Marine Safety Investigation Unit

MARINE SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT

ANNEXES

Safety investigation into the failure of a lifeboat wire rope fall

on board the Maltese registered passenger ship

CELEBRITY CENTURY

while alongside in Kailuna Kona, Hawaii

on 26 February 2013

201302/030

MARINE SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 08/2014

FINAL

LIST OF ANNEXES

Annex A Wire Rope Certificates

Annex B Chronology of the Wire Rope

Annex C Company Policies, Procedures and Schedule for Renewal, Maintenance

and Inspection of Wire Falls

Annex D Navalimpianti Service Reports, Maintenance Reports and Inspections

Annex E MSIU Safety Alert 01/2013

Annex F Evaluation of Failed Tender Boat Wire Rope,

Celebrity Cruises Inc., 25 April 2013

Annex G Certificates of Analysis of New and Used Grease Samples

Annex A Wire Rope Certificates

Annex B Chronology of the Wire Rope

23 January 2008: Usha Martin Americas, Inc. orders 5000 Ft. of dry galvanized steel wire rope from Usha Martin Limited, India.

08 February 2008: Usha Martin Limited, India completes manufacture of wire rope as specified by Usha Martin Americas, Inc.

04 July 2008: Wire Rope is tested and examined for compliance with specification and Inspection Certificate is issued by Usha Martin, India.

29 March 2010: RCCL purchases three (3) sections (total 1477 m) of the dry galvanized steel wire rope from Usha Martin. Usha Martin provides a Conformance Certificate for the wire rope and it is delivered directly to Celebrity Century. The ship has a designated climate controlled location for storing all wire ropes until placed in service.

20 April 2010: Shipboard personnel replace the wire ropes on tender boat no. 10 in accordance with their shipboard planned maintenance schedule (every 60 months). They cite date for job: replace davit fall wire in AMOS system.

April 2010 to May 2011: Once a month: Shipboard personnel clean wire ropes with diesel oil and they manually apply grease. They cite date for job: lubricate davit wire rope for tender no. 10 in AMOS system. Timing is as expected in AMOS system; process is not as listed in the AMOS system. Once every three months: Shipboard personnel inspect wire ropes for wear and tear, corrosion, abrasion, termination failure, birdcage, shock load damage and fatigue. They cite date for job: inspect davit wire rope for tender no. 10 in AMOS system. Timing is as expected in AMOS system; process is as listed in the AMOS system.

18 May 2011: Navalimpianti conducts annual inspection of lifeboats and davits, including davit wire ropes.

May 2011 to August 2012: Once a month: Shipboard personnel clean wire ropes with diesel oil and they manually apply grease. They cite date for job: lubricate davit wire ropes for tender no. 10 in AMOS system. Timing is as expected in AMOS system; process is not as listed in the AMOS system.

Once every three months: Shipboard personnel inspect wire ropes for wear and tear, corrosion, abrasion, termination failure, birdcage, shock load damage and fatigue. They cite date for job: inspect davit wire fall for tender no. 10 in AMOS system. Timing is as expected in AMOS system; process is as listed in the AMOS system.

26 August 2012: Navalimpianti conducts annual inspection of lifeboats and davits, including wire ropes. This was the last external inspection prior to the accident. August 2012 to January 2013: Once a month: Shipboard personnel clean wire ropes with diesel oil and they manually apply grease. They cite date for job: lubricate davits wire rope for tender no. 10 in AMOS system. Timing is as expected in AMOS system; process is not as listed in the AMOS system. Once every three months: Shipboard personnel inspect wire ropes for wear and tear, corrosion, abrasion, termination failure, birdcage, shock load damage and fatigue. They cite date for job: inspect davit wire ropes for tender no. 10 in AMOS system. Timing is as expected in AMOS system; process is as listed in the AMOS system.

16 December 2012: Shipboard personnel inspect wire ropes for wear and tear, corrosion, abrasion, termination failure, birdcage, shock load damage and fatigue. They cite date for job: inspect davit wire ropes for tender no. 10 in AMOS system. The timing is as expected in the AMOS system. The process is as listed in the AMOS system. This is the last inspection by shipboard personnel prior to the accident.

26 January 2013: Shipboard personnel clean wire ropes with diesel oil and they manually apply grease. They cite date for job: lubricate davit wire rope for tender no. 10 in AMOS system. This is the last cleaning and lubrication prior to the accident. According to the AMOS system, the next lubrication of the wire ropes was due on or about 26 February 2013.

26 February 2013: Wire rope on tender/lifeboat no. 10 fails due to severe corrosion and loss of integrity and strength. Extensive damage to tender boat no. 10; no injuries.

Annex C Company Policies, Procedures and Schedule for Renewal, Maintenance

and Inspection of Wire Falls

Annex D Navalimpianti Service Reports, Maintenance Reports and

Inspections

Annex E MSIU Safety Alert 01/2013

Annex F Evaluation of Failed Tender boat Wire Rope,

Celebrity Cruises Inc., 25 April 25, 2013

Annex G Certificates of Analysis of New and Used Grease Samples