Changing the Script:New Challenges and Solutions Report of the 2014 Nuclear Discussion Forum

Organized by

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan EastWest Instituteto the United Nations in New York

Copyright © 2015 EastWest Institute

The cover image is a depiction of Nomade, a piece by Spanish sculptor Jaume Plensa, now housed in Pappa-john Sculpture Park in Des Moines, Iowa, USA. The eight-meter-tall sculpture is made of a latticework of white steel letters and uses light, sound and language to express its message. Plensa suggests that language repre-sents more than merely a means of communication, but rather has the power to construct, shape and alter the way we think. (Flickr)_

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CONTENTS

Foreword 7

Introduction and Overview 8

I. The Nuclear Security Summit Process 10

Adapting the Architecture of Nuclear Security 11

Role of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 12

II. Role and Status of Security Assurances 13

Changing Perceptions 14

Linkages to Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) 15

III. The Road Ahead to the 2015 NPT Review Conference 17

Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone 18

Future of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 19

IV. The Humanitarian Approach 20

Related Processes 20

Shifting Discourse 21

Recommendations and Next Steps 23

Appendices: 26

I. NDF Speakers 27

Policy Reference Points:

II. The Nuclear Security Summits: Forward-Looking Implementation Plans 28

III. Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States 31

IV. Beyond the Usual Script: New Solutions for the 2015 NPT Review Conference 34

V. A New Perspective: Institutionalizing the Humanitarian Approach 37

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In 2014, the EastWest Institute (EWI) and the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakh-stan hosted the third annual Nuclear Discussion Forum (NDF), a series of off-the-record meetings that brought representatives of United Nations Member States together to dis-

cuss key achievements, opportunities and challenges that lie ahead of the 2015 Treaty on the Non-proliferations of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference.

The impetus for the NDF stems from a shared vision by EWI and the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan for a Member State-driven process that bridges divides, drives mo-mentum and builds the political willpower to overcome barriers to a world free from nuclear weapons. The 2014 Forum built on the success of previous NDF gatherings by providing an in-formal setting for UN representatives and experts to exchange ideas, enhance understanding on issues of contention and develop creative solutions to longstanding challenges.

We are grateful for the generous support of the Government of Kazakhstan and EWI’s core funders, who continue to make this dialogue possible. We are also grateful to our colleagues, hailing from over 50 missions to the UN that participated in the deliberations. The valuable insight, experience and guidance they brought were instrumental to the Forum’s efforts to reframe certain issues and revitalize the push for a world without nuclear weapons.

A special note of gratitude is also due to the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Ms. Angela Kane and members of her office; Mr. Tom Markram, Chief of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch (Nuclear Weapons) of the Office for Disarmament Affairs; and Mr. Geof-frey Shaw, Director of New York Liaison Office of the International Atomic Energy Agency, for the critical support they provided to this initiative.

We believe this report serves two basic purposes. First, it is a timely document that blends content from the Forum’s rich discussions with a substantive background on the most promi-nent issues that emerged during the sessions. Second, the report makes a number of action-able recommendations for consideration by the United Nations First Committee and otherdisarmament bodies.

We hope that this report will enrich current discussions on nonproliferation and disarmament and strengthen the momentum towards achieving a world without nuclear weapons. The threat posed by nuclear weapons is global, and the responsibility for reducing it is a shared one. In pursuing that goal, we are committed to promoting and advocating the recommenda-tions contained within this report to key policymakers, stakeholders and the diplomatic com-munity at large.

It is our strong conviction that Kazakhstan, which has well institutionalized this Forum over the last four years drawing UN Member States into an engaged dialogue, deserves full con-sideration to be elected to serve as a non-permanent member on the Security Council (2017-2018). Its strategic location at the cross roads between Europe and Asia, and its record of being an oasis of peace and stability, brings definite value added to the Council.

David J. Firestein H.E. Kairat AbdrakhmanovPerot Fellow and Vice President, Permanent Representative of the Strategic Trust-Building Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Nations

FOREWORD

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To be sure, these are not propitious times for the nuclear disarmament agenda. Nearly a quarter century after the end

of the Cold War, global nuclear weapon stock-piles stand at over 16,000 warheads, 4,200 of which are considered operational.1 Instead of pursuing negotiations in good faith on the elimination of nuclear weapons, as agreed upon in the text of the Treaty on the Non-proliferations of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), all nuclear-weapon states are currently engaged in modernization programs for their nuclear arsenals.2 The indefinite postponement of the 2012 conference on the establishment of a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) undermines confidence in the rel-evance and legitimacy of the nonproliferation and disarmament regime. Deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament continues to forestall negotiations on the proposed Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty and the odds of an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty remain remote at best.

At the same time, there are a number of positive developments that the international community should take heart from. Although their arsenals remain massive, the United States and Russian Federation have reduced their nuclear stockpiles by about 85 percent since their Cold War peak.3 As the two nuclear superpowers gradually reduce their nuclear arsenals, a growing number of states, inter-national organizations and civil society have voiced their support for a Nuclear Weapons Convention banning nuclear weapons. Wide-spread attention has also been granted to the series of conferences on the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, which have breathed new life into the disar-mament agenda. Finally, on the margins of the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee, the five nuclear-weapon states signed the proto-col to the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free

1 Of the estimated 4,200 operational warheads, 1,800 are estimated to be on high alert. http://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/

2 http://legacy.armscontrol.org/act/2014_05/Nuclear-Weapons-Modernization-A-Threat-to-the-NPT

3 http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2014/233401.htm

Zone (CANWFZ) Treaty, bolstering the NPT and the nonproliferation regime.

Creative solutions, strengthened political will and sustained action are required to sur-mount the obstacles that stand in the way of a nuclear weapon free world. For seven decades the international community has recognized the catastrophic consequences inherent to the use of nuclear weapons. A world without nuclear weapons is a realistic and achievable goal, however distant. As UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s declared on the International Day for the Total Elimina-tion of Nuclear Weapons on September 26, 2014, “nuclear disarmament is therefore not an idealistic dream, but an urgent necessity to meet the genuine security interests of all humanity.”4 In order to get there, this report will demonstrate the urgent need to move beyond the traditional script and identify new proposals, interconnections and opportuni-ties.

The Nuclear Discussion Forum

The EastWest Institute is pleased to continue its partnership with the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan—a state that has exemplified and led international efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons—in order to develop new approaches and enhance en-gagement on some of the most pressing challenges facing the nonproliferation and disarmament agenda.

The Nuclear Discussion Forum, jointly orga-nized and run by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Na-tions and the EastWest Institute since 2011, aims to accomplish just that. Indeed, it has widely recognized within the UN community as “a key initiative aimed at strengthening the path to nuclear zero.”

In 2014, the EastWest Institute and the Per-manent Mission of the Republic of Kazakh-

4 http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sgsm16194.doc.htm

Introduction & Overview

This report will demonstrate the urgent need to move beyond the tra-ditional script and identify new proposals, interconnec-tions and op-portunities.

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stan held a series of meetings that brought together representatives from 58 United Na-tions Member States and experts to assess the challenges and opportunities to achieve practical progress on the path to a world without nuclear weapons. The Forum’s stated objectives are as follows:

1. Bring together disparate groups and viewpoints in a sustained dialogue to bridge divides and find common ground in the international agenda on nuclear non-proliferation, disar-mament and security.

2. Find common language and op-portunities for cooperative action on some of the most contentious issues stalling further progress on disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security.

3. Identify actionable recommenda-tions to build upon the momentum of recent successes in the interna-tional agenda.

4. Inform the larger work of the First Committee and other disarmament bodies as they seek to make further progress on the road towards nucle-ar disarmament.

The 2014 NDF sessions focused broadly on three separate, but interrelated topics:

• Future architecture of the nuclear security agenda

• Role and status of security assur-ances

• Key issues and approaches ahead of the 2015 NPT Review Conference

• Humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons

During the discussions on these issues, par-ticipants touched upon a number of con-comitant issues that include, inter alia, nucle-ar-weapon-free zones, transparency, future roles for the IAEA, and the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan.

Participants

The 58 Permanent Missions to the United Na-tions in New York that participated in some or all sessions of the 2014 NDF include:

Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad,

Chile, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Geor-gia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, In-dia, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Neth-erlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Palau, Philippines, Poland, Por-tugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emir-ates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Uzbekistan.

Acknowledgements

In addition, the 2014 Forum benefitted im-mensely from the participation and support of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), led by Ms. Angela Kane, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Virginia Gambia Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and supported by Mr. Tom Markram, Chief of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch (Nuclear Weapons), ODA. Thanks are also due to International Atomic Energy Agency, and Mr. Geoffrey Shaw, Director of its New York Liaison Office. We would also like to express our profound appreciation to the distinguished speakers who helped guide the discussions.

Disclaimer

This report provides both a general over-view of the topics the NDF addressed in its 2014 sessions along with the highlights and findings from each session. The recommen-dations and suggestions continued herein represent the observations of the EastWest Institute and do not necessarily reflect the views of the experts or the Permanent Mis-sion of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Nothing in this report should be attributed to any UN Member State representative. It is not a con-sensus report, nor was it shared with partici-pants prior to publication. Any errors or omis-sions are the responsibility of EWI. This report is a reflection of the dialogue that occurred and may not comprehensively cover all the issues, perspectives and regions involved in the field of disarmament, though an attempt has been made to present a balanced repre-sentation.

The forum worked to bring together disparate groups and viewpoints in a sustained dia-logue to bridge divides and find common ground in the international agenda on nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and security.

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The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) pro-cess aims to prevent nuclear terrorism by reducing the amount of dangerous

nuclear material in the world, improving the security of all nuclear material and radioac-tive sources and enhancing international co-operation. The first summit was held in Wash-ington, D.C. in 2010 to secure vulnerable nuclear material around the world. Additional summits were held in 2012 in Seoul, 2014, in The Hague, and a fourth summit will be held in Washington, D.C. in 2016.

The primary outcome of the first NSS in 2010 was a consensus, non-binding communique that pledged to strengthen nuclear security norms and secure all vulnerable nuclear ma-terial in four years. Leaders further agreed to the Washington Work Plan, which high-lights specific domestic and international measures to implement the commitments outlined in the communique. The work plan recommended the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and rati-fication of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, as well as participation and cooperation with the In-ternational Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Ini-tiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Many states also pledged voluntary commit-ments, including the enactment of domestic

legislation, the creation of research and train-ing centers and the removal of stockpiles of fissile materials.

Additional high-level attention on the threat of nuclear terrorism was brought to bear by a second summit in Seoul in 2012. While the 2010 NSS focused primarily on securing highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutoni-um, the 2012 summit broadened its scope to include the protection of radioactive-sources and the intersection between nuclear safety and security. The summit in Seoul introduced the “gift basket” concept, joint statements by groups of countries pledging to take concrete steps to advance specific aspects of nuclear security. In all, the participating states initi-ated over 100 new commitments. Encourag-ingly, observers estimate that NSS partici-pating countries have implemented around 90 percent of national commitments made during the 2010 summit.

In March 2014, 53 world leaders gathered in The Hague for the third Nuclear Security Summit. Since the previous summit in 2012, seven additional states have removed all or most of the materials needed to build a nu-clear bomb within their territory, and more than a dozen others have taken meaningful action to reduce quantities and better se-cure the materials they hold. The two notable commitments that emerged from The Hague were Japan’s commitment to repatriate

Encouragingly, observers esti-mate that NSS participating countries have implemented around 90 percent of na-tional commit-ments made during the 2010 summit.

I. The Nuclear Security Summit Process

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500kg of HEU and plutonium to their coun-tries of origin and the signing of the Strength-ening Nuclear Security Implementation “gift basket” by 35 states. This important initiative includes specific commitments by states to adhere to IAEA security recommendations and the hosting of peer reviews on the imple-mentation of these commitments.

Future Architecture of the Nuclear Security Agenda

Many of the NDF participants lauded the NSS for elevating the issue of nuclear security to a high-profile stage. Not only has it gained focused attention at the highest levels of na-tional governments, but it has also expanded that attention from a national to a global di-mension. One speaker noted that this has created an emerging global security frame-work and culture as states recognize that it serves their self-interest to promote coopera-tion, reduce stocks of nuclear materials and strengthen security within their borders and beyond them.

Though the NSS has drawn a spotlight on these issues, at the same time NDF partici-pants pointed out that the implementation of commitments made at the summits remain voluntary and uneven. The international com-munity failed to secure all vulnerable nucle-ar material by 2014, as called for in the first

summit communique. This is due in no small part to the fact that states have enacted measures primarily on a voluntary basis and several key countries have yet to ratify funda-mental international legislation.

Further progress on a global nuclear se-curity network is hampered by the view of many states that nuclear security as an in-dividual rather than a collective responsibil-ity. Although participation in the NSS has grown over the past four years, attendance in the process is biased towards Western, developed economies. Of the 53 world lead-ers present at the 2014 NSS, over half hailed from North America and Europe alone. Greater efforts could be made to encourage a broad geographic presence from develop-ing regions (Africa, Latin America, the Middle East) to resolve what is in effect a global is-sue. Assistance could also be provided to un-der-represented regions to encourage wider participation, exchange best practices and aid in capacity building.

An additional concern that has not been addressed by the NSS is that measures to strengthen nuclear security could impede ci-vilian nuclear energy programs, particularly in the developing world. This belief is given credence by the perception that the threat of nuclear terrorism is extraordinarily remote and that greater emphasis should be placed on nuclear disarmament as the primary guar-

Further prog-ress on a glob-al nuclear se-curity network is hampered by the view of many states that nuclear security as an individual rather than a collective re-sponsibility.

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antor of nuclear security. A number of coun-tries have argued that undue attention has been focused on nuclear security and non-proliferation over nuclear safety and disar-mament, and that an equal share of respon-sibility rests with nuclear-weapon states and nonnuclear-weapon states alike.

Instead of de-emphasizing the concept of disarmament, during the NDF one speaker proposed that disarmament should be in-cluded in discussions on nuclear security, a point that received broad approval from Fo-rum members. The speaker noted that the direction of current measures in the realm of nuclear security will only contribute a finite amount toward addressing the threat of il-licit trafficking and nuclear terrorism. Rather, as many participants agreed, discussions should include a focus on disarmament, which will do more than anything else to achieve the norms and standards set out by the NSS process. By including a focus on dis-armament within the context of nuclear se-curity, participants suggested, the concepts would reinforce one another and help achieve the goals of both. Members remarked that given their interrelated nature, a focus in one area does not necessitate a lack of improve-ment in the other.

NSS and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Following the third NSS in The Hague, some voices questioned the utility of continuing the process. One speaker relayed to the Fo-rum that during the lead-up to the third Sum-mit, the organizers expressed concerns that topic of nuclear security had already become staid and platitudinous. As it turned out, the speaker noted, far from exhausting the topic

the summit exposed just how much sub-stance and progress remained. Forum mem-bers agreed with this view, pointing to the im-mense value of the summits and expressed a desire to maintain the momentum of the NSS by building an enduring global nuclear secu-rity architecture.

In order to sustain the process beyond the putative final summit in 2016 in Washington, NDF discussants questioned what a succes-sor to the NSS would look like. In response, speakers and participants suggested the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could inherit the role of caretaker of the NSS process. One speaker noted that the IAEA had both the expertise and legal mandate to assume this responsibility, while another par-ticipant recommended that meetings take place on a routine basis and on the expert level. In particular, the IAEA’s guidance and ability to improve the synergy between nucle-ar security and safety were seen as critical in taking the NSS process forward.

One creative suggestion put forth during discussions was, given the far-reaching suc-cess of the NSS process, to adapt a similar architecture to other disarmament initiatives that are lagging behind. Several participants echoed this sentiment, noting that it might be a practical option to push the disarma-ment agenda forward and stimulate success in other areas. With the IAEA as the center-piece for the future NSS, participants advised that other initiatives, such as United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, could pro-vide an added value by supplementing or complementing the process. These process-es might be integrated into the NSS process or a related model that, upon reaching critical mass, could then be spun off as independent mechanisms.

With the IAEA as the center-piece for the future NSS, participants advised that other initia-tives, such as United Nations Security Coun-cil Resolution 1540, could provide an added value by supplement-ing or comple-menting the process.

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II. Role and Status of Security Assurances

Since negotiations on the NPT began, se-curity assurances to non-nuclear-weap-on states against the use or threat of

use of nuclear weapons have come to be con-sidered a critical aspect of the nonprolifera-tion and disarmament regime. The demand for security assurances has grown stronger since then, in particular from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), as countries that have re-nounced nuclear weapons have sought guar-antees that in return they will not be attacked or threatened with such weapons.

Just prior to the conclusion of NPT negotia-tions, the UN Security Council adopted Reso-lution 255 (1968), which recognized the Se-curity Council’s obligation to come to the aid of any NPT State Party “that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.”5 Although this commitment, defined as a positive secu-rity assurance, was designed to encourage non-nuclear-weapon states to join the NPT, it nevertheless disappointed many non-aligned states that had advocated for more robust as-surances that they would not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons (negative security assurances).

Ultimately, no agreement was reached on the inclusion of security assurances within the NPT, despite numerous proposals from both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states. At that time, the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-publics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States concluded that security assurances should be pursued “in the context of action relating to the United Nations, outside the NPT itself

5 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/255(1968)

but in close conjunction with it.”6 Instead, all five NPT nuclear-weapon states have made unilateral pledges regarding security assur-ances, though several of these pledges in-clude qualifications and are not considered legally-binding. The reluctance of the NPT nuclear-weapon states stems primarily from a concern that binding, universal security as-surances treaty would constrain military op-tions and weaken the perceived strength of commitments to defend allies.

Security assurances are regularly addressed during NPT Review Conferences and Pre-paratory Committees. Although the 2000 Review Conference did not explicitly men-tion an international treaty on security as-surances, it reaffirmed the role of the NPT as the forum for dealing with them and tasked the Preparatory Committee to make recom-mendations for the following Review Confer-ence. Although no progress on the issue was achieved in 2005, the 2010 NPT Review Con-ference included security assurances within the agreed upon Action Plan, calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to initiate dis-cussions on:

“effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, with-out limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all as-pects of this issue, not excluding an inter-nationally legally binding instrument.”7

6 http://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/CD_and_NSA_Fact_Sheet_Apr_2014.pdf

7 Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, document NPT/CONF.2010/50 (vol. I), p. 22.

The reluctance of the NPT nu-clear-weapon states stems primarily from a concern that binding, uni-versal security assurances treaty would constrain mili-tary options and weaken the perceived strength of commitments to defend al-lies.

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To date, limited progress has been made in extending security assurances to all non-nu-clear-weapon states, despite repeated calls for such action. Many states have argued that the positive security assurances contained within UN Security Council Resolution 255 can be strengthened by identifying what ac-tion would be taken and what would happen in the event of a veto.

Changing Perceptions

One speaker during NDF sessions noted that, although security assurances are included on the permanent agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, the NPT has emerged, by de-fault, as the primary forum for the advocacy of security assurances. In fact, participants pointed out that security assurances were the subject of two detailed working papers submitted by the Non-Aligned Movement and Iran to the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee, the recommendations of which should be taken up at the 2015 Review Conference.

A lack of concrete progress on the issue led many discussants to adopt a pessimistic view on security assurances. In principle, security assurances should be viewed as a means to encourage states to adhere to their nonproliferation commitments as it offers a concrete guarantee of security. As signa-tories to the NPT, many participants noted that non-nuclear-weapon states should be granted legally binding security assurances, and found the absence of these assurances deeply troubling. Where there have been positive developments in the granting of se-curity assurances, participants argued that

the assurances are not robust enough and are weakened by the conditions attached by the nuclear-weapon states.

However, several Forum members observed that the international perception of security assurances is changing. As one speaker sug-gested, this change in perception is made apparent by a growing recognition of a differ-ence between security assurances offered by nuclear-weapon states, and the security as-surance non-nuclear weapon states would receive from a nuclear-free world. Several participants emphasized that disarmament alone was the ultimate guarantor against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In or-der for security assurances to be meaningful, Forum members declared that they must not be viewed solely as an end, but as a broader effort to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

In this vein, one speaker asked the Forum to consider what specific contributions se-curity assurances will make in achieving a world without nuclear weapons. In response, a participant offered that security assur-ances should be considered as a limited step towards disarmament. Security assurances alone will not bring the world to the finish line, but they are useful in reinforcing the norm against the possession of nuclear weap-ons and delegitimizing their use. Members warned against losing sight of the ultimate goal of disarmament: we should not be striv-ing for a world with unused nuclear weapons, but a world without any nuclear weapons.

One intervention by a participant assessed the deteriorating security situation in the

However, sev-eral Forum members ob-served that the international perception of security as-surances is changing.

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One partici-pant noted that recent developments in Ukraine have brought into question the meaning and reliability of security assur-ances granted by nuclear-weapon states, especially those coun-tries that be-came non-nu-clear-weapon states upon joining the NPT.

Ukraine and its impact on the relevance of security assurances. The participant noted that recent developments in that country have brought into question the meaning and reliability of security assurances granted by nuclear-weapon states, especially those countries that became non-nuclear-weapon states upon joining the NPT.

As with the discussions on the future architec-ture of the nuclear security summit process, participants expressed an interest in formal-izing the linkage to disarmament. Members described a need for a clear connection to disarmament, defining both the end zone and a timeline to get there. One participant noted that without these guideposts, progress be-comes languid, if it is accomplished at all.

The Promise of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

Nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) contin-ue to play an important role in strengthening the nonproliferation regime and enhancing global peace and security. Unlike the NPT, the five treaties that establish NWFZs--the Latin American zone (1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific zone (1985 Treaty of Raroton-ga), the South-East Asian zone (1995 Treaty of Bangkok), the African zone (1996 Treaty of Pelindaba) and the Central Asian zone (2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk)--all include addi-tional protocols for nuclear-weapon states to provide security assurances, though several include reservations. The protocols, which are considered legally binding, oblige the nu-clear-weapon states to respect the status of

the given zone and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against member states of the given treaty zone.

Although many of the Forum’s discussant not-ed the limited potential of security assuranc-es, one member stressed that even achieving this preliminary step remains largely elusive. The speaker suggested that the only practi-cal means to move forward was within the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones. One speaker ranked the creation of a NWFZ in Lat-in America and the Caribbean as one of the most significant breakthroughs in the field of disarmament and nonproliferation. As the first treaty to cover a heavily populated area of the world, the Tlatelolco Treaty has served as a model for all future NWFZ’s and repre-sented a demonstrable first step towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Fortunately there is positive news on this front. On the margins of the 2014 NPT Pre-paratory Committee, the People’s Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-ern Ireland and the United States signed the Protocol to the Central Asian Nuclear-Weap-on-Free Zone Treaty (CANWFZ). Participants and speakers widely applauded this develop-ment due to the Protocol’s provision of legal-ly-binding assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against CANWFZ Treaty parties.

On the other hand, other participants ar-gued that the reservations and interpreta-tions of nuclear-weapon-free zones treaties by nuclear-weapon states circumscribe the

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utility of this approach. By imposing these limitations, one participant questioned how committed the nuclear-weapon states were to security assurances and the ultimate goal of disarmament. Instead of waiting for the nuclear-weapon states to withdraw their res-ervations, many participants advocated for all nuclear-weapon states to sign a universal, legally binding negative security assurance agreement. In the interim, participants advo-cated increasing pressure on nuclear-weap-on states by taking every opportunity to call upon them to withdraw their reservations to NWFZ treaties.

There are also several approaches that can be utilized to expand beyond the 100 coun-tries that are covered by regional NWFZ trea-ties. One possibility is to use an incremental approach that creates a NWFZ through the declaration of nuclear-weapon-free states. In 1992, Mongolia declared itself a nuclear-weapon-free state and in 2012 secured par-allel declarations from the People’s Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-ern Ireland and the United States reaffirming their respect for Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status and the joint statement on nega-tive security assurances.

Several other states have also enacted na-tional legislation prohibiting the manufac-ture, acquisition, placement band transpor-tation of nuclear weapons. Examples include the 1987 New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act, as well

as constitutional laws by the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of Austria. 8 In 2004, the Kingdom of Norway adopted a set of ethical guidelines for its pension fund that proscribe investment in entities that are in-volved in the development and manufacture of nuclear weapon components.9 Notably, the Norwegian government made the decision to divest its pension fund from these compa-nies because it has determined that nuclear arms as “weapons that violate fundamental humanitarian principles” as it has for other weapons banned by international law, includ-ing landmines and cluster munitions.

Another strategy is through the creation of transitional zones until all the preconditions and issues for a NWFZ can be addressed and agreed upon. Such a zone could be initiated with a limited scope--in terms of geographic area or weapons systems. Rather than insist-ing on the inclusion of all relevant parties, a limited NWFZ could begin with a small num-ber of countries or even parts of the coun-tries’ territories. These transitional measures can contribute to confidence building and also have a higher likelihood for success rath-er than a rigid all-or-nothing approach.

8 Rob van Riet, “Legislative Measures to Further Nuclear Abolition”, World Future Council, 2012.

9 http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Select-ed-topics/the-government-pension-fund/responsible-investments/companies-excluded-from-the-invest-ment-u.html?id=447122

Participants advocated increasing pressure on nuclear-weap-on states by taking every opportunity to call upon them to withdraw their reserva-tions to NWFZ treaties.

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The NPT Re-view Confer-ence process has produced a number of key achieve-ments, includ-ing the indefi-nite extension of the treaty and resolution on the estab-lishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruc-tion (WMD) in 1995,

Despite its many failings, the NPT re-mains at the heart of the nonprolifera-tion and disarmament regime. One of

the reasons it has weathered successive storms since its entry into force in 1970 is the periodic review process of the Treaty’s implementation. NPT signatories gather ev-ery five years with two primary goals in mind: to consider a backward-looking aspect that examines the period in review and assesses the implementation of the Treaty’s articles, and also a forward-looking component that establishes benchmarks to measure future implementation of treaty commitments.

In the lead-up to these meetings, pundits frequently foretell the impending collapse of the Treaty and the nonproliferation and dis-armament regime as a whole.10 Although a lack of progress on a number of key issues may cause a gradual decline in confidence and relevance of the treaty, a sudden break-down is improbable at best. The NPT Review Conference process has produced a number of key achievements, including the indefinite extension of the treaty and resolution on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in 1995, and the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty agreed to in 2000.

10 See: http://fas.org/nuke/control/npt/news/1-00-eriggle.pdf; http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-1-4684-1315-1_4; http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Dig-ital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=114651; http://www.contemporarysecuritypolicy.org/assets/CSP-27-3-Carranza.pdf

Mindful of the failure in 2005 to adopt a con-sensus document at the Review Conference, in 2010 States Parties renewed their efforts to find common ground and embrace a multi-lateral approach. One of the most significant outcomes of the last NPT Review Conference was the 64-point Action Plan, which called upon States Parties to undertake specific actions along the three pillars of the NPT: nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.11 In so doing, the 2010 Review Conference created a scorecard for countries to measure progress and ensure accountability on a variety of issues, includ-ing adoption of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, enhancing physical protection of nuclear ma-terials, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in military strategy and applying transpar-ency and verifiability to the implementation of treaty obligations. The recommendations also included a number of practical steps to further the implementation of a zone free of WMD in the Middle East.

Since 2010, overall progress on certain disarmament measures has been met with measured success. Through the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the United States and the Russian Federation have reduced deployed strategic nuclear warheads to the lowest level in nearly 50 years.12

Consultations amongst the nuclear-weapon states, organized under the P5 Process, have resulted in greater transparency, reporting

11 http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2010/Final-Document.pdf

12 http://www.state.gov/t/us/2014/221215.htm

III. The Road Ahead to the 2015 NPT Review Conference

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and cooperation on verification measures. This process has also been instrumental in building and maintaining consensus, developing common language on terminology and creating a foundation for multilateral arms control.

In order to spur on the pace of disarmament, many states have endorsed a global ban on nuclear weapons. At the 68th session of the General Assembly, the Non-Aligned Movement introduced a resolution that called for a nuclear weapons convention to prohibit the “possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer and use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction.”13 The resolution, which was approved by 129 states, also established September 26 as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

Non-nuclear-weapon states have been ac-tively pushing for progress on disarmament through other initiatives as well. The first High-level Meeting (HLM) of the UN General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament, con-vened on September 26, 2013, successfully elevated the issue and placed added pressure on nuclear-weapon states. The Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) that met in Geneva in the summer of 2013 was successful in bringing divergent parties together and thus focused on constructive dialogue to identify proposals to move forward. Another significant achievement of the OEWG was its openness to the contributions of civil society.

As mentioned previously, the Nuclear Security Summit Process has also brought international attention to bear on the challenges posed by stockpiles of nuclear materials and provided structure and

13 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/gadis3493.doc.htm

deadlines for enhancing global nuclear security. These efforts have a direct impact on the NPT as they not only reinforce nonproliferation commitments, but also promote the responsible development of civilian nuclear applications.

Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone

The final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference called for the convening of a con-ference on the establishment of a zone free of WMD in the Middle East, to be attended by all states of the Middle East. While the confer-ence was tentatively scheduled to be held in Helsinki in December 2012, the meeting was postponed indefinitely. Although new dates for the conference have not been set, a facili-tator appointed by the UN Secretary-General has hosted multilateral consultations with re-gional states to discuss the conference agen-da, as well as organizational and substantive issues, holding over 300 such meetings by April 2013 alone. According the facilitator’s report, all states within the region have af-firmed their support for the establishment of zone, but disagree on how this should be ac-complished.14

Forum members reiterated the observation of one speaker who declared that progress on a Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone is of the utmost importance to the continued health and future of the NPT. Participants stressed the imperative of overcoming the current impasse on negotiations in order to restore credibility to the NPT process. A broad consensus of the Forum noted that the failure to hold a conference on a zone free of

14 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/18

Through the New Strategic Arms Reduc-tion Treaty, the United States and the Rus-sian Federation have reduced deployed stra-tegic nuclear warheads to the lowest level in nearly 50 years.

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Participants stressed the imperative of overcoming the current impasse on negotiations in order to re-store credibil-ity to the NPT process.

WMD in the Middle East would jeopardize the 2015 NPT Review Conference, hamstringing it before it even begins.

A proposal put forth during discussions in-volved modifying the scope of existing nucle-ar-weapon-zones. Participant brainstormed about the possibility of enlarging current nu-clear-weapon-free zones. This would increase their geographic reach and also increase pressure on nuclear-weapon states to ac-cede to a universal security assurance agree-ment. Conversely, in regions that are unable to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the creation of smaller units was proposed, with the possibility for expansion when it becomes politically feasible.

Given the deep pessimism that has engulfed this topic, merely hosting the Helsinki Confer-ence might be deemed a success. In order to reach that admittedly low bar, the conference organizers could limit the conference’s scope, agenda, and expectations. The focus should be on substance and concrete steps instead of rhetoric, preconditions, and resolutions to intractable regional issues. Confidence-build-ing measures such as a regional nuclear-test-free zone or a ban on the production of fissile materials could represent tentative steps in the right direction.

In the long term, there are a number of mea-sures that would lay the foundation for a ro-bust, lasting nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.15 All states in the region should cease plutonium and highly-enriched ura-nium (HEU) production, declare and place existing stockpiles under IAEA safeguards and restrict uranium enrichment levels. In order to establish the confidence neces-

15 http://fissilematerials.org/library/rr11.pdf, http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/nuclear-weapon-free-zones-en-314.pdf

sary to achieve a NWFZ in the Middle East, all states that have not done so should sign comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA and ratify the Additional Protocol. Beyond this, relevant states should consider a regional verification organization, with the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials as a possible model. Such a verification structure would greatly contribute to bolstering confidence by allowing countries to inspect nuclear facili-ties to ensure they are civilian in nature.

Future of the NPT

Several Forum members expressed their deep concern and pessimism for the future of the NPT. Although many participants rec-ommended measures to vitalize the treaty and review process, some felt that we are approaching the final chance for the NPT to prove its value and validity by deciding on concrete action with tangible results. One participant observed that the NPT was ne-gotiated in a different era and that it had, perhaps, reached its maximum potential. In its stead, one participant pointed to a NAM proposal to initiate negotiations on a com-prehensive convention on nuclear weapons in the Conference on Disarmament, and to host a high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament by 2018 to review the progress towards this goal.

As one participant stated, if we conclude that the NPT is ineffective and no longer suits our purposes, that does not presage the demise of the nonproliferation and disarmament re-gime. Rather, we should look to other devices and calibrate our guidance systems to arrive at the same destination–a nuclear weapon-free world.

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Beginning with the 2010 NPT Review Confer-ences, states parties official-ly expressed their “deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weap-ons.”

One issue that has gained significant traction within the past five years, es-pecially amongst non-nuclear-weapon

states, is the notion of a humanitarian dimen-sion to nuclear disarmament. Beginning with the 2010 NPT Review Conferences, states parties officially expressed their “deep con-cern at the catastrophic humanitarian conse-quences of any use of nuclear weapons,” and reaffirmed “the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.”16 This was followed by a resolution passed by the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in November 2011, finding it “difficult to en-visage how any use of nuclear weapons could be compatible with the rules of international humanitarian law, in particular the rules of distinction, precaution and proportionality.”17

The humanitarian approach was further de-veloped by a series of international confer-ences that focused on the humanitarian im-pact of nuclear weapons. On March 4-5, 2013, the Norwegian government hosted the first conference which where 128 governments, international organizations and civil soci-ety groups experts were invited to present evidence on the impact of a nuclear weapon detonation. They concluded that interna-tional and national bodies lack the capacity to respond and provide assistance to those affected by such an event. The conference received broad support for bringing govern-

16 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50%20%28VOL.I%29

17 http://www.standcom.ch/

ments together to consider the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and adding a re-freshing dimension to standard disarmament and nonproliferation discussions.

The Oslo conference was followed by a sec-ond meeting in Nayarit, Mexico on February 13-14, 2014. Participation grew to include 146 governments at this conference, which exam-ined the global and long-term consequences of the detonation of a nuclear weapon, either by accident or design, and the risks posed by the mere existence of these weapons. The majority of governments present called for concrete political and legal action against nu-clear weapons, with the chair of the confer-ence advocating for “new international stan-dards and norms, through a legally binding instrument.” At the close of the conference, Austria announced it will host the next meet-ing on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons on December 8-9, 2014.

Related Processes

The humanitarian approach in the context of nuclear weapons follows in the footsteps of several other successful humanitarian initiatives that lead to arms control treaties, including the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty (MBM), the 2008 Convention on Clus-ter Munitions (CMC), and the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). These campaigns empha-sized the humanitarian consequences of the use of these weapons and harnessed the en-gagement of a broad spectrum of stakehold-ers, including civil society groups, academics

IV. The Humanitarian Approach

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Of course, there are key differences between the humanitar-ian approach to nuclear weapons and the processes used to ban anti-personnel landmines and cluster muni-tions.

and health professionals. In the context of the Ottawa and Oslo processes, the acceptabil-ity of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions were questioned in light of their in-discriminate effects on civilians. By invoking these humanitarian considerations, the utility and legitimacy of these weapons were dimin-ished in the eyes of many governments. Many proponents of the humanitarian approach aim to mirror this strategy to effect similar re-sults in the realm of nuclear weapons.

Of course, there are key differences between the humanitarian approach to nuclear weap-ons and the processes used to ban anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions. Nuclear weapons differ from conventional weapons in their technical characteristics, scope, consequences, role in national securi-ty strategies and political implications. Com-parisons are further complicated by the en-during concept of nuclear deterrence and the belief that nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantor of security.

A Shifting Discourse

The initiative is an attempt to reframe the dis-armament debate and shift away from what was previously a security-oriented discourse. Many states and civil society organizations hope that the initiative will promote a reduc-tion in role of nuclear weapons in military and security doctrines, raise the threshold for use and delegitimize the possession of nuclear weapons entirely. The humanitarian approach, however, is not without its detrac-

tors. Many states view initiatives such as this one as distractions that derail focus from a more practical step-by-step approach. Some proponents have suggested that the humanitarian initiative has the potential to complement the NPT, and indeed many see it as falling within the NPT process. However, the initiative’s lack of an overarching strategy calls into question how exactly this would be accomplished.

Following the third conference on the human-itarian impact of nuclear weapons in Vienna, many commentators have questioned the next steps for the humanitarian approach. In order to maintain the initiative’s momentum, South Africa has suggested it might host a fourth conference on the subject following the 2015 NPT Review Conference. 18 Given South Africa’s distinct status within the dis-armament community as a state that relin-quished its nuclear arsenal, South Africa is in a unique position to take the process forward.

In the long term, this focus on the humani-tarian dimension and the concomitant em-phasis on human security, rather than na-tional security, could lead to a treaty banning nuclear weapons. Indeed, in his summary of the second conference in Nayarit, the chair concluded that “the broad-based and com-

18 http://www.icanw.org/cam-paign-news/south-africa-considers-fol-low-up-to-the-vienna-conference/?utm_source=General+Newsletter+1&utm_campaign=bb64e68efd-Test25_21_2013&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_3ab25a3b34-bb64e68efd-54520985

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Several NDF members ar-gued that the integration of the humanitar-ian approach and disarma-ment discus-sions could be the best av-enue to pursue a world without nuclear weap-ons.

prehensive discussions of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons should lead to the commitment of states and civil society to reach new standards and norms, through a legally binding instrument.”19 This would in effect close a loophole in international law, given the absence of an explicit prohibition on the possession of nuclear weapons. A clear legal standard rejecting nuclear weapons would lend further support to the legal, politi-cal, and normative basis for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

One NDF speaker noted that despite the di-verging views of the approach as a distrac-tion from serious disarmament negotiations or the foundation for future disarmament efforts, what is not debatable is the renewed energy that humanitarian dimension has brought to bear on disarmament and non-proliferation discussions. In short order, it has served to inspire a new generation of scholars, government officials and NGOs to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world. It has also burnished the roles of civil society, rule of law and democracy to the field of disarma-ment. Indeed, several NDF participants hailed the humanitarian initiative as an approach that would “put new wind into the sails of dis-armament.”

While the humanitarian approach may seem novel, NDF speakers pointed out that the link between a humanitarian focus and dis-armament is far from new, and, in fact, it has several notable precedents. The 1868 St. Pe-tersburg Declaration, 1899 Hague Declara-tion, 1907 Hague Regulations, and Geneva Protocol were cited as examples of treaties that targeted certain categories of weapons that caused superfluous injury, unnecessary suffering or whose use would by repugnant to the conscience of humankind. Discussants observed that an emphasis on similar con-siderations in the context of nuclear weap-ons, as the conferences in Oslo and Nayarit have done, reinforces the understanding that these weapons cannot be used without fla-grantly violating international humanitarian law.

Several NDF members argued that the inte-gration of the humanitarian approach and disarmament discussions could be the best avenue to pursue a world without nuclear weapons. Arms control agreements that are

19 http://www.sre.gob.mx/en/images/stories/cih/ci.pdf

grounded in humanitarian concerns have demonstrated an enduring permanence, while the same cannot be said of those predi-cated on security concerns alone. The initia-tive was also seen as an effective option to facilitate discussions on nonproliferation and disarmament with states that are not cur-rently party to the NPT.

During discussions on the institutionalization of the humanitarian approach, participants made the distinction between international organizations and the notion of international organization –the coalescence of historical processes that seek to ensure peace and security and make the world safe for human habitation. International organizations can work efficiently in closed environments, but they frequently lack coordination and trans-parency and develop rivalries and friction with other organizations when they touch upon common problems. Participants noted that these compartmentalized initiatives, pro-cedures and political posturing come at the expense of measurable progress and that an organization is not required to institutionalize the humanitarian approach. Forum members suggested that the approach could sustain itself as a broad-based movement, given the degree of interest states have expressed in such a short amount of time.

One salient question that emerged from NDF discussions was whether the humanitarian approach would be incorporated into the NPT Review Process or if there existed other propi-tious end goals. Although the goals of the ap-proach may not be clearly articulated, partici-pants stressed the need to maintain current momentum with an eye towards including the humanitarian dimension in a prominent role during the 2015 NPT Review Conference. Discussants also proposed that this focus is part of an irreversible trend that will lead to a convention banning nuclear weapons, as it has for chemical and biological weapons.

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The NDF was widely recognized as serv-ing a critical function by providing the opportunity for United Nations experts

to meet in an informal environment and en-gage with one another without circumspec-tion. Although discussions touched upon sev-eral positive developments, NDF participants noted the presence of ominous clouds on the horizon and predicted stormy weather ahead for the nonproliferation and disarmament regime. With the upcoming NPT Review Con-ference in mind, NDF sessions emphasized a number of key issues that will impact the out-come of the Review Conference, including:

• A growing impatience at the per-ceived imbalance in the implemen-tation of NPT Treaty obligations;

• The exigent need for progress on convening a conference on a zone free of WMD in the Middle East;

• The opportunity for new initiatives to positively impact the pace and scope of nonproliferation and disar-mament discussions;

• Increasingly effective civil soci-ety campaigns and their ability to impact international opinion and demand a response from national governments;

• The linkages and synergies that can be gained by combining, comple-menting, or supplementing different approaches.

Of course, the highlights and findings includ-ed in this report represent only a snapshot of the fruitful and engaging discussions held during NDF sessions that EWI has chosen to focus on. These recommendations and con-clusions should be considered EWI’s inter-pretations of the NDF sessions and may not accurately represent the positions of partici-pating Member States.

Rewriting the Script

The 2015 NPT Review Conference offers an opportunity to move beyond the 2010 Action Plan and pursue a comprehensive discus-sion on the obstacles that stand in the way of a world without nuclear weapons. Many of these challenges are familiar and seem-ingly intractable. Nevertheless, the experi-enced group of experts present at the NDF identified creative and innovative solutions that fit into the existing nonproliferation and disarmament framework – putting new wine in old bottles. Rather than reiterating vapid and uninspiring declarations, these new solu-tions will rewrite the script and help Member States move beyond simply regulating and limiting nuclear weapons, to realizing their complete elimination.

On the basis of the suggestions put forth during the NDF, this report recommends 12 specific measures to be undertaken before,

New Solutions and Recommendations: Rewriting the Script

As the IAEA continues to help member states take advantage of nuclear tech-nology and sustainable development applications, it is essential that the agen-cy’s resources are sufficient, assured and predictable.

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during and following the 2015 NPT Review Conference:

• Reaffirm the role of the IAEA: The IAEA is entrusted with a number of roles and responsibilities under the NPT. As the IAEA continues to help member states take advantage of nuclear technology and sustainable development applications, it is es-sential that the agency’s resources are sufficient, assured and predict-able. The IAEA should also see a re-affirmation of support for strength-ening the implementation of nuclear safeguards. Additionally, member states should reaffirm the IAEA’s central role in strengthening the global nuclear security framework and work diligently to improve the security of radioactive sources.

• Enhance confidence through transparency: Nonproliferation and disarmament are two sides of the same coin. Transparent ac-counting on nuclear stockpiles and disarmament activities by the nucle-ar-weapon states would instill confi-dence that these states are comply-ing with their commitments under Article VI. At the same time, non-nuclear-weapon states should strive to conclude both comprehensive safeguards agreements and sign the Additional Protocol to allay pro-liferation concerns. A lack of trans-parency on both these fronts fosters misperceptions of an unwillingness to fulfill treaty obligations.

• Progress on the Middle East WMDFZ: Participants emphasized the very real possibility that the failure to convene a conference on a zone free of WMD in the Middle

East could jeopardize the success of the 2015 NPT Review Conference. Recognizing the interrelationship between the integrity of the NPT and the need for serious action to be taken towards establishing the zone, Member States should exert all possible effort to convening a conference or, failing that, establish-ing and adhering to a strict time line. It is equally important that a limited agenda be agreed upon to and ex-pectations be managed.

• Continue dialogue with all states: Despite a deep and storied tension between the nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, it is essential to maintain open lines of communication between and within these groups. For example, one par-ticipant pointed to a useful dialogue NAM countries held with one nucle-ar-weapon state at an NPT Prepara-tory Committee meeting as a model to be emulated. These exchanges do not have to end in agreement but are nevertheless inherently valuable in understanding the position of the other side.

• Transitional approach to expand NWFZ’s: During NDF discussions, participants suggested that NWFZ could be expanded by enlarging cur-rent nuclear-weapon-free zones, or creating a zone through individual declarations by nuclear-weapon-free states. Zones could also be created that limit certain weapons systems, with the possibility for ex-pansion when it becomes politically feasible.

• NWFZ’s as a preliminary step: NDF participants saw NWFZ’s as

The very real possibility that the failure to convene a conference on a zone free of WMD in the Middle East could jeop-ardize the success of the 2015 NPT Review Confer-ence.

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NDF partici-pants recom-mend estab-lishing time lines and goal-posts for other disarmament processes to avoid stagna-tion and inac-tion. As one participant put it, with-out concrete goalposts your vision blurs as time passes.

one of the few practical measures available for states to provide and re-ceive security assurances. The sign-ing of the Protocol to the CANWFZ by the P5 was an encouraging step, but states should be encouraged to expand NWFZ’s and remove the res-ervations attached to the treaties.

• Negotiate a negative security assurance agreement: Although NWFZ’s serve an important pur-pose, they should not be viewed as the “end game.” Nuclear-weapon states should look further on the ho-rizon for a universal, legally-binding negative security assurance agree-ment, ideally under the auspices of the NPT. Such a step would show-case to the international community the nuclear-weapon states’ serious commitment to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security strategies.

• Combining different approaches: NDF participants were supportive of utilizing successful nonprolifera-tion and disarmament initiatives to jumpstart other measures that have stalled or lagged behind. Both the Nuclear Security Summit Process and the Humanitarian Initiative were brought up as examples of pos-sible mechanisms that could have a force-multiplier effect when com-bined with other processes.

• Create goalposts: The 2010 NPT Action Plan succeeded in identifying action items to assess progress on the implementation on nonprolifera-tion and disarmament. NDF partici-pants recommend establishing time lines and goalposts for other disar-mament processes to avoid stagna-

tion and inaction. As one participant put it, without concrete goalposts your vision blurs as time passes.

• Undertake unilateral steps: States or groups of states often fall prey to the temptation to wait for others to take action in accordance with their internationally recognized obliga-tions. These states would do well to recognize their own agency in the process and their power to under-take unilateral action. Instead of political grandstanding, NDF partici-pants pointed to individual efforts, such as the self-declarations by New Zealand and Mongolia to become nuclear-weapon-free states.

• Propel the humanitarian initia-tive: This approach has been instru-mental in strengthening ownership of disarmament by all countries. Momentum should be sustained by maintaining a dialogue that focuses on the catastrophic effects of nucle-ar weapons use, increasing partici-pation in international conferences to include nuclear-weapon states and clearly articulating the goals of the humanitarian initiative.

• Pursue a treaty banning nuclear weapons: The emphasis on human security over national security, and the horrific consequences of nuclear weapons’ use should lead the codi-fication of an explicit prohibition on the possession of nuclear weapons. Until such time, states should con-sider the adoption of a Universal Declaration of a Nuclear Weapons-Free World, proposed by the Repub-lic of Kazakhstan.

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Appendices

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APPENDIX I

2014 Nuclear Discussion Forum Speakers

April 23, 2014: The Nuclear Security Summits: Forward-Looking Implementation Plans Ms. Angela Kane High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

H.E. Ambassador Karel Jan Gustaaf Permanent Representative of the KingdomVan Oosterom of the Netherlands to the United Nations

H.E. Ambassador Oh Joon Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations

June 3, 2014: Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in the Context of the 2015 NPT Review Conference Ms. Angela Kane High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

H.E. Ambassador Eduardo Ulibarri Permanent Representative of the Republic of Costa Rica to the United Nations

H.E. Ambassador Jarmo Viinanen Permanent Representative of the Republic of Finland to the United Nations

June 27, 2014: Beyond the Usual Script: New Solutions for the 2015 NPT Review Conference Ms. Virginia Gamba Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

H.E. Ambassador Desra Percaya Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations

H.E. Ambassador Vladimir Drobnjak Permanent Representative of the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations

Mr. Geoffrey Shaw Director of the New York Liaison Office, International Atomic Energy Agency

November 20, 2014: A New Perspective: Institutionalizing the Humanitarian Approach

Ms. Virginia Gamba Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

Mr. Andreas Riecken Minister Plenipotentiary and Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Austria

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The Nuclear Security Summits: Forward-Looking Implementation Plans Policy Reference Points

(Draft Prepared by the EastWest Institute)

Questions to Consider

• How can we encourage broader participation in the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process beyond current participating states?

• How do we move beyond voluntary commitments to make sure the recommended standards for nuclear security are being met, while also balancing the need to rec-ognize states’ sovereignty? Are additional, legal-binding commitments necessary?

• What additional role, if any, should the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) play in promoting security standards? How can the IAEA’s hand be strengthened in enforcing these standards?

• How do we institutionalize the process moving forward? How can a sustainable mod-el for the future of the NSS process be made? Are these desirable end goals?

• In what ways can the nuclear security regime be improved? How can cross-border exchanges of nonsensitive information be made more fluid? How can best practices be decided upon, disseminated and implemented? How can progress be measured?

• How, can nuclear weapons be addressed in the context of nuclear safety and secu-rity? When the topic is military instead of industry stockpiles, how can the coopera-tion of all countries be assured?

• What balance can be found between the use of nuclear materials, such as highly-en-riched uranium (HEU) in medical products, and the threat they pose as radiological sources vulnerable to theft? What role can industry play in finding that balance? Can the NSS play a role in assisting industry in preventing the use of radioactive materials in dirty bombs?

• The NSS initiative’s successes are largely focused on securing HEU and plutonium and creating measures to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Can the NSS also be effective concerning the important issues of strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and downsizing large nuclear arsenals?

The Nuclear Security Summit Process

The Nuclear Security Summit aims to prevent nuclear terrorism by reducing the amount of dangerous nuclear material in the world, improving the security of all nuclear material and radioactive sources and enhancing international cooperation. The first summit was held in Washington, D.C. in 2010 to secure vulnerable nuclear material around the world. Additional summits were held in 2012 in Seoul, 2014, in The Hague, and a fourth summit will be held in Washington, D.C. in 2016.

2010 Summit – Washington, D.C.

Initially hailed as a success, the primary outcome of the first NSS was a consensus, non-bind-ing communique that pledged to strengthen nuclear security norms and secure all vulnerable

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nuclear material in four years.20 Leaders further agreed to the Washington Work Plan, which highlights specific domestic and international measures to implement the commitments outlined in the communique. The work plan recommended the implementation of UN Secu-rity Council Resolution 1540 and ratification of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, as well as participation and cooperation with the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Ter-rorism and the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.21 Many states also pledged voluntary commitments, including the enactment of domestic legislation, the creation of research and training centers and the removal of stock-piles of fissile materials.

Despite these accomplishments, the 2010 summit has been criticized on a number of grounds. For example, the much-heralded communique left open to interpretation how “vulnerable” nuclear materials would be “secured” and how progress towards this goal would be measured. Some observers argued that the national commitments were low-hanging fruit – initiatives that were already underway, unambitious, and would be up to the states themselves to evalu-ate their fulfillment.22 Furthermore, commitments announced through the communique, work plan, or in national statements were voluntary and non-binding, thereby weakening the ro-bustness and universality of the nascent nuclear security regime.

2012 Summit – Seoul

Additional high-level attention on the threat of nuclear terrorism was brought to bear by a second summit in Seoul in 2012. While the 2010 NSS focused primarily on securing highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, the 2012 summit broadened its scope to include the protection of radioactive-sources and the intersection between nuclear safety and security. The summit in Seoul introduced the “gift basket” concept, joint statements by groups of coun-tries pledging to take concrete steps to advance specific aspects of nuclear security. In all, the participating states initiated over 100 new commitments. Encouragingly, observers estimate that NSS participating countries have implemented around 90% of national commitments made during the 2010 summit.23

Although the vast majority of HEU and plutonium stockpiles are located in a minority of coun-tries, nuclear terrorism is a global threat that requires the cooperation and vigilance from the international community. That there have been 16 confirmed cases of unauthorized posses-sion of fissile material documented by the IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking Database since 1993.24

2014 Summit – The Hague

In March 2014, 53 world leaders gathered in The Hague for the third Nuclear Security Summit. Since the previous summit in 2012, seven additional states have removed all or most of the materials needed to build a nuclear bomb within their territory and more than a dozen oth-ers have taken meaningful action to reduce quantities and better secure the materials they hold. The two notable commitments that emerged from The Hague were Japan’s commit-ment to repatriate 500kg of HEU and plutonium to their countries of origin and the signing of the Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation “gift basket” by 35 states. This important initiative includes specific commitments by states to adhere to IAEA security recommenda-tions and the hosting of peer reviews on the implementation of these commitments. Some other notable achievements include:

• Since the Seoul Summit, at least 15 metric tons of HEU have been down-blended to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU), which will be used as fuel for nuclear power plants. This is equivalent to approximately 500 nuclear weapons.

20 https://www.nss2014.com/sites/default/files/documents/11.communique.pdf21 https://www.nss2014.com/sites/default/files/documents/12.work_plan.pdf22 http://cns.miis.edu/stories/pdfs/120316_nuclear_security_summit_pomper_warren.pdf23 http://csis.org/publication/2014-nuclear-security-summit24 http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NuclearSecuritySummit

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• Almost all NSS countries stated that they had updated or were currently reviewing updates or revising nuclear security-related legislation, in order to comply with inter-national guidelines and best practices.

• Twenty-eight NSS countries stated they have installed additional radiological detec-tion systems at ports or border checkpoints or have equipped mobile search teams with such systems since 2010. From developing countries, capacity building and sharing of best practices

• Thirty-three countries committed to fully implementing the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 on the non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and to undertake developing a national action plan.25

• Two-thirds of the NSS countries have taken a step further and committed them-selves to incorporate IAEA guidance into binding national regulations and to let the IAEA invite peer-reviews of external experts (IPPAS-missions).

Lingering Issues

Although the Nuclear Security Summit has succeeded in elevating the issue of nuclear security and the importance of international cooperation, the implementation of commitments made at the summits remains uneven. The international community failed to secure all vulnerable nuclear material by 2014, as called for in the first summit communique. This is due in no small part to the fact that states have enacted measures primarily on a voluntary basis, and several key countries have yet to ratify fundamental international legislation.

Further progress on a global nuclear security network is hampered by the view of many states that nuclear security as an individual rather than a collective responsibility. Although participation in the NSS has grown over the past four years, attendance in the process is biased towards Western, developed economies. Of the 53 world leaders present at the 2014 NSS, over half hailed from North America and Europe alone.26 Greater efforts could be made to encourage a broad geographic presence from developing regions (Africa, Latin America, the Middle East) to resolve what is in effect a global issue. Assistance could also be provided to underrepresented regions to encourage wider participation, exchange best practices and aid in capacity building.

Additionally, questions have arisen as to the successor to the summit process following the putative final summit in 2016 in Washington, D.C. Several suggestions have been proposed to inherit the role of the NSS, including the IAEA, the Group of 20, or the creation of an additional institution or international convention. A further concern that has not been addressed by the NSS is that measures to strengthen nuclear security could impede civilian nuclear energy programs, particularly in the developing world.27 This belief is given credence by the perception that the threat of nuclear terrorism is extraordinarily remote and that greater emphasis should be placed on nuclear disarmament as the primary guarantor of nuclear security. A number of countries have argued that undue attention has been focused on nuclear security and nonproliferation over nuclear safety and disarmament, and that an equal share of responsibility rests with nuclear-weapon states and nonnuclear-weapon states alike.

Similarly, the production and possession of large stockpiles of fissile materials, especially by states with nuclear weapons, continues to pose a significant risk to nuclear security.

25 This includes the following countries: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zea-land, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States (https://www.nss2014.com/sites/ default/files/documents/joint_statement_on_unscr_1540_-_final_version_24_march2.pdf)

26 https://www.nss2014.com/en/nss-2014/countries-and-achievements27 http://www.idsa.in/system/files/IB_NuclearSecurity.pdf

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Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Policy Reference Points

(Draft prepared by the EastWest Institute)

Questions to Consider

• What is the best approach to pursuing unconditional legally-binding security assur-ances within the NPT?

• How can the reluctance of some nuclear-weapon-states to engage in substantive ne-gotiations on security assurances be overcome? Can the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 984 (1995) be used as a model for additional commitments from nuclear-weapon states?

• Should security assurances be packaged with other issues to better address the in-terests and concerns of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states?

• What are the benefits of an international convention on negative security assurances, as opposed to remaining within the NPT? In what forum should such a treaty be ne-gotiated?

• Many states point to the signing of protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zones as a path towards universalizing security assurances. Is this a viable position? How can securi-ty assurances be extended to regions where nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties have not come into force?

• Is an incremental approach an appropriate strategy to achieve progress on this is-sue? What are other possible interim arrangements that could be instituted while a legally binding international instrument is negotiated?

Assurances and the NPT

Since negotiations on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) began, security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons have come to be considered a critical aspect of the nonproliferation and disarma-ment regime. The demand for security assurances has grown stronger since then, in particu-lar from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), as countries that have renounced nuclear weap-ons have sought guarantees that in return they will not be attacked or threatened with such weapons.

Just prior to the conclusion of NPT negotiations, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 255 (1968), which recognized the Security Council’s obligation to come to the aid of any NPT State Party “that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.”28 Although this commitment, defined as a positive security assurance, was designed to encourage non-nuclear-weapon states to join the NPT, it nevertheless disap-pointed many non-aligned states that had advocated for more robust assurances that they would not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons (negative security assurances).

28 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/255(1968)

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Ultimately, no agreement was reached on the inclusion of security assurances within the NPT, despite numerous proposals from both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states.29 At that time, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America concluded that security assurances should be pursued “in the context of action relating to the United Nations, outside the NPT itself but in close conjunction with it.”30 Instead, all five NPT nuclear-weapon states have made unilateral pledges regarding security assurances, though several of these pledges include qualifications and are not considered legally-binding. The reluctance of the NPT nuclear-weapon states stems primarily from a concern that binding, universal security assurances treaty would constrain military options and weaken the perceived strength of commitments to defend allies.

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones Treaties

Nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) continue to play an important role in strengthening the nonproliferation regime and enhancing global peace and security. Unlike the NPT, the five treaties that establish NWFZs -- the Latin American zone (1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific zone (1985 Treaty of Rarotonga), the South-East Asian zone (1995 Treaty of Bangkok), the African zone (1996 Treaty of Pelindaba) and the Central Asian zone (2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk) -- all include additional protocols for nuclear-weapon states to provide security assurances, though several include reservations. The protocols, which are considered legally binding, oblige the nuclear-weapon states to respect the status of the given zone and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States Parties of the given treaty zone.

On the margins of the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation signed the Protocol to the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (CANWFZ).31 This is significant in that the Protocol provides legally-binding assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against CANWFZ Treaty parties.

Previous NPT Review Conferences and Preparatory Committees

Security assurances are regularly addressed during NPT Review Conferences and Preparatory Committees. Although the 2000 Review Conference did not explicitly mention an international treaty on security assurances, it reaffirmed the role of the NPT as the forum for dealing with them and tasked the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations for the following Review Conference.32 Although no progress on the issue was achieved in 2005, the 2010 NPT Review Conference included security assurances within the agreed upon Action Plan, calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to initiate discussions on “effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to

29 http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/buntim11.pdf30 http://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/CD_and_NSA_Fact_Sheet_

Apr_2014.pdf31 http://www.kazakhembus.com/in_the_news/united-states-signs-protocol-to-central-asian-nuclear-

weapon-free-zone-treaty32 Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, document NPT/CONF.2000/28 (vol. I), p. 15.

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discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument.”33

Lingering Issues

To date, limited progress has been made in extending security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon states, despite repeated calls for such action. Many states have argued that the positive security assurances contained within UN Security Council Resolution 255 can be strengthened by identifying what action would be taken and what would happen in the event of a veto.

As one of the central pillars of the nonproliferation regime, it is difficult to argue against unequivocal and binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon states as a legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon states. The upcoming 2015 NPT Review Conference will have to consider the issue of security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Negotiations on security assurances within the context of the NPT are significant as they would benefit current NPT parties and also serve to incentive those who remain outside the Treaty or those who may consider withdrawing from it.

Certainly, substantial progress has been made on unconditional and legally binding assurances through the signing of protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zones. Nevertheless security assurances codified within the NPT would fulfill the spirit, if not the letter of the Treaty, and strengthen the legal foundation for the nonproliferation and disarmament regime. Indeed, security assurances granted to non-nuclear weapons states would underscore the basic principle that security is guaranteed by the nuclear nonproliferation regime and not nuclear weapons. NPT States Parties should consider allocating specific time during the 2015 NPT Review Conference to discuss and consider proposals on security assurances, and establish subsidiary bodies to develop and deliver recommendations to the Review Conference. Such an environment would be conducive to the possibility of negotiating a legally binding protocol to the NPT on security assurances.

Beyond the Usual Script:New Solutions for the 2015 NPT Review Conference

33 Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, document NPT/CONF.2010/50 (vol. I), p. 22.

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Policy Reference Points

(Draft prepared by the EastWest Institute)

Questions to Consider

• How might a step-by-step approach, as advocated by the NWS, be the most appro-priate course of action for disarmament? How can we reconcile this with the acceler-ated demand for progress on disarmament? What are the building blocks for a world without nuclear weapons?

• What tools are available to improve progress within the P5 Process? How can these consultations translate to concrete action in multilateral arms control?

• What joint projects are available to bridge divides and enhance dialogue between NWS and NNWS? How can trust and cooperation be improved between and within these two groups?

• How can progress on formal treaties be invigorated? What ad-hoc measures can NWS and NNWS pursue to promote nonproliferation and disarmament goals?

• In light of current developments what steps need to be taken to avert increasing threats of nonproliferation?

• How can the goals of the humanitarian approach be further incorporated into the NPT Review Conference process? How can the initiative be translated into specific actionable goals?

• What efforts can be made to promote additional peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while also addressing compliance and security concerns, as well as threats from non-state actors?

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is credited with establishing the precedent in multilateral arms control agreements for periodic reviews of treaty imple-mentation. Every five years, NPT Review Conferences have two primary functions: a backward-looking component that examines the period in review and assesses the implementation of the Treaty’s articles, and a forward-looking aspect that establishes benchmarks to measure future implementation of treaty commitments. In 2010, the Review Conference agreed to a comprehensive 64-point Action Plan across the three pillars of the NPT – nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Although there have been several positive developments since the last Review Conference, it is clear that in 2015 NPT States Parties will have to confront significant challenges and identify concrete measures to surmount ob-stacles to future progress.

Progress on Disarmament and Nonproliferation

Since 2010, overall progress on disarmament has been met with measured success. Through the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the United States of America and the Russian Federation have reduced deployed strategic nuclear warheads to the lowest level in nearly 50 years.34 Consultations amongst the nuclear-weapon states (P5 Process) have resulted in greater transparency, reporting and cooperation on verification measures. This process has also been instrumental in building and maintaining consensus, developing common language on terminology and creating a foundation for multilateral arms control.

34 http://www.state.gov/t/us/2014/221215.htm

APPENDIX IV

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In order to spur on the pace of disarmament, many states have endorsed a global ban on nuclear weapons. At the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the Non-Aligned Move-ment introduced a resolution that called for a nuclear weapons convention to prohibit the “possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer and use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction.”35 The resolution, which was approved by 129 states, also established 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

The Nuclear Security Summit Process has also brought international attention to bear on the challenges posed by stockpiles of nuclear materials and provided structure and deadlines for enhancing global nuclear security. These efforts have a direct impact on the NPT as they not only reinforce nonproliferation commitments, but also promote the responsible development of civilian nuclear applications.

The Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) that met in Geneva in the summer of 2013 was suc-cessful in bringing divergent parties together and thus focused on constructive dialogue to identify proposals to move forward. Another significant achievement of the OEWG was its openness to the contributions of civil society. This is model can and should be replicated in 2015.

The Humanitarian Initiative

One issue that has gained significant traction within the past five years is humanitarian di-mension of nuclear disarmament. Two conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons were held, one in March 2013 in Oslo and another in February 2014 in Nayarit, while a third conference is planned for late 2014 in Austria. Discussions focus on the immediate humanitarian impact of a nuclear weapon detonation, the wider impact and longer-term con-sequences and the national and international preparedness and response capacity.

Though not supported by all states, the initiative is an attempt to reframe the disarmament debate and shift away from what was previously a predominately security-oriented discourse. Many states and civil society organizations hope that the initiative will promote a reduction in role of nuclear weapons in military and security doctrines, raise the threshold for use and delegitimize the possession of nuclear weapons entirely.

Middle East WMD-Free Zone

The final document of the 2010 Review Conference called for the convening of a conference on the establishment of a zone free of WMD in the Middle East, to be attended by all states of the Middle East. While the conference was tentatively scheduled to be held in Helsinki in De-cember 2012, the meeting was postponed indefinitely. Although new dates for the conference have not been set, a facilitator appointed by the UN Secretary-General has hosted multilateral consultations with regional states to discuss the conference agenda, organizational and sub-stantive issues, holding over 300 such meetings by April 2013 alone.36 According the facilita-tor’s report, all states within the region have affirmed their support for the establishment of

35 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/gadis3493.doc.htm36 http://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/CNS-Monitoring-Report_2014_web.pdf

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zone, but disagree on how this should be accomplished.37

Building Momentum

Although NPT States Parties have fallen short of the 2010 Action Plan, there is nevertheless substantial progress and constructive proposals with which to build upon to guarantee a suc-cessful Review Conference in 2015. For example, the humanitarian initiative has undoubtedly brought renewed energy to the NPT. Nuclear-weapon states might be encouraged to partici-pate in and set the agenda for future conferences.

The road to a successful Review Conference may not be a smooth one, and it is therefore es-sential that NWS, NNW, NAM, EU, AU and other regional groups maintain open lines of com-munication and sustained engagement, both in bilateral and multilateral settings. Frank dis-cussions on priorities, concerns and goals are critical and should become regularized. The NPT Review Conference hopefully will bring about simultaneous progress in all three pillars of the Treaty.

37 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/11

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A New Perspective: Institutionalizing the Humanitarian ApproachPolicy Reference Points

(Draft prepared by the EastWest Institute)

Questions to Consider

• What strategies/methodologies could be used to sustain the humanitarian ap-proach? What are the next steps for the humanitarian initiative in 2015 and beyond?

• What arguments can be made that would allay concerns that the humanitarian initia-tive distracts from a practical step-by-step approach to disarmament or undermines existing processes? How can all states be encouraged to engage with the initiative?

• How can the goals of the humanitarian approach be further incorporated into the NPT process? What role should it play in the 2015 NPT Review Conference?

• What processes can the approach supplement? Are there applications to nuclear se-curity and nonproliferation initiatives?

• Can this approach be used to move nonproliferation and disarmament discussions outside of the NPT, perhaps through a parallel process?

• What are some practical measures that can be taken within the humanitarian context that will help push current discussions on nuclear weapons beyond the established rhetoric? To what extent has the humanitarian approach succeeded or failed to re-frame the debate on nuclear weapons?

• How can the goals of the humanitarian approach be more clearly articulated?• What lessons do the Ottawa and Oslo processes present in reframing the discourse

on nuclear weapons?

Background

Although concerns for the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons have been ex-pressed for as long as these weapons have been in existence, the push for a humanitarian approach in the nonproliferation and disarmament debate did not gain significant momentum until quite recently. In the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, NPT States Parties noted “the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and reaffirm[ed] the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.”9 This acknowledgement was significant as it marked the first time States Parties explicitly linked a concern for humanitarian consequenc-es of nuclear weapons to the NPT. It also presaged a series of international resolutions that emphasized the humanitarian approach and elevated the issue to the highest levels.

In November 2011, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Council of Delegates issued a resolution emphasizing the immense suffering that would result from a nuclear weapon deto-nation and the incompatibility of the use of nuclear weapons with international humanitarian law.38 Recognition of the humanitarian approach by the international community has grown since then, as evidenced by an increasing number of states that have signed or issued joint

38 https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/resolution/council-delegates-resolution-1-2011.htm

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statements on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons: from 2012-2013 two statements were issued during the UN General Assembly and two more were issued during preparatory meetings of the 2015 NPT Preparatory Committee.

From 4-5 March 2013, the Norwegian government hosted the first international conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. During the conference, which was attended by 128 governments, international organizations, and civil society groups, experts presented evidence on the impact of a nuclear weapon detonation and concluded that international and national bodies lack the capacity to respond and provide assistance to those affected by such an event. The conference received widespread support for bringing governments together to consider the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and adding a refreshing dimension to standard disarmament and nonproliferation discussions.

The humanitarian approach was further developed by a second conference hosted by Mexico from 13-14 February 2014. Participation grew to include 146 governments at this conference, which examined the global and long-term consequences of the detonation of a nuclear weap-on, either by accident or design, and the risks posed by the mere existence of these weapons. The majority of governments present called for concrete political and legal action against nu-clear weapons, with the Chair of the conference advocating for “new international standards and norms, through a legally binding instrument.”39 At the close of the conference, Austria announced it will host the next meeting on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons from 8-9 December 2014.

Parallels

The humanitarian approach in the context of nuclear weapons follows in the footsteps of several other successful humanitarian initiatives that lead to arms control treaties, including the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty (MBM), the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CMC), and the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). These campaigns emphasized the humanitar-ian consequences of the use of these weapons and harnessed the engagement of a broad spectrum of stakeholders, including civil society groups, academics and health professionals. In the context of the Ottawa and Oslo processes, the acceptability of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions were questioned in light of their indiscriminate effects on civilians. By invoking these humanitarian considerations, the utility and legitimacy of these weapons were diminished in the eyes of many governments. Many proponents of the humanitarian approach aim to mirror this strategy to effect similar results in the realm of nuclear weapons.

Of course, there are key differences between the humanitarian approach to nuclear weap-ons and the processes used to ban anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions. Nuclear weapons differ from conventional weapons in their technical characteristics, scope, conse-quences, role in national security strategies, and political implications. Comparisons are fur-ther complicated by the enduring concept of nuclear deterrence and the belief that nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantor of security.

Reframing the Issue

Given its growing popularity in the international community, the humanitarian approach is viewed by a number of governments, international organizations and civil society as a fast track to expedite the goals of the nonproliferation and disarmament regime. The key to its success as a powerful marketing tool rests in the approach’s ability to decouple the debate surrounding nuclear weapons from a security discourse and shift the focus to the humanitar-ian dimension of the nuclear weapons.

While the humanitarian approach is grounded in a legal perspective in the context of interna-tional humanitarian law, it also encompasses moral and political imperatives that run counter to the use and possession of nuclear weapons. Although the goals of the humanitarian ap-proach have not been coherently articulated, they coalesce around four primary outcomes: to

39 http://www.sre.gob.mx/en/images/stories/cih/ci.pdf

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raise awareness of the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, reduce their prominence in national security doctrines, delegitimize their possession, and move towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Next Steps

As we approach the third conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in De-cember 2014, the international community will need to look ahead to the next steps for the humanitarian approach. First and foremost, the next conference should sustain recent mo-mentum in reframing the nuclear discourse by seeking wider participation, conducting new and innovative research, emphasizing discussion on the weapons themselves and the impact of a nuclear detonation, and building support for a conference following Vienna.

The humanitarian approach presents an opportunity to facilitate dialogue outside of dead-locked multilateral disarmament fora. Future discussions should seek a clear articulation of the goals of the humanitarian approach and develop concrete, realistic measures that will minimize the humanitarian risk of nuclear weapons. The humanitarian approach should also find ways to promote or complement current efforts on the nonproliferation and disarmament agenda. Possible proposals include missile de-alerting and open ocean targeting, negative se-curity assurances and no first use pledges, and international cooperation on crisis response and management of the humanitarian consequences of a nuclear detonation.

The humanitarian approach has proven successful in establishing new dialogue channels, as evidenced by the participation of two non-NPT states in the Oslo and Nayarit conferences. Moving forward, the humanitarian approach should seek the inclusion of nuclear-weapon states. Future conferences could seek to narrow their agenda so as to encourage the partici-pation of nuclear-weapon states. Nuclear-weapon states could contribute technical expertise and assistance in emergency preparedness measures and disaster response capacity-build-ing.

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Ikram ul-Majeed Sehgal (Pakistan)Chairman

Security & Management

Amb. Kanwal Sibal (India)Former Foreign Secretary of India

Kevin Taweel (U.S.)Chairman

Asurion

Amb. Pierre Vimont (France)Executive Secretary General

European External Action ServiceFormer Ambassador

Embassy of the Republic of France in Washington, D.C.

Alexander Voloshin (Russia)Chairman of the Board

OJSC Uralkali

Amb. Zhou Wenzhong (China)Secretary-General

Boao Forum for Asia

NON-BOARD COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Laurent Roux (U.S.)Founder

Gallatin Wealth Management, LLC

Hilton Smith, Jr. (U.S.)President and CEOEast Bay Co., LTD

CO-FOUNDER

Ira D. Wallach* (U.S.)Former Chairman

Central National-Gottesman Inc.

CHAIRMEN EMERITI

Berthold Beitz* (Germany) President

Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach-Stiftung

Ivan T. Berend (Hungary)Professor

University of California, Los Angeles

Francis Finlay (U.K.)Former Chairman

Clay Finlay LLC

Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Germany)

Former Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs

Donald M. Kendall (U.S.)Former Chairman and CEO

PepsiCo. Inc.

Whitney MacMillan (U.S.)Former Chairman and CEO

Cargill Inc.

Mark Maletz (U.S.) Chairman, Executive Committee

EastWest InstituteSenior Fellow

Harvard Business School

DIRECTORS EMERITI

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (Poland)CEO

Bank Polska Kasa Opieki S.A.Former Prime Minister of Poland

Emil Constantinescu (Romania)President

Institute for Regional Cooperation and Conflict Prevention (INCOR)

Former President of Romania

William D. Dearstyne (U.S.)Former Company Group Chairman

Johnson & Johnson

John W. Kluge* (U.S.)Former Chairman of the Board

Metromedia International Group

Maria-Pia Kothbauer (Liechtenstein)

Ambassador Embassy of Liechtenstein to

Austria, OSCE and the UN in Vienna

William E. Murray* (U.S.) Former Chairman

The Samuel Freeman Trust

John J. Roberts (U.S.) Senior Advisor

American International Group (AIG)

Daniel Rose (U.S.) Chairman

Rose Associates Inc.

Mitchell I. Sonkin (U.S.) Managing Director

MBIA Insurance Corporation

Thorvald Stoltenberg (Norway) President

Norwegian Red Cross

Liener Temerlin (U.S.) Chairman

Temerlin Consulting

John C. Whitehead (U.S.) Former Co-Chairman

Goldman Sachs Former U.S. Deputy Secretary

of State

The EastWest Institute seeks to make the world a safer place by addressing the seemingly intractable problems that threaten regional and global stability. Founded in 1980, EWI is an international, non-partisan organization with offices in New York, Brussels, Moscow and Washington. EWI’s track record has made it a global go-to place for building trust, influencing policies and delivering solutions.

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