central asian paper

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RESEARCH PAPER

Course: Research Methodology

Title: International Dimension of Central Asia

Submitted to: Dr.Mavara Inayat

Submitted by: Muhammad Ali

Department Of International RelationsQuaid-e-Azam University

Islamabad.

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Contents

GEOPOLITICAL PATTERNS IN CENTRAL ASIA AFTER SEPTEMBER 11.

US CENTRAL ASIA RELATION.

RUSSIA CENTRAL ASIA RELATION

POST 9/11 CHALLENGES

NEW WINNERS AND LOSERS

CHINA SETBACK

RUSSIA GAINS

IRAN LOOSES

ANY CHANCE OF THE FUTURE GREAT GAME IN CENTRAL ASIA?

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GEOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11

When everyone is dead, the Great Game in Central Asia is over: Not before.

(As quoted in Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game Revisited)

The geopolitical situation in Central Asia after September 11, 2001, terrorist

attacks on the US, which resulted in the deployment of the US-led anti-terrorist coalition

forces in the Central Asian States (CAS), to carry out combat operations in Afghanistan,

where the main suspect held responsible by the US, Osama bin Laden, was taking

refuge under the former Taliban regime.

Given the socio-political complexities of the CAS, their internal dynamics are not

an easy matter to grasp, and least of all to predict its possible directions, which in the

present context of Afghan-related developments, is becoming more and more

complicated with the passage of time. The various states of the Central Asian region, as

well as of neighbouring areas and other global states, remain in pursuit of both

preserving their national interests, or to derive political benefits from this strategically

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important region, whose huge hydrocarbon resources are a source of interest to them.

Since the early 19th century, with the start of the era of industrialisation and its growing

requirements for energy, there was also the corresponding pursuit of the need to

explore, exploit, and control the hydrocarbon resources where these existed, including

the huge oil and gas reserves known even then to exist in the Caucasus and Central

Asian regions.This rationale was a dominant feature in the external factors that

influenced the geopolitics of Central Asian region earlier. After the CAS achieved their

independence, from the disbanded Soviet Union in 1991, it continues to attract various

international state and non-state actors to carve out a share in the abundant oil and gas

resources of the region. But the events of 9/11 have brought some major changes in the

traditional geopolitical landscape of the Central Asian region.

The current geopolitical chess game in Central Asia, referred to as Great Anti-

Terrorist Game, is different from the earlier geopolitical developments of the region in

several ways. Before September 11, Russia figured as dominant actor due to its

geographic proximity and its own compulsions to dominate the region. Post-revolution

Russia in its USSR phase made efforts to forge deep political, economic, linguistic, and

cultural linkages with the CAS. In the current Great Anti-Terrorist Game, along with

Russia, the USA is also emerging as a dominant player due to its military presence in

the region as well as the huge military resources at its command. At present there are

around 1000-1500 troops of the US 10th Mountain Division, stationed at Uzbekistans

Khanabad air base. Another 3000 troops of US-led anti-terrorist coalition are deployed at

the Kyrgyz Manas International airport, and an unidentified number of forces are

stationed both in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. In response to their extensive and active

support to the US in its war on terrorism, the CAS are receiving economic, political, and

military assistance from the US, giving the US greater leverage over Russia in this

strategically important region, vis--vis securing an access to the land-locked region and

consolidating its position in order to exercise control over the huge oil and gas resources

of the region. Using the events of 9/11, the US has enmeshed its short-term goal of

pursuing Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network with its long-term goal to establish

its presence in the Central Asian region. It should not be forgotten that it places the US

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in direct proximity to both Russia and China, where both are vulnerable. Although it

remains to be seen what directions that presence will take in times to come.

To understand the present post-9/11 geopolitical landscape of the region, the following

three sets of relations are essential to understand and analyse, as they form the mainaspects of the new Great Anti-Terrorist Game. These are (a) US-Central Asia

Relations, (b) Russia-Central Asia Relations.

US-Central Asia Relations

The US and CAS had no prior history of diplomatic relations before the demise of

former Soviet Union, but throughout the 1990s they maintained good friendly relations

with each other. Massive economic, political, and military support remained the main

instruments of the US policy towards this region. In fact, the regions strategic

importance, owing to its unique geographic location with proximity to both Russia and

China, and its huge oil and gas resources, and its willingness to welcome and absorb

the US-led western ideals of democracy and free market economy made it one of the

important regions for the US. For CAS, the US provided an alternate to the decades of

Russian supremacy, which they wanted to distance themselves from.

The events of September 11 further strengthened bilateral relations between

various CAS and the US. Their common borders with and geographic proximity toAfghanistan, on an immediate basis made the CAS frontline states in the US war on

terrorism. Four CAS allowed the US to use their airbases in war on terrorism, namely,

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Even Turkmenistan, an officially

declared neutral state which is not part of any regional organisation or alliance system in

Central Asia, offered its bases and air corridor to the US air force for logistical support,

search and rescue operations. All the airbases were for re-supply missions, transporting

of aid goods, carrying out search and rescue operations, for handling any emergency

situations, and in some cases launching attacks on Afghanistan, as in the case of theManas airbase in Kyrgyzstan.

Besides attaining its short-term military objectives, in the long-term the US

presence in the CAS offers some other advantages to the US as well. The proximity of

the CAS is not only to Afghanistan, but also to Iran, Russia, China and its Tibet region.

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The Central Asian bases have placed the American forces close to Chinas western

frontier where, in combination with the US bases located in the proximity of Chinas

eastern and southern regions - such as those based in South Korea and the Indian

Ocean - they allow the US to militarily encircle China. These bases in Central Asia have

positioned the US troops close to Russias southern border for the first time in the post-

WW II period. The Central Asian bases also provide the US military with an outreach to

Iran, which Bush singled out as part of the axis of evil in his State of the Union address

in January 2002. Already, under its ICBM regime, the US has missiles and advanced

surveillance systems that can target all important sites in Iran, Russia and China; and

with its troops and air force positioned in active deployment in the Central Asian bases,

indicates a grand and horrific strategy of world dominance that lies behind the current

US strategies. Moreover, for exercising control over the oil and gas resources of Central

Asian region, which according to estimates are around 200 billion barrels of oil and

about 236-237 trillion cubic feet of gas the US military presence gives the US a leverage

over Russia and other states, with regard to the oil diplomacy vis--vis Central Asian

region. Some American political observers and analysts have gone so far as to state that

the September 11 incident was pre-planned to secure an access to and exercise control

over the Eurasian hydrocarbon resources. A pamphlet published in New York in

December 2001, stated as follows:

The heinous terrorist acts of September 11 gave the rulers an excuse tolaunch a war they had already plotted anyhow. As Bush and his advisors have

repeatedly warned, this war has no end in sight. Far more than Afghanistan is at

stake. US imperialist, led by Rockefellers Exxon Mobil, need to grab the profit

bonanza that can come from fuelling the East Asian energy boom anticipated over

the next decade or so. The grander strategic design is nothing less than US control

of the entire Eurasian landmass and the sea-lanes that serve it.

The US military presence in Central Asia will have profound effects on the

alliance system of the region, which was earlier marked with the dependence of the CAS

on Russia, given their seven decades of subjugation under the former Soviet rule. In the

post-9/11 period, the CAS are entering into a new phase of strategic partnership with the

US. Of these, Uzbekistan enjoys a more special status, since it signed a strategic

security pact with the US on 12th October 2001, which the Uzbek government termed as

having established a qualitatively new relationship based on a long-term commitment to

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advance security and regional stability. Since then high level US officials have been

streaming in and out of CAS. For instance, the US Defiance Secretary, Donald

Rumsfeld, paid four official visits to the CAS since 9/11, the last one being in April 2002,

to appraise the role that these states played during the war on terrorism. Similarly, the

Presidents of CAS also paid separate official visits to the US. For example, the Kazakh

President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, went to the US on a state visit in December 2001. The

Uzbek President paid a four-day official visit to the US in March 2002. Both the countries

signed with the US the Decleartion on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation

Framework, and affirmed their joint commitments to tackle the threat of terrorism in all

its forms.

The eager receptivity of the CAS to the US presence and role in the region lie in

their own economic, political, and security concerns. Particularly, a major concerncommonly shared by all of the CAS is to attain maximum security guarantees from the

US against the terrorist threats in their own region. Since their independence, all these

states have been faced with varying kinds and degrees of internal unrest bordering on

terrorism, stemming from their religious militant groups, and the historical ethnic disputes

existing in these states, with their own outfits like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

(IMU), Hizb-ul-Tahrir, and Tajikistans Tajik Opposition Front, which has remained a

security threat to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. As events came to light, it

brought to the surface the fact that these organisations had links with the al-Qaeda andother regional and global militant religious groups. The US, in its terrorist list has already

blacklisted IMU. Its commander, Juma Namangani, was reportedly killed in the early

phase of the US bombing on Afghanistan. Within this commonly shared concern, there

are tensions arising out of the domination of bigger states vis--vis their smaller

neighbours. In Central Asia that domination is exerted by Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan,

and resented by other states, particularly Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. As stated in the

observation that the areas two biggest states, Kazakhstan (population 14.8 million) and

Uzbekistan (24.2 million), are sparring for local hegemony, while the two smaller states,

Kyrgyzstan (4.9 million) and Tajikistan (6.2 million), seek security.

When the US troops established their presence in Uzbekistan, there were fears

that Uzbekistan would exploit the US support to exercise its hegmonistic designs over

other states in Central Asia. However, the stationing of US forces in other CAS,

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particularly in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, has helped mitigate such concerns among the

smaller CAS.

All these states need long-term economic support from the US as well, because

of their poor economic conditions. A sizeable increase in the US aid and financialassistance to CAS is further strengthening ties among them. For poorer countries, such

as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the financial resources brought in by the Western troops,

particularly in the form of aid assistance, as well as fee charges for utilising base

facilities and take off and landing charges, are the main inputs into their deprived

economies. Apart from that the US pledged $125 million unconditional assistance to

Tajikistan, while $14 million had already been injected into the Kyrgyz economy. It is

further expected that $40 million will be further put into the Kyrgyz economy by the end

of 2002.

The most important economic boon for these states would be in form of oil and

gas export pipelines from the CAS to the outer world. The recently signed deal between

Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to construct a gas pipeline from Daulatabad

gas field in Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to the Gawader sea port in Pakistan is an

encouraging development for the CAS, since the pipelines could be a fore-runner to

roads as well. But the crucial link remains stability and peace in Afghanistan for the

success of any such project. Signs are that the Afghan government and people are

conscious of benefits that would accrue to them out of such developments, and are likely

to work for their interests rather than against it.

The political regimes in power in the CAS hope that in response to their active

support to the US, it would be less critical of their poor human rights and democracy

record. All these regimes in the post-9/11 period, cracked down on their political

opposition, which has led to political unrest notably in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and

Turkmenistan.

Russia-Central Asia Relations

The US presence in the CAS is likely to have far-reaching impact on the Russia-

Central Asia relations, a fact that is not lost upon the Russian government. Even before

the events of September 11, there were tensions between the CAS and Russia. One

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major reason was the separatist movement by the Chechens, which led to war. After the

first Chechen war (1994-96), around four thousand Russian troops and thousands of

innocent Chechen civilians were killed. The inhumane killings of thousands of innocent

Muslims in Chechnya raised sympathies of the Muslim population in the CAS, especially

when the Russian government asserted that it would fight the threat of Islamic militancy

at all levels and in every former Soviet republic. The Chechen war raised fears of

Russias intentions to interfere in the internal affairs of other Caucasian and Central

Asian states, since Russia insisted that their weak and fragile regimes needed Moscows

active support in their internal affairs if they were to survive Economically, on account of

being dependent on the export routes of Russia for the Central Asian goods and energy

resources, the CAS remain wary of Russian dominance. Russia not only pays poorly,

but is also very tardy with payments whether it is the government or private sector. Many

Russian companies reportedly owe millions of dollars to the CAS.

Getting the desired economic and political support from the US does not mean

that for CAS it will be easy to abandon Russia. Both Russia and the CAS are

economically inter-dependent. Approximately 50% of Russian foreign currency revenues

are generated by the Central Asian regions oil and gas sales, in which the Kazakh

energy resources are a major contributor. Gas from Turkmenistan flows into Russian

markets and supplements Russias European exports. Turkmenistan is entirely

dependent upon Russias state-owned gas giant, Gazmprom, for its gas exports, exceptfor a small pipeline that it runs to Iran. The same is the case with the oil-rich Kazakhstan,

where only one pipeline to the Russian Black Sea port carries Kazakh oil to the outer

world. Although the recent trans-Afghan pipeline deal has raised hopes in Central Asia

for another non-Russian route, but that depends largely upon permanent peace in

Afghanistan.

For security reasons as well, the CAS cannot end their association with Russia,

because of the presence of a large Russian Diaspora in these states, which may resist

such a move. That, too, could have destabilising effects for the entire region of Central

Asia. The presence of Russian military and security guards in these states, makes

Russia an important guarantor of and a factor within the Central Asian security scenario.

Russias historical involvement in the region gives it a deeper understanding of and

insight into the regional dynamics, as compared even to the USA. From the CAS point of

view as well, the known factor would be preferable to the unknown and uncertain factor.

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In fact, Russia itself fears that if regional instability and insecurity, emanating

from the illicit drugs and weapons trade, political suppression, religious extremism, and

international terrorism, is left unchecked, it may spill over into its own territory. That is

why since the independence of the region in 1991, Russia has laid emphasis on close

security relations with CAS, to attain its own security objectives in the region, as well as

to provide the much-needed security to the CAS. The events of 9/11, and the

consequent US military presence in the region, only served to increase the emphasis

Russia places on multilateral and bilateral cooperation with its neighbors in Central Asia.

The recent Russian military exercises in the Caspian Sea (7-15 August, 2002), involving

around 60 warships and 10,000 men along with some Kazakh and Azeri units, is a

manifestation of how Russia has accelerated its efforts to pursue and maintain its

security influence in this region. The stated objective of these exercises is to check the

preparedness of the Russian seamen for tackling any sort of regional and international

threats, linked to international terrorism in particular. As the Russian Navy Commander,

Admiral Vladimir Kuroedov, stated, these exercises show that Russia can protect its

interests in the Central Asian and Caucasus region. Moreover, the Russian readiness

skills for interaction with other Caspian states, will be improved accordingly. Some of the

regional states, particularly Iran, are sceptical of the Russian designs in the region.

Following the official statements emanating from the US State Department and

Pentagon, with respect to the stationing of the US troops in the CAS on a long-termbasis, Russias resolve to play a decisive role in Central Asian region has also

increased. Wary of the US intentions with respect to its future strategy vis--vis the CAS,

Russia desires to solve all the regional problems by involving the regional states, and

minimising the role of outside powers in any future economic, political and security

problems of the region. The summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

(SCO), held at St. Petersburg (Russia) in June 2002, and the first Summit meeting of the

Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), held at

Almaty (Kazakhstan) from June 3-5, 2002, is a step in this direction. The fact that the

charter of the SCO was signed in the said meeting and a decision also reached in that

very meeting on the establishment of a counter-terrorism center in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan),

is ample proof of the fact that the revitalization of the organisation at this crucial hour

testifies to Russias desire to play a more proactive role in its backyard. Also Russian

efforts at the CICA conference, which was attended by nearly 16 countries, testifies to

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Russias ambitions to play a more predominant role in world affairs as a Eurasian

power.

Although, at present the geopolitical balance in Central Asia seems to be in

favour of the US, in the long run Russia would not allow the US to totally outweigh itsown influence in the region. A recent meeting of heads of state of CAS, Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, discussed the post-war political situation in Afghanistan, and the

prospects of increasing economic cooperation among these states with Russia. In fact,

both the CAS and Russia are aware of the fact that sidelining each other in their policies

will create security and economic problems for them, that is why all of them are trying

hard to maintain a balance in their ties in the American presence in the region. Roger N

McDermott, a political consultant at the Scottish center for International Security at

University of Adenburg, commenting on Central Asia-Russia security interdependence,quite rightly points out; the truth is that the Central Asian states know that Moscow

cannot afford to turn its back on them and their struggles and see militant Islam spread

further northwards: for them it is not a choice Moscow or Washington, so much as

Moscow-plus.

Post-9/11 Challenges to the CAS

The events of September 11, thrust the CAS into a challenging situation.

Overnight these states became important to both the US and Russia, who are bestowing

them with political, economic, and security concessions, which they could not have

thought of during the last one decade following their independence. It largely depends

upon the CAS as to how they exploit the emerging geopolitical situation by balancing the

US and Russian interests in their welfare.

Deriving economic benefits from US presence in their region will have to be

balanced by their manifold linkages with Russia to allay its own security concerns.

Russia can very easily instigate and support the anti-state elements within the CAS, thatfunction as extremist and opposition elements in the region, to sabotage the security

measures in CAS guaranteed by the US, and are thus an important trump card in the

Russian hands, which would be used whenever Russia feels the need. Recently,

Turkmenistans opposition leader, Boris Shikhmuradov was in Moscow, reportedly trying

for an uprising against Turkmen President, Suparmurad Niyazov.

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Moreover, given the manner of the US commitment worldwide, the political and

security support of the US to the CAS is short-term in nature. Meanwhile, the

authoritative regimes in Central Asia have tried to capitalise on the US presence to

strengthen their hold in their respective countries, as the following developments show.

The referendum in Uzbekistan in January 2002, extended the term of President Islam

Karimov for the next five years; the removal of Turkmen Security officials who might

have threatened President Niyazovs rule; the arrest and trial of several opposition

leaders both in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, can be quoted as examples of

undemocratic trends in the CAS. Like in other countries around the region, there is a

rising distrust for the US among the masses of CAS, who, while appreciating the

American effort to eliminate Taliban and al-Qaeda would perceive that USA is

prioritising counter terrorism to the detriment of human rights, and the promotion of

democracy is being translated into direct US support of increasingly repressive and

authoritarian Central Asian regimes. Growing number of disaffected Central Asians are

thus seeking membership of Islamic opposition groups as the only alternative for

invoking change. Most of the regional and international human rights organisations have

expressed grave concerns about the US support to the repressive regimes in Central

Asia, as these states and particularly Uzbekistan have a poor human rights record.

Uzbek President, Islam Karimov has been charged of several human rights abuses like

torture of dissidents, politically motivated arrests and custodial deaths. This has led and

is still leading towards ordinary people joining extremist groups who pledge that theywould get rid of Islam Karimovs repressive rule.

In fact, the US is in a strong position to use its influence in the region to push the

regimes towards reforms, by making its economic and security assistance contingent on

their democratic and economic reforms, thus addressing the root cause of the peoples

dissatisfaction, which lies in ongoing poverty, unemployment, and the lack of education.

The post-9/11 period has brought for the CAS the chances of change in the traditional

geopolitical set-up in the region, which can be beneficial if their leadership rises to the

occasion. The oil and gas resources, which were once the cause of conflict among

various powers in the region, may also become the greatest hope for peace and

development in the region, particularly if the dominant players like the US and Russia

convert their confrontation over the exploitation of the oil and gas in the CAS, to one of

multilateral cooperation. However, much depends on the regimes of the CAS and how

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they preserve their national interests. Like other dominant actors in the region, no one is

more aware than the ruling regimes of the CAS that Central Asian politic is in fact a

house of cards: every time you remove one element, the whole thing comes crashing

down.So sidelining one for the sake of the other may again thrust the CAS in a New

Great Game situation of 1990s, in which Russia and US tried to counterweigh each

other, but at the cost of the entire regions economic and political stability and prosperity.

Although the event of tne September 11 have produced new winner and loosers in the

region.

NEW WINNER AND LOOSERS

The events of September 11 and the onset of the U.S. campaign against

terrorism have produced new winners and losers in and around Central Asia. The region

itself has been the big winner; the world has focused attention on it to a degree

unimaginable in the 1990s. The reason the world cares is different now than in the early

1990s, when Central Asia had nuclear weapons left over from the Soviet Union, or in the

mid-1990s, when oil and gas were of great interest, or in the late 1990s, when

nongovernmental organizations were campaigning for human rights. The world cares

about Central Asia now for two reasons: its proximity to the South Asian tinderbox and

the belated realization by Western political establishments that state failure anywhere in

post-Soviet Central Asia carries significant risks for the West in its efforts to root out al

Qaeda-style terrorist networks.

The new focus on Central Asia is a marked departure from the 1990s when U.S.

and Western attitudes toward Central Asia were full of ambivalence about the nature of

their interests there. Then, the United States could best be described as a bystander

who was interested in the region but unwilling to get involved.

The worst imaginable turn of events from the standpoint of U.S. interests would

be a geopolitical wrestling match between Russia, China, Iran, India, Pakistan, andTurkey for control of Central Asia. It would upset too many other interests that the United

States might have elsewhere. The best approach for all parties involved, the Talbott

speech suggested, would be to allow Central Asia to become a great-power-free zone,

to let it develop its natural resources and achieve stability through economic

development. Hence, the unspoken but obvious conclusion: the United States would be

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willing to help with economic development and democratization, but most of all it would

like to keep the region from becoming an American problem.

That attitude prevailed for the rest of the 1990s. By the end of the second Clinton

administration, U.S. relations with Central Asia reached a difficult stage. The region'simage in Western media had become tarnished by widespread reports of corruption,

growing authoritarianism, and lack of progress on economic reform. Increasingly, the

expert community came to view the "stans" not as the next generation of Asian tigers but

as the next wave of failed states. The region's energy wealth--once thought to be the

engine of its economic recovery--had come to be viewed as the source of rampant,

debilitating corruption that one day would ensure it a permanent place among those

resource-rich nations, such as Nigeria or Congo, that had failed to take advantage of

their natural wealth. As a result, by the end of the 1990s, the U.S. strategic debate (tothe extent that there was one) about Central Asia was left pondering whether it was

"strategic quicksand" or a "mission too far." The change of administrations in

Washington in 2001 initially seemed to trigger few changes in this attitude of general

indifference. Prior to September 11, the Bush administration evidently had little time to

revisit U.S. policy toward Central Asia. It did not figure prominently in reports of the Bush

administration review of foreign policy priorities, which focused heavily on major

powers--China, Russia, and India. Perhaps the sole exception was the region's energy

potential, which the authors of the May 2001 report of the National Energy PolicyDevelopment Group identified as a promising source of hydrocarbons that could help

diversify the world's energy supply and lessen global dependence on the Persian Gulf.

China's Setback.

In the near term, the most prominent victim of the new post-September 11

security order in Central Asia has been the Shanghai Forum and, by extension, China.

Established in the mid-1990s by Russia, China, and the Central Asian states, the forum

was intended to serve many purposes. For Russia and China, it was a chance to

manage Central Asian security affairs and cross-border issues free of U.S. influence.

The Shanghai Forum offered the Central Asian states the opportunity to sit at the same

table with the two biggest players in the region, to harness their resources to help make

Central Asia more secure against Afghanistan-based and domestic insurgents and

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militant Islamic movements, and to do all this while getting both Moscow and Beijing to

guarantee their existing borders.

But since September 11 the United States has established itself as the main

power broker in China's strategic backyard. Moreover, the United States has displacedChina as Russia's principal interlocutor in Central Asian regional affairs and has pursued

a new strategic relationship with India--China's long-term competitor. Finally, the United

States has resumed a patron-client relationship with Pakistan--long a Chinese partner.

None of this is to be taken lightly by the national security establishment in Beijing,

especially given the tensions in relations with Washington in recent years.

In the near term, China's reversal of fortune in the heart of Eurasia has been

breathtaking. A regional power broker prior to September 11, China now finds itself

marginalized, displaced, and virtually alone, pondering the unenviable (for Beijing) option

of playing second fiddle to the United States and a host of its newfound best friends. No

matter how much China gains from the U.S. military campaign--and there can be little

doubt that it has been a beneficiary of the campaign against the Taliban and the ensuing

blow to operations of its own Uighur militants--U.S. preponderance in Central Asia must

be a serious setback to the government that aspires to the role of the Asian superpower.

Russia's Gain.

Russia's post-September 11 position in the Central Asian region is more

bittersweet. Undoubtedly, few among Moscow's foreign policy and military elite cherish

the sight of U.S. troops in their strategic backyard. U.S. military presence has been an

awkward reality for Russia's national security establishment; after all, the Russian

government granted the United States access to facilities that the Russian military still

controlled in areas that were Soviet only a decade ago. At least, some must have

thought resentfully, the United States had the decency to consult with Russia before

moving into the region.

Still, the uncompromising public stance by President Vladimir Putin in support of

U.S. actions has brought a number of important advantages to Moscow. The United

States has tacitly acknowledged certain Russian droit de regard in Central Asia. Russia's

own military campaign in Chechnya ceased being a barrier to Moscow's relations with

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the West and instead became something of a bridge on the strength of the argument

that both Russia and the United States are fighting the same militant Islamic enemy.

Russian claims of Osama bin Laden's complicity in Chechnya's separatist (Moscow

prefers to call it terrorist movement have also been perceived in a different light since

September 11. The issue of violations of human rights in Chechnya has been effectively

relegated to the back burner in favor of the more immediate concerns about terrorism

and other issues in relations with Washington.

Furthermore, Russia got a major post-September 11 boost in its standing in

relation to China, whose growing economic, military, and strategic might had become a

source of increasingly vocal concern among Russian politicians and foreign policy

specialists. New regard for Russia in Washington, as well as prospects for continuing

improvements in U.S.-Russian relations, must send an important signal to Beijing,further contributing to its sudden sense of isolation.

In Central Asia proper, the new spirit of accord and cooperation in U.S.-Russian

relations has had important implications as well. Central Asian potentates have learned

well how to play Washington and Moscow against each other. The fact that there is now

less light between respective Russian and U.S. positions on a number of important

issues leaves Central Asian governments less room to maneuver and exploit their

differences, whether in regard to pipeline routes, Caspian boundaries, or security ties to

rogue regimes.

In practical terms, Russia can do little other than offer the United States

unimpeded access to Central Asia. It has no military muscle that would have allowed it

to play a significant role in the Afghanistan military campaign in the air or on the ground.

In the short and medium terms, the best that Moscow can do in support of counter

terrorism is to provide unfettered access to and from the Central Asian region, share

intelligence, and do all it can (including accepting international aid) to put its own house

in order--to secure its nuclear weapons, material, and expertise, as well as its chemical

weapons and biological warfare capabilities.

The nature of Russia's contribution to the war in Afghanistan indicates its likely

role in the region beyond the near term. Geography will ensure its continuing importance

to the region for years to come, if only as an outlet for oil and gas. Alternatives to

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existing shipping routes will take years to build, and even then they will complement,

rather than substitute for, the routes currently crossing Russia.

In addition to its geographic proximity, Russia is bound to stay involved in Central

Asia for a long time because of its residual ethnic population there. Despite considerableemigration from Central Asia, the region is still home to some 8 million ethnic Russians

(the largest populations residing in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan--5.1 million and 1.4

million, respectively). Although the fate of ethnic Russians abroad is unlikely to be as

important a theme in domestic politics as some politicians have claimed, no government

in Moscow will be in a position to ignore this issue, especially in the event of regional

destabilization.

But Russia's military weakness, lack of power projection capabilities, and limited

resources (already under multiple domestic demands) will mean that it is not a realistic

candidate to become the region's security manager or hegemon for years to come,

regardless of the future of U.S.-Russian relations. Even so, given the congruence of U.S.

and Russian interests in combating radical Islamic terrorism, Moscow's military

weakness means that U.S. military presence in Central Asia will benefit Russian security

interests, no matter how difficult it will be for the Russian elite to come to terms with this

turn of events.

Iran's Loss.

By contrast, Iran--Russia's long-time partner in Central Asia and ally in the anti-

Taliban cause--has found itself among the losers in the region's post-September 11

realignment. Long the pivotal member of the anti-Taliban coalition and loyal backer of

the Northern Alliance, Iran has been squeezed out of its key foothold in Central Asia--

Tajikistan--with which it shares strong common cultural, linguistic, and ethnic ties.

The speed and eagerness with which the Tajik government accepted U.S.

military presence on its soil must have seemed the ultimate betrayal to Tehran. The

opening of Turkmen airspace to American over flights (even if officially only for

humanitarian purposes) and the deployment of allied troops to Central Asia must have

underscored to Iran's political establishment that in a confrontation with the United

States, it would now need to worry about U.S. presence not only in the Persian Gulf but

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also in the north--Central Asia and the Caucasus--to say nothing of the east and south--

Afghanistan and Pakistan.

There can be little doubt that Iran, like China, has been an immediate beneficiary

of the military defeat of the Taliban, with which Tehran had had a very tense relationship.But the aftermath of the military campaign and the de facto establishment of a U.S.

protectorate in Afghanistan must have been a blow to Iranian interests, adding to a

growing sense of encirclement by the United States.

In the immediate post-September 11 periods and the active phase of the military

campaign in Afghanistan, U.S.-Iranian relations showed glimmers of hope. Both the

United States and Iran had long been opposed to the Taliban regime. Iran's expression

of sympathy for the United States after the tragedy of September 11, pledge of

cooperation in delivering essential humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, and offer of

assistance to U.S. airmen in cases of emergency had further fueled those hopes. In the

absence of a common enemy, however, the United States and Iran found themselves on

opposite sides of the Afghan divide. Iranian attempts to play factional politics in

Afghanistan threatened the stability of the fragile U.S.-backed Hamid Karzai

government.

In addition, Iranian rejection of the invitation by Washington to join the war on terrorism

manifested itself in continuing Iranian support for terrorist attacks against Israel, most

notably, as suggested in the so-called Karine-A incident of January 2002, in which Israel

Defense Forces intercepted a major clandestine shipment of Iranian-supplied weapons

and munitions to the Palestinian Authority. The episode sent a powerful signal that

expectations of an imminent U.S.-Iranian thaw in the aftermath of September 11 had

been premature indeed. This in turn was a blow to Iranian influence in Central Asia,

where a new sheriff--the United States--was in charge.

ANY CHANCE OF THE GREAT GAME IN THE CENTRAL ASIA?

The Great Game in Central Asia itself may appear to have considerably slowed

down in 2006. But nothing could be more deceptive an impression. True, we've

witnessed nothing like the cataclysmic events of the previous year - "Tulip

Revolution" or the Andizhan uprising in Uzbekistan.

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Partly this was because the bickering over geopolitical influence became somewhat

manifestly lopsided, with Russia and China not only retaining their gains of

yesteryear but also consolidating them, and the US painstakingly attempting to

recoup its lost influence in the region.

The single biggest "success story" of US diplomacy in the Great Game during the

past year has been that Washington prevailed on Russia and China to give

consideration to its reasoning that granting full membership to the Islamic Republic of

Iran in the SCO might not be consistent with their own long-term interests. This was

no mean achievement, considering that both Russia and China have such high

stakes in their bilateral relations with Tehran. But Iranian President Mahmud

Ahmadinejad attended the summit as a special invitee.

Equally, the fact that, unlike its previous year's summit, the SCO meeting in June

2006 did not assume an overt anti-American overtone must remain a matter of relief

for Washington. In many ways, the SCO demeanor has come to be the litmus test of

the United States' geopolitical standing in Central Asia at any given time. Contrary to

earlier US estimations, the SCO is increasingly acquiring a swagger that is

suggestive of its potential to become the main powerhouse of the Eurasian region -

arguably, a leading Eurasian economic and military bloc.

During the five-year period since its birth in 2001, the SCO, which has as members anumber of underdeveloped countries including some desperately poor ones with

nothing ostensibly to bind them together except their common geography, has not

only held together but has grown in size and influence.

Initially drawing on the Chinese tri-fecta of "terrorism, separatism and extremism",

the SCO speaks today about the establishment of a free-trade area and about

common energy projects such as exploration of hyrdrocarbon reserves, joint use of

hydroelectric power and water resources. But from the US perspective, the SCOagenda continues to be laden with a heavy cloud of suspicion regarding the United

States' geostrategic intentions in the Central Asian region.

This impression gets further confirmed by the SCO's decision to hold large-scale

joint military exercises scheduled for the coming summer in central Russia with the

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Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the military alliance that is

Moscow's answer to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's enlargement into the

post-Soviet space. The CSTO includes Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

That the military exercises will take place against the backdrop of the chill that has

descended on Russia-US relations in the past year or two, and in the light of the

likely deployment of the first interceptors of the US missile defense systems in

Central Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, is no doubt significant.

It is irrelevant whether the SCO can be called a latter-day Warsaw Pact or a "NATO

of the East". What is important is that on a practical plane, when it transpired that the

US aircraft deployed at Manas Air Base might be undertaking reconnaissance

missions into sensitive military regions in central Russia and China's Xinjiang,

Moscow and Beijing put their foot down and acted in concert within the framework of

the SCO, insisting that the stated purpose of the US military presence in Central Asia

must be fulfilled in letter and spirit, namely that it restricted itself exclusively to

undertaking resupply missions for the "war on terror" in Afghanistan.

The then-Kyrgyz president, Askar Akayev, was caught in the middle and overthrown

from power in the process as a furious Washington let loose the "Tulip Revolution"on him for his perceived intransigence in turning down the US request for the

stationing of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft in Manas. But

the SCO quietly and firmly held its ground. Thereby it made an important point - that

it had gained traction as a security organization. Not only that, the SCO proceeded to

follow up at its summit in June 2005 with the call for the vacation of the US military

presence in the region.

Indeed, going one step further, the SCO emphatically rallied behind the leadership ofUzbekistan in its move to ask for the vacation of the US air base at Karshi-

Khanabad. On both counts - restrictions placed on the use of Manas and the eviction

from Karshi-Khanabad - Washington meekly had to give in. In the process, Bishkek

even renegotiated the bilateral agreement on Manas a few months ago by getting

Washington to increase the annual rent of the base from US$2.7 million to between

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$150 million and $200 million.

The year 2006 has thus made it clear that the US is unlikely to become a single

dominant power in Central Asia. Simply put, Russia and China have together put up

the SCO dikes delimiting the US influence in the region, which will be difficult for

Washington to breach for the foreseeable future. During the year, by and large

Washington has vainly exhausted its energies in attempts to create

misunderstandings between Russia and China and in pitting one SCO member state

against another.

The heart of the matter is that apart from the bleeding wounds in Iraq and

Afghanistan, which remain a major distraction for US diplomacy worldwide, US policy

in Central Asia is seriously handicapped in two other respects. First, the United

States' complete loss of influence in Tashkent after the Andizhan mishap in May

2005 is cramping overall US diplomacy in the region.

There is no denying that Uzbekistan is a key country in Central Asia. In the Soviet

era, everyone from Josef Stalin down knew the axiom that Uzbekistan was the hub

of the geopolitics of the region. True, the US put out several feelers to Tashkent

through intermediaries for reconciliation, and lately even the European Union lent a

hand, but Tashkent wouldn't budge. The laceration of Uzbek national pride by the USover Andizhan opened such painful wounds that forgiveness may take much time

coming and will extract sincere repentance on the part of Washington for its role in

the Andizhan uprising. Meanwhile, the US has been left with no option but to watch

Russian and Chinese influence in Tashkent expanding by leaps and bounds.

In a similar fashion, but in an even more fundamental sense, US diplomacy in

Central Asia is seriously hobbled by Washington's alienation from Iran. Ten years

have gone by since the famous article by Zbigniew Brzezinski in Foreign Affairsmagazine calling for unconditional abandonment of the US policy of containment of

Iran. Brzezinski had brilliantly argued the case (which most US career diplomats

assigned to the region then also believed) that for US regional diplomacy to be

anywhere near optimal in the Caucasus, in the Caspian region and in Central Asia, it

must befriend Tehran. But Washington's mental block over Iran persists.

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Meanwhile, the "Greater Central Asia" strategy unveiled by Washington last April

with so much elan has already fizzled out. The strategy was avowedly intended to

roll back Russian and Chinese influence in the region. Testifying before the US

Congress that month, a senior State Department official said, "A lot of what we do

here is to give the countries of the region the opportunities to make choices ... and

keep them from being bottled up between two great powers, Russia and China."

The US official conjured up visions that could only belong to the world of fantasies:

"Students and professors from Bishkek and Almaty can collaborate with and learn

from their partners in Karachi and Kabul, legitimate trade can freely flow overland

from Astana to Islamabad, facilitated by modern border controls, and an enhanced

regional power grid stretching from Almaty to New Delhi will be fed by oil and gas

from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and hydropower from Tajikistan and

Kyrgyzstan."

No wonder there are no takers in Central Asia for Washington's policy construct.

Central Asian states are aware of the Taliban's resurgence in Afghanistan, and

reckon that peace is a distant goal. Even New Delhi seems embarrassed. Islamabad

keeps quiet. The only capital to evince enthusiasm for Washington's paradigm of

steering Central Asian states toward South Asian allies has been Kabul.

Sino-US convergence?

But failures may often hold the key to success. In a way, the current failures in

regional policy may open a window of opportunity for the US in the period ahead.

The point is: Without the glue of a serious US geopolitical challenge to bind them

together into undertaking collective countermeasures, can the Sino-Russian

condominium hold together in Central Asia for long? It is apparent that divergenceshave already appeared in the respective Chinese and Russian interests in Central

Asia.

China has used the SCO forum and the Russian influence in Central Asia to return to

the region, which is indeed its back yard, for the first time in nearly 1,000 years. It is

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important to bear in mind that Beijing launched the idea of the SCO, and Russia

accepted it. China views Central Asia as its "near abroad". As China's economic

muscle grows, Beijing can afford to be more assertive.

China's soft power is already at work in the region. It is increasingly able to invoke its

bilateral-cooperation mechanisms with Central Asian countries. There is hardly any

need for China to ride piggyback on Russian goodwill or Russian influence in the

region. China has used the SCO for acquiring local knowledge, and in building

relations with the region's indigenous political, economic and military elites.

It is in the area of energy security that Chinese interests and concerns have already

begun diverging significantly from those of Russia. The trend during 2006 has been

that Russia's energy interests - in controlling the region's transportation routes for oil

and gas, in sourcing the region's energy for meeting Russia's domestic needs that

would leave an exportable surplus for meeting its commitments in Europe, in having

a say in determining the price of energy in the region - are increasingly affected by

China's robust quest for oil and gas in the region.

The early signs of this contradiction in Sino-Russian cooperation in Central Asia

began appearing in 2005 when the China National Petroleum Corp acquired the

PetroKazakhstan oil company for $4.18 billion.

China's gas deal with Turkmenistan in April 2006; the commissioning of an oil

pipeline from Kazakhstan; China's proposal for an energy-pipeline grid for Central

Asia and connecting it with Xinjiang; China's cooperation agreement with Iran in the

Caspian region; China's gas deals with Uzbekistan; China's interest in participating in

a Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan gas pipeline - all these are happenings within

one calendar year, each imbued with strategic significance.

This past year, too, China has waded into the controversial waters of the Caspian

Sea in search of oil when last January Iran's North Drilling Co and China Oilfield

Services Ltd signed an oil-exploration agreement relating to the disputed deep

waters of the southern Caspian. In one way or another, all these developments cut

into Russian interests in Central Asia's energy sector.

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Having said that, however, the China-Russia strategic partnership has a much

greater regional and global logic than Central Asia, and the attempt in Moscow and

Beijing will presumably be to harmonize their differences in Central Asia from

spinning out of control. Also, both Moscow and Beijing realize that Central Asian

states themselves will seek out Russia to balance their relations with China.

How these contradictory tendencies will play out within the SCO processes presents

an engrossing topic. Clearly, the opportunity arises for the US to establish a dialogue

with the SCO. A breakthrough may come in 2007. The prominent Russia hand in the

Heritage Foundation in Washington, DC, Ariel Cohen, wrote recently, "Given that the

SCO primarily serves as a geopolitical counterweight to the US, Washington stands

little chance of ever receiving full membership in the group ... But US officials do not

necessarily need full membership in the organization in order to work closely with the

Central As states. It would serve Washington's best interests to remain in close

contact with the SCO. To do so, it could resubmit an application seeking observer

status.

"To boost the chances of success," Cohen added, "the US should engage Central

Asian states by balancing democracy promotion and democratization with its other

national interests, including security and energy."

Conceivably, we may expect even a NATO overture to the SCO in the coming year.

Without doubt, a palpable sense of urgency is already apparent in US thinking to the

effect that the Chinese-Russian strategic partnership poses a serious threat to the

United States' geopolitical position in Central Asia, and second, that China is actively

remaking Central Asia's order. Last September, the US Congress held a special

hearing titled "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Is it Undermining USInterests in Central Asia?"

Moscow seems to anticipate that another US bid for observer status with the SCO is

looming - and that unlike in 2005, Beijing may not oppose it this time. Curiously, at

the end of December, Russia formalized a mechanism for regular political dialogue

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with the Mercosur grouping of Latin American countries, which has a definite slant

(comparable to the SCO's) against US economic hegemony in the Western

Hemisphere.

Speaking on the occasion in Brasilia, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said,

"We have, by and large, been watching with the most sincere sympathy the

integration processes in South America. We consider that the strengthening and

elevation of the level of integration within the region works objectively in favor of the

creation of a more stable and more fair world order in which all problems will be

tackled multilaterally. I am certain that the partnership between Russia and Mercosur

will be instrumental in attaining this goal."

The US estimation is basically that behind the facade of unity, China, Russia and the

other SCO members and observer countries harbor serious differences of opinion.

While "discord" may be too strong a word, to quote a US strategic analyst, "It is quite

possible that differences will grow behind the facade of [SCO] unity. Washington

must be alert to exploit any openings to gain geopolitical advantage. While the

political, ideological and military dimensions of the New Great Game in Central Asia

continue to heat up, it should be clear to all players that plenty of time remains in the

contest. The SCO now appears to have momentum on its side, but such an

advantage can dissipate quickly."

Thus the US would tell China that Russia was needlessly dragging it into an anti-

American bloc, and that there was nothing irreconcilable involving US and Chinese

interests in Central Asia. US strategic analysts have been arguing that both the

United States and China are interested in the stability of the region; both are against

the ascendancy of extremist forces in the region; both are interested in Central Asia's

transition to market economies and in the region's globalization; both have stakes in

the rapid development of Central Asia's hydrocarbon sector and in the diversifiedand efficient flow of the region's energy to the world market.

There are signs that the US is also using the oil-price issue as a wedge to divide

Russia and China. The US has also been campaigning in the capitals of SCO

member countries (and observer countries) that Russia is aspiring to transform the

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SCO into a club of energy producers and to be its dominant partner, and that if the

Russian stratagem is allowed to proceed unchecked, that will be detrimental to the

interests of Central Asian energy producers - and even of China and India. These

are interesting straws in the wind.

The recent five-nation energy summit of major Asian consuming countries (China,

Japan, South Korea, India and the US) hosted by China is partly at least an

expression of Beijing's commonality of interests with Washington in leading an

energy dialogue of consuming countries vis-a-vis Russia. Conceivably, Beijing may

be harboring grievances that Moscow is keeping Chinese companies out of

investment opportunities in Russia's strategic oil and gas fields in Russia's Siberia

and the Far East, and even in the Russian pipelines leading to the Chinese market.

China may also be displeased with Gazprom's insistent attempts to get in on the

Sakhalin energy projects. ExxonMobil is under pressure for a proposed gas pipeline

from Sakhalin-1 to China. Russia's gas monopoly seems to want to discount any

competition for its own plans for a gas pipeline to China through the Altai highlands

near the Russian-Kazakh-Mongolian border. Its preference seems to be to buy all

gas from Sakhalin-1 so that it remains the sole exporter of gas to China. China is

also keenly watching the holdup in Sakhalin-2, being the highest-profile foreign-

investment project in Russia's energy sector to date.

Important investment decisions are pending in 2007 with regard to Sakhalin-1,

Sakhalin-2, Sakhalin-3, the Shtokman gas fields and the vast Russian energy

reserves in the Far East on the whole. How the Kremlin makes these decisions will

have a significant bearing on Chinese thinking and, indirectly, that can cast shadows

on the geopolitics of Central Asia.

Besides, the ground reality is that according to recent studies, Russia will need toimport 79 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually from Central Asia's gas-producing

countries (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) to meet its domestic needs

and to fulfill its export commitments. How this plays out in Russia's overall political

and economic ties with Central Asian countries will have a significant impact on the

regional milieu.

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It is obvious that Gazprom views Central Asia as a priority area. A major

development in 2006 in Central Asia's energy sector was the agreement between

Gazprom and Uzbekneftgaz to undertake a geological survey of Uzbekistan.

Gazprom is committing $260 million in the coming three years alone for the

exploration of the Ustyurtki oil and gas deposits in Uzbekistan. Again, Russia and

Kazakhstan entered an agreement in October to set up a gas joint venture at the

Orenburg gas refinery in Russia - the first time Kazakhstan was making a major

investment in the Russian economy.

The joint venture is expected to process 30.6bcm gas in 2012, including 15bcm from

Kazakhstan's Karachaganak gas field (which has an estimated 1 trillion cubic meters

of reserves), which Russia and Kazakhstan are pledged to develop jointly.

Niyazov's secret

The struggle over control of oil and gas and their transportation routes is bound to

intensify in 2007. It will remain central to the geopolitics of Central Asia. In turn, pipeline

politics in the Caspian can be expected to produce strange bedfellows.

Already, geopolitical circumstances in the Caspian Basin have led to a sharp

deterioration in Russia-Azerbaijan relations. Again, despite all the wooing of Kazakhstanby Washington, the indefinite postponement of the Odessa-Brody pipeline project last

week has stemmed from Kazakhstan having to be mindful of Russian sensitivities.

Least of all, Iran remains the wild card in the pack. Depending on which way the Iran

nuclear issue develops in 2007, Iran can impact on the energy map of China, Central

Asia, the Caspian, the Caucasus, Russia and Europe - and, conceivably, the United

States itself.

But an entirely new ball game opens up with the sudden demise of Turkmen president

Saparmurat Niyazov on December 21. It calls attention to the fragility of the Central

Asian calculus. The political uncertainties centered on Niyazov's successor come at an

extremely tricky time when Russia, China and the US are virtually preparing to besiege

Ashgabat with offers and counter-offers for gaining access to Turkmenistan's gas

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reserves.

Will Niyazov's successor follow his policy of "positive neutrality"? Russia strives to retain

its strategic leverage as the monopolist transporter and re-exporter of Turkmen gas. The

European Union, supported by the US, on the other hand, is attempting to resist the

Russian leverage by opening direct access to Turkmen gas.

In 2006, the US and Turkey revived the 10-year-old idea of a trans-Caspian gas pipeline

project (as part of the so-called East-West Energy Corridor) to supply Turkmen gas to

Europe via Turkey. Turkmenistan's gas output may well approach 80bcm annually at

present. The trans-Caspian pipeline envisages an annual draw of 16bcm from the

Turkmen output in the first stage, to be expanded to 32bcm in the second stage. In the

US geostrategy, the project is vital for reducing Europe's heavy dependence on Russian

energy supplies. Niyazov had prevaricated in the light of Moscow's opposition. But what

will be the outlook of Niyazov's successor?

Russia, on the contrary, will insist on the fulfillment of its April 2003 framework

agreement with Turkmenistan, which provides for a 25-year contract on gas supplies to

Russia, with Ashgabat pledging to supply 100bcm per year of gas from 2010 onward (a

total of 2 trillion cubic meters cumulatively over the 25-year period). Moscow now seeks

to tap even more deeply into Turkmenistan's gas reserves for meeting Russia's domesticneeds and for re-export to Europe as "Russian gas".

Meanwhile, Turkmenistan also stands committed to supply 8-10bcm of gas to Iran's

northern region, apart from occasionally voicing interest in the Turkmenistan-

Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline project. China, on its part, entered an agreement with

Niyazov in April for purchase of 30bcm of Turkmen gas annually from 2009 onward for a

30-year period, and jointly to explore and develop Turkmen gas deposits on the right

bank of Amu Darya River.

Besides challenging Russia's monopoly control of Turkmen gas hitherto, China has also

undercut the Russian practice of buying cheap Turkmen gas, by agreeing that China will

pay a price "set at reasonable levels, and on a fair basis, pegged on comparable

international market price". At the same time, China's deal also threatens the West,

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which will be a strategic loser if Turkmenistan decides to send its gas eastward instead

of Europe.

The European Union's 3,400-kilometer Nabucco gas pipeline from eastern Turkey to

Austria and central Europe at an estimated cost of $5.8 billion, to be commissioned in

2010, will be a net sufferer in that case, as it is predicated on the expectation that

Turkmenistan can be a key supplier country.

Niyazov was always an enigmatic figure on the Central Asian political chessboard. But

the biggest puzzle he has left behind was no doubt his chance remark shortly before his

death in a conversation with visiting German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in

Ashgabat that Turkmenistan recently discovered a super-giant gas field, South Iolotansk,

with proven reserves of 7 trillion cubic meters of gas.

Like Corporal Hatfield in his sentry post in Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan, Niyazov didn't

probably realize what a maelstrom he was creating. If South Iolotansk indeed holds such

untold treasures, the impact on the energy map of Russia, Europe and China will be

dramatic. And certainly, the center of gravity of the Great Game will overnight shift

eastward to the home of the fabled Ahalteke race horse - away from the SCO and all

that. Central Asia, then, may never be the same again.

Toward a New Strategy

Given those stakes and the enduring nature of Central Asian resistance to political and

economic modernization, the only sensible option for U.S. policy is to work with the

region's ruling regimes but simultaneously to seek gradual change in their domestic

political and economic environments. The watchwords in this context should be

continuity and gradualism.

In the area of economic assistance, the emphasis should be on alleviating widespread

poverty and eliminating potential sources of political destabilization, such as high

unemployment in rural and urban areas. Given the region's need for major

improvements in basic infrastructure, the water supply system, and other labor-intensive

projects, U.S. and other international assistance could go a long way toward providing

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much-needed jobs and income, defusing political tensions, and improving intraregional

cooperation.

Domestic politics represents a far more challenging target for U.S. assistance. The entire

experience of the 1990s in Central Asia suggests that the region's political elites havenot embraced the basic concepts of democracy and have only paid lip service--at best--

to admonitions from Western leaders and international organization. Thus, the real

challenge--given the inevitability of political succession throughout Central Asia--is to

make sure that succession does not lead to destabilization, as befell Tajikistan in the

early 1990s. In the absence of stable domestic institutions and in the presence of

personality-based regimes, whose chief aim has been to avoid political succession,

political succession is the biggest long-term threat to regional stability.

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REFERNCES

For the online archive of Clinton administration statements, see

and

. [BACK]

Address by Strobe Talbott on July 21, 1997. See

. [BACK]

See, for example, Kenneth Weisbrode, "Central Eurasia: Prize or Quicksand?

Contending Views of Instability in Karabagh, Ferghana and Afghanistan," International

Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 338; and Richard D. Sokolsky and Tanya

Charlick-Paley, "NATO and Caspian Security: A Mission Too Far?" (Washington, DC:

RAND, MR-1074-AF, 1999).[BACK]

See . [BACK]

China's post-September 11 isolation in Central Asia is underscored by the

unprecedented new positive relations between Russia and the United States, which

were unaffected even by U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty--a move

that is more likely to affect the U.S.-Chinese strategic balance than U.S.-Russian

strategic balance. [BACK]

See, for example, materials from discussion on China and the future of Russian-

Chinese relations held by the leading Russian foreign and defense policy organization

Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, accessed at

. [BACK]

See Robert Satloff, "The Peace Process at Sea: The Karine-A Affair and the War On

Terrorism," National Interest (Spring 2002), accessed at

; James

Bennet, "Seized Arms Would Have Vastly Extended Arafat Arsenal," The New York

Times, January 12, 2002; and "President Bush, Prime Minister Sharon Discuss Middle

East," February 7, 2002, accessed at

.[BACK]

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http://clinton.archives.gov/welcome/welcome.htmlhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_1ahttp://www.state.gov/www/regions/nis/970721talbott.htmlhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_2ahttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_3ahttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_3ahttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_4ahttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_5ahttp://www.svop.ru/yuka/856.shtmlhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_6ahttp://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/satloff/satloff-peace.htmhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-15.htmlhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_8ahttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_8ahttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_1ahttp://www.state.gov/www/regions/nis/970721talbott.htmlhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_2ahttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_3ahttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_4ahttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_5ahttp://www.svop.ru/yuka/856.shtmlhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_6ahttp://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/satloff/satloff-peace.htmhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-15.htmlhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_8ahttp://clinton.archives.gov/welcome/welcome.html


32/34

See remarks by Tommy Franks in August 2002 that U.S. troops will remain in

Afghanistan "indefinitely," accessed at

. [BACK]

Colin L. Powell, remarks at International Conference for Reconstruction Assistance toAfghanistan, Tokyo, Japan, January 21, 2002, accessed at

.[BACK]

United States-Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation

Framework, March 12, 2002, accessed at

.[BACK]

In fiscal year 2002, assistance funding to the five Central Asian states was estimated at

$442 million. Since 1992, U.S. Government assistance to Kazakhstan has amounted to

roughly $1 billion; Uzbekistan, $600 million; Turkmenistan, $250 million; Tajikistan, $475

million; and Kyrgyzstan, $725 million. Compiled from Department of State data, it can be

accessed at ,

,


33/34

Americas Afghan War: Courting the Central Asian States,

www.subcontinent.com/sepral/bulletin/bulletin200111269.htm

Ibid.

Tamara Makarenko, The Dangers of Playing the Central Asian Game, Janes

Intelligence Review, Vol. 1, No.6, June 2002.

Ahmed Rashid, Jihad; The Rise of Islamic Militancy in Central Asia, 2002,

(Vanguard; Lahore), pp. 193-195.

Ahmed Rashid, ibid, pp.193-195

Fiona Hill, The Caucasus and Central Asia in US Foreign Policy,www.brook.edu/default.htm

Constantine Dmitriev and Mark Eaton, The Trans-Caspian After 11 September,

2001, Central Asia and the Caucasus: Journal of Social and Political Studies, No.

3(15), 2002, pp.21-23.

Ibid.

Ibid.

J. Colton and Micheal McFaul, Americas Real Russian Allies, Foreign Affairs,Vol.

80 No. 6, November-December 2001, p. 48.

Central Asia: Seven Months Without Russia, www.rosbalt.com/2002/06/ 46575.html

US and Russia seed of New World Order seen, www.rense.com/political/politics.htm

M. A. Shaikh, op.cit.

Information on the internal situation in Central Asia is widely available to the general

public. For example, the International Crisis Group has published a series of reports

describing conditions in Central Asian countries and highlighting their implications for

their stability: "Central Asia: Water and Conflict, May 2002," accessed at

33


34/34

; "Central

Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential, April 2002," accessed at . See also "Nations in

Transit," published annually by Freedom House, accessed at

. [BACK]

In December 2001 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the U.S.

Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, A. Elizabeth Jones,

summarized the past 2 centuries of Central Asian history as a transition from

"squabbling and despotic warlords" to Russian colonization to Soviet-imposed isolation.

Testimony accessed at .

[BACK]

All five Central Asian states have seen major increases in infant mortality, a basic

indicator of a country's health, since their independence and are comparable to some of

the least developed countries in Africa. See the Central Intelligence Agency, The World

Factbook 2001, accessed at

; and Demograficheskiy

Yezhegodnik SSSR 1990 (USSR Demographic Yearbook 1990) (Moscow:
http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=668http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=606http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=606http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htmhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_13ahttp://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2001/11299pf.htmhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_14ahttp://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.htmlhttp://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=668http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=606http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=606http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htmhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_13ahttp://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2001/11299pf.htmhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF195/sf195.htm#sf195_14ahttp://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html

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