chapter 000r-judge wood & his queens

8/14/2019 Chapter 000r-Judge Wood & His Queens

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Page 1 Chapter DRAFT-000R INSPECTOR-RIKATI on CITIZENSHIP & Why not voting Page 1A book on CD about ELECTORAL AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS

RRP $30.00 + P&H charges (where applicable) (ISBN 0-9751760-1-3 prior to 1-1-2007) ISBN 978-0-9751760-1-6PLEASE NOTE : You may order/purchase at http://www.schorel-hlavka.com or by facsimile 0011-61-3-94577209

The Chapter relating to the proceedings in a trial by jury ended that Wood J in July 2008instructed the Jury to return a verdict of NO GUILTY, this at the conclusion of theprosecutors case, where we had filed a NO CASE TO ANSWER , way back in 2006!

Chapter 000R JUDGE WOOD & HIS QUEENS* Gary, Are you trying to take a swipe on Judge Wood?

**#** INSPECTOR-RIKATI , actually, what I am trying to expose is what I view is one of thedumbest conclusions I ever came across in a reason of judgment, and the Reader has to make uptheir own kind if this was a judge dealing with LEGAL FACTS or LEGAL FICTION ..I WILL QUOTE PARTS OF PREVIOUS PUBLISHED BOOKS WE ALREADY HAVECANVASSED SOME OF THE MATTERS..The issue is that Wood J in the reason of judgment attacked the UNREPRESENTED Defendant inwhat I consider an extraordinary disgraceful manner. As the framers of the Constitution madeclear, once a person claims a legislation to be ULTRA VIRES then it remains so unless the Courtsoverrule it. Now, not some ruling because a judge fancy some own perception based on LEGAL

FICTION but a JUDICIAL RULING on LEGAL FACTS..The Commonwealth of Australia is acting on behalf of the states and therefore exercises the powersof the Queen in right of the State of Victoria as much as it does for the Queen in her right of theState of NSW, etc. The Commonwealth of Australia does not exist on its own without the states asits powers is derived from the former Colonies (now States) The Queen of Australia is a LEGALNONSENSE as it portrays a Queen without a country as the Commonwealth of Australia is notsome INDEPENDENT nation and cannot become one under the Constitution.And, as shown below no person can become a lawyer without citizenship and so neither then canbecome a judge!Then again, citizenship being a political position and not being a nationality as the

unconstitutional Australian Citizenship Act 1948 purports..Then again, as I understood it from the reason of judgment Wood J never even realised that the 15November ADDRESS TO THE COURT with the CD contained the about 50 submissions andfurther supportive material and then he had the gall, so to say, to verbosely attack theUNREPRESENTED Defendant where she had done no wrong, and justifiable understood to haveher case railroaded, where the judge didnt even bother to set out what she had presented assubmissions versus the failure of the Crown to set out if it agreed or not, and if not why not. A judge must be and so be seen to be impartial and not somehow conduct the case for the Crown, inparticular not where the issue of ABN connecting the Court with the Crown was an implied biasand no business can validly adjudicate.What indeed is the use of a party setting out in an elaborate manner submissions backed up withextensive researched material if in the end they judge claimed to have read all relevant material butnever appeared to me having in fact done so and then go off like anything making known in apublic statements, as a REASON OF JUDGMENT is to severely criticise the UNREPRESENTEDDefendant, and excusing the Crown. To me this was bullying a UNREPRESENTED Defendantwithout justified cause. I will below set out further matters but it doesnt cover everything as thatwould take reams of paperwork. However, what ought to be clear is that the Senate Represent theStates and therefore does not act for the Commonwealth as such but is obligated to vote for and onbehalf of the states which the Commonwealth represents in matters for which it has been providedlegislative powers, and citizenship is not one of them..


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As I have extensive set out below also; Hansard 10-3-1891 Constitution Convention DebatesQUOTE

Dr. COCKBURN: There have been only four amendments in this century. The hon. member,Mr. Inglis Clark, is a good authority on America, and I am sure he will agree with me that out of sixteen amendments only four have been agreed to in this century. All the other amendments whichhave been made were really amend- [start page 198] ments which were indicated almost at the veryframing of the constitution, and they may be said to be amendments which were embodied in theconstitution at the first start. The very element, the very essence, of federation is rigidity, and it isno use expecting that under a rigid and written constitution we can still preserve those advantageswhich we have reaped under an elastic constitution. All our experience hitherto has been under thecondition of parliamentary sovereignty. Parliament has been the supreme body . But when weembark on federation we throw parliamentary sovereignty overboard. Parliament is nolonger supreme. Our parliaments at present are not only legislative, but constituent bodies.They have not only the power of legislation, but the power of amending their constitutions.That must disappear at once on the abolition of parliamentary sovereignty. No parliamentunder a federation can be a constituent body; it will cease to have the power of changing itsconstitution at its own will.

.As such, Section 16 of the Victorian Constitution Act 1975 is ULTRA VIRES , because theVictorian Constitution Act 1975 itself was not approved by a State Referendum, and this it seemsWood J of the County Court of Victoria hasnt got a clue about, and so relies upon some section of an ULTRA VIRES legislation!.The following applies as much to Federal laws of the Commonwealth of Australia as it does tofederal laws in the USA;http://familyguardian.tax-tactics.com/Subjects/LawAndGovt/ChallJurisdiction/AuthoritiesArticle/AuthOnJurisdiction.htm

The general misconception is that any statute passed by legislators bearing the appearance of law constitutes

the law of the land. The U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and any statute, to be valid, must bein agreement. It is impossible for both the Constitution and a law violating it to be valid; one must prevail. Thisis succinctly stated as follows:

The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, though having the form and name of law, is in reality nolaw, but is wholly void, and ineffective for any purpose; since unconstitutionality dates from the time of itsenactment, and not merely from the date of the decision so branding it. An unconstitutional law, in legalcontemplation, is as inoperative as if it had never been passed. Such a statute leaves the question that itpurports to settle just as it would be had the statute not been enacted.

Since an unconstitutional law is void, the general principles follow that it imposes no duties, confers no rights,creates no office, bestows no power or authority on anyone, affords no protection, and justifies no actsperformed under it. . .

A void act cannot be legally consistent with a valid one. An unconstitutional law cannot operate to supersedeany existing valid law. Indeed, insofar as a statute runs counter to the fundamental law of the land, it issuperseded thereby.

No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to enforce it.

Sixteenth American JurisprudenceSecond Edition, 1998 version, Section 203 (formerly Section 256)

Quick & Garran's " Annotated Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia " more accuratelyand more meaningfully says that;


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"A law in excess of the authority conferred by the Constitution is no law; it is wholly voidand inoperative; it confers no rights, it imposes no duties; it affords no protection.".

Hansard 1-3-1898 Constitution Convention DebatesMr. GORDON .-

Once a law is passed anybody can say that it is being improperly administered, and it leaves open thewhole judicial power once the question of ultra vires is raised.

Again;and it leaves open the whole judicial power once the question of ultra vires is raised

Hansard 1-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

Mr. SYMON .-It is not a law if it is ultra vires .

Mr. GORDON .-It would be law by acquiescence. It would remain a law until it was attacked. It mightinjure a few individuals, but that might be to the benefit of the whole. Or if it were not, the party whose area of power was infringed on would attack if.

Again;It would remain a law until it was attacked.

Clearly, once I objected to the constitutional validity of the proclamation, writ(s), election, etc thenfrom that moment it was and remained ULTRA VIRES ..The following is the same regarding State legislation as if in relation to federal legislation where itis in breach of constitutional provisions;

Hansard 1-3-1898 Constitution Convention DebatesQUOTE

Mr. GLYNN .-The Federal Parliament can affect the prerogative, but only within the limits prescribed by thisAct.

And

Mr. SYMON .-Do you think acquiescence would make a law if the law passed by the CommonwealthParliament was ultra vires ?

Mr. GORDON .-It would until the law was impugned. If the state did not impugn that law it would remain inforce. It is a law, and it could be allowed to be valid by the force of acquiescence. And here is another point. Theproposal which I am supporting, to some extent keeps a remnant of parliamentary sovereignty over the strictinterpretation of the courts.

Mr. FRASER .-That is too abstruse for laymen altogether.

Mr. GORDON .-Well, I think not. I am sure that if the honorable member applies his mind to the subject hewill see it is not abstruse. If a statute of either the Federal or the states Parliament be taken into court the court isbound to give an interpretation according to the strict hyper-refinements of the law. It may be a good law passedby "the sovereign will of the people," although that latter phrase is a common one which I do not care muchabout. The court may say-" It is a good law, but as it technically infringes on the Constitution we will have to

wipe it out. " As I have said, the proposal I support retains some remnant of parliamentary sovereignty, leaving itto the will of Parliament on either side to attack each other's laws.

END QUOTE.QUOTE

Mr. ISAACS .-That might make persons criminals who were not otherwise criminals. It might not havebeen an offence to do a certain thing if the High Court declared the law to be ultra vires , but if that lawwas made intra vires from an antecedent date, all the persons who did that thing might be subject topunishment.

END QUOTE.


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QUOTEMr. ISAACS .-You say the people accept the position in law; but they are asked whether they will change the

Constitution.

[start page 1721]

Mr. HOLDER .-That is exactly it. I would never dream of asking the people to reverse a legal decision arrivedat by the High Court. I have been specially careful in the form of the amendment to avoid any such thing. I donot dream that the High Court will on one day say that a certain Bill is ultra vires , and that the people shall theday after, or some months after, say the court was wrong. That is not what I suggest. I suggest that the peopleshould accept the decision of the High Court that the law was ultra vires , but should say it ought not to be ultravires -that the Constitution should be enlarged so that such a decision could not be given again. I do not wish toleave it to the people to say that the decision was wrong, but to leave them to say that the Constitution should beso enlarged so as to-make such a decision impossible in the future. That is a different thing from making thepeople Judges or giving them a judicial position. I really feel very hopeless as a layman addressing theConvention on a very technical legal point like this. I quite anticipate-and though this is not a wise thing to say, Ido not mind saying it-I quite anticipate defeat before I sit down. At the same time, I shall not cease to regretdefeat if it comes, nor shall I cease to believe that this way out, or some other which the Drafting Committeecould easily suggest, ought to be adopted, so as to avoid the possibility of anybody outside saying, with anyappearance of truth, that this is a lawyer-written Constitution. I want to move the motion in a slightly differentform. I want to leave out the word "High" before "Court" in each case, so that the word "court" only shall stand. Imean that word to cover not merely the decision of the High Court, but the decision of the last court of appealfrom the High Court, if that appeal be made. With that alteration, I move the amendment standing in my name.

Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).-I move that progress be reported. I wish to make a statement withoutdiscussing the question. I should like honorable members not to go away when progress is reported, because Iwish to get an order for the printing of the Bill with the amendments so far, and for the Drafting Committee'samendments to be embodied pro forma in the Bill. In order to do that the standing orders will have to besuspended, and that requires the attendance of a majority of the House.

Mr. DOBSON (Tasmania).-Would it not be better for the leader of the Convention (Mr. Barton) to answer thearguments of Mr. Holder, and let a division be taken? If we do not take a division tonight we shall occupy thewhole of tomorrow in discussing this question, which includes that of the High Court, the referendum, anddeadlocks.

Mr. BARTON .-After the opinion some persons outside seem to hold about lawyers, I shall leave thediscussion of this matter to the laymen.

The motion was agreed to.

Progress was then reported.

The standing orders having been suspended,

Hansard 2-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

Mr. ISAACS .-It compels everybody who has obeyed the decision of the higher courts to act, or refrain fromacting. That is a position which none of us would willingly get into, and the retrospective action is wrong.

AndMr. ISAACS .-

Unless the honorable member is willing to amend his clause in that respect, we should only complicate matters,and if retrospective operation were given to it we should be lending ourselves to what would be, quiteunintentionally on the part of the honorable member, a gross injustice.

And

The CHAIRMAN .-I would point out that clause 121 says that the provisions [start page 1729] of theConstitution shall not be altered except in the manner following-that is, by an absolute majority of theSenate and of the House of Representatives. That seems to me to be conclusive.

Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).-I share in the objections which so many honorable members have offeredto this clause. I certainly hope that I shall not be taken to be speaking simply as a lawyer, and with a desire that


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this Constitution should be under the law and lawyers, when I express my objections to it. I agree with what hasbeen said to the effect-although there is a great weight to be attached to Mr. Holder's argument-that the clausewill operate as an appeal from the High Court to a popular authority-an appeal to an authority which, at any rate,is not a competent authority on a question of law. As to the question of making a law, the people ultimately areno doubt the best authority, but on the question as to the reading of a law they can scarcely be the best authority.There is a difficulty in this clause which also presents itself to me-that is, it works only one way. Where a lawhas been decided by the High Court to be ultra vires , by this appeal to the people it may be decided to beintra vires of the Constitution from the beginning. Take the case of a law which the High Court decides to bewithin the Constitution, and which the people have a very strong opinion is outside the bounds of the

Constitution, and that the court has been wrong there. Now, if it is right to make a clause of this kind operate forthe purposes of appeal in the one case, it is equally right to make it operate for the purposes of appeal in theother.

Mr. ISAACS .-That is not necessary. The people have it in their power to repeal an Act if they do not like it.

Mr. BARTON .-In this case the object is to enable the people to make valid that which under the Constitutionis invalid. If you make the clause work one way, what reason is there for not making it work the other? Withreference to the general effects of the clause, it seems to be clear that where the High Court has wronglydecided a matter to be intra vires of the Constitution , you provide no sort of way of dealing with it exceptingby repeal.

AndMr. BARTON .-

All I am arguing is, that the effect of the clause would be the same as if he had done so. There is not muchdifference between saying, as is said in this clause, that when the High Court has decided a matter to be ultravires you may remit it to the people, who may determine that it is within the powers of the Constitution, whichwould be a reversal in one sense of the decision of the High [start page 1730] Court, and saying boldly, and atonce, that if the High Court declares the law to be ultra vires the people may decide that it is intra vires .

Mr. SYMON .-It is a matter of form.

Mr. BARTON .-Yes, the difference between these two procedures is simply a matter of form. In the clause thewords are used "and the law shall be conclusively deemed to have been intra vires of this Constitution from thepassing thereof." The peculiarity of this part of the clause is very striking, because the words I have read followthese words-"and if approved as therein provided the Constitution shall be deemed to have been enlarged." If theConstitution is to have been deemed to have been enlarged for that contingency it is only because the law wasultra vires . If you carry that further and say that it is intra vires , what do you want with any enlargement? It isquite inconsistent. It amounts to saying that the Constitution has been enlarged, and that is only necessary if thelaw was ultra vires . And yet it is followed by the words-"and the law shall be conclusively deemed to have beenintra vires ," which is to decide that the High Court was not right but wrong.

Mr. KINGSTON .-That is like the passing of a Validating Act.

Mr. BARTON .-No; a Validating Act does not put things in that way, and I say that that is an objection of more than form. When you say that the Constitution shall have been deemed to have been enlarged, you decidethat the Constitution requires amendment in that particular, but when you say that the law shall be conclusivelydeemed, to have been intra vires from the passing thereof, then you decide that the Constitution does not requireamendment. There is very considerable not only ambiguity, but contradiction in the proposal. What are we askedto authorize the people to do-to decide that the High Court was right? In which case their decision could onlyhave effect if it operate as an enlargement, or to decide that the High Court is wrong, in which case theConstitution is sufficient from the beginning. We ought to know which road we are to take before we vote on theclause. It seems tome that the objection there is a strong one, and that it requires some answer. I shall not nowrepeat the arguments adduced by other honorable members against the clause. That is unnecessary. But I do saythat I have not been at all convinced that it is our duty to adopt the clause.

Mr. ISAACS .-There is one additional difficulty, which my honorable friend (Dr. Quick) has suggested. TheConstitution would be deemed to be enlarged by the passing of a law, but if you wanted to alter or amend it youcould not do so.

Mr. HOLDER .-That is the point Mr. O'Connor mentioned last night.


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Mr. BARTON .-That is to say that, the law having been passed, and the Constitution having beenenlarged, the Constitution has been amended.

Mr. ISAACS .-That is all. You could not alter a word of it.

Mr. BARTON .-No, you would have to take the question of whether the Constitution was really amended orenlarged; but the decision might mean that the Constitution did not require enlargement at all.

And

Sir EDWARD BRADDON .-Does the honorable member think that if an appeal were made to the people toupset the judgment of the Supreme Court, the case could be so clearly put before the electors that they would beable to give an intelligent verdict upon it?

Mr. HOLDER .-I should not dream for an instant of asking the people to consider, much less to either confirmor reverse, any decision of any competent court, because I do not think that they would be competent topronounce an opinion in regard to such a matter. But I would allow the people to say-"The Supreme Court isright, and to cure the defect in the Constitution which has been sprung upon us we want to see it enlarged, so thatanother similar decision will be impossible." I do not propose to ask the people to adjudicate upon the decisionsof the Supreme Court, but I wish to give them power to enlarge the Constitution in accordance with the decisionof the Supreme Court.

Mr. Holder's proposed new clause 121A, was, by leave, withdrawn.

Legislation can be ULTRA VIRES in regard of certain persons while INTRA VIRES in regard of others. Hence, one should be careful not to confuse matters.

Hansard 28-1-1898 Constitution Convention DebatesMr. WISE (New South Wales).-

He lays down in express terms the principle which Judge Shipman used as the basis of his judgment in the case Icited yesterday from 22 Blatchford, 131, that is to say, if a state passes a law the effect of which is to injure theterritory or property of persons outside the state-that may not be the intention, but if the direct effect is to inflictinjury upon the territory or property of citizens in another state-then that law, although in so far as it only affectscitizens within the state that passes it, it is intra vires of the Constitution, it becomes ultra vires in so far as itinflicts injury on the inhabitants of another state. That, I believe, was the intention, although I feel somediffidence in insisting upon it. This was the view which formed the basis of the judgment of Mr. Justice

Shipman.Therefore legislative provisions are ULTRA VIRES for so far it trespasses upon the constitutionallimitations of legislative powers.

Also, while in the above it was referred to about the High Court of Australia declaring something tobe ULTRA VIRES , and this was in the HCA 27 of 1999 Wakim case regarding the purportedCross Vesting Act , this was no more then but an official declaration but the parties were before theCourts already and if the Cross Vesting Act was to be deemed only INTRA VIRES from when theHigh Court of Australia made its declaration then it would have been to little avail for the partyseeking this declaration. Clearly, it was ULTRA VIRES from onset.

Hansard 1-3-1898 Constitution Convention DebatesMr. GORDON .-Once a law is passed anybody can say that it is being improperly administered, and it leaves open the

whole judicial power once the question of ultra vires is raised.

Quick & Garran's " Annotated Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia " more accuratelyand more meaningfully says that;

"A law in excess of the authority conferred by the Constitution is no law; it is wholly void and inoperative;it confers no rights, it imposes no duties; it affords no protection.".

Therefore, once a person makes a constitutional based objection then that is the end of it.


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END QUOTE

* All right, let loose on your tirade upon Judge Wood..**#** I would not call it a tirade rather that I am, so to say, flabbergasted that a judge can makesuch an extraordinary statement without even bothering to set out the positions of both parties. Assuch, it appears to me that you can forget about what is legally applicable just ask the judge hisviews and you can ignore about having a proper litigation..* Can I ask you, is this the Judge Wood who was so much telling an UNREPRESENTEDDefendant that she may need legal representation?.**#** Yes, as he himself, as I understand it, never even realised what was to be considered for the judgment..

* Are you then not interfering with the course of justice by this Chapter?.**#** Not at all, as I am well entitled as a Author to criticise a Judge for what I consider to be anabsurd kind of judgment that even a first year law student could have produced a better judgement.I did forward an email to the Associate of Judge Wood Mr Ed Sullivan as follows;QUOTE 15-2-2008 EMAILSir,This email is forwarded not in the position of being the Attorney for Ms van Rooy, but as a personwho for decades has researched reasons of judgments in assisting people in their litigation..For the record, I am not aware ever having had any cases involving Justice Wood and as such my

comments are not bias in that regard..As Author of books in the INSPECTOR-RIKATI series on constitutional and other legal issues Ido at times expose what I consider misconceived or ill conceived judgment..It is my view that the 6-2-2008 judgment of Wood J in the matter of No. S02604146 van Rooy ispossibly one of the worst and most ill conceived and misconceived judgments I ever came (over thedecades) across..I do not know what the standards of judicial adjudication is in the Country Court of Victoria but, soto say, to me this judgment to me does take the cake..I propose in future to publish a book about this judgment and what my views are about it, while inthe meantime providing Ms van Rooy also with this statement she may or may not as such wish toincorporate in her material..Neil v Nott (1994) 68 ALJR 509 at 510 (High Court)"A frequent consequence of self representation is that the court must assume the burden of endeavouring to ascertain the rights of the parties which are obfuscated by their own advocacy".


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My views in this regard are expressed below and I invite you to respond to them so I may in futurepublish it also in a forthcoming book, as to avoid any complaint that I have not provided thisopportunity to you on behalf of His Honour..I may state that already in my email of 7-2-2008 to [email protected] Iexpressed my concerns even so then not even having read the Reason of Judgment. His Honour'sown comments appear to underline that Ms Van Rooy was still on about the issue of non-compliance by the Crown to the 15 November 2008 orders, which His Honour appears to acceptoccurred, where His Honour had somehow gone over to the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTIONmatter without informing the UNREPRESENTED Defendant Ms van Rooy he actually had doneso..Indeed where His Honour indicates willing to proceed with a trial regardless of any appeal, and youalready having indicated, as I understand it to be, that an Appeal does not operate as a stay of proceedings, then I am extremely concerned how any UNREPRESENTED Defendant, not just Msvan Rooy, could possible obtain a fair and proper trial if a judge has this kind of conduct?.Judicial officers do need to consider the submissions of both parties and then do end with a

conclusion that one of the parties may dislike and this is part of the legal process and itself is not anissue that one can criticise a judicial officer for, however, when a Reason of Judgment is so, as Iview, defective. ill conceived, miss conceived, etc and display a lack of understanding/considerationto the issues that were before the Court then I view a party so deprived on a proper Reason of Judgment may be justified to have concluded his/her case was, so to say, railroaded..I am expressing my personal views and if Ms van Rooy does or does not accept those views asbeing so perceived also by her is another matter. However, I do view it is essential that I provideHis Honour, through his Associate, an opportunity to respond, even if in the end no response will beforthcoming..

A publication of the Book would obviously after any proceedings that are currently before the Courtregarding the matters to which the Reason of Judgement are relating to are completed orpermanently stayed as to avoid any conflict with the case and Ms van Rooy;s rights while the caseis actually being litigated..A copy of this email will also be forwarded to the Crown, and it too is invited to respond so itsresponse can be published..I now express my views about the judgmentQUOTE

Some, but not all of the Grounds of appeal (albeit will be set out in a more appropriate format)regarding the Woods 6-2-2008 orders indicating that a judge, so to say, fresh to the caseappears to be bias and failed to understand and comprehend this complex case and sounderlining that unlikely any other judge may likely do so having far less time to read allmaterial as His Honour Wood claimed to have done are; That His Honour Wood by way of 6-2-2008 Reasons of Judgment appeared to be judicial bias, failed to appreciate dealing with aunrepresented Defendant, failed to follow proper procedures to deal with matters, misused hisposition to dismiss the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION even so His Honour himself accepteda failure by the Crown to comply with the 15 November 2006 orders of Gullaci J (and therebyfailing to prove jurisdiction), and other matters which underlines that His Honour Wood despiteclaiming (on 13-2-2008) having spend the afternoon, the evening and the morning on readingthe material failed totally to understand, comprehend and so to judicially consider the relevant


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issues and each element of the OBJECTION OF JURISDICTION the Defendant had raised,failed to invoke federal jurisdiction and as such failed to appropriately dismiss the OBJECTIONTO JURISDICTION INVOLVING FEDERAL ISSUES, FAILING TO DISMISS THE Form78B NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS by which His Honour purported to havedismissed the Defendants case of non compliance by the crown as well as the OBJECTION OFJURISDICTION, this even so His Honour actually never did so, and neither had specificallyindicated to the unrepresented Defendant that His Honour no longer was dealing with the issueof compliance or non-compliance of the Crown with the 15 November 2006 orders of Gullaci Jand had moved on to the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION, and so denied theUNREPRESENTED Defendant any proper opportunity to address the issue of the OBJECTIONTO JURISDICTION. His Honour himself on 13 February 2008 (after the judgment) indicatedthe issue of what may be an unfair trial therefore was a judicial officer who appeared to beaware that the Appeal Courts had been very critical upon judges failing to provide appropriateassistance to an UNREPRESENTED Defendant to ensure that this UNREPRESENTEDDefendant was aware as to what His Honour was dealing with. That it was not for His HonourWood to rob the UNREPRESENTED Defendant having the benefits of the 15 November 2006orders of Gullaci J, that the Crown was bound by the orders. Where then His Honour himself concluded that the Crown failed to comply with these 15 November 2006 orders then it was not

for His Honour to assume there was JURISDICTION where the Crown having the onus toprove this by seeking to defeat each and every element of the OBJECTION TOJURISDICTION and the unchallenged Section 78B of the NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONALMATTERS had failed to do so. His Honour referring to matters in a totally differentconstruction then the UNREPRESENTED Defendant so painfully had carefully set out in hermaterial as to try to get even ordinary people not skilled in legal matters tounderstand/comprehend what the real issues were about underlines that His Honour assumptionthat the Crown would not have assisted even if they had complied with the 15 November 2006orders of Gullaci J was not only an ill conceived and miss conceived argument as where theUNREPRESENTED Defendant maintained to claim the benefits of the Orders His HonourWood has no judicial powers to rob her of those benefits but also that His Honour excused the

non-compliance because His Honour himself failed to understand and comprehend what wasapplicable. Indeed, if the Crown had set out matters it may very well have avoided this grossmiscarriage of justice, as then His Honour could have had precisely the kind of presentationbefore him that His Honour Gullaci J all along intended there would be and so ordered on 15November 2006. A Clear example is the misconception about the Court charging GST, that HisHonour claimed was not applicable. The UNREPRESENTED Defendant had not made such asubmission at all, rather had raised the issue of the GST as being a Federal legislation thatresulted in Courts being ABN/CAN registered and by this causing the Courts to engage in abusiness structure shared with others, such as the Department of Justice (including the Office of Public Prosecutions, a.k.a OPP/DPP) the Prostitution Control Commission, etc, and that thiscaused the Court to be or implied to be bias towards the Crown as well ads causing the Court tobe a business entity, which cannot adjudicate as a Court of Law. The State of Victoria being aregistered business entity in the USA sharing the same ABN/CAN number with the Courtthereby implicatively passed this status by this also on to the Court. His Honour indicating thatthe Section 78B was misconceived and had stated so already during the hearing, before evenhaving read the material and as such was bias or implied bias and also by this proved that HisHonour failed to be open minded as to read the material in a manner in particular where it dealswith an UNREPRESENTED Defendant presenting a case by written submissions, that HisHonour will deal with issues without a prejudged mind. That his Honour failing tounderstand/comprehend the implication of federal issues and as such failing tounderstand/comprehend that only by invoking federal jurisdiction His Honour could effectivelydismiss the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION and the unchallenged Form 78B NOTICE OF


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CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS, then His Honour albeit pretending that the OBJECTION TOJURISDICTION did fail never for this effectively did so as a State Court that fails to invokefederal jurisdiction cannot dispose of a federal matter. His Honours error to disregard theapplication of federal issues, and to rely upon Section 16 of the Victorian Constitution even sothe UNREPRESENTED Defendant had in her WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS extensively disputedthe validity of the Victorian Constitution Act 1975 which contained the section 16 His Honourrelied upon then it was His Honour who clearly grossly erred in law. That albeit His Honour didseek to rely upon Authorities ,in regard of the extend of the application of section 16 of theVictorian Constitution act 1975, this was irrelevant as if the Parliament of Victoria in the firstplace lacked the legislative powers, as the UNREPRESENTED Defendant had maintained toamend the Colonies original Constitution since the 1901 Federation, then the whole of thelegislation is in question and His Honour therefore was bound to address the issue of thevalidity of the Victorian Constitution Act 1975, as challenged by the UNREPRESENTEDDefendant, and not merely assume it was nevertheless a valid enactment. Where the validity of the Victorian Constitution Act 1901 has its origin in what the Framers of the Constitution(Commonwealth of Australia Act 1901 (UK)) made clear and so extensively canvassed by theUNREPRESENTED Defendant, that the Colonial Parliament by becoming State Parliament nolonger had the powers to amend their own constitutions as they changed from sovereign

Parliament to constitutional Parliament, then while His Honour may not appreciate thisextensive set out by the UNREPRESENTED Defendant it never should excuse for a judge thento ignore these relevant issues. Regardless if the Defendant is represented orUNREPRESENTED, it did not excuse the Defendant from compliance with the 15 November2006 orders of Gullaci J and the UNREPRESENTED Defendant clearly was recognised by HisHonour Wood J to have complied with these orders., and as such the UNREPRESENTEDDefendant should not then be robbed of the benefits of the orders. While His Honour in hisReason of Judgment relied upon Authorities His Honour seemed to fail to understand that theUNREPRESENTED Defendant in her WRITTEN SUBMISSION had made clear that she reliedupon her Attorney Mr. G. H. Schorel-Hlavka and his assistance in the case and had raised issuesno Court ever before had canvassed. Hence, it was therefore highly inappropriate for His

Honour to rely upon Authorities which had never considered the details that now were beforeHis Honour. No matter how cumbersome it may have been to His Honour to deal with each andevery element of the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION which also included a CD presentationof details/information and Authorities it was essential and an onus upon His Honour to reflect inthe Reason of Judgment that His Honour had appropriately considered each and every elementof the OBJECTION OF JURISDICTION as well as the Section 78B NOTICE OFCONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS in an appropriate manner, showing to set out the argument of each element put by the UNREPRESENTED Defendant in her WRITTTEN SUBMISSIONSand that, if any, put by the Crown in its submissions. His Honour arguments about thecitizenship issue also underlined that His Honour never understood that the Victorian SupremeCourt, as the UNREPRESENTED Defendant referred to in her WRITTEN SUBMISSIONSitself had made clear that the oath was relevant, etc, and as such citizenship was relevant to thevalidity of an appointment of a person to be a lawyer as admitted to the Supreme Court of Victoria Bar, and failing this a judge could not be validly appointed if the judge in question wasnot appropriately admitted to the Victorian Supreme Court Bar. The UNREPRESENTEDDefendant having had been directed in October 2006 to provide her arguments as to the Section78 NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS and her OBJECTION TO JURISDICTIONby way of WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS, and the UNREPRESENTED Defendant having done soand His Honour on 15 November 2006 having , as must be implied by the orders, accepted thatthe Crown (OPP) had to overcome the objections and constitutional issues raised by theUNREPRESENTED Defendant then was entitled that where she had in an elaborate manner setout matters and canvassed the relevant issues that basically a first year law student ought to be


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able to understand the issues, after giving sufficient and appropriate time to consider the mattersset out, then His Honours ill conceived and miss conceived Reason of Judgment about theapplication of federal issues and that federal law was not relevant, etc, may underline that HisHonour regardless of the claimed amount of time having spend reading the WRITTENSUBMISSION, albeit fail to refer to the CD content as well as the content of the S78B NOTICEOF CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS then could not have been considering in a judicial mannerall relevant details that were before the Court. His Honour wood therefore appeared to havedenied the UNREPRESENTED Defendant a fair and proper trial and if this is eventuating witha judicial officer who claims to have spend such considerable amount of time reading materialthen the UNREPRESENTED Defendant unlikely would have any hope in the world to obtain afair and proper trial by another judge either who would not have the inclination and/or the timeto try to gather what the UNREPRESENTED Defendants case really is about.

END QUOTE.It ought to be pointed out this is a mere summary and not intended and neither must be perceived tooutline all issues/defects I view there to exist in relation to the reason of Judgment.I would not mind if you wish to provide a contribution to add perhaps more issues of defects, etc, if you were to be concerned that I have perhaps overlooked to raise some, albeit again, I have not as

yet addressed the whole of the Reason of Judgment..As a member of the public , I for one could not conceive that the Reason of Judgment adequatelyreflects what the case was before the Court, and yet a Reason of Judgment ought to do so as toindicate to the general public that the Court dispensed JUSTICE. Litigation before the Courts areafter all pursued on behalf of the general public, in the name of the Crown, and so I for one like tosee a competent judgment from judicial officers each time they adjudicate that reflects the issuesthat were before the Court and that also displays the Court has shown to have consider the issuesand appropriately disposed of them. This, I regret to say, I do not at all conclude of the 6-2-2008Reason of Judgment and hence I propose to write about it in a forthcoming book and for this inviteyou and others to provide for response that I then can include so my Readers for themselves can

ascertain if my views about the Reason of Judgment may have merits or not and are or are notthemselves misconceived/ill conceived or that indeed the reason of Judgment fails the standard of being considered a reasonable reflection of what the case was about upon which the Courtadjudicated..For the record, I have already published books in which I have set out issues of concern regardingHigh Court of Australia and other Reason of Judgments and as such the 6-2-2008 Reason of Judgment is not the first and neither would be the last Reason of Judgment that I write and cast myviews about..END QUOTE 15-2-22008 EMAIL

* Did you get a response?.**#** Not at all. Anyhow, lets have a look at the PUBLIC DOCUMENT the Court order actuallyis;QUOTE 6-2-2008 REASON OF JUDGMENT OF WOOD J

(Revised)

(His Honour Judge Wood)


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R U L I N G

HIS HONOUR: These are my reasons in response to the application

that Ms Van Rooy has orally put this morning and my reasons in

respect of the written submissions, being the three volumes

plus her response to the Crown's submissions to the court. I

also acknowledge that I have read all of the relevant material

including His Honour Judge Gullaci's various transcripts and

orders.

First I will set out the history of this matter.

By information dated 6 November 2004 the informant

Detective Sergeant Reed charged the defendant with tenoffences each alleged to have been committed on 1 November

2004. The defendant appeared before the Heidelberg

Magistrates' Court on 11 February 2004 and following committal

proceedings in September of 2005 she was committed to stand

trial in this court on 15 September 2005.

On 11 November 2005 the defendant appeared in this court

at a mention hearing.

On 10 March 2006 and later on 3 April 2006 the Court of

Appeal of this State and then on 3 April the High Court of

Australia dealt with other matters which the defendant raised

in proceedings that are not connected with these proceedings,

as Ms Van Rooy made clear to me this morning. So the next

step is that on 2 August 2006 the defendant appeared before

His Honour Judge Gullaci and the defendant was granted an

adjournment to 18 August 2006 in order to further prepare her

defence.

The trial was further adjourned on 18 August 2006 to 2

October 2006 and on the latter date to 5 November 2006. The


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reasons for these adjournments were various and

included proposed challenges to the jurisdiction of the court

by the defendant, the unavailability of Crown witnesses and

mention is also made, perhaps of obtaining a nolle prosequi in

respect of the proceedings before this court.

However, on 15 November 2006 His Honour Judge Gullaci made

interlocutory orders. This was necessary as the defendant had

submitted a very detailed complex submission

of 464 pages divided into 106 paragraphs contained in three

Spirex bound volumes which, as I understand it, was also

submitted to the Attorney-General of New South Wales, Victoriaand the Commonwealth. In this submission the defendant submitted

that the proceedings before this court were not justiciable

because for various reasons, which I shall shortly summarise,

this court lacked jurisdiction principally because various

Federal enactments were inconsistent with the constitution of the

Commonwealth of Australia. For reasons that I shall shortly give

these objections are baseless.

His Honour Judge Gullaci directed the Crown to respond

to the submission within three months, that is to say, by 15

February 2007 and he afforded the defendant the right to

reply which she availed herself of. The Crown and the

defendant delivered their submissions.

His Honour set a trial date for 4 February 2008 and the

trial came on before the Chief Judge on that date. The Chief

Judge in turn appointed me on that day to hear the defendant's

application or applications and the proceedings commenced

before me yesterday. Regrettably, the file presented to both

the Chief Judge and myself was grossly incomplete in that it


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contravene the Federal Constitution. They do

not in my ruling because the source of power to enact these

proceedings is the Constitution of the State of Victoria. The

sovereign power is Her Majesty the Queen in

right in the State of Victoria rather than Her Majesty the

Queen in right of the Commonwealth of Australia.

Section 16 of the Constitution Act 1975 being Act number

8750 of 1975 which I shall for the purposes of brevity refer

to as the Victorian Constitution, contains numerous provisions

and interesting enough in Part VIII the supply and delivery of

water which seems most appropriate in these troubled times,but nonetheless I digress.

Section 16 of the Constitution Act is in the following

terms: "Legislative power of Parliament, Parliament shall

have power to make laws in and for Victoria in all cases

whatsoever."

The High Court on a number of occasions has had to

consider the meaning of that section and equivalent sections

of interstate legislation. I refer to the cases noted by

Mr Murray James (of the Office of Public Prosecutions)in the

submission direction by His Honour Judge Gullaci by way of

response to the defendant's submission. Reference is there

made to the well-known decision of the High Court in Levy v.

the State of Victoria (1996)189 C.L.R. 579 at page 642 where

His Honour Mr Justice Kirby in referring to s.16 of the

Victorian Constitution stated, and I quote:

"As far as the Victorian Constitution wasconcerned, the defendant has pointed to the largegrant of legislative power in that instrument. Infact, it could hardly have been expressed in more


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general terms.Such a grant has been held to be plenary."

His Honour referred to various cases, being R v. Burra,

Mc-Cawley v. RT King, Union Young Steamship Co. of Australia v.

King and continued:

"The Victorian Constitution is not the kind ofrigid document controlling, as the AustralianConstitution does, all laws made under theauthority of Parliament".

And in the later decision of Kable v. DPP (NSW) (1999)

189 C.L.R. 51 at page 81 His Honour Mr Justice Dawson quoted

with approval a passage in the judgment of their Honours, the

Chief Justice, Chief Justice Knox as he then was, Rich andDixon JJ in Le Mesurier v. Connor (1929) 42 C.L.R. 481,

495-496:

"The Parliament may create Federal courts and overthem and their organisations it has many amplepowers, but the courts of the States are judicialorgans of another government. They are created bystate law. Their existence depends upon state law.That law, primarily at least, determines theconstitution of the court itself and theorganisations through which its powers andjurisdictions are exercised."

Pursuant to that power, that legislative power contained

in s.16 of the state constitution, the Victorian Parliament

has enacted the Crimes Act 1958 under which the defendant is

charged. The Magistrates' Court Act s.25(1)(b) which

empowered a Magistrates' Court to conduct a committal

proceedings in respect of an indictable offence. I pause to

observe that the offence, although the defendant was charged

on a number of counts before the Magistrates' Court, they

included the count now before this court, it being an

indictable count; that pursuant to the Crimes Act - I


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apologise. I had thought that I flagged but I haven't got it.

I am referring to the power of the Director of Public

Prosecutions to make presentment before this court, Mr

Southey. Do you know the section number offhand, do you

remember?

MR SOUTHEY: I don't I'm afraid, Your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: Perhaps your instructor can find it. I'm trying to

find it. I will come back to it.

And pursuant to s.16 of the Constitution passed the County Court

Act under s.36A of that Act jurisdiction is conferred on this

court to try cases such as this.The defendant's written submissions, as I say, rest upon the

contention that these proceedings violate the Federal

constitution. If they do, by reason of s.109 of the

Constitution, Federal law prevails over State law. This can

only happen if both legislature, namely the Commonwealth and

State Parliament purport to cover the same field or the same

topic. However, the Commonwealth Crimes Act and the

Commonwealth Criminal Code do not purport to cover the same

field, that is to say the same criminal offence that is now

before this court and thus, s.78B of the Judiciary Act , which

is relied upon by the defendant in the written submissions,

is inapplicable.

The defendant contends that s.51(i) of the Federal

Constitution, being the trade and commercial power, and s.117

which provides, in effect, that residents of different states

not be discriminated against in Federal law can cause conflict

because, for one thing, private toll roads attract fees to

users that residents of other states, on roads in their states


18/51



are not subjected to. Further, that this may result in loss

of licence. Secondly, that the Australian Citizenship Act

1948 being an act of the Federal Parliament has not been

declared to be valid by the High Court and thus it cannot be

said that the judge, that is me, is an Australian citizen and

that the court therefore is unable to try the case. In

passing, the law of the Commonwealth and of the State, for

that, matter does not make citizenship a prerequisite for

judicial appointment as best I can ascertain. Paradoxically,

I ask myself if the proposition is correct that a Federal

enactment is invalid until the High Court declare it to bevalid, how could members of the High Court make such a

declaration without a previous High Court bench declaring the

Act itself valid or otherwise.

Thirdly, the third point, the major point relied upon is

that there is an apprehension of or perceived bias because it

is contended that invalid state laws, (in this case the Road

Traffic Act ) - are the basis of proceeding before this court,

that is that there has been some inspection by the judge of

that law and that in some way that inspection would effect the

judgment of the judge in relation to the merits of the

proceeding now before the court. If there is bias or

perceived bias, a judge is obliged to stand aside. In this

case there has been no suggestion at least to date that such

bias attaches to myself in the proceedings which I have

conducted, rather it is an argument raised in support of the

lack of jurisdiction which, as I understand it, is, best put

is that in the Road Traffic Act is invalid and a judge has

reference to it, that judge in some way is infected against


19/51



the defendant and therefore is biased or at least may be

perceived to be such.

The fourth major point raised is that the Goods and

Services Tax is a tax of judicial services provided by the state

and thus the independence of the court is undermined. That is a

misapprehension because there is no GST

on services of this court. Rather, there is a confusion on the

part of the defendant that orders for costs which are legal

costs or costs of the court in filing and preparing files for

cases in some way include GST which they do not.

Fifthly, the defendant refers to Magna Carta, theconstitution of the United States, Mr Habib, Guantanamo Bay,

Court of Star Chamber, hostilities overseas in Afghanistan,

which simply have no relevance to the matter now before the

court.

Insofar as the point raised by Ms Van Rooy this

morning which I have described as the point succinctly put,

that though understandable is not an answer justifying the

court to quash the presentment. It is true that His Honour

Judge Gullaci sought the assistance of the Crown in the

detail in which I have attempted to delve into in these

reasons, but the Crown failed to comply with that. Just how

helpful such a research would have been to the ultimate

decision of the court is open to speculation, suffice it for

me to say that the submissions of the Crown deal with the

constitutional point, that is to say, the jurisdiction of

this court to deal with the count now before it and provides

an answer insofar as the Crown is concerned as to the

validity of these proceedings.


20/51



Where a party fails to comply with a court order or

direction there is power for the court to make an order for

costs where such an order is justified under the provisions

of the Crimes (Criminal Trials) Act . If the order is not

complied with, it is then a matter for the individual judge

to determine the way to proceed. In my respectful opinion it

would not have been of assistance to me if the Crown had

attempted to go into the matter, as I have done, for it is my

anticipation that they, the Crown, would have fared no better

than I have in the time available. I mean no disrespect to

Ms Van Rooy who I assume with others prepared the threevolumes and the response when I say that it is in various

parts hard to discern when one topic is complete and another

one addressed. That is understandable because she is not a

lawyer, as best I know, nor has she had legal training, and

it is difficult for a non-professional, a person who does not

have the benefit of legal training, to deal with points point

by point, or seriatim, as I say.

For those reasons the Crown's response in its

failure, as I have outlined it, does not afford a basis for

me to deny the State of Victoria the trial which it presents

against the accused.

Ultimately the obligation rests upon the judge, in

this case myself, to determine in the light of the

submissions made what is the position insofar as the accused

is concerned, namely is she presented fairly for trial in

accordance with the law. At the current time, at this stage

of proceedings, it is my ruling that she is and the objection

to the jurisdiction and/or the objection to the matter


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proceeding by reason of the Crown's failure to fully respond

to His Honour Judge Gullaci's direction must fail.

---END QUOTE 6-2-2008 REASON OF JUDGMENT OF WOOD J.

* He did mention the Queens, didnt he?.**#** Having first stated in the proper context as to avoid to mislead or be accused to seek tomislead a reader lets now go to the what I consider offensive part regarding the Queens;QUOTE

The defendant's submission in the written submissions is

based upon the contention that these proceedings contravene the

Federal Constitution. They do

not in my ruling because the source of power to enact theseproceedings is the Constitution of the State of Victoria. The

sovereign power is Her Majesty the Queen in

right in the State of Victoria rather than Her Majesty the

Queen in right of the Commonwealth of Australia.

END QUOTE.

* Well he does state Her Majesty the Queen in right of the State of Victoria rather then Her Majestythe Queen in Right of the Commonwealth of Australia, doesnt he?.**#** Well, there is the problem. Queen Elizabeth II is the Queen in Right of the State in that she isthe Queen of the United Kingdom. As such, she is also the Queen in right of every other State,albeit WA (Western Australia) at the very least has abolished the reference to the Queen. Now lawsenforced by the Commonwealth can only be in the rights of the states.

* Moment, you lost me there. Isnt the Commonwealth superior to the states?.**#** Not at all..* Doesnt Commonwealth legislation override State legislation?.**#** Not at all on a general manner, only if there is a conflict within the powers of theCommonwealth Parliament legislative powers..* So, only if the Commonwealth legislate it has superior power?.**#** Not at all in all cases. If the Commonwealth legislate as to a Crimes Act then it does notoverride State Crimes Act legislation.


22/51



* I am getting confused now. The Commonwealth has superior legislative powers and it has.t it canhave legislation but it may not at all affect State legislation, would you mind to explain this?.**#** Actually, British law is superior to Commonwealth and State legislative powers in certaincircumstances..* Excuse me, would you mind not trying to make a riddle out of it all as I am really starting to get aheadache about this all..**#** Ok, hold onto your seat and better fasten your seat belt as you are going to be in for a ride!.* I just want an explanation, not to go for a ride!.**#**I just felt like saying this. Anyhow, you be falling of your chair if you hear this all. Hansard 1-3-1898 Constitution Convention DebatesQUOTE

Sir JOHN DOWNER .-We spend time enough in discussing things here, and when every one isagreed that this clause is not to be adopted in the form in which it is printed, but is only to be a

power of the Parliament, it is not worth while to discuss the question of whether it is [start page1665] absolutely necessary to put in the words. Where there is a wide difference of opinion, itwould be safer to do it. I agree with Mr. Barton that there is no power, because sub-section (37) of clause 52 reads-

Any matters necessary for or incidental to the carrying into execution of the foregoing powers, orof any other powers vested by this Constitution in the Parliament or Executive Government of theCommonwealth, or in any department or officer thereof.

I venture to say that these are not necessary or incidental to the execution of any powers. TheCommonwealth will come into existence under this Constitution plus English law, one of

whose principles is that the Queen can do no wrong. That is the foundation on which theConstitution is established. Then, how can you so interpret sub-section (37) as to say that,incidental to the carrying out of the Constitution, the Parliament which is established on the basisthat the Queen can do no wrong, may provide that the Queen can do wrong?

END QUOTEAgain

The Commonwealth will come into existence under this Constitution plus English law,one of whose principles is that the Queen can do no wrong. That is the foundation onwhich the Constitution is established.

* Moment, the High Court of Australia in Sue v Hill made clear that the Commonwealth of Australia is independent, didnt is?.**#** Again:QUOTE.That is the foundation on which the Constitution is established.END QUOTEAs such, nothing the States and the Commonwealth could have done to alter this and the HighCourt of Australia lacks any constitutional powers to amend the Constitution by any judgment. Itsonly power is to adjudicate within constitutional confinements..


23/51



* Ok, You are saying that therefore the Commonwealth of Australia cannot be INDEPENDENTand neither can be without British law because of the above statement.**#** I did not state because of the above statement as there was a lot more to it. British maritimelaw maintains constitutionally at least to override Commonwealth maritime laws. British treatiesremain to be superior, but it all provided it does not interfere with constitutional provisions enactedin the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK).For example the British Parliament endorsed the European Union constitution.The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) is a British Act and as suchconsidering the decision of Aggregate Industries UK Ltd., R (on the application of) v English Nature and & Anor [2002] EWHC 908 (Admin) (24th April, 2002) and Judgments - Mark(Respondent) v. Mark (Appellant), OPINIONS, OF THE LORDS OF APPEAL for judgment INTHE CAUSE, SESSION 2005-06 [2005] UKHL 42 on appeal from: [2003] EWCA Civ 168It appears that the The European Convention for the protection of Human Rights andFundamental Freedoms (the ECHR) albeit not overriding constitutional law, is complimentaryto British (constitution) law, as the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) is..* So the European Union Human Rights provisions apply to the Commonwealth of Australia,, is

that what you are claiming?.**#** Only for so far it does not conflict with the federal constitution. For example we are racistbecause the Colonies (now known as States) voted in referendums to embrace Section 51(xxvi) of the Constitution to discriminate upon races. As such the European Human Rights provisions are notoverriding this. Neither so can the United Nations Charter. Actually we cannot be a nation: assuch as Victoria is still a dominion under the British Crown..* Yes, pull the other leg will you. Why on earth can we not be a member of the UN when theCommonwealth of Australia was one of the founding members?.

**#** Well again we have to refer back to the Hansard; Hansard 2-3-1898 Constitution Convention DebatesQUOTE

Mr. SYMON (South Australia).-I beg to move-

That the words "The Commonwealth of" (line 10) be struck out. [start page 1747] That will leavethe clause to provide simply that the colonies shall be united in a Federal Constitution, under thename of "Australia." Now, my honorable friend (Dr. Cockburn), earlier in the present session,moved in this direction in connexion with a later clause, but it was pointed out at that time that thatclause did not deal specifically with the name, that the clause now under reconsideration dealt withthat subject, and that the amendment he then proposed could be more properly dealt with under thisclause. Now, honorable members will recollect that in Adelaide I moved in the same direction. Onthat occasion there was a very short debate, and not wishing to press the matter exhaustively then,but rather to leave it until after the Bill had been before the public and the Legislature, pursuant tothe Enabling Act, I did not on that occasion press the matter to a division; but I wish to tellhonorable members that I intend to press the question to a division on this occasion. I only desire toutter one or two sentences, because it seems to me the matter is so plain that any one who willconsider it for a moment will agree with my view, and that it will be unnecessary for me to occupya long time in commending it, as I do, to the acceptance of honorable members. I wish to clear awaythe misconception in the first place that I have any objection whatever to the word"Commonwealth," or to the use of the word "Commonwealth," in this Bill. I have no objection tothat where it is confined to the expression of the political Union. In the preamble honorable


24/51



members will find that what we desire to do is to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth-that is the political Union-" under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain andIreland , and under the Constitution hereby established." Honorable members will therefore see thatthe application of the word Commonwealth is to the political Union which is sought to beestablished. It is not intended there to have any relation whatever to the name of the country ornation which we are going to create under that Union. The second part of the preamble goes on tosay that it is expedient to make provision for the admission of other colonies into theCommonwealth. That is, for admission into this political Union, which is not a republic, whichis not to be called a dominion, kingdom, or empire, but is to be a Union by the name of "Commonwealth," and I do not propose to interfere with that in the slightest degree. The firstclause says-This Act maybe cited as the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act." I assent toall that. Then comes clause 3, which says it shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the advice of Her Majesty's Most Honorable Privy Council, to declare by proclamation that, on and after a daytherein appointed, not being later than one year after the passing of this Act, the people of thecolonies enumerated shall be united in a Federal Constitution under the name of-I say it ought to be"of Australia." Why do we want to put in "the Commonwealth of Australia"? We are there by ourConstitution giving the name to our country, and, to the united people who are to be established as anation under the Constitution. By what name, I would like to ask honorable members, will they call

this Federal Union? It will be called by the name Australia, whether we like it or not.END QUOTEAgain;QUOTEThat is, for admission into this political Union, which is not a republic, which is not to becalled a dominion, kingdom, or empire, but is to be a Union by the name of "Commonwealth," and I do not propose to interfere with that in the slightest degree.END QUOTE.Also consider Hansard 7-3-1898 Constitution Convention DebatesQUOTE

Mr. SYMON (South Australia).-I beg to move-

That the words "Commonwealth of" be omitted from clause 3.

I do not wish to re-open the matter at this stage. I merely desire to state the reason why I venture toask the Convention to reconsider the amendment which I propose, and which is submitted with aview to the insertion of the simple name "Australia" instead of "The Commonwealth of Australia"in this clause. The reason which causes me to submit this for the consideration of the Convention istwofold; first, that some honorable members, who were not present during the very short discussionwhich took place when the matter was considered and voted on before, were under the impression

that it was intended in some way to obliterate or remove the name of the Commonwealth, and thesecond branch of the reason is that I find the Drafting Committee have inserted ark amendmentwhich removes the difficulty which previously existed, and which seems to me to render itnecessary that the Substitution I now suggest should be made. As to the first reason, I have noobjection, and never had, to the use of the word "Commonwealth." As I pointed out the other day,"Commonwealth" is used as a name for the political union we are establishing under theConstitution , in the preamble, and all the succeeding clauses, and will be continued, just as before,throughout all the other clauses of the Bill as indicating the political union . All I seek to do is todeclare that the name of the Commonwealth shall be the simple name to which we are accustomed-the grandest name which we can attach to it-that of Australia.END QUOTE


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.As such, the Westminster Act referring to the Commonwealth as a DOMINION was in breach of constitutional provisions as the Commonwealth of Australia never was..The Commonwealth of Australia is a POLITICAL UNION as like the European Union is inEurope..* So, you are claiming that the High Court of Australia got it wrong?.**#** Not just wrong, it simply had no constitutional powers to adjudicate in this as it did. It wassitting as a Court of Disputed Return to adjudicate on behalf of the Members of parliament whothemselves have no judicial powers, as such it is a bit rich for the High Court of Australia then totry to pretend it made some judicial decision as to the Queen of Australia, to which Members of Parliament, they represented, had no judicial powers over..* Is that it?.**#** There is more to it. As I assisted Josepha with her draft APPEAL case;

QUOTE GROUND 12That His Honour Wood in the 6-2-2008 reason of judgment stated; these objections are baseless. And His Honour referred to the Queen. However, Within the High Court of Australia indicated inSue v Hill , that there is a Queen of Australia, and that Heather Hill by her alliance to QueenElizabeth II of the United Kingdom was as such an alien. However, His Hono9ur Woods in hisreason of Judgment relies upon the Queen, being it that the Colonial Constitution was never givenroyal consent by the Queen of Australia and that the State s since Federation being subject to theBritish Crown as such are bound to continue so. Hence, if the Queen somehow changed in personato become Queen of Australia in regard of the States, since 1986, then the question of the validity of laws and constitutions enacted prior to it and enforced against the UNREPRESENTED Defendant

is in question.More over, the Sue v Hill decision by the High Court of Australia is in total conflict withhttp://www.geocities.com/englishreports/77ER377.html Calvin's Case 7 Coke Report 1a, 77 ERat 396,QUOTE And the usual and right pleading of an alien born doth lively and truly describe andexpress what be 1s. And therein two things are to be observed. 1. That the most usual and bestpleading in this case, is, both exclusive and inclusive, viz. extra ligeantiam domini Regis, &c. etinfra ligeantiam alterius Regis, as it appeareth in (a) 9 Ed. 4. 7. b. Book of Entries, fol. 244, &c.which cannot possibly be pleaded in this case, for two causes. 1. For that one King is sovereign of both kingdoms. 2. One ligeance is due by both to one sovereign; and in case of an alien theremust of necessity be several Kings and several ligeances. END QUOTEAndQUOTE7 Coke Report 18 b, 77 ER p399subdito dato, of a donaison: for that is the right name, so called, because his legitimation is givenunto him; for if you derive denizen from deins nee, one born within the obedience or ligeance of the King, then such a one should be all one with a naturalborn subject. And it appeareth beforeout of the laws of King W. 1. of what antiquity the making of denizens by the King of England hathbeen.3. There be regularly (unless it be in special cases) three incidents to a subject born. 1. That theparents be under the actual obedience of the King. 2. That the place of his birth be within the King's


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dominion. And, 3. The time of his birth is chiefly to be considered; for he cannot be a subject bornof one kingdom that was born under the ligeance of a King of another kingdom, albeit afterwardsone kingdom descend to the King of the other.END QUOTEAs the material of the UNREPRESENTED Defendant did set out that Heather Hill was bornwithin the real of the British Crown, and the Commonwealth of Australia is a POLITICALUNION and never was a monarchy, dominion, republic, etc, then the title of Queen of Australiais a fictitious title and cannot have any legal application.His Honour Wood J assuming that because of Authorities therefore the Section 16 of the VictorianConstitution Act 1975 was valid, without having at all set out in detail as to what the defendantscounterargument was as set out in her submissions, then failed clearly to provide a proper indicationof consideration as to how the Authorities His Honour Wood J relied upon were standing upagainst the issues raised by the UNREPRESENTED Defendant, in particular where theUNREPRESENTED Defendant had on the CD included in Folder Authorities the folder Folder01 Authorities-Judgment which contained 167 Cases, including Sue v Hill [1999] HCA 30.Where the title Queen of Australia is another title for the British Crown, then for all purposes itdid not and cannot create a Monarchy or purport that the Commonwealth of Australia is aMonarchy. The conflict the UNREPRESENTED Defendant raised is that if the is charged in the

matter of Queen v van Rooy then she is entitled to know which Queen is authorising the case orunder which authority of which Queen is the proceeding instituted against the UNREPRESENTEDDefendant.His Honour Wood J in the 6-2-2008 reason of judgment stated;QUOTEThe sovereign power is Her Majesty the Queen inright in the State of Victoria rather than Her Majesty theQueen in right of the Commonwealth of Australia.END QUOTEAs such, His Honour held that not the Queen of Australia but that it was the British Crown itself which provided sovereign powers.

However, the colonial powers were provided by the British Crown and the Federal Constitution,The Commonwealth of Australia Act 1900(UK) also was the British Crown. With the High Courtof Australia however having declared that since 1986 the Queen of Australia applies then itcannot be that laws enacted by the State of Victoria are continuing under the British crown whilethe laws enacted under the Commonwealth of Australia since 1986 are under the Queen of Australia.Indeed, where in Sue v Hill the High Court of Australia made clear that Heather Hill was a alienbeing born under the British Crown then it cannot be that Commonwealth law provides forAustralian citizenship under the Queen of Australia and then the State using the British Crownenforces this Australian citizenship to appoint police, judges, Members of State Parliament, etc, asthen the police, judges, Members of State Parliament all have sworn alliance to the Queen of Australia and not having sworn alliance to the British Crown in which name it seeks to enforcelegislation in the name of the British Crown.The UNREPRESENTED Defendant has also included on the CD filed on 15 November 2006 in theFolder 41 other relevant material the subfolder78B 021204 which included the documentForm 69-78B-2.doc being the Section 78B that was before the County Court of Victoria and usedby Mr. G. H. Schorel0-Hlavka in his successful appeals on 19 July 2006 which in paragraph 17refers to the Supreme Court Moller decision regarding the oath, etc.While His Honour Wood J did not seem to understand and/or comprehend how critical the federalissues were to the defence of the UNREPRESENTED Defendant, it was not for His Honour Woodto assume because of Authorities, no matter how misconceived they were, that therefore there was jurisdiction without canvasses in details the considerable set out the UNREPRESENTED Defendant


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had placed before the Court in her submissions and upon which His Honour Gullaci J based his 15November 2006 orders.END QUOTE

* So what was the Moller decision about?.**#** Well let quote a part of the judgment; Moller v Board of Examiners for Legal Practitioners [1999] VSCA 116 (30 July 1999)QUOTESometime during 1992 or 1993 the appellant made inquiries about becoming an Australian citizen.He then learned that it would be necessary for him to swear an oath of allegiance to Her MajestyThe Queen. The appellant is, however, a staunch republican and did not then pursue his applicationto become an Australian citizen, believing that any oath of allegiance should be to Australia ratherthan to the Queen.END QUOTEAndQUOTEOn 24 January 1994 the procedure for obtaining Australian citizenship changed so that applicants

were no longer required to swear an oath of allegiance to the Queen but were instead required tomake a pledge to Australia. Accordingly, in February 1995, the applicant became an Australiancitizen.END QUOTE.Actually I better include the whole judgment;QUOTECHARLES, J.A.:

1. The appellant was born in Johannesburg in the Republic of South Africa on 24 March 1972.He and his family left South Africa in April 1989 and moved to New Zealand and inFebruary 1991 they emigrated to Australia. The appellant was granted permanent residentstatus in Australia.

2. Between February 1991 and February 1997 the appellant was a student at the University of Tasmania, graduating in May 1995 as Bachelor of Arts with Honours and in May 1997 asBachelor of Laws with First Class Honours.

3. Sometime during 1992 or 1993 the appellant made inquiries about becoming an Australiancitizen. He then learned that it would be necessary for him to swear an oath of allegiance toHer Majesty The Queen. The appellant is, however, a staunch republican and did not thenpursue his application to become an Australian citizen, believing that any oath of allegianceshould be to Australia rather than to the Queen.

4. On 24 January 1994 the procedure for obtaining Australian citizenship changed so thatapplicants were no longer required to swear an oath of allegiance to the Queen but wereinstead required to make a pledge to Australia. Accordingly, in February 1995, the applicantbecame an Australian citizen.

5. In June 1997 the appellant moved to Melbourne where he took up part-time employment asa para-legal with a Melbourne firm of solicitors. In September 1997 the CommonwealthGovernment appointed him one of the 36 non-Parliamentary delegates to the Constitution alConvention and in February 1998 he duly attended the Convention in Canberra. In March1998 the appellant entered into articles with a member of the firm of solicitors at which he


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