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OLS Operation Lifeline Sudan. A Review. (6/6). Ataul Karim, Team Leader. July 1996.First comprehensive review of OLS, funded by donor governments and supported byUNDHA, UNICEF as lead agency. 300 plus pages.

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/A

APPENDIX 1

DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

TERMS OF REFERENCE

FOR AN

OPERATION LIFELINE

SUDAN (OLS)

REVIEW

18 August 1995

INTRODUCTION

Operation Lifeline Sudan is a programme of humanitarian assistanceimplemented by UNICEF, WFP and more than 40 national and international NGOs,and designed to meet the needs of war-affected civilians, particularly women andchildren.

OLS operates under a unique agreement with the parties to the conflict whichestablishes the foremost humanitarian principles of OLS: neutrality, transparency andaccountability. This enables it to operate in both Government and rebel-controlledareas.

Overall responsibility for the coordination of OLS falls on the UN Department ofHumanitarian Affairs. OLS leadership is provided by the UN Resident Coordinator inhis DHA capacity as UN Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations in the Sudan,based in Khartoum. The southern sector programme, which delivers assistancecross-border into Sudan, is headed by the OLS Coordinator-Nairobi. In 1993, the UNSecretary General appointed a Special Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs to the Sudanwho reports to DHA and whose primary responsibility is to facilitate negotiations onaccess for humanitarian assistance.

Since 1989, when OLS began as a short-term programme to deliver food andprovide other inputs to save lives, it has developed considerably. While still providingfood aid and basic health care to reduce mortality and morbidity amongst affectedpopulations, OLS now implements a much broader programme that extends tohousehold food security, water and sanitation, basic shelter, primary education,support to psychologically traumatized children, capacity building and promotion ofhumanitarian principles.

With wide access to a war-affected population of approx. 4.25 million and acombined UN agency financial requirement of USD 101 million for 1995 alone (notincluding an equal or greater sum channelled through international NGOs), OLS nowreaches more people than ever before. Originally serving some eight sites in southernSudan, DHA-led negotiations have expanded access to over 100 locations.Concurrently, during the life of OLS significant changes have taken place within theUN system, e.g. the establishment of DHA, the evolution of greater emphasis onprotection issues in the context of civil strife. As a consequence of these changes, theOLS structure and operating mechanisms have expanded enormously, with greater

numbers of field staff and ever-more extensive systems for programme coordination,monitoring, logistics, security and radio communications.

OLS was given a unique mandate when it began: for the first time ever, asovereign government allowed the delivery of humanitarian assistance to rebel-controlled areas. In recent years, the increasing number of complex emergenciesthroughout the world has seen the UN intervene in ways which have extended theboundaries of humanitarian assistance. However, within the international community,there is still considerable divergence of opinion on how best to deal with complexemergencies.

The chronic emergency in the Sudan and the UN's unique response, setagainst the global backdrop of increasing emergencies and dwindling aid budgets,indicate the need to take stock and to review the development of OLS. This idea hasbeen supported by many donors in recent consultations, while the Government andrebel movements have concurred with the proposal. A detailed, critical and analyticalreview of OLS, its achievements and failures, will therefore take place in 1995. Thisreview of OLS will have its main objectives:

I. To analyze the OLS mandate, its appropriateness in creating maximum accessto populations in need and in ensuring respect for fundamental humanitarianprinciples.

II. To assess the effectiveness of OLS' coordination structures, in particular therelationship between the UN, donors, NGO and Sudanese counterparts.

III. To assess the efficiency of OLS' modus operandi, identifying constraints andachievements of OLS' various activities in:

the provision of appropriate, timely and cost-effective relief assistance topopulations in need;

the provision of programmes contributing to the promotion of self-sufficiency and food security;

the efficiency of OLS operational support to programme delivery.

It is expected that the review will refer to previous reviews/evaluations of OLS,including various sectoral analyses, and see to what extent lessons learned have beenundertaken and implemented. It will also propose, where applicable, improvedstrategies for OLS, particularly in the areas of:

programme designcoordination mechanismscost-effectivenesspromotion and protection of humanitarian principlessystematic monitoring

The review will suggest lessons that might be learned from OLS by otherhumanitarian assistance programmes in complex emergency situations.

TERMS OF REFERENCE (TORI

The relationship between the creation of humanitarian space and the flow ofassistance to war-affected populations is the basis of OLS and hence the main focusof this review. Therefore the team will not be expected to undertake a detailedanalysis of the impact of OLS programmes, but rather to review the effectiveness of itsmodi's operand! in meeting the needs of war-affected civilians.

Mandate. Principles and Structure

Mandate and Principles;

What are the factors which have contributed to, or impeded, OLS in thefulfilment of its mandate to provide humanitarian assistance to all in need in a neutral,impartial and transparent manner?

Is there a consensus among the following groups regarding OLS's mandateand principles and their translation into operational procedures and modalities?

Government/SPLM/SSIMInternational NGOsAffected populationsDonorsLocal NGOs and other community groups

How has OLS benefitted from or been restricted by adherence to its mandateand basic principles. Are neutrality and impartiality the most appropriate approachesto working in such situations?

To what extent have OLS and the parties to the conflict respected agreementsentered into? How have the modalities of negotiated agreements contributed to thesuccess of the OLS operation? What has been the contribution of the UN SpecialEnvoy?

Is OLS making the best use of all possible channels to increase access topopulations in need?

Within its existing mandate, is OLS doing enough to ensure that humanitarianassistance reaches its intended beneficiaries? What strategies has OLS developed toaddress breaches of humanitarian agreements and ground rules relating to OLS?

What could have been done to increase the effectiveness of the Convention onthe Rights of the Child, international humanitarian law and specific resolutions for theprotection of war-affected and displaced populations?

What have been the biggest constraints to ensuring accountability tobeneficiary communities? How might these constraints be overcome?

Structures

Has the UN's coordination role been defined with sufficient clarity to beaccepted and understood by the parties to the conflict, the UN agencies and NGOs?

How has the establishment of DHA and the role of the UN Special Envoyaffected coordination and leadership in OLS?

Has the UN provided effective leadership and coordination of OLS through theUNCERO/OLS Coordinator-Nairobi management link?

Has the UN coordinated effectively with NGOs in programme policy-making andimplementation?

Have the various coordination mechanisms (letters of understanding, meetings,workshops, field staff) been effectively used for programme implementation and toensure adherence to the OLS principles?

How could coordination be strengthened/reinforced?

How has OLS been hindered and/or facilitated by: inter UN agency staffing andstructures?; by NGO policies and reporting requirements?

Has the mechanism of the consolidated inter-agency appeal proved adequateas a resource mobilisation tool for OLS?

Have donor funding procedures served effectively in responding to OLSprogramme requirements?

Has the donor community shown a coordinated and effective policy in supportof the OLS mandate and fundamental principles?

Has OLS been accountable and transparent in relation to donors?

Programme Strategy:

The team will focus on a cross-section of OLS sectoral activities including bothconventional relief as well as interventions with a longer-term focus. Within the sectorsof household food security, health, education and water, the team will ask whetherOLS agencies have succeeded in defining common objectives and achieving themthrough programmes that most effectively meet the needs of the Sudanese people.Particular attention should be given to the role that these programmes have played inpromoting the survival and development of children.

Identifying Needs:

Have assessment/monitoring systems contributed to a consensus on the extentand prioritisation of sectoral and geographical needs?

Does OLS have an information collection system adequate to its programmeplanning needs?

Coordination Structures and Mechanisms:

Have the structures and mechanisms created been effective in promotingcoordination in programme planning and implementation as well as in making the bestuse of agencies' comparative advantages? How have these structures responded torapidly changing field conditions?

Implementation:

Has OLS managed to provide levels of assistance, proportioned to need, towar-affected civilians irrespective of their location? To what degree has this

"•. • v* . • .r-.Tyf<'w^p<g« «w»»»!ffiMW apnt>n**vi»\>-t^v»-.-f i.r~»r. -

contributed to responding to the total identified needs of an war-affected civilians in thecountry?

• How has OLS responded to the survival needs of accessible populations?

Has OLS achieved a strategic balance of food and non-food assistance with theaim of promoting self-reliance?

What has been achieved in protecting livelihoods and promoting self-sufficiency?

Has OLS sufficiently emphasized capacity building and sustainability inprogramme planning and implementation?

Gender:

How have OLS programmes reflected the primary role of women in themaintenance and restoration of family and community life?

Delivery of Assistance: Strategies and Cost-Effectiveness

At the outset of OLS, the strategy for the delivery of assistance to serve war-affected civilians was established. With respect to logistics, cost-effectiveness and thepracticalities of ensuring neutrality in a conflict, the cross-border operations serveSPLM areas and in-country operations serve GOS locations. In the intervening years,rail and river corridors opened, permitting cross-line deliveries to take place fromwithin the country, while access to GOS areas by cross-border operations alsobecame an accepted option. At the same time, safe and effective road access hasdeclined, forcing continued reliance on expensive but secure air transport services.

Have these changes influenced the original rationale of delivery based on cost-effectiveness and logistical practicality?

Has OLS done everything possible to reduce operational costs by takingadvantage of opportunities for new delivery modalities and access routes?

Have the overall operational and overhead costs been reasonable in relation to

the actual delivery of assistance? How might OLS achieve greater cost-efficiency?

Do the existing conditions permit the greater use of in-country logistic bases?

Food Aid/Food Security:

Special focus is given to the area of food aid and food security for two mainreasons: food aid represents the most significant area of OLS expenditure; OLS hasadopted a strategy that seeks to promote household food security through acomprehensive analysis of both available and potential sources of food. Many of thequestions that follow apply to other sectors as well as that of food aid/food security.

I. Are there clear policies and objectives for the promotion of nutritional well-beingand food security?

To what extent have food aid and the various household food securityinterventions (seeds and tools, livestock, fishing) improved the nutritionalstatus, household food security and economic well-being of targetgroups?

How can the criteria developed for the identification of food aidbeneficiaries be improved?

II. Has OLS been able to identify needs for food aid?

Have the methodologies used each year by OLS and by the jointFAO/WFP crop assessment and food supply missions achieved a clearunderstanding of the level to which populations have access to foodsources and resources?

To what extent can standardised monitoring and assessment

methodologies be applied by OLS throughout Sudan?

III. Has OLS been able to translate information gathered into appropriatedecisions/strategies?

How has the information gathering in assessments been used in

8

decision-making on the allocation and timing of food aid and otherinputs?

Has OLS established effective fora that have allowed all agenciesworking in the area of food aid and food security to come together withthe information required to make coherent and consistent decisions?

Has OLS/WFP explored alternative uses of food aid, such as food forwork, market support, monetization, production support, rather thandirect food relief? What more might be done in this area? To whatextent has food aid assisted beneficiaries toward self-sufficiency? Whathave been the constraints in using food aid to promote self-sufficiency?

Is there evidence to suggest that food aid acted as a disincentive toproduction or interfered with traditional community level self-helpmechanisms?

IV. Has OLS been able to deliver food in a timely and appropriate manner oncepotential beneficiary populations have been identified? What have been themain constraints?

With regard to the concern of the donor community over the diversion offood aid, has OLS done enough to ensure that food aid reaches itsintended beneficiaries?

Capacity Building and Empowerment:

How has OLS ensured that humanitarian assistance enhances local capacities,empowers local populations and provides sustainable initiatives? /""

What have the parties to the conflict done to permit the establishment andfunctioning of effective and accountable humanitarian counterparts to OLS? —?

Has OLS done all it could to promote/support these counterparts? S

. i

Have counterparts provided adequate service/support to OLS agencies? /'*

Has the support provided by OLS agencies been appropriate to the capacity ^building needs of local organisations and community groups? S

What is being done to promote beneficiary participation in planning andimplementation of relief and rehabilitation activities? /"""

What impact has this had on programme quality?

10

^

APPENDIX 2:TECHNICAL ASSUMPTIONS IN MODELLING COST EFFECTIVENESS

1. Quantities

In 1995, WFP fielded 23,841 -Mt of relief commodities to South Sudan. This figurevaries slightly from that used in official WFP reports. The variation is explained byrevisions done to WFP databases in March 1996.

2. Support and Monitoring Costs

As noted in Chapter 8, support and monitoring costs are assumed to be equal to the sumof grants received for each of these costs categories during 1995. Grant information wastaken from the DHA database of grants received by the appealing agencies in 1995.These grants are listed in Figure A.l.

Figure A.1: Grants to WFP in 1995 (US-$)

Project AreaFood MonitorsFood MonitorsFood MonitorsLogisticsSupport CostsFood MonitorsFood MonitorsFood MonitorsFood MonitorsLogisticsLogisticsRoad rehabilitationSupport CostsSupport CostsEmergency Food AidLogisticsTotal

SectorNorthernNorthernNorthernNorthernNorthernSouthernSouthernSouthernSouthernSouthernSouthernSouthernSouthernSouthern

Amount178,571571,430114,570

2,500,000553,350404,000119,048402,875969,000272,532235,087124,000531,000560,000

1,232,8605,000,000

13,768323

From the above, we have calculated USD 1,644,350 for support costs, and USD2,759,494 for monitoring costs. WFP is unable to desegregate these costs specifically,but notes that our estimate is "quite reasonable" (McMahon, 1996, May 17).

3. Fixed and Variable Monitoring Costs

WFP monitors note that approximately three-quarters of field visits were for assessmentpurposes, and one-quarter related to distribution. Monitoring costs cannot therefore besuspended, even if no deliveries occur. Conversely, doubling relief quantities will notdouble the amount of monitoring required. We assumed that 60% of monitoring costswere fixed, and 40% variable. Variable monitoring costs were apportioned to sectorsand clusters in proportion to the amount of relief commodities received by each. Itshould be noted also that the variable cost share of monitoring - 40% - is a generousestimate. In practice, a large part of the relevant budget for monitoring was the cost ofexpatriates, whose number varies little with the amount of relief commodities deliveredannually.

4. Value of Commodities

WFP supplied cereals, pulses, and cooking oil as the basic components of the emergencyfood basket. WFP Nairobi calculated that in 1995, the basket comprised 85% cereals,12% pulses, and 3% oil, based on weight. A similar breakdown has not been calculatedfor the Northern Sector. For purposes of comparison and substitution between sectors,the commodity shares indicated for the Southern Sector are used for the Northern Sectoras well.

Figures A.2 and A.3 below presents commodity values for Northern and SouthernSectors.

Figure A.2: Northern Sector food basket

Commodity

SorghumLentilsOilValue 1 MT ofaverage foodbasket

Weight sharein food basket

85%12%3%

Value per MT,weighted for importand local purchase

$ 146.80$ 572.25$ 962.25

Weighted with foodbasket

$ 124.78$ 68.67$ 28.87$ 222.31

Note: For technical reasons, commodity values for the Northern Sector include PortSudan ancillary costs for imported commodities; no ancillary costs are calculated forlocally purchased sorghum.

II

Figure A.3: Southern sector food basket

Commodity

SorghumMaizePulsesOilValue 1 MT ofaverage foodbasket

Weight sharein food basket

72%13%12%3%

GIF Mombassa

$ 180.00$ 200.00$ 530.00$ 930.00

Weighted with foodbasket

$ 129.60$ 26.00$ 63.60$ 27.90$ 247.10

Note: For technical reasons, ancillary costs in Mombassa are absorbed into theMombassa-Lokichokio road transport rate.

5. Ancillary Costs of Food Imports

With regard to transport costs, Figure A.4 indicates costs that apply to food imports toPort Sudan.

Figure A.4: Ancillary cost

OperationLandingShuntingWarehousing

Rate (S/MT)9.752.50

10.00

As can be seen in this table, USD 22.25 is added to the cost of every ton of foodimported to Port Sudan. No ancillary cost is calculated for locally purchased food. Also,all food delivered by the Northern Sector is assumed, as far as transport routing isconcerned, to have originated in Port Sudan. This tends to inflate the total cost of locallypurchased food, but this effect is almost completely cancelled out by the otherassumptions. For Mombassa, ancillary costs are absorbed into the USD 115/MT roadtransport rate to Lokichokkio.

6. Delivery Matrix - 1995 Baseline

Figure A.5 below indicates the pattern and mode of transport, including clusterdestination and tonnages, for WFP deliveries in 1995.

Ill

Figure A.5: WFP 1995 relief food deliveries (MT) - sectors and transport modes

Region

BahrElGhazalBahrElGhazalBahrElGhazalEquatoria

Equatoria

Equatoria

Equatoria

Equatoria

Upper Nile

Upper Nile

Upper Nile

Upper Nile

Upper Nile

Upper Nile

TransitionalZoneTransitionalZoneTransitionalZoneKhartoum

Cluster

Northern Bahr ElGhazalWau Town

Lakes

Western Equat-oria surplus zoneW. Equatoria withIDP campsJuba Town

Eastern Equatoriainsecurity zoneEastern Equatoriadrought zoneJonglei war zone

Pibor PochallaareaWestern UpperNile war zoneNorthern Jongleifactional fightingSobat Chotburawar zoneRenk Malakal

South Darfur

Southrn Kordofan

Central State

Khartoum

Total

Northern SectorAir

470

470

Road

230

4101

2263

197

201

6992

liver

64

854

245

594

497

430

1050

3733

Rail

0

Southern S.Air

3303

43

4

20

187

1430

82

377

4296

49

9791

Road

583

2272

2855

Total

3303

230

107

4

20

1324

1014

2272

2024

82

874

4725

49

1050

4101

2263

197

201

23841

Note: Of the 6992 MT transported overland by the Northern sector, 1,442.6 MT wentfrom Babanussa to Ed Da'ein by train. No cost record was obtained for this operation(The train was to go to Wau and was redirected to Ed Da'ein.). This consignment istreated as road transport as others were to South Darfur, using a end-of-1995 roadtransport rate.

IV

Note: Of the 6,992 MT transported overland by the Northern Sector, 1,442.6 MT wentfrom Babanussa to Ed Da'ein by train. No cost record was obtained for this, however(the train was destined for Wau but was re-routed to Ed Da'ein). This consignment isthus treated as road transport similar to other consignments hi South Darfur, using theend of 1995 road transport rate.

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Note: Distance in. nautical miles Basis: WFP Operation Lifeline Sudan map,measurements and conversion into nautical miles by Review Team

8.1 WFP's Estimate of Total Cost of Air Operations

Estimates for the cost of air operations in Sudan in 1995 were provided by WFP Rome(McMahon, 1996, May 21), and are listed in Figure A.8.

Figure A.8: Total cost of WFP air operation 1995

Aircraft leasesSupport costsIn-kind contribution byECHO: Begian Air ForceC- 170 for 7 monthsSector total

Northern Sector$ 715,871$ 120,000

$ 835,871

Southern Sector$ 4,959,568$ 2,902,179$ 4,200,000

$ 12,061,747

It should be noted that the USD 12.061 million for the Southern Sector does not includeindirect support costs. These indirect costs have not been determined.

In 1995, WFP received donor contributions worth USD 8 million for logistics. Theshortfall was financed out of "outstanding balances of ITSH (Internal Transport,Storage, and Handling) for 1993/94" (McMahon, 1996, May 21).

8.2 Cost Per Mile and Ton

WFP Nairobi provided cost data for "secondary transport" (i.e. by air from Lokichokkio)to various destinations in South Sudan. Payload capacity was given as 16.2 MT for C-130 aircraft, regardless of distance. For Buffalo aircraft, payload capacity varied from6.2 MT to 8.5 MT depending on distance. Using regression techniques, we calculatedrates per mile and ton. Because of reduced payload on longer distances, and because oftime spent in the drop zone (uniformly 20 minutes per drop), fixed rates had to bereplaced by linear equations, as follows:

C-130: Cost (distancejper MT>= USD 1.42/MT * distance + USD 68/MTBuffalo: Cost (distance;per MT)= USD 3.39/MT * distance - USD 61/MT

The intercept is positive for C-130 aircraft because of the drop zone time. It is negativefor Buffalo aircraft because of the distance-payload tradeoff.

83 Calculation of Block Hour Cost

Using the above equations, and inserting the values for a calculation point (for example,for Akon in northern Bahr El Ghazal, distance from Lokichokkio equals 470 nauticalmiles, payload is 16.2 MT for the C-130 aircraft, and 6.5 MT for the Buffalo aircraft,round-trip time equals 3.9 hours for the C-130 including drop zone, and 4.8 hours for theBuffalo), we calculated the following block hour cost values:

C-130: USD 3,868 per hourBuffalo: USD 1,759 per hour

The values we have calculated here roughly agree with those calculated by WFP forsecondary transport rates, cited in a recent study (WFP, 1995, August 30), as follows:

"C-130: USD 3,500 - 3,900 per hour, depending on distance (this is because a supportcharge of USD 1,620 is charged uniformly per flight)".

However, our value for Buffalo aircraft differ considerably from a calculation made byWFP in the same document, as follows:

"Buffalo: USD 2,345 - 2,355 per hour. The variation with distance is slight because asupport cost of only USD 50 is charged per flight".

This seems inadequate to us, but we have no other data. We have therefore adjusted ourmodel uses for Buffalo aircraft, by multiplying slope and intercept with the factor USD2,350/USD 1,759. The resulting equation is thus:

Buffalo: Cost (distance;per MT)= USD 4.53/MT * distance - USD 82/MT

8.4 Cost of Food Transport By Air

Using these cost equations, and assuming 60% of relief commodities were transportedby C-130 aircraft, the cost of transporting 10,261 MT is estimated to be USD10,650,248 or USD 1,038/MT. This is higher than the USD 690/MT for the NorthernSector air transport, and the USD 745/MT for the Southern Sector air transportcalculated in the 1995 Consolidated Appeal.

8.5 Apportioning the Balance of Air Operation Costs

The total cost of air operations exceeded the cost of airlifting and airdropping by someUSD 2.2 million (USD 12.9 million minus USD 10.7 million). Determining the natureand use of this difference is difficult:

XI

* The value of in-kind services by the Belgian C-130 was estimated by the donor atUSD 5 million (Project SUD-95-1/N14), and was re-estimated by WFP as USD 4.2million. Since the use of this aircraft was affected by the flight ban, it is difficult todetermine a commercial value for the same amount of services.

* UNICEF and NGO air service consumption may have impacted on the WFP coststructure. Although UNICEF called forward USD 7.7 million to support logistics and airtransport (from Project Nl 1-B, "Logistic Backstop for all Non-Food Relief Activitiesfrom Lokichokkio"), cost allocation between UNICEF - which operates the Lokichokkiobase camp - and WFP - which is responsible for air operations - may not perfectly mirrorthe cost of all non-WFP versus WFP cargo and passenger movements. The magnitudecan be seen by the fact that WFP flew 1,340 MT of non-food commodities out ofLokichokkio in 1995.

* A part of the USD 2.8 million estimated monitoring cost was used for monitoringmovements by air. The USD 7.9 million original budget for operational and supportmonitoring (Projects N16, N17, N18, 1995 Consolidated Appeal, pages 99 and 101)included USD 1.6 million for aircraft lease for monitoring purposes.

We have no data on how to re-evaluate the Belgian C-130 in-kind contribution, or tocharge part or all of the USD 2.2. million difference to WFP monitoring, or to servicesfor UNICEF and NGOs. The USD 2.2. million must therefore be seen as an unexplainederror term.

9. WFP Calculations of Total Operational Cost

Figure A.9 below presents WFP's own calculation of total operational costs fordeliveries in 1995.

Figure A 9: WFP's own calculation total operation costWFP Khartoum 3/3/96

XII

as at 31/12/1995

„• fiss^&r^.-:.; -J^*m.&-

MODE

gffe;TOTAL,-V^MTV-

C.I.F.ValueS

TRANSPORT- Costin$;/u

TOTAL CpSTjl•><••/;•' in S •»?-;$$

SUB TOTAL WFP(from Loki)SUB TOTAL WFP(from Khartoum)

SUB TOTAL NGOS

AIR

AIR

AIR

273

470

2,312

81,900

94,000

462,382

218,400

211,500

1,040,360

300,300

305,500

1,502,742

SUB TOTAL WFP RIVER 2,151 430,206| 537,758) 967,964

SUB TOTAL WFPSUB TOTAL NGOS

LANDLAND

6,99637,107

1,399,1547,421,320

1,049,3665,565,990

2,448,52012,987,310

TOTAL WFPTOTAL NGOS

9,42039,419

2,005,2607,883,702

2,017,0236,606,350

4,022,28314,490,052

TOTAL DELIVERIES 48,838| 9,888,962 8,623,373) 18,512,335

SPLA MODE TOTAL

MT

C.I.F.

Value $

TRANSPORT

Cost in $

TOTAL COST*

in$

SUB-TOTAL WFPSUB TOTAL NGOS

AIRAIR

9,5803,064

2,873,970919,200

7,663,9202,451,200

10,537,8903,370,400

SUB TOTAL WFPSUB TOTAL NGOS

LANDLAND

2,83327,962

849,9488,388,600

424,9744,194,300

1,274,92212,582,900

[SUB TOTAL WFP [RIVER | 1,625) 324,924] 406,155) 731,079)

SUBTOTAL WFPSUB TOTAL NGOS

14,03831,026

4,048,8429^07,800

8,495,0496,645,500

12,543,89115,953300

TOTAL DELIVERIES 45,064 13356,642 15,140,549 28,497,191

* Approximate based on average transport rates by various modes

XIII

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