1

Changing Patterns of Participation in Porto Alegre*

Bernhard Leubolt, Andreas Novy, Joachim Becker

Submitted Version of the article published in:

International Social Science Journal 59 (No. 193-194), pp. 435-448 © 2008 UNESCO and

Blackwell Publishing

Please always refer to the original version of ISSJ

Abstract

This article aims at understanding local capabilities for empowerment, dealing with the

potential for progressive political movements at the local level. Applying an analytical path-,

context-, and scale-sensitive approach to urban governance, this article will discuss

participatory governance in Porto Alegre, the capital city of Rio Grande do Sul, the most

southern state of Brazil. Porto Alegre’s Participatory Budget represents an international best

practice model of urban governance. In recent years it has been referred to as a role model

concerning pro-poor participatory governance and adopted by many other cities and

international organizations. In this article we give special emphasis to recent transformations

which we characterize as a change from a radical project of democratization towards a model

of consensual governance. The former conception – linked to the administration of the Partido

dos Trabalhadores (1989-2004) – tended towards a project of social transformation where

conflicts were dealt with openly and democratically and the local level was treated as a space

of experimentation for political projects of up-scaling. Its implementation led to remarkable

social progress. The latter conception – implemented by the new mayor after 2005 – has

stronger links to mainstream “good governance” concepts, focusing on consensual

arrangements and Private–Public Partnerships.

2

Decades of research on grassroots and local state politics call for an evaluation of the

achievements of local politics. It is urgent to understand local capabilities for empowerment.

This article will deal with the potential for progressive political movements at the local level.

Historically, the city was a privileged site of social struggle in specific conjunctures. The

1920s, for example, were the heyday of alternative local state projects in Europe. But it was

only with the onset of the next crisis in the 1980s that alternative local development "from

below" was discussed again (Novy et al. forthcoming). The municipal government of Porto

Alegre, the capital city of Rio Grande do Sul, the most southern state of Brazil will serve as a

starting point for our critical appraisal of local power as it represents a well-known

international best practice model of urban governance.

Porto Alegre’s participatory budgeting (PB) was one of the best practices presented at the

UN-HABITAT conference in Istanbul in 1996 (www.bestpractices.org). In recent years it has

been referred to as a role model for “empowered participatory democracy” (Fung and Wright

2001), “participatory publics” (Avritzer 2002), “redistributive democracy” (Santos 2002),

“participatory democracy” (Roussopoulos and Benello 2005), or “social innovation”

(Moulaert et al. 2005) in academic circles. It has also been recognized by other international

organizations as an important best practice model of local governance. The European Union

has also recognized this innovative model, which is best displayed by the choice of Porto

Alegre as the host city of the EU–Latin America cooperation programme, URB-AL No.9 on

“municipal finance and participatory budgeting” (Porto Alegre 2004). The practice of PB also

led the organizers of the World Social Forum to choose Porto Alegre as the first venue of the

forum. This in turn resulted in a considerable international diffusion of PB, now implemented

in about 170 Brazilian municipalities (Wampler and Avritzer 2005), as well as in a growing

number of cities in Latin America (Goldfrank 2006), Europe (Sintomer et al. 2005), and other

parts of the world. These practices are very diverse, whereby the case of Porto Alegre stands

out as being (1) one of the first experiences, which (2) has been in practice uninterruptedly

since 1989, and (3) representing the most radical participatory experience (cf. Wampler and

Avritzer 2005; Avritzer 2006; Goldfrank 2006).

This article will discuss participatory governance in Porto Alegre and its recent

transformations, referring to an approach to urban governance, which is scale-, path- and

context-sensitive (Brenner 2004, Leubolt et al.2007). Participation is among the often

ambiguous concepts of local governance, included in the broader, often normative concept of

“good governance” (for discussion cf.: Weiss 2000; Swyngedouw 2005; Leubolt 2007). It has

3

been denounced as “the new tyranny” of development politics (Cooke and Kothari 2001).

This notion refers to practices of participation being used as a tool to prevent actors from

criticizing government via consultation in the decision-making process without having the

possibilities of intervention. The case of Porto Alegre has been particularly important for the

development of notions of “participation as transformation” (Hickey and Mohan 2004) which

are supposed to foster processes of social emancipation. Originally, the participatory budget

was conceived as a conscious attempt to change the form of the local state. The local

leadership of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) understood that it had to change the strategic

selectivity of the state in order to envisage transformatory changes at the policy level. In

accordance with Jessop (2002, p. 40), “(b)y strategic selectivity, (we) understand the ways in

which the state understood as a social ensemble has a specific differential impact on the

ability of the various political forces to pursue particular interests and strategies in specific

spatio-temporal contexts through their access to and/or control over given state capacities –

capacities that always depend for their effectiveness on links to forces and powers that exist

and operate beyond the state’s formal boundaries.” New participatory state structures around

PB were created while it demoted existing branches of the state like the local parliament

which had been a main locus of clientelist practices.

1. Historical Background

PB has evolved within a particular state tradition. Rio Grande do Sul was different from the

rest of Brazil. It bears the imprint of a border region. Up to the 19th century, this imprint was

rather military. Both the Portuguese empire and later the Brazilian state sought to secure the

Southern border against the Spanish-language colonies or states. In order to achieve this, they

attracted settlers who first originated from the Açores, and later from Germany and Italy.

Family farmers were given small lots of land. They were regarded as eventually well-

motivated defenders of the land. In the 19th century, Emperatrice Dona Leopoldina viewed

the small settlers as a possible counterweight to the latifundistas – the big landlords of Rio

Grande do Sul’s extreme south. This desire did not materialise on a national scale, but only in

Brazil’s southernmost state and this type of agriculture and the ensuing social structure

remained exceptional in Brazil (and Latin America in general; Targa 1996b, p.28 ff.; 1996a,

p.91).

Porto Alegre turned into the commercial centre of the prosperous agricultural zone in the

northern part of Rio Grande do Sul as it was geographically well positioned in the river

network which was the backbone of transport for much of the 19th century. The economic

4

development of the city was favoured by the Rio-Grandense state government of the Partido

Republicano Rio-Grandense (PRR). This party represented a social bloc of the urban middle

class, a minority of cattle raisers and representatives of the settlers, merchants and

industrialists. The PRR strived for a new form of the regional state based on broad alliance to

foment economic diversification. Their developmental and republican vision of order and

progress was based on the positivism of Auguste Comte (Cowen and Shenton 1996). They

wanted to conciliate economic progress and the preservation of the social order (Pesavento

1997, p.67), clashing with the interests of latifundistas of Rio Grande do Sul’s extreme south.

With the end of slavery (1888, in Rio Grande do Sul already 1884) and the Brazilian

monarchy (1889), the conflict between the two power blocs exacerbated. In a regional civil

war between 1893 and 1895, the PRR prevailed as it had the sympathies of the local military.

The PRR established a “positivist dictatorship” in Rio Grande do Sul which lasted for more

than three decades and led the foundations of the Brazilian developmental state (Bosi 1999) .

Power was concentrated in the hands of the governor whereas the parliament had little

influence. A hundred years later, the municipal governance of Porto Alegre was restructured

in a similar direction (Carneiro/Penna 1992, p. 59). In the conception of the PRR, the state

was committed to the “common good” which resulted in rather progressive fiscal policies, an

expansion of infrastructure in cooperation with foreign capital, a promotion of peasant

agriculture and, at least indirectly, manufacturing and attempts of conciliation between capital

and labour (Pesavento 1993; Targa 1996a). The local government “municipalised” some of

the infrastructure in this period (Almeida 1996, p.101). The economic development of Porto

Alegre benefited considerably from these policies (Carneiro/Penna 1992, p. 80).

This type of a regional state was unique in the economically heterogeneous and politically

decentralized Brazilian República Velha (1889-1930). As a form of “conservative

modernisation” (Targa 1996a, p.92) it served as a basis for a political Rio-Grandensian

(gaucho) regionalism as a profoundly contradictory mode of development. It instituted

citizenship under the auspices of capital and an authoritarian and paternalist state. This

authoritarian trait might have had its roots in a harsher confrontation with latifundistas.

In the 1950s and early 1960s, the state governments of Rio Grande do Sul regarded

accelerated industrialisation as the way out of the crisis. However, the political forces were

divided over the best way to promote industrialisation. Some advocated a passive adaptation

to national policies; others preferred more specific regional policies. The conservative bloc

favoured an agriculture-based industrialisation. The left wing of the Partido Trabalhista

5

Brasileiro (PTB) around Leonel Brizola advocated more diversified industrialisation and

reformist policies. The state government under the leadership of Brizola (1958-1962) turned

the foreign-owned telecommunication and electricity companies into state-owned companies

and strengthened the public banking sector. PTB was particularly strong in urban centres like

Porto Alegre, whereas conservative forces had a stronghold in the southern “zona colonial”.

The gaucho left was on the forefront of the struggle against right wing authoritarian

tendencies (cf. Müller 1993, p.370 ff.; Pesavento 1997, p.126ff.).

As the political process threatened to transcend the limits of “conservative modernisation” on

the national scale, the military toppled the democratic government of João Goulart in 1964.

The military dictatorship entailed a national homogenisation of policies, putting an end to

alternative regional development efforts. It ruthlessly repressed the left and social movements.

The party system was reduced to two official parties. The regime did not go beyond searching

for “passive” consensus and de-politised society.

“Growth” and “development” were central for the legitimization of the military regime. The

gross inequalities of “tropical Fordism” (Faria 1995) had already fomented social discontent

as large parts of the population were excluded. This was especially made apparent in the cities

with the rise of favelas (slums). The economic crisis beginning in the 1970s accelerated de-

legitimization. The economic strategy of the military regime had led to the growth of the

salaried middle class and the industrial working class which began to loose in the 1980s due

to economic stagnation.

Trade unions, emphasizing autonomy from the state and internal democracy, arose in the

industrial centres. Groups of the urban marginalised organised themselves, too (Novy 1994):

women started to demonstrate against the rising costs of living, mothers insisted on the

establishment of nursery schools, citizens demanded that their streets be paved and proper

sewage systems be installed. New actors arose on Brazil’s public stage (Sader 1988), fostering

the transition to democracy. From then onwards, numerous grassroots initiatives emerged,

particularly on the periphery of cities, which were largely state-oriented, giving priority to

specific demands. These mostly involved state provision of public services, but also addressed

other issues, such as wages and the cost of living. In their fight against social exclusionary

dynamics of capitalist economy and political exclusion by the military dictatorship, the

different social movements formed alliances for political and social democratisation. The

resulting political conjuncture can be compared to Europe after World War II, where anti-

fascist party alliances drafted constitutions including democratic and social rights which

6

promoted the rise of the welfare state (cf. Canfora 2004). The Brazilian social movements

also influenced the drafting process of the constitution which included unprecedented

democratic and social rights. Finally ratified in 1988, the new federal constitution also

decentralised resources and responsibilities to the municipalities, increasing the local space

for manoeuvre considerably (Affonso and Barros Silva 1995).

2 Social Movements and the Emergence of Participatory Budgeting

Social movements were particularly strong in Porto Alegre (Baierle 1992). Residents, mainly

from irregular, poorer quarters, rebelled against the government's lack of interest in acting for

their benefit. Their primary demands were investments in urban infrastructure and services as

well as autonomous political participation of social movements. They criticized the city

government and underscored their demands through spectacular actions, such as roadblocks.

They linked their material demands to questions of rights and voiced the demand to

democratise the budget (Fedozzi 2000). Initially, there were strong links between the social

movements and the PDT (Partido Democrático Trabalhista), one of the successor parties of

PTB, due to the historical tradition in Rio Grande do Sul. But as the first elected PDT-city

government under Alceu Collares (1985-1988) did not achieve the promised results of better

living conditions combined with a programme of democratization via conselhos populares

(popular councils), another progressive party gained strength: the Partido dos Trabalhadores

(PT) which had its roots in the new trade unions, catholic “base communities”, other social

movements and small militant parties of the radical left. PT was based on a vision of radical

political transformation. Olívio Dutra, the PT’s candidate for mayor in 1988, demanded

democratisation and a turn-around in the distribution priorities of public budgets to favour

socially marginalised groups. Participatory budgeting (PB) finally was to be the means by

which this promise of democratisation of the local state was to be fulfilled. It was the main

state project of the first local PT government which aimed at empowering the popular classes.

The second PT mayor, Tarso Genro, who originated from a different PT current,

complemented the PB by more comprehensive elements like strategic planning (cf. Genro

1997, Becker 2003, p. 253) that were attractive to the middle strata. The basic changes in the

strategic selectivy of the local state were made by these first two PT city governments. The

third and fourth local PT governments restricted themselves to minor amendments.

The strategic orientation in the starting phase of the PT-government was a compromise

between proponents of a “workers’ government” in “confrontation with the ruling class” and

proponents of a government “in the interest of the whole city” (Utzig 1996). The first option

7

was inspired by Lenin’s concept of “double power” by which the soviets were supposed to

replace the bourgeois parliament. This would have resulted in giving power to the popular

councils and to include only the organized progressive sectors of civil society. The second

option was inspired by Habermas’s concept of the “public sphere” and republican notions of

citizenship (for a review of these concepts cf. Novy and Leubolt 2005) – a space open to all

citizens which could provide a public sphere where media corporations and other powerful

actors would have less power than usually. Even though this latter option finally prevailed –

against important radical fractions of the PT and social movements that wanted to confine

participation to organized social movements – the notion of social and political transformation

was highly important at that stage. Particularly during the first PT local government,

participation was designed to strengthen the popular classes. Thus, the outcome was a form of

“radical democracy”, as proposed by Laclau and Mouffe (1985), where social transformation

is meant to occur while the institutions of liberal democracy are strengthened.

A progressive tax reform combined with considerable improvements in tax collection

increased distributable resources, enabling PB to become a success. In 1990 the municipal

income rose by 38,7% with further increases of 8.7% in 1991 and 8.3% in 1992, leading to a

boost in the share of investments in the municipal budget from 3.2% in 1989 to 11.2% in

1990 and 17.5% in 1991 (Fedozzi 2000, p.127ff.; Faria 2002, p.62ff.). This important measure

and the unique institutional setting which combines direct and indirect democracy were other

important elements leading to the success of PB (for detailed descriptions cf. Abers 2000;

Fedozzi 2001; Santos 2002). Central, transparent and publicly discussed indicators for the

allocation of the local state’s resources among the various city districts have been decisive

instruments in ensuring distributive equality. The decisions made within the framework of PB

soon showed positive material effects. Particularly between 1989 and 1996, the city’s basic

infrastructure markedly improved (UNDP 2002, p.81). In a comprehensive study on the

redistributive effects of participatory budgeting, Marquetti (2003) shows that a greater amount

of public resources per person has been invested in poorer areas. Social groups that were

largely excluded from public life – particularly the poor and women – have gained from the

introduction of PB. Empirical studies conducted by the NGO Cidade (2003) and Fedozzi

(2007) showed that these groups also represented the majority of the participants. Thus,

Sergio Baierle (2002) diagnosed the emergence of a “plebeian public sphere” which

differentiates PB in Porto Alegre from others which have been dominated by local elites

(Sintomer et al. 2005; Sintomer and De Maillard 2007).

8

The unique feature of the Porto Alegre model of PB has always been its participatory

decision-making process. Budgetary decisions affect urban development considerably, as all

investment decisions have to be included in the budget. The participants not only make

suggestions but are also responsible for the ranking of the proposed projects. During the first

local PT government, the PB process was focused on the priorities in the various city districts.

In 1994, the second PT government introduced additional “thematic fora”, e.g. on education,

health and social services, transport and economic development covering the whole city. This

was aimed at a stronger involvement of the middle strata and of organized interest groups like

trade unions, professional and business associations which had been at the margins of the PB

so far (Becker 2003, p. 253). In a similar vein, the administration of Tarso Genro launched a

reform of long-term urban planning. Like in other Latin American cities (cf. Arantes et al

2000), Barcelona served as an important reference for the reformulation of the strategic

planning and “city marketing”. These processes shared the emphasis on competitiveness of

the city, on the links between public and private sectors, the critique of the Fordist

bureaucratic planning model and the demand for a more flexible approach to planning. These

changes in planning empowered sectors that were different from those strengthened by PB.

Corporative sectors strongly linked to real estate played a major role in formulating the new

10-year planning “master plan”, Plano Diretor. With the support of opposition members of

the local parliament, they achieved more flexibility in planning and a more intensive use of

urban rent than had originally been provided for. This was balanced by a more equitable and

democratic use of land as it had been advocated by NGOs linked to the popular classes (Porto

Alegre 1999, Porto Alegre 2000, Silva 2000, p. 160, Fedozzi 2000, pp. 183ff.). The role of the

poor in this process was rather weak (Abers 2000, p. 150, Silva 2000, p. 160). Thus, the local

PT government of Tarso Genro gave a slightly different bend to the change of the strategic

selectivity of the state. Though the new initiatives of the following local PT government led

by Raul Pont implied a shift of emphasis back to the popular classes, the Plano Diretor which

had been initiated by Tarso Genro was to have a long-term impact on the socio-economic

spatiality of the state.

PT promoted new local state structures and demoted others. The latter concerned especially

the local parliament. In Brazil, the executive branch of the state has the responsibility for

setting up the budgetary proposal whereas the legislature has the final power to accept or

reject it (Giacomoni 2002, p.53). Although the municipal legislative always had the legal

authority to reject budget proposals prepared by the municipal executive via participatory

budgeting, the parliamentarians hardly ever changed the executive’s proposals. This

9

demonstrates how strong the legitimacy of the PB process has been compared to the

municipal legislative. Since these budgetary rearrangements had traditionally been linked to

clientelist practices, the replacement with open and transparent discussions within PB has

been celebrated widely (Abers 2000, ch. 8). While governing Porto Alegre, PT has never been

part of a coalition which enjoyed a majority in the local parliament.

The number of civic associations and social movements in Porto Alegre, in contrast to other

capital cities in Brazil, increased in the 1990s. The PB had an impact on their living

conditions and provided an incentive to organised political acitivity. The stance of the social

movements towards the city administration also changed in this period from a more

confrontational approach or clientelist relationship towards transparent cooperation (Genro

and Souza 1997, p.33ff.). A recent survey, conducted by Schneider and Baquero (2006),

shows the main motivation for the participating poor majority was the possibility of gaining

direct material benefits, whereas participating middle-class citizens were also strongly

motivated by the “good governance” characteristics of PB such as reduced corruption or the

positive international image of Porto Alegre. “Middle sectors were asked to contribute tax

revenues in exchange for cleaner and more democratic government. Poor citizens were asked

to contribute political support in exchange for material benefits. These were not exchanges of

a clientelistic sort; rather, they represented a customised and targeted version of citizenship”

(Schneider and Baquero 2006, p.22), leading to a “cross-class coalition” of support.

As indicated above, this coalition favoured the poor citizens within PB. Middle class and

corporate sectors tended more towards projects aiming at participatory long-term planning

which was difficult to integrate into PB, as the budgetary cycle restricted the horizon for

participatory planning to one year1. One result of the participatory creation of the “master

plan” submitted to the local parliament in 1996 and finally adopted in 1999 was that the real

estate sector obtained more flexibility in planning and the possibility of using space more

intensively than the government proposed. The adoption of the new Plano Diretor led to a

new cycle of construction and, as a result, processes of urban fragmentation, polarization, and

gentrification have also been taking place in Porto Alegre which led to new social movements

“of the rich” pressing for quality of living and the preservation of cultural heritage in the

wealthier districts (Soares 2006, p.137ff.).

Further problems arose due to financial restrictions, which were in part the result of austerity

politics and the financial crises in 1998/99. This led to a re-centralization of “fiscal

responsibility” via national laws (Santos 2002, p.532). As the costs for sustaining the public

10

investments kept rising, this resulted in a decrease of the share of investments in the

municipal budget which never recovered to the initial size (Cavalho in: Schneider and

Baquero 2006, p.18). This led to delays of investments, especially in the housing sector. In

2003, for the first time the city administration presented a budgetary deficit to the participants

of PB (Solidariedade 2003, p.116ff.) reported. These financial problems have persisted until

today.

As noticed by Goldfrank and Schneider (2006), the participatory process legitimized the city

administration in parliament. Conflicts with the municipal legislative were rather mild in the

beginning, as the main opposition party at the time (PDT) was also left-of-centre. PB proved

to be important for the considerable electoral success of the PT in Porto Alegre, which

governed the city for four consecutive terms (1989-2004). Perceiving the PB as the centre

piece of PT’s local state project, opposition parties began to adopt a more hostile stand over

time. They did not permit any further progressive tax reforms which would have enlarged the

available resources for the PB, and PB was denounced as a marketing instrument of the PT. In

2004, nearly all opposition parties, which have opposed PT´s PB for a long time, joined forces

to elect José Fogaça for mayor. Since 2005, Porto Alegre has a new city government. But it

has maintained PB as an internationally accepted best practice model, thereby acknowledging

that it “does not belong to the PT”.

2.3 Up-Scaling PB

In the strategic conception of the PT, local governments have been regarded as experiments of

alternative governing, which should also provide experience for regional and national

governments (Magalhães et al. 2002). PB has always been treated as a key invention and thus,

it was obvious to try to up-scale this experience to other spheres of government, which would

allow integrating the productive sphere to a much larger extent. An important example, which

received less attention in academia than the municipal experiences, was the state government

of Rio Grande do Sul (1999-2002), where the increased number of involved actors also led to

increased conflicts with established actors, especially due to PT’s electoral success in Porto

Alegre. The former government had established a consultation mechanism (Consulta

Popular) in its last year of office as a counter-model to PB – the Leitmotiv of the PT-

campaign. PB in Rio Grande do Sul thus had to cope with actors who were already part of a

different model of participation. In this model, a higher degree of autonomy of the involved

civil society actors was combined with reduced decision-making power. It was a consultation-

based mechanism, drawing mainly on local mayors and Coredes (regional development

11

councils) (Bandeira 2003; Faria 2005). Together with the state-parliament – controlled by

opposition parties – these actors set up a parallel participatory space – the “democratic

forum”, to be able to counterpose the decisions taken within PB. The latter attracted a very

high number of participants (between 190,000 in 1999 and 378,340 in 2001), also reaching

the electoral bases of the opposition parties from 2000 onwards (Goldfrank and Schneider

2006).

The existence of this wide spectrum of participatory spaces also created problems, as time is a

limited resource, especially for the poor. Nevertheless, the idea of up-scaling remains a

promising strategy, as dangers of localism can be avoided. Contrary to assertions that

participatory processes have to take place on the local level as complexity is too high on other

scales (e.g. Dahl 2006), Schneider and Goldfrank (Schneider and Goldfrank 2002) showed

that implementation has been more efficient than before. The possibility of tackling industrial

policies – and thus the sphere of production – led to an interesting example of democratically

controlled endogenous development (Friedmann and Weaver 1979; Stöhr and Taylor 1981),

where small and medium-sized local enterprises where given priority over multinational

corporations and social over economic development (Soares 2002; Leubolt 2006). Despite

economic success (Rio Grande do Sul grew faster than the Brazilian average between 1999

and 2002), the PT was voted out of office. The following government (2003-2006 under

governor Germano Rigotto) immediately transformed PB back to Consulta Popular and the

newly elected government (from 2007 onwards under governor Yeda Crusius) even

announced the cancellation of this participatory mechanism due to “financial problems”

(Folha de São Paulo 20-06-2007).

Similar to the Porto Alegre experience, PT also enacted a change of the strategic selectivity of

the state in Rio Grande do Sul. However, this did not result from large-scale social

mobilization. It was rather a strategic initiative of PT as a governing party which aimed at

innovating and up-scaling the local model of PB. It menaced the positions of the hitherto

dominating social and political forces which joined forces in order to defeat PT in elections

and to end its political experiment. As the new PB model at the level of Rio Grande do Sul

was not so deeply rooted, the new right-wing state government was able to reverse the

changes in the structure of the state.

When PT’s candidate Lula won the national presidential elections in 2002, this was again not

the result of social mobilisation, but of social discontent which PT was able to capture

electorally (Panizza 2004). In this constellation, PT did not have the political strength to

12

fundamentally change the strategic selectivity of the state, esp. the key importance of

satisfying finance capital (Becker 2008). But there have been changes in the administration of

income transfers, the strengthening of public institutions, esp. the reorganisation of public

banks and enterprises, and policies benevolent to economic growth. Contrary to the

experiences in Rio Grande do Sul, traditional clientelism and political bargaining, always

linked to more or less open corruption, were the chosen mechanisms to pursue these

strategies. PT’s national political strategy has been oriented towards material improvements,

esp. of the poorest strata of the population, without questioning capitalist development and the

existing form of representative democracy. Radical democratization in the form of PB – as in

Porto Alegre and Rio Grande do Sul – have not been part of the agenda.

3. Recent Transformations of Urban Governance in Porto Alegre

While the change in government at the regional level, led to a rupture with the PT-

government and the PB-experience, at the city level, opposition never got as fierce. The new

government led by José Fogaça governs under the slogan “Preservando conquistas.

Construindo mudanças” (Preserving achievements. Constructing changes) and preserves

much of the institutions of popular participation due to the high prestige of participatory

governance models. Nevertheless, important transformations have taken place.

The major new invention is called “Local Solidarity Governance” (Governança Solidária

Local – GSL; cf.: Porto Alegre 2006). This programme is implemented parallel to PB and thus

PB is no longer the central axis of urban government. Even the coordinating secretariats have

been renamed and reframed. According to the PB-monitoring NGO Cidade (e.g.: Cidade

2006) the strategic shift towards GSL has been accompanied by a remarkable decline of

attendance of PB plenaries by government officials which means less technical assistance and

less accountability to PB. A strive for consensus marks GSL, being a reaction to criticism on

(1) the conflictive nature of PB, as participants struggle for investments in their immediate

communities without considering the city as a whole, being linked to (2) its short-term

planning horizon, and (3) the focus on demands for state investments without considering

private–public partnerships (PPPs), especially as municipal finances are scarce (Porto Alegre

2006, p.13ff.). As a solution to these problems the government proposed new consensus-

oriented interactions of state and civil society. This communitarian discourse focussed on the

“rights and obligations” of citizens, pointing out that projects should also mobilize private

capital instead of being merely public investments.

13

The shift towards PPPs marks a difference in the view of the role of the state. Whereas the

conception centring on public funding views the tax system as the appropriate mechanism of

securing solidarity, communitarian solutions can easily be linked to forms of philantrophy or

charity which can lead to relations of personal dependence (Laville 2005). The new secretary

responsible for participatory governance, Cézar Busatto, when talking to participants of PB,

has pronounced:

We have to begin to discuss who can help us, because on its own the city government cannot do it all. I need you to help, to look for other partners, to make the rich people cry, as many know how to do, so that they open their pocketbooks and put some of their money in this neighborhood, and the university also, and the NGOs too, and those rich doctors who could start free medical consultations here, also. (quoted in: Schneider 2007, p.3)

The basic idea of GSL is linked to the idea of “good governance” where the state works

together with civil society organisations in networks. “Network society” points to the strategic

conception of Manuel Castells, who presented his normative conclusions concerning urban

policies in a joint study with Jordi Borja, a long-standing member of the socialist Municipal

Government of Barcelona (Borja and Castells 1997). As a report presented to the Habitat

Conference in Istanbul, this manual has assumed something like an official stamp of approval.

It has been a major reference in the debates on city planning and development and its

conclusions have found their way into the political practices of major urban governments

(Arantes et al. 2000; Hadjimichalis and Hudson 2006). For Borja and Castells (1997, p.3),

there are two basic tenets of local policies: (1) Local governments are to contribute towards

“improving the productive and competitive conditions of the companies on which, in the last

analysis, the welfare of the local society depends”. (2) Local institutions are to accomplish

“the cultural integration of ever more diverse societies”. In order to cope with these tasks, the

cities are to develop a strategic concept to cater for both competitiveness and cultural

integration. The strategic vision requires a strong “personalized leadership” (Borja and

Castells 1997, p.98) which has to strive towards a “citizen consensus” (ibid., p.100) which is

to be built around PPPs. A strong local cultural identity and social peace are perceived as

major assets in the struggle for competitiveness and international recognition (Borja and

Castells 1997, p.101). A kind of “competitive community” is thus to be formed with the help

of PPPs. However, this is not a complete change of perspective in regard to the PT

government. For some sectors of PT, Borja and Castells have been an important reference,

and their concept provided guiding principles for reforming strategic planning, particularly

during the government of Genro.

14

The NGO Cidade recently reported that although PB remains, an increasing number of

planned investments have not taken place effectively (Cidade 2006). The current city

administration mainly attributes this to fiscal problems inherited by the preceding

government. But this does not explain the constantly lowering rate of investments which

made the economist Muzell (2007) call the latest budgetary proposal an “exercise in fiction”.

The possibility of another municipal tax reform is currently not being considered by the

government. It remains to be seen, whether GSL’s new focus on PPPs can solve the problems

resulting from a lack of public financial resources. A recent survey by Fedozzi (2007, p. 35)

indicates that particularistic demands for urban infrastructure are gaining importance for PB

participants while communitarian values linked to democracy are judged less important.

Another interesting finding of Fedozzi’s survey (2007, p. 19ff.) is the declining rate of

participation of the middle class, which hints at the erosion of the “cross class coalition”

supporting PB and the PT.

Apart from focusing on GSL the new government has emphasised questions of information

and transparency (Furtado 2007; Macedo 2007). A new project – “ObservaPOA” has been

launched to collect all relevant information on a website

(<http://www2.portoalegre.rs.gov.br/observatorio>). It shall further democratize information,

although the high level of digital exclusion compared to European levels is recognized.

Remarkable results have been produced in partnerships with local universities such as a

participatory assessment of poverty (Comim et al. 2007) which also serves to qualify the

social indicator “carência”2 which is vital for the distributive effects of PB. Nevertheless, this

new focus has negative side effects considering PB, as a recent report by Schneider (2007,

p.2) suggests:

Explicitly, Busatto suggested that his privileged access to statistics gave him greater understanding of the region than even the inhabitants, “Do you know how many children, adolescents, adults, senior citizens, and Family Income Transfers? How many? I think you don’t even know your own region in numbers. You live here, but when I show you, you will be scandalized.”

Concerning problems such as access to sewage networks or waste water treatment, the

indicators did not get better since the new administration took office (Porto Alegre 2007,

p.170). New PPPs such as the infrastructure project for public transport (cf.

<www.ppp.portoalegre.rs.gov.br>) are large-scale projects, which differ considerably from

the small-scale projects originating in PB. It is too early to analyze the socio-economic results

of this new consensus-oriented strategy. However, it can be said that the present local

government aims at partly reversing the strategic selectivity of the state brought about by PB

while maintaing the appearances of participatory governance.

15

4. Final Reflections

In our final reflection, we want to link the development in Porto Alegre to discussions on

urban governance. The case of PB in Porto Alegre from 1989 to 2004 stands out as a

particularly effective strategy of social inclusion because the participatory process has been

(1) open to all persons affected instead of being restricted to an “enlightened elite”, (2) the

participants have possessed effective decision-making power instead of a mere consulting

position and (3) the decisions within participatory settings concerned socio-economic

development. It is often forgotten, but of crucial importance, that this innovative institutional

setting was created by and strongly linked to the governing party PT (Novy and Leubolt

2005). This strategic focus led to a high decision making power of the participants, turning

Porto Alegre’s PB into one of the most radical examples of participatory democracy.

Most of the other examples of PB and the PB in Porto Alegre since 2005 are less radical or

transformative in their design and more oriented towards “good governance” (Sintomer et al.

2005; Wampler and Avritzer 2005). They lean towards Borja’s and Castell’s notion of

participation which encompasses easy access to information, individual feed-back facilities

and project-based consultation (Borja and Castells 1997, p.116, 190-192), but which does not

encompass collective involvement in decision-making. The strategic project is to “instil ‘civic

patriotism’ in its inhabitants” (ibid., p.110). Although “good governance” has always been

incorporated in Porto Alegre’s PB, current changes suggest a pronounced strive towards a

consens-oriented model of common deliberation in complex situations which is post-political

(Mouffe 2006), as it denies antagonism, making it difficult to articulate structurally diverging

interests based on class, gender or ethnicity within the field of democratic politics. While PB

permits the articulation of interests and to make choices, PPPs impede the formation of

conflicting collective subjects. The consensual network-governance arrangements have also

produced severe problems concerning democratic accountability, as recent European

empirical analyses suggest (Hadjimichalis and Hudson 2006; Smith et al. 2006).

PT’s government experiences at various scales and in various times demonstrate how

important the historical circumstances and the degree of social mobilisation is and how

indispensible changes in the strategic selectivity of the state are for alternative policies. PB

was originally an attempt to transform the local state through the creation of new participatory

channels. It was PT’s strategic response to strong mobilization from below which was nation-

wide at its peak at that time. PB helped to maintain a considerable social momentum while

redirecting it from confrontation to negotiation. It clearly strengthened the popular classes.

16

Other participatory elements which were mainly introduced during the second tenure of PT

were rather aimed at the middle strata. Thus, the balance between different social forces in the

alliance supporting PT has shifted from time to time. Towards the end of the cycle of local PT

governments, the alliance between popular classes and the middle strata eroded. This was one

of the reasons why PT was voted out of office. However, the changes in urban government

that had been brought about by PT have outlasted its times in local government which

indicates its hegemonic character. The new local government did not dare to frontally attack

PB, but tries to weaken its impact and to give new directions to it.

In how far recent transformations towards a consensual governance arrangement affect the

transformative character of participatory budgeting remains to be seen. However, the

democratization of the municipal budget in Porto Alegre originally hinted at the connection

between political and socio-economic democracy. Decision-making power was directly

related to material improvements which provided the basis for inclusive strategies, collective

learning and empowerment. Lobbying activities continued to exist, but the strife for public

resources took place within open participatory settings, where formerly excluded parts of the

populations were well-represented. This sort of “plebeian public sphere”, emerging from a

process of radical democratization, contrasts with network-governance settings where

“enlightened elites” negotiate behind closed doors. It will remain a legacy for further attempts

of broad democratisation of politics, society and the economy.

Endnotes

* This article has been written within the framework of KATARSIS (http://katarsis.ncl.ac.uk/), Coordination

Action (CA) under European Commission Framework-6 Programme. The authors would like to thank Carlos

Winckler for numerous discussions and his invaluable support concerning research in Porto Alegre. The valuable

comments on earlier drafts by Markus Auinger, Dan Hawkins, Heinz Leubolt, Oliver Prausmüller and the

anonymous Brazilian referee along with the help during research by the staff of the administrations of Porto

Alegre and Rio Grande do Sul, the Fundação de Economia e Estatistica (FEE) and the NGO Cidade as well as

Luiz Faria and Luciano Fedozzi are also highly appreciated. The final responsibility remains with the authors.

1 This can be exemplified by environmental politics, where the urgent need for investments was difficult to

combine with environmental concerns, which has been illustrated by sewage management: whereas 85% of the

population had access to the sewage network in 2004, only for 27% waste water treatment occurred in 2004

(Porto Alegre 2007, p.170).

2 Carência can be vaguely translated into “lack” and refers to a lack in infrastructure or services. Its inclusion led

to the recognition of social goals of public spending, as this indicator modified the initial priorities of the PB-

participants.

17

References

ABERS, R.N., 2000. Inventing Local Democracy. Grassroots Politics in Brazil. Colorado: Lynne Rienner.

AFFONSO, R.D.B.Á. and BARROS SILVA, P.L.B., eds., 1995, Federalismo no Brasil. Desigualdades Regionais e Desenvolvimento. São Paulo: Fundap.

ALMEIDA, P.F.C.D., 1996. As razões materiais da posição periférica da indústria gaúcha na indu-strialização restringida brasileira. In: L.R.P. Targa, ed., Gaúchos&Paulistas: Dez escritos de história regional comparada. Porto Alegre: FEE, 117- 139.

ARANTES, O., VAINER, C. and MARICATO, E., 2000. A cidade do Pensamento único: Desmanchando consensos. Petrópolis: Vozes.

AVRITZER, L., 2002. Democracy and the Public Space in Latin America. Princton: Princton University Press.

AVRITZER, L., 2006. New Public Spheres in Brazil: Local Democracy and Deliberative Politics. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 30 (3), 623-637.

BAIERLE, S., 1992. Um novo Princípio Ético-Político: Prática Social e Sujeito nos Movimentos Populares Urbanos em Porto Alegre nos Anos 80. Tese de Mestrado, Universidade Estadual de Campinas.

BAIERLE, S., 2002. The Porto Alegre Thermidor? Brazil's 'Participatory Budget' at the Crossroads. In: L. Panitch and C. Leys, eds., Socialist Register 2003. Fighting Identities: Race, Religion and Ethno-Nationalism. London: Merlin Press, 305-328.

BANDEIRA, P.S., 2003. O capital social e a atuação dos conselhos regionais de desenvolvimento do Rio Grande do Sul. Tese de Doutorado, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul.

BECKER, J., 2003. Contra la corriente: política municipal alternativa en el Cono Sur. Sociedade em Debate, 9 (3), 225-265.

BECKER, J., 2008. Zwiespältige Verhältnisse: Progressive Regierungen und soziale Bewegungen in Südafrika und Brasilien. In: S. Schmalz and A. Tittor, eds., Linke Politik jenseits von Marcos und Chávez. Zum Verhältnis von sozialen Bewegungen, Gewerkschaften und Parteien. Hamburg: VSA, (forthcoming).

BORJA, J. and CASTELLS, M., 1997. Local and Global. The Management of Cities in the Information Age. London: Earthscan Publications.

BOSI, A., 1999. Dialética da Colonização. 3rd ed. São Paulo: Editora Schwarcz.

BRENNER, N., 2004. New State Spaces. Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

CANFORA, L., 2004. La democrazia: Storia di un'ideologia. Roma: Laterza.

CIDADE, 2003. Fazendo Política: Perfil das Conselheiras e Conselheiros do Orçamento Participativo 2002/2003. Porto Alegre: Cidade.

CIDADE, 2006. De Olho no Orçamento, 10 (20). <http://www.ongcidade.org/site/arquivos/jornal/deolho%2020%20dez%202006%200145895f1335690.pdf>, last visit 26-12-2007.

COMIM, F.V., BAGOLIN, I.P., PORTO JR., S.D.S., FILHO, R.B., PICOLOTTO, V. and AVILA, R.P.D., 2007. Relatório sobre Indicadores de Pobreza Multidimensonal e Pobreza

18

Extrema para Porto Alegre. Porto Alegre: Prefeitura Municipal de Porto Alegre. <http://lproweb.procempa.com.br/pmpa/prefpoa/observatorio/usu_doc/relatorio_pobreza_poa_2007_final_julho.pdf>, last visit 22-12-2007.

COOKE, B. and KOTHARI, U., eds., 2001, Participation. The new tyranny? London: Zed Books.

COWEN, M.P. and SHENTON, B.W., 1996. Doctrines of Development. London: Routledge.

DAHL, R.A., 2006. On Political Equality. New Haven: Yale University Press.

FARIA, C.F., 2005. O Estado em Movimento: Complexidade Social e Participação Política no Rio Grande do Sul. Tese de Doutorado, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais.

FARIA, L.A.E., 1995. Um estudo sobre o regime de acumulação da economia brasileira. Relatório de pesquisa. Porto Alegre: FEE.

FARIA, L.A.E., 2002. A Administração popular em Porto Alegre: Uma Experiência Alternativa de Reforma do Estado na América Latina. Revista de Economia Contemporânea, 6 (2), 51-83.

FEDOZZI, L., 2000. O Poder da Aldeia. Gênese e História do Orçamento Participativo de Porto Alegre. Porto Alegre: Tomo Editorial.

FEDOZZI, L., 2001. Orçamento Participativo. Reflexões sobre a experiência de Porto Alegre. 3rd ed. Porto Alegre: Tomo Editorial.

FEDOZZI, L., 2007. Observando o Orçamento Participativo. Análise histórica de dados: perfil social e associativo, avaliação e expectativas. Porto Alegre: Tomo.

FRIEDMANN, J. and WEAVER, C., 1979. Territory and Function. London: Edward Arnold.

FUNG, A. and WRIGHT, E.O., 2001. Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance. Politics & Society, 29 (1), 5-41.

FURTADO, A., 2007. Observatório da Cidade de Porto Alegre – democratizando a informação: Indicadores socioeconômicos como elemento para a tomada de decisões e indicadores de acompanhamento do Orçamento Participativo. <http://lproweb.procempa.com.br/pmpa/prefpoa/observatorio/usu_doc/paper_observa_revisado.pdf>, last visit 22-12-2007.

GENRO, T., 1997. Porto da cidadania. A Esquerda no Governo de Porto Alegre. Porto Alegre: Artes e Oficios.

GENRO, T. and SOUZA, U.D., 1997. Orçamento Participativo. A experiência de Porto Alegre. São Paulo: Fundação Perseu Abramo.

GIACOMONI, J., 2002. Orçamento Público. 11th ed. São Paulo: Editora Atlas.

GOLDFRANK, B., 2006. Lessons from Latin American Experience in Participatory Budgeting. Paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association Meeting conference, San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 2006.

GOLDFRANK, B. and SCHNEIDER, A., 2006. Competitive Institution Building: The PT and Participatory Budgeting in Rio Grande do Sul. Latin American Politics & Society, 48 (3), 1-31.

HADJIMICHALIS, C. and HUDSON, R., 2006. Networks, Regional Development and Democratic Control. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 30 (4), 858-872.

19

HICKEY, S. and MOHAN, G., eds., 2004, Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation? Exploring New Approaches to Participation. London: Zed Books.

JESSOP, B., 2002. The Future of the Capitalist State. Cambridge: Polity Press.

LACLAU, E. and MOUFFE, C., 1985. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Demoratic Politics. London / New York: Verso.

LAVILLE, J.-L., 2005. Action publique et économie: un cadre d'analyse. In: J.-L. Laville, J.-P. Magnen, G.-C.D.F. Filho and A. Medeiros, eds., Action publique et économie solidaire. Romonville: Erès.

LEUBOLT, B., 2006. Staat als Gemeinwesen. Das Partizipative Budget in Rio Grande do Sul und Porto Alegre. Wien: LIT.

LEUBOLT, B., 2007. On the Different Facetes of the Debate on Governance. Journal für Entwicklungspolitik, XXII (1), 4-25.

LEUBOLT, B., NOVY, A. and BEINSTEIN, B., 2007. KATARSIS D1.5 Survey Paper: Governance and Democracy. Wien. <http://katarsis.ncl.ac.uk/wp/wp1/ef5.html>, last visit 22-12-2007.

MACEDO, C.E.G., 2007. The Democratization of Information as a process of qualification and participation: the experience of the City of Porto Alegre Observatory. Porto Alegre: Prefeitura Municipal de Porto Alegre. <http://lproweb.procempa.com.br/pmpa/prefpoa/observatorio/usu_doc/democratiz_inform_ingles.pdf>, last visit 22-12-2007.

MAGALHÃES, I., BARRETO, L. and TREVAS, V., eds., 2002, Governo e cidadania. Balanço e reflexões sobre o modo petista de governar. 2nd ed. São Paulo: Fundação Perseu Abramo.

MARQUETTI, A., 2003. Participação e Redistribuição: o Orçamento Participativo em Porto Alegre. In: L. Avritzer and Z. Navarro, eds., A Inovação Democrática no Brasil: O Orçamento Participativo. São Paulo: Cortez, 129-156.

MOUFFE, C., 2006. On the political. Abingdon: Routledge.

MOULAERT, F., MARTINELLI, F., SWYNGEDOUW, E. and GONZÁLEZ, S., 2005. Towards Alternative Model(s) of Local Innovation. Urban Studies, 42 (11), 1969-1990.

MÜLLER, G., 1993. A economia política gaúcha dos anos 30 aos 60. In: J.H. Dacanal and S. Gonzaga, eds., RS : Economia e Política. 2 ed. Porto Alegre: Mercado Aberto, 358-402.

MUZELL, P., 2007. Porto Alegre 2007 budget: an exercise in fiction. Porto Alegre: CIDADE. <http://www.ongcidade.org/site/arquivos/artigos/muzellsite4579a6d8bb2b0.pdf>, last visit 28-12-2007.

NOVY, A., 1994. Lokaler Widerstand und struktureller Wandel in Brasilien. Lokalinitiativen der Armen an der Peripherie von São Paulo. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.

NOVY, A., HAMMER, E. and LEUBOLT, B., 2008. Social innovation and governance of scale in Austria. In: J. Hillier, F. Moulaert, S. Vicari-Haddock and D. Maccallum, eds., Social Innovation and Territorial Development. Aldershot: Ashgate, (forthcoming).

NOVY, A. and LEUBOLT, B., 2005. Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre: Social Innovation and the Dialectical Relationship of State and Civil Society. Urban Studies, 42 (11), 2023-2036.

20

PANIZZA, F., 2004. 'Brazil Needs to Change': Change as Iteration and the Iteration of Change in Brazil's 2002 Presidential Election. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 23 (4), 465-482.

PESAVENTO, S.J., 1993. A República Velha gaúcha: “estado autoritário e economia”. In: J.H. Dacanal and S. Gonzaga, eds., RS : Economia e Política. 2 ed. Porto Alegre: Mercado Aberto, 193-228.

PESAVENTO, S.J., 1997. História do Rio Grande do Sul. 8th ed. Porto Alegre: Mercado Aberto.

PORTO ALEGRE, M.G., 1999. Plano diretor de desenvolvimento urbano ambiental. Lei complementar 434/99, Secretaria do Planejamento Municipal.

PORTO ALEGRE, M.G., 2000. Trajétoria do Projeto Cidade Constituinte e a reformulação do Plano Diretor. Periodo pesquisando janeiro de 1993 – março de 2000, Secretaria do Planejamento Municipal.

PORTO ALEGRE, M.G., 2004. Municipal Finance and Participatory Budgeting. Base Document. Launching Seminar of URB-AL Network No.9. <http://lproweb.procempa.com.br//pmpa/prefpoa/urbal9/usu_doc/DB_in_int.pdf>, last visit 27-12-2007.

PORTO ALEGRE, M.G., 2006. Governança Solidária Local. Porto Alegre Cidade-Rede: Documento-de-Referência. Porto Alegre. <http://www.governancalocal.com.br/pdf/livro.pdf>, last visit 28-12-2007.

PORTO ALEGRE, M.G., 2007. Anuário Estatístico 2006. <http://www2.portoalegre.rs.gov.br/anuario/>, last visit 28-12-2007.

ROUSSOPOULOS, D. and BENELLO, C.G., eds., 2005, Participatory Democracy. Prospects for Democratizing Democracy. Montréal: Black Rose Books.

SADER, E., 1988. Quando novos personagens entraram em cena. Experiências e lutas dos trabalhadores da Grande São Paulo 1970-80. São Paulo: Paz e Terra.

SANTOS, B.D.S., 2002. Orçamento Participativo em Porto Alegre: para uma democracia redistributiva. In: B.D.S. Santos, ed., Democratizar a Democracia: Os caminhos da democracia participativa. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 455-597.

SCHNEIDER, A., 2007. Crisis in the Home of Participatory Budgeting: Technical Accuracy and Hierarchy. Porto Alegre: CIDADE. <http://www.ongcidade.org/site/arquivos/artigos/crisisaaronop461d1990e1759.pdf>, last visit 17-12-2007.

SCHNEIDER, A. and GOLDFRANK, B., 2002. Budgets and Ballots in Brazil: Participatory Budgeting from the City to the State. Institute of Development Studies, Brighton. IDS Working Paper 149. <http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/bookshop/wp/wp149.pdf>, last visit 17-12-2007.

SCHNEIDER, A. and BAQUERO, M., 2006. Get What You Want, Give What You Can: Embedded Public Finance in Porto Alegre. Brighton: IDS Working Paper 266. <http://www2.ids.ac.uk/gdr/cfs/pdfs/Wp266.pdf>, last visit 17-12-2007.

SILVA, F.J.H.D., 2000. A política habitacional no 3o mandato da Administração Popular. In: R. Pont, ed., Porto Alegre: uma cidade que conquista. A terceira gestão do PT no governo municipal. Porto Alegre: Artes e Ofícios, 153-164.

21

SINTOMER, Y. and DE MAILLARD, J., 2007. The limits to local participation and deliberation in the French politique de la ville. European Journal of Political Research, 46 (4), 503-529.

SINTOMER, Y., HERZBERG, C. and RÖCKE, A., 2005. Participatory Budgets in a European Comparative Approach: Perspectives and Chances of the Cooperative State at the Municipal Level in Germany and Europe. Berlin. <http://www.buergerhaushalt-europa.de/documents/Volumen_zwei_Endbericht_Buergerhaushalt_Europa5.pdf>, last visit 18-12-2007.

SMITH, M., MATHUR, N. and SKELCHER, C., 2006. Corporate Governance in a Collaborative Environment: what happens when government, business and civil society work together? Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14 (3), 159-171.

SOARES, L.T., ed., 2002, Tempo de desafios. A política social democrática e popular no governo do Rio Grande do Sul. Petrópolis: Editora Vozes.

SOARES, P.R.R., 2006. Metamorfoses da metrópole contemporânea: Considerações sobre Porto Alegre. GEOUSP - Espaço e Tempo, (20), 129-143.

SOLIDARIEDADE, O.N.G., 2003. Caminhando para um Mundo Novo. Orçamento Participativo de Porto Alegre visto pela comunidade. Petrópolis: Editora Vozes.

STÖHR, W.B. and TAYLOR, D.R.F., eds., 1981, Development from Above or Below? Chichester: J. Wiley and Sons.

SWYNGEDOUW, E., 2005. Governance Innovation and the Citizen: The Janus Face of Governance-beyond-the-state. Urban Studies, 42 (11), 1991-2006.

TARGA, L.R.P., 1996a. Violência revolucionária e fundação do Estado burguês. In: L.R.P. Targa, ed., Gaúchos&Paulistas: Dez escritos de história regional comparada. Porto Alegre: FEE, 81-92.

TARGA, L.R.P., 1996b. O Rio Grande do Sul: fronteira entre duas formaçoes históricas. In: L.R.P. Targa, ed., Gaúchos&Paulistas: Dez escritos de história regional comparada. Porto Alegre: FEE, 17-48.

UNDP, 2002. Human Development Report 2002. Deepening democracy in a fragmented world Oxford: Oxford University Press.

UTZIG, J.E., 1996. Notas sobre o governo do PT em Porto Alegre. Novos Estudos, (45), 209-222.

WAMPLER, B. and AVRITZER, L., 2005. The Spread of Participatory Budgeting in Brazil: From Radical Democracy to Participatory Good Government. Journal of Latin American Urban Studies, 7, 37-52.

WEISS, T.G., 2000. Governance, good governance and global governance: conceptual and actual challenges. Third World Quarterly, 21 (5), 795-814.

22

Biographical note

Bernhard Leubolt (corresponding author) holds a doctoral scholarship by the Heinrich-Böll-

Stiftung for the research programme “Global Social Policies and Governance” at the

University of Kassel (Germany). His e-mail is: bernhard.leubolt@uni-kassel.de. His research

interests include governance and state theory, social inequality, political economy, and

development studies.

Andreas Novy is associate professor for urban and regional development at the Vienna

University of Economics and Business Administration (Austria). He has been involved in

comparative research on European cities and between Latin America and Europe. He is the

scientific director of the Paulo Freire Centre for Transdisciplinary Development Research and

Education in Vienna. His e-mail is: Andreas.Novy@wu-wien.ac.at. His research interests are

development studies and the political economy of urban and regional development.

Joachim Becker is associate professor at the department of economics at the Vienna

University of Economics and Business Administration (Austria). His e-mail is:

Joachim.Becker@wu-wien.ac.at. His research interests include development economics,

regulation theory, state theory, regional integration, and Mercosur.