central policy unit the government of the hong kong special administrative region · 2018. 4....

CENTRAL POLICY UNIT

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG

SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

A STUDY ON UNDERSTANDING

OUR YOUNG GENERATION

THE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG

FEBRUARY 2011

A Study on Understanding our Young Generation

Final Report

Professor Paul Siu Fai YIP (Principal Investigator)

Dr Paul Wai Ching WONG (Co‐Investigator)

Ms Frances Yik Wa LAW (Co‐Investigator)

Department of Social Work and Social Administration, and

Dr King‐wa FU (Co‐Investigator) Journalism and Media Studies Centre

The University of Hong Kong

Commissioned by

Central Policy Unit

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government

Disclaimer

Any information herein or any portion of the information herein may NOT be quoted, re‐produced, duplicated, copied, sold, or otherwise exploited for any purpose without the ex‐press permission of the Department of Social Work and Social Administration of The Uni‐versity of Hong Kong.

A Study on Understanding our Young Generation: Final Report

Acknowledgement

We would like to thank the Census and Statistics Department of the HKSAR Government for providing data and the Social Science Research Centre (SSRC) of The University of Hong Kong for its assistance recruiting participants for the telephone and online surveys. We also wish to acknowledge the significant contribution of our post‐80s young research assistants: Ms Sophia G. Chak, Mr Gary Ip, Mr Rickey Yau, and Mr Jonathan Yeung. Their sincere ide‐as and dedicated hard work certainly make this report outstandingly representative.

Last but not least, we wish to appreciate the contributions of all the focus‐group participants and individual interviewees who were willing to spare their free time to contribute genuine and useful information. Their input has made this report fruitful, complete, and successful.


Table of Contents

Executive Summary..............................................................................................................................i

Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................1

Literature Review.................................................................................................................................2

Media Portrayal of the “Post‐80s” – A Brief Review.....................................................................11

Study Framework ..............................................................................................................................14

Methods...............................................................................................................................................15

Results: Demographic and Socioeconomic Profile........................................................................18

Results: Focus‐group Studies ...........................................................................................................34

Results: Telephone and Online Survey...........................................................................................43

Results: Semi‐structured Interviews ...............................................................................................79

Conclusions and Recommendations ...............................................................................................87

References ...........................................................................................................................................93

Research Team....................................................................................................................................99

Appendix A.......................................................................................................................................100

Appendix B .......................................................................................................................................112

Appendix C.......................................................................................................................................114

Appendix D.......................................................................................................................................124


i

Executive Summary

Youth protests against the construction of the Guangzhou‐Shenzhen‐Hong Kong express rail link have raised widespread attention and concern in our community. The media has adopted various terms—such as “post‐80s”, “the 4th generation”, “digital natives”, “the net generation”, and “generation Y”—for this young generation (i.e., the young geners).

The objective of this research study is to assess and understand the young generation’s needs, views, and frustrations. Over eight months, this study used various research ap‐proaches to expand our understanding of the younger generation. We conducted a media content analysis and a literature review, which served as a platform to understand the young generation from both global and local perspectives. We then collected in‐depth in‐formation via four studies: (i) a demographic and socioeconomic profile study, (ii) focus group studies, (iii) telephone and online surveys, and (iv) semi‐structured interviews. We categorized the findings of these studies into three major dimensions: (a) psycho‐socioeconomic, (b) communication use, and (c) civic/community involvement.

Media Content Analysis

Major media content in Hong Kong—including newspapers and magazines—were searched between Jan 1 and Feb 28, 2010 using keywords “80後” and “post‐80s”. A total of 1,996 arti‐cles were identified (1,894 Chinese articles and 102 English articles). Although the media portrays a wide range of public views towards the young generation and its character and attitudes, articles generally portray the younger generation as highly educated, but with a relatively low median income. That makes it seem impossible for them to purchase their own property, which has become one of the major obstacles in their future, especially for family planning. The articles also point out that this generation is unique in that they are educated in the common values of fairness and justice in society, rather than just earning money. Also, the media reported that one of the core reasons behind the recent demonstra‐tions was the government’s failure to listen objectively to their views.


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Demographic and Socioeconomic Profile

Data collected from the Census and Statistics Department shows that the young generation accounted for 20.24% of the entire Hong Kong population in 2009. The educational attain‐ment of this cohort was higher than older generations; however, their median income was lower. Media accounts have talked about this finding. Statistics have also showed that youth aged 15‐19 are increasingly working in the fields of wholesale, retail, import/export trading, restaurants, and hotels since 2001.

Focus Group Studies

Six focus groups were conducted with 46 young geners aged 18‐29. Their opinions and views were collected. Unlike some descriptions from the media, participants were consid‐erably energetic, passionate about life, and well‐educated. Even though they sometimes feel frustrated about facing a glass ceiling, they have strong passion towards their career. Most surprisingly, the focus groups expressed their deep concern about the development of their home, their neighbourhood, their city—Hong Kong, China. They have felt ignored and have grievances about the current mode of civic engagement. They want the government to ad‐dress their needs. They want to be listened to sincerely and genuinely.

Telephone Interview and Online Survey

The main study consists of two parts: (Part 1) a telephone interview and (Part 2) an online survey. The main study confirmed the prior qualitative findings about their needs and aspi‐rations. The question set was generated in accordance with the three main study dimensions. A total of 1,020 randomized mobile users aged 15 to 29 participated in the telephone inter‐view, and 328 participants completed the online survey.

Respondents were well‐educated, and their incomes mostly ranged between HK$6,000 and HK$14,000. Respondents described difficulties with job promotion and agreed that further education may help. Many have considered furthering their education in the future. Young geners are not very absorbed in their current work, perhaps because their work does not in‐trinsically motivate or inspire them; however, most of them work more than 41 hours a week.

Respondents still hold fairly strong traditional family values and a high percentage intend to get married. In addition, data revealed that young people have strong housing aspirations, and living close to their family is a key concern for them.


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Regarding civic engagement, those who voted in the 2008 LegCo election have drifted from the political party they voted for. Over 50% have no favourable candidate or party in the 2012 LegCo election. Although the results of this study do not focus on attitudes towards the acceptability of the violent behaviours of the demonstrations, there is indirect evidence in the finding that close to 50% of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement “the law should always be obeyed even if a particular law is wrong”. Media use on the Internet and on mobile devices is getting very popular. Over 60% of respondents ac‐quire information online, send or receive SMSs, and use other forms of instant text messag‐ing at least once a day.

Semi‐structured Interviews

Using purposive sampling, twenty interviewees (aged 18‐29) were invited to express their views and aspirations towards the three dimensions and their fourteen sub‐themes devel‐oped in this study in a one‐hour face‐to‐face interview. This provided more data to follow up with preliminary results from the focus groups and survey studies.

Findings demonstrated that the rise in the young generation’s education level has not in‐creased job promotion. The rise in education has even leads to some difficulties, especially for clerks, service workers, and shop salespeople. Almost all have considered furthering their education in order to stay competitive in the work field. They consider their preference for outdoor activities during leisure time a sign that they are mentally healthy.

In terms of financial management, interviewees do not prefer to spend much money shop‐ping. They prefer instead to spend money on travelling and investments (e.g. stocks, funds, and bonds). Some said they purchase clothing online because prices are usually cheaper. They are upset about government‐developer shields to luxurious flats, and this hinders their confidence in being able to purchase a home in the future and presents a barrier to their plans to start families.

When talking about how to increase youth civic engagement, some participants said the government’s form of communication is rather conservative: emails and phone calls are lim‐ited in their ability to collect the young generation’s views. Face‐to‐face meetings were not very appealing to them, especially when the meetings are not very interactive.


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Recommendations

Findings proved that young geners are looking for “space”. A tangible plan is needed to create more recreation space—including social, mental, physical, and environmental recrea‐tion—as an investment in our young generation.

The seriousness of their education aspiration should be met by the support from the gov‐ernment. It is crucial to increase the number of institutions allowing University Grants Committee (UGC)‐funded degrees. More vocational training should be made available for the young generation to boost world competitiveness. It is also recommended to lengthen the repayment period and/or reduce the interest rate of Student Grant Loans.

The government should initiate and promote working environments that encourage healthy work‐life balance. Employees should be encouraged to leave work on time, though with oc‐casional overtime. They should also be allowed to work from home sometimes for better job flexibility. Miso‐affluence views show their concern for high housing prices, which are a cause of grievances. A people‐oriented home purchasing plan with a predictable timeline of homeownership has to be reviewed regularly. Because young geners still maintain strong family values, they still see owning a flat/house as necessary step in forming a family. Also, more accessible public spaces should be opened for leisure meetings and activities.

Our young generation is very net‐savvy. Freedom of speech is one of their core values, and they exercise it with the world via online platforms like Facebook, blogs, SMS, email, and online newspapers. A bi‐modal approach including top‐down and bottom‐up agenda—but with genuine consultation across the community—will promote youth engagement.

Not only is the youth the future; THEY’RE NOW. They are an important barometer of gov‐ernment performance and an indicator of how much the community accepts policies. People from other generations should try to remove their pride and prejudice towards the younger generation and replace it with acceptance and tolerance. Beginning in earnest with the young generation is the best way to make progress. They are the best insurance for the fu‐ture of Hong Kong.


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內容摘要

2010年初，年青一代反對興建廣深高速鐵路香港段(簡稱高鐵)的激烈示威行動，引起了社會對事件的廣泛關注，媒體紛紛以「八十後」、「第四代香港人」、「數碼網民」、「網絡世代」

和「Y世代」等詞彙界定這批新一代年青人(我們稱之為「年青一代」)。

本研究之目的，正是要評估及了解香港年青一代的需要、對社會的看法以及所面對的困難。在

歷時八個月的研究裡，我們採取了不同手法擴闊大家對年青一代的理解。首先進行的是媒體內

容分析與文獻回顧，這可作為了解全球及本地年青人狀況的知識基礎，然後我們再通過四大途

徑收集進一步資料，包括「人口統計及社會經濟數據」、「聚焦小組研究」、「電話及網上調

查」和「半結構性訪談」。最後，這些研究結果分成了三類，分別為「心理社會經濟」、「通

訊使用」及「公共／社區參與」。

媒體內容分析

研究人員就坊間主要報章雜誌資料進行搜尋，採用關鍵字為「80後」及「post‐80s」，搜尋範圍定於2010年1月1日至2月28日，共搜出1,996篇文章，其中1,894篇為中文報導，102篇為英文報導。雖然各大媒體所描繪對年青一代的特質和態度的公眾輿論很廣泛，相同的是，這一代普

遍都被視為學歷偏高，但入息中位數偏低。因此，對他們來說，置業幾乎是不可能的事，這將

成為他們計畫將來及成家立室的主要障礙之一。值得探討的是，這一代的獨一無二之處，在於

他們所接受的教育裡，平等和社會公義這些共有價值比個人財富更為重要。而就報導所見，年

青一代上街示威的其中一個重要原因，是政府並沒有客觀聆聽他們的想法

人口統計及社會經濟數據

根據政府統計處資料，在2009年，年青一代佔本港總人口20.24%。和過去的資料相比，這一代的教育水平比他們的前輩高，可是收入中位數卻比他們低。數據又顯示，2001年至今，愈來愈多15‐19歲年青人加入批發、零售、出入口貿易、餐飲及酒店業行列。


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聚焦小組研究

共46位年青人參與了六個聚焦小組，他們的年齡介乎18‐29歲。研究人員在過程中收集他們的意見和看法，發現這群年青人精力充沛、享受生活、教育程度高，顯然與部份媒體描述的狀況

有所不同。雖然在工作升遷上遇到無形阻力，有時亦因此而感到沮喪，可是這群年青人對事業

仍是充滿激情的。最令人印象深刻的是，這群年青人對他們的家、他們的城市、他們的毗鄰

──香港和中國，懷著一份非常深切的熱愛，且十分關注其發展。他們感到自己是被忽視的一群，並對現行的公共參與制度相當不滿。他們要求政府正視其需要，認為大家都必須用心聆聽

彼此的聲音。

電話訪問及網上調查

研究主體包括兩部份，第一部份為電話訪問，第二部份為網上調查，以先前收集到的「質化」

資料為基礎，進一步了解年青一代的需要和志向。問卷內容圍繞三大主要研究範疇，調查員隨

機抽樣訪問了 1,020 位 15‐29 歲流動電話用戶，另有 328 位回應者完成了第二部份的網上調查問卷。

回應者教育程度良好，月入介乎 HK$6,000 至 HK$14,000。他們表述了升遷困難的狀況，並認同持續升學有助於升遷，有考慮過進修增值。調查亦發現年青一代對所從事之工作投入感並不

高，原因可能是工作本質缺乏推動性或激勵性，可是大部份人每週工時均超過 41 小時。

這群年青人相當重視傳統家庭價值，大部份稱會結婚。此外，資料亦反映了他們強烈的住屋需

要及期望，計劃置業之時，他們的最大考慮是是否住近家人。

在公共參與方面，曾於 2008 年立法會選舉中投票的年青人，對所投政黨的支持度有所變化，超過 50%稱未知在 2012 年的立法會選舉中會支持哪位人選或哪個政黨。雖然研究並非集中研究為何年青人會接受示威期間的激烈行動，但以下調查結果或可間接反映出他們的態度──近50%回應者就「即使某條法例是錯的，仍該遵守法律」這句子表示「不同意」或「強烈不同意」。另一方面，使用互聯網與流動器材作為資訊交流媒體的人愈來愈多，逾 60%年青人每天至少一次從網上、收發手機短訊或其他即時文字訊息獲取資訊。


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半結構性訪談

研究人員對聚焦小組及問卷調查之研究結果進行初步評估之後，採用立意抽樣的方式，邀請了

二十名介乎 18‐29 歲的年青人參加歷時一小時的會談，以表達他們對三大研究範疇下十四項副題的觀點和想法。結果可從聚焦小組及電話和網上調查的初步結果提供更多資料。

訪談結果顯示，年青一代教育水平的提高對工作升遷並無幫助，令人感到前無去路，這於「文

員、服務人員及店舖零售人員」族群尤其顯著。幾乎所有受訪者都考慮過進修，以求在工作行

業裡保持競爭力。他們認為自己精神健康良好，譬如閒暇時較喜歡戶外活動。

在財務管理方面，受訪者表示不喜歡消費購物，寧願把金錢花在旅遊及其他投資之上(例如股票、基金及債券)。有受訪者補充說會上網購買衣物，因價錢通常較便宜。此外，他們亦對政府與發展商的豪宅政策感到不滿，認為此舉打擊了他們置業的信心，成為成家立室一大障礙。

至於如何在公共參與上加強年青人的角色，有受訪者指出，現時政府與市民之間的溝通方式十

分保守，面向年青一代，只靠電郵與電話是不足夠收集他們的意見。而與高官對談也並不吸

引，因為在這種聚會裡，根本就不會有充足的交流。

建議

研究結果顯示，我們這代年青人尋求的是「空間」。實質的解決方法，就是給予他們空間，無

論社交上、精神上、物質上還是環境上，也要為他們創造或再造更多空間，這是絕對值得投資

的。

這種長遠的培育非常重要，亦有賴政府的支持配合。為了協助年青人提高競爭力，教資會資助

學位數目必須增加，政府亦應為年青一代提供更多職業訓練機會，這有助於他們適應真實世界

的競爭。此外，有關當局亦可考慮延長學生貸款的還款期，或調低貸款利息。

健康平衡的工作生活模式，可由政府帶頭推動和宣傳，例如盡量讓職員準時下班，或間中容許

他們在家中工作，令工作時間更有彈性。社會的仇富情緒源自樓價高企，政府必須盡快推行一

套以民為本的住屋計劃，適時修訂，並應於不久的將來見到成果。須明白我們的年青一代重視

家庭，住屋對成家立室的確十分重要，這是無可置疑的。此外，政府亦應開放更多公共空間，

讓年青一代有足夠的地方聚會和活動。

我們的年青一代是互聯網專家，言論自由就是他們的核心價值，透過網上平台如 Facebook、網誌、短訊、電郵或網上報章，他們可以跟世界各地的人溝通交流。若想接觸這群年青人的想

法，不妨採取一套雙向的互動模式，由上而下兼由下而上，向公眾進行真正的咨詢。

年青人不只是我們的未來，也是現在，他們是政府的監察者，也是社會政策接受程度的指標。

無論你是六十後、五十後或是其他年代的人，是時候拋開傲慢與偏見，換上接納和容忍。真心

的對待年青新一代將會是雙贏的，投資在他們身上, 是我們最佳的保險。


1

Introduction

The increased civic and political activities of Hong Kong youth—especially over the con‐struction of the express rail link to Guangzhou since Jan 8, 2010—has brought public atten‐tion to Hong Kong’s new generation. Terms like “post‐80s”, “the 4th Generation” (Lui, 2007), “Digital Natives” (Prensky, 2001), “the Net Generation” (Tapscott, 1997), and “Generation Y” have become fashionable in the mass media during social discussions of the new genera‐tion, particularly as its frustrations have turned into agitation against the government and LegCo of the HKSAR.

While attending the Legislative Council question‐and‐answer session on 14th Jan 2010, Chief Executive Mr Donald Tsang recognized the urgency in understanding the views and needs of young people in Hong Kong, saying “we do need to learn more about our young people, to listen to them and understand their ideas and aspirations, and their expectations of the community and the government. We need to [understand] their disappointment and dissat‐isfaction too”. In mid‐April, a survey published by the Hong Kong Institute of Asia‐Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong reported 25.9% of young respondents agreed with the use of radical means to urge the government to respond to their demands. Even though the picture suggested by this finding has yet to be confirmed, the ignition of social concerns demonstrates the widespread popular acceptance of this picture, as well as the need to debunk any myths surrounding it. The young generation’s views and needs have yet to be heard, especially in policy formulation and decision‐making.

Some commentators suggested these events were “a sharp reminder that the government has to be alert to the community’s grievances and to its perception of social injustice” (Ng & Cheung, 2010). It is very important to have a holistic understanding of their concerns. The proposed study is an attempt to help the government understand the concerns of our youth and improve communication and engagement between them and policy‐makers.

This study is a series of empirical and evidence‐based investigations, all attempting to de‐scribe this cohort in systematic and contextualized ways. We must stress that the primary goal of this study is not merely to identify various needs, views, frustrations, or features of this cohort, but also, more ambitiously, to examine a broader scope of concerns from various macro‐level perspectives—for example, the social, economic, cultural, and political forces underlying recent youth behaviour. In addition, the micro‐level understanding of some in‐dividuals’ experiences can help confirm and extend this broad picture.


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Literature Review

Introduction

The life experiences of young people in modern societies have changed quite significantly from earlier generations (Beck, 2009). These changes cut across social relationships, educa‐tion, the labour market, leisure, lifestyles, and the ability to become established as inde‐pendent young adults (Resnick, 2005). Many of these changes are a direct result of the re‐structuring of labour markets, of an increased demand for educated workers, of flexible em‐ployment practices, and of social policies that have extended the period in which young people today have to negotiate a set of “risks” that were largely unknown to their parents (Beck, 2009).

Moreover, because many of these changes have happened within a relatively short period of time—since the 1980s—the paths that had helped smooth the processes of social reproduc‐tion have become obscure (Furlong, Campbell, & Roberts, 1990). This increased uncertainty can be a source of stress and vulnerability for the young geners. Moreover, these uncertain‐ties have brought out stress in the older generation because many of them do not know how to provide for the new generation (Beck, 2001, 2009).

Labour force and unemployment among young people

Studies looking at young people and social change have multiplied in the past few decades (United Nations, 2007). Generally speaking, scholars and policy‐makers have studied the effects of social changes from agricultural to industrial to post‐industrial society and global‐ization on young people’s educational opportunities, labour market participation, depend‐ency, leisure, lifestyle, health, and political participation.

According to the International Labour Office, both labour force participation rates and em‐ployment‐to‐population ratios declined from 1998 to 2008. This is partially because more young people are in the education system. However, even among employable youth, unem‐ployment rates were much higher than previous generations of the youth. The World Youth Report 2007 – Young People’s Transition to Adulthood: Challenges and Opportunities, prepared by the United Nations (2007), reported that, in 2005, 55.7% (353 million) of the global youth la‐bour force were lived in Asia. Particularly in East Asia, the unemployment problem is more prominent for young females than young males (International Labour Office, 2010).


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Although many young people across Asia are now better prepared than ever to enter the workforce, a large proportion is still unable to find employment. In Southeast Asia and the Pacific, youth are five times more likely than older workers to be unemployed and are al‐most three times more likely to be unemployed than adults (United Nations, 2007). In all regions, the reported youth unemployment rates probably understate the seriousness of the problem because they do not count underemployment and poverty in youth that do hold jobs (International Labour Office, 2010).

Hong Kong has 1,418,200 youth aged 15‐29—20% of the total population (Census and Statis‐tics Department, 2010a). Nearly 35% of this population is receiving formal education; how‐ever, youth face very high unemployment rates. The 2010 unemployment rates (July – Sept) for the 15‐19 and 20‐24 age groups are 21.7% and 13.6%, respectively, while the general population rate during the same period is only 4.4% (Census and Statistics Department, 2010b).

Education and career prospects for young people

Among the most important factors that will influence whether Asian economies will con‐tinue to benefit from their sizeable youth population is how much of an opportunity youth have to develop their potential through education, decent employment opportunities, and adequate health care (United Nations, 2007). Access to education has been expanded in many parts of Asia, but the gains are most noticeable in primary school. Despite progress at the primary level, investment and enrolment rates still lag in secondary and higher educa‐tion. This situation is worrisome because the global labour market is increasingly seeing sec‐ondary education as the lowest level of schooling required for employment (United Nations, 2007).

Income mobility in Hong Kong has not improved much over the past decade. Although 42% of the bottom quintile of the earning distribution in 1996 had successfully moved up to a higher level, the rest of the group remained in the lowest level (Vere, 2006). Most impor‐tantly, education is key to increasing upward social mobility and preventing downward so‐cial mobility. Although education is crucial to upward mobility, Lui (2009) argued that young people in Hong Kong—particularly those from middle‐class families—suffer under heavy pressure to achieve academically in a highly competitive system. Thus, many stu‐dents might not truly benefit from education. Children who do not fit into this competitive system simply might not be able to move up in society through other channels.

The Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups conducted a telephone survey of youth (aged 15‐24) attitudes on a number of social phenomena. Interestingly, 48% respondents were dis‐satisfied with their prospects of upward social mobility in Hong Kong society. This is nearly double the number from the 2007 survey (Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups, 2010).


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The survey showed that youth dissatisfaction was on the rise. The percentage of youth dis‐satisfied with their quality of life increased from 14% to 25% since 2007. And the percentage dissatisfied with their opportunities for further education increased from 15% to 32%. Ap‐parently, young people feel there are more constraints on their social mobility, quality of life, and further education than a few years ago.

Unemployment and its psychosocial impact on young people

Prolonged unemployment is known to be associated with depression, anxiety, low self‐esteem, and poor health among youth (Bjarnason & Sigurdardottir, 2003; Hammarstrom & Janlert, 1997; Mossakowski, 2009). Unemployed youth often engage in self‐destructive be‐haviours, such as substance abuse (Hammer, 1992). Family support is thought to be one of the most important protective factors for unemployed youth. International studies have found that unemployed youth experience less psychological distress if they have adequate parental support (Hendry & Raymond, 1986). Social support is also seen as a protective fac‐tor, although it is more significant among young females than males (Hammer, 1993). Bjar‐nason and Sigurdardottir (2003) further suggested that males who suffer the added burden of traditional gender expectations suffer more distress during unemployment. It is impor‐tant to understand the impact of unemployment on local young people, particularly males who are unemployed during Hong Kong’s economic transition (Yip & Caine, 2010).

Family formation, housing needs, and independence

Considerable evidence shows that modern young people are becoming independent from their parents at an older age than previous generations (Beck, 2009). They tend to spend more time on education and start families later (Ward, 2006). Some have suggested that lengthy education and training are not a major reason why young people are continuing to live at home. Instead, the scarcity of economic opportunities may be the key reason (Resnick, 2005). Perhaps the difficulty of having their own living space is another important hurdle to financial independence for young people in Hong Kong. Youth consider it important to have affordable and safe private housing before they consider themselves grown up. Re‐search in Western countries has shown that homeownership and family formation are close‐ly and positively connected (Mulder, 2006). Researchers have suggested that in countries with low fertility, high homeownership, and high real estate prices (e.g., Spain, Italy, and Greece), the cost of homeownership makes it difficult for young people to form families and raise children (Ineichen, 1981; Mulder, 2006). In Hong Kong, young geners seem to face a number of obstacles in the transition into an independent adult life, including a highly com‐petitive education system, few job opportunities, limited opportunities for continuing edu‐cation, and a lack of affordable housing. It is important to find feasible ways to address to the whole range of factors reducing young people’s quality of life. Homeownership is im‐


5

portant to them, but it is important to stress that they are NOT looking for homeownership per se, but rather a decent living arrangement that can meet their needs. Renting is an ac‐ceptable option, but it should be affordable.

Globalization and its impact on young people’s worldviews

One of the most interesting features of the recent major social change in many developed societies is the shift from traditional values to a new values system: post‐materialism. The sociological theory of post‐materialism was developed in the 1970s by Inglehart (1995, 2000). After about four decades of research, Inglehart postulated that the Western societies in his studies were undergoing a transformation of individual values, switching from materialist values of economic and physical security to a new set of post‐materialist values of autonomy and self‐expression.

Inglehart (2000) argued that rising prosperity was gradually liberating people in advanced industrial societies from the stress of basic materialistic needs. Inglehart speculated that this transformation was not life‐cycle change (the idea that people become more materialistic as they age), but a genuine example of intergenerational value change (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Inglehart assumed that individuals pursue various goals in more or less a hierarchical order. While people may universally aspire to freedom and autonomy, they have to first satisfy the most pressing material needs like hunger, thirst, and physical security, since they are neces‐sary for survival (this hierarchy of needs was originally proposed by Maslow). After basic needs are satisfied, the focus will gradually shift to non‐material needs, such as self‐esteem and self‐actualization (Maslow, 1948).

Although the validity, stability, and causal picture of post‐materialism theory has been de‐bated, Inglehart’s worldwide longitudinal World Values Survey1 has documented the world’s changing values. According to the 2000 World Values Survey, the highest percent‐age of post‐materialists was in Australia (35%), followed by Austria (30%), Canada (29%), Italy (28%), Argentina (25%), the United States (25%), Sweden (22%), the Netherlands (22%), and Puerto Rico (22%; Inglehart, 2010). Although Hong Kong participated in the 2005 World Value Survey, and the basic results of the survey are posted on the website (www.worldvaluessurvey.org), detailed analysis and results are unavailable.

Subjective well‐being (SWB), life satisfaction, and happiness in changing societies Another emerging research interest in the modernized world is the study of subjective well‐being and happiness. Life satisfaction is a global cognitive judgment of one’s life, and it is 1 The World Values Survey has been carried out in five waves of surveys from 1981 to 2007 in scores of coun-tries that cover almost 90% of the world’s population.


6

one of the most frequently used indicators of subjective well‐being (Inglehart, 1995, 2000). Happiness is another indicator of subjective well‐being indicator, and it focuses on positive emotions. It correlates with life satisfaction, but it is conceptually different—it is more about people’s emotional states and is more sensitive to sudden changes in mood (Diener, 2000).

Researchers first believed that happiness was more or less fixed, so neither individuals nor societies could increase their long‐term happiness. For example, Diener and colleagues (Di‐ener, 1984, 2000; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985; Suh, Diener, & Fujita, 1996) stud‐ied subjective well‐being over time in France, Japan, and the United States, and they found no significant change in well‐being despite tremendous economic growth. Prominent psy‐chologists found that subjective well‐being and personality traits emerge early in life, are fairly stable over time, and have a moderate to strong genetic component (Diener, Oishi, & Lucas, 2003; Lucas, Clark, Georgellis, & Diener, 2003). But Inglehart argues that the in‐creased wealth of modern Western nations did not increase happiness because wealth has fundamentally re‐organized the way citizens achieve happiness. Inglehart and colleagues (2008) found that, across the entire world, richer countries tend to be happier than poorer countries, so wealth seems to make people happier. But once wealth crosses a certain threshold, more money does not seem to make a difference. This can be seen as a sign that materialist concerns become less important after people achieve basic affluence.

What contributes to life satisfaction in China and Hong Kong

Similar studies have in China and Hong Kong have revealed interesting findings. Brock‐mann and colleagues (2009) found that happiness in China dropped from 1990–2000, despite exponential improvement in material living standards. This finding contradicts the theory that income growth for people who have not yet achieved material wealth will increase happiness. They postulated that this pattern could be explained by China’s top‐heavy in‐come inequality. Even though they are making more money, the gap between the average person and the wealthy turns people into ‘frustrated achievers’. In a fast‐paced society, fi‐nancial dissatisfaction may be the strongest depressor of subjective well‐being (Brockmann et al., 2009).

A similar pattern has also been found in Hong Kong. Wong and colleagues (2006) found that Hong Kongers are not as satisfied with life despite a comparatively high national average income level. One reason for Hong Kong’s dissatisfaction is the high level of income ine‐quality. Wong and colleagues also tested correlations between social political variables and life satisfaction, and they found that perception of the severity of social problems and per‐ception of adequacy of social mobility were related to lower life satisfaction. The other two social variables—perception of social problems as socially caused and satisfaction with gov‐


7

ernance—were not significantly related to life satisfaction. In addition, they found that per‐sonal characteristics (age, self‐perceived class status, and household income) had the largest relationship with life satisfaction. Other personal characteristics (gender, marital status, edu‐cation levels, and homeownership) did not have significant relationships with life satisfac‐tion.

Political Engagement and new media use

The vast development of information technology and rise in Internet use have changed the Hong Kong’s young people communicate and participate in political and civic discourse. Hong Kong is top‐ranked among developed societies for its use of information technology (International Telecommunication Union, 2009). Hong Kong has high rates of personal com‐puter ownership and Internet connection (Census and Statistics Department, 2010). Accord‐ing to Census data, 76% of Hong Kong households have personal computers, and 97% of these computers are connected to the Internet. Moreover, Hong Kongers are also known to be sophisticated users of social media or so‐called “Web 2.0” applications. A 2010 survey found that high proportions of 20‐29‐year‐olds in Hong Kong use Web 2.0 applications: 23% blog, 33% update/maintain profiles on social networking sites, and 26% contribute to online forum/discussion groups—all in the past month (Synovate, 2010).

Enabling political participation via new media

Because the Internet allows for the rapid dissemination of information and is robust, interac‐tive, and globally borderless, it is seen as a major ingredient for citizen participation in the new political world, which is usually anchored within the boundaries of democracy and/or traditional party politics (Sparks, 2001). With the development of social media, citizens are able to express their opinions on a wider range of platforms, by writing on or replying to personal blogs or online BBS, re‐twittering others’ messages, or using social networking sites. These ways of online participation are new ways of enriching political discussion and socie‐tal debates, increasing diversity of opinions, and promoting pluralism (Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development, 2007).

This line of thought underlies an argument that online political participants are no longer passively receiving political information and knowledge; instead, they new media is ena‐bling them to be active agents, initiators, and contributors to political discussion. These new ways of active involvement can facilitate political participation, in principle regardless of their race, socioeconomic status, or gender. New modes of political involvement could also challenge the dominant model of the public opinion formation, which is usually set by the mainstream mass media, government, political parties, and social elites. Consequently, new


8

media can give people more channels to express their personal interest and their views to‐wards social issues. This message is particularly profound at a time of declining voting rates and interest in politics in many democratic societies. Many people have high hope that the Internet can encourage the younger generation to learn civic engagement (Dahlgren, 2007).

Youth, political engagement, and new media

The Internet and emerging media have been recognized as ways to unprecedentedly in‐crease youth involvement in the process of public decision making (Dahlgren & Olsson, 2008; Montgomery & Gottlieb‐Robles, 2006). In a 2008 telephone survey of American youth aged 18‐24, about one in every six respondents said they had taken part in two or more civic or political activities in the past 12 months (Smith, Schlozman, Verba, & Brady, 2009). Al‐though this report only considered political blogging and political use of social networking sites, it concluded, “What is most unambiguous is that posting material about political or social issues on the Web and using social networking sites politically are forms of online en‐gagement that are dominated by the young—especially the youngest adults” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 50).

Another major area of concern in online political engagement is the social role of new media in constructing identity, citizenship, and individuality during the life course of young gen‐eration (Vinken, 2007). As Dahlgren and Olsson put it (2008, p. 496), many young people in modern societies spend a lot of time and energy on “identity work”, meaning “they are en‐gaged in formulating who they are, what life goals they want to strive for, what their voca‐tional calling will be”. The Internet is able to offer multiple virtual platforms and networks to establish belonging to social groups, build personal identities, and discover their social position and meaning with their peers, communities, and society at large.

Different views

Some empirical findings, at least in the United States, suggest that people are too optimistic in thinking the Internet will be a solution to falling interest in politics and deliberative de‐mocracy (Hindman, 2009; Smith et al., 2009). For example, Smith and colleagues (2009, p. 3) argue “the Internet is not changing the fundamental socioeconomic character of civic en‐gagement in America. When it comes to online activities such as contributing money, con‐tacting a government official or signing an online petition, the wealthy and well‐educated continue to lead the way”. Dahlgren (2009, p. 7) notes that “[the newer Information Tech‐nology and Communications] are contributing to a reconfiguration of political life – though it is still unclear if this will be sufficient to reconstruct democracy”.


9

Another shortcoming of the overly optimistic attitude towards the societal effects of the In‐ternet is the notion that too much emphasis is put on technology, but not on the broader so‐ciocultural and political contexts. This overemphasis on a single factor invites criticisms, like “naïve Internet‐optimism” (Laer & Aelst, 2010, p. 248) or technological determinism.

Researching political engagement and new media

International and local studies consistently find that the young generation depends heavily on the Internet for learning, social activities, and leisure (City University of Hong Kong, 2009; Jones & Fox, 2009). This young cohort is perceived, usually by the older adults, as lack‐ing self‐regulation and more susceptible to the influence of mass media (Strasburger, Wilson, & Jordan, 2009). But many scholars argue that emphasizing the negative impact of media is unfounded theoretically, empirically, and in terms of public policy (Livingstone, 2009). The widespread public obsession with the negative effect of media—called “moral panic” or “media panic”—has caused considerable social anxiety over young people’s online activities and dominated public debate. The result is that it has directed research attention dispropor‐tionately to studying the negative effects of emerging media, with examples like online vio‐lence, Internet suicide (Fu, Wong, & Yip, 2009), Internet addiction (Fu, Chan, Wong, & Yip, 2010), and cyber bullying (Chau & Xu, 2007). But there has been relatively little research on the opportunities to be gained with new media and its pro‐social impacts (Montgomery & Gottlieb‐Robles, 2006). One example of potential beneficial impacts is the opportunity for young generation’s democratic involvement.

There is still limited research about youth online political engagement in Hong Kong. Recent incidents, like the protests against the LegCo approval of funding for the express rail link (Jan 2010) and the 2012 political reform proposal (Jun 2010), have triggered much discussion about young people’s involvement in social issues and political debate, much of which was reportedly mobilized through the Internet (Lai, 2009). One of the major concerns of this study is how young people’s socioeconomic background, psychosocial factors, media use, and other underlying contextual factors shape their political engagement.

Summary of the literature review

The literature review has provided an overview of some of the major issues that our young geners are facing in the modern era. There are many reasons why there is a pressing need to understand our young geners: the increasing minimum age to leave the education system, the increasing requirements of education and skills in the competitive labour market, the older age of independency and family formation, the worldwide emerging trend away from the stress of basic materialistic needs to the new aspirations for freedom, autonomy, and life


10

satisfaction, the exponential growth of new media, the World Wide Web, and the Internet. All of these influence how people engage with society.


11

Media Portrayal of the “Post‐80s” – A Brief Review

The term “post‐80s” (80後) has been used widely in the Hong Kong media since the anti‐express railway movement started in the end of 2009. That sparked a wide‐ranging discus‐sion and differing portrayals of the young generation. This chapter reports a content analy‐sis of how these news articles are portraying youth in Hong Kong.

This study has three objectives. First, we aim to understand how the media is portraying the post‐80s. Second, we develop a system of coding the text of the articles to validate the initial framework of our study (socioeconomic, psychosocial, political engagement, and media use) and to extend sub‐themes under each dimension (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Third, we com‐pare the findings with the findings from other methodologies (e.g., focus groups and semi‐structured individual interviews) to identify discrepancies between media portrayal and general perception of the post‐80s.

Method

Major content from Hong Kong media—including newspapers and magazines—were searched via WISENEWS between Jan 1 and Feb 28, 2010. Keywords “80後” and “post 80s” were used to identify articles, which were then categorized into the 14 sub‐themes. A total number of 1,996 articles were identified (1,894 Chinese articles and 102 English articles; Fig‐ure 1). Excluding non‐Hong Kong media coverage, 1,339 articles were found in local news, with 1,257 Chinese and 82 English articles (Table 1). Distributions of the newspaper sources can also be found in Appendix A Table 1.


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Figure 1: Proportion of news articles by language (n = 1,996)

Table 1: Proportion of local news articles in terms of language, paper section (n = 1,339)

Section/Language Chinese articles English articles Total

News Reporting 770 57 827

Commentary 487 25 512

Total 1,257 82 1,339

Three raters were recruited to code the news articles according to 14‐subthemes. Coding re‐liability was measured by the total number of coding mismatches in a total of 50 articles (50% Chinese and 50% English). Overall inter‐rater reliability was .75. Raters then used the program NVivo 2.0 to categorize the articles according to the three dimensions. Detailed findings are displayed in Appendix A Table 2.

Results

Reading media reactions to the express rail link incident, it is clear that the media is

characterizing the young generation in different ways. To better understand these depictions,

we compiled a review based on three perspectives: (1) socioeconomic, (2) psychosocial, and

(3) communication use and civil involvement.

From a socioeconomic perspective, reports generally say that the post‐80s are well‐educated.

But this is at odds with their median income, which has gradually decreased to such an ex‐

tent that they can barely afford their daily expenses. Moreover, it seems to be impossible for


13

them to purchase their own property, which will be a major obstacle in planning their future

and starting families. Articles also reported that the slow work mobility can be explained by

narrow job availability in the market. The majority of job posts have been filled by people in

their 40s and 50s (born in 1950s and 1960s). This generation is also net‐savvy and used to

using the Internet to socialize, gather and forward information, and voice opinions.

From a psychosocial perspective, the media describes this generation’s attitudes as more

open‐minded and receptive to intimate relationships. They are educated during their school

days with the common values of justice and fairness in society, rather than just the value of

earning money. In addition, media characterizations of the post‐80s are sometimes at odds

with each other. Some say they are energetic and creative; others describe them with a dark

side for being troublemakers and self‐centred. In terms of mental health, the media implies

that they are in a high‐stress environment and feel frustrated and hopeless with lots of

dissatisfaction in areas like social mobility, housing, and work.

From the perspective of communication use and civil involvement, the media suggests that

the government has failed to listen objectively to the young generation’s views and failed to

engage the young generation. Furthermore, they are disappointed with the trial Facebook

interaction programme because it lacked sincerity and communication. There are many new

tools for engagement and participation, but the government has not successfully built a

communication platform to interact with the public. The results of the media content analy‐

sis also suggest that the government should change its mode of engagement. For example, it

should be more familiar with interactive Internet platforms, plan efficient strategies to col‐

lect ideas and opinions, and even open public forums with live broadcasting.

Other perspectives in the media argue that most of the post‐80s used peaceful means of

demonstration. Many post‐80s feel the government has ignored opinions different from its

own. Also, because of its occasional aggressive acts towards police, the young generation

has been labelled “violent”, which implies that they are unreasonable and self‐centred. Yet

most post‐80s still value fairness, objectivity, and rationality. They are enduring this

criticism with much rationality, even as their image is being distorted under the media

spotlight.


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Study Framework

Based on our literature review, the media content analysis, and Lui’s (2007) four‐generations categorization, we further investigate the post‐80s. We use here three dimensions, with a range of 14 sub‐themes with a special focus on the 15‐29 age cohort. The goal is to under‐stand, identify, and comprehensively assess their needs, views, aspirations, expectations, cultural characteristics, and mental well‐being. Each dimension will be discussed based on findings from focus groups, telephone and online surveys, and semi‐structured interviews.

The Socioeconomic Dimension

1. Socioeconomic status and financial dependence, living arrangements, and plans

2. Education, career plan, and perceived social mobility

3. Family formation

4. Social network and capital: Support from family, relatives, friends, and community

5. Social life, including leisure, pop culture, and sub‐culture; consumption patterns and

volunteerism

6. Housing needs and aspirations

The Psychosocial Dimension

7. Worldview, life values, acceptance of diversity, and attitudes towards post‐materialism,

religion, and spirituality

8. Personality: Assertiveness, curiosity, risk‐taking, and creativity

9. General mental health: Stressors, help‐seeking, service utilization, resilience, strengths,

and achievements

Political Engagement and Media Use

10. Use of traditional/new media and digital literacy

11. Attitudes towards public government

12. Civic participation and preferred mode of engagement

13. Acceptance of violent behaviour in the demonstrations

14. Views on Hong Kong civic and political development


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Methods

This section explains the research methods used in each study.

Demographic and Socioeconomic Profile

To ensure validity and reliability, data used are mostly from the Census and Statistics De‐partment, HKSAR, as well as from published academic papers.

Focus Groups

A series of semi‐structured focus group studies was conducted. Purposive sampling, a non‐probability sampling method, was used to maximize the range of participant characteristics within the research scope of this study. Participants were invited to participate in one of the six discussion sessions. Each session had a focus theme drawn from the three proposed di‐mensions (psychosocial, socioeconomic, and communication use and civic involvement). Each group was moderated by a co‐investigator with expertise in the topic. Informed con‐sent was obtained before the interviews. HK$50 was offered to each participant. Each focus group lasted for 2 to 3 hours. Interested parties were allowed to use pseudonyms to help them feel comfortable speaking freely.

Discussions from the seven focus groups were recorded and transcribed. As in the media content analysis, the transcriptions were analyzed using a directed approach based on the 14 sub‐themes (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). NVivo 2.0 was used for data management. Work was compared with the findings of the media content analysis and semi‐structured interviews.

Sample

A total of 46 participants aged 18‐29 (males = 31, females = 15, mean age = 24.8) participated in the seven focus groups. Demographic information was collected from the participants and is displayed in the results section.


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Telephone and Online Survey

The main study has two parts: (Part 1) a telephone interview and (Part 2) an online survey. In cooperation with the HKU Social Sciences Research Centre, a sample of mobile numbers was generated randomly using the mobile numbers prefix data published by the Office of Telecommunications Authority (OFTA). All generated numbers were assigned a random number and re‐ordered before being used for fieldwork. Each mobile number was dialed and attempted three times. Mobile phone users were excluded if they were not aged 15‐29. Each telephone interview lasted less than 15 minutes. Interviewees were encouraged to take part in the online interview for a chance at winning a drawing for a 16GB iPad.

Interviewees who agreed over the phone to participate in Part 2 were asked to provide an email address, where they received a link to the online questionnaire. A reminder system (see flow chart below) was also developed to encourage participation. Interviewees were reminded via email and SMS in 7 days in case of incompletion. After another 7 days, par‐ticipants received a follow‐up phone call to resolve any of their concerns.

Figure 2: Reminder system

Done

Done


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Sample

A total of 1,020 mobile users (males = 494, females = 526) between the ages of 15 and 29 par‐ticipated in the telephone interview via random sampling. The cooperation rate is 50.4% (Appendix A Table 4). Among them, 34.1% were aged 15‐19; 35.8% were aged 20‐24; and 30.1% were aged 25‐29. After the interview, 499 subjects agreed verbally to participate in the online study, although 171 did not complete it. Overall, 328 subjects completed the online survey. The attrition rate is 32%.

Semi‐structured Individual Interviews

Interviewees were invited to express their views and aspirations towards the three proposed dimensions and the fourteen sub‐themes in a one‐hour face‐to‐face interview. Purposive sampling was undertaken to identify participants whose characteristics were required for in‐depth analysis after preliminary assessment of the results of the survey and the focus groups. The co‐investigators with expertise in the topics of interest conducted the interviews and encouraged the interviewees to share their opinions in detail. Interviewees were allowed to help them feel comfortable speaking freely.

Discussions from the 20 individual interviews were recorded and transcribed in the inter‐viewees’ spoken language. As in the media content analysis, the twenty transcriptions were organized according to the 14 sub‐themes by using NVivo 2.0 by the same raters. Work was compared with findings acquired in the media content analysis and focus groups.

Sample

Twenty individual interviews (males = 15, females = 5, age mean = 24.0) were conducted as the telephone and online study was completed. Demographic information was collected from the participants, as reported below.


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Results: Demographic and So‐cioeconomic Profile

The total Hong Kong population in 2009 was 7,026,361 (Figure 3). The gender ratio is 1.12 female to male. There are a total of 1,423,587 (20.3%) people aged 15‐29. The gender ratio of this group is also 1.12 female to male. The gender ratio in the 25‐29 group (1.33) is higher than the 15‐19 and 20‐24 groups, which could be due to the presence of domestic helpers2 (see Table 2).

Figure 3: Population pyramid 2009

Table 2: Age distribution of the young generation in 2009

Age/Gender Male Female Sub‐total

15‐19 223,572 (15.7%) 210,976 (14.8%) 434,548 (30.5%)

20‐24 217,560 (15.2%) 234,314 (16.5%) 451,874 (31.7%)

25‐29 230,249 (16.2%) 306,916 (21.6%) 537,165 (37.7%)

Sub‐total 671,381 (47.2%) 752,206 (52.8%) 1,423,587 (100%)

Sources: Census and Statistics Department

2 The number of domestic helpers in 2009 (provisional) was 76,667.


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As noted in Figure 4, there is a downward trend in the proportion the 15‐29‐year‐olds makeup of the overall population over the last 20 years for both males and females. But this trend has reversed in 2008. According to provisional 2010 numbers, the proportion contin‐ued to drop for females but rose again for males.3

Figure 4: Proportion of young generation residents (age 15‐29) in Hong Kong from 1991 to 2010

3 Due to differences in sampling size between the two surveys (Census/by‐census, and women and men key statistics) and projection of 2010, sampling error and data variation may distort 2008 and 2010 data.

Sources: Census 1991, 2001; By‐census 1996, 2006; Women and Men in Hong Kong – Key statistics 2009; Projected mid‐year Population 2007‐2036. Census and Statistics Department.


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Living Arrangements and Plans

Household size has decreased in recent decades. Four‐person households are now the most common, replacing five‐person households. However, the Census shows households with 25‐29‐year‐olds have shrunk to less than or equal to 3 people (including themselves). This trend can be seen from 1991 to 2006 and seems to becoming a long‐term trend.

Figure 5: Household size of the young generation between 1991 and 2006 (aged 15‐29)

Sources: Census 1991, 2001; By‐census 1996, 2006. Census and Statistics Department.


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Educational Attainment

Figure 6 shows the distribution of the young generation’s highest educational attainment for upper secondary school, sub‐degree, and degree courses from 2001‐2009. For those who aged 15‐19, over 50% have finished upper secondary education, and more than 25% have completed post‐secondary education. Over 80% of young adults aged 20‐24 have attained upper secondary education and at least 50% have entered sub‐degree courses. People aged 25‐29 have a lower proportion completing post‐secondary courses. In addition, the propor‐tion of young geners completing degree courses has soared 25.9% in the 20‐24 group and 24.7% in the 25‐29 group since 2001.

Figure 6: Highest education attainment of the young generation (aged 15‐29) between 1991‐2009

Sources: Census 1991, 2001; By‐census 1996, 2006. Census and Statistics Department.


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Marital Status and Fertility Rate

Table 3 shows the marital status of the young generation in percentages and absolute numbers.4 More details are discussed below, with a focus on two types of marital status: “now married” and “never married”.

Table 3: Distribution of different marital status on young adults (aged 20‐29)

Male

Marital Status (MS)

1991 1996 2001 2006 2008

Aged 20‐24

202,248

(93.5%)

212,658

(94.4%)

205,231

(95.3%)

205,829

(97.1%)

213,100

(98.2%)

Never married

25‐29 189,995

(67.0%)

175,083

(70.9%)

177,645

(75.4%)

175,695

(81.2%)

196,000

(85.7%)

20‐24 13,761

(6.4%)

13,158

(5.4%)

9,651

(4.5%)

5,975

(2.8%)

3,900

(1.8%)

Now married

25‐29 91,977

(32.5%)

69,995

(28.3%)

55,708

(23.7%)

39,079

(18.1%)

31,800

(13.9%)

20‐24 271

(0.1%)

356

(0.2%)

372

(0.2%)

156

(0.1%)

#5 Widowed/

Divorced/

Separated 25‐29 1,405

(0.5%)

1,962

(0.8%)

2,158

(0.9%)

1,491

(0.7%)

800

(0.3%)

4 Due to sampling size differences between two surveys (Census/by‐census, and women and men key statistics), sampling error and data variation may distort 2008 data. 5 Statistics have not been released due to large sampling error.


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Female

Marital Status (MS)

1991 1996 2001 2006 2008

Aged 20‐24

177,247

(82.9%)

193,889

(85.3%)

210,578

(88.9%)

216,218

(92.2%)

227,200

(94.4%)

Never married

25‐29 133,723

(45.5%)

148,741

(52.0%)

167,496

(59.5%)

185,862

(67.6%)

206,400

(69.0%)

20‐24 36,159

(16.9%)

32,582

(14.3%)

25,355

(10.7%)

17,456

(7.4%)

13,000

(5.4%)

Now married

25‐29 158,280

(53.8%)

133,667

(46.8%)

109,452

(38.9%)

84,504

(30.7%)

89,000

(29.8%)

20‐24 513

(0.2%)

858

(0.4%)

1,004

(0.5%)

887

(0.4%)

700

(0.3%)

Widowed/

Divorced/

Separated 25‐29 2,187

(0.8%)

3,401

(1.2%)

4,343

(1.5%)

4,528

(1.6%)

3,700

(1.2%)

Sources: Census 1991, 2001; By‐census 1996, 2006 Women and men in Hong Kong – Key statistics 2009 Census and Statistic Department


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Figure 7 shows the proportion of married young adults (aged 20‐29) between 1991 and 2008.6 It is clear that the proportion of the married young adults has decreased over time, with a more rapid decline in the 25‐29 group compared to the 20‐24 group. One possible rea‐son could be the increase in women pursuing continuing education, as shown in Figure 6.

Figure 7: Proportion of now‐married young adults (aged 20‐29)

6 Due to sampling size differences between two surveys (Census/by‐census, and women and men key statistics), sampling error and data variation might distort 2008 data.

Sources: Census 1991, 2001; By‐census 1996, 2006. Women and Men in Hong Kong – Key Statistics 2009. Census and Statistics Department.


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Figure 8 shows the proportions of people who have never married in specific age groups of young adults from 1991 to 2008.7 This increasing trend involves all age groups and genders. Nevertheless, the increase is larger for those aged 25‐29.

Figure 8: Percentage of never‐married young adults (aged 20‐29) between 1991‐2008

7 Due to the sampling size differences between two surveys (Census/by‐census, and women and men key statis‐tics), sampling error and data variation might distort 2008 data.

Sources: Census 1991, 2001; By‐census 1996, 2006. Women and Men in Hong Kong – Key Statistics 2009. Census and Statistics Department.


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Figure 9 shows that the fertility rate of the young geners is generally decreasing, especially in the 25‐29 age group. There has been a drop of 40 births per 1,000 women from 1991 to 2001 and it remains at 58/1,000 in 2008.8 Over the past 17 years the fertility rate of the 20‐24 group has declined from 40/1,000 to 24/1,000, which is considered low compared to other countries.9

Figure 9: Fertility rate of females aged 15‐29

8 Due to sampling size differences between two surveys (Census/by‐census, and women and men key statistics), sampling error and data variation might distort 2008 data. 9 Fertility rates in 2008 (per 1,000 women): Singapore: 20‐24: 29/1,000; 25‐29: 79/1,000; Taiwan: 20‐24: 32/1,000; 25‐29: 72/1,000. Sources: Fertility National Statistic, R.O.C. (2010). Rates of Childbearing Age – Women, Singapore Department of Statistics (2010).

Source: Women and Men in Hong Kong ‐ Key statistics 2009


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Employment Status

Figure 10 shows the proportion of the young generation participating in the labour force compared to the overall population. The proportion of youth participating in the labour force is higher (except for ages 15‐19), through it has consistently decreased since 1991 from 29.4% to 9.2% for males and from 25.7% to 9.3% for females in March 2010.10

However, the proportion of employed 20‐24‐year‐olds has fallen about 20% in both genders and has approached the overall population participation rate. Meanwhile, females aged 25‐29 have shown the opposite trend, with an increase from 79.7% to 87.1%. The proportion of males remains steady above 90%.

Figure 10: Proportion of the young generation (ages 15‐29) participating in the labour force between 1991 and 2010

10 Due to sampling size differences between two surveys (Census/by‐census, and Quarterly report – General Household Survey), sampling error and data variation might distort 2009 and 2010 data.

Sources: Census 1991, 2001; By‐census 1996, 2006. Quarterly Report General Household Survey 2010. Census and Statistics Department


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Figure 11 shows unemployment rates for the young generation. The unemployment rate for females is lower than males. In general, the older the age, the lower the unemployment rate. Moreover, the rate has been climbing in the 15‐19 group since 1991, from 8.6% to a peak of 25.4% for males in 2001 and from 7.5% to a peak of 21.4% for females in 2001. For females, unemployment has fallen since 2006 to 11‐15% in March 201011; for males, it dropped in 2006, but rose again to around 25% for people aged 15‐19.

Figure 12 shows that the percentage of young geners working in manufacturing, transport, storage, and communication has been decreasing. In contrast, young people are working more and more in the community, social, and personal services industry, reflecting the change in work spectrum from trading to personal services. Interestingly, government sta‐tistics in Figure 13 show an increasing trend in wholesale, retail, import/export trades, res‐taurants, and hotels among 15‐29‐year‐olds since 2001.

Figure 11: Unemployment rates of the young generation (aged 15‐29) between 1991 and 2010

11 Due to sampling size differences between two surveys (Census/by-census, and Quarterly report – General Household Sur-vey), sampling error and data variation might distort 2009 and 2010 data.

Sources: Census 1991, 2001; By‐census 1996, 2006. Quarterly Report General Household Survey 2010. Census and Statistics Department


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Figure 12: Job industry distribution of the young generation (ages 15‐29) between 1991 and 2006

Figure 13: Occupation distribution of the young generation (ages 15‐29) between 1991 and 2009

Sources: Census 1991, 2001; By‐census 1996, 2006. Census and Statistics Department, 2010. Census and Statistics De‐partment



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Employment Income

Figure 14 shows 15‐29‐year‐olds’ monthly median employment earnings over the past 20 years. The data shows that 25‐29‐year‐olds’ employment earnings are roughly the same as in 1996. However, those aged 15‐19 and 20‐24 earned less than they did in 1996. Those two groups now earn HK$5,000 and HK$7,500 respectively. Furthermore, over 90% of 15‐19‐year‐olds and 70% of 20‐24‐year‐olds earn less than HK$10,000 (Figure 15).

Figure 14: Monthly median employment earnings of the young generation (ages 15‐29) between 1991 and 2009



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Figure 15: Monthly income from major employment of the young generation (ages 15‐29) between 1991 and 2009



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Voting Turnout

In 2008, 548,421 people aged 18–29 registered as electors for the Legislative Council Election, and they made up 16.3% of the total number of electors (n = 3,372,007).

Overall, 38.5% of people aged 18‐30 are registered to vote. In specific age groups, 23.5%, 43.1%, and 46.8% of those aged 18‐20, 21‐25, and 26‐30 are registered to vote, respectively.

Figure 16 shows the changes in voting turnout over the past four Legislative Council Elec‐tion years. T

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