chapter 1
TRANSCRIPT
Chapter I
Chapter I
“I know of no problem more frustrating or more bedevilled by mean spiritedness and
lack of mutual confidence, or of a problem where all concerned would so easily gain
from a reasonable settlement”. 1
Brian Urquhart: The former Undersecretary-General of the United Nations
The Historical Survey of the role of the UN as a mediator in the Cyprus conflict
1.1 Introduction
According to Brian Urquard “more than 50 years have passed since the
internationalization of the Cyprus Question and the adoption by the United Nations General
assembly of resolution 814 (IX) of December 17, 1954”.2 The United Nations (UN) is still
working to solve the Cyprus question with a serious examination of its peacekeeping and
peacemaking operations. This chapter sets out to study the UN’s peacemaking efforts in
Cyprus from 1954 to 2001 and why UN peacemaking efforts failed to bring a peaceful
settlement to the Cyprus problem. The Chapter first examines how this protracted conflict
affected the UN’s peacemaking agenda’s response to its various periods. It is then to
consider why the two communities authorized, tolerated or opposed the UN involvement in
the Cyprus conflict. The chapter will also examine the failure of the UN efforts, which
originates from the intercommunal mistrust, the influence of the international community,
the politics of the great powers and two communities’ political aims and their relation with
the great powers.
These factors would be studied within the framework of the eleven periods of the Cyprus
Conflict: (a) The early UN involvement to Cyprus, 1945-1960; (b) The origin of the UN
presence in Cyprus, 1960-1963; (c) The UN’s Mediation, 1964-1965. (d) The
1 Brian Urquard, “A Life in Peace and War”, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1987), p.198.
2 Van Coufoudakis, the United Nations Peacekeeping and Peacemaking and the Cyprus Question, (The western political quarterly, Vol.29, No.3, Sep., 1976), p.457. For a detailed account of the parliamentary diplomacy of the 1954-1958 periods, see Stephen G. Xydis, 1954-1958, Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University of Press, 1967).
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intercommunal discussions, 1967-1973; (e) The division of the island: the 1974 events in
Cyprus; (f) The Vienna talks and high-level agreements, 1975-1982 (g) The declaration of
the ‘TRNC’ and the draft Framework Agreement, 1982 – 1986; (h) The set of ideas and
Confidence Building Measures 1988 – 1994; (i) The New Actors: European Union
dimension, 1994-1997. (j) The reviving of peace efforts, 1997-2000.
Secretaries-General of the UN have been actively involved in efforts to solve the Cyprus
conflict since the 1960’s. Their peacemaking plans will be the primary focus of this chapter
but it is also to explore circumstances under which the UN became involved in an issue that
at first appeared to be a domestic ethnic dispute.
1.2 The Historical Background to the UN’s involvement with Cyprus
1.2.1 The early UN involvement in Cyprus, 1945 -1960
The mid 1950’s was an important historical period for the Cyprus conflict. It is
identified by the scholars as one of decolonisation and self-determination for the Greek
Cypriots. According to Richmond, “at the end of the Second World War the Greek
Cypriots expected that their old national aspiration of Enosis would be granted in return for
having fought on the side of the British”.3 The Greek word eνωσις (Enosis) means “union”.
It is primarily used to refer to the unification of Cyprus and Greece, and became a political
issue, and a goal of Greek foreign policy, during the years of British colonial rule in Cyprus
(1878-1960). The struggle for Enosis was derived from the concept of Megali the struggle
of the Greeks against the Ottoman Empire. Enosis was part of a much wider Pan-Hellenic
movement which aimed at reconstructing the Byzantine Empire under Greek Hegemony.4
The British Government in 1948 supported the idea of a constitution that granted equality
between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities in the island. The suggested
3 Oliver P. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay, “The Work of the UN in Cyprus-Promoting Peace and Development”, (England: Palgrave Publishers, 2001), p.4.
4 J. Reddaway, “Burdened with Cyprus”, (London: Weiden & Nicolson, 1986), p.14.
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Chapter I
constitution would end the British rule in Cyprus.5 According to historians “the Ottoman
Empire conquered Cyprus in 1571 and administrated it until 1878 when she assigned its
administration to the UK by the Cyprus Convention in exchange for a tribute and promises
of UK defence in the Caucasus region against Russia. Upon Turkey’s entry into the World
War I, the UK annexed Cyprus. The position was internationally regularised by the treaty
of Lausanne 1923, whereby, in Article 20, Turkey adaptation of such a constitution would
end the British rule”.6 The suggestion was rejected by the AKEL party (The Progressive
Party of Working People) and the church. The AKEL party was established in 1921 as the
Communist Party of Cyprus. The Communist Party supported the independence of Cyprus
and opposed Enosis (union with Greece) which was the main aim of most Greek Cypriot
non-communists. The party became illegal in 1931 when the British colonial government
imposed restrictions on civil rights following a nationalist riot.
The rejection was the turning point in the history of the Cyprus conflict. Hubert Faustmann
stated that “ when faced with British intransigence concerning any change in the status of
the island and in the light of arrests of several politicians (mainly the AKEL partisans), the
Greek Cypriot leaders decided to break the deadlock and internationalise the problem
through the UN in 1949”.7 British Government was intransigent for two primary reasons.
Cyprus was a crucial strategic colony and an important passage for British troops. The
second reason was that it was against the idea of Enosis because of the loss of the other
colonies of Britain. It was incorporated into the UN charter that the Greek Cypriots wanted
to join with Greece on the right of self-determination.
The years from 1949 to 1952 provided hope and frustration for Greek Cypriot society. At
the beginning, all the Greek Cypriot political parties on both the left and right agreed to
defend the concept Enosis. Also on 5 December 1949, the Church announced that it would
hold a plebiscite on Enosis.8 This was a sign that the church and the political parties were
5 Claire Palley, “An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-General’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004”, (Oxford, England and Portland, Oregon: Hart publishing, 2005), p.14.
6 Ibid., p.14.
7 Oliver P. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.4.
8 Ibid., p.4.
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Chapter I
unified to fight for Enosis. “The referendum was held in January 1950 and 95.7% of the
Greek Cypriot voted in favour of Enosis”.9
The plebiscite had a short life for three main reasons. The first reason was the political
divisions inside of the Greek Cypriot society. There was a troubled partnership between the
Church and the communist party, AKEL.10 Secondly even if the Greek Cypriot society had
found some support from the mainland Greek public and the mainland Greek politicians,
the Greek Government at that time did not support Enosis. Thirdly, it was not feasible to
obtain international support by lobbying the Greek Cypriot cause.11 Makarios was
Archbishop and Primate of the autocephalous Cypriot Orthodox Church (1950-1977) and
first President of the Republic of Cyprus (1960-1977).12 He proposed that the only way for
the Enosis to succeed was for him to visit Athens regularly to organize mass rallies in
support of his and the Greek Cypriot cause.13 Eventually he succeeded and the Greek
government reluctantly gave its support to the Enosis. On 15 February 1951, the Greek
Prime Minister, Sophocles Venizelos, gave his famous speech concerning the Cyprus issue.
“I am happy to have the opportunity to express from this official tribune to the Chamber and the
whole of the Greek people the demand for the union of Cyprus with Mother Greece, a matter
which constitutes the ardent desire both of the Cypriot and the Greek People.” The speech of the
Prime Minister of Greece Sophocles Venizelos on 15 February 1951 14
Until the early 1950’s it was almost impossible for Greece to make an official request from
the UN. The Greek Government changed its policy in 1952 and Marshal Papagos was
elected. His election was supported by the United States (US) and Britain. The US
9 Ibid., p.4. See Doros Alastos, “Cyprus in History: a Survey of 5,000 years”, (Greece: Zeno, 1976), pp.379-80.
10 Oliver P. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.5.
11 Ibid., p.5.
12 Christopher Hitchen, Cyprus, (London: Quartet Books 1984), p.23. See Glafkos Clerides, My Deposition, (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing 1992), p.25.
13 Oliver P. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.5.
14 Ibid., p.5. See Ludwig Discher, “Die Zypernfrage: Dokumente XXXIII”, (Frankfurt: M. Alfred Metzner, 1960), p.28.
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supported Papagos because he promised to put an end to a period of internal political
instability and the Americans advised Greece to adopt a majority electoral system.15
Papagos was newly elected and he did not want to take the Cyprus issue to the UN. This
attitude worried Archbishop Makarios who responded by increasing the international
pressure. From October 1952 to March 1953, he travelled to the US, UK, France and
Greece, holding the press conferences and asking for international support for Enosis. On
13 August 1953, Makarios sent a memorandum to the UN requesting that the Cyprus
problem be registered on its agenda.16 Greece wanted bilateral negotiations with Britain. At
the same time, Greece had used the UN for the first time as a forum but merely to announce
that it did not intend to use it as such.
Richmond argues that “by 1954, it was evident that Britain was not willing to discuss with
Greece the question of Cypriot independence and Enosis with Greece”.17 Archbishop
Makarios’ Enosis propaganda worked in Greece. The domestic pressure on the Greek
government increased. In mainland Greece pressure was being applied. Both Cypriot
pressure groups and opposition parties for Enosis were forcing the government of Marshal
Papagos to appeal to the UN. The Papagos government had no choice left but to bring the
Cyprus question to the General Assembly of the UN. The Greeks appealed to the General
assembly to terminate the colonial rule and accept self-determination on the island. The
choice of the General Assembly indicated that “it was the best for the existing international
institutions, in terms of its membership, proceedings, and public exposure, to present the
Greek Case”.18 Richmond stated that “the General Assembly then became a primary
political instrument in the search for bilateral negotiations with Britain”.19 At the same time
in Cyprus the EOKA anticolonial movement was initiated by General George Grivas.20
EOKA: Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston, [National Organization of Cypriot Fighters]
15 Nancy Crawshaw, “the Cyprus Revolt: an Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece”, (England: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p.67.
16 Oliver P. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.7.
17 Ibid., p.7.
18 Ibid., p.7.
19 Ibid., p.7.
20 Ford Jones W., “1959, Grivas and the story of EOKA”, (London: Robert Hale ltd, 1959), p.26. See General Grivas, “letter of 18 February 1959 to Averoff in: G Clerides, Cyprus: my deposition”, (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, Vol. 1, 1989), p.73.
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was a Greek Cypriot military resistance organization that fought for self-determination and
union with Greece in the mid- to late- 1950s.
In this time, the EOKA Guerrillas were attacking the British forces on the island. The
General Assembly considered the Greek application during five sessions. The Greek
Cypriots also continued their propaganda to the rest of the world and the crucial European
organisations such as the Council of Europe. The Ankara Government and Turkish
Cypriots expressed their objections towards the Greek Cypriot campaign for the liberation
of Cyprus. In the late 1950’s the slogan Taksim (partition or double Enosis) was formed by
the Turkish Cypriots in response to the formation of EOKA. Taksim envisaged a popular
Turkish idea that the island should be divided between Greece and Turkey, which was seen
by the Turkish community as a compromise, as they had envisaged that should Britain ever
leave Cyprus, it would revert back to Turkey. Richmond stated that “The Turkish Cypriots
formed VOLKAN, later renamed the Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (TMT) in which Denktaş
was reputedly involved as a founder member”.21 Denktaş was later became the President of
the de facto state Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and leader of the Turkish
Cypriot Community. TMT was a Turkish Cypriot terrorist organization against the EOKA
and Enosis.
From 1954 to 1958, the General Assembly considered the Greek government’s application
for self-determination of the Greek Cypriots. According to Dodd, “the British, as a last
desperate effort, advanced in 1958 the Macmillan Plan, a partnership plan that principally
provided for a Greek and Turkish official to work alongside a British governor, which
could lead to partition”.22
This plan was similar to a British political offer in late 1940’s. The plan would provide the
co-operation and participation of Turkey and Greece in a joint effort to achieve peace,
progress and prosperity of the island. The island would have a system of representative
21 Oliver Richmond, Doctor of Philosophy thesis: “Being Mediated Upon: The Cyprus communities and the United Nations 1964-1994”, (England: University of Kent, 1997) p.63.
22 Clement Dodd, “Storm Clouds over Cyprus: A briefing”, (England: The Eothen press, 2002), p.10. See Polyvios G. Polyviou, “Cyprus: the Tragedy and the Challenge”, (London: John Swain & Son, 1975), p.4.
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Government with each community exercising autonomy in its own communal affairs. The
international status of the island would remain unchanged for seven years.
Macmillan stated that “the governor, acting after consultation with the representatives of
the Greek and Turkish Governments, would have reserved powers to ensure that the
interests of both communities were protected”.23 The British Government's proposal was
refused both by Greece and Makarios. The British government partnership plan principally
provided for a Greek and Turkish official to work alongside a British governor. Therefore,
“U.S attempted to blunt the impact of the Greek appeals on the UN assembly and this was
achieved by (a) the casting of negative votes on the inclusion of the Cyprus question in the
agenda of the General Assembly”.24 The rejection of the Macmillan Plan caused diplomatic
activity to shift to the UN. The Greek Government's new policy was based on an interim
period of self-government leading to independence under the UN auspices, “that status not
being subject to alteration without UN consent”.25
Stephen G. Xydis stated that “Archbishop Makarios informed Britain that he was ready to
accept independence with guarantees for the Turkish Minorities. The British stand had been
to stress that the solution they were seeking was one acceptable to the three Governments
and to the peoples of Cyprus and to achieve this end they were ready to enter into
discussions with all concerned at the appropriate time”.26
The Turkish Foreign Minister, F. Zorlu, stressed that “the right to self-determination or
independence should be given to both Cypriot peoples”.27 He explained that in Cyprus,
“there were two separate peoples but not a nation and consequently each of them was
entitled to equal rights vis-à-vis independence and self-determination”.28
23 Harold Macmillan, “Riding the Storm: 1956-1959”, (England: Macmillan, April 1971), p.67.
24 Van Coufoudakis, “the United Nations Peacekeeping and Peacemaking and the Cyprus Question”, (The western political quarterly, Vol.29, No.3, Sep, 1976), p.460.
25 John Reddaway, Op. Cit., p. 115.
26 Stephen G. Xydis, “1954-1958-Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation”, (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University of Press, 1967), p.294.
27 John Reddaway, Op. Cit., p.115.
28 Ibid., p.115.
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Chapter I
“The adopted final draft called for a conference between the three governments directly
concerned and the representatives of the Cypriots and considered that the self-government
and free institutions should be developed in accordance with the charter of the UN to meet
the legitimate aspirations of the Cypriots. It urged such a conference to be convened and
that all concerned should cooperate to ensure a successful outcome in accordance with the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN”.29
The General Assembly, had considered the question of Cyprus, recalling its resolution
1013 (XI). The resolution expressed its confidence that continued efforts would be made by
the parties to reach a peaceful, democratic and just solution in accordance with the Charter
of the UN.
Following this resolution Zorlu's personal approach to Averoff suggesting bilateral talks
between themselves was accepted by the Greek Government.
In 1958, the foreign minister of Turkey Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and his Greek counterpart
Evangelos Averoff agreed to meet to discuss the Cyprus question. Averoff accepted the
request and the discussions went ahead. In due course, both governments and the Cypriot
communities became involved.
The British had accepted with difficulty that they would have only bases in Cyprus, not
Cyprus as a base.30 Dodd stated “the Greek-Turkish talks reached fruition in Zurich in the
February 1959 in Zurich when bots sides finally reached on the agreement”.31 The
agreement was to form the basis of the Republic of Cyprus and Zorlu and Averoff came to
London more or less to tell Britain how it was to give up its own colony.
29 Oliver P. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.38.
30 Clement H. Dodd, “Strom Clouds over Cyprus”, (Huntington: the Eothen Press, 2001), p.11.
31 See appendix 2 for the treaty of Guarantee and the treaty of alliance.
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Chapter I
The Treaty of Alliance and the treaty of Guarantee were prepared with the basic structure
of the Republic of Cyprus divided into 4 different stages (see figure one).32 The Republic of
Cyprus was the partnership agreement between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot
communities on the basis of 70 percent to 30 percent.
The basic elements of a constitution for the new Republic of Cyprus had been drawn up by
Greece and Turkey in consultation with the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. The
constitution established a president, vice president and veto powers in order to protect the
identity and the rights of the minority. The General executive authority was vested in a
council of ministers with a ratio of seven Greeks to three Turks. A House of
Representatives of fifty members, also with a seven-to-three ratio, were to be separately
elected by communal balloting on a universal suffrage basis. In addition to this the separate
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Communal Chambers were provided to exercise control
in matters of religion, culture, and education. According to Article 78 (2) any law imposing
32 Metin Tamkoç, “the Turkish Cypriot State: Embodiment of the Right of Self-Determination: figure 4”, (Lefkoşa: K.Rüstem & Brother, 1988), p.71.
33 Clement H. Dodd, Op. Cit., p.11.
26
32
Figure 1
Chapter I
duties or taxes would require a simple majority of the representatives elected by the Greek
and Turkish communities respectively taking part in the vote.34
The legislation on other subjects was to take place by simple majority but again the
President and the Vice-President had the same right of veto on foreign affairs, defence and
internal security and other matters. The judicial system would be headed by a Supreme
Constitutional Court, composed of one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot and
presided over by a contracted judge from a neutral country. Britain requested permanent
British military bases on the island. Taksim (partition) and Enosis were banned according
to new agreement.
On 11 February 1959 the treaty was known as the London and Zurich agreements. This
treaty was signed by the new Republic of Cyprus with Britain, Greece and Turkey. The
Guarantor powers, Britain, Greece and Turkey, also guaranteed ‘the state of affairs
established by the Basic Articles of the Constitution’. Dodd stated, “they agreed if the
terms of the treaty were breached, to consult each other, whilst recognising that any one of
the guarantor states could if necessary to take action ‘with the sole aim of re-establishing
the state of affairs created by the treaty”.35 The crisis was over only for three years. In the
early 1960’s the intercommunal troubles resumed. Both sides reluctantly signed the
agreements. Neither Greek Cypriots nor Turkish Cypriots would surrender from their
political movements: Enosis and Taksim.
In the late 1950’s the UN’s involvement in the Cyprus question provided a new way for
states to settle their differences, police the world, and support decolonisation. Richmond
stated that “however the General Assembly was still divided between those who
encouraged a more active role for the UN and those who favoured a neutral stand and no
active international mediation”.36 The major powers, Britain and the US, managed to
prevent any UN involvement beyond a vague statement of support for further negotiations.
34 Dr Tuncer Arifoğlu, the General Secretary of the National Unity Party (UBP), private interview, the date of Interview: 8 July 2005, Nicosia (Lefkoşa), Cyprus.
35 Clement Dodd, Op. Cit., p.11.
36 Oliver P. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.38.
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The part-involvement of the UN in Cyprus at this time was based on the fear of many
member states of the escalation of animosities into a full-blown Greco-Turkish war.
There were other factors. Only the Greek side wanted the self-determination. Britain,
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots were against the idea of self-determination. The British
considered the UN involvement as unnecessary. They presumed that the UN’s involvement
would preclude it from siding with the Greek demands from the International
Community.37 The UN involvement was partly effective in the establishment of the
Republic of Cyprus by internationalising the Cyprus issue.
1.2.2 The origins of the UN presence in Cyprus, 1960-1963
On August 1960, Cyprus became an active member of the UN and the British flag
came down as Cyprus ended eighty-two years of colonial rule. Archbishop Makarios
became the president and Dr. Fazil Küçük became the vice president in the Republic of
Cyprus. Kyriacos C. Markides stated that “the Republic was established to last only three
years and it was unsurprising that most attached very little legitimacy to the new Republic
of Cyprus and hoped that the island would eventually be able to unite with Greece”.38
Turkish Cypriots accepted the arrangements. Groom argued that “In 1960’s the extremists
within both communities were working to try to bring about Enosis and Taksim, by force
of arms if necessary”.39
Many Greek Cypriots have claimed since 1960, including Makarios, that the ‘1960’
accords were forced upon them and they denied the right of the Greek Cypriot majority to
rule the island, a right to claimed on the grounds that the Turkish Cypriots were a
‘minority’, not more than eighteen percent of the population. According to Dodd, “there
37 The London Tripartite Conference in 1955 and Radcliffe’s constitutional proposals of 1956 were part of such strategic manoeuvres. Oliver P. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.40.
38 Kyriacos C. Markides, “The Rise and the fall of the Cyprus Republic”, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1977), p.88.
39 Professor John Groom, Professor of International Relations in University of Kent, private interview, Date of interview: 5 May 2005, Canterbury.
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was also some dissatisfaction on the anti-imperialist left in Greek Cypriot politics that
Britain should still retain military bases”.40
The UN became actively involved in Cyprus after the constitutional crisis was sparked by
Archbishop Makarios on 21 December 1963. There was disagreement over certain
constitutional feature of the Republic-taxation, the creation of separate municipalities and
the legislative veto system. According to the Turkish Cypriot leadership Dr Fazil Küçük
the Vice President of Cyprus and Denktaş (Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber) these
problems led to a stalemate in communal and state politics. Repeated but unsuccessful
attempts were made to solve these disputes by the two community leaders. Eventually, on
30 November 1963, Makarios announced the thirteen-point amendments.
The amendments were consolidated to remove hindrances in order for the functioning of
the political system. The thirteen amendments included the constitutional improvements
containing the abandonment of the veto power by both the President and the Vice
President. Turkey, as a guarantor state, initially rejected the amendments. In the weeks that
followed tensions grew between the two communities. Turkey readied itself for a military
intervention. “At the last moment, the three Guarantor powers agreed to establish a joint
peacekeeping force under British leadership”.41 Following threats of an imminent invasion
by Turkey the United Kingdom stepped in to secure the observance of a cease-fire between
the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots in the fracas that erupted, by positioning its
forces in areas of high tension. The UK soon requested the UN take over.
As the British force was hampered by Greek Cypriot opposition because of their perception
of a link to the colonial period, a NATO force had been discounted by Makarios on the
grounds of Turkey’s significant role in NATO. Dodd stated that “while the Greek Cypriots
were determined to reduce the status of the Turkish Cypriot community to a protected
minority, the Turkish Cypriots sought the physical separation of the two communities”.42
40 Clement H. Dodd, Op. Cit., p.6.
41 Ibid., p.11.
42 Ibid., p.11.
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The intercommunal strife continued on this issue. Turkey was anxious about the status of
the Turkish Cypriot community and renewed its threat to intervene.
1.2.3 The UN’s mediation, 1964-1965
On 4 March 1964 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 186, which
provided for: “(a) the creation with the consent of the government of Cyprus of a UN
Peacekeeping Force; (b) the composition and size of the force to be established by the
Secretary-General in consultation with the governments of Cyprus, Great Britain, Greece
and Turkey; (c) the functions of the force to be to prevent the recurrence of fighting and to
assist in the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal
conditions; (d) the force and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions;
(e) the force to be stationed on Cyprus for three months; (f) the force to be financed by
voluntary contributions; (g) a mediator to be appointed by the Secretary-General in
agreement with the four governments for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and
an agreed settlement of the problem”.43
At the same as it established a peacekeeping force, the Council also recommended that the
Secretary-General, in consultation with the parties and the Guarantor Powers, designate a
mediator to take charge of formal peacemaking efforts.44 The force itself was to use its best
efforts to prevent a recurrence in fighting and to contribute to the maintenance and
restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. The force came to Cyprus
for three months but because of the conflict in Cyprus, the force has been stationed in the
island for more than 40 years.45 Jose Rolz-Bennet was the first candidate for the position of
Secretary-General’s representative for Cyprus. Turkey rejected him due to his lack of
knowledge of the island’s affairs.46
43 Van Coufoudakis, Op. Cit., p. 464.
44 See appendix 4 for The UN Security Council Resolution (186) of March 4th 1964.
45 The definitive texts on peacekeeping in Cyprus are Michael Harbottle, “The Impartial Soldier”, (London; New York: OUP, 1970) and James A. Stegenga, “The United Nations force in Cyprus”, (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University, 1968).
46 Ibid., p.11.
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Chapter I
The UN Secretary-General U Thant decided to appoint a Finnish diplomat Sakari
Tuomioja. According to Richmond, “Tuomioja thought that Turkey would prefer Enosis
with concessions and had a little faith in the potential effectiveness of the UN peacemaking
mission”.47 The intercommunal violence erupted between the two sides in 1964 resulting in
Turkish warplanes bombing the Kokkina-Mansoura area in the Northwestern part of
Southern Cyprus. There was a war between Turkish Cypriots and the Greek commander
Grivas. Grivas wanted to invade the area in order to stop the Turkish Cypriots receiving
military help from Turkey. Therefore, Turkish fighter jet planes attacked Grivas army. The
US had a different perspective. Ker-Lindsay stated that “in early June, following another
Turkish threat to invade, Washington launched an independent initiative under Dean
Acheson, a former Secretary of State”.48 In July 1964, the Acheson plan was presented to
unite Cyprus with Greece, subject to the following conditions: (a) Turkey receives the
Greek Island of Kastellorizon, (b) two Turkish cantonments are established in Cyprus, and
(c) a military base is ceded to Turkey.49
The suggestion was rejected by Makarios. He argued that giving territory to the Turkish
army would be a limitation on Enosis. After the rejection of the first plan, a second version
of the plan was offered by the US. This proposed the following condition: Turkey receives
a 50-year lease on a base in Cyprus, rather than full sovereignty.50 This offer was rejected
by the Greek Cypriots and Turkey. The US tried to do more to convince both sides to find a
solution but no agreement was reached to solve problem under the Acheson Plan.
Ambassador Tuomioja then suddenly died on August, 1964. Galo Plaza Lasso was chosen
as a mediator by the Secretary-General U Thant. Polyviou stated that “Plaza supported an
independent and unitary Cyprus with effective protection of individual and minority
rights”.51 The Secretary-General on the 26th of March 1965 accepted Dr. Plaza’s 66 pages
report. It was argued that “Dr. Plaza described the 1960 constitution as a ‘constitutional
47 Oliver P Richmond and James Ker -Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.109.
48 James Ker-Lindsay, “EU Accession and UN peacemaking in Cyprus”, (England: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2005), p.11.
49 Polyvios G. Polyviou, Op. Cit., p.47.
50 James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.11.
51 Polyvios G. Polyviou, Op. Cit., p.42.
31
Chapter I
oddity’ and could not help wondering whether the physical division of the minority from
the majority, which was sought by the Turkish side, was not a desperate step in the wrong
direction”.52 Plaza also stated that “The UN Charter and Principles also recommended that
the establishment of a truly independent unitary Cypriot state with majority rule and
safeguarded proportional rights for the minority”.53
According to UN officials, the Greek Cypriots were eager for Enosis and the Turkish
Cypriots were demanding a federal solution to the Cyprus problem. The Greek Cypriots
accepted the Galo Plaza report and Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots rejected it. Turkish
Cypriots and Turkey accused Plaza of exceeding his mandate and called on Plaza to resign.
According to Ker-Lindsay, “the Greek Cypriots also made it clear that if Galo Plaza
resigned they would refuse to accept a replacement”.54 At the end of 1965 Plaza resigned
from his post. The Secretary-General U Thant initiated the function of the good offices for
the two sides. Good offices involve little more than informal contacts and suggestions on
the part of the Secretary-General with the disputant.
1.3 The UN Peacemaking efforts in Cyprus
1.3.1 The intercommunal discussions, 1967-1974
The years between 1967 and 1973 are known as the normalisation period as a result of
the number of UN peacekeepers considerably reducing the intercommunal conflicts.
However the Turkish Cypriots were frustrated with the UN peacekeeping mission.55 The
Turkish Cypriots believed that the UN peacekeeping force sent to the island in 1964 was
ineffective and helpless in defending the Turkish Cypriot community against the Greek
Cypriots attacks. “In March 1966, a more modest effort attempt at peacemaking was
52 Ibid., p.42.
53 Steven E. Lobell and Philip Mauceri, “Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation”, (England: Palgrave-Macmillan; 1st edition, January 17, 2004), p.108.
54 James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.12.
55 The point of view was approved by Mr Akay Cemal and Mr Sabahattin İsmail. Mr Sabahattin İsmail, the journalist/writer of the Volkan newspaper, the private interview, Date of interview 17 July 2005, Nicosia (Lefkoşa), Cyprus. Mr Akay Cemal, The chief editor of the Halkın Sesi: [People Voice] newspaper in the North Cyprus, the private interview, Date of Interview: 15 July 2005, Nicosia (Lefkoşa), Cyprus. This interview was translated from Turkish to English.
32
Chapter I
initiated under the auspices of Carlos Bernades, the Secretary-General’s Special
Representative for Cyprus”.56
Bernades aimed to encourage the two sides to agree to a settlement through direct dialogue.
However Greece was enduring a series of turbulent political events that led to severe
uncertainty. The crisis eventually got out hand for both the elected government and King
Constantine II and ended dramatically in the early hours of April 21 1967.57
On 9-10 September 1967, the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers attended two meetings
in Thrace. The result of the meetings was unsatisfactory. The Greek Junta declared Enosis
as a solution to Cyprus problem. The Turkish Government responded with the declaration
of rejection. Greece was now forced to abandon the idea of union for the foreseeable
future.58
In November 1967 the intercommunal violence resumed. Turkey bombed the Greek
Cypriot force in response to major attacks on Turkish Cypriot villages in the south of the
island. At the same time Greece decided, after the Turkish bombing, to recall General
Grivas and reduce its forces in the island.
The Turkish Cypriots declared their own provisional administration. Makarios rejected the
declaration and labelled it illegal. According to Polyvios G. Polyviou, “the Secretary
General, having heard various consultations suggested at the beginning of 1968 the
commencement of local talks in Cyprus under the aegis of his Special Representatives in
Cyprus”.59 The Secretary-General’s initiation of talks was supported by Greece, the UK,
US and Turkey. They were held between the presidents of the communal chambers,
Glafcos Clerides and Rauf Denktaş. “From the very beginning it was mutually agreed that
the aim of the local talks would be an exploration of various possibilities for the solution of
56 James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.12.
57 Richard Clogg, “A Short History of Modern Greece”, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2nd edition, December 11, 1986), p.154.
58 Ibid., p.12.
59 Polyvios G. Polyviou, Op. Cit., p.43.
33
Chapter I
the constitutional problem on the basis of an independent, unitary and sovereign state”.60
The four rounds of intercommunal talks occurred between 1967 and 1974. Ker-Lindsay
stated that “in the first round talks the Turkish Cypriots were prepared to make several
concessions regarding constitutional matters, but Makarios refused to grant them greater
autonomy”.61
The second round talks were focused on local government issues and were unsuccessful. In
third round from 1970 to 1971 the Turkish Cypriots agreed to relinquish many of the
special rights obtained under the Zurich settlement, such as the veto right and the 70:30
ratio.62 However they aimed to create a state within a state and the setting up of two
completely separate regional administrations. The result of the talks was again failure. The
Greek Cypriots refused the suggestion of the Turkish Cypriots getting a completely
separate regional administration. The fourth round attempted to find a solution on
constitutional issues. The final intercommunal talks collapsed due to the events of 1974 in
Cyprus.
1.3.1 The division of the island, the 1974 events in Cyprus
In September 1971 EOKA-B was formed by Grivas. EOKA-B was the Greek Cypriot
fascist pro-Enosis paramilitary organization formed in 1971. It was supported by the ruling
Greek junta which came to power in 1967 having overthrown the legitimate Greek
government of George Papandreou. When George Grivas returned to Cyprus in 1971, he
created EOKA-B in response to President Makarios's apparent failure to deliver on the
policy of Enosis. He was angered by Makarios rejection of Enosis in 1959, and was further
upset when the President reaffirmed this position on his re-election in 1968. Grivas then
took the reins of EOKA-B, planning to overthrow Makarios and achieve Enosis through
violent means. Grivas returned to the island without the knowledge of the Junta in Greece.
From 1971 to 1974, Grivas repeatedly tried to remove Makarios from power. The
deterioration prompted Clerides to appeal to the US ambassador to Cyprus to persuade the
60 Ibid., p.44.
61 James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.13.
62 Polyvios G. Polyviou, Op. Cit., p.44.
34
Chapter I
Greek government not to try to overthrow Makarios. In early 1974 Grivas was dead and
Brigadier Dimitros Ioannidis took the control of the junta. In July 1974 Makarios tried to
persuade the military dictatorship in Greece to leave the island.
Yet Ioannidis was determined to remove Makarios from power. In July 1974 he was
replaced by the ultra Greek nationalist Nicos Sampson. The Prime Minister of Turkey Mr
Bülent Ecevit flew to London to try to persuade the British Government to intervene on the
island. The American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the British Foreign Secretary
James Callaghan refused to join Turkey in attempts to restore the situation to that of 1960,
as allowed under the Treaty of Guarantee. According to Dodd “some Greek and Turkish
Cypriots believe that Kissinger engineered the coup that overthrew Makarios in order to
bring about the Turkish intervention and division of the island between two reliable Cold
War allies.63 Dodd states that “it is asserted, not without some truth, that Kissinger made
little attempt to stop the Turkish action, unlike President Johnson in 1964”.64 On 20 July
1974 Turkey launched the military invasion of the island. “The first phase of action
resulted, after fierce fighting, in the capture of small section of the north of the island,
including Kyrenia”.65As a result of the first intervention the three guarantor powers decided
to meet in Geneva.
At the same time the Junta regime in Greece collapsed. Turkey gave five days to achieve a
settlement between the two sides. Necatigil stated that “the Geneva conference ran into
difficulties on the second day owing to the conflicting interpretations of the UN”.66 On 30
July 1974 after five days of negotiations between the guarantor powers the declaration was
signed by three ministers of the guarantors’ states.67 According to the agreement the areas
controlled by the opposing armed force should not be extended and a security zone should
be set up.68
63 Clement Dodd, Op. Cit., p.17.
64 Ibid., p.17.
65 Ibid., p.17.
66 Zaim M. Necatigil, “The Cyprus question and the Turkish position in International Law”, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.82.
67 See appendix 7 for the Geneva Declaration (30 July 1974).
68 Zaim M. Necatigil, Op. Cit., p.83.
35
Chapter I
Additionally the Greek or Greek Cypriot forces should be immediately withdrawn from the
occupied Turkish Cypriot enclaves. The foreign ministers also agreed that the negotiations
should continue to secure the restoration of peace in the area and the re-establishment of
the constitutional government in Cyprus. On 8 August 1974, in Switzerland another round
of discussions was initiated by the Greek and Turkish representatives.
The Turkish Cypriots persisted on the geographical division of both communities in the
island. The Greek Cypriots, mainly Makarios, found this request unacceptable. On 14
August 1974, the talks ended in frustration.69 Within the hours Turkey continued its second
military operation in the island. Turkey invaded and occupies 36 per cent of the northern
part of Cyprus.
Joseph Luus, the Secretary-General of the NATO, sent a secret letter to the UN. According
to O’Malley, “the letter indicated that America was directly responsible for the coup by
EOKA B and for allowing the Turkish invasion take place”.70 The consequence of the
division was a disaster. “Following a Turkish military invasion in 1974 there ensued an
internal movement of populations with Greek- Cypriots fleeing south from the advancing
Turkish army and Turkish-Cypriots gathering in the north”.71 Today over thirty five
thousand Turkish troops are located in North Cyprus. According to Reddaway “history has
bequeathed to Cyprus a legacy of strife, in which the years from 1960 to 1974 have special
place. It has aptly been observed that the Turkish Cypriots cannot forget those years and
that the Greek Cypriots cannot remember them”.72
1.3.2 The Vienna talks and high-level agreements, 1975-1982
69 See the appendix 4 UN Security Council Resolution 357 (1974). See appendix 7 the UN general Assembly Resolution 3212 (1 November 1974).
70 O'Malley, Brendan and Ian Craig, “The Cyprus Conspiracy”, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), p.48.
71 George Yiangou, “The Accession of Cyprus to the EU: Challenges and Opportunities for the New European Regional Order”, (European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) University of Cambridge, UK, Vol.2, 2002), p.2.
72 John Reddaway, “Odi et Amo: Vignettes of an Affair with Cyprus”, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987), p.83.
36
Chapter I
On the Turkish Cypriot side, the Autonomous Cyprus Turkish Administration was
succeeded by the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC), which was proclaimed on 13
February 1975.73 “A democratic constitution was drawn up by the assembly, approved by a
referendum held on 8 June 1975 and published in the Official Gazette on 17 June 1975”. 74
The 99.4 percent of the Turkish Cypriots voted yes to the constitution. Necatigil stated that
“this was the interim constitution which left the door open for the creation of a federal
Republic of Cyprus of which the Turkish Federated State would be one of the
components”.75
In Security Council debates which followed the proclamation of the Turkish Cypriot
federated State of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot representative stressed that separation of the
two communities came about as a result of acts of the Greek Cypriots and that there could
be no return to the 1960 constitution. Physical separation was vital to the safety of Turkish
Cypriots. According to Necatigil, “The Security Council adopted resolution no 376 of 12
March 1975 without vote regretting the decision to declare the part of the Republic of
Cyprus would become a ‘Federated Turkish State’ ”.76 It was, in fact, noted by the
resolution that the proclamation was not intended to prejudge a final settlement.
In early 1975, the Turkish and Greek Cypriots had a number of meetings in the presence of
the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative at that time, Mr Weckmann-Munoz and
exchanged views concerning the basis for the start of talks on the substance of the Cyprus
problem.77 Both sides agreed to talk on humanitarian issues and the powers and function of
the federal state. On 28 April 1975, the UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim initiated a
new mission of Good Offices.
73 Zaim M. Necatigil, Op. Cit., p.89.
74 Ibid., p.89.
75 Ibid., p.89.
76 Ibid., p.90.
77 PIO, “Cyprus Intercommunal talks: Following the Turkish Invasion of July-August 1974”, (Cyprus: Public Information Office Nicosia, July 1981), p.7.
37
Chapter I
Clerides and Denktaş decided to negotiate the humanitarian issues relating to the events of
1974 in Vienna. The territorial nature of the government issues was also discussed in the
Vienna meetings. At the beginning of the Vienna meetings the UN Security Council
adopted on the 12 March 1975 resolution 367. The resolution, inter alia, called on all states
to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the
Cyprus Republic.78
At these meetings both sides declared many proposals to the UN. During 1976 the
negotiations were constantly undermined by the issues of recognition for the Turkish
Cypriots while for the Greek Cypriots allegations of the forcible expulsion of Greek
Cypriots from the Turkish controlled area of the island were the dominant issues. In 1976,
the Secretary-General was unable to bring the Turkish Cypriots to make concrete written
proposals. The main obstacle preventing the negotiations from restarting remained the
unwillingness of the Turkish Cypriots to present proposals and the unwillingness of the
Greek Cypriots to negotiate without having some idea of what the Turkish Cypriot position
was.
The most significant step towards solid progress was the agreement worked out between
Denktaş and Archbishop Makarios. On 12 February 1977, Denktaş and Makarios met in
Nicosia. This meeting was organised by the UN Secretary-General Dr. Waldheim. Ker-
Ker-Lindsay stated that “on 12 February, The two leaders signed a four point agreement
confirming that a future Cyprus settlement would be based on a federation made up of two
states (bi-zonal) and two communities (bi-communal)”.79 According to High-Level
agreement “the territory under each side’s administration would be discussed in the light of
economic viability, productivity and land ownership”.80 The Central government would be
given powers to ensure the unity of the state. “Principles such as freedom of movement,
settlement, rights of property, were open to discussion taking into consideration the
fundamental basis for a bicommunal federal system and certain practical difficulties”.81 An
78Ibid., p.12.
79 James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.15.
80 See appendix 9 for the High level agreement on 12 February 1977.
81 See appendix 9 for the High level agreement on 12 February 1977.
38
Chapter I
agreement was signed that Enosis and Taksim were officially ended. The Cyprus would be
reunited as a federation and that both sides would have their own zone of control.
On 31 March and 7 April 1977 the second series of Vienna Talks occurred. According to
Farid Mirbagheri, “during the second series of the Vienna talks, the Greek Cypriots
submitted proposals on the territorial aspect of the problem and the Turkish Cypriots on the
constitutional aspect”.82
The Turkish Cypriots offered the proposal of federation by evolution. The Turkish Cypriots
wanted an effectively autonomous state under a loose federal structure. The Greek Cypriots
claimed that the role and the function of the central government would lead to
confederation rather than federation and would further separate the two communities.83
The Turkish Cypriots claimed that the Greek Cypriot’s plan ignored the essentials of the
bizonality and economic viability. The second round of these discussions ended with very
little progress. On May 1977 Archbishop Makarios died and was replaced by the Foreign
Minister Spyros Kyprianou. According to Ker-Lindsay “the following November a new
twelve-point proposal was drafted by the US, Britain and Canada and presented to the two
sides by the Secretary General”.84 The plan known as the American-British-Canadian
initiative was aimed to establish a federation of the two states. The plan would allow the
Greek and Turkish Cypriot states to join under the weak federation.
The Plan had similarities with the Macmillan plan. According to Plan “the central
government would deal with foreign affairs, external defence, currency and central banking
interregional and foreign trade”.85 The states would take the responsibility for the issues
which was not covered by the central government. Mirbagheri stated that “a bicameral
parliament, the upper chamber composed of equal numbers of representatives, and lower
chamber proportional to the size of the two populations would be created”.86 The army size
82 Farid Mirbagheri, “Cyprus and International Peacemaking”, (London: C.Hust & Co, 1998), p.92.
83 Ibid., p.92.
84 James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.15.
85 Ibid., p.15.
86 Farid Mirbagheri, Op. Cit., p.93.
39
Chapter I
of Greece and Turkey on the island would be reduced to 950 Greek and 650 Turkish troops.
This was similar to the 1960 agreements. The Greek Cypriot President and the Turkish
Cypriot Vice-President had the same right of veto on foreign affairs, defence and internal
security and other matters.87 The Greek Cypriots rejected the idea. They claimed that the
freedom of movement, settlement and the right to own property were not protected on the
basis of the plan.
The UN continued as a broker to find a solution to Cyprus problem. On 19 May 1979 the
ten point agreements was reached between President Kyprianou and Denktaş. The
agreement was the result of two days of intense negotiations chaired by the UN Secretary-
General. The 10-point agreements included a number of new provisions, such as
demilitarization and a commitment to refrain from destabilising activities and actions.
Famagusta is a city on the east coast of Cyprus. The city was occupied by the Turkish
military during the invasion of the island by Turkey in 1974. “Most of the modern part of
the city, known as Varosha (in Turkish: Maraş), was deserted, becoming a closed-off
military zone, something which persists to this day”.88 The Varosha problem would be
solved under the territorial and constitutional aspects. Then the new round of discussions
initiated in Nicosia failed for two reasons. The Turkish Cypriots did not want to discuss the
Varosha and the concept of bicommunality also was not agreed by the two sides. In
summer 1980, Secretary-General Waldheim wanted to reinitiate the negotiations between
Greek and Turkish Cypriots by putting forward a proposal for an ‘Interim Agreement’.
The aim of the proposal was the reopening of the international airport to civilian traffic, the
placing of Varosha under UN administration and the removing the economic embargo
imposed by the Republic of Cyprus on the Turkish Cypriots. The proposal initiated a series
of intercommunal talks. On 9 August 1980, the auspices of the UN Secretary-General is
special representative Hugo Gobi monitored the new negotiations. Four topics were
discussed in the negotiations: the improvement of the level of goodwill between the two
sides, the return and resettlement of Greek Cypriot refugees in Varosha, constitutional
87 Ibid., p.93.
88 See Republic of Cyprus government web page: www.cyprus.gov.cy (accessed 26 December 2005).
40
Chapter I
matters and territorial issues. The talks between the two sides failed due to a disagreement
on the term bi-zonality. Ker-Lindsay stated that “the Greek Cypriots insisted sovereignty
must rest with the central state according to the standard model of federation”.89
1.3.4 The declaration of the ‘TRNC’ and the draft Framework Agreement, 1982-1986
Javier Perez de Cuellar became the new Secretary-General in January 1982. Perez de
Cuellar found it useful to have frequent, top level meetings with the leaders of the two
Cypriot communities. In April 1982 in Geneva he met with both Kyprianou and Denktaş.90
He believed that the intercommunal negotiations were the best available method of
continuing the negotiating process. Thus on May 1983 the UN General Assembly passed a
resolution demanding the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Republic
of Cyprus.91
The Turkish Cypriots were angered at the resolution. They threatened to proclaim their
independence. Mirbagheri stated that “in August de Cuellar gave the two sides a set of
proposals for consideration that called for a rotating presidency, the establishment of a
bicameral assembly along the same lines as previously suggested and 60:40 representations
in the central executive”.92 The amount of territory to be given back by the Turks would be
8-13 percent, reducing the existing 37 percent to either 29 or 24 percent.93 In the eyes of
most Greek Cypriot politicians, this was nowhere near enough of a compromise by the
other side. Unlike in the 1960 constitution the legislature was to be bicameral rather than
unicameral and each community would vote for its own parliament.94
The Principles of the proposal were accepted by both community leaders- Kyprianou and
Denktaş. According to Secretary-General, “however despite positive development hopes
89 James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.17.
90 Farid Mirbagheri, Op. Cit., p.93.
91 The UN General Assembly Resolution 37/253, 13 May 1983.
92 James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.17.
93 ‘The Aide Memoire Text’, Cyprus Mail, August 1983.
94 ‘The Aide Memoire Text’, Cyprus Mail, August 1983.
41
Chapter I
for settlement was damaged in a few months later”.95 On 15 November 1983, the Turkish
Cypriots proclaimed the TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus). The TFSC
(Turkish Federated State of Cyprus) was changed to the TRNC. The Turkish Cypriots took
advantage of the post-election political instability in Turkey, which was just returning to
civilian rule after a military coup in 1980. The UN Security Council passed a resolution on
UDI (Turkish Cypriot unilateral declaration of independence).96 According to the UN the
UDI decision upset the possibility of reaching a settlement. Denktaş rejected resolution
541. Ker-Lindsay stated that “in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General informing him
of the decision, he insisted that the wore was not intended to kill the settlement hopes”.97
He claimed that any future settlement would be truly federal in nature.
On 10 September 1984, the proximity talks began in New York. Three suggestions were
offered by the Secretary-General. These were confidence building measures, the structure
of the federal government and territorial adjustment. The new state would be established as
a bi-zonal, bi-communal and non-aligned federation. The Proximity talks offered similar
plans to those of the UN: the Turkish Cypriots would retain 29 percent of their federal state
and all foreign troops would leave the island.
In January 1985, the two leaders met for their first face to face talks since the 1979
agreements. However the draft agreement was rejected by both sides. Mirbagheri stated
that “Kyprianou insisted that the package was incomplete and vague about important issues
such as the time frame for the withdrawal of foreign armed forces, so he could not agree
until these points had been clarified”.98 The Turkish Cypriots appeared to be against an
immediate withdrawal of Turkish troops while the Turkish side began to modernise its
equipment.
Denktaş’s view was that Turkey should have intervened earlier than it did, and that he
could not afford to let the troops leave as a similar situation could arise again. On January
95 James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.17.
96 See appendix 12 for the UN resolution 541 (1983) adopted by the Security Council on 18 November 1983.
97 James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.17.
98 Farid Mirbagheri, Op. Cit., p.96.
42
Chapter I
1985, the summit was concluded with no progress achieved. The Proximity talks had
collapsed. In August 1985 “Denktaş agreed to discuss the new version of the draft
agreement with the Secretary-General revised with the aid of Kyprianou but argued that it
contained more negative aspects for the Turkish Cypriots compared with the previous
version”.99 Therefore this time the Turkish Cypriots rejected the agreement. By November
the Secretary-General was able to report that “he believed that the two sides were within
reach of an agreement, although the leaders of both sides were less optimistic”.100 This was
to be expected since there was already a deep history of disappointment despite some
attempts at innovation by both sides. The Secretary-General was enthusiastic to continue
his peacemaking mission. On 29 March1986 de Cuellar offered a new Draft Framework
Agreement.101
The 1986 Draft Framework agreement in many ways was parallel to the failed January
1985 summit proposals. For example the issue of security and defence were left for later
negotiations of new defence treaties. According to Mirbagheri, “the legislature was the
same as that proposed in January 1985, but important matters would require separate
majorities for each community represented in the parliament”.102 The withdrawal of the
foreign troops, 29 percent of the amount of territory given the Turkish Cypriots,
independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, bi-zonal state in Cyprus was also presented in the
Draft Framework agreement.
“On the basis of the draft agreement of March 1986 Kyprianou accused the Secretary-
General of being influenced by the US favourable position towards Turkey”.103 There was
also controversy between the Cypriot Government and the UN Secretariat over the
Secretary-General’s proposals on the withdrawal of Turkish troops. Therefore, the Greek
Cypriots rejected the draft. The Greek Cypriots argued that the Draft Framework
Agreement on the removal of the Turkish troops, the three freedoms (movement, residency,
99 James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.17.Cyprus mail, 29 August 1985, p.1.
100 Ibid., p.17. New York Times, 15 December 1985, p.20.
101 See appendix 13 for the United Nations resolution the Draft Framework Agreement, (29 March 1986).
102 Farid Mirbagheri, Op. Cit., p.136.
103 James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.17. New York Times, 17 April 1986, p.10.
43
Chapter I
and treaty of establishment) and the question of the Turkish settlers was not clear. Also the
Greek Cypriots believed that the proposed structure of the state was of a confederal nature.
Further attempts to establish a solution to the problem failed. The following year Greek-
Turkish hostility in the Aegean Sea was tremendously increased which delayed the
peacemaking mission of the UN.
1.3.5 The Set of ideas and Confidence Building Measures, 1988-1994
In January 1988, George Vassiliou was elected as the new president of Cyprus. He
decided to use a new approach in finding a solution to the Cyprus problem. There were also
certain improvements in the relations between Turkey and Greece. For example according
Ker-Lindsay, “there was the ground breaking meeting between Prime Ministers Turgut
Özal and George Papandreou in Davos, Switzerland”.104 In August 1988, the Greek
Cypriots decided to apply for membership in the EU. Denktaş was against the Greek
Cypriot application. Denktaş objected strongly pointing out that the so-called Republic of
Cyprus had no legal grounds to claim sovereignty over the Turkish Cypriots.
Denktaş also pointed out that EC membership would, in effect, bring about union with
Greece (Enosis) which the 1960 treaties forbade. In June 1989, the UN offered a new
document to the two communities named as the set of ideas. The set of ideas were rejected
by Denktaş who disagreed with the substance of the proposal. He disliked the idea of
presenting the formal plans to both sides. However, in February 1990 the two sides met
again in New York. Denktaş wanted the word ‘communities’ to be used in a way that
implied a right of self-determination. The Turkish Cypriots had questioned the UN
authorities and therefore its legitimacy and consequently Perez de Cuellar decided to end
the talks. On 4 July 1990, Cyprus formally applied for full membership to the European
Community. Turkey, which had applied for EC membership in 1987, was strongly opposed
to the application. A similar response came from the Turkish Cypriots. However, in
September 1990 the EU Commission accepted the Cypriot application.
In response to the EU Commission, Turkey and the TRNC announced a declaration to
introduce a customs union and the removal of passport controls. In 1991, the Secretary-104 Ibid., p.18.
44
Chapter I
General reported that “he was focusing on a new constitutional arrangement to regulate the
relationship between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on a federal, bi-zonal and bi-
communal basis”.105 However the Secretary-General’s arrangements were rejected by both
sides. In October 1991, de Cuellar ended his efforts.
In January 1992 Boutros Boutros Ghali was elected as the new Secretary-General of the
UN. He continued to work on the set of ideas. Ker-Lindsay stated that “on 3 April 1992, he
presented the Security Council with the outline plan for the creation of a bi-zonal, bi-
communal federation that would prohibit any form of partition, secession or union with
another state”.106 Again, the Turkish Cypriots rejected negotiation on the set of ideas. They
argued that the UN was exceeding its authority. Furthermore the Turkish Cypriots
demanded direct talks with the Greek Cypriots without UN involvement. The offer was
rejected by the UN. However the Greek Cypriots accepted the set of ideas as the basis of
the negotiations without any preconditions.
Eventually the Turkish Cypriots returned to the negotiations on the set of ideas. According
to Dodd, “the Turkish Cypriots accepted 91 of the 100 UN proposals but they wanted a
rotating presidency, equality in the council of ministers, the rotation of ministers, the
removal of disparities between two states and the retention of 29% plus of the territory”.107
Ghali understood that too many conditions were being demanded from the Turkish side.
Ghali decided to approach the problem in a different way. He offered Confidence-Building
Measures (CBMs) for the development of goodwill. Five points were offered. These were
(a) reducing the military forces in the island, (b) transferring Varosha to direct UN control,
(c) reducing the restriction on contacts between the two sides, (d) undertaking an island-
wide census and (e) conducting feasibility studies regarding a solution.108
In February 1993, Glafkos Clerides was elected as the new president of Cyprus. According
to Ker-Lindsay, “Preelection hopes existed that the long standing relationship between
105 Ibid., p.19. New York Times, 5 August 1991, p.4.
106 Ibid., p.19.
107 Clement Dodd, Op. Cit., p.30.
108 See appendix 14-15 for the UN Security Council Resolution 789, 25 November 1992.
45
Chapter I
Clerides and Denktaş might enable the two sides to reach an agreement more easily were
seemingly confirmed when, shortly after the election, the two men met for dinner under
UN auspices”.109 On 24 May 1993 the CBMs were presented to both sides. The Turkish
Cypriots rejected the CBMs.
According to Dodd, “the main idea was for the area of Varosha on the east coast to be
ceded to the Greek Cypriots in return for the reopening of Nicosia International Airport”.110
The Turkish Cypriots feared losing its best bargaining counters. Greek Cypriots thought the
CBMs would give some sort of recognition to North Cyprus. At the same time the Republic
of Cyprus took a step towards joining the European Union (EU). The European
Commission (EC) agrees to start the negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus. “Instead,
after noting that a settlement would further reinforce its European vocation, the
commission concluded that as soon as the prospect of a settlement was surer it would be
ready to start the accession process”.111
At the end of the CBMs Ghali blamed the Turkish Cypriots for the collapse of talks. In
January 1994 Clerides informed Joe Clark, the UN envoy, that “discussions could not be
resumed on the CBMs as Denktaş refused to move from the position that he had adopted
the previous June in New York”.112 A few days later Denktaş accused the UN officials
particularly the Special representative of trying to force him to accept the CBMs. Clerides
then stated that “he could not continue to negotiate on the CBMs as Denktaş still did not
accept them”.113
1.4 The New Actors and the UN’s evolution in the Cyprus Problem
1.4.1 The New Actors: The European Union dimension, 1994-1997
109 James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.20.
110 Clement Dodd, Op. Cit., p.32.
111 James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.20.
112 Ibid., p.20.
113 Ibid., p.20.
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Chapter I
Henceforth Clerides concentrated on the issue of EU accession, the procurement of
arms and defence with Greece. At the Corfu European Council, held on 24-25 June 1994,
the EU officially confirmed that Cyprus and Malta would be included in the next wave of
enlargement. Shortly after the Corfu meeting the European Court of Justice forced
limitations on the export of goods from Northern Cyprus into the EU.114 The economic
activities were restricted to North Cyprus. The EU and Turkish relations were also
damaged when Greece blocked the final implementation of a custom union. According to
Semin Suvarierol “Therefore Turkey and the TRNC signed a common declaration on
December 28, 1995, which asserted that they only approve the accession of Cyprus to the
EU within the framework of a definite solution of the Cyprus problem”.115
In July 1996 the EU decided to open full membership talks with Cyprus six months after
the completion of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). Turkey reacted to the situation
with rejection. According to Ker-Lindsay, “Mr Murat Karayalçın, The Turkish Foreign
Minister, warned that the decision could lead to the permanent division of the island and
that any integration of the EU and the Greek Cypriots would be matched by Turkey and the
TRNC”.116
In August 1996, the most serious intercommunal clashes took places in Cyprus. “An anti
occupation motorcycle rally erupted into violence and eventually led to the death of two
Greek Cypriots. The fighting happened when a number of Greek Cypriot broke through
UN barriers and entered the buffer zone near the eastern town of Deryneia. There they
clashed with Turkish and Turkish Cypriot youths from the Grey wolves, a paramilitary
organisation. This led to the death of a Greek Cypriot. Soon afterwards, another Cypriot
was shot dead as he attempted to climb a Turkish flag pole.”117 The Greek Cypriots claimed
114 Stefan Talmon, “The Cyprus Question before the European Court of Justice”, (European Journal of law, Volume 12, Number 4, 2001), p.376.
115 Semin Suvarierol, “The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey's Road to Membership in the European Union”, (Turkish Studies; Vol.4, No.1, 2003), p.59.
116 James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.21.
117 Ibid., p.21
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to have identified the killer as being Kenan Akın, the Minister of Agriculture and Natural
Resources of the TRNC.118
In 1996 the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) concluded the Titina Loizidou case.
The court declared that Turkey was an occupying force in Cyprus. It was a legal case
regarding the rights of refugees wishing to return to their former homes and properties in
Kyrenia. According to the ECHR decision, “Titina Loizidou was awarded around $825,000
dollars after ruling that Turkey had violated her human rights by denying her access to her
property in the Turkish-controlled north of Cyprus”.119 For many years, Ankara refused to
pay the compensation. According to commentators “the significance of this case is not so
much in its financial impact but in the political repercussions. The stunning victory by
Titina Loizidou against Turkey is likely to impact […] on the UN brokered talks aimed at
reuniting Cyprus […] No refugee and/or land owner will surrender their land to facilitate a
bizonal bicommunal settlement which will lead to the permanent division of Cyprus”.120
In 1997, the Greek Cypriots had agreed on a contract with Russia to buy S300 surface to air
missiles. According to David Hannay, “the missiles in question had a sufficient range to
shoot down Turkish aircraft taking off from their bases in southern Turkey”.121 On the other
hand, the Clerides administration denied the Turkish complaint. The administration
claimed that the S300 anti-aircraft missile system was bought for the defence of southern
Cyprus. “The Turkish government protested vigorously when the Republic of Cyprus
announced its decision to purchase Russian S-300 missiles with a range of 150km in
January 1997”.122 The International community observed the situation as presenting a
118 The Cyprus New Agency, 10 September 1996, Akin denied the claims: Aktuel, (31 October 1996).
119 ‘World: Europe Turkey declines to pay damages to Greek Cypriot woman’, BBC, 28 October, 1998, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/203362.stm (accessed 5 May 2007).
120 Ayla Gürel & Kudret Özersay, “The Politics of Property in Cyprus Conflicting Appeals to ‘Bizonality’ and ‘Human Rights’ by the Two Cypriot Communities”, Institutt for fredsforskning (International Peace Research Institute), Oslo (PRIO), PRIO Report 3, 2006, p.26. See Eleni Apeyitou, ‘The Case of Loizidou vs. Turkey’, Human Rights Action, 24 September 1998, emphasis added; available at http://www.hr-action.org/action/ (accessed 5 May 2007).
121 David Hannay, Op. Cit., p.70.
122 Semin Suvarierol, Op. Cit., p.59. “It is worth noting that Cyprus is the most militarized island in the world. For further information on this and the crisis over the S-300 missiles", see Madeleine Demetriou, “On the Long Road to Europe and the Short Path to War: Issue-Linkage Politics and the Arms Build-up on Cyprus,” Mediterranean Politics, Vol.3, No.3, (Winter 1998), pp.38–51.
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dangerous shift in the military balance of Cyprus. Hannay stated that “the reaction in the
North of the island and in Ankara was strong and the Turkish foreign minister in particular
made some extremely bellicose statements which implied, although they did not state in
terms, that force might be used to prevent the delivery of the missiles from Russia or
against them once deployed”.123
1.4.2 The Revival of Peace Efforts, 1997-2001
In Early 1997 Mr Kofi Annan became the Secretary-General of the UN. He decided to
soften relations between the two sides and reactivated the peace process mission. Kofi
Annan wrote a letter to Clerides and Denktaş to invite them for face to face talks. Meetings
were held in Troutbeck (New York) in July and in Glion (Switzerland) in August. The UN
Secretary-General adopted different tactics from those used in 1984-1986 and in 1992. The
UN Secretary-General did not propose a constitution this time. He tried to get both sides to
agree on principles that would provide the basis for a constitution. This was a courageous
attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable. There were difficulties from the outset especially
over where sovereignty would be located The Greek Cypriots disagreed with the UN
suggestion that sovereignty emanates equally from the Greek and Turkish communities.
According to Dodd, “in Glion the UN changed its second draft Declaration mainly in
favour of the Greek Cypriot side dropping the shared sovereignty”.124 The Turkish Cypriots
decided to leave the meeting when the EU, towards the end of the Troutbeck meeting,
decided to open accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus. This also encouraged
Denktaş to say “he was only going to Glion to make the point that he could not participate
in any meaningful way if the TRNC was not recognized as equal”.125
The Turkish Cypriots and Turkey forgot that the UN only recognized the legitimate state of
the Republic of Cyprus. The TRNC is a de facto state which is only supported by Turkey.
Dodd stated that “after the Glion talks, Turkey and TRNC announced that the two states
123 David Hannay, Op. Cit., p.70.
124 Clement Dodd, Op. Cit., p.31.
125 Ibid., p.31.
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would pursue a policy of integration in the spheres of economy, finance, defence and
foreign affairs with a joint council to implement an agreement”.126
On 31 August 1998 Denktaş declared the confederal model as a solution to the Cyprus
problem. The International Community and the UN rejected the proposal. In December the
Clerides administration declared that the S300 missiles would be installed on Crete, rather
than Cyprus. After the huge 1999 earthquake in the south of Turkey Greco-Turkish,
tensions were softened. It was the year that Turkey broke the ice with Greece after years of
hostility which had often threatened to assume a military form. First Greece sent rescue
teams of doctors and nurses to Turkey. Then the Foreign Minster George Papandreou and
Ismail Cem agreed on a process of rapprochement.
In December 1999 in Helsinki, Greece lifted its veto against Turkey. Turkey obtained its
candidate status from the EU. The UN noted the positive movements between Greece and
Turkey and on 3 December UN decided to initiate the proximity talks in New York. Ker-
Ker-Lindsay stated that “even though the discussions continued through more rounds held
in Geneva and New York, by the fifth round, held in Geneva in November 2000, Denktaş
was increasingly critical of the role of the EU in the process”.127
On January 2001 Denktaş declared that he would not attend the sixth round of negotiations.
He again requested direct talks with the Greek Cypriots. In September 2001, Annan hoped
that the process of negotiations would start again but Denktaş rejected the request.
On 4 November, Prime Minister Ecevit announced that Turkey would not cave in to
pressure from the EU to reach settlement on the island. According to Ker-Lindsay, “If the
EU confirmed that Cyprus would join the EU Turkey would even consider annexing
Northern Cyprus”.128 This was the first time in history that the Turkish Prime Minister used
the term annexation in a direct manner. The EU decided to conclude the entry negotiations
with Cyprus and gave a 1 May 2004 membership deadline for the Republic of Cyprus.
126 Ibid., p.31.
127 James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.22.
128 Ibid., p.23.
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1.5 Conclusion
This chapter demonstrated the important historical events in Cyprus. There are many
phases where the UN tried to break the Gordian knot between the two sides. Since 1963, all
the efforts of the UN have ended in frustration. The UN was far more effective in its
peacekeeping function rather than its peacemaking mission. However some of the factors
necessary for a successful mediation were present in the peacemaking effort in Cyprus
between 1964 and 2001. Throughout the twenty-five years under review the peacemaking
efforts of the International Community centred mainly on the UN. The reader can also see
that the UN could not create an objective plan for both sides.
The crucial area of dispute on the Cyprus problem is clearly that of creating a political
system that satisfies both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Another factor is that of the time
factor. It is possible to observe that since the mid-1980’s finding a solution to the Cyprus
problem became more difficult with the 1990’s considered a time of deadlock between the
two sides. The Turkish Cypriot leadership managed to establish their state free from the
Greek Cypriot domination. The Greek Cypriots were aware that in fact the new Cyprus
would not look like the 1960 agreement. The main objection for the Greek Cypriot
leadership was the constant presence of the Turkish army, the property issues and the
Turkish settlers. On the other hand, The Turkish Cypriots always feared the issues of the
removal of the Turkish troops and the function of the new state.
The process was informal and flexible, and this suited the parties. The outside influence on
the Cyprus situation was also another major problem for the UN peacemaking agenda. The
US and its allies were very influential on both parties in the last 45 years. US policy on
Cyprus usually supported a prevention of the escalation of the conflict in shape of a Greco-
Turkish war. The British tried to secure their sovereignty bases. Russia throughout the
period under review tried to exploit the Cyprus problem for the furtherance of two main
objectives: to weaken the southern-eastern flank of NATO and maintain the independence
and non-alignment of Cyprus.129
129 See Robert Cutler, “M. Domestic and foreign influences on the Policy Making: the Soviet Union in the 1974 Cyprus conflict”, Soviet Studies, Vol. 37, No.1, January 1985, pp.60-89.
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Nevertheless, Russia was not directly involved in the problem. In this chapter it is possible
to observe that the mainland countries had a great influence over both communities and this
disturbed the UN. Turkey enjoyed a more direct and uninterrupted cultural and political
influence on the Turkish Cypriot community. The Greece and the Greek Cypriots tried to
achieve Enosis but there were many interruptions to their agenda. The 1974 Military
invasion of Turkey of the island changed Greek policy on Cyprus. It is also possible to
observe that Makarios’ thoughts on the concept of enosis fluctuated. After the 1990’s the
EU factor also became an important catalyst for both communities. In the early 1990’s the
EU supported the Greek Cypriots. This was because of Denktaş’s rejectionist politics on
the UN peacemaking agenda and the confederal idea of a solution to the Cyprus problem.
However, the EU changed its policy in the 1990’s deciding to cooperate with the UN.
52