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. . Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem Hiroaki Terao (Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan) at Recent developments on geometrical and algebraic methods in Economics Hokkaido University, Sapporo 2014.08.22 H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 1 / 33

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Page 1: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

.

......

Chambers of Arrangementsand

Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

Hiroaki Terao

(Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan)

at

Recent developments on geometrical and algebraic methods in EconomicsHokkaido University, Sapporo

2014.08.22

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 1/ 33

Page 2: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

Contents

...1 Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

...2 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

...3 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

...4 Two theorems on arrangements and their chambers

...5 Implications

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 2/ 33

Page 3: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

Contents

...1 Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

...2 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

...3 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

...4 Two theorems on arrangements and their chambers

...5 Implications

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 2/ 33

Page 4: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

Contents

...1 Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

...2 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

...3 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

...4 Two theorems on arrangements and their chambers

...5 Implications

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 2/ 33

Page 5: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

Contents

...1 Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

...2 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

...3 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

...4 Two theorems on arrangements and their chambers

...5 Implications

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 2/ 33

Page 6: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

Contents

...1 Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

...2 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

...3 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

...4 Two theorems on arrangements and their chambers

...5 Implications

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 2/ 33

Page 7: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

Contents

...1 Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

...2 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

...3 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

...4 Two theorems on arrangements and their chambers

...5 Implications

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 2/ 33

Page 8: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Hyperplane Arrangement

A (central) hyperplane arrangement A is:

A := {H1, . . . ,Hn}

in an ℓ-dimensional vector space V over a field Kdefined by Hi = ker(αi) with αi ∈ V∗(1 ≤ i ≤ n).

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 3/ 33

Page 9: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Hyperplane Arrangement

A (central) hyperplane arrangement A is:

A := {H1, . . . ,Hn}

in an ℓ-dimensional vector space V over a field Kdefined by Hi = ker(αi) with αi ∈ V∗(1 ≤ i ≤ n).

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 3/ 33

Page 10: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Hyperplane Arrangement

A (central) hyperplane arrangement A is:

A := {H1, . . . ,Hn}

in an ℓ-dimensional vector space V over a field Kdefined by Hi = ker(αi) with αi ∈ V∗(1 ≤ i ≤ n).

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 3/ 33

Page 11: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Chambers

When K = R (the real number field), the connectedcomponents of

M(A) := V \n∪

i=1

Hi

are called chambers.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 4/ 33

Page 12: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Chambers

When K = R (the real number field), the connectedcomponents of

M(A) := V \n∪

i=1

Hi

are called chambers.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 4/ 33

Page 13: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Intersection lattice

Let

L(A) = {all intersections of hyperplanes belonging toA}= {∩H∈B

H | B ⊆ A}

and introduce a partial order by X ≥ Y⇔ X ⊆ Y to makeL(A) a partially ordered set.[Agree that L(A) has the minimum V.]Then L(A) is called the intersection lattice.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 5/ 33

Page 14: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Intersection lattice

Let

L(A) = {all intersections of hyperplanes belonging toA}= {∩H∈B

H | B ⊆ A}

and introduce a partial order by X ≥ Y⇔ X ⊆ Y to makeL(A) a partially ordered set.[Agree that L(A) has the minimum V.]Then L(A) is called the intersection lattice.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 5/ 33

Page 15: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Intersection lattice

Let

L(A) = {all intersections of hyperplanes belonging toA}= {∩H∈B

H | B ⊆ A}

and introduce a partial order by X ≥ Y⇔ X ⊆ Y to makeL(A) a partially ordered set.[Agree that L(A) has the minimum V.]Then L(A) is called the intersection lattice.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 5/ 33

Page 16: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Intersection lattice

Let

L(A) = {all intersections of hyperplanes belonging toA}= {∩H∈B

H | B ⊆ A}

and introduce a partial order by X ≥ Y⇔ X ⊆ Y to makeL(A) a partially ordered set.[Agree that L(A) has the minimum V.]Then L(A) is called the intersection lattice.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 5/ 33

Page 17: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Intersection lattice

Let

L(A) = {all intersections of hyperplanes belonging toA}= {∩H∈B

H | B ⊆ A}

and introduce a partial order by X ≥ Y⇔ X ⊆ Y to makeL(A) a partially ordered set.[Agree that L(A) has the minimum V.]Then L(A) is called the intersection lattice.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 5/ 33

Page 18: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Mobius function

Defineµ : L(A)→ Z

byµ(V) := 1, µ(X) := −

∑Y<X

µ(Y).

Poincare polynomial

Define the Poincare polynomial

π(A, t) :=∑

X∈L(A)

µ(X)(−t)codimX.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 6/ 33

Page 19: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Mobius function

Defineµ : L(A)→ Z

byµ(V) := 1, µ(X) := −

∑Y<X

µ(Y).

Poincare polynomial

Define the Poincare polynomial

π(A, t) :=∑

X∈L(A)

µ(X)(−t)codimX.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 6/ 33

Page 20: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Mobius function

Defineµ : L(A)→ Z

byµ(V) := 1, µ(X) := −

∑Y<X

µ(Y).

Poincare polynomial

Define the Poincare polynomial

π(A, t) :=∑

X∈L(A)

µ(X)(−t)codimX.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 6/ 33

Page 21: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Mobius function

Defineµ : L(A)→ Z

byµ(V) := 1, µ(X) := −

∑Y<X

µ(Y).

Poincare polynomial

Define the Poincare polynomial

π(A, t) :=∑

X∈L(A)

µ(X)(−t)codimX.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 6/ 33

Page 22: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Mobius function

Defineµ : L(A)→ Z

byµ(V) := 1, µ(X) := −

∑Y<X

µ(Y).

Poincare polynomial

Define the Poincare polynomial

π(A, t) :=∑

X∈L(A)

µ(X)(−t)codimX.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 6/ 33

Page 23: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Factorization TheoremTheorem. (H. T. 1981). Suppose that A is a freearrangement in Cℓ with exponents d1,d2, . . . , dℓ.Then

π(A, t) =ℓ∏

i=1

(1+ dit).

Zaslavsky’s Chamber-Counting Formula

Theorem.(Thomas Zaslavsky 1975).

|Chambers| = π(A,1).

If A is a free real arrangement in Rℓ with exponentsd1,d2, . . . , dℓ, then |Chambers| = π(A,1) =

∏ℓi=1(1+ di).

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 7/ 33

Page 24: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Factorization TheoremTheorem. (H. T. 1981). Suppose that A is a freearrangement in Cℓ with exponents d1,d2, . . . , dℓ.Then

π(A, t) =ℓ∏

i=1

(1+ dit).

Zaslavsky’s Chamber-Counting Formula

Theorem.(Thomas Zaslavsky 1975).

|Chambers| = π(A,1).

If A is a free real arrangement in Rℓ with exponentsd1,d2, . . . , dℓ, then |Chambers| = π(A,1) =

∏ℓi=1(1+ di).

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 7/ 33

Page 25: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Factorization TheoremTheorem. (H. T. 1981). Suppose that A is a freearrangement in Cℓ with exponents d1,d2, . . . , dℓ.Then

π(A, t) =ℓ∏

i=1

(1+ dit).

Zaslavsky’s Chamber-Counting Formula

Theorem.(Thomas Zaslavsky 1975).

|Chambers| = π(A,1).

If A is a free real arrangement in Rℓ with exponentsd1,d2, . . . , dℓ, then |Chambers| = π(A,1) =

∏ℓi=1(1+ di).

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 7/ 33

Page 26: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Factorization TheoremTheorem. (H. T. 1981). Suppose that A is a freearrangement in Cℓ with exponents d1,d2, . . . , dℓ.Then

π(A, t) =ℓ∏

i=1

(1+ dit).

Zaslavsky’s Chamber-Counting Formula

Theorem.(Thomas Zaslavsky 1975).

|Chambers| = π(A,1).

If A is a free real arrangement in Rℓ with exponentsd1,d2, . . . , dℓ, then |Chambers| = π(A,1) =

∏ℓi=1(1+ di).

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 7/ 33

Page 27: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Factorization TheoremTheorem. (H. T. 1981). Suppose that A is a freearrangement in Cℓ with exponents d1,d2, . . . , dℓ.Then

π(A, t) =ℓ∏

i=1

(1+ dit).

Zaslavsky’s Chamber-Counting Formula

Theorem.(Thomas Zaslavsky 1975).

|Chambers| = π(A,1).

If A is a free real arrangement in Rℓ with exponentsd1,d2, . . . , dℓ, then |Chambers| = π(A,1) =

∏ℓi=1(1+ di).

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 7/ 33

Page 28: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Factorization TheoremTheorem. (H. T. 1981). Suppose that A is a freearrangement in Cℓ with exponents d1,d2, . . . , dℓ.Then

π(A, t) =ℓ∏

i=1

(1+ dit).

Zaslavsky’s Chamber-Counting Formula

Theorem.(Thomas Zaslavsky 1975).

|Chambers| = π(A,1).

If A is a free real arrangement in Rℓ with exponentsd1,d2, . . . , dℓ, then |Chambers| = π(A,1) =

∏ℓi=1(1+ di).

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 7/ 33

Page 29: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Catalan arrangement of type B2 is free with exponents (1,5,7)'

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α1 = −1α1 = 0

α1 = 1α2 = −1α2 = 0α2 = 1

α1 + α2 = −1

α1 + α2 = 0

α1 + α2 = 1

2α1 + α2 = −12α1 + α2 = 0

2α1 + α2 = 1

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The number of chambers isπ(A,1) = (1+ 1× 1)(1+ 5× 1)(1+ 7× 1) = 96

related to the Edelman-Reiner conjecture (solved by M. Yoshinagain 2004)

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 8/ 33

Page 30: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Catalan arrangement of type B2 is free with exponents (1,5,7)'

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α1 = −1α1 = 0

α1 = 1α2 = −1α2 = 0α2 = 1

α1 + α2 = −1

α1 + α2 = 0

α1 + α2 = 1

2α1 + α2 = −12α1 + α2 = 0

2α1 + α2 = 1

1

2

3

4

5

6

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2122

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26

27

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29

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3132

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

4041

4243

44

45

46

47

48

The number of chambers isπ(A,1) = (1+ 1× 1)(1+ 5× 1)(1+ 7× 1) = 96

related to the Edelman-Reiner conjecture (solved by M. Yoshinagain 2004)

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 8/ 33

Page 31: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Catalan arrangement of type B2 is free with exponents (1,5,7)'

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α1 = −1α1 = 0

α1 = 1α2 = −1α2 = 0α2 = 1

α1 + α2 = −1

α1 + α2 = 0

α1 + α2 = 1

2α1 + α2 = −12α1 + α2 = 0

2α1 + α2 = 1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

1819

20

2122

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

3132

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

4041

4243

44

45

46

47

48

The number of chambers isπ(A,1) = (1+ 1× 1)(1+ 5× 1)(1+ 7× 1) = 96

related to the Edelman-Reiner conjecture (solved by M. Yoshinagain 2004)

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 8/ 33

Page 32: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Catalan arrangement of type B2 is free with exponents (1,5,7)'

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α1 = −1α1 = 0

α1 = 1α2 = −1α2 = 0α2 = 1

α1 + α2 = −1

α1 + α2 = 0

α1 + α2 = 1

2α1 + α2 = −12α1 + α2 = 0

2α1 + α2 = 1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

1819

20

2122

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

3132

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

4041

4243

44

45

46

47

48

The number of chambers isπ(A,1) = (1+ 1× 1)(1+ 5× 1)(1+ 7× 1) = 96

related to the Edelman-Reiner conjecture (solved by M. Yoshinagain 2004)

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 8/ 33

Page 33: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

1. Basic concepts about hyperplane arrangements

Catalan arrangement of type B2 is free with exponents (1,5,7)'

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α1 = −1α1 = 0

α1 = 1α2 = −1α2 = 0α2 = 1

α1 + α2 = −1

α1 + α2 = 0

α1 + α2 = 1

2α1 + α2 = −12α1 + α2 = 0

2α1 + α2 = 1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

1819

20

2122

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

3132

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

4041

4243

44

45

46

47

48

The number of chambers isπ(A,1) = (1+ 1× 1)(1+ 5× 1)(1+ 7× 1) = 96

related to the Edelman-Reiner conjecture (solved by M. Yoshinagain 2004)

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 8/ 33

Page 34: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

2. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

Assume that a society of m people have ℓ policy optionsand that every individual has his/her own order ofpreferences on the ℓ policy options.

A social welfare function can be interpreted as a votingsystem by which the individual preferences areaggregated into a single societal preference.

We require the following two requirements for areasonable social welfare function:

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 9/ 33

Page 35: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

2. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

Assume that a society of m people have ℓ policy optionsand that every individual has his/her own order ofpreferences on the ℓ policy options.

A social welfare function can be interpreted as a votingsystem by which the individual preferences areaggregated into a single societal preference.

We require the following two requirements for areasonable social welfare function:

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 9/ 33

Page 36: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

2. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

Assume that a society of m people have ℓ policy optionsand that every individual has his/her own order ofpreferences on the ℓ policy options.

A social welfare function can be interpreted as a votingsystem by which the individual preferences areaggregated into a single societal preference.

We require the following two requirements for areasonable social welfare function:

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 9/ 33

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2. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

Assume that a society of m people have ℓ policy optionsand that every individual has his/her own order ofpreferences on the ℓ policy options.

A social welfare function can be interpreted as a votingsystem by which the individual preferences areaggregated into a single societal preference.

We require the following two requirements for areasonable social welfare function:

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 9/ 33

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2. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

The Two Requirements

(A) the society prefers the option i to the option j if everyindividual prefers the option i to the option j (Paretoproperty),

(B) whether the society prefers the option i to the optionj only depends which individuals prefer the option i tothe option j (pairwise independence).

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 10/ 33

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2. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

The Two Requirements

(A) the society prefers the option i to the option j if everyindividual prefers the option i to the option j (Paretoproperty),

(B) whether the society prefers the option i to the optionj only depends which individuals prefer the option i tothe option j (pairwise independence).

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 10/ 33

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2. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

The Two Requirements

(A) the society prefers the option i to the option j if everyindividual prefers the option i to the option j (Paretoproperty),

(B) whether the society prefers the option i to the optionj only depends which individuals prefer the option i tothe option j (pairwise independence).

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 10/ 33

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2. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (Kenneth Arrow 1950).For ℓ ≥ 3, the only social welfare function satisfying the tworequirements (A) and (B) is a dictatorship, that is, the societalpreference has to be equal to the preference of one particularindividual.

(A) the society prefers the option i to the option j if every individualprefers the option i to the option j (Pareto property),(B) whether the society prefers the option i to the option j onlydepends which individuals prefer the option i to the option j(pairwise independence).

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 11/ 33

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2. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (Kenneth Arrow 1950).For ℓ ≥ 3, the only social welfare function satisfying the tworequirements (A) and (B) is a dictatorship, that is, the societalpreference has to be equal to the preference of one particularindividual.

(A) the society prefers the option i to the option j if every individualprefers the option i to the option j (Pareto property),(B) whether the society prefers the option i to the option j onlydepends which individuals prefer the option i to the option j(pairwise independence).

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 11/ 33

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2. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (Kenneth Arrow 1950).For ℓ ≥ 3, the only social welfare function satisfying the tworequirements (A) and (B) is a dictatorship, that is, the societalpreference has to be equal to the preference of one particularindividual.

(A) the society prefers the option i to the option j if every individualprefers the option i to the option j (Pareto property),(B) whether the society prefers the option i to the option j onlydepends which individuals prefer the option i to the option j(pairwise independence).

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 11/ 33

Page 44: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

2. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (Kenneth Arrow 1950).For ℓ ≥ 3, the only social welfare function satisfying the tworequirements (A) and (B) is a dictatorship, that is, the societalpreference has to be equal to the preference of one particularindividual.

(A) the society prefers the option i to the option j if every individualprefers the option i to the option j (Pareto property),(B) whether the society prefers the option i to the option j onlydepends which individuals prefer the option i to the option j(pairwise independence).

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 11/ 33

Page 45: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

2. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (Kenneth Arrow 1950).For ℓ ≥ 3, the only social welfare function satisfying the tworequirements (A) and (B) is a dictatorship, that is, the societalpreference has to be equal to the preference of one particularindividual.

(A) the society prefers the option i to the option j if every individualprefers the option i to the option j (Pareto property),(B) whether the society prefers the option i to the option j onlydepends which individuals prefer the option i to the option j(pairwise independence).

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 11/ 33

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2. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

Why is Arrow’s theorem true?

What is the reason behind Arrow’s theorem?Condorcet’s paradox by Marquis Condorcet (1743-94)A,B,C : 3 people, 1,2,3 : 3 optionslists of preferences :A : 1 > 2 > 3,B : 2 > 3 > 1,C : 3 > 1 > 2In this situation it is very hard to decide the societalpreference in a “democratic way” like the majority rule.Roughly speaking, this is the reason why Arrow’sImpossibility Theorem holds.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 12/ 33

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2. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

Why is Arrow’s theorem true?

What is the reason behind Arrow’s theorem?Condorcet’s paradox by Marquis Condorcet (1743-94)A,B,C : 3 people, 1,2,3 : 3 optionslists of preferences :A : 1 > 2 > 3,B : 2 > 3 > 1,C : 3 > 1 > 2In this situation it is very hard to decide the societalpreference in a “democratic way” like the majority rule.Roughly speaking, this is the reason why Arrow’sImpossibility Theorem holds.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 12/ 33

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2. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

Why is Arrow’s theorem true?

What is the reason behind Arrow’s theorem?Condorcet’s paradox by Marquis Condorcet (1743-94)A,B,C : 3 people, 1,2,3 : 3 optionslists of preferences :A : 1 > 2 > 3,B : 2 > 3 > 1,C : 3 > 1 > 2In this situation it is very hard to decide the societalpreference in a “democratic way” like the majority rule.Roughly speaking, this is the reason why Arrow’sImpossibility Theorem holds.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 12/ 33

Page 49: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

2. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

Why is Arrow’s theorem true?

What is the reason behind Arrow’s theorem?Condorcet’s paradox by Marquis Condorcet (1743-94)A,B,C : 3 people, 1,2,3 : 3 optionslists of preferences :A : 1 > 2 > 3,B : 2 > 3 > 1,C : 3 > 1 > 2In this situation it is very hard to decide the societalpreference in a “democratic way” like the majority rule.Roughly speaking, this is the reason why Arrow’sImpossibility Theorem holds.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 12/ 33

Page 50: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

2. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

Why is Arrow’s theorem true?

What is the reason behind Arrow’s theorem?Condorcet’s paradox by Marquis Condorcet (1743-94)A,B,C : 3 people, 1,2,3 : 3 optionslists of preferences :A : 1 > 2 > 3,B : 2 > 3 > 1,C : 3 > 1 > 2In this situation it is very hard to decide the societalpreference in a “democratic way” like the majority rule.Roughly speaking, this is the reason why Arrow’sImpossibility Theorem holds.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 12/ 33

Page 51: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

2. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

Why is Arrow’s theorem true?

What is the reason behind Arrow’s theorem?Condorcet’s paradox by Marquis Condorcet (1743-94)A,B,C : 3 people, 1,2,3 : 3 optionslists of preferences :A : 1 > 2 > 3,B : 2 > 3 > 1,C : 3 > 1 > 2In this situation it is very hard to decide the societalpreference in a “democratic way” like the majority rule.Roughly speaking, this is the reason why Arrow’sImpossibility Theorem holds.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 12/ 33

Page 52: Chambers of Arrangements and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem › ~terao › ...beamer.ver.8.pdf · Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version) 3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

2. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (economics version)

Why is Arrow’s theorem true?

What is the reason behind Arrow’s theorem?Condorcet’s paradox by Marquis Condorcet (1743-94)A,B,C : 3 people, 1,2,3 : 3 optionslists of preferences :A : 1 > 2 > 3,B : 2 > 3 > 1,C : 3 > 1 > 2In this situation it is very hard to decide the societalpreference in a “democratic way” like the majority rule.Roughly speaking, this is the reason why Arrow’sImpossibility Theorem holds.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 12/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

A = {H1,H2, . . . ,Hn} : a real central arrangement in Rℓ

Ch = Ch(A) : the set of chambersHj : defined by αj = 0H+j := {x ∈ Rℓ | αj(x) > 0} : a half-spaceH−j := {x ∈ Rℓ | αj(x) < 0} : the other half-spaceB := {+,−}ϵσj : Ch −→ B are defined by ϵσj (C) = στ if C ⊆ Hτj(σ, τ ∈ B, j = 1, . . . ,n)m : a positive integerChm, Bm : the m-time direct productsϵσj : Chm→ Bm is induced from ϵσj : Ch→ B byϵσj (C1,C2, . . . ,Cm) = (ϵσj (C1), ϵσj (C2), . . . , ϵσj (Cm))

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 13/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

A = {H1,H2, . . . ,Hn} : a real central arrangement in Rℓ

Ch = Ch(A) : the set of chambersHj : defined by αj = 0H+j := {x ∈ Rℓ | αj(x) > 0} : a half-spaceH−j := {x ∈ Rℓ | αj(x) < 0} : the other half-spaceB := {+,−}ϵσj : Ch −→ B are defined by ϵσj (C) = στ if C ⊆ Hτj(σ, τ ∈ B, j = 1, . . . ,n)m : a positive integerChm, Bm : the m-time direct productsϵσj : Chm→ Bm is induced from ϵσj : Ch→ B byϵσj (C1,C2, . . . ,Cm) = (ϵσj (C1), ϵσj (C2), . . . , ϵσj (Cm))

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 13/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

A = {H1,H2, . . . ,Hn} : a real central arrangement in Rℓ

Ch = Ch(A) : the set of chambersHj : defined by αj = 0H+j := {x ∈ Rℓ | αj(x) > 0} : a half-spaceH−j := {x ∈ Rℓ | αj(x) < 0} : the other half-spaceB := {+,−}ϵσj : Ch −→ B are defined by ϵσj (C) = στ if C ⊆ Hτj(σ, τ ∈ B, j = 1, . . . ,n)m : a positive integerChm, Bm : the m-time direct productsϵσj : Chm→ Bm is induced from ϵσj : Ch→ B byϵσj (C1,C2, . . . ,Cm) = (ϵσj (C1), ϵσj (C2), . . . , ϵσj (Cm))

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 13/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

A = {H1,H2, . . . ,Hn} : a real central arrangement in Rℓ

Ch = Ch(A) : the set of chambersHj : defined by αj = 0H+j := {x ∈ Rℓ | αj(x) > 0} : a half-spaceH−j := {x ∈ Rℓ | αj(x) < 0} : the other half-spaceB := {+,−}ϵσj : Ch −→ B are defined by ϵσj (C) = στ if C ⊆ Hτj(σ, τ ∈ B, j = 1, . . . ,n)m : a positive integerChm, Bm : the m-time direct productsϵσj : Chm→ Bm is induced from ϵσj : Ch→ B byϵσj (C1,C2, . . . ,Cm) = (ϵσj (C1), ϵσj (C2), . . . , ϵσj (Cm))

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 13/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

A = {H1,H2, . . . ,Hn} : a real central arrangement in Rℓ

Ch = Ch(A) : the set of chambersHj : defined by αj = 0H+j := {x ∈ Rℓ | αj(x) > 0} : a half-spaceH−j := {x ∈ Rℓ | αj(x) < 0} : the other half-spaceB := {+,−}ϵσj : Ch −→ B are defined by ϵσj (C) = στ if C ⊆ Hτj(σ, τ ∈ B, j = 1, . . . ,n)m : a positive integerChm, Bm : the m-time direct productsϵσj : Chm→ Bm is induced from ϵσj : Ch→ B byϵσj (C1,C2, . . . ,Cm) = (ϵσj (C1), ϵσj (C2), . . . , ϵσj (Cm))

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 13/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

A = {H1,H2, . . . ,Hn} : a real central arrangement in Rℓ

Ch = Ch(A) : the set of chambersHj : defined by αj = 0H+j := {x ∈ Rℓ | αj(x) > 0} : a half-spaceH−j := {x ∈ Rℓ | αj(x) < 0} : the other half-spaceB := {+,−}ϵσj : Ch −→ B are defined by ϵσj (C) = στ if C ⊆ Hτj(σ, τ ∈ B, j = 1, . . . ,n)m : a positive integerChm, Bm : the m-time direct productsϵσj : Chm→ Bm is induced from ϵσj : Ch→ B byϵσj (C1,C2, . . . ,Cm) = (ϵσj (C1), ϵσj (C2), . . . , ϵσj (Cm))

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 13/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

A = {H1,H2, . . . ,Hn} : a real central arrangement in Rℓ

Ch = Ch(A) : the set of chambersHj : defined by αj = 0H+j := {x ∈ Rℓ | αj(x) > 0} : a half-spaceH−j := {x ∈ Rℓ | αj(x) < 0} : the other half-spaceB := {+,−}ϵσj : Ch −→ B are defined by ϵσj (C) = στ if C ⊆ Hτj(σ, τ ∈ B, j = 1, . . . ,n)m : a positive integerChm, Bm : the m-time direct productsϵσj : Chm→ Bm is induced from ϵσj : Ch→ B byϵσj (C1,C2, . . . ,Cm) = (ϵσj (C1), ϵσj (C2), . . . , ϵσj (Cm))

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 13/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

A = {H1,H2, . . . ,Hn} : a real central arrangement in Rℓ

Ch = Ch(A) : the set of chambersHj : defined by αj = 0H+j := {x ∈ Rℓ | αj(x) > 0} : a half-spaceH−j := {x ∈ Rℓ | αj(x) < 0} : the other half-spaceB := {+,−}ϵσj : Ch −→ B are defined by ϵσj (C) = στ if C ⊆ Hτj(σ, τ ∈ B, j = 1, . . . ,n)m : a positive integerChm, Bm : the m-time direct productsϵσj : Chm→ Bm is induced from ϵσj : Ch→ B byϵσj (C1,C2, . . . ,Cm) = (ϵσj (C1), ϵσj (C2), . . . , ϵσj (Cm))

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 13/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

A = {H1,H2, . . . ,Hn} : a real central arrangement in Rℓ

Ch = Ch(A) : the set of chambersHj : defined by αj = 0H+j := {x ∈ Rℓ | αj(x) > 0} : a half-spaceH−j := {x ∈ Rℓ | αj(x) < 0} : the other half-spaceB := {+,−}ϵσj : Ch −→ B are defined by ϵσj (C) = στ if C ⊆ Hτj(σ, τ ∈ B, j = 1, . . . ,n)m : a positive integerChm, Bm : the m-time direct productsϵσj : Chm→ Bm is induced from ϵσj : Ch→ B byϵσj (C1,C2, . . . ,Cm) = (ϵσj (C1), ϵσj (C2), . . . , ϵσj (Cm))

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 13/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

A = {H1,H2, . . . ,Hn} : a real central arrangement in Rℓ

Ch = Ch(A) : the set of chambersHj : defined by αj = 0H+j := {x ∈ Rℓ | αj(x) > 0} : a half-spaceH−j := {x ∈ Rℓ | αj(x) < 0} : the other half-spaceB := {+,−}ϵσj : Ch −→ B are defined by ϵσj (C) = στ if C ⊆ Hτj(σ, τ ∈ B, j = 1, . . . ,n)m : a positive integerChm, Bm : the m-time direct productsϵσj : Chm→ Bm is induced from ϵσj : Ch→ B byϵσj (C1,C2, . . . ,Cm) = (ϵσj (C1), ϵσj (C2), . . . , ϵσj (Cm))

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 13/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

A = {H1,H2, . . . ,Hn} : a real central arrangement in Rℓ

Ch = Ch(A) : the set of chambersHj : defined by αj = 0H+j := {x ∈ Rℓ | αj(x) > 0} : a half-spaceH−j := {x ∈ Rℓ | αj(x) < 0} : the other half-spaceB := {+,−}ϵσj : Ch −→ B are defined by ϵσj (C) = στ if C ⊆ Hτj(σ, τ ∈ B, j = 1, . . . ,n)m : a positive integerChm, Bm : the m-time direct productsϵσj : Chm→ Bm is induced from ϵσj : Ch→ B byϵσj (C1,C2, . . . ,Cm) = (ϵσj (C1), ϵσj (C2), . . . , ϵσj (Cm))

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 13/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

Definition 1.

A map Φ : Chm −→ Ch is called an admissible map if there exists afamily of maps φσj : Bm −→ B (1 ≤ j ≤ n, σ ∈ B = {+,−}) whichsatisfies the following two conditions:(1) φσj (+,+, . . . ,+) = +, and(2) the diagram

Chm

ϵσj��

Φ // Chϵσj��

Bmφσj // B

commutes for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and σ ∈ B = {+,−}.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 14/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

Definition 1.

A map Φ : Chm −→ Ch is called an admissible map if there exists afamily of maps φσj : Bm −→ B (1 ≤ j ≤ n, σ ∈ B = {+,−}) whichsatisfies the following two conditions:(1) φσj (+,+, . . . ,+) = +, and(2) the diagram

Chm

ϵσj��

Φ // Chϵσj��

Bmφσj // B

commutes for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and σ ∈ B = {+,−}.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 14/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

Definition 1.

A map Φ : Chm −→ Ch is called an admissible map if there exists afamily of maps φσj : Bm −→ B (1 ≤ j ≤ n, σ ∈ B = {+,−}) whichsatisfies the following two conditions:(1) φσj (+,+, . . . ,+) = +, and(2) the diagram

Chm

ϵσj��

Φ // Chϵσj��

Bmφσj // B

commutes for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and σ ∈ B = {+,−}.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 14/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

Definition 1.

A map Φ : Chm −→ Ch is called an admissible map if there exists afamily of maps φσj : Bm −→ B (1 ≤ j ≤ n, σ ∈ B = {+,−}) whichsatisfies the following two conditions:(1) φσj (+,+, . . . ,+) = +, and(2) the diagram

Chm

ϵσj��

Φ // Chϵσj��

Bmφσj // B

commutes for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and σ ∈ B = {+,−}.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 14/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

Definition 1.

A map Φ : Chm −→ Ch is called an admissible map if there exists afamily of maps φσj : Bm −→ B (1 ≤ j ≤ n, σ ∈ B = {+,−}) whichsatisfies the following two conditions:(1) φσj (+,+, . . . ,+) = +, and(2) the diagram

Chm

ϵσj��

Φ // Chϵσj��

Bmφσj // B

commutes for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and σ ∈ B = {+,−}.

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

Definition 1 (continuing).

Let AM(A,m) denote the set of all admissible maps determined byA and m.When Φ is an admissible map, a family of maps φσj(1 ≤ j ≤ n, σ ∈ B = {+,−}) satisfying the conditions in Definition 1 isuniquely determined by Φ, A and m.

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

Definition 1 (continuing).

Let AM(A,m) denote the set of all admissible maps determined byA and m.When Φ is an admissible map, a family of maps φσj(1 ≤ j ≤ n, σ ∈ B = {+,−}) satisfying the conditions in Definition 1 isuniquely determined by Φ, A and m.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 15/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

Definition 1 (continuing).

Let AM(A,m) denote the set of all admissible maps determined byA and m.When Φ is an admissible map, a family of maps φσj(1 ≤ j ≤ n, σ ∈ B = {+,−}) satisfying the conditions in Definition 1 isuniquely determined by Φ, A and m.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 15/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

Definition 1 (continuing).

Let AM(A,m) denote the set of all admissible maps determined byA and m.When Φ is an admissible map, a family of maps φσj(1 ≤ j ≤ n, σ ∈ B = {+,−}) satisfying the conditions in Definition 1 isuniquely determined by Φ, A and m.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 15/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

Definition 2.

For 1 ≤ h ≤ m, let Φ : the projection to the h-th component,φσj : the projection to the h-th component.Then Φ is an admissible map with a family of mapsφσj (1 ≤ j ≤ n, σ ∈ B = {+,−}).We call the admissible maps of this type projective admissiblemaps.

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

Definition 2.

For 1 ≤ h ≤ m, let Φ : the projection to the h-th component,φσj : the projection to the h-th component.Then Φ is an admissible map with a family of mapsφσj (1 ≤ j ≤ n, σ ∈ B = {+,−}).We call the admissible maps of this type projective admissiblemaps.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 16/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

Definition 2.

For 1 ≤ h ≤ m, let Φ : the projection to the h-th component,φσj : the projection to the h-th component.Then Φ is an admissible map with a family of mapsφσj (1 ≤ j ≤ n, σ ∈ B = {+,−}).We call the admissible maps of this type projective admissiblemaps.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 16/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

Definition 2.

For 1 ≤ h ≤ m, let Φ : the projection to the h-th component,φσj : the projection to the h-th component.Then Φ is an admissible map with a family of mapsφσj (1 ≤ j ≤ n, σ ∈ B = {+,−}).We call the admissible maps of this type projective admissiblemaps.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 16/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

Definition 2.

For 1 ≤ h ≤ m, let Φ : the projection to the h-th component,φσj : the projection to the h-th component.Then Φ is an admissible map with a family of mapsφσj (1 ≤ j ≤ n, σ ∈ B = {+,−}).We call the admissible maps of this type projective admissiblemaps.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 16/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

Definition 2.

For 1 ≤ h ≤ m, let Φ : the projection to the h-th component,φσj : the projection to the h-th component.Then Φ is an admissible map with a family of mapsφσj (1 ≤ j ≤ n, σ ∈ B = {+,−}).We call the admissible maps of this type projective admissiblemaps.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 16/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

The Braid Arrangement Case

A : the braid arrangement in Rℓ (ℓ ≥ 3)A = {Hij | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ ℓ} where Hij := ker(xi − xj)H+ij := {(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xi > xj}H−ij = {(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xi < xj}.Sℓ : the permutation group of {1,2, . . . , ℓ}Then Ch(A)↔ Sℓ (One-to-one correspondence) :Each chamber of A can be uniquely expressed as{(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xπ(1) < xπ(2) < · · · < xπ(ℓ)} for a permutationπ ∈ SℓThus the set of orders of preferences↔ Sℓ ↔ Ch(A)

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

The Braid Arrangement Case

A : the braid arrangement in Rℓ (ℓ ≥ 3)A = {Hij | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ ℓ} where Hij := ker(xi − xj)H+ij := {(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xi > xj}H−ij = {(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xi < xj}.Sℓ : the permutation group of {1,2, . . . , ℓ}Then Ch(A)↔ Sℓ (One-to-one correspondence) :Each chamber of A can be uniquely expressed as{(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xπ(1) < xπ(2) < · · · < xπ(ℓ)} for a permutationπ ∈ SℓThus the set of orders of preferences↔ Sℓ ↔ Ch(A)

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

The Braid Arrangement Case

A : the braid arrangement in Rℓ (ℓ ≥ 3)A = {Hij | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ ℓ} where Hij := ker(xi − xj)H+ij := {(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xi > xj}H−ij = {(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xi < xj}.Sℓ : the permutation group of {1,2, . . . , ℓ}Then Ch(A)↔ Sℓ (One-to-one correspondence) :Each chamber of A can be uniquely expressed as{(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xπ(1) < xπ(2) < · · · < xπ(ℓ)} for a permutationπ ∈ SℓThus the set of orders of preferences↔ Sℓ ↔ Ch(A)

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 17/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

The Braid Arrangement Case

A : the braid arrangement in Rℓ (ℓ ≥ 3)A = {Hij | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ ℓ} where Hij := ker(xi − xj)H+ij := {(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xi > xj}H−ij = {(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xi < xj}.Sℓ : the permutation group of {1,2, . . . , ℓ}Then Ch(A)↔ Sℓ (One-to-one correspondence) :Each chamber of A can be uniquely expressed as{(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xπ(1) < xπ(2) < · · · < xπ(ℓ)} for a permutationπ ∈ SℓThus the set of orders of preferences↔ Sℓ ↔ Ch(A)

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 17/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

The Braid Arrangement Case

A : the braid arrangement in Rℓ (ℓ ≥ 3)A = {Hij | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ ℓ} where Hij := ker(xi − xj)H+ij := {(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xi > xj}H−ij = {(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xi < xj}.Sℓ : the permutation group of {1,2, . . . , ℓ}Then Ch(A)↔ Sℓ (One-to-one correspondence) :Each chamber of A can be uniquely expressed as{(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xπ(1) < xπ(2) < · · · < xπ(ℓ)} for a permutationπ ∈ SℓThus the set of orders of preferences↔ Sℓ ↔ Ch(A)

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 17/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

The Braid Arrangement Case

A : the braid arrangement in Rℓ (ℓ ≥ 3)A = {Hij | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ ℓ} where Hij := ker(xi − xj)H+ij := {(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xi > xj}H−ij = {(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xi < xj}.Sℓ : the permutation group of {1,2, . . . , ℓ}Then Ch(A)↔ Sℓ (One-to-one correspondence) :Each chamber of A can be uniquely expressed as{(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xπ(1) < xπ(2) < · · · < xπ(ℓ)} for a permutationπ ∈ SℓThus the set of orders of preferences↔ Sℓ ↔ Ch(A)

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 17/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

The Braid Arrangement Case

A : the braid arrangement in Rℓ (ℓ ≥ 3)A = {Hij | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ ℓ} where Hij := ker(xi − xj)H+ij := {(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xi > xj}H−ij = {(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xi < xj}.Sℓ : the permutation group of {1,2, . . . , ℓ}Then Ch(A)↔ Sℓ (One-to-one correspondence) :Each chamber of A can be uniquely expressed as{(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xπ(1) < xπ(2) < · · · < xπ(ℓ)} for a permutationπ ∈ SℓThus the set of orders of preferences↔ Sℓ ↔ Ch(A)

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 17/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

The Braid Arrangement Case

A : the braid arrangement in Rℓ (ℓ ≥ 3)A = {Hij | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ ℓ} where Hij := ker(xi − xj)H+ij := {(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xi > xj}H−ij = {(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xi < xj}.Sℓ : the permutation group of {1,2, . . . , ℓ}Then Ch(A)↔ Sℓ (One-to-one correspondence) :Each chamber of A can be uniquely expressed as{(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xπ(1) < xπ(2) < · · · < xπ(ℓ)} for a permutationπ ∈ SℓThus the set of orders of preferences↔ Sℓ ↔ Ch(A)

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 17/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

The Braid Arrangement Case

A : the braid arrangement in Rℓ (ℓ ≥ 3)A = {Hij | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ ℓ} where Hij := ker(xi − xj)H+ij := {(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xi > xj}H−ij = {(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xi < xj}.Sℓ : the permutation group of {1,2, . . . , ℓ}Then Ch(A)↔ Sℓ (One-to-one correspondence) :Each chamber of A can be uniquely expressed as{(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) ∈ Rℓ | xπ(1) < xπ(2) < · · · < xπ(ℓ)} for a permutationπ ∈ SℓThus the set of orders of preferences↔ Sℓ ↔ Ch(A)

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 17/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

The Braid Arrangement Case

Smℓ ↔ Chm

ϵσj��

Φ // Ch

ϵσj��

↔ Sℓ

Bmφσj // B

Other correspondences are:a social welfare function↔ Φa dictatorship↔ the projection to a component(A) (Pareto property)↔ (1) (φσj (+, . . . ,+) = +)(B) (pairwise independence)↔ (2) (commutativity)φσj ◦ ϵσj = ϵσj ◦ Φ (∀j)

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 18/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

The Braid Arrangement Case

Smℓ ↔ Chm

ϵσj��

Φ // Ch

ϵσj��

↔ Sℓ

Bmφσj // B

Other correspondences are:a social welfare function↔ Φa dictatorship↔ the projection to a component(A) (Pareto property)↔ (1) (φσj (+, . . . ,+) = +)(B) (pairwise independence)↔ (2) (commutativity)φσj ◦ ϵσj = ϵσj ◦ Φ (∀j)

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 18/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

The Braid Arrangement Case

Smℓ ↔ Chm

ϵσj��

Φ // Ch

ϵσj��

↔ Sℓ

Bmφσj // B

Other correspondences are:a social welfare function↔ Φa dictatorship↔ the projection to a component(A) (Pareto property)↔ (1) (φσj (+, . . . ,+) = +)(B) (pairwise independence)↔ (2) (commutativity)φσj ◦ ϵσj = ϵσj ◦ Φ (∀j)

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 18/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

The Braid Arrangement Case

Smℓ ↔ Chm

ϵσj��

Φ // Ch

ϵσj��

↔ Sℓ

Bmφσj // B

Other correspondences are:a social welfare function↔ Φa dictatorship↔ the projection to a component(A) (Pareto property)↔ (1) (φσj (+, . . . ,+) = +)(B) (pairwise independence)↔ (2) (commutativity)φσj ◦ ϵσj = ϵσj ◦ Φ (∀j)

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 18/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

The Braid Arrangement Case

Smℓ ↔ Chm

ϵσj��

Φ // Ch

ϵσj��

↔ Sℓ

Bmφσj // B

Other correspondences are:a social welfare function↔ Φa dictatorship↔ the projection to a component(A) (Pareto property)↔ (1) (φσj (+, . . . ,+) = +)(B) (pairwise independence)↔ (2) (commutativity)φσj ◦ ϵσj = ϵσj ◦ Φ (∀j)

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 18/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

The Braid Arrangement Case

Smℓ ↔ Chm

ϵσj��

Φ // Ch

ϵσj��

↔ Sℓ

Bmφσj // B

Other correspondences are:a social welfare function↔ Φa dictatorship↔ the projection to a component(A) (Pareto property)↔ (1) (φσj (+, . . . ,+) = +)(B) (pairwise independence)↔ (2) (commutativity)φσj ◦ ϵσj = ϵσj ◦ Φ (∀j)

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 18/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

The Braid Arrangement Case

Smℓ ↔ Chm

ϵσj��

Φ // Ch

ϵσj��

↔ Sℓ

Bmφσj // B

Other correspondences are:a social welfare function↔ Φa dictatorship↔ the projection to a component(A) (Pareto property)↔ (1) (φσj (+, . . . ,+) = +)(B) (pairwise independence)↔ (2) (commutativity)φσj ◦ ϵσj = ϵσj ◦ Φ (∀j)

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 18/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

Arrow’s impossibility theorem can be formulated as:Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangement version)IfA is a braid arrangement with ℓ ≥ 3, then every admissible map isprojective.

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

Arrow’s impossibility theorem can be formulated as:Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangement version)IfA is a braid arrangement with ℓ ≥ 3, then every admissible map isprojective.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 19/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

Arrow’s impossibility theorem can be formulated as:Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangement version)IfA is a braid arrangement with ℓ ≥ 3, then every admissible map isprojective.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 19/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

Condorcet’s paradox can be interpreted in terms of arrangementsand their chambers:

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 20/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

Condorcet’s paradox can be interpreted in terms of arrangementsand their chambers:

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 20/ 33

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3. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (arrangementversion)

Braid arrangement in R^3

H12

H13 H23

1=21=3 2=3A

2>1>3 1>2>3

B 2>3>1 1>3>2

3>2>1 3>1>2Lists of preferences

A : 1>2>3 C

B : 2>3>1

C : 3>1>2

(H12)+ ¥ cap (H23)+ ¥ cap (H13)- would satisfy all of the

three, but it is empty. (Condorcet’s paradox)

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 21/ 33

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Decomposability/Indecomposability of an Arrangement

For a central arrangement A, define the rank of Ar(A) = codimRℓ

∩1≤j≤n Hj

Definition 3. A central arrangement A is said to bedecomposable if there exist nonempty arrangements A1 and A2

such that A = A1 ∪A2 (disjoint) and r(A) = r(A1) + r(A2). In thiscase, write A = A1 ⊎A2

A central arrangement A is said to be indecomposable if it is notdecomposable.

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Decomposability/Indecomposability of an Arrangement

For a central arrangement A, define the rank of Ar(A) = codimRℓ

∩1≤j≤n Hj

Definition 3. A central arrangement A is said to bedecomposable if there exist nonempty arrangements A1 and A2

such that A = A1 ∪A2 (disjoint) and r(A) = r(A1) + r(A2). In thiscase, write A = A1 ⊎A2

A central arrangement A is said to be indecomposable if it is notdecomposable.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 22/ 33

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Decomposability/Indecomposability of an Arrangement

For a central arrangement A, define the rank of Ar(A) = codimRℓ

∩1≤j≤n Hj

Definition 3. A central arrangement A is said to bedecomposable if there exist nonempty arrangements A1 and A2

such that A = A1 ∪A2 (disjoint) and r(A) = r(A1) + r(A2). In thiscase, write A = A1 ⊎A2

A central arrangement A is said to be indecomposable if it is notdecomposable.

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Decomposability/Indecomposability of an Arrangement

For a central arrangement A, define the rank of Ar(A) = codimRℓ

∩1≤j≤n Hj

Definition 3. A central arrangement A is said to bedecomposable if there exist nonempty arrangements A1 and A2

such that A = A1 ∪A2 (disjoint) and r(A) = r(A1) + r(A2). In thiscase, write A = A1 ⊎A2

A central arrangement A is said to be indecomposable if it is notdecomposable.

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Decomposability/Indecomposability of an Arrangement

For a central arrangement A, define the rank of Ar(A) = codimRℓ

∩1≤j≤n Hj

Definition 3. A central arrangement A is said to bedecomposable if there exist nonempty arrangements A1 and A2

such that A = A1 ∪A2 (disjoint) and r(A) = r(A1) + r(A2). In thiscase, write A = A1 ⊎A2

A central arrangement A is said to be indecomposable if it is notdecomposable.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 22/ 33

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Decomposability/Indecomposability of an Arrangement

For a central arrangement A, define the rank of Ar(A) = codimRℓ

∩1≤j≤n Hj

Definition 3. A central arrangement A is said to bedecomposable if there exist nonempty arrangements A1 and A2

such that A = A1 ∪A2 (disjoint) and r(A) = r(A1) + r(A2). In thiscase, write A = A1 ⊎A2

A central arrangement A is said to be indecomposable if it is notdecomposable.

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Decomposability/Indecomposability of an Arrangement

Remark 1. A = A1 ⊎A2 if and only if the defining polynomials forA1 , ∅ and A2 , ∅ have no common variables after an appropriatelinear coordinate change.

Remark 2. It is also known that A is decomposable if and only if itsPoincare polynomial π(A, t) is divisible by (t + 1)2.

An arrangement of only one hyperplane is always indecomposable.

An arrangement of two hyperplanes is always decomposable.

The Boolean arrangement is always decomposable intoarrangements with only one hyperplane.

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Decomposability/Indecomposability of an Arrangement

Remark 1. A = A1 ⊎A2 if and only if the defining polynomials forA1 , ∅ and A2 , ∅ have no common variables after an appropriatelinear coordinate change.

Remark 2. It is also known that A is decomposable if and only if itsPoincare polynomial π(A, t) is divisible by (t + 1)2.

An arrangement of only one hyperplane is always indecomposable.

An arrangement of two hyperplanes is always decomposable.

The Boolean arrangement is always decomposable intoarrangements with only one hyperplane.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 23/ 33

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Decomposability/Indecomposability of an Arrangement

Remark 1. A = A1 ⊎A2 if and only if the defining polynomials forA1 , ∅ and A2 , ∅ have no common variables after an appropriatelinear coordinate change.

Remark 2. It is also known that A is decomposable if and only if itsPoincare polynomial π(A, t) is divisible by (t + 1)2.

An arrangement of only one hyperplane is always indecomposable.

An arrangement of two hyperplanes is always decomposable.

The Boolean arrangement is always decomposable intoarrangements with only one hyperplane.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 23/ 33

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Decomposability/Indecomposability of an Arrangement

Remark 1. A = A1 ⊎A2 if and only if the defining polynomials forA1 , ∅ and A2 , ∅ have no common variables after an appropriatelinear coordinate change.

Remark 2. It is also known that A is decomposable if and only if itsPoincare polynomial π(A, t) is divisible by (t + 1)2.

An arrangement of only one hyperplane is always indecomposable.

An arrangement of two hyperplanes is always decomposable.

The Boolean arrangement is always decomposable intoarrangements with only one hyperplane.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 23/ 33

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Decomposability/Indecomposability of an Arrangement

Remark 1. A = A1 ⊎A2 if and only if the defining polynomials forA1 , ∅ and A2 , ∅ have no common variables after an appropriatelinear coordinate change.

Remark 2. It is also known that A is decomposable if and only if itsPoincare polynomial π(A, t) is divisible by (t + 1)2.

An arrangement of only one hyperplane is always indecomposable.

An arrangement of two hyperplanes is always decomposable.

The Boolean arrangement is always decomposable intoarrangements with only one hyperplane.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 23/ 33

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Decomposability/Indecomposability of an Arrangement

Remark 1. A = A1 ⊎A2 if and only if the defining polynomials forA1 , ∅ and A2 , ∅ have no common variables after an appropriatelinear coordinate change.

Remark 2. It is also known that A is decomposable if and only if itsPoincare polynomial π(A, t) is divisible by (t + 1)2.

An arrangement of only one hyperplane is always indecomposable.

An arrangement of two hyperplanes is always decomposable.

The Boolean arrangement is always decomposable intoarrangements with only one hyperplane.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 23/ 33

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Decomposability/Indecomposability of an Arrangement

Remark 1. A = A1 ⊎A2 if and only if the defining polynomials forA1 , ∅ and A2 , ∅ have no common variables after an appropriatelinear coordinate change.

Remark 2. It is also known that A is decomposable if and only if itsPoincare polynomial π(A, t) is divisible by (t + 1)2.

An arrangement of only one hyperplane is always indecomposable.

An arrangement of two hyperplanes is always decomposable.

The Boolean arrangement is always decomposable intoarrangements with only one hyperplane.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 23/ 33

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Decomposability/Indecomposability of an Arrangement

Any nonempty real central arrangement A can be uniquely (up toorder) decomposed into nonempty indecomposable arrangements:

A = A1 ⊎A2 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Ar .

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 24/ 33

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Decomposability/Indecomposability of an Arrangement

Any nonempty real central arrangement A can be uniquely (up toorder) decomposed into nonempty indecomposable arrangements:

A = A1 ⊎A2 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Ar .

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 24/ 33

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Decomposability/Indecomposability of an Arrangement

Any nonempty real central arrangement A can be uniquely (up toorder) decomposed into nonempty indecomposable arrangements:

A = A1 ⊎A2 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Ar .

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 24/ 33

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Decomposability/Indecomposability of an Arrangement

Any nonempty real central arrangement A can be uniquely (up toorder) decomposed into nonempty indecomposable arrangements:

A = A1 ⊎A2 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Ar .

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 24/ 33

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

The following two theorems completely determine the set AM(A,m)of admissible maps.

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

The following two theorems completely determine the set AM(A,m)of admissible maps.

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

The following two theorems completely determine the set AM(A,m)of admissible maps.

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Theorem 1. For a nonempty real central arrangement A with thedecomposition

A = A1 ⊎A2 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Ar ,

there exists a natural bijectionAM(A,m) ≃ AM(A1,m) × AM(A2,m) × · · · × AM(Ar ,m)for each positive integer m.

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Theorem 1. For a nonempty real central arrangement A with thedecomposition

A = A1 ⊎A2 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Ar ,

there exists a natural bijectionAM(A,m) ≃ AM(A1,m) × AM(A2,m) × · · · × AM(Ar ,m)for each positive integer m.

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Theorem 2. Let A be a nonempty indecomposable real centralarrangement and m be a positive integer. Then,(1) if |A| = 1, AM(A,m) = {Φ : Chm→ Ch | Φ(C,C, . . . ,C) = C foreach chamber C},(2) if |A| ≥ 3, every admissible map is projective.

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Theorem 2. Let A be a nonempty indecomposable real centralarrangement and m be a positive integer. Then,(1) if |A| = 1, AM(A,m) = {Φ : Chm→ Ch | Φ(C,C, . . . ,C) = C foreach chamber C},(2) if |A| ≥ 3, every admissible map is projective.

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Theorem 2. Let A be a nonempty indecomposable real centralarrangement and m be a positive integer. Then,(1) if |A| = 1, AM(A,m) = {Φ : Chm→ Ch | Φ(C,C, . . . ,C) = C foreach chamber C},(2) if |A| ≥ 3, every admissible map is projective.

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Theorem 2. Let A be a nonempty indecomposable real centralarrangement and m be a positive integer. Then,(1) if |A| = 1, AM(A,m) = {Φ : Chm→ Ch | Φ(C,C, . . . ,C) = C foreach chamber C},(2) if |A| ≥ 3, every admissible map is projective.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 27/ 33

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Corollary. Decompose a nonempty real central arrangementAinto nonempty indecomposable arrangements asA = A1 ⊎A2 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Aa ⊎ B1 ⊎ B2 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Bb with|Ap| = 1 (1≤ p ≤ a) and |Bq| ≥ 3 (1≤ q ≤ b).Then, for each positive integer m,

|AM(A,m)| = (2a(2m−2))mb

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 28/ 33

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Corollary. Decompose a nonempty real central arrangementAinto nonempty indecomposable arrangements asA = A1 ⊎A2 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Aa ⊎ B1 ⊎ B2 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Bb with|Ap| = 1 (1≤ p ≤ a) and |Bq| ≥ 3 (1≤ q ≤ b).Then, for each positive integer m,

|AM(A,m)| = (2a(2m−2))mb

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 28/ 33

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4. Two theorems on arramgements

Corollary. Decompose a nonempty real central arrangementAinto nonempty indecomposable arrangements asA = A1 ⊎A2 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Aa ⊎ B1 ⊎ B2 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Bb with|Ap| = 1 (1≤ p ≤ a) and |Bq| ≥ 3 (1≤ q ≤ b).Then, for each positive integer m,

|AM(A,m)| = (2a(2m−2))mb

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 28/ 33

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5. Implications

What do Theorems 1 and 2 imply?

Theorem 1. For a nonempty real central arrangement A with thedecomposition A = A1 ⊎A2 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Ar . there exists a naturalbijectionAM(A,m) ≃ AM(A1,m) × AM(A2,m) × · · · × AM(Ar ,m)for each positive integer m.

Theorem 2. Let A be a nonempty indecomposable real centralarrangement and m be a positive integer. Then,(1) if |A| = 1, AM(A,m) = {Φ : Chm→ Ch | Φ(C,C, . . . ,C) = C foreach chamber C},(2) if |A| ≥ 3, every admissible map is projective.

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5. Implications

What do Theorems 1 and 2 imply?

Theorem 1. For a nonempty real central arrangement A with thedecomposition A = A1 ⊎A2 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Ar . there exists a naturalbijectionAM(A,m) ≃ AM(A1,m) × AM(A2,m) × · · · × AM(Ar ,m)for each positive integer m.

Theorem 2. Let A be a nonempty indecomposable real centralarrangement and m be a positive integer. Then,(1) if |A| = 1, AM(A,m) = {Φ : Chm→ Ch | Φ(C,C, . . . ,C) = C foreach chamber C},(2) if |A| ≥ 3, every admissible map is projective.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 29/ 33

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5. Implications

What do Theorems 1 and 2 imply?

Theorem 1. For a nonempty real central arrangement A with thedecomposition A = A1 ⊎A2 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Ar . there exists a naturalbijectionAM(A,m) ≃ AM(A1,m) × AM(A2,m) × · · · × AM(Ar ,m)for each positive integer m.

Theorem 2. Let A be a nonempty indecomposable real centralarrangement and m be a positive integer. Then,(1) if |A| = 1, AM(A,m) = {Φ : Chm→ Ch | Φ(C,C, . . . ,C) = C foreach chamber C},(2) if |A| ≥ 3, every admissible map is projective.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 29/ 33

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5. Implications

What do Theorems 1 and 2 imply?

Theorem 1. For a nonempty real central arrangement A with thedecomposition A = A1 ⊎A2 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Ar . there exists a naturalbijectionAM(A,m) ≃ AM(A1,m) × AM(A2,m) × · · · × AM(Ar ,m)for each positive integer m.

Theorem 2. Let A be a nonempty indecomposable real centralarrangement and m be a positive integer. Then,(1) if |A| = 1, AM(A,m) = {Φ : Chm→ Ch | Φ(C,C, . . . ,C) = C foreach chamber C},(2) if |A| ≥ 3, every admissible map is projective.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 29/ 33

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5. Implications

What do Theorems 1 and 2 imply?

Theorem 1. For a nonempty real central arrangement A with thedecomposition A = A1 ⊎A2 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Ar . there exists a naturalbijectionAM(A,m) ≃ AM(A1,m) × AM(A2,m) × · · · × AM(Ar ,m)for each positive integer m.

Theorem 2. Let A be a nonempty indecomposable real centralarrangement and m be a positive integer. Then,(1) if |A| = 1, AM(A,m) = {Φ : Chm→ Ch | Φ(C,C, . . . ,C) = C foreach chamber C},(2) if |A| ≥ 3, every admissible map is projective.

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5. Implications

hyperplane↔ a political issue

arrangement↔ a set of political issues

A = A1 ⊎A2 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Ar .↔ a set of political issues is grouped intocertain subsets

For each Ai with (|Ai | ≥ 3), there is a “mini-dictator.”

For each Ai with (|Ai | = 1), any voting system (e. g., the simplemajority rule) works as long as unanimous decisions are respected.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 30/ 33

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5. Implications

hyperplane↔ a political issue

arrangement↔ a set of political issues

A = A1 ⊎A2 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Ar .↔ a set of political issues is grouped intocertain subsets

For each Ai with (|Ai | ≥ 3), there is a “mini-dictator.”

For each Ai with (|Ai | = 1), any voting system (e. g., the simplemajority rule) works as long as unanimous decisions are respected.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 30/ 33

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5. Implications

hyperplane↔ a political issue

arrangement↔ a set of political issues

A = A1 ⊎A2 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Ar .↔ a set of political issues is grouped intocertain subsets

For each Ai with (|Ai | ≥ 3), there is a “mini-dictator.”

For each Ai with (|Ai | = 1), any voting system (e. g., the simplemajority rule) works as long as unanimous decisions are respected.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 30/ 33

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5. Implications

hyperplane↔ a political issue

arrangement↔ a set of political issues

A = A1 ⊎A2 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Ar .↔ a set of political issues is grouped intocertain subsets

For each Ai with (|Ai | ≥ 3), there is a “mini-dictator.”

For each Ai with (|Ai | = 1), any voting system (e. g., the simplemajority rule) works as long as unanimous decisions are respected.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 30/ 33

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5. Implications

hyperplane↔ a political issue

arrangement↔ a set of political issues

A = A1 ⊎A2 ⊎ · · · ⊎ Ar .↔ a set of political issues is grouped intocertain subsets

For each Ai with (|Ai | ≥ 3), there is a “mini-dictator.”

For each Ai with (|Ai | = 1), any voting system (e. g., the simplemajority rule) works as long as unanimous decisions are respected.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 30/ 33

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5. Implications

This is random thoughts which might mean nothing.However, Theorems mean something mathematically.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 31/ 33

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5. Implications

This is random thoughts which might mean nothing.However, Theorems mean something mathematically.

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 31/ 33

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5. Implications

This work appeared in Advances in Math. 214 (2007) 366–378

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 32/ 33

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5. Implications

I stop here.Thank you!

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 33/ 33

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5. Implications

I stop here.Thank you!

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 33/ 33

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5. Implications

I stop here.Thank you!

H. Terao (Hokkaido University) 2014.08.22 33/ 33