chapter 12 waisbord
TRANSCRIPT
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Chapter12
LatinAmerica
SilvioWaisbord
The
press
contributes
to
democratic
governance
by
monitoring
and
holding
the
powerful
accountable(watchdog),coveringissuesofpublicsignificancethatrequiretheattentionofcitizensand
policymakers (agendasetting), and facilitating the expression of a myriad of perspectives (gate
keeping). This study reviews the conditions that affect the performance of the press as watchdog,
agendasetter, and gatekeeper in Latin America, and discusses courses of action to strengthen the
qualityofpressreportingonawiderangeofissuesandviews.1
By performing watchdog, agendasetting and gatekeeping functions, the press promotes
criticism,deliberation,
and
diversity
of
opinion.
These
are
key
principles
of
the
democratic
public
sphere,
thecommunicativespace for the formation ofpublic opinion and the promotionofcivic interests. As
analyzedbyJrgenHabermas,thenotionofthepublicsphereremainsusefultoassessthestateofthe
pressincontemporarydemocracies.2Surely,asseveralauthorshaveperceptivelyobserved,Habermas
original analysis presents some limitations, namely an idealized reconstruction of the conditions for
public discourse in European bourgeois democracies, and an excessively pessimistic view about the
declineofthequalityofdemocraticspeech in latemodernity.3Despite itsshortcomings,thenotionof
thepublicsphereremainsrelevantbothasaconceptualconstructandanormative idealtoassessthe
performance of the press. It rightly points out problems for civic expression created by encroaching
stateandmarketpower.Itholdspublicdeliberationandcriticalinformationascentraltothedemocratic
process through which citizens scrutinize governments and other powerful actors, identify public
demands,andshapepolicymaking.Itdrawsattentiontotheroleofinstitutions,includingthepress,in
fostering reflexiveandcriticalpublics. Although Habermas theoryofcommunicationaction turned to
locatingdemocraticspeechinintersubjective,unmediatedsituations(ratherthaninstitutions,ashedid
previously),hisrecognitionoftheneedforformalforatonurturedeliberationandcriticismstillgrounds
the
notion
that
the
press
is
a
preeminent
institution
in
the
public
sphere.
4
From this perspective, the press should offer platforms for public dialogue, stimulate
conversationsonawiderangeofpublic issues,andturntheattentionofpolicymakersandcitizensto
matters of relevant public interest. Press theories have identified several conditions for the press to
perform its democratic obligations. Liberal positions have stressed the need for constitutional
prerogatives to shelter the press from government intrusion. Radical and communitarian arguments
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have emphasized the need for dispersed ownership to avoid monopolistic information markets and
ensureadiversityofperspectives.Socialresponsibilitypositionshaveraisedtheissueoffairaccessand
publicethicsascrucialforthedemocraticpress.5Incontemporarydemocracies,alltheseconditionsare
necessary to facilitate the wide availability of information that monitors state actions and business
practices,highlightsissuesofpublicinterest,andbringsoutmultipleperspectives.
Althoughtheidealofthepublicspherestillofferacompellingframeworktoassessthestateof
the media in democracy, it does not offer concrete guidelines about press policies andjournalistic
practices. Classic analyses of the public sphere, notably the work of Habermas and Hannah Arendt,
focused on smallgroup settings and restricted polities. Thus, the ideals of deliberation and criticism
need be rethought in the contexts of largescale and mediated democracies.6 How can those ideals
inform largemediasystemsandjournalisticpractices incontemporarydemocracies?Howcantheybe
madeeffective
in
todays
press,
an
institution
vastly
different
and
more
complex
than
the
print
media
in
colonialAmericaorinBritishandFrenchbourgeoisdemocracies?HowdowereconcileHabermasvision
ofunmediateddiscourseasidealspeechwiththefactthatjournalismsdefiningtaskistomediatethe
flowof information? Thesequestionsarecentraltounderstandingtheconditionsthatstrengthenthe
contributionofthepresstodemocraticgovernance.
Heremy interest isto foregroundthe ideaofmediadiversityasthe fundamentalprinciplefor
thepresstopromotedeliberationandcriticisminLatinAmerica.Althoughmediadiversityisacontested
notion,
it
provides
a
blueprint
for
media
democracy
that
is
characterized
by
the
heterogeneity
of
content and structures.7 For Denis McQuail, media diversity contributes to democracy by reflecting
differences insociety,givingequalaccesstovariouspointsofview,andofferingwidechoices.8Here I
focusonstructuraldiversity,aninstitutionalfeatureofpresssystemsasawholerelatedtoownership
and regulation, and performance diversity, which refers to the practices and content produced by
news organizations. Both are important to promote media democracy; both continue to have severe
problems intheregion.Theexistenceofnewsorganizationsanchored indifferentprinciplesaswellas
theproductionofdiversecontentarebothequallynecessarytofosterexpandtherangeofperspectives
inthe
media.
Fromapublicsphereperspective,mediadiversity iscrucialtopreservecommunicativespaces
that limit the influence of governments and large business. In Latin America, it requires overcoming
persistentobstaclesthathavehistoricallyundermineddemocraticjournalismandopportunitiesforcivic
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expression in the press. Specifically, it demands regulating the influence of states and markets,
promotingdispersedownership,andlevelingcitizensaccesstonewsmaking.
Mediapluralismoffersapointofreferencetoassesswhetherpresssystemseffectivelyexpand
therangeofissuesandperspectivesinthepublicsphere.Apluralmediasystemoffersastrongerbasis
forthepresstorepresentadiversityofinterests.Itisanchoredininstitutionalpluralism,thatis,ahybrid
andbalancedorder integratedbyorganizationsthat functionaccordingtoamixofcivic,political,and
commercial principles.9 Institutional pluralism is necessary to preserve and renew deliberation and
criticismascoreprinciplesofthepublicsphereincontemporarydemocracies.
Despite recent advances in democratic expression, media pluralism remains weak in Latin
American democracies. The succession of civilian administrations in the past twentyfive years has
usheredinbetterconditionsforthepressandpublicexpression.10Onlysporadically,however,thepress
offers a wide set of perspectives on issues of public interest, and scrutinizes official secrecy and
wrongdoing. The persistent weakness of media diversity coupled with the primacy of official news
undercut potential opportunities for the press to make a stronger contribution to democratic
expression.
The end of military dictatorships improved the conditions forjournalistic practice and civic
participation. An extensive literature has documented significant actions towards participation and
emancipationinthepastdecades.11Theexistenceofrobustandvibrantpublicspheresisaremarkable
characteristic
of
contemporary
Latin
American
democracies.
The
mobilization
of
human
rights,
indigenous,womens,youth,andenvironmentalmovements;theemergenceofnovelformsofcitizens
participation and journalism; the rise and consolidation of various protest groups; experiments in
participatory administration and budgeting; and the mushrooming of NGOs and civic advocacy
organizationsdemonstrate thevitalityofcivicexpression.These formsofcivicparticipation,however,
shouldnotbeconsidereduncritically.Publicspheresbrimmingwithmobilizedgroupsarenotinevitably
synonymouswithdemocraticdeliberationandinstitutionalizedgovernance.Whilesomeareexpressions
ofcriticaldebateandprogressiveparticipation,othergroupscontributetopoliticalpolarization.While
some are authentic expressions of grassroots mobilization, other groups are closely linked to state
interestsandclientelisticnetworks.12
Theconsolidationof liberaldemocraciesandtheaffirmationofavibrantcivilsocietyhavenot
beensufficientconditionstoinstitutionalizemediapluralism.Aparticipativeandlivelypublicsphere,in
principle,offersarichreservoirfortheaffirmationofpluralpresssystemsanddemocraticjournalism.It
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doesnotnecessarilyimprovetheperformanceofthepress,however.Thetenuousinstitutionallinkages
betweenthepressandthepublicsphere, Iargue,underminethepotentialofthepresstostrengthen
democratic governance. This paper explores why the connective tissues between the press and the
publicsphereremainweakinLatinAmerica,anditconcludesofferingactionstostrengthenthoseties.
Thelegacyofweakmediapluralism
Contemporary Latin American democracies inherited a weak legacy of media pluralism.
Althoughtheregionhasarich traditionofcivic initiativestodemocratize informationandexpression,
the prospects for pluralistic media systems have been compromised by authoritarianism, turbulent
politics,andthecollusionbetweenthestateandbusiness.Unregulated influenceofgovernmentsand
markets coupled with the close proximity between official and business interests have historically
underminedmediademocracy.13
These dynamics took different shape in authoritarian and democratic periods. Authoritarian
regimes bulldozed democratic expression through censorship and repression. While they persecuted
oppositionalmedia,theysoughttoensurepositivenewsthroughfavoringownerswithbusinessdeals.
Duringdemocraticperiods,governmentsdidnotengage informalcensorshipandrepression,butthey
were not inclined to change fundamental structures to promote civic interests. The result was the
consolidation ofpress systems dominated by amix of state and market interests. Although print and
broadcast media largely followed a commercial logic, they assiduously courted governments to reap
political
and
economic
benefits.
Under
these
conditions,
truly
independent
journalism
was
exceptional.Keepingahealthyautonomyfromthestatewasnotsoundbusinessfornewsorganizations
thatpursuedcommercialgoals.
Throughout the region, the oldest and most influential newspapers were born as projects of
partisanfactionsandpowerfulfamiliesduringthepostindependenceperiod.Manyof todays leading
newspapers (e.g. Perus El Comercio, Brazils Estado de Sao Paulo, Chiles El Mercurio, Argentinas La
Nacin) were founded during the oligarchic republics of the nineteenth century. In the context of
restricted
democracies,
in
which
a
small
percentage
of
population
held
political
rights,
newspapers
expressedtheeconomicandpoliticalambitionsofelitefactionsandpoliticalparties.Likewise,thepress
was also partisan in countries under prolonged dictatorial regimes. They were conceived as political
endeavors,oftenfundedbypersonalfunds,ratherthanmarketdrivenenterprisestoensuremeansfor
publicexpression.Partisanjournalismremaineddominantduringthegradualexpansionofdemocracyin
the firstdecadesof the twentiethcentury.Partisanismwascentral tonewspapers thatexpressed the
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interestsofurbanmiddleclassesandtheworkingclassesthatfoughtfortheexpansionofpoliticaland
social rights. Massmarket tabloids avoided being closely identified to political parties, but they still
maintainedcloselinkstogovernmentsandpoliticalleaders.
Despitethelongtraditionofproximitybetweenpoliticalpartiesandthepress,apartisanpress
didnotbecomedominantduringthetwentiethcentury.Continuouspoliticalinstabilityunderminedthe
continuityofpoliticalparties,andthus,thelongtermsurvivalofpartisannewspapers.Colombiawasthe
only exception; the stability of its bipartisan democracy survived allowed the traditional Liberal and
Conservative parties to hold moderate influence over newspapers.14 In most countries, however, the
continuouscyclesofcivilandmilitaryregimesanddecadelongdictatorshipsunderminedthelifespanof
thepartisanpressaswellasnewspapersthatexpressedcivicgroups(e.g.tradeunions,religious).The
partisanpresscouldnotsurvivecensorshipandpersecution,socialupheaval,andeconomicturmoil.The
weaknessof
the
partisan
press
paved
the
way
for
the
consolidation
of
amarket
based
press.
National
presssystemstypicallyfeaturedelitenewspapersthatrepresentedtheinterestsofdominanteconomic
andpoliticalgroups,andbroadsheetsandtabloidsthatcateredtomiddleclassesandtheworkingclass.
Themarketlogicprevailedoverthepartisanlogic.
Thefactthatthepresshasbeen largelyorganizedaroundcommercialprinciples,however,did
notresultinthecompleteseparationofthepressfromthestate.Infact,themainstreampressandthe
statehaveconsistentlybeenataclosedistance.Thisrelationshipwasbasedoneconomicandpolitical
linkages
and
mutual
advantages.
Government
officials
needed
the
news
media
to
advance
their
political
goals,andthebusinessprospectsofmediacompanieswerepinnedtomaintaininggoodrelationswith
thestate.Officialswereableto influencenewspapersthroughdiscretionarycontrolofpublic finances
such asgovernment advertising, controlover newsprint production and/or importation, and arbitrary
control of special funds. In some cases, coronelismo electrnico (electronic clientelism), as it is
calledinBrazil,wasdominant,particularlyinruralareaswherevastnumbersofmediapropertieshave
beeninthehandsofgovernmentofficials.15
So, the problem was not state ownership of the press, but rather, the excessive power of
governments and private interests. Despite the overall growth of marketbased media, government
advertisingcontinuedtobeasignificantsourceofmediarevenue,particularly incountriesandregions
withsmalleconomiesandadvertisingbudgets.16Whileofficialsfounditbeneficialtocourtnewspapers
to ensure favorable coverage, newspapers with close connections to governing powers reaped
economic benefits, such as advertising, tax breaks, importation permits, and broadcasting licenses.
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More than longstanding, organic mouthpieces for political parties, newspapers offered shortterm
supportforspecificadministrations.
Althoughthesedynamicshaveprevailed,attimes,therelationsbetweenthepressandnational
governmentswereconflictive.Whereaspressdissentduringmilitarydictatorshipswasrareandmostly
confined to alternative, leftwing publications, mainstream newspapers clashed with governments
duringdemocraticperiods.Ideologicalreasonstypicallycausedconflictsbetweengovernmentsandthe
press. For example, conservative dailies not only opposed populist governments such as Perons in
Argentina and Vargas in Brazil between the 1930s and 1950s, and the socialist administration of
SalvadorAllende inChile intheearly1970s.Theyalsoactivelysupportedmilitary interventions.Leftist
and liberal newspapers opposed conservative governments and military dictatorships. Press
government tensionsescalatedduring timesofpoliticalpolarization.Presidentsandcabinetmembers
admonished
critical
newspapers,
and
sought
to
punish
them
through
ordering
investigations
into
newspaperfinancesandtemporaryclosures,andpassingdraconianlegislation.17
Similar dynamics also affected broadcasting policies. Private interests dominated radio and
television since their beginnings. Neither public broadcasting nor mixed systems were strong
alternatives to the private model. Public stations have been chronically underfunded and remained
controlledbygovernments.Privatebroadcasting,however,wasnotcompletelydistantfromthestate.
Like newspaper owners, radio and television proprietors were also interested in maintaining close
linkages
with
governments
to
keep
licenses
and
expand
business.
Governments
controlled
official
advertising,whichparticularlyforstationsinsmalltownsandeconomicallydepressedareas,remaineda
vital financial source. In some cases such as Brazil and Mexico, tightknit linkages between state and
privateinterestswerecrucialfortheconsolidationofbehemothbroadcastingcompaniessuchasGlobo
andTelevisa,respectively.18
In summary, the legacy of press and democracy has simultaneously been plagued by both
marketcaptureandstatecapture.Bothauthoritarianandpopulistregimesusedstateresourcesto
control media markets and suppress deliberation and criticism. Powerful business, in turn, influenced
governmentpoliciestoexpandandconsolidatepower.Thebasisformediapluralismwasweakbythe
timetheregionshiftedfromauthoritarianismtodemocracyinthe1980s.
Mediapluralism,aforgottenpriority
The consolidation of democratic rule has not significantly altered the historical structural
relationsamong media,stateand markets. Unquestionably, todaysconditions are significantly better
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thanduringthemilitarydictatorships.Theabsenceofstatesponsoredeffortstosuppress freedomof
expressionandpersecutedissidents,theabolitionofformalcensorship,andthemoderateenforcement
of constitutional rights have contributed to the improvement of the conditions for democratic
expressionintheregion.
Overall conditions are troubling, however. Table 12.1 shows the consolidation of clear
patternsduringthepastyears.
[Table12.1abouthere]
AnnualsurveysconductedbyFreedomHouseandReporterswithoutBordershave identified
threegroupsofcountriesintermsoftheconditionsforpressdemocracyandpublicexpression.First,
there is a small group of countries (Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay) where conditions have been
consistentlybetter than in the rest of the region. This isnotsurprising,considering that theoverall
qualityofdemocracyinthesecountrieshasalsobeenpraisedbyscholarsandinternationalagencies.19
Second,therearetwocountries(CubaandVenezuela)wereconditionshavebeenextremelydifficult
forthepressforduetothepoliticalcharacteristicsoftherulinggovernments.Itwouldbeshortsighted
toequateconditions inbothcountriesgiven thedifferencesbetweenCubasdecadeoldcommunist
ruleandChavezssocialistpopulistregime.Despitethelattersattempttosuppresscriticism,formsof
dissentingjournalisminbothprintandbroadcastingpersistamidstpoliticalpolarizationinVenezuela.
The situation in Colombia, a country that used to included in this group until recently, seems be
changing.Against
ahistorical
context
of
prolonged
internal
conflict
and
extensive
anti
press
violence,
the ongoing process of pacification has gained renewed force and has benefited media democracy,
too.Third,theconditions inthemajorityofcountriesfitsFreedomHousespartiallyfreecategory.
After the initial process of liberalization during the transition to democratic rule in the 1980s and
1990s, media democratization has languished in most countries. Media pluralism hasnt showed
significantimprovements,buttherehasntbeenamajorreversaltowardsauthoritarianpolicies.
Themainproblemisthatoldstructuralobstaclesremaininplace.Therehavenotbeenmajor
policy
initiatives
to
reform
press
systems
in
order
to
promote
diversity
and
strengthen
countervailing
forcestostateandmarketpowers.Thevastmajorityofelectedadministrationshavebeenequivocally
committedtodemocraticcommunication.Regardlessofwhethertheyembracedneoconservativeor
populistpolicies,governmentshavegenerallyaimedtopreservethecurrentstatusquo.Atbest,some
administrationshavetolerateddissentwithoutpersecutingcritics.Atworst,othershavetriedtocajole
themediathroughvariousmeans.Inneithercase,hasmediapluralismbeenamainpolicypriority.20
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Pressorganizationshaverecordednumerouscasesoflocalandnationalgovernmentsthathave
continuedtorunroughshodoverthemedia.Theyhaveresortedtovariousmeans.
First,governmentshavecontinuedtomanipulatepublicresourcestorewardcomplacentnews
organizations and punish critical journalism. The allocation of official advertising, tax breaks, and
favorableloansonstateownedbankstonewscompaniesisstillplaguedwithsecrecyandfavoritism.21
Some governments have blatantly bribed publishers and poured astronomical funds into newspapers
andbroadcastingstations.22Publicbroadcastinghasbeenpronetocronyismandpropaganda.Officials
have arbitrarily granted and renewed television and station licenses, and in many countries, have
personallybenefittedfromtheprivatizationofradioandtelevisionstations.
Second, while governments have used legislation to advance shortterm political goals and
business interests, theyhavebeen reluctanttosupport legalchanges to facilitatemediadiversityand
public scrutiny. On the one hand, some administrations have relaxed crossmedia ownership laws to
furtherpromote theambitionsofmediacorporations.Criticshavedubbednew legislation theClarin
law and Televisa law in Argentina and Mexico respectively, as they were ostensibly intended to
benefit the most powerful media corporations in each country.23 In Peru, the 2004 broadcasting law
lacksmechanismstocontrolexecutivedecisions,promotecivicparticipation, increasetransparencyof
mediaoperations,anddefendaudience interests. New lawsandgovernment inactionhave facilitated
concentrationofmediaownership.24Ahandfuloflargecorporationscontroltheleadingnewspapersin
many
countries,
including
Argentina,
Bolivia,
Chile,
Guatemala,
and
Venezuela.
25
Likewise,
most
televisionmarketshavebecomeconsolidated inimperfectduopoliessuchas inBrazilandMexico, in
whichtwocorporationscontrolthemainovertheairstationsandcablesystems.
On the other hand, civilian governments have been largely uninterested in promoting a legal
environmentthatencouragescriticaljournalism.Tellingly,manypresslawspassedduringauthoritarian
regimes have not been overturned yet. Libel and slander laws provide officials with a range of legal
weaponstobrowbeatthepress.Themajorityofcountrieslacklegalmechanismstorequirerecordingall
official communication and proceedings, and to facilitate public access to government information.
Doubtless,thepassingoffreedomofinformationlawsinrecentyearsinArgentina,PeruandMexicois
auspicious.Mobilizedcoalitionsofcivicgroupsshouldbecreditedforraisingawarenessandconducting
advocacy with legislators to pass adequate legislation. Unfortunately, various problems weaken the
effective enforcement of the laws and, ultimately, their contributions to accountability and
transparency.26
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Third,antipressviolencehascontinued.Humanrightsandpressfreedomorganizationshave
recorded scores of cases of official coercion of the press. Methods include verbal attacks on news
organizations, pressure onjournalists and media owners to suppress critical stories or cancel news
programs,andorderingtaxinquiriesandpoliceraidsofnewsrooms.Oneissueofparticularconcernis
that official tirades against the press legitimize antipress violence in countries such as Colombia,
wherejournalists are frequently the target of attacks by the police, the military, and extralegal
groups. Furthermore, government inaction perpetuates impunity and undermines press democracy.
The failureofgovernmentstoconductthorough investigationsandprosecuteoffendersexacerbates
thelackofaccountability.
In summary, opacity and arbitrariness characterize government decisions affecting the press.
Governments have been effective at passing legislation to benefit officials and business allies, and
preservinglaws
that
shelter
officials
from
public
scrutiny.
Regrettably,
they
have
showed
little
interest
in
supporting policies to promote media pluralism. This would have required reinforcing government
accountability, rolling back legislation that discourages critical reporting, enforcing sunshine laws,
diversifying patterns of media ownership, and soliciting and ensuring broad participation from civic
society.
With a few exceptions, none of these steps were taken. There have been limited efforts to
democratize access to public broadcasting.27 Take the case of community radio. Although leading
stations
in
metropolitan
areas
have
increasingly
been
incorporated
into
cross
media
corporations,
a
myriadofpublic,private,mixed,andcommunitygroupsownandmanageradiostationsscatteredinthe
region.Radioownershipismoredispersedthaninothercountries,largelyduetothesignificantgrowing
numberofstationsandlowerbarrierstoentry.Amoredisaggregatedmarketstructurepartiallyexplains
why radio, in principle, offers better opportunities for public expression than newspapers and
television.28However,themajorityofcommunity radiostationsare in legal limbo.Governmentshave
beenreluctanttopasslegislationtoprovidealegalframeworktosupporttheiroperations.
Although the collusion between government and large media corporations has remained
dominant,relationshavenotalwaysbeenpeaceful.Theascendancyofpopulisminthelastdecadehas
ushered in clashes between governments and rightwing proprietors. They have battled over
communication policies and official criticism of the press. Frequently, presidents used a strong
nationalisticandclassbasedrhetorictocastigateowners. Inresponse,associationsrepresenting large
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media owners have excoriated governments. These conflicts have taken place against a backdrop of
increasedpoliticalpolarizationintheregion.
Doubtlessly,theleadcasehasbeentheconflictiverelationsbetweentheChavezadministration
andtraditionalmediaownersinVenezuela.Sincecomingtopowerin1999,Chavezhaspassedlawsthat
were fiercely opposed by media owners.29 The government accused conservative proprietors of
supportingthefailed2002coup.ThecontroversialdecisionnottorenewthelicenseofRadioTelevision
Caracas,oneoftheoldest televisionstations in thecountryownedbyanantiChavezbusinessgroup,
wastheflashpointinadecadeoftenserelations.
In other countries, populist administrations and large media groups also engaged in fierce,
mostly rhetorical,battles. Althoughconfrontations did not reach ashowdownas theydid in Chavezs
Venezuela,therehavebeenconflictsbetweengovernmentandmediacorporationsinArgentina,Bolivia,
Ecuador and Nicaragua.30
Presidents have frequently criticized media owners for defending anti
popular interests, and offering biased reporting of government policies. Despite highprofile, verbal
sparring, populist governments have not faced undivided opposition from media proprietors. In fact,
theyhaveenjoyedamicablerelationswithownerswhohavenotcriticizedgovernmentpolicies.
Besides the unregulated influence power of governments and business, statelessness is
another major obstacle for democratic journalism, particularly in the interior of many countries.31
Statelessnessreferstosituationwherestatesfailtomeetkeyobligationssuchasthecontroloverthe
legitimatemeans
of
violence
and
the
guarantee
of
civic
rights.
In
such
situations,
extra
legal
actors
(e.g.
paramilitaryandparapoliceorganizations,drugtraffickers,othermafialikeoperations)exertabsolute
and autonomous power through violence. Governments are ineffective in controlling violence and
enforcinglaws.Certainly,suchsituationsdonotonlynegativelyaffectthepress,buttheyerodepolitical
and economic stability that is essential for the public sphere. However, journalists and civic
organizations,particularlythosewhorevealcorruptionandcallforaccountability,arethemaintargets
ofviolence.
The
lack
of
serious
investigation
and
prosecution
of
perpetrators
further
deepens
statelessness. Colombia and Mexico, which global press organizations have considered some of the
worldsmostdangerousplace forjournalists in thepastdecade,areexamplesof thissituation.Areas
suchasColombiasMagdalenaMedioorMexicosnorthernborderwiththeUnitedStatesarenotorious
nostatezones.Communityradiostationsandprintjournalistswhohavechallengedparamilitaryforces
anddrugtraffickersandhaveexposedcomplicitybetweengovernmentofficialsandillegalactors,have
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sufferedthebluntoftheattacks. Inthesecircumstances,any formofcriticaljournalism is impossible.
Peace and security, two minimal conditions for the existence of the press and the public sphere, are
missing.Reasoned,moderate,andcriticalpublicdiscourseisanathematotheexerciseofnakedviolence
andabsenteegovernment.
The combination of quidpro quo practices between the state and media corporations, the
persistentlackofmediapluralism,andstatelessnessunderminetheprospectsforademocraticpress
inLatinAmerica.
Thetensionsofwatchdogjournalism
The conditions analyzed in the previous section provide the backdrop to analyze the
performanceofthepressaswatchdog,agendasetter,andgatekeeper.Myargument isthatalthough
the mainstream press occasionally scrutinizes wrongdoing and brings out a plurality of civic voices,
effortstopromotewidedeliberationandcriticismareoftendrownedoutinpresssystemsthatprioritize
theinterestsofgovernmentsandlargecorporations.
Several studies have analyzed the state of watchdog journalism in the past decades.32
Throughouttheregion,pressexposeshavehadsignificantpoliticalrepercussions includingjudicialand
congressionalinvestigations,andtheresignationofpublicofficials.Theseriesofexposesandscandalsin
the region suggested auspicious innovations and the contributions of news organizations to social
accountability.33Althoughthesehavebeenunprecedenteddevelopmentsintheregion,theyshouldnot
bemistakenfortheconsolidationofadversarial,publicmindedjournalism.Thepresshasnotradically
changedfromlapdogtowatchdogjournalism.Watchdogjournalismhasevolvedalongaseesawpath,as
itsfortuneschangedaccordingtopoliticalcircumstances.
Some analysts have recently suggested that watchdogjournalism has lost much of its vigor.34
News organizations have sporadically revealed public and private wrongdoing. Hardhitting,
investigative reporting has remained marginal. Leading news organizations have dismantled
investigativeunits.Numerousreportersandeditors,whoproducedexposesandheaded investigations
inthe
1990s,
left
daily
journalism.
Newspapers
that
symbolized
watchdog
journalism
have
seemingly
abandoned critical reporting, changed ownership, or closed down due to economic difficulties (which
were,insomecases,theresultofadvertisingboycottsfromadvertisersandgovernments).
Structural arrangements and dynamics between the state and the market account for the
uneven presence of watchdogjournalism. Several countrywide surveys show that reporters blame
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editorialtimidityandgovernmentinfluenceforlimitedopportunitiesforcriticalstories.35Whileitishard
to produce concrete evidence of behindthescene maneuvers and decisions, opinion columns and
newsroom grapevines are filled with speculations about government andbusiness pressures on news
organizations to refrain from publishing critical reports. Practicing watchdog journalism has often
brought negative consequences for news organizations such as tightened advertising revenues,
restrictionstoofficialeventsandpressconferences,verbalthreats,andphysicalattacks,assassinations
andbombings.
Three issues should be considered to assess the contributions of watchdog journalism to
deliberationandcriticism:thethematicagendaofexposs,editorialbias,andthequalityofcoverage.
The portfolio of watchdog stories has focused on a range of crucial subjects. Revelations on
humanrightsabusesandcriminalactivitiesbymilitaryandpoliceofficershavedemonstratedpersistent
violations of civil rights and corruption. Investigations into drugtrafficking have laid bare complex
linkagesbetweengovernmentofficialsand illegaltrade.Storiesonkickbacksforgovernmentcontracts
andcashforvotesschemes inCongressesrevealedwrongdoingatthecoreofdemocratic institutions.
Exposs of fraudulent practices by small business and crimes by lowlevel officials (mayors, council
members, police officers) have shed light on widespread corruption. Revelations about cases of
pedophilia in the Catholic Church shed light on an institution that has historically wielded significant
power in the region. Stories scrutinizing corporate wrongdoing, however, have been few and far
between.
Even
when
stories
have
put
the
spotlight
on
cases
of
corruption
showing
complicity
between
governmentsandbusiness,thecoveragehasdisproportionatelyfocusedontheresponsibilityofpublic
officials.
Thescarcityofinvestigationsaboutcorporatemalfeasancereflectspoliticalinstitutionalfactors
thatshapenewsproduction,namelyeditorialpoliticscombinedwiththepowerofofficialsourcesand
journalisticvaluesandpractices.
Theriseofwatchdogjournalismneedstobeunderstoodagainstthebackdropofnewpolitical
communication
dynamics.
The
press
has
moved
centerstage
as
elites
and
mobilized
publics
have
chosen
to wage political battles on the media. Given their status as newsmakers and legitimate sources,
political elites hold unmatched advantage to influence news. Scores of press investigations have
originatedintheeffortsofelitestoinfluencethepress.Forreporters,governmentinfightinghasoften
providedcopiousandsensitive information.Powerbattlesamonggovernmentofficialshavebeen the
breedinggroundforexposes.Cabinetmembers,congressionalcommitteesandjudges,anddisgruntled
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12
military and police officers have often piqued newsroom attention and provided evidence of
governmentwrongdoing.36
Whileofficials leaksprodreportersandeditorstopursuestories,theorganizationalcultureof
journalismandthepoliticaleconomyofthepresshaveinfluencedtheevolutionofstories.
Ontheonehand,thecentralityandprestigeofofficialnewsskewsjournalismtowardscovering
officialwrongdoing.Just likepresidentialdeclarationsandcongressionalhearings,expossareanother
formofofficialnews.Newsroompracticesthatprioritizeofficialnewsalsostimulate interest inofficial
corruption. Official news are regularly lead stories, and receive prime space in newsholes. Cadres of
reporters maintain regular contact with official sources. Domestic politics remains the most
prestigious news beat in the professional culture ofjournalism.37 Thus, explosive information from
officialsources ismore likelytoturn intowhatastorydenunciations.Ontheotherhand,ownership
patternsinpresseconomieslimitthethematicagendaofwatchdogjournalism.Itishardtoimaginethat
watchdogjournalism would sniff out corporate corruption given that the largest news companies in
countriessuchasColombia,EcuadorandtheDominicanRepublic,justtomentionsomeexamples,are
partofbusinessgroupswithextensiveholdingsinkeyindustries(e.g.banking,bigagribusiness,tourism,
mining,energy,food,andtelecommunications).Thelackofmediadiversitydoesnotexcludewatchdog
journalism,butitnarrowsdowntherangeofpotentialissuesforinvestigation.
Press ownership is tied to a second important aspect of watchdog journalism: the role of
editorialpartisanism.
Editorial
sympathies
have
motivated
news
organizations
to
reveal
different
cases
of wrongdoing. As mentioned earlier, although the majority of news organizations do not maintain
organiclinkageswithpoliticalparties,theyareidentifiedwithspecificideologiesandpoliticaleconomic
interests. Most Latin American countries lack solid party systems to support partisan journalism.
Instead, news organizations have supported administrations and officials due to various reasons
includingcommonideologyandbusinesspragmatism.38
Not surprisingly, then, editorial interest in different cases of wrongdoing has fallen along
ideological
and
political
divisions.
Left
leaning
and
liberal
news
organizations
have
exposed
human
rightsabusesandwrongdoing inconservativeadministrations.Conservativenewsmedia,instead,have
scrutinizedwrongdoingduringleftistandpopulistadministrations.Newsorganizationswithideologically
diffused editorial politics have covered a wide range of cases of corruption. Political polarization has
sharpened such divisions. In times when conflicts between administrations and news organizations
escalated, such as during the recent skirmishes between populist governments and rightwing
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proprietors, watchdogjournalism has been tainted by political and ideological rifts. The scrutiny of
governmentpowerhasbeenoftenmotivatedbypoliticalantagonismratherthatsomepostpolitical,
professionalgoaltoservethepublicinterest.Currentpoliticalconditionsmakeitdifficulttoconceive
anyformofwatchdogjournalismthatstaysabovethepoliticalfray.Politicalpolarizationdragsthepress
totakesides,andinturn,thepresssharpenspoliticalpolarization.
Two reactionsarepossiblevisvis thechronicweaknessof"professionaljournalism inLatin
Americaanditsimpactontheperformanceofwatchdogjournalism.Fromapositionthatembracesthe
ideals of professionaljournalism, one could lament this situation on the grounds that partisanism
inevitably compromises quality and fairness. Instead, from a perspective that is skeptical about the
prospectsofpostpoliticaljournalismintheregion,onecouldsuggestthatcompetitivepoliticsarethe
main reservoir for the press to foster democratic deliberation and criticism in the public sphere. The
presence
of
competitive
elites
and
organized
publics,
rather
than
journalistic
commitment
to
professionalvalues,setsthebasisforpresscriticism.
Thesepositionscarrynormativeandempiricalimplications:Whatkindofwatchdogjournalismis
betterforthedemocraticpublicsphere?Onethatscrutinizespoweranimatedbywantingtoservethe
public interest?Orwatchdogjournalism inspiredbypartisan ideology?Whatkind isfeasible inLatin
America given political polarization, lack of government transparency, and concentrated media
markets?Welackpersuasiveanswertothesequestions.Theprescriptiveandpragmaticramificationsof
possible
answers
need
to
be
carefully
considered,
particularly
to
assess
appropriate
course
of
actions
to
strengthenwatchdogjournalism.
A third issue is the quality of press denunciations. Watchdogjournalism has rarely been truly
investigative.Intheprintmedia,ithasoftenbeenabsorbedbynewseventsthatarerelativelyeasy
andcheaptocover.Ontelevisionnews,ithastypicallyresortedtohiddencamerasandotherethically
dubious newsgathering techniques to produce ratingsfriendly stories. Consequently, exposs have
been focusedon individuals,episodicevents,andwhatastorynewsratherthanstructuralcauses
and dynamics of corruption.Events are rarely used to produce thematic coverage of wrongdoing.39
Forexample,newsaboutthedevastatingconsequencesofhurricanesandearthquakesarerarelyused
toreportonpoliciestomitigatedisasters,socialpatternsofresidentialdistribution,and landproperty
issues. Thematiccoverage requires editors to remove reporters from the pressuresof daily deadlines
and provide financial support to conduct investigations. In addition to obstacles to access official
information,inadequateworkingconditionsmakesreporterstoodependentonofficial leaksandother
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14
interested parties to gather information. Frequently, the result are stories with flimsy evidence,
undocumented conclusions, and birdseye views of deepseated problems and complex webs of
corruption.
In summary, the tensions of watchdogjournalism are found in the linkages between news
organizationswithmarketsandgovernments,newsroomroutines,andprofessionalcriteriadetermining
news.Whilestructuralconnectionsbetweenthepressandthestatereducethechancesforscrutinizing
official actions, conflicts between governments and news organizations increase opportunities for
adversarialjournalism.Whileconcentratedmediaownershipdiscouragesjournalismfrom investigating
corporatewrongdoing,itdoesnotexcludethepossibilitythatnewsorganizationsmayprobecorruption
in other areas. While professional criteria push reporters to cover big stories about official
wrongdoing, organizational routines drive reporters to cover eventcentered news about corruption.
Structural
and
organizations
constraints
do
not
completely
push
out
watchdogjournalism,
but
they
narrowthepotentialtopicsandunderminethequalityofreportingthatholdspoweraccountable
Thepressasagendasetterandgatekeeper
Structuraldynamicsandprofessionalbiasesalsoconstraintheagendasettingandgatekeeping
rolesofthepress.Asagendasetter,thepressshouldreportonavarietyofsignificantpublicproblems
that need attention from citizens and policymakers. As gatekeepers, journalists should facilitate
dialogueamongmultipleperspectivesbybringingoutarangeofviewsfrom individualsandorganized
groups.The
press
in
Latin
America
is
ill
equipped
to
give
adequate
and
balanced
attention
to
issues
and
opinions.Itispredisposedtoreportonissuesthatareimportanttoofficialsourcesandotherindividuals
and institutions with fluid media access. It is biased to cover issues that are primarily the concern of
welloffmediaaudiences. It isunwilling to focuson issues thatmayantagonizepowerfulofficialsand
majoradvertisers.
The press focuses on issues that are relevant to powerful newsmakers, conventional news
sources,andurbanandwealthieraudiences.40Ittendstoignoreissuesaffectingcitizenswithoutmedia
and
political
clout.
For
example,
it
fails
to
pay
attention
to
health
issues
that
mainly
affect
the
young,
the
old, the poor, ethnic minorities, and rural populations.41 Environmental issues that affect urban
populationsarelikelytogetmorepressattentionthanissuesaffectingruralareas.42Crimeinwealthier
neighborhoodsdrawsmorecoverage,andoften feedsmediapanicsandcrimewavesthatdonot
matchactualincidenceorsocialdistribution.43
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Thepressdoesnotonlypresentanarrowrangeofissues,butitalsofailstogivebalancedspace
todifferentperspectives.Severalstudieshaveconcludedthatpoliticalelitesremainprimarydefiners
of the news, and that the news media neglects to provide adequate coverage of issues affecting
disempoweredcitizens.InChile,poorcitizensarelessfrequentlypresentinnewscoverage.Whenthey
getmediaattention,theyareoftenportrayedashaplessvictimsorcrimeperpetrators.44
InColombia,
coverage of the prolonged internal armed conflict has been dominated by official sources, mainly
politicians and military officers. Voices proposing peaceful solutions have received substantially less
attention. Poor and rural citizens, who disproportionately make the swelling numbers of people
displaced by the conflict, are rarely given opportunities to present their views.45 Although Brazilian
journalismhasincreasinglyofferedmorecoverageonenvironmentalissues,ittendstofocusonofficial
opinionsandconcernsovercivicvoicesandlocalactionstoaddressproblems.46
The
institutional
conditions
of
news
production
account
for
bias
in
agendasetting
and
gate
keeping.Prevalentjournalisticvaluesandworkconditionsfavorreportingonspecifickindsofissuesand
perspectives.Reportingpracticesandrulesreinforcetheagendasettingstatusofofficialsourcesand
other powerful newsmakers. The reluctance of news organizations toassign adequate resources puts
pressuresonreporterstoproducefastand lowcostnews, insteadoftimeconsumingnewsgathering.
Rushedtodelivercontentundertightdeadlines,reporterstypicallyresorttoconventionalsourceswho,
expectedly,prioritizespecificissuesandperspectives.Consequently,acombinationofshoddyreporting
andeditorialconstraintsproducessuperficial,inchoate,andincompletecoverage.
Becausetheylackpoliticalinfluenceandnewsmakingprestige,civicvoicesareatadisadvantage
toinfluencenewsandpublicagendas.Admittedly,theriseofcivicadvocacyjournalisminrecentyears
suggests promising changes to enrich the range of issues and perspectives that are presented.47 A
growingnumberofcivicassociationsandnongovernmentorganizationsintheregionhaveengagedin
news production. From Brazilbased networkAgenciaNacionaldeDireitosda Infancia to Argentinas
ReddePeriodismoSocial, a range of civic groups has aimed to changenews coverageof a myriadof
socialissuesinthemainstreampress.Hopingtoimprovethequalityofnewscoverageonsocialissues,
theyhave
used
avariety
of
sourcing
strategies
such
as
the
establishment
of
specialized
news
services,
cultivatingrelationswithreporters,stagingnewsevents,andproducingstoriesformassdistribution.
The limitations of the press as agendasetter and gatekeeper raise questions about suitable
interventionstoimprovecoverageofissuesthatarecentraltodemocraticgovernance.Itisnotobvious
whethercivicactors caneffectively influence institutionalpractices that influencenewscontent. Civic
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voices are not only notoriously underrepresented in media ownership, but they are also consistently
sidelinedbyjournalisticroutinesthatprivilegetopdown,officialnews.Insocietieswithappallingsocial
disparities and governance problems, the press remains hamstrung by narrow political and private
interests.
These problems reflect the thinness of the connective tissues between the press and civic
society.Aslongasthepressprioritizesrelationswiththestateandthemarket,itishardtoenvisionhow
news organizations would consistently offer critical and balanced information on issues that affect
substantialsegmentsofthepopulation,particularlythosewhoarealreadysociallymarginalized.
LatinAmericaoffersan interestingcaseofunevenadvances incivicexpression.Conditions for
freedom of expression are considerably more open than in any other previous period in the modern
politicalhistoryoftheregion.Deliberationandcriticismarehardlyabsentinthepublicsphere.Thereis
noshortageofmobilizedpublicsaroundadiversesetof issues.Theeffervescenceofmultipleformsof
civic expression suggests dynamic national public spheres. The press, however, has failed to tap into
civic society in ways that it could better serve a diversity of public interests. It has often cautiously
followed, reacted, and/or simply ignored emerging demands as well as new political and social
movements.Opportunitiestoscrutinizepowerandcoverawidersetofpublic issuesandperspectives
aresubordinatedtocoveringpoliticalelitesandnotoffendingmajoreconomicinterests.
Obstaclesandoptions
Toenhancethequalityofpressperformanceisnecessarytopromotemediapluralism,increase
accountabilityofgovernmentdecisionsaffectingthepress,andstrengthencoverageofcivicissuesand
opinions. The goal should be to reinforce the connective tissues between the press and the public
sphere.Suchchangeswouldnothappenwithoutaperspectivethatprioritizesinstitutionstrengthening
and has substantive political will. Although some reforms could be accommodated within prevalent
structures,achievingmediapluralismandaccountabilityareunimaginablewithoutwrestling influence
power from government and private interests. Interventions need to be guided by assessments of
obstacles
for
democratic
journalism
and
lessons
from
past
experiences
of
media
reform
in
the
region.
Aninstitutionalistperspectiveshouldtakeprecedentoverviewsthatreducemediapluralismto
theimpactofglobalizationandnewtechnologies.Recently,globalizationandtechnologicalinnovations
haveanimatedhopefulviewsabouttheprospectsforpressanddemocracy.Althoughglobalmovements
forcivicexpressionandtechnologybasedformsofcitizensjournalism(e.g.blogs,cellphonesandSMS,
electronic social networks) provide new opportunities for civic expression, it would be mistaken to
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automaticallyconsiderthemthebellwetherofpressdemocracy.Oneshouldnotexaggeratetheirability
to chip away at calcified structures and practices in the Latin American press. Although crossborder
civicmovementscontributetoraisingattentionaboutpressissues,governmentsmaintainconsiderable
discretion over the dissemination of information and media policies. The use of new technologies
remainshighlyunequalacrosssocialstrata.WhiletheInternetoffersinformationthatisnotavailablein
the old media, television and radio still attract the largest audiences. Different forms of citizen
journalism remain peripheral in press systems dominated by state and commercial interests. What
needstobeaskediswhetherglobalizationandnewtechnologieseffectivelyredressmajorinstitutional
obstaclesatthecoreofpresssystems.
As a conclusion, this section discusses three approaches to advance the contributions of the
presstodemocraticgovernanceinLatinAmerica.Iproposeacombinationofinterventionstotransform
mediastructures,
government
accountability,
and
journalistic
practices.
Onesetofinterventionsneedtosupportthediversificationofmediaownershipandactionsfor
mediareform.HereIproposesomeillustrativeideas.Supportadvocacyamongkeyactors(government,
business,civicsociety)tospearheadchangesinlegislationtoreducetheinfluenceoflargecorporations
inpresssystems.Raisethevisibilityofmediapluralism inglobalandregional,anddiscussalternatives
formediareformwithgovernmentsandotherrelevantparties.Forexample,PerusVeeduraCiudadana
(CitizensWatchdog)andAMARCsUruguayprogramplayedkeyroles inadvocatingforpolicychanges
and
conducting
consultative
meetings.
Although
the
specifics
of
the
2004
broadcasting
law
were
far
fromwhattheVeeduriahadproposed,thegroupsuccessfullymobilizedpublicandprivatesectorsand
generatedwidespreaddebateaboutmediapolicies. InUruguay,AMARChadaprotagonistroleduring
the public debates and congressional process that resulted in the passing of the community
broadcasting law in 2007. Another way to contribute to the diversification of media ownership is
throughstrengtheningthe financialviabilityofsmallprint,broadcasting,andwebbasedmediathat
are not affiliated with governments or corporations, particularly in areas with weak economies and
government manipulation of public funds. The Swiss Foundation Avina, for example, gives grants to
community
radio
stations
to
develop
media
management
skills
(among
other
goals)
to
increase
the
prospects for their future sustainability. Multilateral and bilateral donors can support programs that
offereconomicincentives(e.g.microloans,grants,subsidies)andopportunitiesforstrengtheningmedia
managementcompetencies.48Theseprograms,especiallyifgovernmentsaretherecipientsoffundsand
coimplementers,requiretransparencyandcivicparticipationtoavoidfavoritismandcorruption.
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Asecondsetofactionsshouldaimtoreducediscretionarycontroloftheexecutiveondecisions
thataffectpressperformance.Moretransparencyandpublicparticipationintheuseofpublicresources
may help to redress centralized power and media patronage. Some areas of intervention include
management of officialadvertising,structure and controlof publicbroadcasting,anddecisionmaking
around issuessuchas taxation, importationpermits,andnewsprintproduction.Organizationssuchas
ArgentinasAsociacinpor losDerechosCivileshavedoneapioneeringmonitoringandpublicizingthe
preferential allocation of public advertising by governments, the use of freedom of information laws,
and other vital issues for democratic governance. It is also important to foster the sense that
government information is a public resource rather than a private good. Shifting such mindset is
tantamount to a major revolution. It demands ensuring the collection and preservation of public
records, strengthening the capacity of government offices to respond to requests from citizens and
journalists,
and
informing
the
population
about
the
existence
of
laws.
By
the
same
token,
the
revocation
of punitive legislation againstjournalistsand the passing and enforcement of access to information
laws are critical, too. Here the work of Mexicos Group Oaxaca stands out for it led the process that
resultedintheapprovalofthefederalFreedomofInformationlawin2001.
A third area of intervention is journalistic practice. Two complementary strategies are
recommended.Oneistoworkwithnewsorganizationsandjournalisticassociations.Certainly,thereare
no shortage of training programs that aim to promote a democratic press in Latin America. An
impressivenumberofassociations,universities,anddonorsregularlyofferworkshopsthatcoverarange
ofreportingskills.Standardtrainingprograms,however,areincompletetoinstitutionalizecivicvoicesin
the press. Curricula that focus on teaching tools and competencies often miss the fact that training
alonedoesnotchangejournalisticpractices.Withoutthe interestofnewsorganizationstomodifythe
currentsystemofincentivesandexpectations,capacitystrengtheningprogramsareunlikelytoachieve
substantial changes. Although they might be of interest to reporters, new skills are unlikely to bring
significantdifferencesas longasroutinesandculturesthataffectperformanceremainunchanged.To
putitdifferently,capacitystrengtheningisnotaboutsimplytransmittingandacquiringskills.Itisabout
reinforcingdemocratic
institutions
and
distributive
competencies
across
the
public
sphere
to
promote
theuseofjournalisticcompetenciesthatfavorcivicperspectives.
Continuous support for professional associations is also important. Many associations (Perus
Instituto de Prensa y Sociedad, Argentinas Foro de Periodismo Argentino, Brazils Observatorio da
Imprensa)haveplayedakeyroleinadvocatingforfreedomofinformationlaws,raisingconcernsabout
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widenopportunities fordeliberationandcriticism.Amoredemocraticpublicsphere isunthinkableas
longassharpdisparitiesinaccesstothepresspersist.
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Table12.1:PressFreedominLatinAmerica
Country Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Argentina PF PF PF PF PF PF
Bolivia
F
F PF PF PF
PF
Brazil PF PF PF PF PF PF
Chile F F F F F F
Colombia NF NF NF NF NF PF
CostaRica F F F F F F
Cuba NF NF NF NF NF NF
DominicanRepublic PF PF PF PF PF PF
Ecuador PF PF PF PF PF PF
ElSalvador PF PF PF PF PF PF
Guatemala PF PF NF PF PF PF
Haiti PF PF PF PF PF PF
Mexico PF PF PF PF PF PF
Nicaragua PF PF PF PF PF PF
Panama PF PF PF PF PF PF
Paraguay PF PF PF PF PF PF
Peru
F
PF PF PF PF
PF
Uruguay F F F F F F
Venezuela NF NF NF NF NF NF
Notes:F=Free,PF=Partlyfree,NF=Notfree.
Source: Freedom House. Freedom of the Press: A Global Survey of Media Independence.
www.freedomhouse.org
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Table12.2:Threatstomediapluralism
Country Violenceagainst
thepress1
Privatemedia
concentration2
Media
legislationon
communityand
publicmedia
3
Preferential
allocationof
official
advertising
4
Argentina + +
Bolivia + + +
Brazil + + + +
Chile + +
Colombia + + + +
CostaRica +
Cuba
DominicanRep +
Ecuador +
ElSalvador +
Guatemala +
Haiti +
Honduras +
Mexico + + +
Nicaragua +
Panama +
Paraguay +
Peru + +
Uruguay + +
Venezuela +
Notes:Typesofthreatstomediapluralismareoperationalizedasfollows:
1.Tenormoredeathsofjournalistsbetween1992and2008.
2.Ahandfulofcompaniescontrolsubstantialholdingsinonemediaindustry(newspaper,magazine,
radio,overtheairtelevision,cabletelevision,satellitetelevision).
3.Pressandbroadcastinglawspassedduringauthoritarianregimesarestillinforce.
4.Casesofpreferentialassignationofofficialadvertisinghavebeenrecordedbetween2000and2008.
Source:CommitteetoProtectJournalists.
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Endnotes
1SeePippaNorris.2005.Globalpoliticalcommunication:Goodgovernance,humandevelopmentsand
masscommunication,inFrankEsserandBarbaraPfetschEds.,ComparingPoliticalCommunication:
Theories,Cases,andChallenges.NewYork;CambridgeUniversityPress.
2JurgenHabermas.1989.TheStructuralTransformationofthePublicSphere.Cambridge:MITPress.
3CraigJ.Calhoun1992.HabermasandthePublicSphere.Cambridge:MITPress.4Habermasdevelopedthispointlargelyinresponsetohiscritics,particularlyNancyFrasersargument
abouttheneedtodistinguishbetweenweakandstrongpublicsinthepublicsphere.Seeher
contribution
in
Calhoun,
Habermas
and
the
Public
Sphere.
5Ontheliberalmodel,thelocusclassicusisFredrickS.Siebert,TheodorePeterson,andWilbur
Schramm.1956.FourTheoriesofthePress.Illinois:UniversityofIllinoisPress.Foracritique,seeJohn
Nerone.1995.LastRights:RevisitingFourTheoriesofthePress.Illinois:UniversityofIllinoisPress.A
comprehensivediscussiononpressmodelsisfoundinDennisMcQuail.2000.MassCommunication
Theory.London:Sage.
6Fordiscussionsonmediapoliciesandjournalisticpracticesalongthelinesofpublicsphereprinciples,
seePeterDahlgrenandColinSparksEds.1991.CommunicationandCitizenship:Journalismandthe
PublicSphere
in
the
New
Media
Age.
London:
Sage;
James
Curran
and,
Jean
Seaton.
2003.
Power
WithoutResponsibility:ThePress,Broadcasting,andNewMediainBritain.London:Routledge;Tanni
HaasandLindaSteiner.2001.Publicjournalismasajournalismofpublics:Implicationsofthe
HabermasFraserdebateforpublicjournalism,Journalism,2(2):123147;JimMcGuiganandStuart
Allan.2006.Mediatingpolitics:JurgenHabermasandthepublicsphere,inDavidBerryandJohn
TheobaldEds.,RadicalMassMediaCriticism:ACulturalGenealogy.Montreal:BlackRoseBooks;and
NicoCarpentier.2007.Copingwiththeagoraphobiamediaprofessional:Atypologyofjournalistic
practicesreinforcingdemocracyandparticipation,inBartCammaertsandNicoCarpentierEds.
ReclaimingtheMedia.Bristol,UK:Intellect.
7Amongothers,seeKariKarpinnen.2006.Mediadiversityandthepoliticsofcriteria,NordicomReview
2:5368;JanvanCuilenberg.1999.Oncompetition,access,anddiversityinmedia,oldandnew,New
MediaandSociety1(2):183207.
8DenisMcQuail.1992.MediaPerformance:MassCommunicationandthePublicInterest.London:SAGE.
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24
9SeeJamesCurranandMichaelGurevitchEds.2001.MassMediaandSociety.3rdedition.London:
Arnold;andJohnKeane.1991.TheMediaandDemocracy.Cambridge:PolityPress.
10Among
others,
see,
Chappell
Lawson
and
Sallie
Hughes.
2005.
Latin
Americas
postauthoritarian
media,inRachelMayandAndrewMiltonEds.,(Un)civilsocieties:HumanRightsandDemocratic
TransitionsinEasternEuropeandLatinAmerica.Lanham:LexingtonBooks;ChappellLawson.2002.
BuildingtheFourthEstate:DemocratizationandtheRiseofaFreePressinMexico.Berkeley:University
ofCaliforniaPress;andSallieHughes.2006.NewsroomsinConflict:JournalismandtheDemocratization
ofMexico.Pittsburgh:UniversityofPittsburghPress.
11Forathoroughdiscussionofthissubject,seeLeonardoAvritzer.2002.DemocracyandthePublicSpace
inLatinAmerica.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.
12SeeRichardFeinberg,CarlosH.Waisman,andLenZamoscEds.2006.CivilSocietyandDemocracyin
LatinAmerica.NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan.
13SeeSilvioWaisbord.2000.MediainSouthAmerica:Betweentherockofthestateandthehardplace
ofthemarket,inJamesCurranandM.ParkEds.,DeWesternizingMediaStudies.London:Arnold.
14MariaTeresaHerranyJavierRestrepo.1995.EticaparaPeriodistas.Bogota:TercerMundo.
15A2001studyestimatedthatalmostaquarterofbroadcastingcompaniesinBrazilareownedby
politicians.Politiciansweregrantedalmost78percentofnewlicensesgrantedbetween1999and2001.
Thisreinforces
existing
patterns
by
which
political
families
have
astronghold
on
both
print
and
broadcastinthemajorityofBrazilianstates.SeeRogerioChristofoletti.2003.Dezimpassesparauma
efetivacriticademidianoBrasil,paperpresentedatthemeetingofINTERCOM,BeloHorizonte,
September.
16Asubstantialliteratureintheregionhasanalyzedthisissue.OnBrazil,seeAlciraAbreu.2002.A
ModernizaodaImprensa,19702000.RiodeJaneiro:JorgeZahar.
17ElizabehFoxEd.1988.TheStruggleforDemocracy.London:Sage.
18JohnSinclair,Theagingdynasties,inElizabethFoxandSilvioWaisbord.2002.LatinPolitics,Global
Media.Austin:
University
of
Texas
Press.
19UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme.2004.DemocracyinLatinAmerica:TowardsaCitizens
Democracy.BuenosAires:Aguilar,Altea,Taurus,Alfaguara.
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26
ExpresineInformacin.Caracas.EspacioPblico;EleazarDiazRangelandothers.2003.Chvezy los
MediosdeComunicacinSocial.Caracas.Alfadileditores.
30RonaldGrebe.2007.EvoMoralesylosmedios.Chasqui.
http://chasqui.comunica.org/content/view/552/142/
31SilvioWaisbord.2007.Democraticjournalismandstatelessness,PoliticalCommunication24:115
129.
32SeeRosentalAlves.2005.Fromlapdogtowatchdog: TheroleofthepressinLatinAmericas
democratization,inHugodeBurghEd.,MakingJournalists,181204.London:Routledge;andSilvio
Waisbord.2000.WatchdogJournalisminSouthAmerica.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.The
discussionbelowlargelydrawsfrommybook.
33EnriquePeruzzottiandCatalinaSmulovitzEds.2006.EnforcingtheRuleofLaw:SocialAccountabilityin
theNewLatinAmericanDemocracies. Pittsburgh,PA:UniversityofPittsburghPress
34JulietGill.2006.MuzzlingtheWatchdog:ChangingMediaPerformanceinDemocraticArgentina,
Ph.D.dissertation,UniversityofMiami; J.Brito.2003.Ellenfueradesujaula:la"primavera
fiscalizadora"delperiodismochileno,InformacinPblica,ust.cl.
35SeeFOPEA.2005.Sobrelosperiodistasylaprofesin.BuenosAires:FOPEA;ObservatoriodeMedios.
2003.InformesobreelestadoactualdelalibertaddeprensaenColombia.Chia:Universidaddela
Sabana;
36
For
examples,
see
Waisbord,
Watchdog
Journalism
in
South
America.
37 SeeFundacinKonradAdenaueryelInstitutoPrensaySociedad.2005.Hbitosdetrabajodel
periodistalatinoamericano.Lima:FundacinKonradAdenaueryelInstitutoPrensaySociedad.
38IdiscussthisissueinSilvioWaisbord.2006.Injournalismwetrust?,inKatrinVoltmerEd.,Mass
MediaandNewDemocracies.London:Routledge.
39TheseconceptsfollowIyengarswellknowndistinction.SeeShantoIyengar.1991.IsAnyone
Responsible?Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.
40AnoverviewisofferedinSantiagoPedraglio.2005.Agendasdistantes:Losmediosdecomunicaciny
lospartidos
polticos
en
la
Regin
Andina,
IDEA,
Democracia
en
la
Regin
Andina,
los
telones
de
fondo.
41RinaAlcalayandCarmenT.Mendoza.2000ProyectoCOMSALUD:Unestudiocomparativode
mensajesrelacionadosconsaludenlosmediosmasivoslatinoamericanos.Washington,DC:Pan
AmericanHealthOrganization.AureaM.daRochaEd.,1995.Saude&Comunicao:Visibilidadese
silncios.SoPaulo:Hucitec/Abrasco.
-
8/12/2019 Chapter 12 Waisbord
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42
JCGonzlez2007.Elpapeldelaprensaenlaconstruccindelasrepresentacionessobrela
problemticaambiental,Convergencia;DianeJukofsky.2000.Elperiodismoambiental:Unaespeciaen
extincin,Chasqui70.http://www.comunica.org/chasqui/jukofsky70.htm
43A
summary
is
found
in
Jorge
Bonilla
Velez
and
Camilo
Gmez.
2006.
Medios
de
comunicacin
y
violenciasenAmericaLatina,Controversia187,
http://www.cinep.org.co/revistas/controversia/controversia187/art06_mediosdecomunicacion.pdf
44SoledadLarrainyAndreaValenzuela.2004.Televisinyciudadana. Santiago:Fucatel.
45ThereisanextensiveliteratureinSpanishonthissubject.SeeLilianaGutirrezCobaetal.2007.La
prensacomocreadoradeestereotipossobrelosreinsertadosyelprocesodepazenColombia,Palabra
Clave,10:2.WendyArenasandothers.2003.ElconflictoarmadoenlaspginasdeElTiempo.Bogota:El
Tiempo.
46FabioladeOliveira.1996.Democracia,MeioAmbienteeJornalismonoBrasil.SaoPaulo:Edusp;
ShirleyLuft.2005.Jornalismo,MedioAmbienteeAmazonia:OsDesmatamentosnosJornais.SoPaulo:
Annablume.
47Foranoverview,seeSilvioWaisbord.2009.Advocacyjournalisminaglobalcontext:The'journalist'
andthe'civic'model.InKarinWahlJorgensenandThomasHanitzschEds.HandbookofJournalism
Studies.
48SeeCIMAandNED.2007.TowardEconomicsustainabilityofthemediaindevelopingcountries,June.
Washington:Center
for
International
Media
Assistance.