Lt. Col. C.E.

Stuart CO

92nd ARMORED FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

Historical Background:Begin Excerpt: “WORLD WAR II HISTORY”

“92nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion:

The 92nd Armored Artillery Battalion was activated on 8 January 1942, the men coming from the 14th and17th Armored Artillery Battalions. Time out please: At noon on 4 July 1944 about 280 guns took part in thesalute to Independence Day, the 92nd Armored Artillery Battalion took part in this celebration effort.During three days on 5- 8 July 1944, the 92nd Armored Artillery fired in support of the Royal Horse Artilleryand the 50th British Brigade. The 92th with others helped to break up a counterattack west of Hottot,France destroying four tanks and killing eight infantry. Prior to the St. Lo.( referred to as operation Cobra )breakthrough the 92nd Armored Artillery Battalion was assigned to the division reserve and to be in directsupport of the 41st Armored Infantry Regiment (division reserve). Division reserve was commanded byCol. Sidney R. Hinds. Operation Cobra started on 25 July 1944 at 0945. On 28 July 1944 about 0300 in theafternoon a frontal attack was made by the Germans from the direction of Cerisy la Salle and directedtoward Pont Brocard, & Notre Dame De Cenilly. The 92nd Armored Field Artillery was of materialassistance in breaking up these attacks, some times by direct fire.

On the night of 29-30 July 1944 the 92nd Artillery, moving to a new position, had to fight its way into itsarea near Bois de Soulles, France. When Combat Command "B" called for fire support, the battalioncomplied although they were also under attack at the time. The Germans were so close that one self-propelled howitzer was sent to engage a German self-propelled gun with direct fire, while "C" Batteryfaced in another direction to destroy another second gun. Please remember that the Armored FieldArtillery were very mobile, not by choice but by necessity in order to survive. Because of the rapidadvance of the 2nd Armored Division pockets of heavy resistance were sometimes bypassed causingsome concern and definite risk to normally units that were supposed to be secure in their operation.Artillery units were moving rapidly to keep within range of the enemy. When the Germans finally fell back,the artillerymen found 150 dead, along with many damaged or abandoned vehicles. About 0100 on 30 July1944 the 92nd was called upon to place artillery fire 200 yards in front of the divisions main forces toprevent them from a frontal attack by the Germans.

On 3 October 1944 again crossed the German border this time crossing the Wurm River at Marienberg,attacking the Siegfried Line frontally. Combat Command "B" consisting of 41st Infantry Regiment, 76thArmored Regiment, 78th and 92nd Armored Field Artillery Battalions, assisted the 30th Infantry Division inscouring Palenberg, pushing on to take Ubach and later Frelenberg, Waurichen, and Beggendorf. On 11-30 October 1944 in the vicinity of Neerbeek, the 2nd Armored Division and the German forces maintaineddefensive positions. Employing 110 or more artillery pieces, Division artillery fired more than 45,000rounds into enemy territory during the three week period from 11-31 October 1944 Division artillery unitsincluded the 14th, 78th, 92, and attached 65th Armored Field Artillery. Heavy fire was laid into thefollowing towns Hongen, Friealdenhoven, Rottgen, Puffendorf, Floverich, Gereonsweiler, Setterich,Siersdorf, Geilenkirchen, which were being used as communications and assembly centers.

Later on 9 January 1945 while flushing out the Germans around Samree, Belgium the92th Armored Artillery was shelling a woods nearby and flushed out three Germantanks two escaped , one destroyed and burned on the spot. Late on the evening of 28February 1945 the 92nd Armored Artillery Battalion overran and captured a four-gun105mm battery near Grevenbroich, Germany. The advance was so fast that someartillery units had to clear their areas of lagging Germans who were left behind by theretreating forces in order to setup their guns.

On 30 March 1945 the 82nd Reconnaissance Battalion was advancing far to the frontof the division main forces around the Haltern-Dulmen line, that they caught up with atrain. Reporting this to division this was passed on to the 92nd Armored Artillery, theyfired an artillery salvo and cut the train in half.. The prisoners taken from the trainthought that the American forces were still on the other side of the canal ( Dortmund-Ems Canal ), they had no idea we were on the east side. Then on to occupy Berlin forthe forty five days in July, August 1945. In 1948 at Ft. Hood, Texas Lt. Col. C.E. Stuart was commandingofficer.”

End Excerpt: “WORLD WAR II HISTORY”

A Battery Kapyong May 1951

2 92nd ARMORED FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

RED DEVI LS KOREA 1950-54

3 KOREAN WAR 1950-1954

HISTORY SUMMARY

Begin Excerpt: “92nd AFA BN Korea 1950-1954 History Summary"

On 12 August 1950, the 92nd AFA Bn left San Francisco for Korea on the USN’s “Marine Adder”. Thebattalion was under strength upon arrival in Japan, and 200 ROK soldiers joined the Red Devil Bn. ByJanuary 1954, only ten of the original 200 were remaining with the battalion.

The men of the battalion soon learned they would take part in the Inchon invasion. The Marines would goashore first to be followed by the 7th Infantry Division. (the 92nd was attached to the 7th ID) along withnumerous miscellaneous units. The Red Devil Bn landed at Inchon on September 20th 1950. Five dayslater, at Suwon airfield, Baker Battery fired the battalions first round in Korea. The 92nd, which was neverin reserve in Korea, was to see over a thousand days of combat in the months ahead.

The combination of the Inchon “end run” by the Marines and the push north by the Eight Army proved tobe a success with both forces conducting a successful link up. On October 10th , after the battalion’smission of aiding in the success of the Inchon landing was over, the Red Devils marched 310 miles toPusan for necessary repairs. Then on November 5, 1950, the battalion took part in a second invasion, thistime at Iwon on the East coast of Korea, north of the Hungham beachhead. The purpose of this landingwas to close the vise on the communist North Korean forces.

On October 25th 1950 Chinese Communist Forces cross the Yalu River into North Korea and make theirentrance into the fighting with a major breakthrough on the right flank of the Eighth Army. They drove theAllies back on all fronts presenting a wedge between the Eighth Army and the X Corps. This unexpectedChinese offensive was a psychological setback to the men of the battalion for they had to change theirattitude of “Home For Christmas” to that of facing a numerically superior enemy in the bitterly coldmountainous regions of North Korea.

Soon the Red Devils were given an important mission to perform. U.S. Marine and Army units weretrapped by the enemy at Chosin Reservoir and the 92nd AFA was to help hold the area open until thesurrounded forces were withdrawn and had totally disengaged. The Red Devils performance was a majorfactor in saving the encircled forces. The skill of projected fire support was credited by the Marines asinstrumental in countless publications and historic representations of the battle.

In January 1951, the 92nd and other U.N. units had ceased to be a withdrawing force and begun a newinitiative in pushing northward. By March, the Red Devils were well seasoned in the realities of combatand the loss of fellow soldiers. The unit was confident and better prepared for the arduous tasks thatawaited them.

Readiness and combat preparedness of the battalion was proven on the morning of April 24, 1951 when“A” and “C” Batteries were attacked by a company size element of Chinese regulars. The enemy chargedthe battery positions in human waves with each communist soldier having a extra full combat load ofgrenades to thrust into our ammo trucks, gas tanks, and key installations. The attacking forces wereprovided with heavy support consisting of mortar and automatic weapons fire. A plan based upon faith inone another’s capabilities, and in their weapons had become a habit in the Red Devils. Enemy machineguns were destroyed by direct fire from the Howitzers. Our own support weapons laid massive automaticweapons fire and mowed the communists down as they made human wave attacks. On that fateful day theRed Devil battalion lost only four men killed and eleven wounded while the communist losses were set at175-200 killed or wounded.

The Red Devils prevailed in the strength of each individual soldier and his personal integrity andcommitment to the battle and to fellow soldiers. In all, the terror of the battle forged a unit of steel whichbonded each together instilling the strength to “get the job done”. This crucial event and it’s lessonslearned would prove critical in the up coming battles that awaited the Red Devils.

4There was a dramatic reduction in activity once the truce talks began in mid-1951. Occasional roundswere received in various batteries but fortunately casualties were low and each Red Devil killed orwounded were greatly missed .

The 92nd spent most of 1952 in support of various ROK, United Nation Forces, and American divisions inthe Kumwha Valley area on the central front facing hill 1062 (Papa San). The Red Devils were in directsupport of the ROK 9th Div and the U.S. 7th Div in the battle for Triangle Hill during October.

In November of 1952, as the North Korean winter moved in with snow and below zero temperatures, the92nd moved westward north of Chorwon to support the U.S. units on-line.

Major casualties occurred during June-July 1953 shortly before the truce was signed while the 92nd wasproviding support for “Outpost Harry”. This engagement had an especially heavy counter battery barragedirected at the 92nd, and incoming rounds were received in all the firing batteries. Able Battery washardest hit with two killed and 17 wounded.

In mid-July 1953 the Communist Chinese Forces launched their last large scale offensive of the KoreanWar. The attack, which consisted of ten enemy divisions, was the largest offensive in two years. The firingbatteries of the battalion, after having sustained horrific artillery, rocket, and mortar fire on the evening ofJuly 13, were again taken under direct attack by communist regular forces. When faced with massattacking human waves in overwhelming numbers, the batteries were ordered to conduct a strategicwithdrawal. Baker and Charlie Batteries found themselves totally enveloped in a sea of communistChinese soldiers. Conducting a breakout, Baker and Charlie Batteries fought their way from theencirclement and were soon reestablished and immediately became operational. Setting the Howitzers inrecord time , Baker and Charlie went from total disengagement to pouring shells back into the advancingcommunist forces. The tenacity and fortitude of these men served as an example of bravery under fire toevery Red Devil in the battalion. By this time the 92nd had gained a reputation of unexcelled excellence.

The advance was stopped 36 hours after it began. During this time the 92nd sustained two enlistedsoldiers killed, the S-2 Officer was killed, and twenty seven were wounded and eight Red Devils listed asmissing in action. Most of the MIA’s were repatriated in “Operation Big Switch” concluding the final peaceaccord. In the 36 hours of solid combat it stands as a tribute to the Red Devils of the limited human loss.This fact clearly speaks to the professionalism and skill craft learned in the earlier bitter battles by the92nd. On July 27 1953, a truce was signed with the Communist North Koreans bringing a cessation ofaction to the Korean conflict. For all who survived the terror filled days of combat, the truce was slow incoming. The loss of all those Red Devils killed, missing , and wounded in action will never be forgotten.

Following the signing of the truce, all United Nations units, including the 92nd, withdrew a few miles inorder to create a buffer zone. Even though the conflict had been officially closed, the battalion remainedcombat ready in case the Korean and Chinese Communist forces should decide to break the truce.

End Excerpt: “92nd AFA BN Korea 1950-1954 History Summary"

Lt. Col. Leon F. Lavoie

CO 1949-1951

Fort Hood Texas

1st place (Sgt Carl's section) and 2nd placehowitzer sections, B Btry, 92d AFA, Direct FireShoot, Fort Hood, TX (Fort Hood Yearbook)

5Begin: Excerpts From “92nd AFA BN Book By Lt. Col. Leon F. Lavoie”

HISTORY DETAIL

Fort Hood Texas 1949-50

Unit History For August, 1950

One August found the 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion at Fort Hood,ready for overseas shipment following its alert on 22 July. Reorganized as a separate Battalion underT/O&E 6-195N the Battalion was reluctantly ready to leave its parent organization, the 2nd ArmoredDivision.

Finally on 2 August, the Battalion departed Fort Hood bytwo trains leaving about three hours apart. Amid tearsand farewells the Battalion left on the first leg of its tripto Korea. The Battalion Commander, last to board on the1st train, received the last salute and well wishes fromthe Division Commander, Major General Albert C. Smithand Brigadier General Charles K. Gailey.

Along the route from the post, wives and children, redeyed, waved a last farewell leaving everyone with a lumpin their throat. The following few hours were mostdifficult as everyone retired to their seat and becameabsorbed in the realization of what was happening. Therewere many unanswerable questions as to when andwhom might or might not return. These questions of necessity had to be left to the fate of Providence andthe will of God. Gradually the train gathered speed westerly through the barren plains of western Texas,New Mexico, Arizona and finally into California.

On 4 August, at about 2300 hours and 2400 hours the two trains carrying the Battalion arrived in CampStoneman California. Assigned Barracks the Battalion retired. The period from 5 through 10 August wasdevoted to processing procedures and some pleasant visits into San Francisco, where officers and menenjoyed last glimpses of a major U.S. city with its gaieties, good food and amusements. Liberal passprivileges were given everyone.

USNS Marine Adder

Personal Reflections From Al Ihan C Battery 1949-1951

“In September 1950 we made the Inchon Landing in Korea. This landing had to be preciselytimed. Inchon had a 30 foot high tide and the ships had to move in, unload, and get out beforethe tide left them stranded. The soldiers climbed over the sides of the troop ships on thesenets (same type we trained on in Ota, Japan) and into the landing crafts waiting below. Themanpower that stormed the beach was huge. There were probably 250 ships involved with thisoperation. We stood in awe, waiting for our turn to climb over, and watching the operationbefore us. There were huge blasts from the Navy guns, the Air Force was bombing and strafingand we, the men of the 92nd were glad that they were not on the receiving end. Once after fighting our way across the beach and to cover we regrouped picked up our “C”rations, ammo, and located our vehicles and reported to “bombed-out factories” to meet andget further orders. The first morning after a restless night, in the early morning hours we wereheating our “C” rations when we heard a plane flying over. With yells of “extinguish all fire andget down” we quickly followed orders. It was our own friendly plane patrolling the area and welost or messed up our early morning meal.Korean soldiers were assigned to all units. They were hungry and poor. Korea was a poorcountry that did not have much and these Korean soldiers were not used to enough food orclothes like the Americans were being furnished with. The Korean soldiers took advantage ofall that was offered to them. When they had to opportunity to eat in mess halls instead of “C”rations, they piled sugar on their food. It was something that they did not have and theyenjoyed all they could get. They also took all of the clothes that they could get and many of theAmerican soldiers resented what we saw because to us we considered it as being “greedy”.Korea did not have decent roads, many of their roads were mainly “cow trails” and theAmerican Military Engineers had to widen existing roads, build roads and bridges for thetroops to use.When the 92nd arrived in Korea, we were detached from the 2nd Armored Division. Our unitbecame known as a bastard unit since it did not belong to any specific Division. Our unit wassent to areas needing assistance. Our unit earned over 100 Campaign Streamers on our unitflag for the three years in Korea alone.”

6

Finally, early on 11 August the Battalion departed Camp Stoneman by harbor boat to San Francisco Portof Embarkation where at Fort Mason's Pier 2 the Battalion boardedthe USNS Marine Adder with 30 officers, 3 Warrant Officers and460 enlisted men.

The Marine Adder, a rapidly reactivated Naval Transport from the"mothball" fleet was far from ready for her departure on 12 Augustwhen the Battalion witnessed the towers of San Francisco fade inthe distance and the Golden Gate bridge disappear over thehorizon.

Once aboard ship the Battalion was attached to the 5th FieldArtillery Group following its transfer from the Fourth Army to theSixth Army.

The ensuing two weeks at sea were relatively peaceful and pleasant excepting for several failures in shipmachinery and equipment affecting the fresh water supply and finally completely immobilizing the MarineAdder.

RAY BROWN - A BATTERY - KILLED 7 SEPTEMBER 1950

in Japan:

(Corporal Brown had unwisely selected a bed in tall grassand fallen asleep and he was run over during the night by a

halftrack.)

MICHAEL HERKO JR.

KIA 13 OCTOBER 1950

HAROLD F. WILSON - B BATTERY

- KIA 28 SEPTEMBER 1950

Landing at Inchon Harbor 9/20/50 (Mattingly)

7

The Marine Adder was dead at sea for some 36 hours as short circuits in power mains rendered the shipsengines inoperative. Finally repaired by an .Air Force Technician the Marine Adder resumed its coursewith a severe rationing of fresh water due to evaporator failure. Later a fire in the galley destroyed a finemeal of turkey. On another occasion pump failures prevented troops from reaching the galley due to thedepth of water in the galley. Cold cuts and crackers were served on deck. Through the grace of God andin spite of the Marine Adder the Battalion jubilantly docked in Yokohama on the evening of 27 Augustwhere Major Drew, who had proceeded by air as Advance Party met the Battalion.

On 28 August the Battalion disembarked and proceeded to load on trains for shipment to Camp Bender inthe interior of Japan. Many curious eyes took their first glimpse, of the Orient and questioned theprevalent odor characterizing the Orient.

The Battalion arrived at Camp Bender at 1900 hours on 28 August and was assigned space in permanenttype buildings. The end of August found the Battalion safe and sound in Japan and anxiously awaitingmail from home after almost a complete month of travel.

“On 20 September, the Battalion with elements of the 7th Divisionoff-loaded into LST's and LSU's and landed in Inchon at 2344 hours.

Proceeding to a designated assembly area south-east of InchontheBattalion preoccupied itself with collecting its equipment andpreparing itself for combat.

By 25 September the Battalion was again complete (minus turn-around shipping) and was assembled in the vicinity of Anyang-niwhere it anticipated commitment either to the north in support ofoperations against Seoul or to the south in support of operationsaimed at joining with the

Eighth US Army.

By now it was clearly evidenced that the Inchon invasion, oncethought impossible, was highly successful. Attesting to theingenuity of American military leaders, the 20 to 25 foot tides ofInchon Harbor had not deterred our Naval Forces. All ships had tobe off loaded to LST's and LSU's and then landed on variousbeaches. Due to the great tidal variations - unloading operationscould be carried out only during 6 hours of a 24 hour day.Meanwhile on 24 September the 92d Armored Field ArtilleryBattalion was given the mission of reinforcing the fires of the 57thFA Bn, the direct support Battalion of the 31st RCT, attacking south toward Suwon and Osan.

1st round fired by 92nd AFA Bn inKorea -September 1950 frompositions at Suwon airstrip(Mattingly)

Looking down on our Hongwon areafrom hill outpost - November 1950(Mattingly)

Machine gun outpost at HongwonNorth Korea November 1950(Mattingly)

A Battery's patrol inthe mountains NE ofHongwon North KoreaNovember 1950(Mattingly)

8

Eager and confident the "Red Devils" rolled into position at the Suwon airfield on 25 September andsmartly occupied their first combat position in Korea. At 1650 hours Battery "B" fired the Battalion's firstround in Korea

Unit History For November, 1950

November first found the Battalion aboard nine (9) vessels, either atsea or departing Pusan for an amphibious landing in North Korea.

The period I through 3November found thevarious ships of theAmphibious Task Forceanchored in a bay at lwon,North Korea.

On 4 November Battery"C' and the Battalion's M-41's arrived in lwon andunloaded. Concurrently,Batteries A and B, aboardthe transport E. D. Patrickwere unloaded andbivouacked on the beach. Battery, "C" was dispatched toPukchong where it supported the 7th Division's attack north-west.

November 9, 1950 -

The Hongwon area, occupied by the battalion, was characterized by fertile flat land cultivated as rice paddieswith several abruptly rising hills elongating themselves to the north and south. Approximately one mile, fromthe Sea of Japan, the flat land to the east generally provided excellent fields of fire with the exception of threeor four intervening hills. The school house occupied by the battalion was nested against a series of hills thatrose abruptly in rear of the building, making the immediate area extremely difficult to defend. Outposts wereinstalled on all commanding hills.

Eleven November found the battalion performing much needed maintenance andestablishing a secure perimeter. The Battalion Commander performed a detailedreconnaissance of the area evaluating fields of fire, avenues of approach and overalldefense measures.

Twelve November found the Battalion digging in their 155 ammunition within theperimeter in an attempt to frustrate any guerrilla attempts to set trucks on fire asdone in the 96th Field Artillery. This proved to be a terrific task since some 130 holeswere necessary to adequately disperse the ammunition.

On Eighteen November Protestant Services were held for all men at 1000 hours.Catholic Services were held at 1600 hours. . On this day most men not required onpatrols and outpost duty, were given time off to take care of their personalequipment. Patrols continued as scheduled, picking up some eighty prisoners, inone town, guarded by one solitary man with a rifle and no ammunition. Anothercommunity revealed some forty-two prisoners. Since no interrogation facilitieswere available, most of the prisoners had to be evacuated to X Corps.

Twenty-three November, Thanksgiving Day, opened peacefully and cold with alight to thickening mist. Patrols were dispatched in all sectors and the installationof trip flares and fragmentation grenades in support of the barb-wire netcontinued. At 1045, the Battalion Commander addressed the Battalion at twoformations, thanking them, for their fine performance and reminding them of the things which we had tobe thankful for on this Thanksgiving Day.

9

At 1115 a Catholic Mass of Thanksgiving was celebrated by Chaplain Walsh in the Battalion Auditoriumfor all Catholic personnel. At 1400 hours Protestant Thanksgiving services were held by Chaplain Braganfor all personnel. Thanksgiving dinner was served at about 1300 hours. Mess halls such as they were,were outfitted with children's school desks and covered with white paper. Some paper flowers wereprovided by school children. Evergreen boughs were used to add a festive appearance. The menucomprised of roast turkey, meat dressing, fresh potatoes, candied yams, peas, cranberry sauce, fruit,fruit-cake, nuts and candy. The meal was exceptionally well prepared, reflecting great credit andprofessional skill on all mess stewards. Excepting for outposts, all men were given a few hours off towrite home and relax.

Dawn broke in a sullen grey half-light on the 29th of November reveling the surrounding area blanketed bythree inches of snow. Pine boughs slightly bowed under the pressure of their puffy white pillowscontrasted with massive armored vehicles trimmed in white. Magpies flying about, chattering madly, werethe only interruption to the peace of this winter day. Having heard of the impending move to Hamhung ,the Battalion Commander and S-3 proceeded to Corps Artillery Headquarters to be briefed on the latestdevelopments. The route from Hongwon to Hamhung was covered with 3 to 4 inches of snow through thesummit of the winding pass and thereon into Hamhung. Colonel Ennis, Corps Artillery Commander,advised that a move was eminent within the next 24 hours. A briefing was held on the situation in whichthe Chinese Communist Forces were driving the Allies back on all fronts in a sudden breakout on theEighth Army and X Corps front driving a serious wedge between the two. Returning to the Battalion areaat approximately 1830 hours after a very hazardous trip, the Battalion staff and Battery Commander's werecalled in for a briefing in which the Battalion was placed on two hour alert. With roads turned to ice by thewarm sun of the day and low night temperatures, the Battalion's tracks would find it difficult to marchover the mountain road.

Twenty-five November found Batteries "A", "B" and "C" leaving at 0645 for their initial positions. foroperation "Snowcap". Battery "B" positioned two howitzers in the vicinity of Yongdong-Ni in support ofthe operation should a sizeable force be encountered. The general area of operations was characterizedby extremely high peaks and deep ravines with swift currents. Approximately two inches of snow coveredthe area and more snow was falling at higher altitudes making visibility extremely limited.

Thirty November found the Battalion concentrating on combat loading and checking radios and sectionequipment. At 1035 hours, Lt. Colonel Swain, Corps Artillery S-2 arrived with a message directing thebattalion to move to Hamhung at once. Reconnaissance parties were ordered to leave at 1130 hours witha pioneer detail and one M 41 as a pilot. The Battalion was ordered to serve lunch immediately and moveout at 1330 hours. Service Battery was designated as rear party to gather items in excess to the otherBatteries and load same on rail cars and to move on the following morning, 1 December. TheReconnaissance Party made good progress over the mountain road despite the icy condition of the road.The pilot M 41 had considerable trouble, chiefly due to two stalled vehicles at bad turns. The descent, onthe southern slope, was most treacherous, since control was more difficult. Crews had to proceed each—41 and shovel dirt and sand into its path. Nevertheless, the Battalion closed in the Hamhung Area by2030 hours in a most treacherous move on an extremely unfavorable road and weather conditions. Snowbegan to fall heavily as the Battalion climbed the pass and by the time the Battalion closed, two inches ofsnow were on the vehicle tops. No mishaps or fallouts occurred reflecting great credit upon the driversand mechanics of this Battalion. While the Battalion was on the road the Battalion Commander and S-3reconnoitered for Battalion positions in the vicinity of Oro-ri adjacent to the 96th Field Artillery Battalion.By 1130 hours the Battalion was bedded down, in scattered bombed out buildings and slit trenches.Minus bedding rolls the men would have a bad night as a bitter wind drove snow in every direction. Thisdays accomplishment further testified the merit and potentialities of self-propelled Artillery.

Unit History For December, 1950

Three December broke with the news of an enemy attack in the vicinity of Majong-dong. A "CCF" patrolhad set a charge to a bridge and partially blown same. Three "CCF" were killed by the machine gunnerguarding the bridge. Battery "B" was displaced forward to the vicinity of Majong-dong from whichpositions it could give good support.

Department Of Defense Photo Of 92nd AFA BN Battery B InSupport Of The 7th Infantry Division In December Of 1950.Photo Taken At Chinhung-ni Which Is About 15 Miles South OfChosin Reservoir and 40 miles North of Hungnam.

Task Force Dog

December 9, 1950

(Mattingly)

Task Force Dog December 9, 1950

Brrrrr! Bundled up at Chinhung-ni North of Sudong North

Korea during the time we went up to shoot for 1st Marine

Division & 31st Inf. Regt. breaking out of the trap at

kotoni and Choson Reservoir. (Mattingly)

10One target of an estimated 150 "CCF" troops was promptly taken under fire with considerable casualties.Later a group of enemy was spotted working their way up on a hill to the left flank. Battery "B" promptlyshifted a platoon to the left and engaged the enemy in direct fire at nine hundred yards. The BattalionCommander of the 3rd Battalion, 7th Regiment, 3rd Division was extremely grateful for services rendered.

Five December found the BattalionCommander and S-3 reporting toHeadquarters X Corps Artillery at 0100hours where a special mission wasdiscussed. The plan called for Batteries"A" and "C", with stripped FDC, to moveto the recently surveyed positions atChinhung-ni from where these Batterieswould fire several prearrangedconcentrations on selected enemytargets. The two Batteries would returnto their Oro-ri positions by dark.Returning to the Battalion CP at 0315the Battalion Commander alerted theBattery Commander's for displacementat 0730 and the S-3 proceeded toprepare data for the enemy targets.Reconnaissance parties headed by theBattalion Commander departed at 0700hours followed by the stripped Batteriesunder the Battalion Executive at 0730.

The Batteriesclosed at Chinhung-ni at 0920 hours. Two 608 radios from the 96th FA Bn. linkedthe FDC with liaison planes which did not have "overlap" channels to work withour 500 series radios.

Registration was not permitted by reason of the large number of C-82 and C-119transports air dropping supplies to the cut-off forces. The artillery concentrationswere fired promptly at 1130 hours lasting through 1200 hours. Air OP's reportedthe concentrations "on the button". With another job well done, under severewinter weather, the "Red Devils" enjoyed a hot meal at 1245 and returned to theirOro-ri positions, closing there at 1545.

Six December - The overall picture was one of withdrawal under pressure in theEighth Army sector. The Chinese communist forces had succeeded in driving asizeable wedge between X Corps and the Eighth Army.

The 1st U.S. Marine Division and elements of the 31st and 32nd RCT's of the 7thInfantry Division were surrounded by elements of 7 Chinese Communist Divisions

in the Chosen Reservoirarea where they hadmanaged to consolidatethemselves in thevicinity of Haragu-ri, onthe southern tip of thegreat reservoir.

Personal Reflections by Hal Remspear HQ Btry 50-51“Early December 1950, We were at Chinhung-ni providing support for the Marines fighting theirway out of the Chosen reservoir. The night they were supposed to start passing our position ontheir way to Hungnam, the Colonel (Lt. Col. Lavoie)called me to his tent. He was handwriting amessage that I would encode on the M-209 cryptograph device. It turned plain language into 5letter code groups. He offered me a drink, a bottle of whiskey or bourbon the size that the airlinesserve, and I sipped it while he finished writing. He asked me how my morale was. When I said"lousy sir", he asked why. I said it was too cold for people, no winter clothing, ground too hard todig a foxhole, lousy food, and always on the edge because of the sporadic enemy mortar roundscoming in. He wrote one more line and gave me the message to read. His words were "Despiteextreme cold and the absence of winter sleeping bags, the morale of the command remains highand proud of their participation in this effort". The message was long and took a long time toencode and then send via Morse code to one of my cohorts back in Hungnam.”

11Elements of the 7th Division to include the 57th Field Artillery Battalion were compelled to destroy andabandon much of their equipment and flee across the ice to Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri, to the south, whereother Marine and Army forces were cut-off. This area, characterized by steep jagged mountains rangingthrough 6000 feet from the central dorsal of North Korea leveled off north and west of Koto-ri into a greatplateau. Located in this area, three great reservoirs furnished hydro- electric power to all of Korea,Manchuria and Vladivostok, Siberia.

The only approach to this area from the east was from the axis Hamhung, Ori-ri, Majong-dong, Chinhung-ni, and Koto-ri. This approach was by a treacherous winding mountain road following a creek-bed to thesummit area between Chinhung-ni and Koto-ri. Both sides of the road were dominated by almost verticalcliffs. Numerous bridges over branch streams and precipitous gorges made this a serious defile that adetermined enemy could command at will by blowing bridges and digging in on the high ground. Severalvalleys, generally from the north-west, fed into this central valley providing excellent avenues ofapproach. December, with its sudden snow falls and bitterly cold winds from the frozen north blastedthrough the passes and all connecting valleys making frostbite casualties a great handicap among front-line troops.

Following the briefing, the Corps Artillery Commander informed the Battalion Commander the plans werenow complete to assist in the relief of surrounded Marine and Army Forces. With some three thousandcasualties, the relief of the surrounded Marine and Army Forces, had been delayed to facilitate theevacuation of their casualties by air. This havingbeen accomplished, "Task Force Dog" wasorganized under Brigadier General Mead of the3rd Division for the purpose of relieving Marineand Army Units at Chinhung-ni and holding thatarea open until the surrounded forces werecompletely pulled out. This Battalion was tosupport the Marines in their attacks, as well as"Task Force Dog."

Ten December blew in with a blasting frigid windrevealing a temperature of 10 below zero. Clearskies gave our air complete command of thesituation. Marine convoys from the northcontinued to roll by since an early hour. Longcolumns of weary Marines followed vehicleconvoys moving slowly but steadily. Specificplans for the delaying action by Task Force Dog,following the passage of Marine and 7th Divisionelements, were formed as a rear guard action.

B Battery about to run the gauntlet from the92nd AFA position just south of Koto-ri toHungnam on the coast - December 11, 1950Note Jim Stegall’s L-19 on top(Harrison)

Excerpt from book "Grasshopper Pilot" By Jim Stegall - Laision Pilot with the 49th Field Artillery

Battalion, 7th Infantry Division: “The weather at Hamhung was about freezing but at the ChosinReservoir it was around zero in the daytime and 20 below at night. For this flight I was carrying a fivegallon container of blood plasma. As I started my climb I could see Chinese soldiers all over thecountryside. Some would look up and others were just milling around. No one seemed interested infiring at me. I climbed to around 5,000 feet and was near my destination when, suddenly, my enginequit. No chance to restart as the L-4 is a hand prop job. My only thought was that I must glide back towhere our troops were on the main road that goes from the Chosin to Hamhung. I was in a glide forten or fifteen minutes and had our forward position along the road in view. I could tell that I wouldmake it. Of course, there was no landing area, so I turned back into the north wind; and as I nearedthe ground, I picked out two trees to crash into. The right wing hit first, then the left, and the planedropped to the ground.

As I sat there dazed, I looked up and saw soldiers running toward me - friendly GI’s - thankgoodness. I had crashed right beside the 92nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion - the forward mostunit along the main road. They got me out and escorted me over to their headquarters. They notifiedmy unit that I was safe, but there was no way to send me back as all traffic would be moving up, notback. I remained with them for about a week. During this time we disassembled what was left of myplane. The fuselage was tied onto the top of a half-track, and one wing was tied to the side of thekitchen truck (2 1/2 ton). The other wing was demolished, so was left there in North Korea. Thesewere great guys and a great combat unit. They took good care of me”. (Jim's plane was loaded on ahalf track by the 92nd AFA Bn).

“This was the beginning the treacherous journey to Hungnam running a gauntlet in sub-zero degreeweather under constant enemy fire. The Marines had broken out of the Chosin perimeter and wereadvancing along the main highway toward our position at Chinhung-ni. We (the 92nd AFA Bn) wouldfall in behind the Marines when they had cleared our position. We watched as the Marines came by. Itwas a heart rending sight. Bedraggled troops came by with their dead comrades on hoods of trucksand across howitzer barrels - any place they could put them. I was given a carbine and assigned toride in a 2 1/2 ton truck. Our convoy fell in after the Marines had cleared. The guns on the armoredvehicles were lowered to direct fire - like a rifle. It was an imposing sight, so the 92nd had little

trouble along the corridor back to Hamhung.”

12Eleven December - By 1000 hours word was received thatthe tail of the Marine column would soon pass our ForwardObserver, Lt. Stofflet. On this signal, long range artilleryfire was placed on prominent high ground and likelyavenues of approach. This artillery fire was marchedforward as the tail drew closer to our Chinhung-ni position.Our batteries were ordered to march order successivelyand form, ready to fall in their prescribed column position.Somehow, the Marine tanks turned out to be the finalelement and the battalion did not move until approximately1410. Meanwhile, the Infantry covered avenues ofapproach and high ground with mortar and automaticweapons fire. Once on the road, the column progressedvery slowly, primarily due to the slow progress of the foot-troops ahead. Sundong- ni continued to be a constantthreat to the column as the enemy appeared determined toharass, if not cut the column there.

A Battery Howitzer - Hungnam December 1950 (Harrison)

Dec. 24 1950- The USNS Breckenridge as it iscircled by LCVPs carrying the last troops off thebeach at Hungnam. We came from Yokahama toInchon on the Breckenridge in Sept. 1950(Mattingly)

13Evidence of bitter action was at hand on allsides in the Sundong defile, where theenemy had persistently displayeddetermination. Smoldering truck-loads ofammunition and burned equipment,intermingled with charred and guttedbodies of Marines gave testimony to theenemy's guerilla tactics in catching thecolumn on the road bumper to bumper.Setting fire to one or two vehicles wassufficient to block the entire column andpin down several hundred men. Constantsmall arms, automatic weapons and mortarfire appeared along the column. One mortarshell landed two vehicles to the rear of theBattalion Commander, wounding Lt.Mooney, General Mead's aide. Another manwas wounded in the truck ahead of the Battalion Executive by small arms fire.

Fortunately, for the Battalion, no one was wounded nor did any vehicles fall out. The Battalion closed inits assembly area in Hungnam at approximately 1930 hours. Weary, tired and dirty, the "Red Devils"enjoyed a hot meal prepared by Service Battery. By 2000 hours, all men were tucked in, dead to the worldafter some 72 hours without sleep and several days of active combat with "Task Force Dog." As directsupport artillery for "Task Force Dog" - on its mission of holding the Chinhung-ni area open for theevacuation of the cut-off Marine and Army Forces, this Battalion displayed exceptional professional skill,spirit and cohesion.

Twenty December - Based upon an eight hourestimate to effect the interchange of personnel,arrangements were made for two LSU's to be madeavailable at 0500 hours for the loading of Battalionpersonnel. Since the men had no rations, a messagewas sent to the Randall requesting a hot breakfast for500 men upon their arrival aboard, estimated at 0630hours. With their guns out of action, the "Red Devils"gathered their personal belongings and awaited thecall to port. The night of Twenty-one-twenty-twoDecember, fortunately was not bitterly cold, althoughraw and penetrating. Through the night men huddledtogether around small scattered fires as Naval gun fireand remaining artillery pounded away at the enemy.Bunched together for warmth, spirits were highamong the dirty, tired, and weary "Red Devils". Prideand satisfaction was in their hearts for a job welldone. Now they knew, that together, with each doinghis job to his level best, that they could fight, sustainand survive. Their combined efforts, in thisbeachhead, had contributed materially to its success. At 033O hours, the Battalion S-3 proceeded to theBattalion position and guided the Battalion to the lighter loading area at Green Beach.

All men were aboard the LSU's by 0530 hours at which time they set off for the Randall at the anchorage.Wiggling up a rope ladder one by one, all men were aboard the Randall by 0630 hours just as theannouncement came over the ship's speaker system that breakfast was served. The clean, freshly paintedinteriors of the Randall were a welcome sight to the dog tired and weary "Red Devils". Following the hotbreakfast everyone settled down for much needed and well deserved sleep.

Demolition Of Hungnam Harbor - December 1950 PhotoTaken From The USNS Randall (Remspear)

14Twenty Four December - By 1400 hours heavyexplosions were heard and seen inland asammunition dumps were destroyed bydemolition crews. Gradually, explosions drewnearer. Underwater demolition teamsdestroyed remaining piers and beach facilities.Finally, at 1500 the USNS Randall set sail - asNaval batteries bombarded the shore linemercilessly. Under a heavy cover of fire, allships at anchorage pulled out in convoy,protected by destroyers thereby bringing to asuccessful completion the intricate militaryfeat of extracting 60,000 troops from abeachhead under a numerical superior enemy.

As Christmas Eve grew on men gathered and talked of home speculating as to what their families mightbe doing. The speaker system played Christmas Carols, adding a bit of color to the occasion. AppropriateChurch services were held to include a Midnight Mass in the mess hall.With all troops now afloat and leaving North Korea, what might be called phase two, was now brought to aclose. Considering the period from the Inchon landing 15 September through Pusan 1 November as phaseone, this second phase converged from the amphibious landing at lwon 6 November through this date 22December. This second phase intended to bring final defeat to the enemy in North Korea, culminated in acomplete reversal by the intervention of Chinese Communist Forces. Under terrific pressure on all fronts,all UN Forces were in the process of withdrawing and extracting themselves from North Korea with whatequipment that they could salvage. The confusion brought on by this situation projected many questionsto the mind. While physically outnumbered 10 to 1 our forces, represented the most modern, the bestequipped and the best clothed Army in the world. Our weapons were the best known to science. Yet, thismodern mechanized force of air, tanks, infantry artillery was being driven back by plain foot troopssparingly equipped with small arms, automatic weapons, few mortars and artillery pieces.

While we pushed in coordinated attacks, they infiltrated their mass on our flanks cutting our supplyroutes and crippling our rear installations. With their human mass they consistently dominated the highground as we sought the valleys for their road nets. On more favorable flat terrain such as, the Hungnambeach-head keyed around a series of small hills dominating flat level approaches from the west and northwe could hold them at bay.

The Hungnam beachhead had proved terrifically expensive to the enemy where he had repeatedly tried torush-in his human mass just to find our artillery and tactical air butchering him in his tracks.Unprecedented in our warfare experience, this on-rushing mass of humanity was not without effect uponthe American soldiers mind. This complete disregard for human life was contrary to our high evaluation ofone human life, which we sought to protect and preserve at great expense. Yet, the American soldier,blazing away at his machine gun, was charged by masses of humans. As he mowed them down therewere always more in the form of an endless chain of humans that just kept coming, no matter how manyhe killed.”

End - Excerpts From “92nd AFA BN Book By Col. Leon F. Lavoie”

The 3rd Howitzer Sec. Btry C in firemission 1950 (Hancock)

15

Begin Excerpt From “Personal Reflection By Clyde Hancock C Btry 1950-51"

“I shall never forget when the reality of being in a war really hit me.The landing on the beach, the planes making bomb runs and thebattle ships firing the big guns didn't do it. It came a few days afterwe were in Korea and our 155MM Howitzers arrived. We were in ourfirst firing positions at Suwon at the end of the air field. In one of thefirst few fire missions, a man in Battery "B" was killed. We all heardthe news but we did not see the blood. The next day or so we gotword that some enemy heavy tanks were approaching our position."C" Battery, of which I was a member, was called on to pull two ofour 155MM howitzers out of position and move forward a few miles,set up a road block, and stop the enemy tanks should they appear. Iwas a member of one of the howitzer crews chosen for the task. Wemoved into position with one howitzer on each side of the road,aimed the howitzers in on a spot in the road and waited. Part of each crew was to stay on the howitzerawake and ready to fire, while part of the crew was to get some sleep. Sometime in the early hours beforedawn I was given permission to bed down, which I did in a small building near the road. Daylight came,but no enemy tanks. Then someone called my name and instructed me to get up and wake the other menwith me. With my eyes not ready to open, and my body not yet ready to wake up, I tried as best I could tofollow orders. The first person I tried to wake was dead, and so was the second. They were soldiers killedin the battle for Seoul. Unknown to me and the men with me, we had bedded down where the KIA's hadbeen collected for removal from the battle field. When I saw American blood brought by weapons of warfrom an enemy, the reality of war set in.

Sometime in early October 1950 my unit was pulled out of the front lines and given orders to prepare foran invasion with the 1st Marine Division somewhere on the East Coast of North Korea. We moved towardthe Port of Inchon and finally we were loaded on the landing crafts. Battery "C" men and equipment wereaboard LST Q074, a US Navy Vessel with a Japanese crew. Bunks were in short supply and large demand,so three men were assigned to each bunk in eight hour shifts. I made friends with some of the crew andwas allowed to eat in the crew's mess and sleep in their lounge.

After fourteen days aboard Q074, we sailed into Pusan Harbor and were transferred to a navy ship for thesea voyage north by way of the Sea of Japan to a place called Iwon. It is now November, and the weatherhas already turned bitter cold. We supported the Marines for about three weeks, and then we were told thewar was all but over, and that we would be getting ready to leave Korea and would be home in the goodold U.S. of A. by Christmas. However, we didn't know about the plans the Chinese had made that includedus.

Thanksgiving Day 1950 until Christmas Eve 1950 will forever remain in this old soldier's mind as onecontinuous nightmare. Either Thanksgiving or the day after we were given orders to load up lock, stockand barrel, and be ready to move with gas tanks full and weapons at the ready. The weather was bittercold, snow was falling, and we were headed in the wrong direction to be going home. When the orderscame down we headed out for a place we would later refer to as the Frozen Chosen. After all these years, Icannot recall just how long it took us to make the move, but I can still see the narrow snow coveredroads, the hairpin curves and steep mountainsides in my mind. After much weary travel fighting sleep andthe cold, we arrived at our assigned position and began to take the enemy under fire sometime around thelast of November or the first of December, 1950.

As time went on, things turned for the worst. The weather turned colder each day until it reached 30degrees below 0. Just a short time after our arrival in the Frozen Chosen, we were surrounded and cut offby the enemy. Ammunition and food ran dangerously low and warm clothing was not to be had. I wasafraid to go to sleep thinking I might freeze to death, and afraid to go on guard duty for fear of being killedby the enemy.

16After awhile, I didn't much care because I thought I would die one way or the other.One cold day while we were engaging the enemy in all directions we were told that help, food andsupplies were on the way. The overcast skies then turned gray with blowing snow and the air drops wouldbe at least hindered, if not prevented altogether. We then heard the roar of aircraft engines which wecouldn't see. It seemed they had missed us altogether as they were flying north and the sound of theaircraft began to fade. Then, all of a sudden three or four flying box cars approached from the north atwhat appeared to be less than a thousand feet and dropped cargo in various colored chutes. It appearedthat Christmas had come early for the 92nd AFA BN, but it was not to be. As we rushed to get the muchneeded food and supplies, we found much to our dismay that it was not for us . As I recall, it was all 30caliber ammo for M1's -- no food. A day or so later, some soldiers that had been trapped just to the northof us broke out and began their march to the sea and safety. I watched as the column went by. Some ofthe men had burlap sacks tied around their feet for warmth. Many of them never made it to the waitingships at Hungnam.

Soon it was time to start our march to the sea and the waiting ships. It was a fight all the way, and I shallnever forget that day and some of the things I saw. We approached a place on the road where the enemyhad held until early that morning, and a place where much U.S. equipment had been destroyed and manyU.S. service men had been slaughtered.

As our column slowed to work our way around the dead and through the wreckage, I looked down fromthe ring mount of the half track on which I was riding, and there by the road lay a soldier that I hadremembered seeing pass by our position a few days before. I shall never forget what I saw.

The young man had been killed by the enemy just a few miles from the waiting ships and safety. He hadfallen to the cold ground on his back, his right had still holding his weapon and near his left hand was hiswallet with the wind turning the pictures. I still see him in my mind and still wonder if he died looking atpictures of his loved ones.

I shall never forget the planes from the carriers that flew so close to us dropping napalm on the enemy soclose to us that we could feel the heat. We finally arrived at the sea port of Hungnam and took up firingpositions. We fired our 155MM howitzers until the very last minute before they had to be loaded on theships. When the howitzers were gone we more or less fought as a rear guard until we were given ordersto load on the landing crafts that would take us out to the waiting ship”.

End - Excerpt From “Personal Reflection By Clyde Hancock C Btry 1950-51"

Begin: Excerpts From “92nd AFA BN Book By Col. Leon F. Lavoie”“25 December, Christmas Day 1950, found the USNS Randall at sea closely approaching Pusan. Devoid ofthe usual X-mas dinner - troops made the most of it, content to be warm, safe and in clean surroundingsafter the tenseness and severe weather of the past weeks. At 1400 hours the Randall anchored in Pusanharbor in the company of many vessels.

Twenty-eight-twenty nine December found the Battalion unloading its equipment and holding a completeT/O&E inventory to evaluate shortages resulting from combat operations in North Korea. On 28 Decemberthe Battalion enjoyed its Christmas Menu of turkey, sweet potatoes, fruitcake, candies and beer.

Unit History For January, 1951The first day of 1951 broke clear and cold. The Battalion Commander was called to Headquarters X CorpsArtillery at 0900 hours, where instructions were received to move the Battalion north to the vicinity ofSeoul. Upon' closing there, the Battalion was to be detached from X U.S. Corps and attached to l U.S.Corps.

On three January the Advance party left the vicinity of Taejon at 0800 hours and continued north throughKumchon - Osan - Suwon to Yongdong- Po, the location of I U.S. Corps.

C Battery Howitzer - Chonan January 1951 (Harrison)

17The early morning hours of four January werehighlighted by heavy explosions from the vicinity ofSeoul and Inchon. Upon checking with Colonel Hallockat I U.S. Corps, instructions were received directing thebattalion to assemble in the vicinity of Chonan, some55 miles south of Yongdong-Po.

Seven January proved warmer and heavily overcast.Reconnaissance parties including the BattalionCommanders departed on reconnaissance at 0800hour. Proceeding north to Songwan, contact was madewith the 39th Field Artillery Battalion where a generalposition area was received. From there the partyproceeded to the general position area where Battery Commanders received their positions. The Battalionwas ordered moved at 1005 hours. Battery Commanders were dispatched to the release point to receivetheir Batteries. The Battalion closed into firing positions at 1100 hours. Communication nets wereestablished and liaison officers dispatched. Security outposts and perimeter defenses were coordinatedby the Battalion Executive. At 1600 hours Battery "B" was registered on a check point marking theBattalions first firing in South Korea.

Twelve January revealed a temperature of six degrees below zero the Battalion's coldest morning inSouth Korea. Although clear and sunny, the day proved to be a bitter one for outside work. Due to theextreme cold, motors were started every three hours during the night and run for twenty minutes. Twentyminute periods provided for the loosening of sludge in the circulatory systems and restored life to thebattery. Shorter periods of operation proved more harmful by depleting the battery.

Twenty-Two January broke cold but soon warmed under a bright sun. Fifty 1,000 foot rolls of barb-wirewere installed along the perimeter. Fragmentary grenades and trip-flares were intermingled into thedouble-apron barb-wire. The full length of wire was covered by flares. Experiments were conducted in thedemolition of HE and White Phosphorous projectiles as obstacles along likely avenues of approach.These were wired with electric caps for detonation at will, electrically, from a control point. Fresh Turkeywas issued for one meal and enthusiastically received by everyone as a welcome relief from cannedrations. Two cans of beer per man were received and issued. A message, received from Eighth ArmyHeadquarters, directed the Battalion to draw six towed 155 —1 howitzers with —5 tractors to bring theBattalion fire-power to that of 18 guns.

The night hours of 27-29 January proved one of action, when the CCF counter-attacked our Infantry onobjective No. 36 at 0115 hours. Of an estimated strength of 300, the enemy first hit Company "A", 1stBattalion, 65th Infantry Regiment separating it and over-running its Command Post. Later the enemy hitCompanies "B" and "C". A tremendous barrage of artillery was brought to bear by FO's. The artillery firescontinued well over an hour shifting from one concentration and then the other. At approximately 0420hours, the enemy attacked the 2nd Battalion, 65th Regiment to the direct front. Infiltrating at first, theenemy succeeded in flanking their position. Again a heavy barrage of artillery was brought down as closeas seventy-five yards to friendly troops. By 0630 hours all positions had been restored with only lightcasualties inflicted on our men in both attacks. The Division Commander, Major General Soule and theDivision Artillery Commander, Brigadier General Shugg, accredited the artillery with the successful halt ofthe counter-attack.

During the day the Battalion Commander and S-2 visited front line infantry positions and confirmed theefficiency of the artillery fires by interview with infantry men. On the promise that last nights attack mighthave been a probing attack to be followed by a large scale attack tonight all outposts were reinforced andfinal perimeters dug and wired in. Trip flares were set up around the area and all guards particularlyalerted. Plans to renew the offensive were made for the next day. Battery "A" captured one CCF prisonerwhile patrolling the hills in their sector.

92nd AFA Bn early 1951 (Mattingly)

Our Battalion position NE Yoju in Feb. 1951 working with 6th ROK Div.(Mattingly)

18During this first month of the new year, the U.N. Forces were transformed from a retreating force to anoffensive force. In the somber days following the Hungnam beachhead and the simultaneous reversalsalong the eighth Army front, a feeling of depression and defeatism was apparent in most quarters. Withgreat numerical odds, the CCF hit in several sections unmercifully, causing a reluctance in our force toengage him with any degree of determination and confidence. Rather, most eyes were fixed to the rear, tothe next delaying position, which regrettably were abundant on most situation maps. Amongst thisprevailing pessimistic undercurrent, some Commanders, initially in minority, expressed a strong feelingthat we could defeat the CCF if we approached him on a solid front, combed our hills and massed our fire-power in contrast to the wide envelopments and piecemeal frittering away of our forces. By mid-Januarythis objective thinking gathered more strength and finally materialized into a cautious offensivemovement that gradually gathered the confidence of all Commanders and troops alike. Toward the end ofJanuary, the U.N. Offensive gained momentum as confidence replaced fear. Repeatedly, the CCF, was metby our Infantry, meticulously combing the high ground, massing all its available fire power and repeatedlyknocked the enemy off his "pins". For the first time in Korea, our artillery was massed and made to meetcounter-attack after counter-attack, unmercifully riddling the enemy's "hordes". The mass of human fleshwas no match for the steel of our combined fire- power. The Infantry Artillery-Tank-Air team regained itsformer prestige.

Unit History For February, 1951Three February proved to be a very interesting day for the"Red Devils". Placed in direct support of "Task ForceMeyers", the Battalion had three other Battalions to reinforceits fires. Forward observers joined the Task Force by 0800hours, at which time the Battalion Commander and S-2reviewed the plan of supporting fires with the Task ForceCommander. A three Battalion "TOT" (Time on Target) wasplanned for the enemy held high ground to the immediatefront, from there on, all missions would be called on byconcentration number by the forward observers. A three sidedbox was planned to completely surround the objective areathereby denying the enemy an escape route and preventingenemy reinforcements from coming into the area. Onceformed, the Task Force moved out at 0950 hours at whichtime the TOT was fired. All Battalions massed beautifully inthe ensuing ten volleys. Under this murderous fire, pinningdown the enemy, the tanks moved off with machine gunsblazing. As the TOT was completed, forward observers promptly called for prearranged concentrations ontowns and high ground. Literally, the tankcolumn was preceded by marching artilleryfire "plastering" all high ground and towns.Fourteen February continued mild andovercast with visibility improving around1000 hours. At 1500 hours, the Battalionwas directed to displace to the vicinity ofYoju where it would reinforce the fires ofthe 61st FA Battalion supporting the 5thCavalry Regiment of the 1st CavalryDivision. This move was prompted by theenemy's drive between Yoju and Wonju.The enemy had already isolated the 38thRegimental Combat Team of the 2ndDivision and threatened the 23rd Regimentof the 2nd Division in Chipyong. The enemyhaving cut their supply route from thesouth, necessitated the 23rd Regiment to beresupplied by Air Drop.

Personal Reflections by Hal Remspear HQ Btry 50-51February 1951“We could determine how close we were to the front by the close air support. Flights of fourplanes made their ground attacks. They fired their rockets on one pass, napalm on the nextpass, and then more passes were made until their machine guns ran out of ammunition. Theplanes were either F-80 Shooting Stars, F-51 Mustangs, or F4U Corsairs. The F-80s wereLockheed jets, and their turning circle was much greater than the prop driven F-51s and F4Us.The F-80s generally completed their circle behind us, the F-51s and F4Us completed theirs infront of us. When the prop driven planes circled behind us, we knew we were very close to theaction, and in these cases we could see the rockets streaming down and the napalm igniting inballs of flame. The enemy was also visible trying to run and hide from the air attacks. Shortlyafter one of these attacks, I was riding in the back of the Colonel's jeep manning the radio andresponsible for the swivel mounted 30 caliber machine gun. We were scouting for a newposition further to the north and passed through an area that had been hit from the air earlierthat day. We came across a group of enemy that had been burned black with napalm. Theirclothes were burned off. One was bent over on his hands and knees with his two black testicleshanging down. The Colonel's driver tried to make a crude joke out of the scene. I forget what hesaid. The Colonel replied with a very cold remark, "That's disgusting, drive on sergeant." He wasright, it was disgusting to see and smell. I don't know what was worse, the affects of napalm orwhite phosphorous. Fortunately, neither was ever used against us while I was there. “

Capt. Bessler as road guide at Wonju Feb. 20 1951,the day we joined the Marines. Notice how the townhas been flattened. (Mattingly)

19The mission of our supported force, the 5th Cavalry Regiment, was to break the enemy's hold and reopenthe supply routes between Yoju and Chipyong. Battalion reconnaissance parties departed at 1615 hoursand selected positions in the stream bed at Yoju.

Nineteen February came in clear and crisp, but was soon mellowed by a warm sun. The BattalionCommander, S-3 and S-2 proceeded on reconnaissance of artillery positions well forward. Proceedingnorth through the 27th British Brigade Sector, the reconnaissance parties turned east it Chuam-ni wherethe 6th ROK Sector begun. Chuam-ni, some 6000 meters north of our present position was the scene of amajor ambush which approached the proportions of a massacre. Some 60 to 70 American dead, lyingabout the ditches and rice paddies with several burned vehicles testified to a surprise attack by theenemy some four days ago. Apparently, a reconnaissance platoon from the 2d Division with "L" Companyof the 9th Regiment was stationed there as a holding force when the enemy attacked from theneighboring hills during the early morning hourscatching everyone unprepared. The dead, a greatnumber of which were Negro Americans, had beenstripped of their shoes, trousers and other warmclothing by the enemy. No evidence of digging-in orpreparing of positions was evident. The presenceof the dead was reported to IX Corps Headquartersfor action by the GRO as hundreds of troops werepassing on the road viewing the gruesomespectacle.

February found the United Nations Forcesregenerating confidence as the result of theiradvances in January. Shoulder to shoulder, theymoved ahead, at first cautiously then more boldlyas they convinced themselves that they were partof a superior, better trained and better equippedforce. February saw the enemy renew his offensiveeffort aimed at dividing our front in the vicinity ofWonju.

March 1951 - Chinese artillery position destroyed by BBattery (Mattingly)

20The enemy's initial successes were swiftly and efficiently converted into setbacks in which the CCF wasmade to pay a price unworthy of the effort.

A great lesson is to be gained from comparing the reactions of two RCT's to the enemy's offensive. OneRCT, under heavy enemy attack fought gallantly as it coiled itself into an iron-ring perimeter at Chipyong.This RCT, resupplied by air, was not only able to defend itself against repeated enemy attacks, butinflicted extremely heavy casualties upon the enemy.

Another RCT, also under heavy enemy attack displaced to supposedly better positions giving updeployed positions in an established perimeter for the road and unwisely moving at night.

Meanwhile the enemy closed in on key points controlling the road and knocked out lead vehicles blockingthe road to the entire column. The enemy then methodically reduced the column with machine guns andmortars. Infiltrators, heavily laden with grenades, then created panic through an inferno of burningvehicles and exploding ammunition with heavy losses of life and equipment. In the presence of theenemy, a unit can best defend itself in a developed perimeter and should not be committed to the road atnight.

With the enemy offensive frustrated, February found the U.N. Forces using their fire-power to greateradvantage through a more efficient utilization of close support aviation and a greater massing of artillery.

By the end of February, U.N. Forces were more confident than ever. They had retrieved the initiative fromthe enemy and completely subjugated him to their will.

Unit History for March 1951

March came in cold and crisp with a morning thattemporarily hampered observation. Promptly at 0750hours this Battalion fired a preparation with the other fourartillery battalions of the Marine Division.

Following this 1500 round preparation the 7th MarineRegiment on the left sector jumped off for their objective,a 900 foot hill. Only scattered resistance was encounteredfrom neighboring high ground. Chinese dead and severalprisoners testified to the effectiveness of the artillerypreparation.

During the morning hours the Battalion Commander, S-2and the Sergeant Major occupied a forward observationpost from which the effectiveness of our artillery firecould be observed. Major General Lowe, personal advisor to President Truman, was present on theobservation post.

At 1400 hours, Brigadier General Gillmore, IX Corps Artillery, visited Battery "C" and observed the Batteryin action firing on an enemy target. During the day the Battalion fired some 600 rounds. During theevening hours some 800 rounds were fired in harassing and interdiction missions.

C Battery Howitzer - BetweenHongchon and ChunchonMarch 1951 (Harrison)

ANDREAS C. THIEL - SERV. BATTERY KIA 31 MARCH 1951

21Fourteen March found the Marine Division resuming the attack. Carefullyscreening all hills, the Marines moved to within four miles of Hongchonwithout encountering any resistance. Maintenance of automotive andcommunications equipment was stressed during the day. During theafternoon hours the Battalion Commander, Battalion Executive and S-2proceeded forward on reconnaissance for positions on the other side ofthe mountain pass. The only positions were found forward of our presentfront line elements. These positions were reported to the S-3 of the IlthMarine Regiment with a request for clearance to move the Battalion in themorning. The abandonment of the extremely treacherous mountain passOunsan was difficult to understand. This 3000 foot mountain was welldug-in, by the enemy, and could have cost much life and effort to secure.The logged-over dug-outs contained ammunition and rice rationsindicating that the enemy bad pulled out in haste. Estimates indicated thatthe enemy had pulled back some eight to ten miles north of Hongchon.

The Battalion enjoyed a fine dinner of steak, fresh potatoes and cabbage salad the first "A" ration inweeks. All cooks exerted great effort to make this meal particularly attractive. With no targets to shoot at,the Battalion had some 3800 rounds on hand and credits for 1800 more at the Ammunition Supply Point.

Twenty-Three March broke mild was a heavy smog covering the entire Chunchon valley greatly limitingterrestrial and air observation. At 0650 hours the Battalion Commander, S-3 and Battery Commanders ofBatteries "A" and "C" proceeded to the northern outskirts of Chunchon. Behind the river dyke, idealpositions were found. The two batteries rolled into position at 0715 hours. Initial radio communicationdifficulties with the tanks were encountered since Company "C" of the 70th Tank Battalion did not havethe Artillery Channel on their tank radios. Rectified by setting off the “tankers" channel on our FDC radio,the Red Devils blazed away on several will adjust missions. During the day the Battalion fired some 700rounds in support of the tanks as they probed North-East and North-West encountering moderateautomatic weapons and mortar fire. The Battalion was credited with several hundred killed and wounded.At 1915 hours, IX Corps Artillery called and stated that The Battalion's mission was changed to reinforcethe fires of the 6th ROK Division as well as those of the Ist Cavalry Division. Further the Battalion was todetach one Battery to the 24th Division and Battery "B" of the 17th Field Artillery Battalion (8 inchHowitzer) was attached to this Battalion.

Looking at the Battalion today, after six months ofactive combat, it reflected a proud, well trained andconfident unit, well seasoned by combat experiencewith all United States Divisions. Reflecting confidencein their leaders, their equipment and training, the menwere welded together through mutual experience andconfidence in one another. The Battalion rallied well to competitive spirit by taking great pride in seeing ajob well done. To a Commander it was a privilege to have such a fine Command. A Battery Commandersmeeting was held at 1930 hours at which time defensive measures were stressed since the present lineappeared to be one to be held until such time as the United Nations clarified the status of the 38thParallel.

March 1951 ReviewThe month of March viewed in retrospect reflects continuous success for the United Nations Forcesmoving North, shoulder to shoulder. During this month the enemy found himself unable to muster enoughstrength to counterattack at any one point in strength. His every effort was repulsed.With milder weather and a more efficient utilization of fire-power, the enemy was forced to give up andwithdraw from exceptionally mountainous terrain that otherwise favored his defensive tactics had heenjoyed adequate logistical support and manpower with which to execute it. Between Hoensong,Hongchon, and Chunchon the enemy not only relinquished difficult terrain without a fight but for the firsttime gave evidence of abandoning field pieces, weapons, ammunition and some food, attesting to theenemies rapid withdrawal from his mountain perches.

A Battery Howitzer set for high-anglefire Northwest of Chunchon April 1951(Harrison)

22 With additional artillery due to arrive in the line, the United Nations fire power was certain to increasegreatly. This factor coupled with the rejuvenated morale of all commands ,during the past two monthswas certain to bring additional success. This new spirit radiating throughout all ranks was largely due tothe development of faith in the individual himself, in his equipment and in his training. Together, shoulderto shoulder the UN Forces had worked their way to within a few miles of the controversial 38th Parallel.

Unit History For April 1951The sixth of April made a mild and misty appearance. A densehaze hung throughout all valleys making terrestrial and aerialobservation exceptionally difficult. Forces in both the 27thBritish Brigade and the 6th ROK Divisions sector continuedforward to line "Kansas" just North of the 38th Parallel. At 0815hours, the Battalion Commander, S-3 and Executive Officerreconnoitered over the pass to the main Chunchon road. Twobridges of questionable capacity were carefully scrutinized, builtof native timber by unskilled workers, they adequatelyaccommodated 1/4 ton vehicles but their .capacity beyond thatwas questionable. Reaching the Pukhan River some 1,200meters North of Chunchon, a small bridge accommodatedvehicles up to 21/2 ton's. The river was fordable by M41's.Continuing North, again crossing the Pukhan river in the 7thMarines sector, suitable positions were found. Crossing thedisputed 38th parallel, the Battalion Commander and S-3 stopped at the Command Post of the 2ndBattalion of the 7th Marine Regiment. While discussing troops dispositions, the adjacent area was shelledby 25 rounds of enemy artillery believed to be of a 105 caliber, causing everyone to hug the groundaffectionately.

Twenty-Second April, a day long to he remembered was cool and clear with good observation in allsectors. As planned, Battery "A" and Headquarters Battery, 92d Armored Field Artillery Battaliondisplaced at 0800 to forward positions with Battery "C" and the 2nd Rocket FA Battery. The BattalionCommander with the S-1 left on an extensive reconnaissance to include east-west and south-north roadsjust north of Chichon-ni, the reconnaissance party visited the 7th Marine CP to verify the location of frontline elements. Finding the line to IX Corps Artillery out, the Battalion Commander left for IX Corps Artilleryto talk with General Gillmore about engineer support. Over the radio, our artillery continued to engagelucrative enemy targets of unusual size. At approximately 1920 hours a radio message indicated that Co."C" of the 2nd Chemical Mortar Bn was overrun by the enemy. A short while later, Captain Hopkins,Battery Commander of the 2nd Rocket (FA) Battery called the Battalion Commander stating that he wasforced to displace some 2,000 yards to the rear as he was under enemy small arms fire. Challenging hisdecision, the Battalion Commander inquired into the Infantry situation. Captain Hopkins replied that theROK Infantry was passing his position on the double, toward the rear and that the 27th ROK Battalion hadabandoned some of their weapons. At this point the Battalion Commander concurred in his displacement.Shortly Captain Hines, the Battalion Liaison Officer with the 2nd ROK Regiment called the BattalionCommander and informed him that he had been ordered by KMAG to leave, that the situation wascompletely out of hand. The Battalion Commander inquired as to a defensive line to be occupied by thereserve - however no information was available. Now realizing, that this was an all out attack by the CCF,the Battalion Commander stopped at the nearest military installation to call General Gillrnore and appraisehim of the situation. General Gillmore concurred in the Battalion Commander's plan to displace the 8 inchHowitzer Battery (A-17) to the rear and then to close all administrative vehicles with their respectiveService Battery.

Captain Hopkins reported his Battery stalled on the road by elements of the 987th AFA. The 987th hadpulled out ahead of the 2nd Rocket Battery and jammed an M7 on a filled turn making it impossible tomove it forward or rearward without caving-in the entire fill. This action caused elements of the 2ndRocket Battery and of the 27th ROK Artillery to build up bumper to bumper. Arriving at the Battalion CP at2140 hours the road was filled with administrative vehicles returning to the rear followed by hundreds ofROK soldiers retreating pell-mell to the rear.

PFC Calvin C. Grant C Btry KIA 24 April 1951

23 A call from, General Gillmore directed the most forceful measures taken to prevent the destruction ofequipment, and to enforce order. Road blocks were set up and manned by officers of this command, togather retreating ROK soldiers. Groups of two and three hundred were marched forward in an effort torestore a defense. The Battalion Commander called the 987th on the radio and urged them to rally theirmen and not to-destroy .any equipment. Meanwhile, Captain Bessier Bn S-2, was ordered forward by theBattalion Commander in effort to consolidate the ROK soldiers and have them outpost the hills on bothsides of the vehicle column.

From 0100 hours thru 0400 hours, the stalled column reported enemy activity in the neighboring hillsevidenced by flares and firing. Some small arms fire was received. However, with news that a MarineBattalion was being dispatched it was believed that through faith and the rallying of man power thatdaylight would find the situation well under control. Through the night the Battalion engaged many enemytargets although there was no contact with forward observers. Throughout the night, the BattalionCommander, in direct contact with Captain Hopkins, Captain Hines and Captain Bessier tried toencourage them. A request from Captain Hopkins to destroy his equipment was denied in the belief thatthe worst had passed and that daylight would restore the situation in our favor. General Gillmore calledduring the night and urged the employment of most forceful measures available. Desperately as we triedto rally the ROK'S, of the several hundred returned forward only 40 had returned to Captain Bessler'slocation.

Around 0445, just as first light appeared and the full moon slid behind the hills, Captain Hopkins andCaptain Bessler reported the vehicle column under heavy attack by CCF on both sides of the road.Employing machine guns, mortars and grenades the CCF closed in on the column. With little hope forimmediate relief and in an effort to spare blood-shed, equipment was incapacitated by removingmechanisms on the 105's and back plates on machine guns and abandoned.

By 0630, Captain Hopkins, Captain Bessler, and Captain Hines and the enlisted men from the vehiclecolumn closed in to the Battalion area. Under terrific mental strain, some wounded; these brave men haddone an exemplary job. At 0650, General Gillmore arrived at the Battalion CP with the lead elements of theMarine Battalion. Captain Bessler, already tired and weary after his all night stand, accompanied theMarines forward. Going over the situation with General Gillmore, the Battalion was ordered to displace torearward positions in the vicinity of Chichon-ni.

At 0045 24 April, Colonel Winecoff, Commanding Officer of the 11th Marine Regiment called for theBattalion Commander to attend a meeting at his CP. Following a discussion on plan of withdrawl theBattalion Commander returned to the CP at 0230. Consistent with instructions, Battery "A" of the 17th FABn was alerted for movement at 0400. This Battalion was alerted to move at 0530 following a hotbreakfast. The command was up by 0400 hours striking tents and packing gear. A hot breakfast wasserved at 0445.

Just as the first light of day, was being followed by daylight, and menfinished breakfast, the Battalion position area was taken under intenseautomatic weapons fire from a hill mass some eight hundred yards away.Concurrently 10 to 12-rounds of 60mm mortar landed in "C" Batteriesposition. Full alert. was immediately sounded as men, ran to their battlestations in half-tracks and on the perimeter. In two minutes, theBattalion's three batteries were returning murderous fire into the series ofparallel trenches held by the enemy. The Battalion Commander from hisradio post in FDC contacted Battery Commanders and deployed Battery"A" in a horseshoe for direct fire purposes. Meanwhile Battery "C",apparently the initial objective of the enemy was charged by several CCFloaded down with grenades but without weapons. Battery "C" mowedthem down with individual weapons and machine guns. Observing twoCCF sheltered under an M41, Sgt. Theral C. Hatley jumped into his driverscompartment and ground them into the ground. Meanwhile the large tracers of enemy 50 calibers could be spotted fromdug-in positions near the top of the Hill.

MARIANO ARRENDONDO -A BATTERY KIA 24 APRIL 1951

OLIVER PORTER - A BATTERY KIA - 24 APRIL 1951

A Battery Howitzer - "on the way!" - South OfKapyong - May 1951 (Harrison)

24Observing these the Battalion Commander ordered Battery "A" to take them under direct fire with their155 howitzers. Using HE and White Phosphorous the machine guns were knocked out. Returning to theFDC the Battalion Commander was ordered to cease fire by the Marines who claimed that we wereshooting into their troops. The Battalion Commander assured the Marines that the fire we were receivingwere not rubber bullets and that we would continue to defend ourselves. Major Tucker, with the BattalionCommander in FDC, was wounded in the arm when one of the many bullets aimed at the FDC tent hit him.Captain Arnett promptly took care of Major Tucker as he gallantly went about treating the wounded. Bynow the men were over their initial scare. Confidence and boldness developed into brazenness as themen stood up in their holes taking "popshots" at groups of infiltrators trying to enter our position withgrenades to set, our ammunition trucks on fire. just as Captain Bessler was pointing out a sniper, hidden,behind a rockpile, to a Sergeant manning a 50 caliber in a truck, the Sergeant was -instantly killed, fallingat Captain Bessler's feet. Another man instantly manned the machine gun. By now the situation appearedunder control as the volume of enemy fire increased appreciably.

At about 0700 our A.O.P. reported into the net. Lt.Turner as spotter was made to search neighboringhills and draws. Spotting two or three groups of 20 or30 CCF our artillery was brought in with excellentresults. As Battery "C" cleaned up the last of theenemy they engaged enemy concentrations withindirect fire by radio. By 0730 everything was undercontrol as men grinned and exchanged remarks. Twoprisoners were taken and some 22 CCF killed within the Perimeter area as they at- tempted to infiltrateinto the position. As a result of the attack the Battalion suffered four killed and eleven wounded. By latercount, the Marines reported 179 enemy killed and wounded. Drilled and taught to cope with such asituation the Battalion rallied splendidly displaying gallantry and many acts of heroism. This proved to bea lucky day for Lt. Moody as a 30 Caliber entered his steel helmet from the right front, grazed the lobe ofhis ear leaving a big hole in the rear of the helmet. Officers wounded included Major Tucker and CaptainHine's, both evacuated.

April 1951 SummaryViewed in retrospect, the month of April saw the United Nations Forces well across the disputed 38thParallel, shoulder to shoulder, and with more artillery then ever before, crisscrossing from one Divisionsector to the other. ,Moving cautiously, with closely coordinated artillery and air support, the UnitedNations Forces probed deep and then consolidated their gains rapidly and systematically. Reports of theenemy's capabilities continued to confirm a heavy build-up of the enemy forces, capable of and expectedto launch a heavy spring offensive. Now fighting through extremely mountainous terrain devoid ofadequate road nets, many trails had to be developed for the deployment of our mechanized forces. Of theentire months happenings, the one fact that remained outstanding, was that our troops require ferventindoctrination to the degree that they possess complete confidence in their weapons, equipment andability. The mere presence of a numerically superior enemy is no basis for the abandonment anddestruction of valuable equipment. Our superior equipment, if properly manned, will contribute greatlytowards the individuals' protection. All men must be made to fight as infantry when necessary.

Unit History For May, 1951Fourteen May appeared heavily overcast graduallyturning to light rain lasting all l day. At 0915 hours aSpecial Service show group reported for aperformance within the Battalion area. A largecrowd enjoyed the show. At 0930 hours theBattalion Commander visited the Battalion rear area.The area was completely dug-in, entrenched andwired-in. The Battalion Commander returned to theCP at 1600 hours after a road reconnaissance. Thenewly improved roads were holding out well underthe slow steady rain.

Personal Reflection by Hal remspear HQ Btry 50-51

“May 19, 1951 We had been part of a massed artillery barrage for several days advancing towardthe Pukhan River Dam. The CCF counter attacked, and the ROK unit on our flank retreated. TheCCF was moving down a road toward our position. Our howitzers were frequently readjusting asthe targets got closer to our position. Our air observers reported enemy positions and casualtiesuntil dark. No matter how many rounds we fired or how many casualties the CCF suffered, theykept coming. Now we were firing at minimum range using charge one and maximum elevation.The 155s sounded very strange with a very subdued sound. After dark, the enemy could no longerbe observed. If he stayed on the current road, he would hit us head on. If he took the fork in theroad and followed the retreating ROKS, he would outflank us on our left. When he got too close tofire on, our guns were readjusted and fired at more distant known targets. Once again, I was deadtired as I crawled into my half-track and fell asleep oblivious to the noise or the danger. The next

day we discovered the CCF had chased the ROKs and avoided us.”

25

Seventeen May broke with a bang. At 0030 hours, the Artillery chattered madly in the 24th Division Sectorto our west where the 5th RCT was under heavy pressure. With a penetration in I company's sector, the5th RCT pulled back another 3,000 yards at 0330 hours, leaving our left flank, against the Pukhan,seriously exposed. Our blocking force, Company G, 2nd Battalion, 21st Regiment had a ringside seat onthe East bank of the Pukhan. Meanwhile, to our immediate front no enemy effort was reported. At 0430 hours, a message from the 24thDivision reported the 5th RCT pulling back another 1,500 yards -placing a ford across the Pukhan intoenemy territory. Around 0440 hours, an enemy message, intercepted by the ROK'S, ordered the CCF toavoid hill tops as they were receiving too many casualties from our Artillery. Another message, receivedaround 0500 hours ordered the CCF to move East and attack South. By 0730 hours, our outposts beganspotting enemy concentrations north of the Pukhan and just across the dam on hill 174.

Lieutenant Hertz, with good communications, on his perch overlooking the river and the dam broughtour Artillery to bear with devastating results. Realizing the dam as a natural avenue of approach and theonly crossing of the wide Pukhan, behind the dam, our artillery interdicted the dam densely andirregularly. Meanwhile our artillery blasted away on hill 174 just north of the darn. An air OP reported 300casualties on hill 174. Shifting from target to target to our front, showing no mercy, the artillery of "LindyLou" by1000 hours had fired some 1,800 rounds on the enemy with excellent results. Meanwhile to theNortheast in the 2nd Regiment Zone, the Liaison Officer reported the Infantry pulling back under enemypressure. In attempting to bring artillery to bear he reported that he had to move out. In this zone, theenemy using crude rafts and tree branches and benefitting from the shallow river bed, infiltrated his waySouth in conjunction with the deployment of a heavy enemy force to the East. Communications with allforward installations remained excellent at all times. At 1020 hours, IX Corps Artillery ordered Task Force"Lindy Lou" to displace by Battery to positions some 4,000 yards to the rear.

Eighteen May found a full moon by which the CCF continued to press the 24th Division to our left.However our lines held as Artillery blasted away in TOT's massing more artillery than we had heretoforein Korea. Ammunition trains worked desperately to keep ammunition by the guns as all availabletransport was utilized to haul ammunition.

Nineteen May appeared overcast with light showers. Lieutenant Hertz ,and Lieutenant Venablecontinued to press forward seeking out enemy targets. Again, at best our artillery could fire onlyinterdiction and harassing missions of our own choosing as our Liaison Officer, Captain Lousteau,continued to report no communications with the companies. Targets picked up by our observers had tobe scrutinized carefully as one Company did not know the location of the other. Generally, the enemyhid out in heavily wooded evergreen patches apparently awaiting resupply before he resumed hisefforts. During the afternoon several Company-size groups were fired upon through our observerswith good results. Moving with the Infantry our observers reported the ROK Infantry as unwilling toengage the enemy.

Firing Battery Spring 1951 (Mattingly)

26 Upon receiving fire, the ROK Infantry failed to deploy and maneuver to engage the enemy. Theypreferred to pull back and call for artillery. Mortars were not employed and the use of machine guns wasrare.

Twenty May found a full moon. All available artillery crunched the enemy's every effort to penetrate ourlines. By morning the Battalion Commander requested permission to return the artillery to its formerlocation. With General Gillmore's concurrence, the artillery closed by 1030 hours. Visiting the 31stRegiment the Battalion Commander recommended positive measures to insure better communications.The use of mortars on enemy targets' was encouraged. With the enemy's initial efforts thwarted - theUnited Nations sought to convert his spring offensive into a United Nations offensive. Crippled by thedevastating fire power, the enemy was forced to pause for regrouping, consolidation and resupply.

It was in this off-balance position that the United Nationsunleashed its might on twenty May. In zone, the 32nd and 17thRegiments moved out in the attack leaving the disorganized 31stin reserve. As Lieutenants Hertz and Venable pressed forwardwith the Infantry gains of 4 to 5 thousand yards were registered.The enemy's complexion had changed from one ofdetermination to one of reluctance. He refused to engage ourforces. All along the general defense line -the fire power of theUnited Nations poured steel into every enemy concentration.Following this great barrage of artillery and air the UN Forcesmoved out in pursuit of the defeated enemy.

The great enemy Spring Offensive had been turned into a United Nations victory. To our front as theenemy sought to escape north - our artillery pinned him down. Tired and weary after several days ofsustained firing under heavy tension - the personnel of Task Force "Lindy L:ou" enjoyed a reasonablenight's sleep - proud of their accomplishments.

Twenty three May was clear after 1100 hours. Many large groups of CCF were observed retreatingNorth. At 0830 hours the Battalion Commander and S-3 proceeded North on reconnaissance. At 1330hours the Battalion Commander visited Headquarters, IX Corps Artillery and received instructions tomove the Battalion into the vicinity of Saggong-ni. The Battalion was alerted to move at 1405 hours andclosed in its forward positions at 1430 hours. A change in the Task Force organization returned Battery"C" to this Battalion, leaving the 2nd Rocket Battery attached. Battery "13" of the 937th FA (Long Tom)Battalion was attached to the Battalion. The Battalion could not fire on targets due to communicationdifficulties with the ROK units. Plans for early displacements in the morning were made. No missionswere fired during the night. Twenty five May appeared warm with a heavy smog hanging over most valleys. This smog, possibly theresult of fires started by the Chinese to conceal their retreat, hampered our observation in mostsectors. Throughout the front the Chinese fled North. Outflanked and cut-off they hideout in woodeddraws until flushed out by artillery. This morning an aerial observer observed a group of about twohundred swimming the Pukhan River in an attempt to escape. Promptly engaged by our time-fire, anestimated 150 were killed.

Twenty seven May found the Battalion up at 0430 hours in a pouring rain. After a warm breakfast themen struck camp and were ready to roll at 0615 hours. The Battalion Commander and BatteryCommanders departed on reconnaissance at 0615 hours, arriving in Chunchon at 0730 hours. Positionswere selected Northeast of Chunchon from which the Battalion could support the 7th Infantry and 6thROK Divisions.

Thirty May appeared overcast and rainy hampering our observation. Throughout the morning hours, theartillery continued to chatter at enemy targets. The enemy, apparently a relatively small force, was makinga determined stand for the Hwachon-Kumwha corridor.

27Thirty one May made a heavy overcast appearance gradually giving way to sunny skies by 1200 hours.Friendly air became active as weather cleared and engaged several enemy targets. During the day theBattalion Commander reconnoitered North and East for road nets and suitable artillery positions. Allalong the Hwachon Reservoir hundreds of pack animals and carts had been knocked out by artillery andair. Several artillery pieces of 76 and 105 caliber were observed by the road side, with some fifteen 20mmantiaircraft weapons. Dead Chinese, victims of artillery and air lined the road and the stench wasrevolting. Our position area gradually dried out after being submerged by the heavy downpour.

May 1951 in RetrospectViewed in retrospect the month of May first found the United Nations Forces completely disengagedfrom the enemy. Well dug-in, behind a highly organized defense-line that boasted an unprecedentedquantity of criss crossing artillery fire, the United Nations awaited the CCF's next move. finally on Mayeighteen, his long awaited Spring Offensive was launched in its typical mass of humanity. However,unmercifully, the steel of the United Nations fire power withered the enemy's mass of flesh. Extended,committed, the enemy was seriously hurt. In this sensitive and vulnerable position the United Nationslaunched an offensive that caught the enemy off balance and licking, his wounds. During the balance ofMay the United Nations Forces not only recrossed the disputed 38th Parallel but cut deeply into NorthKorea. Several large enemy troop concentrations were surrounded and cut-off. Several thousandprisoners were taken and much equipment was destroyed. In a highlight feature of the Korean War,United Nations Artillery chewed away at large enemy troop concentrations attempting to escape,destroying hundreds of pack-animals, wagons and supplies. The toll in enemy killed ran into severalthousands. Prisoners testified that they could not withstand the deadliness of United Nations Artilleryand Air. Thus May saw the Chinese Spring Offensive smartly turned into a United Nations pursuit. At theclose of this month the United Nations stood poised, ready to drive for the Chorwon-Kumha Corridor.During this period the Battalion fired its 60th thousand round in Korea.

Unit History for June, 1951

Two June broke heavily fogged-over in most sectors gradually clearing by 1000 hours. Air OP's riskingthe fog again spotted lucrative enemy targets which were promptly taken under Artillery fire. At 0700hours reconnaissance parties departed for the assignment of a new position in Hwachon. The Battalionminus Battery "B" and Service followed 30 minutes later. Units closed in new positions by 0930 hoursand promptly engaged enemy targets. At 1100 hours the Battalion Commander called General Gillmoreand suggested that Battery "B" be moved forward. General Gillmore concurring, the BattalionCommander displaced Battery "B" at 1400 hours and the 2nd Rocket FA Battery with the Battalion inHwachon.Four June continued overcast and rainy. Our Infantry continued to push forward slowly and cautiouslyagainst sporadic resistance. The enemy, well dug-in in layered bunkers, was difficult to extricate. At1130 hours IX Corps Artillery requested a road reconnaissance be made to the North West toSangsillaeri.

Nine June continued overcast with heavy intermittent showers. The Battalion Commander and BatteryCommanders continued to press reconnaissance forward. In the left sector good progress was made by ourInfantry. However in the right sector resistance proved a little more determined in the form of a delayingaction along the road axis to Kumhwa. Under determined effort, the enemy yielded ground, apparentlyresolved to withdraw beyond the great Chorwon-Kumhwa Corridor.

Thirteen June was clear providing good observation throughout the day. The long hours of daylight rangingfrom about 0515 hours through 1130 hours gave the enemy few hours rest from our air. To our front theenemy continued to fight a delaying action. Our forces already in Chorwon anti Kumwha pressed the enemysufficiently to give up large stores of supplies. Throughout the day our artillery engaged groups of fromforty to a hundred enemy attempting to work their way North through mountain trails. On this day theBattalion fired its sixty thousandth round in Korea.

C Battery Firing 75,000th round in

Korea 1951 (Turner)

1951 - Battlefieldcommission for NCO

Sgt. Elder (Mattingly)

B Battery 1951 (Thorne)

28Seventeen June broke exceptionally clear developing into a beautiful summer day. Friendly air was activeall day long developing several enemy targets to our front. Brigadier General Gillmore visited theBattalion at 1330 hours. At 1410 hours the Battalion Commander proceeded North and West onreconnaissance to within three miles of Kumhwa. Position areas were selected should the need arise tooccupy them. At 1630 hours Protestant services were held. At 1915 hours a meeting with all officers washeld at which time rotation and the efficiency of the Command were discussed. During the day menenjoyed showers at the Battalion shower point, installed in a nearby creek. Small, compact, the showerunit imposed no transportation problem to the command and proved a great morale factor.

Twenty-five June made a clear appearance developing into thewarmest day of the year. Friendly air was active throughoutthe day striking at enemy assembly areas and fortifications. At1200 hours Lieutenant General Hoge, Commanding General,IX U.S. Corps fired the 75,000th projectile in Korea. At a simpleceremony, General Hoge and General Gillmore were presentedwith the 75,000th projectile-appropriately marked. The CorpsCommander and Corps Artillery Commander assisted in theramming. Lieutenant General Hoge pulled the lanyard assistedby General Gillmore. A turkey dinner was served following theceremony with General Hoge and General Gillmore as dinneras guests of the Battalion Commander.

June 1951 in Retrospect

June witnessed the UN Forces, once again shoulder to shoulder,pressing the enemy well North of the 38th Parallel as he sought to execute an orderly delaying action. To thisend, the enemy displayed considerable skill and efficiency through his ability to hold up our advance, whenhe chose, with small groups of troops, well dug-in and equipped with automatic weapons, covered by mortarand some artillery. Caught under the pressure of the UN pursuit, closing-in on his heavy built-up area ofChorwon - Pyonggong, Kumhwa, and South East through Hwachon to Inje in the East, the enemy struggledto extricate his supplies of food, ammunition and equipment. Only partially successful, large cache's ofsupplies were abandoned in irrigation ditches, natives homes and freshly dug holes in cultivated fields.

Apparently uncertain as to the United Nations Offensiveintentions, the enemy gave ground rapidly across the Southernmountain mass overlooking the great plains connectingWonsan with the "Iron Triangle". In fact, the enemy gave upreal estate more quickly that the UN Forces cared to acquire,as evidenced by several pauses through the latter part of June.The enemy, however, reacted quickly to our hesitancy bymoving in and digging-in acrossfrom line "Ermine" from whichpositions he defended and patrolledstubbornly. The area from line"Ermine", North through Kumsongcould have been ours uncontested,had the UN Forces been interested inreal estate. The latter part of the

month witnessed Battalion size limited-objective attacks aimed at keeping theenemy "off balance" and confused. These attacks caused considerable loss to theenemy in equipment and supplies as he was dislodged from his bunkers.Unit History for July 1951Four July, the 175th Anniversary of our Independence appeared clear and coolerwith a high overcast that did not hinder observation. Activity to the frontcontinued relatively quiet with only minor incidents. During the day the NationalColors, Battalion Standard and "Red Devil" flag were displayed, with allBatteries furnishing guards.

Rok Presidential Unit Citation

Chinese POWs taken in Summer 1951 (McMenemy)

29At 1145 hours Battery Commanders assembled their Commands around the guns for the firing of thesalute to the Nation. The 48 gun salute was fired at five second interval beginning at 1200 hours.Following this the Preamble to the Constitution and the opening portion of the Declaration ofIndependence was read to all men. At 1300 hours, at a representative ceremony, SFC Earl F Elder ofService Battery was commissioned a 2nd Lt., Artillery. At 1530 hours Brigadier General Gillmore,Commanding General of IX Corps Artillery visited the Battalion. Everyone listened to the newsbroadcasts for the latest developments on cease fire talks.

A letter from Headquarters Eighth Army dated 10 July, informed theBattalion that it was entitled to the ROK Presidential Unit Citationfor action with the 7th Infantry Division during the period 15through 27 September 1950.

Twenty July continued heavily overcast with continuous wind-driven showers apparently signifying thearrival of the long awaited Monsoon season. With the Battalion area a quagmire of mud, men attemptedto drain and improve irrigation of the area. Some classes were held in tents but most outdoor traininghad to be cancelled. Battery B, of the 17th FA Bn. continued to improve its position under a serioushandicap of mud.

Twenty-three July made a heavily overcast appearance with threatening showers that gradually gave wayto clear weather. As defined by an Eighth U.S. Army directive this Battalion was entitled to five Battlestars for Korea.

Thirty-one July appeared overcast after several heavy showers during the night. On this last day of July theBattalion continued to reinforce the fires of the 24th Division Artillery and those of the 18th ROK FieldArtillery Battalion. The Battalion's strength rested at 29 Officers, 3 Warrant Officers and 607 enlisted men.

July 1951 in Retrospect

July may be characterized by its relative inactivitywherein both sides, dug-in and dispatched patrolsinto one another's lines. Influenced by the cease firenegotiations in Kaesong, both sides displayedrestrained aggressiveness. During July, the UnitedNations Forces launched several limited objectiveattacks aimed at keeping the enemy off balance andobtaining timely enemy order of battle information.Prisoners taken to our front revealed the arrival ofnew units replacing those encountered in June'sadvance.

During July sufficient enlisted replacements werereceived to realize the rotation of two-thirds of theBattalion's original personnel. Regrettably, officerreplacements continued scarce with a total of one received during July. Three Sergeants were awardedBattlefield Commissions during July, to bring the total to eight, received in Korea.End - Excerpts From 92nd AFA BN Book By Col. Leon F. Lavoie

WILLIAM F. LONG -KILLED IN ACTION 14OCTOBER 1951(Long Family)

DONALD JOHNSON - B BATTERY

KIA 5 NOVEMBER 1951

Lt. Col. Edward Cleveland CO

January 1952 - August 1952

Lt. Col. Dale E.Buchanan COSeptember 1951 - January1952

CHRISTOPHER DONALL KIA 7 MARCH 1952

30

Begin: Excerpt from “92nd AFA BN History”

August 1951 And Thereafter

The 92nd spent the latter part of 1951 and most of 1952 in support of various ROK and Americandivisions in the Kumhwa Valley area on the central front facing hill 1062 (Papa San). The Red Devils werein direct support of the ROK 2nd Div and the U.S. 7th Div in the battle for Triangle Hill during October.

End: Excerpt from “92nd AFA BN History”

Osong Mountain (background) friendly

outpost (foreground) - view taken from the

MLR (Settlemire)

31

Begin: Excerpts from article “Struggle for Kumhwa Ridges” By John Randolph

Central Front Korea, Nov. 1, 1952 (AP)Savage Battles Among Ridges

Editors Note - For two weeks bloody fighting hasbeen swirling about Triangle Hill and Sniper Ridgein Korea. Why have both sides seen fit to sacrificeso many men for these hills, and what is thefighting like? Mr. Randolph, 34, a veteran reporterfrom Michigan, here describes the actual fighting.He was decorated with the Silver Star a year ago byGen. Van Fleet for helping carry woundedinfantrymen to safety.

Osong Mountain (Papa San), strongest Communist fortress in Korea, looms over Kumhwa Valley abrooding, sinister, evil shape. Below its five greatrocky bastions two long ranges topped by the crestsof Triangle Hill and Sniper Ridge, stretch to thesoutheast deep in Allied territory. To wincommanding heights of Sniper Ridge and TriangleHill of these two lesser ranges, the Allies have beenfighting a savage, swaying battle since the morningof Oct. 14 - and the end is not yet.

Losses About EqualThe losses of brave men in this concentrated bloody violence cannot be revealed at this time. But whenthe numbers are made public, this bitter struggle for the Kumhwa ridges will take its rightful place amongthe more terrible battles of the Korean war - Kunu, the Changjin Reservoir, Hoengsongs Massacre Valleyand Heartbreak Ridge. For it has been one of the major actions of the war, a solid Allied assault against afortified hill system by the full strength of two divisions, one American and one South Korean. The losseswere shared almost equally. Americans will be both proud and sad at the deeds of their young men in theSeventh Infantry Division. And the Colombians and Ethiopians whose battalions were on these hills, canbe assured that their sons fought among the best.

Hq Btry formation summer 1952 (Settlemire)

Triangle Hill Through The BC Scope Fall 1952 (Crosby)

32

To understand this battle, you must see the land in your minds eye. Imagine the crouching Sphinx ofEgypt looking Southeast. Its big head and heavy shoulders are reared high. In front stretch two long leancat legs, ending in curled paws.

LEFT LEG SNIPER RIDGE

The head and the shoulders are Onsong. The right

leg is Triangle and its cluster of smaller heights -Jane Russell, Pikes Peak -- and Little Sandy. Theleft leg is Sniper Ridge, with Pinpoint Hill near thepaw and The Yoke a ridge junction closer to theSphinx. Onsong itself is a bulky mass, made up offive towering ridges that curve inward to a centralcrest, like a five armed swastika or a whirlingpinwheel. Its top rises 3500 feet from the valleybelow. Today the Allies are on both southeasternridges leading up to the Sphinx itself, still fightinghard, and about half way up to the legs. Just off theSphinxs right paw is Kumwha Junction, once abustling provincial capital , but now only a flatpasture - if there were only cattle to graze on it.

A STRATEGIC SPOT

Even without walls and people, Kumhwa is an important place, theexact strategic center of the 155 mile Korean front, and one of the mostimportant Allied positions in Korea. It still is the junction of five roads, ariver and a railroad that may someday run again. It is also the easternanchor of the central Korean plain that is known as the Iron Trianglewhich is held half by the U.N. and half by the Communists. Moreimportant than that, Kumhwa is the Seoul invasion gateway on thenortheast. There is no doubt that as long as the enemy holds Osong -to say nothing of the Sphinxs legs, Kumwha is not safe. For a year anda half, during daylight, Chinese eyes have watched every man andtruck that crossed that junction, and night or day, winter or summer,Kumhwa receives more shells than rain.

ATTACK IS LAUNCHED

Gen. Van Fleet gave the orders that put the Kumhwa front into motion in the early dawn of October 14,

sending U.S. Seventh Division against the Triangle Hill ridges and the ROK Second Division againstSniper. As for the fighting itself, it reached a pitch of ferocity that, with the similar battle for White HorseHill, is new to Korea. In almost every way, it resembles - on a narrow sector - the savage trench warfare inFlanders in the first world war. It is also akin to such deadly World War II fights as Monte Cassino,Tarawa, Iwo Jima, Saipan and Okinawa. When the full tale is told, it may lead some of these in loss of life.

7th Inf Div wounded on Hill 598 Kumwha Oct.

1952

Kumwha - Triangle Hill (foreground) Hill 1062

(background)- October 1952(Settlemire)

92nd barrage landing on Triangle Hill

Air Strike on Hill 1062 1952 (Settlemire)

33

SHELLS CRASH STEADILY

Look out the narrow slit of a forward observationbunker and imagine desolate brown mountaincrests, bathed in full sunlight, stripped of trees andplants, and churned to ashy sand by the consistentcrash of shells. Tiny figures - men - work their wayup the sandy slopes that are as pitted as apockmarked face, one shell hole merging intoanother. Every few seconds an incoming shell (thisis quiet firing, not a real barrage) bursts on thecrest or slopes, sending up an ugly burst of brown-black smoke and churning the sand with jaggedsteel fragments. Many miss, but some land amongthe attackers. Then litter bearers converge andslowly struggle down the slopes, still under fire,with their torn burdens.

GIs PRESS FORWARD

Up on the crest - and there are both Koreansand Americans there - men inch their wayforward through paths of machine-gun bulletsand among the shell bursts, hoping to blind aChinese bunker with their rifles or flamethrowers and then to blow it in with blocks ofTNT. This is the deadliest job of all. Whether itsucceeds or fails some of these men in thedemolition and fire parties are almost alwayskilled or wounded as they leap from shell holeto shell hole.

PLAN RUSHING ATTACK

From time to time an air strike hits the enemy mountainwith bombs or napalm, the screams of the jets in theirpower dives sounding all too much like an incomingwhopper. As darkness falls, the shell bursts turn toflashes of orange and yellow, and you know that in theblack night men on one side or the other are creepingforward, seeking out weak spots for a rushing attack.When there is a night battle, to get light for their machinegunners the Allies turn on batteries of searchlights whileflare planes and star shells hang new lights in the sky.

North of Chorwon - late November 1952 (Settlemire)

34

Red tracers from machine guns cut the air like Roman candles; green and red Chinese signal flares soarup and up and up; and the firing rises to a crescendo as the artillery of each side works itself into a fury.

The brown familiar peaks of daytime become strange monsters in the thin blue flare light; erratic smoketrails daub the sky like a futuristic nightmare. It is a premiere of hell. Out of the lonely center of the fire,little lost figures of men grapple one another in the shaking light, shooting, clubbing, stabbing, hurlinggrenades, and even choking with the bare hands. Somehow, in the confusion, one side fells victory andthe other gives ground. The fighters break apart, the losers pull back, the winners to burrow feverishlyinto the shifting sand..

DAYLIGHT IN EAST

The artillery dies down to random thudding. Another eternity has passed. There is daylight in the east.

The shadows melt away, and it is dawn again, with the long fingers of the sun picking out the freshbodies on the hill. Men huddle in their holes, thankful for the warm sun, fearful for the new day, and theguns mutter their endless liturgy of death.

End -Excerpts from article “Struggle for Kumhwa Ridges” By John Randolph

Begin: Excerpt from “92nd AFA BN History”

In November of 1952, as the North Koreanwinter moved in with snow and below zero

temperatures, the 92nd moved westward northof Chorwon to support the U.S. units on the

front line. Major casualties occurred during June-July

1953 shortly before the truce was signed whilethe 92nd was providing support for OutpostHarry. This engagement had an especially

heavy counter battery barrage directed at the92nd, and incoming rounds were received in all

the firing batteries. Able Battery was hardesthit with two killed and 17 wounded.

End: Excerpt from “92nd AFA BN History”

HERMAN L. McCOLLUM A BATTERY KIA 17 JUNE 1953

WILLIAM T. MOORE - A BATTERY KIA 17 JUNE 1953

KENNETH R. BASHAM - B BATTERY KIA 8 FEBRUARY 1953

Air Section L-19 - James Dorland was KIA over enemyterritory as an air observer and Landon Reid was takenas a POW on 26 March 1953.

JAMES N. DORLAND - HQ BATTERY - KIA 26 MARCH 1953

35

36

MARCH 1953

Begin: Excerpts from “Memorable Battles of the Korean War”Outpost Harry : See Web Pages http://www.ophsa.org/ and http://www.kwvm.com/

“HOLD AT ALL COSTS. Dan Braucherof Willowbrook, Illinois, a member ofthe Korean War Museum, remindedAmerica not to forget the siege ofOutpost Harry by writing an articleabout OP Harry in the September 1992issue of The Graybeards. InGraybeards, Dan summed up theevents of one of the worst battles inKorean War history. We ran across hisarticle while browsing through oldeditions of the magazine not long ago, and found it to be a perfect complement to interviews which havebeen conducted by the staff of the Korean War and Douglas County Museums in Tuscola. Member MartinMarkley, who was a company commander at OP Harry, told us a few other details about Harry for ourarticle. We combined the Braucher/Markley information, excerpts from interviews, information fromdeclassified documents, and data from government military records to bring our viewers this featurearticle about Outpost Harry.

Harry was an outpost east of the Chorwon Valley with sister outposts to the West called Tom and Dick.OP Dick was about 100 yards in front of the Main Line of Resistance, and Tom was about 250-300 yardsin front and below the MLR. The later was the floor of the valley. Harry, which was over 400 yards fromthe MLR, was also higher than the MLR, making supply much more difficult. The route to the outpost wasunder constant enemy observation and fire, and its height made it harder to pack supplies up the hill.Unlike Tom and Dick, which could get supporting fire from the MLR, Harry got less close supporting firefrom the MLR because company 60mm mortars and the heavy machine guns did not have enough range.Harry relied more on artillery and heavy mortars companies. For political leverage (and because Harryhad a commanding view of all the division area which the Chinese Communist Forces wanted), the CCFwere attempting to take Harry, and as many UN Outposts as possible before the soon-to-be cease fire(July 27, 1953). If the CCF took Harry, they would have controlled the entire area.

In a war zone, each unit is assigned an area ofresponsibility - sometimes yards, sometimes miles,depending on the size and number of units availablein the area as well as the terrain. Outposts Tom, Dickand Harry were in the Third Infantry Division area ofresponsibility for weeks before the infamous June1953 siege took place. The 15th Infantry Regimentwas responsible for Harry and Tom at that time, andthe Greeks who were attached to the 15th InfantryRegiment were responsible for OP Dick. The 65thInfantry Regiment went to reserve June 5, leaving the3rd battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment in chargeof the immediate OP Harry sector, with King yards ofthe MLR. If outposts were lost to the CCF the MLRand the route to South Korea would be in gravejeopardy so orders came down from 8th Armythrough the 3rd Division to "hold it at all costs."

92 AFA BN road march to Kumsong

area June/July 1952 (Dwyer)

37In the evening of June 10th, K Company, commanded by Capt. Martin A. Markley, was hit by a largenumber of CCF after a tremendous artillery and mortar barrage. Markley had been briefed earlier that dayon what was about to happen on Harry, and he in turn briefed his men. Ammo and communications werechecked, as were final protective fires. "Everyone prepared to fight," said Markley, "and some knew theywould likely die."

CCF regiment-sized forces (three infantry battalions, tanks, mortars -- at least three times larger than abattalion) hit and succeeded in overrunning the outpost for a time. When K company got under cover inbunkers, friendly Variable Time (VT) artillery was called in to stop the CCF attack. The artillery roundsexploded in the air rather than on impact, and this, plus hand-to-hand combat, finally drove the CCF offof Harry that night. K Company was so depleted that they were immediately reinforced by a reserveplatoon and then replaced by another company of the 3rd Battalion.

The CCF continued their nightly attacks with forces up to 3600 and thousands of artillery and mortarrounds. All nine rifle companies of the 15th Infantry, as well as units of the Greek battalion and 5th RCT,took part in reinforcing and holding Harry against tremendous odds. Estimates are that 88,810 enemyrounds over 81mm size, as well as mortars, were fired on Harry during the course of the main attacks. Friendly mortar and artillery units in conjunction with friendly tank fired 368,185 rounds over 81mm size.

The 39th and the 58th Field Artillery, as well as the 92ndArmored Field Artillery, were firing as fast as possible. The topof the outpost was so pulverized with artillery and mortar firethat bodies were later found eight feet below the existingsurface. This photo of Harry, taken in March of 1953, shows ableak and rocky incline. The enemy forces employed againstOutpost Harry during the period 10-18 June were tabulated byIntelligence Sections to be substantially as follows June 10-1l -a reinforced CCF regiment of approximately 3,600 CCF; June11-12 - a CCF regiment of approximately 2,850; June 12-13 - areinforced CCF regiment; June 13-14 - an estimated 100 CCF;June 14-15 - an estimated 120 CCF; June 15-17 - negative; June17-18 - a CCF regiment. Several UN companies involved tookup to 80% casualties.

Declassified information about Outpost Harry now shows that"hold at all costs" meant a high price in human lives. From June 10 to the 18th, the casualty figure was15th Infantry Regiment - 68 KIA, 343 WIA, 35 MIA; KATUSA - 8 KIA, 51 WIA, 7 MIA; Greek Force - 15 KIA, 36WIA, 1 MIA. Attached and supporting units 5th RCT - 13 KIA, 67 WIA, 1 MIA; 10th Engr. Bn. - 5 KIA, 23WIA; 39th FA - 5 KIA, 13 WIA. Armored personnel carriers and tanks were used to evacuate the WIAs andthe KIAs in the aftermath of each attack. Replacement companies and engineers also joined in carryingthe dead and wounded down the hill so they could be transported on to an aid station. When fighting,Markley noted, medical attention often had to wait. Buddies helped each other, often giving first aid untilthe medics arrived. The 15th "Can Do" Infantry Regiment held Outpost Harry at a dear price againstoverwhelming odds. This action prevented a CCF breakthrough just before the truce. From June 10 toJune 18, the entire 74th CCF Division was utilized against this position and at the end of the engagementwas considered combat ineffective. Overall, the enemy casualties at Outpost Harry were KIA (counted) -223; KIA (estimated) - 1450; WIA 3000.”

End - Excerpts from “Memorable Battles of the Korean War”

Lt. Col. Ralph ElliottCO February 1953 -September 1953

92nd AFA Bn Firing Battery 1953(Dwyer)

38

Begin: Excerpt from “92nd AFA BN History”

92nd AFA BN Action July 1953

“In mid-July 1953 the Communist Chinese Forces launched their last large scaleoffensive of the Korean War. The attack, which consisted of ten enemydivisions, was the largest offensive in two years. The firing batteries of thebattalion, after having sustained horrific artillery, rocket, and mortar fire on theevening of July 13, were again taken under direct attack by communist regularforces. When faced with mass attacking human waves in overwhelmingnumbers, the batteries were ordered to conduct a strategic withdrawal. Bakerand Charlie Batteries found themselves being infiltrated by communist Chinesesoldiers. Conducting a breakout, Baker and Charlie Batteries fought their wayfrom the encirclement and were soon reestablished and immediately becameoperational. Setting the Howitzers in record time, Baker and Charlie went fromtotal disengagement to pouring shells back into the advancing communistforces. The tenacity and fortitude of these men served as an example of bravery under fire to every RedDevil in the battalion. By this time the 92nd had gained a reputation of unexcelled excellence

The advance was stopped 36 hours after it began. During this time the 92nd sustained two enlisted

soldiers killed, the S-2 Officer was killed, and twenty seven were wounded and eight Red Devils listed asmissing in action. Most of the MIAs were repatriated in Operation Big Switch concluding the final peaceaccord. In the 36 hours of solid combat it stands as a tribute to the Red Devils of the limited human loss.This fact clearly speaks to the professionalism and skill craft learned in the earlier bitter battles by the92nd.”

End - Excerpt from “92nd AFA BN History”

Begin: Excerpt From Hugh R. Lafferty, Personal Reflection:

“Retired Captain Artillery, 1st Lt. Arty Korea Battery C, 92nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion

Early July 1953, most of us realized this Korea Conflict(never a declared war) was "winding down" and would beover soon. Intelligence reports from Army and Corp filtereddown re a possible enemy thrust near Kumsong, CentralFront. Objective? Straigkiten out the MLR (front line MainLine of Resistance) before the Armistice. Our lines trackednortheast for a few hundred yards and the Chinese didn'tlike this "spike in the lines". They wanted the killer linesnice and neat--east to west. Those of us who did thefighting had a simple question and comment "So what?""Let the bastards have the turf. Pull back and tell them toenjoy it. Is four hundred yards of trench worth morebloodshed?" Our brass-on-high decided to teach those upstart Chinesea lesson. They would move every cannon in Corp Artilleryinto temporary positions behind this Salient and by God,the Chinese would cringe at this show of force. And, what's more, the brass insisted, the crack ROK FirstDivision was in the front line trenches and no enemy would dare attempt a break through. No sir. Piece ofcake. On July 9, 1953 all Corp Artillery units left their permanent positions in a bold daylight move tosupport positions behind this "Salient". The thousands of Chinese who watched this bizarre show offorce had to smile ...

My battery, Battery C, was ordered into a narrow steep walled "mini canyon" position approximately 400yards behind the front lines. It was hardly suitable for a heavy mortar company, let alone a 155 mmhowitzer battery. Foolish.

JAMES BRADLEY - SERVICE BATTERY - KIA 14 JULY 1953

VERNON MEADOWS - SERV & B BATTERY - KIA 14 JULY 1953

ROBERT L. NICKSON - B BATTERY KIA 14 JULY 1953

RICHARD L. PEDERSEN - C BATTERY - KIA 14 JULY 1953

PATRICK C. REID - HQ BATTERY KIA 14 JULY 1953

39 Fortunately, we "marched stripped down" (road marched in column with just basic equipment and loads)to the new position. Forty (approx) men and auxiliary equipment and several "non-combat" vehiclesremained in our "permanent" position. Every man volunteered to move into the new "Salient" Position.Headquarters "suggested" our permanent position be occupied to prevent pilfering; commandspecifically stated all units would return to permanent positions when "this Salient thing with theChinese" was over. It would only take a couple of days...

During a preliminary reconnaissance of the new area before the move, I realized there was one way inand the same way out of out that narrow hell hole. If the enemy did break through the front lines, somethree-four hundred yards in front of us, could seal off the mouth of the canyon and pick us off. My driver,Corporal Willard Rudd and I went out on another recon after we occupied the mini-canyon position anddid find an ancient trail running east and west in front of us and parallel to the front lines. It was obviousour tank howitzers couldn't handle the steep hill trail, and, we'd be exposed to the full brunt of enemyfire, some three hundred yards away across noman's land. We were, my opinion, in a trap. Telephonerequests (to the best of memory) to headquarters requesting a move to an alternate position wereignored.

The summer rains had raised the water level in our mini canyon position to almost surface level. Weliterally crammed six self propelled howitzers and other supporting equipment and vehicles into this minicanyon and found ourselves battling mud, rats and, of grave concern, sinking howitzers. There was noway really to buoy them up out of the slime. Cannoneers prevailed and used stones, rotten tree limbs,anything under tank treads and gun platforms. Back breaking tasks.

For centuries, the Koreans have relied on human and animal excrement to fertilize their crops. Beautifulvegetables. Of course the average length of an intestinal tape worm in one of the natives or a ROKsoldier with gut blown open was about six feet. And the stench in the area. Impossible to describe. Ourdrinking water supply was limited. Our medics and I were concerned about sanitary conditions ...washing hands and mess gear was practically impossible. We ate soggy C rations, or went without.

The rain didn't let up after we occupied "Shitville". We floated and sloshed and the men never flinchednor did they complain. We were limited to "high angle fire" artillery support missions because themassive hill-wall in front of our howitzers was too steep for standard fire missions. We were finally ableto buoy up the howitzers and prevent them from sinking. However, the angle of fire (howitzer tubesalmost vertical) shifted the center of gravity of the main tank frame such that the gun platforms at therear of each piece were SINKING into the muck.

On the night of July 12, 1953, the enemy "found the range" with deadly "Willie Peter" (WhitePhosphorous shells) and peppered us constantly. All we could do was burrow into the muck and keepfiring.

During the day, July 13, 1953, action lessened. It wastoo damn quiet and at nightfall, we found out why.The ROK division we were supporting (SouthKoreans) left the line and headed south. It wasplanting time and what the hell, the war was soon tobe over ... so let's "bug out". The Chinese began theirpatrol probes the afternoon of July 13. We reportedthis to battalion but received no acknowledgment.Later, we realized that Battery C was the onlyopposition between fifty thousand Chinese ready tomarch south and attack the main Corp Artillery forceto our rear.

We were still in position before dawn, July 14, 1953.Enemy small arms fire and rats all around us. Wecouldn't raise Battalion on the telephone or via radio.We couldn't leave. Orders are orders.

92nd AFA Barage Landing -1953 (Williams)

40

Finally, we were ordered to CSMO (Close Station March Order) and as we formed up in a column werealized we had to fight our way out. Thanks to Leo Calvert and Adrian Krenk and others in our servicesection, we were still mobile. During our stay in "Shitville" these valiant soldiers nursed rain soakedengines back to health and performed maintenance miracles that an Eighth Army Center in Seoulcouldn't accomplish. My opinion. I led our column out at approx 5:45 AM, July 14, 1953 and had radiocontact with Leo Calvert in the last vehicle in the column, a jeep.

About seven hundred yards south of "Shitville" we saw howitzer parapets. It was Battery C 555 (TripleNickel) Field Artillery, a 105 mm howitzer truck drawn unit. Nothing. No activity. It didn't look right. Sidecomment. Our 155 mm howitzers had been in position SEVEN HUNDRED YARDS AHEAD OF 105HOWITZERS!! No way, but orders are orders and by God, we carried out orders and didn't flinch. Seconds later all hell cut loose.

The Chinese had overrun that 555 outfit, killing them almost to the last men. The enemy must haverealized we weren't tanks after all!! And that's probably what kept us from being overrun in "Shitville".The enemy wasn't going to mess with tanks and in the dark or gloom our silhouettes looked like heavytanks. Thanks to Adrian Krenk and Calvert and his service people, we started our howitzer-tank enginesevery fifteen minutes during the night! No strategy on our part. We had to make sure we could turn overthose damn engines in the driving rain.

Sergeant Calvert and Adrian Krenk were in the last vehicle (jeep)in ourcolumn and the Chinese were hell bent on destroying US. The fact that wewere "fully armored" saved us--thirteen fifty caliber and thirteen thirtycaliber machine guns ripped those bastards apart.

Up front, the Chinese stormed our jeep and we fought back. Thank God thefifty caliber machine gunner on the half track right behind us did a numberon those bastards. My jeep driver, Willard Rudd was hit in the legs. I was hitin the left hand and both legs and the jeep was a sieve. Willard held it on theroad and "drove on the rims" for two miles.

Our former battery commander, Bob Rader, was at a key T road junctiondirecting friendly elements to safety. The last thing I remember I was beingloaded into a medic half track somewhere along the road south, the road tosafety. Leading the column that morning of July 14, I could take somecomfort in the fact that my guys were behind me. There was nothing behind Adrian Krenk and LeoCalvert and Lt. Oscar Brock but hundreds of screaming Chinese hell bent on killing them and otherAmericans. All three men in that jeep were hit.

Our guys gave as "good as they took" ... there wasn't a round of small arms ammo left in the wholeoutfit. Good men, all of them.” End - Excerpt From “Hugh R. Lafferty, Personal Reflection:”

C Battery Firing 300,000 Round - 1953

41Begin Excerpts: “ 92nd AFA Bn Command Report for Month of June and July 1953 " (reconstructed fromoriginal photocopy)

Subject: Command Report for Month of June 1953

3. Destruction of enemy bunkers and caves 5544. Counter Battery Fire 160215. Defensive Fires 10657(b) Observed results of firing were as follows I

1. Casualties 37

2. Bunkers damaged or destroyed 33 3. Artillery positions damaged or destroyed 47

(3) During the period 10 - 18 June Headquarters, "A", "B”, and "C" Batteries were subjected to some of themost intense counter-battery fire experienced by this unit during the Korean operation. The enemyemployed larger caliber weapons than had heretofore been observed by this unit. Fragment analysisindicated that both 122mm guns and 152mm gun howitzers had been employed. On 17 June 1953, between1900 and 2100 hours, “A" Battery received the most accurate bombardment the enemy directed in the batteryarea resulting in 2 EM KIA, two (2) officers and thirteen(13) EM WIA, Casualties and damage to materiel waseffectively reduced by the sandbag and log revetments and bunkers in the position area.This action occurred during the Battalion's support of the defense of Outpost Harry,

2. Commander's Recommendations: Proposed Change to T/O&E 6-326 8 September 1952.SUBJECT: Command Report for Month of July 1953

(3) The Battalion fired 6504 rounds during the month.

(c.) Ammunition expenditures was as follows: 1. Registrations 6032. Harassing and Interdiction Fires 371 3. Destruction of enemy bunkers and caves 295 4. Counter Battery fire 3162

5. Defensive Fires 2073

(b.) Observed results of firing were as follows: 1. Casualties 202. Bunkers damaged or destroyed 13

(4) Ths most significant action in which this unitwas engaged during the period and prior to cessationof hostilit ies occurred in the Kumwha - Kumsong Salient of IXUS Corps during the night and early morning hours of 13 - 14 July1953. On 12 July 1953, in anticipation of an expected attack, batteries “A”, "B", and “C”, and the operations and communications platoons from Hq Battery, moved to positions inthe Capitol Republic of Korea Division sector. Battery “A”occupied a position at CT 76744l, “B” at CT 765446, “C” at CT752445 and Hq elements at CT765442 in the battery “A” area. Located adjacent to this Battalion were the 555th FA Battalion, Battery “A” of the 424th FA Battalion, Battery "A" of the 955th FABattalion and elements of two Battalions of the Capitol ROKDivision Artillery. At approximately 132200I all batteries ofthis Battalion were subjected to heavy counterbattery firewhich continued until about l40045I. At that tine heavy enemy fires ceased falling in Hq and "A" Batteryareas although sporadic rounds did continue to fall around battery positions.

Photo from Chinese Military Museumof captured U.S. M-14 Artillery. It couldpossibly be two captured 92nd AFA BnM-14s but NO positive identificationhas ever been made.

42 Batteries “B” and "C" continued to receive heavy fire and by 140300 accurate counterbattery fire wasbeing received in "C" Battery position at the rate of about 3 rounds per minute. Counter battery fire received by theBattalion during period was from medium and light artillery, rockets and (immediately prior to displacement)mortars. Because of heavy action, no accurate estimate can be given of total rounds received, but over

500 rounds fell in each of the "B" end "C” Battery areas. During this action the Battalion expended 1392

rounds, firing close in defensive fires in defense of MLR positions and counter battery missions. During

this action extreme difficulty was encountered in maintaining satisfactory communications, because of

hostile shelling of wire lines and heavy enemy interference on all radio channels.

After the attack started satisfactory direct communication was never established with IX Corps ArtilleryFDC. Fire missions were relayed through the FDC of the 955 FA Battalion located seven miles to the rear.Because of these communications difficulties, full utilization of the fire capabilities of the Battalion wasnot achieved. During the course of the action only fragmentary information could be obtained regardingground action. Such information as was obtained indicated that there were heavy enemy attacks acrossthe division front and that the enemy had penetrated MLR positions at two points.

One CP of the 955 fa Battalion located 3000 meters in front of “C" Battery was overrun. However, reportsreceived indicated these penetrations had been contained. At approximately 140340I an unknown numberof unidentified personnel approached “C" Battery's position. They were fired upon when they failed tohalt. Shortly thereafter small arms and automatic weapons fire was received in the "C" Battery area fromthe right front. At approximately 140350I Battery "B” was subjected to small arms and automatic weaponsand mortar fire from high ground on both right and left front of Battery Position. By l4o400I all contact waslost with higher headquarters, adjacent units and with Battery “C".

Based upon reports of firefights at both "C" and "B" Battery positions and information previously receivedthat the 555th FA Battalion was displacing, I made the decision to displace the Battalion to positionsvicinity coordinate a CT 743363. Necessary orders were immediately transmitted to "A" and “B” Batteries.At l40408I radio contact was reestablished with Battery "C" and the order transmitted to that unit. As “C"Battery march column approached the vicinity of position which had been occupied by "C" Battery, 555thFA Battalion, coordinates CT 758448, was subjected to heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire frompositions on both aides of road. Fire was also received from a recoilless weapon or rocket launcher in that

area. The local installations were in flames. “C” Battery column continued to receive fire until it reached

Highway 117 A, vicinity coordinates CT 765449, when contact was broken off.

During this action, “C “ Battery lost 2 Howitzer Motor Carriages, M-4l; 2 Half-Tracks, Personnel Carrier, M3A1; 21/2 ton truck and1 1/4 ton truck due to enemy action. In addition, two HowitzerMotor Carriages, M-4l, and 1 Half- Track were abandoned in thebattery position because they were immobilized. Atapproximately l40450I rear elements of the Battalion were

subjected to automatic weapons fire from an enemy armored

vehicle at coordinates CT 763438. The column moved slowly

because of the contention of vehicular and foot traffic on the road.

Otherwise the withdrawal was orderly. At approximately l40630Ithe Battalion was placed in position vicinity CT 743363 but "B"Battery displaced shortly thereafter to positions vicinity CT704364. No significant action occurred subsequent to 140630I. There were 22 Officers, 378 enlisted men, and 70 KATUSA inforward positions from this Battalion; the Battalionlost one (l) Officer and two (2) enlisted men killed in actionand eight (8) En1isted men missing in action.

43

There were three (3) Officers, tventv (20) Enlisted Men and four (4) KATUSA personnel vounded in action.During this action the Battalion vas directly engaged by an unknown number of enemy troops. Noreliable estimate of enemy casualties can be given. From 140800I to 161100I Battalion exr-ended 2034 rounds in support of 3rd US Division during the period in which new defensive line in Kumsong Salientwas stabilized.

(5) On 16 July 1953 the Battalion displaced to original positions east of Chorwon. The last roundsexpended by the Battalion prior to the cease fire were fired by Battery "A" at 272058. This vas abat tery vo l ley d i rected at host i le ar t i l lery. At the t ime of the "Cease Fire", the 92d ArmoredField Artillery Battalion had completed 1034 days of active combat in Korea, and fired a total of 311,929 rounds. 2. Commander's recommendations - None.

Ralph H. Elliot

Lt. Col. Arty

Commanding

End Excerpt: “92ND AFA BN COMMAND REPORT FOR JUNE AND JULY 1953"

Begin: Excerpt from Military History Book Chapter entitled "The last offensive”

See: Web Page http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/korea/truce/fm.htm for the full document

CHAPTER XXI

The Last Offensive

The resumption of armistice negotiations at Panmunjom on to July and the apparent pacification of Syngman Rheeduring early July provided an incentive for the last Communist offensive. With the end of hostilities at long last insight, the enemy was faced with its final opportunity to give the world a convincing display of Communist militarymight; to teach the upstart ROK forces another lesson; and to improve defensive terrain positions in the bargain.The June offensive had accomplished these aims to some degree, but much of the Kumsong salient still remained.29

Furthermore, the ROKA units had bent but not broken under the Communist assault; perhaps this time the Chinesemight really give them a trouncing.

By evening of 13 July the Communists had moved elements of five Chinese armies into attack and support

positions along the central sector that encompassed the Kumsong salient. Facing them from west to east lay theROK 9th and Capital Divisions of the U.S. IX Corps and the ROK 6th, 8th, 3d, and 5th Divisions of the ROK II Corps.

The increase in the tempo of artillery and mortar fire on 13 July corroborated earlier intelligence reports from

prisoners, deserters, agents, and reconnaissance that the Communists were about to launch a major drive aimedprimarily at ROK units on the central front. After darkness descended, the Chinese forces moved forward en masse.A reinforced regiment from the 72d Division of the CCF 24th Army struck the ROK 9th Division's right flank while the203d Division of the CCF 68th Army smashed into the ROK Capital Division guarding the left shoulder of theKumsong bulge. Friendly outposts were overrun as wave after wave of Chinese joined the assault. By midnight,enemy units had penetrated the main line of resistance up to 1,000 meters in some places. In the Sniper Ridgesector-long a bone of contentionfriendly forces had to pull back to avoid being cut off. Throughout the night thepressure continued, with huge expenditures of artillery and mortar fire from both sides.30

In the ROK 6th Division area adjacent to the Capital Division, four battalions from the 204th Division of the CCF 68th

Army hit a company-sized outpost of the ROK 19th Regiment. By the morning of 14 July, they had penetrated themain line positions of the regiment and surrounded one friendly battalion.

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Elements of the 204th Division moved through the ROK 6th Division sector and then swung to the west and joinedin the attack upon the Capital Division.31

To the east the Chinese on 13 July sent four companies to surround an outpost in the ROK 8th Division lines and abattalion against a company outpost in the ROK 3d Division area on the right shoulder of the Kumsong salient. Theyalso attacked the ROK 5th and 7th Divisions to keep them occupied while the main assault was in progress.

By the morning of 14 July the pattern of the Communist offensive attack had developed as the enemy increased the

weight of his pressure upon the ROK 3d Division. Battalion and two-battalion attacks accompanied by heavyartillery and mortar support broke through the ROK 3d outpost system and drove into the main line positions. The22d and 23d Regiments received assault after assault, but with the aid of the 18th Regiment in blocking positionsmanaged to hold on. Then four enemy companies filtered in through the adjacent ROK 5th Division sector andswung in behind the 23d Regiment. When the indication of a double envelopment became apparent, the ROK 3dbegan to pull back.

As the Chinese pierced the ROK lines along the central front and cut off units from their parent organizations, thesituation became confused. Soldiers from the 6th, 8th, and Capital Divisions found themselves defendingstrongpoints together. Lateral and front-to-rear lines of communications were soon out of commission and radioand foot messengers became the chief means of sending and receiving instructions and information. Sisterregiments were often out of contact and unaware of what the other was doing. Reports trickling in from the frontwere often delayed and usually incomplete as the ROKA commanders displayed their customary unwillingness toforward unfavorable news that would cause them to lose face.

Despite the lack of details, it was apparent after the first day of the Chinese assault that the enemy's use of major

elements of six divisions had made serious inroads in the ROK Capital and 3d Divisions' sectors. Since theseguarded the shoulders of the salient, the ROK 6th and 8th Divisions were in danger of having their flanks exposed toa double envelopment. General Taylor, therefore, on 14 July ordered the ROK Capital, 6th, 8th, 3d, and 5th Divisionsto fall back south of the Kumsong River line at the base of the bulge. This would straighten out the defensive lineand shorten the front to be covered. In the process of complying with Taylor's instructions, however, the ROKcommanders lost contact with and control of some of their units, with the result that many of them did not stop atthe Kumsong line. Instead they continued to retreat farther south replacing the bulge with a sag in the Eighth Armylines.

The intensity and determination of the Chinese offensive impressed Clark and Taylor to the point that they decided

to fly reinforcements from Japan to Korea to bolster the front. The U.S. 187th Airborne RCT was rushed to Korea andon 14 July Taylor attached the unit to the U.S. 2d Division. The latter took over the U.S. 3d Division's positions, andthe airborne troops relieved elements of the ROK 9th Division, permitting the ROK's to narrow their front and tostrengthen the left flank of the retreating Capital Division. In the meantime, the U.S. 3d Division shifted over intoblocking positions behind the Capital Division to stem the enemy advance. As the Capital's units fell back, theypassed through the 3d Division and were reorganized and rehabilitated in the rear. On 15 July the 3d took overresponsibility for the Capital Division's sector and assumed operational control of the division.

In the ROK II Corps area, Taylor released the ROK 11th Division to the corps commander, Lt. Gen. Chung Il Kwon,

who dispatched the division forward to relieve the ROK 3d Division. The ROK 6th Division was also withdrawn fromthe line and, along with the ROK 3d, was reorganized and reconstituted. Thus, on 15 July, the Eighth Army had theROK 9th, the U.S. 3d with the remnants of the Capital Division, the ROK 11th, 8th, and 5th Divisions on the front linesfrom west to east to check the Communist offensive. On 16 July the ROK II Corps received orders to counterattackand restore the Kumsong River line. The enemy offensive had slowed by this time and the Chinese were engaged inthe involved task of organizing the defense of the terrain they had taken and in replacing the heavy casualties theyhad suffered in breaking through the ROKA positions.

The ROK 11th, 8th, and 5th Divisions, attacking abreast, launched the counteroffensive the same day. Against

variable enemy, opposition they edged forward toward the Kumsong River east of Kumhwa. Between 16-19 July thethree divisions, with the 6th, 3d, and 7th ROK Divisions in blocking positions in reserve, attained the high groundsouth of the river. On 19 July the ROK 6th Division passed through the 5th Division and assumed responsibility forits sector.

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Efforts to cross the river and take defensive positions on the north bank of the Kumsong met with increasing enemyresistance and were abandoned after 20 July. For the last week of the war the ROK II Corps held the Kumsong Riverline against minor enemy pressure.

Despite the gains of the counteroffensive, the Chinese had removed the Kumsong salient and straightened out theirlines on the central front. Their penetration had been approximately six miles and the weight of their assault had cutoff and disorganized many of the ROKA units facing them. It had taken nine ROK and U.S. divisions in blocking andcounterattacking roles to halt the Communist advance and to regain some of the lost terrain.

The enemy offensive had also provided additional. grist for the Communist propaganda mill, which loudly claimedmilitary victory for its side. On the other hand, the price that the enemy had paid to sustain a major drive wasextremely high; the Eighth Army estimated that over 28,000 casualties had been inflicted upon the Chinese duringtheir breakthrough and its aftermath.32

While the ROK II Corps was carrying out its counteroffensive, the Communists exerted pressure upon several

scattered points along the Eighth Army line in an effort to take longcontested hills and outposts prior to the signingof an armistice. The reasons behind this pressure were difficult to fathom, since all of the threatened points fell in thedemilitarized zone and would have to be abandoned by the UNC forces anyway. As it turned out, the Communistshad to surrender possession of their new gains shortly thereafter.

The operations along the front during the last week of the Korean War subsided again to smallscale probes and

patrols, as each side now anticipated that the armistice soon would be signed.

The Tally Sheet

A recapitulation of enemy activity in the final months might prove helpful in assessing the military situation whenhostilities ended.33 (Map VIII)

The close relationship between the Communist military operations and the truce negotiations at Panmunjom wereapparent through the April-July period. As the two sides moved toward settlement, the intensity of the enemy'soperations varied according to the prospects for reaching final agreement. Beginning in late March, the Communistsassumed an increasingly offensive attitude at the front and displayed a willingness to employ their forces more lavishlythan they had in the past.

While the negotiations dragged in late April and early May, the tempo of enemy action slackened again. In the closingdays of May, after the 25 May UNC proposal, which seemed to offer the possibility of a truce within the near future, theCommunist attacks commenced to pick up impetus once again. The agreement on prisoners of war on 8 June wasfollowed by the large-scale assaults of 10-17 June which succeeded in attaining better terrain positions, cowing thegrowing ROK opposition to the armistice, and providing the Communists with a propaganda mantle of military victory.

The dramatic release of the Korean non repatriates by Syngman Rhee on 18 June reintroduced the elements ofuncertainty into the situation and ground operations again declined until the truce meetings resumed on to July. Then,in their largest offensive since the spring of 1951, the Communists sought to repeat the June objectives on a moregrandiose scale.

C Btry 2nd Gun Section: Recognition of Firing 300000 Round in

Korea - 1953

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The following table of casualties and artillery expenditures serves to depict more graphically the intensification ofcombat activity between April and July:

COMMUNIST COMMUNIST UNC UNC

DATE

1953

CASUALTIES ARTILLERY ROUNDS

CASUALTIES ARTILLERY

ROUNDS

APRIL 10,500

51,690 4,343 1,255,015

MAY 16,454 99,340 7,570 1,747,718

JUNE 36,346 329,130 23,161 2,710,248

JULY 72,112 375,565 * 29,629 2,000,982

* HIGHEST TOTAL DURING THE KOREAN WAR

The Communists established two artillery records for themselves in July, the highest total for any month and

the highest total for a ten-day period 197,550 rounds during the 11-20 July span. The freedom with whichenemy troops expended artillery and mortar shells demonstrated clearly that their supply situation hadimproved greatly and that they were willing to fire the rounds necessary to support their attacks. Even after thedrains of June and July, there were no shortages of ammunition except on a local basis.

End - Excerpt from Military History Book Chapter entitled "The last offensive”

Lt. Col. Norvel Barnhart CO(right) September 1953-April1954

Lt. Col. Claire Towne BnCO April 1954 - 1955

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TRUCE SIGNED

Begin: Excerpt from “92nd AFA BN History”

On July 27 1953, a truce was signed with the Communist North Koreansbringing a cessation of action to the Korean conflict. For all who survivedthe terror filed days of combat, the truce was slow in coming. The loss of allthose Red Devils killed, missing , and wounded in action will never beforgotten. Following the signing of the truce, all United Nations units,including the 92nd, withdrew a few miles in order to create a buffer zone.Even though the conflict had been officially closed, the battalion remainedcombat ready in case the Korean and Chinese Communist forces shoulddecide to break the truce.

End: Excerpt from “92nd AFA BN History”

The Battalion was deactivated on 27 July 1955 at Camp Omiya Japan

Document compiled by: Jim Settlemire 92nd AFA BN - HQ Btry 1952-53

END OF DOCUMENT