence do they bring to the assembly?10. Who do they represent as they do not have constituencies?11. Are the appointees from your party?12. Are the appointees accountable yes/no?13. If yes, to whom and why?14. If not why?15. How is the relationship between the appointed and elected members

like?16. Certain people are advocating that the quota should be reserved for

women, what is your take on that?17. Would you support that the quota should be eliminated completely?

56

A2 Questions for Appointed Assembly Councillors1. How long have you been in the assembly?2. What is your occupation?3. Who recommended you for this appointment?4. What is your motivation for accepting this post?5. Are you active in politics Yes/No?6. If yes which Party?7. Are you part of any of working committees of the assembly Yes/

NO?8. Why the above answer?9. Whose views do you represent in the assembly since you do not

have constituencies?10. What influence do you bring to bear on the assembly?11. Are you accountable? Yes/No12. If yes to whom and how?13. How is the relationship between you and the elected representatives?14. How is your voting behaviour/pattern? Are you part of the

majority/opposition and do you vote the same way as the rest of your group or do you vote based on the issue?

A3 Questions for Elected Assembly Member1. How long have you been in the Assembly?2. What motivates you to be an assembly member?3. What development have you sent to your constituency?4. How do work you in the assembly? 5. How is the /your voting behaviour in the assembly? 6. What is the relationship between you and the appointed members?7. Do you know who appoints the non elected assembly members Yes/No8. If yes who?9. On what basis are appointed assembly members selected?10. What contribution do they bring to the Assembly?11. What kind of policies do they normally support?12. Are they always in support of government policies?13. Are some of them experts in certain fields e.g. engineering? 14. Are they incumbent party members Yes/No?15. If yes do they display their support for government policies explicitly/

implicitly at the Assembly?16. What is the relationship between you and the appointed members?17. Some people are advocating that the quota should be legislated for wo-

men, do u support that? If yes why?18. Should the quota be taken out completely?

57

Appendix B General Assembly and Committees

Meetings ObservedMA Type of

MeetingDate Venue

AMA General Assembly 20-07-2011 and 25-07-2011

Old Parliament House, Accra

AMA Finance Commit-tee

18-07-2011 AMA Assembly Hall

KMA Executive Com-mittee

28-0-07-2011

A Hall adjacent the Mayor’s Office KMA

KMA General Assembly 04-08-2011 Prempeh Hall, Ku-masi

Source: Researcher’s own construction

58

ReferencesAbrahamsen, R. (2000) Disciplining Democracy. London: Zed

BookAgrawal, A. and J. C. Ribot (1999) "Accountability in Decentraliz-

ation: a Framework withSouth Asian and West African Cases." Journal of Developing Areas 33(4): 473-502.

Institute of Local Government System A Handbook: The Role of the Assembly Member in Ghana’s Local Government System.

Ahwoi, K. (2010) Local Government & Decentralization in Ghana. Unimax Macmillan Ltd Ghana.

Allah Mensah, B. (2005) Women in Politics and Public life in Ghana, Friedrich Ebert Foundations, Accra.

Antwi-Boasiako, K.B. (2010) 'Public Administration: Local Gov-ernment and Decentralization in Ghana', Journal of African Studies and Development Vol. 2(7), pp. 166-175.

Awortwi, Nicholas (2010) The Past, Present, and Future of De-centralization in Africa: A Comparative Case Study of Local Government Development Trajectories of Ghana and Uganda, International Journal of Public Administration, 33: 12, 620-634

Ayee, J.R. A. (2003) Decentralization and Local Government: the Ghanaian Experience,

Ayee, J.R.A. (2004). Ghana: A top-down initiative. In: Olowu, D., & Wunsch, J.S. (eds.), Local governance in Africa: The chal-lenges of democratic decentralisation (pp. 125–54). London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Ayee JRA (2004a) Decentralized Governance and Poverty Reduc-tion at the Local Level in Ghana. Regional Development Dia-logue l:71-86

Ayee JRA (2004b) Ghana: A Top-Down Initiative. In: Olowu D, Wunsch J (eds) Local Governance in Africa: The Challenges of Democratic Decentralization.

Ayee J.R.A. (2008). The balance sheet of decentralization in Ghana, In Saito, F. (ed.), Foundations for local governance: Decentralisation in comparative perspective. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag.

Blair H. 2000. Participation and accountability at the periphery: democratic local government in six countries. World Develop-ment 28(1): 21–39.

Boahen, A.A. (1965) 'Asante and Fante AD 1000-1800', A Thou-sand Years of West African History: A Handbook for Teachers and Students, ed.JF Ade Ajayi and Ian Espie (Ibadan, Nigeria, 1965) : 165-190.

Christopher J. Ree & Farhad Hossain (2010) Perspectives on De-centralization and Local Governance in Developing and

59

Transitional Countries International Journal of Public Admin-istration, 33:12-1, 581-587

Conyers, D. (1983) ‘Decentralization: the Latest Fashion in De-velopment Administration?’, Public Administration and Devel-opment 3: 97-109.

Conyers, D. (1984) ‘Decentralization and Development: A Review of the Literature’, Public Administration and Development 4(2): 181-97.

Crook, Richard C. and James Manor (1998) Democracy and De-centralization in South Asia and West Africa, Participation, Accountability and Performance Cambridge

Crawford, G. (2009) '‘Making Democracy a Reality’? the Politics of Decentralisation and the Limits to Local Democracy in Ghana', Journal of Contemporary African Studies 27(1): 57-83.

Dahlerup, D. (2003) 'Comparative Studies of Electoral Gender Quotas', Lima, Peru .

Dickson, K. (1969) 'Some Determinants of Urban Growth in Nine-teenth Century Ghana', Bulletin Ghana Geographical Associ-ation 14(1969): 46-57.

Ghana, Republic of (1992) Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992. Ghana Publishing Corporation, Tema.

Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1990) Economic recovery and politics in the PNDC’s Ghana. Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 28, 328–43.

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), (2002) the International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design. Stockholm: Sweden.

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), (2010) Quota Database/quotaProject: Global Data-basse of Quotas for Women. Assessed 28/9/2011. www. quo-taproject.org/

Jay M. (2007) The Canadian Senate: Roles, Powers & Operations. Assessed 25/9/2011, www.mapleleafweb.com

Kauzya, J-M. 2002. ‘Local Governance Capacity Building for Full Range Participation: Concepts, Frameworks, and Experiences in African Countries’, 4th Global Forum on Re-Inventing Gov-ernment, New York, United Nations, pp. 361-362.

Katz R. (1997) Democracy and Elections Oxford: Oxford Univer-sity Press.

Kiyaga-Nsubuga, J. and Y. Olum (2009) Local Governance and Local Democracy in Uganda, Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance (2).

Langseth, P. (1996). Civil service reforms: A general view, In Vil-ladsen, S., & Lubanga F. (eds.), Democratic decentralisation in Uganda: A new approach to local governance. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

60

Laws, S., C. Harper and R. Marcus (2003) Research for Develop-ment: A Practical Guide. Sage Publications Ltd.

Litvack, Jennie, Ahmad Junaid, and Richard Bird (1998) Rethink-ing Decentralization in Developing Countries, PREM Sector Studies Series, Washington, DC: World Bank.

Local Government Act 1993Manin, B., Przeworski, A., & Stokes, S. C. (1999).Introduction In

Przeworski, Stokes, & Manin (Eds.),Democracy, accountabil-ity and representation (pp. 1–26). Cambridge, UK/New York, US: Cambridge University Press

Mawhood Philip (1983) Local Government in the Third World: The Experience of Tropical Africa. John Wiley & Sons

Ndegwa, S. (2002). Decentralisation in Africa: A Stocktaking Sur-vey, African Region Working Paper Series no. 40, Washing-ton, D.C.: World Bank.

Norris, P. (1997) 'Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Ma-joritarian and Mixed Systems', International Political Science Review 18(3): 297-312.

Novacx, G. 1970. Democracy and Revolution, Pathfinder Press, New York, in M.M. Yusif, 2008. ‘Local Governance and Demo-cracy: The Basic Principles’, viewed 20 October 2011, <http://mmyusuf.blogspot.com/2008/01/local-governance-and-democracy.

Ofei-Aboagye, E. (2000) Promoting the Participation of Women in Local Governance and Development: The Case of Ghana. European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM).

Ofei-Aboagye, E. (2004) 'Promoting Gender Sensitivity in Local Governance in Ghana', Development in Practice : 753-760.

O'Leary, Z. (2009). The essential guide to doing your research project Sage Publications Ltd

Olowu, D. (2003). Local institutional and political structure and processes: Recent experience in Africa. Public Administration & Development, 23,41–52.

Olowu, D., J.S. Wunsch and J.R.A. Ayee (2004) Local Governance in Africa: The Challenges of Democratic Decentralization. Lynne Rienner Pub.

Oyugi, W.O. (2000). Decentralisation for good governance and development: The unending debate. Regional Development Dialogue, 21(1), 3–22.

Packel, Daniel. 2008. “Electoral Institutions and Local Govern-ment Accountability: A LiteratureReview.” Social Develop-ment Working Paper No. 111. World Bank, Washington DC.

Parker, Andrew N. (1995) Decentralization: The Way Forward for Rural Development?, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 1475, Washington, DC: World Bank.

Pitkin, H. F. (1967) The concept of representation. Berkeley: Uni-versity of California Press, 1967.

61

Rees, C.J. and F. Hossain (2010) 'Perspectives on Decentraliza-tion and Local Governance in Developing and Transitional Countries', International Journal of Public Administration 33(12): 581-587.

Ribot, J.C. (2007) 'Representation, Citizenship and the Public Do-main in Democratic Decentralization', Development 50(1): 43-49.

Romeo L. (1996). Local development funds: Supporting decent-ralized planning and financing of local development. New York: United Nations Capital Development Fund.

Rondinelli, D.A. (1981). Government decentralization in compar-ative perspective: Developing countries. International Review of Administrative Science, 47(2), 133–45.

Rondinelli, Dennis (1999) What is decentralization?, in Jennie Lit-vack and Jessica Seddon(eds.) Decentralization Briefing Notes, WBI Working Papers, Washington, DC: World Bank

Russell, M. (2001) 'What are Second Chambers for?', Parliament-ary Affairs 54(3): 442.

Samuels, D.J. and M.S. Shugart (2003) 'Presidentialism, Elections and Representation', Journal of Theoretical Politics 15(1): 3

Schedler, A. (1999) 'Conceptualizing Accountability', The self-re-straining state: Power and accountability in new democra-cies: 13–28.

Smoke, P., (2003). Decentralisation in Africa: Goals, dimensions, myths and challenges. Public Administration and Develop-ment, 23, 7–116.

Thomi, W., P. Yankson, and S. Zanu. 2000. Lessons from the past and the future of decentralisation in Ghana. In Thomi, Yank-son and Zanu, 327-356.

Tsebelis, G. and J. Money (1997) Bicameralism. Cambridge Uni-versity Press.

United Nations Development Program (UNDP). (1998). A Global Sampling of Experiences, Management Development and Governance Division, Decentralised Governance Monograph, Bureau of Policy Development, New York.

World Bank (1997) World development report 1997: The state in a changing world. New York: Oxford University Press, for World Bank.

World Bank. (2000) World development report: Entering the 21st century. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

Wraith, R.E. (1972) Local Administration in West Africa. Africana Pub. Corp.

Wunsch, J.S., & Olowu, D. (1990). (eds). The failure of the cent-ralized state: Institutions and self-governance in Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Yilmaz, S., Y. Beris and R. Serrano-Berthet (2008) Local Govern-ment Discretion and Accountability: A Diagnostic Framework

62

for Local Governance. World Bank. Social Development De-partment.

Yin, R., (2003) Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 3rd edition: California. Sage Publications Inc.

Websiteshttp://www.ghanadistricts.com/districts/?news&r=2&_=6 As-

sessed 15/10/2011http://www.ghanadistricts.com/districts/?r=1&_=3&sa=2995 As-

sessed 15/10/2011www.quotaproject.org. Assessed 28/9/2011http://www.ghanadistricts.com/districts/?r=1&_=3&sa=2995 As-

sessed 28/9/2011

63