chapter 13 leveraged buyout structures and valuation

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Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

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Page 1: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Leveraged Buyout Structures and

Valuation

Page 2: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

No one spends other people’s money as carefully as they spend their own.

—Milton Friedman

Page 3: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Course Layout: M&A & Other Restructuring Activities

Part IV: Deal Structuring &

Financing

Part II: M&A Process

Part I: M&A Environment

Payment & Legal

Considerations

Public Company Valuation

Financial Modeling

Techniques

M&A Integration

Business & Acquisition

Plans

Search through Closing

Activities

Part V: Alternative Strategies

Accounting & Tax

Considerations

Business Alliances

Divestitures, Spin-Offs & Carve-Outs

Bankruptcy & Liquidation

Regulatory Considerations

Motivations for M&A

Part III: M&A Valuation & Modeling

Takeover Tactics and Defenses

Financing Strategies

Private CompanyValuation

Cross-BorderTransactions

Page 4: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Learning Objectives• Primary Learning Objective: To provide students with a knowledge

of how to analyze, structure, and value highly leveraged transactions.

• Secondary Learning Objectives: To provide students with a knowledge of – The motivations of and methodologies employed by financial

buyers;– Advantages and disadvantages of LBOs as a deal structure;– Alternative LBO models;– The role of junk bonds in financing LBOs;– Pre-LBO returns to target company shareholders;– Post-buyout returns to LBO shareholders, and – Alternative LBO valuation methods– Basic decision rules for determining the attractiveness of LBO

candidates

Page 5: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Financial Buyers or Sponsors

In a leveraged buyout, all of the stock, or assets, of a public or private corporation are bought by a small group of investors (“financial buyers aka financial sponsors”), usually including members of existing management and a “sponsor.” Financial buyers or sponsors:

• Focus on ROE rather than ROA. • Use other people’s money.• Succeed through improved operational performance, tax

shelter, debt repayment, and properly timing exit.• Focus on targets having stable cash flow to meet debt

service requirements.– Typical targets are in mature industries (e.g., retailing,

textiles, food processing, apparel, and soft drinks)

Page 6: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Impact of Leverage on Return to Shareholders

All-Cash Purchase ($Millions)

50% Cash/50% Debt ($Millions)

20% Cash/80% Debt ($Millions)

Purchase Price $100 $100 $100

Equity (Cash Investment by Financial Sponsor)

$100 $50 $20

Borrowings 0

$50 $80

Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT)

$20 $20 $20

Interest @ 10%1 0

$5 $8

Income Before Taxes $20 $15 $12

Less Income Taxes @ 40% $8

$6 $4.8

Net Income $12 $9

$7.2

After-Tax Return on Equity (ROE)2 12% 18% 36%

Impact of Leverage on Financial Returns

1Tax shelter in 50% and 20% debt scenarios is $2 million (I.e., $5 x .4) and $3.2 million (i.e., $8 x .4), respectively.2If EBIT = 0, ($5), and ($8), ROE in 0%, 50% and 20% debt scenarios = $0 / $100, [($5) x (1 - .4)] / $50 and [($8) x (1 - .4)] / $20 = 0%, (6)% and (24)%, respectively. Note the value of the operating loss, which is equal to the interest expense, is reduced by the value of the loss carry forward or carry back.

Page 7: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

LBOs Create Value by Reducing Debt and Increasing Margins Thereby Increasing Potential Exit Multiples

Firm Value

Debt Reduction Reinvest in Firm

Free Cash Flow

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7

Debt Reduction & Reinvestment Increases Free Cash Flow and in turn Builds Firm Value

Tax Shield Adds to Free Cash Flow

Debt Reduction

Adds to Free Cash Flow by

Reducing Interest & Principal

Repayments

Reinvestment Adds to Free Cash Flow by

Improving Operating Margins

Tax Shield

Page 8: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

LBO Value is Maximized by Reducing Debt, Improving Margins, and Properly Timing Exit

Case 1:

Debt Reduction

Case 2:

Debt Reduction + Margin Improvement

Case 3:

Debt Reduction + Margin Improvement + Properly

Timing Exit

LBO Formation Year:

Total Debt

Equity

Transaction Value

$400,000,000

100,000,000

$500,000,000

$400,000,000

100,000,000

$500,000,000

$400,000,000

100,000,000

$500,000,000

Exit Year (Year 7) Assumptions:

Cumulative Cash Available for

Debt Repayment1

Net Debt2

EBITDA

EBITDA Multiple

Transaction Value3

Equity Value4

$150,000,000

$250,000,000

$100,000,000

7.0 x

$700,000,000

$450,000,000

$185,000,000

$215,000,000

$130,000,00

7.0 x

$910,000,000

$695,000,000

$185,000,000

$215,000,000

$130,000,000

8.0 x

$1,040,000,000

$825,000,000

Internal Rate of Return 24% 31.2% 35.2%

Cash on Cash Return5 4.5 x 6.95 x 8.25 x

1Cumulative cash available for debt repayment increases between Case 1 and Case 2 due to improving margins and lower interest and principal repayments reflecting the reduction in net debt.2Net Debt = Total Debt – Cumulative Cash Available for Debt Repayment = $400 million - $185 million = $215 million3Transaction Value = EBITDA in 7th Year x EBITDA Multiple in 7th Year4Equity Value = Transaction Value in 7th Year – Net Debt5The equity value when the firm is sold divided by the initial equity contribution. The IRR represents a more accurate financial return, because it accounts for the time value of money.

Page 9: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

LBO Deal Structure• Advantages include the following:

– Management incentives,– Better alignment between owner and manager objectives,– Tax savings from interest expense and depreciation from asset

write-up,– More efficient decision processes under private ownership,– A potential improvement in operating performance, and– Serving as a takeover defense by eliminating public investors

• Disadvantages include the following:– High fixed costs of debt raises firm’s break-even point,– Vulnerability to business cycle fluctuations and competitor

actions,– Not appropriate for firms with high growth prospects or high

business risk, and– Potential difficulties in raising capital.

Page 10: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Classic LBO Models: Late 1970s and Early 1980s

• Debt normally 4 to 5 times equity. Debt amortized over no more than 10 years.

• Existing corporate management encouraged to participate.

• Complex capital structure: As percent of total funds raised– Senior debt (60%) – Subordinated debt (26%)– Preferred stock (9%)– Common equity (5%)

• Firm frequently taken public within seven years as tax benefits diminish

Page 11: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Break-Up LBO Model (Late 1980s)

• Same as classic LBO but debt serviced from operating cash flow and asset sales

• Changes in tax laws reduced popularity of this approach– Asset sales immediately upon closing of the

transaction no longer deemed tax-free– Previously could buy stock in a company and

sell the assets. Any gain on asset sales was offset by a mirrored reduction in the value of the stock.

Page 12: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Strategic LBO Model (1990s)

• Exit strategy is via IPO• D/E ratios lower so as not to depress EPS • Financial buyers provide the expertise to grow earnings

– Previously, their expertise focused on capital structure• Deals structured so that debt repayment not required

until 10 years after the transaction to reduce pressure on immediate performance improvement

• Buyout firms often purchase a firm as a platform for leveraged buyouts of other firms in the same industry

Page 13: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

LBOs in the New Millennium• Explosion in frequency and average size of LBOs in the U.S. during

2005-2007 period ($5-$10 billion range)• Tendency for buyout firms to bid for targets as a group (“Club

Deals”)• Increased effort to “cash out” earlier than in past to boost returns

due to increased competition for investors• LBO “boom” fueled by

– Global savings glut resulting in cheap financing– Fed “easy” money policies– Excess capacity in many industries encouraging consolidation– Attempt to avoid onerous reporting requirements of Sarbanes-

Oxley• LBOs increasingly common in European Union due to liberalization

and “catch-up” to U.S.

Page 14: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Role of Junk Bonds in Financing LBOs

• Junk bonds are non-rated debt. – Bond quality varies widely– Interest rates usually 3-5 percentage points above the prime rate

• Bridge or interim financing was obtained in LBO transactions to close the transaction quickly because of the extended period of time required to issue “junk” bonds.– These high yielding bonds represented permanent financing for

the LBO• Junk bond financing for LBOs dried up due to the following:

– A series of defaults of over-leveraged firms in the late 1980s – Insider trading and fraud at such companies a Drexel Burnham

(Michael Milken), the primary market maker for junk bonds• Junk bond financing is highly cyclical, tapering off as the economy

goes into recession and fears of increasing default rates escalate

Page 15: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Discussion Questions

1. Define the financial concept of leverage. Describe how leverage may work to the advantage of the LBO equity investor? How might it work against them?

2. What is the difference between a management buyout and a leveraged buyout?

3. What potential conflicts might arise between management and shareholders in a management buyout?

Page 16: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Factors Affecting Pre-Buyout Returns

• Premium paid to target firm shareholders frequently exceeds 40%

• These returns reflect the following (in descending order of importance):– Anticipated improvement in efficiency and tax

benefits– Wealth transfer effects (e.g., from bondholders to

shareholders)– Superior Knowledge– More efficient decision-making

Page 17: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Factors Determining Post-Buyout Returns

• Empirical studies show investors earn abnormal post-buyout returns due to --Full effect of increased operating efficiency not reflected in the pre-LBO premium.--More professional management, tighter performance monitoring by owners, and reputation of financial sponsor.--Studies may be subject to “selection or survival bias,” i.e., only LBOs that are successful are able to undertake secondary public offerings.--Abnormal returns may also reflect the acquisition of many LBOs 3 years after taken public.--Properly timing when to exit the business.

Page 18: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Valuing LBOs

• A leveraged buyout can be evaluated from the perspective of common equity investors or of all investors and lenders

• From common equity investors’ perspective,

NPV = PVFCFE – IEQ ≥ 0

Where NPV = Net present value

PVFCFE = Present value of free cash flows to common equity

investors

IEQ = The value of common equity

• From investors’ and lenders’ perspective,

NPV = PVFCFF – ITC ≥ 0

Where PVFCFF = Present value of free cash flows to the firm

ITC = Total investment or the value of total capital including

common and preferred stock and all debt.

Page 19: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Decision Rules

• LBOs make sense from viewpoint of investors and lenders if PV of free cash flows to the firm is ≥ to the total investment consisting of debt and common and preferred equity

• However, a LBO can make sense to common equity investors but not to other investors and lenders. The market value of debt and preferred stock held before the transaction may decline due to a perceived reduction in the firm’s ability to– Repay such debt as the firm assumes

substantial amounts of new debt and to– Pay interest and dividends on a timely basis.

Page 20: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Valuing LBOs: Cost of Capital Method1

Adjusts for the varying level of risk as the firm’s total debt is repaid.

• Step 1: Project annual cash flows until

target D/E achieved• Step 2: Project debt-to-equity ratios• Step 3: Calculate terminal value• Step 4: Adjust discount rate to reflect

changing risk• Step 5: Determine if deal makes sense1Also known as the variable risk method.

Page 21: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Cost of Capital Method: Step 1

• Project annual cash flows until target D/E ratio achieved

• Target D/E is the level of debt relative to equity at which– The firm will have to resume payment of taxes

and– The amount of leverage is likely to be

acceptable to IPO investors or strategic buyers (often the prevailing industry average)

Page 22: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Cost of Capital Method: Step 2

• Project annual debt-to-equity ratios

• The decline in D/E reflects

– the known debt repayment schedule and

– The projected growth in the market value of the shareholders’ equity (assumed to grow at the same rate as net income)

Page 23: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Cost of Capital Method: Step 3

• Calculate terminal value of projected cash flow to equity investors (TVE) at time t, (i.e., the year in which the initial investors choose to exit the business).

• TVE represents PV of the dollar proceeds available to the firm through an IPO or sale to a strategic buyer at time t.

Page 24: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Cost of Capital Method: Step 4• Adjust the discount rate to reflect changing risk.• The firm’s cost of equity will decline over time as debt is repaid and equity

grows, thereby reducing the leveraged ß. Estimate the firm’s ß as follows:

ßFL1 = ßIUL1(1 + (D/E)F1(1-tF))

where ßFL1 = Firm’s levered beta in period 1 ßIUL1 = Industry’s unlevered beta in period 1 = ßIL1/(1+(D/E)I1(1- tI)) ßIL1 = Industry’s levered beta in period 1 (D/E)I1 = Industry’s debt-to-equity ratio in period 1 tI = Industry’s marginal tax rate in period 1 (D/E)F1 = Firm’s debt-to-equity ratio in period 1 tF = Firm’s marginal tax rate in period 1

• Recalculate each successive period’s ß with the D/E ratio for that period, and using that period’s ß, recalculate the firm’s cost of equity for that period.

Page 25: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Cost of Capital Method: Step 5

• Determine if deal makes sense

– Does the PV of free cash flows to equity investors (including the terminal value) equal or exceed the equity investment including transaction-related fees?

Page 26: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Evaluating the Cost of Capital Method

• Advantages:– Adjusts the discount rate to reflect diminishing

risk as the debt-to-total capital ratio declines– Takes into account that the deal may make

sense for common equity investors but not for lenders or preferred shareholders

• Disadvantage: Calculations more burdensome than Adjusted Present Value Method

Page 27: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Valuing LBOs: Adjusted Present Value Method (APV)

Separates value of the firm into (a) its value as if it were debt free and (b) the value of tax savings due to interest expense.

• Step 1: Project annual free cash flows to equity investors and interest tax savings

• Step 2: Value target without the effects of debt financing and discount projected free cash flows at the firm’s estimated unlevered cost of equity.

• Step 3: Estimate the present value of the firm’s tax savings discounted at the firm’s estimated unlevered cost of equity.

• Step 4: Add the present value of the firm without debt and the present value of tax savings to calculate the present value of the firm including tax benefits.

• Step 5: Determine if the deal makes sense.

Page 28: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

APV Method: Step 1

• Project annual free cash flows to equity investors and interest tax savings for the period during which the firm’s capital structure is changing.– Interest tax savings = INT x t, where INT and t are the

firm’s annual interest expense on new debt and the marginal tax rate, respectively

– During the terminal period, the cash flows are expected to grow at a constant rate and the capital structure is expected to remain unchanged

Page 29: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

APV Method: Step 2

• Value target without the effects of debt financing and discount projected cash flows at the firm’s unlevered cost of equity.– Apply the unlevered cost of equity for the period

during which the capital structure is changing.– Apply the weighted average cost of capital for the

terminal period using the proportions of debt and equity that make up the firm’s capital structure in the final year of the period during which the structure is changing.

Page 30: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

APV Method: Step 3

• Estimate the present value of the firm’s annual interest tax savings.– Discount the tax savings at the firm’s

unlevered cost of equity– Calculate PV for annual forecast period only,

excluding a terminal value, since the firm is sold and any subsequent tax savings accrue to the new owners.

Page 31: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

APV Method: Step 4

• Calculate the present value of the firm including tax benefits

– Add the present value of the firm without debt and the PV of tax savings

Page 32: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

APV Method: Step 5

• Determine if deal makes sense:

– Does the PV of free cash flows to equity investors plus tax benefits equal or exceed the initial equity investment including transaction-related fees?

Page 33: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Evaluating the Adjusted Present Value Method

• Advantage: Simplicity.• Disadvantages:

– Ignores the effect of changes in leverage on the discount rate as debt is repaid,

– Implicitly ignores the potential for bankruptcy of excessively leveraged firms, and

– Unclear whether true discount rate should be the cost of debt, unlevered cost of equity, or somewhere between the two.

Page 34: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Discussion Questions

1. Compare and contrast the cost of capital and the adjusted present value valuation methods?

2. Which do you think is a more appropriate valuation method? Explain your answer.

Page 35: Chapter 13 Leveraged Buyout Structures and Valuation

Things to Remember…

• LBOs make the most sense for firms having stable cash flows, significant amounts of unencumbered tangible assets, and strong management teams.

• Successful LBOs rely heavily on management incentives to improve operating performance and a streamlined decision-making process resulting from taking the firm private.

• Tax savings from interest expense and depreciation from writing up assets enable LBO investors to offer targets substantial premiums over current market value.

• Excessive leverage and the resultant higher level of fixed expenses makes LBOs vulnerable to business cycle fluctuations and aggressive competitor actions.

• For an LBO to make sense, the PV of cash flows to equity holders must equal or exceed the value of the initial equity investment in the transaction, including transaction-related costs.