1Falsified/altered evidence

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 1302, 1391 and 1543. April 26, 1991.]

PAULINO VALENCIA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ARSENIO FER. CABANTING, Respondent.

CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, Complainant, v. ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, ATTY. EDUARDO U.

JOVELLANOS and ATTY. ARSENIO FER. CABANTING, Respondents.

LYDIA BERNAL, Complainant, v. ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS. — Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. It is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may get the better of the sentiments of loyalty and disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition would constitute malpractice (In re Attorney Melchor Ruste, 40 O.G. p. 78) and is a ground for suspension. (Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248).

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLIES WHILE LITIGATION IS PENDING. — Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the litigation is pending. (Director of Lands v. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513; Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775).

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A THING IS IN LITIGATION WHILE A CERTIORARI IS STILL IN PROGRESS; CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. (Gan Tingco v. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic dictates, in certiorariproceedings, that the appellate court may either grant or dismiss the petition. Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has terminated when the judgment of the trial court become final while a certiorari connected therewith is still in progress. Thus, purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly, this malpractice is a ground for suspension.

4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; AFFIRMATIVE TESTIMONY IS GIVEN GREATER WEIGHT THAN NEGATIVE TESTIMONY. — It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and received the sum of P200.00 in consideration of his executing the document "Compraventa Definitiva" which would show that Paulino bought the property. This charge, Atty. Antiniw simply denied. It is settled jurisprudence that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony (Bayasen v. CA, L-25785, Feb. 26, 1981; Vda. de Ramos v. CA, Et Al., L-40804, Jan. 31, 1978). When an individual’s integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all time is expected of him. (De los Reyes v. Aznar, Adm. Case No. 1334, Nov. 28, 1989).

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF A FARMER WHO FINISHED ONLY GRADE IV ON DELICATE SUBJECT GIVEN CREDENCE. — Although Paulino was a common

farmer who finished only Grade IV, his testimony, even if not corroborated by another witness, deserves credence and can be relied upon. His declaration dwelt on a subject which was so delicate and confidential that it would be difficult to believe the he fabricated his evidence.

6. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; FIRST DUTY OF A LAWYER IS NOT TO CLIENT BUT TO ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. — A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client (Santos v. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622), but not at the expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shop workers Union v. La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client but to the administration of justice. (Lubiano v. Gordalla, 115 SCRA 459) To that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. While a lawyer must advocate his client’s cause in utmost earnestness and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to illegal means for his client’s interest. It is the duty of an attorney to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor. (Pangan v. Ramos, 93 SCRA 87).

7. ID.; DISBARMENT; NOT MEANT AS PUNISHMENT BUT INTENDED TO PROTECT THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. — Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the most important of them is mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In re: Ivan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer whose acts show his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar. (Halili v. CIR, 136 SCRA 112). Disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that courts and the public may rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega v. Sison, 125 SCRA 293). Atty. Antiniw failed to live up to the high standards of the law profession.

8. ID.; ID.; RESPONDENT LAWYER SHOULD BE GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES. — Procedural due process demands that respondent lawyer should be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him. He enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is proved. (Santos v. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622). The case must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. (Camus v. Diaz, Adm. Case No. 1616, February 9, 1989). Since Atty. Antiniw was not accorded this procedural due process, it is but proper that the direct testimony of Lydia Bernal be stricken out.

9. ID.; ID.; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE DOES NOT RESULT IN DISMISSAL OF CASE; EXCEPTION. — In view also of the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant, Administrative Case No. 1543 should be dismissed. Although the filing of an affidavit of desistance by complainant for lack of interest does not ipso facto result in the termination of a case for suspension or disbarment of an erring lawyer. (Munar v. Flores, 122 SCRA 448), We are constrained in the case at bar, to dismiss the same because there was no evidence to substantiate the charges.

10. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; HEARSAY. — The additional charge against Atty. Antiniw in Administrative Case No. 1391 is predicated on the information furnished by Lydia Bernal. It was not based on the personal knowledge of Constancia L. Valencia: hence, hearsay. "Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand." (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 6th

2ed., vol. 2, 1989, p. 486). Being hearsay, the evidence presented is inadmissible.

11. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEY; CAMARADERIE AMONG LAWYERS IS NOT PROOF OF CONSPIRACY. — Besides, the camaraderie among lawyers is not proof of conspiracy, but a sign of brotherhood among them. One of the fourfold duties of a lawyer in his duty to the Bar. A lawyer should treat the opposing counsel, and his brethren in the law profession, with courtesy, dignity and civility. They may "do as adversaries do in the law: strive mightily but (they) eat and drink as friends." This friendship does not connote conspiracy.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

These consolidated administrative cases seek to disbar respondents Dionisio Antiniw, Arsenio Fer Cabanting and Eduardo Jovellanos (the last named, now an MCTC Judge) for grave malpractice and misconduct in the exercise of their legal profession committed in the following manner:

1. Administrative Cases No. 1302 and 1391

In 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia (Paulino in short) and his wife Romana allegedly bought a parcel of land, where they built their residential house, from a certain Serapia Raymundo, an heir of Pedro Raymundo the original owner. However, they failed to register the sale or secure a transfer certificate of title in their names.

Sometime in December, 1968, a conference was held in the house of Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos to settle the land dispute between Serapia Raymundo (Serapia in short) another heir of Pedro Raymundo, and the Valencia spouses since both were relatives and distant kin of Atty. Jovellanos. Serapia was willing to relinquish ownership If the Valencias could now documents evidencing ownership. Paulino exhibited a deed of sale written in the Ilocano dialect. However, Serapia claimed that the deed covered a different property. Paulino and Serapia were not able to settle their differences. (Report of Investigating Judge Catalino Castañeda, Jr., pp. 21-22).On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting, filed a complaint against Paulino for the recovery of possession with damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. V-2170, entitled "Serapia Raymundo, Plaintiff, versus Paulino Valencia, Defendant." (Report, p. 11)

Summoned to plead in Civil Case No. V-2170, the Valencias engaged the services of Atty. Dionisio Antiniw. Atty. Antiniw advised them to present a notarized deed of sale in lieu of the private document written in Ilocano. For this purpose, Paulino gave Atty. Antiniw an amount of P200.00 to pay the person who would falsify the signature of the alleged vendor (Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 7). A "Compraventa Definitiva" (Exh. B) was executed purporting to be a sale of the questioned lot.

On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, Serapia Raymundo. The lower court expressed the belief that the said document is not authentic. (Report, p. 14).

Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65, with Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court failed to provide a workable solution concerning his house. While the petition was pending, the trial court, on March 9, 1973, issued an order of execution stating that "the decision in this case has already become final and executory"

(Exhibits 3 and 3-A). On March 14, 1973, a writ of execution was issued.

On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty. Jovellanos and the remaining portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting, on April 25, 1973. (Annex "A" of Administrative Case No. 1302).

On March 4, 1974, Paulino filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No. 1302) against Atty. Cabanting on the ground that said counsel allegedly violated Article 1491 of the New Civil Code as well as Article II of the Canons of Professional Ethics, prohibiting the purchase of property under litigation by a counsel.

On March 21, 1974 the appellate court dismissed the petition of Paulino.

On October 14, 1974, Constancia Valencia, daughter of Paulino, filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No. 1391) against Atty. Dionisio Antiniw for his participation in the forgery of "Compraventa Definitiva" and its subsequent introduction as evidence for his client; and also, against Attys. Eduardo Jovellanos and Arsenio Cabanting for purchasing a litigated property allegedly in violation of Article 1491 of the New Civil Code; and against the three lawyers, for allegedly rigging Civil Case No. V-2170 against her parents.

On August 17, 1975, Constancia Valencia filed additional charges against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos as follows:

"1. AGAINST ATTY. DIONISIO ANTINIW:

"In the year 1973 Atty. Dionisio Antiniw fraudulently and in confabulation with one Lydia Bernal had a deed of sale, fabricated, executed and ratified before him as Notary Public by one Santiago Bernal in favor of Lydia Bernal when as a matter of fact said Santiago Bernal had died already about eight years before in the year 1965.

"2. AGAINST ATTY. EDUARDO JOVELLANOS:

"In the year 1954 Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos, fraudulently and in bad faith, in confabulation with Rosa de los Santos as vendee had, as Notary Public, executed and ratified before him, two (2) deeds of sale in favor of said Rosa de los Santos when as a matter of fact the said deeds were not in fact executed by the supposed vendor Rufino Rincoraya and so said Rufino Rincoraya had filed a Civil Case in Court to annul and declare void the said sales." (p. 7, Report)

2. Administrative Case No. 1543.

A deed of donation propter nuptias, involving the transfer of a piece of land by the grandparents of Lydia Bernal (complainant) in favor of her parents, was lost during the last world war. For this reason, her grandmother (the living donor) executed a deed of confirmation of the donation propter nuptias with renunciation of her rights over the property. (Complaint, p. 1). Notwithstanding the deed, her grandmother still offered to sell the same property in favor of the complainant, ostensibly to strengthen the deed of donation (to prevent others from claiming the property).

On consultation, Atty. Antiniw advised them to execute a deed of sale. Atty. Antiniw allegedly prepared and notarized the deed of sale in the name of her grandfather (deceased at the time of signing) with her grandmother’s approval.

3Felicidad Bernal-Duzon, her aunt who had a claim over the property, filed a complaint against her (Lydia Bernal) and her counsel, Atty. Antiniw for falsification of a public document. (Complaint, pp. 1-2) The fiscal exonerated the counsel for lack of evidence, while a case was filed in court against Lydia Bernal.

On October 3, 1975, Lydia Bernal filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No. 1543) against Atty. Antiniw for illegal acts and bad advice.

Pursuant to the resolution of the First Division of this Court dated December 9, 1974, the resolution of the Second Division dated March 3, 1975 and the two resolutions of the Second Division both dated December 3, 1975, Administrative Cases Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 were referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.

Upon formal request of Constancia L. Valencia and Lydia Bernal dated March 3, 1976, all of these cases were ordered consolidated by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza per his handwritten directive of March 9, 1976.

On April 12, 1988, We referred the investigation of these cases to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. When Atty. Jovellanos was appointed as Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan, We referred the investigation of these cases to Acting Presiding Judge Cesar Mindaro, Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, Villasis, Pangasinan, for further investigation.

In view of the seriousness of the charge against the respondents and the alleged threats against the person of complainant Constancia L. Valencia, We directed the transfer of investigation to the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

The three administrative cases were raffled to Branch XVII of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, under the sala of Judge Catalino Castañeda, Jr.

After investigation, Judge Catalino Castañeda, Jr., recommended the dismissal of cases against Atty. Jovellanos and Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting; dismissal of Administrative Case No. 1543 and the additional charges in Administrative Case No. 1391 against Antiniw and Judge Jovellanos; however, he recommended the suspension of Atty. Antiniw from the practice of law for six months finding him guilty of malpractice in falsifying the "Compraventa Definitiva."

The simplified issues of these consolidated cases are:

I. Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation of Art. 1491 of the New Civil Code.

II. Whether or not Attys. Antiniw and Jovellanos are guilty of malpractice in falsifying notarial documents.

III. Whether or not the three lawyers connived in rigging Civil Case No. V-2170.

I

Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code:

The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public of judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:

x       x       x

(5) . . .this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by

assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they make take part by virtue of their profession.

Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. It is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may get the better of the sentiments of loyalty and disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition would constitute malpractice (In re Attorney Melchor Ruste, 40 O.G. p. 78) and is a ground for suspension. (Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248).

Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the litigation is pending. (Director of Lands v. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513; Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775).

In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. (Gan Tingco v. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic dictates, in certiorari proceedings, that the appellate court may either grant or dismiss the petition. Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has terminated when the judgment of the trial court become final while a certiorari connected therewith is still in progress. Thus, purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly, this malpractice is a ground for suspension.

The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute malpractice. There was no attorney-client relationship between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos, considering that the latter did not take part as counsel in Civil Case No. V-2170. The transaction is not covered by Art. 1491 nor by the Canons adverted to.

II

It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and received the sum of P200.00 in consideration of his executing the document "Compraventa Definitiva" which would show that Paulino bought the property. This charge, Atty. Antiniw simply denied. It is settled jurisprudence that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony (Bayasen v. CA, L-25785, Feb. 26, 1981; Vda. de Ramos v. CA, Et Al., L-40804, Jan. 31, 1978). When an individual’s integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all time is expected of him. (De los Reyes v. Aznar, Adm. Case No. 1334, Nov. 28, 1989).

Although Paulino was a common farmer who finished only Grade IV, his testimony, even if not corroborated by another witness, deserves credence and can be relied upon. His declaration dwelt on a subject which was so delicate and confidential that it would be difficult to believe the he fabricated his evidence.

There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed falsification of a deed of sale, and its subsequent introduction in court prejudices his prime duty in the administration of justice as an officer of the court.

A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client (Santos v. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622), but not at the expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shop workers Union

4v. La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client but to the administration of justice. (Lubiano v. Gordalla, 115 SCRA 459) To that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. While a lawyer must advocate his client’s cause in utmost earnestness and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to illegal means for his client’s interest. It is the duty of an attorney to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor. (Pangan v. Ramos, 93 SCRA 87).

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the most important of them is mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In re: Ivan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer whose acts show his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar. (Halili v. CIR, 136 SCRA 112). Disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that courts and the public may rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega v. Sison, 125 SCRA 293). Atty. Antiniw failed to live up to the high standards of the law profession.

The other charges of malpractice against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos should be dismissed for lack of evidence.

During the proceedings in Administrative Case No. 1543, Lydia Bernal testified in full on direct examination, but she never submitted herself for cross-examination. Several subpoenas for cross-examination were unheeded. She eventually requested the withdrawal of her complaint.

Procedural due process demands that respondent lawyer should be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him. He enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is proved. (Santos v. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622). The case must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. (Camus v. Diaz, Adm. Case No. 1616, February 9, 1989). Since Atty. Antiniw was not accorded this procedural due process, it is but proper that the direct testimony of Lydia Bernal be stricken out.

In view also of the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant, Administrative Case No. 1543 should be dismissed. Although the filing of an affidavit of desistance by complainant for lack of interest does not ipso facto result in the termination of a case for suspension or disbarment of an erring lawyer. (Munar v. Flores, 122 SCRA 448), We are constrained in the case at bar, to dismiss the same because there was no evidence to substantiate the charges.

The additional charge against Atty. Antiniw in Administrative Case No. 1391 is predicated on the information furnished by Lydia Bernal. It was not based on the personal knowledge of Constancia L. Valencia: hence, hearsay. "Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand." (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 6th ed., vol. 2, 1989, p. 486). Being hearsay, the evidence presented is inadmissible.

The additional charge filed by Constancia L. Valencia against Atty. Jovellanos in Administrative Case No. 1391 was not proved at all. Complainant failed to prove her additional charges.

III

There is no evidence on record that the three lawyers involved in these administrative cases conspired in executing the falsified "Compraventa Definitiva" and rigged the Civil Case No. V-2170.

Atty. Jovellanos is a distant kin of the Raymundos and Valencias. In fact, he and the Valencias are neighbors and only two meters separate their houses. It would not be believable that Atty. Jovellanos, a practicing lawyer, would hold a meeting with the heirs of Pedro Raymundo in his house with the intention of inducing them to sue the Valencias. Atty. Jovellanos even tried to settle the differences between the parties in a meeting held in his house. He appeared in Civil Case No. V-2170 as an involuntary witness to attest to the holding of the conference.

Besides, the camaraderie among lawyers is not proof of conspiracy, but a sign of brotherhood among them. One of the fourfold duties of a lawyer in his duty to the Bar. A lawyer should treat the opposing counsel, and his brethren in the law profession, with courtesy, dignity and civility. They may "do as adversaries do in the law: strive mightily but (they) eat and drink as friends." This friendship does not connote conspiracy.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: 1. Dionisio Antiniw DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer Cabanting SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months from finality of this judgment; and 3. Administrative Case No. 1391 against Attorney Eduardo Jovellanos and additional charges therein, and Administrative Case No. 1543 DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[A.C. NO. 13021, A.C. No. 13912, A.C. No. 15433 : June 30, 2008]

CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, Complainant, v. ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal for reinstatement to the Bar of respondent Dionisio C. Antiniw.

The record shows that respondent was disbarred and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys on April 26, 1991 in a consolidated Decision4 of this Court, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: 1. Dionisio Antiniw DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer Cabanting SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months from finality of this judgment; and 3. Administrative Case No. 1391 against Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos and additional charges therein, and Administrative Case No. 1543 DISMISSED.

In the aforesaid consolidated Decision, respondent was found guilty of malpractice in falsifying a notarized deed of sale and subsequently introducing the same as evidence for his client in court.

Respondent's motion for reconsideration of the consolidated decision disbarring him was denied by the

5Resolution of August 26, 1993.5 In the same Resolution, the Court also held with respect to respondent's plea for mercy and compassion that:

x x x the same is merely NOTED until such time as he would have been able to satisfactorily show contrition and proof of his being again worthy of membership in the legal profession.

Subsequently, in a Manifestation dated September 17, 1993,6 respondent proffered his apologies to the Court for his shortcomings as a legal practitioner asserting that if there was an offense or oversight committed against the legal profession, it was due to his sincere belief that he was doing it honestly to protect the interest of his client. He pleaded that, pending his submission of proof showing that he is again worthy of membership in the Bar, he be permitted to continue with his notarial work. In a Resolution dated October 19, 1993,7 the Court denied respondent's plea in the aforesaid Manifestation.

On January 4, 1994, respondent filed a Petition dated December 8, 19938 praying for leave to submit proof of his being again worthy to be re-admitted to the legal profession. Attached to the Petition were testimonials, affidavits and sworn certifications of known and outstanding members of his community at Urdaneta, Pangasinan, as well as manifestos and resolutions of groups and associations representing various sectors thereat, all attesting to his honesty, worthiness, respectability and competency as a lawyer and as an elected Board Member in Pangasinan. In a Resolution dated January 27, 1994,9 the Court denied said petition. A Letter dated February 1, 199510 which was sent to the Court by Bishop Jesus C. Galang, D.D. of the Diocese of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, pleading for respondent's reinstatement, was noted in the Court's Resolution dated March 14, 1995.11

Respondent filed an Appeal for Reinstatement dated March 8, 1996,12 declaring that since his disbarment, he had embarked on and actively participated in civic and humanitarian activities in the Fifth District of Pangasinan where he was again elected for the third time as a Provincial Board Member and for which activities he received Plaques of Appreciation and Recognition, Resolution/Letters, Awards and Commendations from local government officials of Pangasinan and different groups and associations in the province, all showing that he is worthy to once again practice the legal profession. His appeal, however, was denied by the Resolution dated April 23, 1996.13

On December 17, 1996, respondent filed a Plea for Re-Admission dated December 8, 1996,14 reiterating his earlier plea for the lifting of his disbarment. The plea was also denied on January 28, 1997.15

On September 1, 1997, respondent again filed a Plea for Judicial Clemency and Reinstatement to the Bar dated August 30, 1997,16 submitting in support thereof the favorable indorsements, letters and resolutions from the Pangasinan Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP); the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts at Lingayen and Urdaneta, Pangasinan; the Provincial Prosecutor's Association of Pangasinan; Eastern Pangasinan Lawyer's League; the Provincial Board of Pangasinan; Rotary Club of Urdaneta; and the past National President of the IBP, Atty. Numeriano G. Tanopo Jr. The foregoing plea was merely noted by the Court on October 14, 1997.17

The following year, respondent filed an Appeal dated July 8, 1998,18 reiterating therein his apologies to the Court and promising that should he be given back his license to practice law, he will live up to the exacting standards of the legal profession and abide by the

Code of Professional Ethics and the Lawyer's Oath. Among the written proofs appended to his appeal was the Letter dated June 18, 199819 from Bishop Galang, of the Diocese of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, wherein he reiterated his earlier plea for respondent's reinstatement.

In a Letter dated July 13, 199820 received by this Court on July 23, 1998, Bishop Galang withdrew his letter dated July 10, 1998 recommending respondent's reinstatement for being misled into signing the same.

Thereafter, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion dated December 22, 1998,21 wherein he pointed out that more than seven (7) years had elapsed from the time of his disbarment and that others who were likewise disbarred but for a shorter duration, namely Attys. Benjamin Grecia and Benjamin Dacanay,22had already been reinstated to the law profession. Among the attachments to respondent's Manifestation was Resolution No. 98-7c dated 6 July 1998 issued by the IBP, Pangasinan Chapter, strongly indorsing respondent's plea for judicial clemency and reinstatement, and the letter dated June 18, 1998 from Bishop Galang supporting his reinstatement to the Bar.

In a Resolution dated February 9, 1999,23 the Court noted (a) the letters dated June 18, 1998 and July 13, 1998 of Bishop Galang; (b) Appeal dated July 8, 1998 and Manifestation and Motion dated December 22, 1998 both filed by respondent. Respondent was also required to comment on Bishop Galang's letter dated July 13, 1998 within ten days from notice.

In his Comments with Motion dated March 23, 1999,24 on Bishop Galang's letter dated July 13, 1998, respondent denied the existence of a letter dated July 10, 1998 of Bishop Galang but acknowledged the existence of the letter dated June 18, 1998. Respondent averred that if the Bishop was indeed referring to the June 18, 1998 letter, he never misled or had any intention to mislead the bishop into signing the same. By its Resolution dated June 22, 1999,25 the Court noted the aforesaid Comments with Motion of respondent

An Appeal Reiterating Earlier Petition, Appeal, Pleas and Motion for Reinstatement to the Bar dated August 28, 199926 was filed by the respondent on September 21, 1999. In a Resolution dated November 16, 1999,27 the Court noted said appeal and denied for lack of merit respondent's prayer that his Plea for Judicial Clemency and Reinstatement dated September 1, 1997 and Manifestation and Motion for Reinstatement dated December 22, 1998 be approved and given due course.

Thereafter, respondent's wife, Manuela A. Antiniw, sent to the Court a Letter of Appeal dated February 7, 2000,28 asking for clemency in behalf of her husband and affirming therein that her husband had for eight (8) years continuously pleaded for his reinstatement and that he had submitted proof by way of testimonials of (a) his character and standing prior to his disbarment, (b) his conduct subsequent to his disbarment, and (c) his efficient government service. Attached to the letter of respondent's wife was a sworn testimonial of one of the complainants in the consolidated administrative cases, Lydia Bernal, attesting to the respondent's character reformation. The aforesaid letter was noted by the Court in a Resolution dated 28 February 2000.29

Respondent filed a Plea for Judicial Clemency and Reinstatement dated March 19, 2001,30 therein asserting that the long period of his disbarment gave him sufficient time to soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct, redeem himself, and prove once more that he would be able to practice law and at the

6same time uphold the dignity of the legal profession. The Court, in its Resolution of June 26, 2001,31denied the aforesaid plea.

By its Indorsement dated September 10, 2001,32 the Office of the Chief Justice referred to the Bar Confidant the letter dated August 24, 200133 of Assistant Commissioner Jesse J. Caberoy of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) requesting comment on the contention of respondent that the disbarment of a lawyer only prevents him from practicing his profession and does not operate to divest him of his earned eligibility by passing the Bar examination. In a Letter dated September 20, 2001,34 respondent cited pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other pertinent Civil Service Laws in support of his aforementioned stand. The aforesaid Letters dated August 24, 2001 and September 20, 2001, of CSC Assistant Commissioner and respondent, respectively, were noted by the Court's Resolution dated November 20, 2001.35 Likewise in said Resolution, the letters were referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.

In its Report and Recommendation dated January 25, 2002,36 the OBC opined that the eligibility vested in a successful bar candidate would not be prejudiced or forfeited by his disbarment and the matter of enjoying first - grade eligibility by passing the Bar, in relation to the position of City Administrator, should be determined by the CSC. Nevertheless, the OBC was of the view that the controversy between the CSC and respondent could not be considered as already ripe for judicial determination. Thus, the OBC recommended that the CSC, through Assistant Commissioner Caberoy, and respondent be advised to institute the corresponding legal remedy before the proper court.

In a Resolution dated February 12, 2002,37 the Court held that it could only resolve actual controversies brought before it and would thus, refrain from rendering advisory opinions. Accordingly, the Letter dated August 24, 2001 of Assistant Commissioner Caberoy and Letter dated September 20, 2001 of respondent were merely noted.

Respondent then filed a Plea for Reinstatement to the Bar dated February 28, 2002,38 stating therein that for the past ten (10) years since he was disbarred, he had deeply regretted having violated his obligations as a lawyer; that he realized the gravity of his mistakes; and that because of such disbarment, he even lost his chance to be permanently appointed as City Administrator of Urdaneta City and/or as City Legal Officer, after his stint as a Provincial Board Member in Pangasinan for three (3) consecutive terms. In the event his disbarment is lifted, respondent then promised never to cause dishonor again to the legal profession and to abide by the ideals and canons thereof. Attached to his Plea for Reinstatement to the Bar were certifications from various civic and religious groups attesting to his good moral character and to his worthiness to be a member of the legal profession. In a Resolution dated April 23, 2002,39 the Court noted the aforesaid Plea. Subsequently, the Court required the IBP to Comment on the aforesaid respondent's Plea through its Resolution dated July 23, 2002.40

In its Comment of September 9, 2002,41 the IBP, through its Commission on Bar Discipline, recommended the following:

Considering that the respondent has shown that he has been repentant of what he had done which was a gross violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Canon of Professional Ethics and that he has been completely reformed and is therefore worthy to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorney's as evidenced by Certifications of

different religious and civic groups, it is recommended that he be allowed to again practice the legal profession.

It is, however recommended that he be placed on probation, meaning that the reinstatement should only be temporary and that he be placed under observation for one year.

If during the period of one year, he proves that he has completely lived up to the high standards of the legal profession, by then it will be recommended that his reinstatement as a member of the Bar be made permanent.42

The aforesaid comment was noted and referred to the IBP Board of Governors for comment and recommendation by the Resolution dated December 3, 2002.43

The IBP Board of Governors issued its Resolution No. XVI-2005-99, dated March 12, 2005 44 resolving as follows:

xxx to approve respondent's Plea for Reinstatement and recommend the reinstatement of Atty. Dionisio C. Antiniw as member of the bar immediately.

On June 6, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution45 referring the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for study and recommendation.

On March 23, 2007, the OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation,46 to wit:

Indeed the high standards of the Bar require an impeccable record but our findings show that respondent has been sufficiently punished for the last fifteen (15) years of his disbarment and he has sufficiently reformed to be a worthy member of the Bar. In all candor, he promises the Court that should he be reinstated to practice the legal profession, he will faithfully abide by the ideals, canons and ethics of the legal profession and by his oath as a lawyer.

x x x

In the light of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the disbarment of respondent DIONISIO C. ANTINIW from the practice of law be LIFTED and he be allowed to resume the practice of law.47

We agree with the foregoing recommendations of the Office of the Bar Confidant and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline as affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondent was disbarred from the practice of law pursuant to the Decision promulgated on April 26, 199148 which pertinently reads, as follows:

There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed falsification of a deed of sale, and its subsequent introduction in court prejudices his prime duty in the administration of justice as an officer of the court.

A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client. (Santos v. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622) but not at the expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shopworkers Union v. La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client but to the administration of justice. (Lubiano v. Gordalla, 115 SCRA 459) To that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. While a lawyer must advocate his

7client's cause in utmost earnestness and with the maximum skill he can marshall, he is not at liberty to resort to illegal means for his client's interest. It is the duty of an attorney to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor. (Pangan vs Ramos, 93 SCRA 87).

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the most important of them is mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In re: Ivan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer whose acts show his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar. (Halili v. CIR, 136 SCRA 112). Disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that courts and the public may rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega v. Sison 125 SCRA 293). Atty. Antiniw failed to live up to the high standards of the law profession.49

However, the record shows that the long period of respondent's disbarment gave him the chance to purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up once again to the exacting standards of conduct demanded of every member of the bar and officer of the court. During respondent's disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years to date for his professional infraction, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies and pleas for reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show that he has regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and unblemished record as an elected public servant, as attested to by numerous civic and professional organizations, government institutions, public officials and members of the judiciary.

In Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,50 the disbarment of a lawyer was lifted for the reasons quoted hereunder:

The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite apparently, given him sufficient time and occasion to soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct, redeem himself and prove once more that he is worthy to practice law and be capable of upholding the dignity of the legal profession. His admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion and reinstatement show that he is ready once more to meet the exacting standards the legal profession demands from its practitioners.51

Moreover, it is well-settled that the objective of a disciplinary case is not so much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court. Restorative justice, not retribution, is our goal in disciplinary proceedings.52

Guided by this doctrine and considering the evidence submitted by respondent satisfactorily showing his contrition and his being again worthy of membership in the legal profession, the Court finds that it is now time to lift herein respondent's disbarment and reinstate him to the august halls of the legal profession, but with the following reminder:

[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying

the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a right but a bounden duty as well x x x. That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members.53

Likewise, respondent is enjoined to keep in mind that:

Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws, as he is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.54

WHEREFORE, the disbarment of DIONISIO C. ANTINIW from the practice of law is LIFTED and he is therefore allowed to resume the practice of law upon payment

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 100643. August 14, 1992.]

ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 79, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,

Morong, Rizal, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, Morong, Rizal, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS,

Quezon City, and AGUEDO EUGENIO, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; JUDGMENT; FINAL UPON LAPSE OF REGLEMENTARY PERIOD OF APPEAL AND NO APPEAL PERFECTED. — Petitioner fails to refute the ruling of respondent appellate court that the issues presented in the intent case had been previously raised before and decided upon the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392, which decision became final and executory, and in fact already entered in the judgment book by reason of petitioner’s failure to seasonably file an appeal or a motion for reconsideration. This is fatal. It has been repeatedly held that finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected. The decision therefore of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 had attained finality, there being no appeal nor motion for reconsideration interposed. Likewise, it is settled jurisprudence that once a decision becomes final, the Court can no longer amend, modify, much less set aside the same.

2. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDING; PROCEEDING IN REM; PERSONAL NOTICE NOT REQUIRED TO VEST AUTHORITY TO COURT. — As early as 1910, in Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, We already ruled that land registration proceedings are proceedings in rem, not in personam, and therefore it is not necessary to give personal notice to the owners or claimants of the land sought to be registered, in order to vest the courts with power or authority over the res. Thus, while it may be true that no notice was sent by registered mail to petitioner when the judicial reconstitution of title was sought, such failure, however, did not amount to a jurisdictional defect.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLICATION THEREOF, SUFFICIENT NOTICE TO VEST COURT JURISDICTION. — In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila, Br.

8170, We said that" [t]he purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it." Thus, notice of hearing by proper publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to clothe the court with jurisdiction, and the mere fact that a person purporting to have a legitimate claim in the property did not receive personal notice is not sufficient ground to invalidate the proceedings.

4. ID.; ID.; CAUSE OF ACTION; CANNOT BE LITIGATED TWICE BY VARYING FORMS OF ACTION. — Shorn of its finery, CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 merely re-echoes the issues raised in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 which as become res judicata. Verily, petitioner’s action to annul the order of the trial court allowing reconstitution duplicates its earlier motion to set aside the said order, which was granted but later reversed by the appellate court — which reversal became final and executory due to petitioner’s failure to file an appeal within the reglementary period. A party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.

5. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; RULE 10.02 OF CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; VIOLATED WHEN LAWYER MISREPRESENT CONTENTS OF DECISION. — However, the phrase "without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty, in the above quoted second paragraph on page 3 of the Petition for Review, is not found in the decision penned by Associate Justice Manuel C. Herrera for respondent Court of Appeals. It now appears as part of a material statement of fact in the decision of the court a quo when actually it is not. This to Us is a prima facie case of attempting to mislead [Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as in fact that which has not been proved] this Court, a serious offense which constitutes willful disregard of a lawyer’s solemn duty to act at all times in a manner consistent with truth.

R E S O L U T I O N

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The petition filed on December 28, 1990, by Adez Realty Incorporated before the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 23773, sought to annul the order of the accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal, dated November 20, 1984, allowing the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12662. The petition likewise sought to set aside in effect the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 dated July 31, 1990.

On April 30, 1991, respondent Court of Appeals 1 dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On June 26, 1991, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied. The respondent court, in dismissing the petition, said that: (a) the petition is a reiteration of the issues raised before it 2 earlier in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392, promulgated July 31, 1990, and since no motion for reconsideration or appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court was filed, the same became final and executory, and consequently entered in the judgment book on October 11, 1990; and, (b) the accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal, had jurisdiction over the

subject matter, the issue then being one of venue and not of jurisdiction, which can be waived if not timely objected to in a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 4, of the Rules of Court.

Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where petitioner raises four (4) issues which nevertheless may be simplified into the following: whether the accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal, may acquire jurisdiction over reconstitution proceedings involving real property situated in Quezon City, and whether publication of the notice of the petition in two (2) successive issues of the Official Gazette and its posting in the bulletin board of the accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal, is sufficient compliance with Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 26.

Wittingly or unwittingly, petitioner fails to refute the ruling of respondent appellate court that the issues presented in the intent case had been previously raised before and decided upon the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392, which decision became final and executory, and in fact already entered in the judgment book by reason of petitioner’s failure to seasonably file an appeal or a motion for reconsideration. This is fatal.

It has been repeatedly held that finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected. 3 The decision therefore of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 had attained finality, there being no appeal nor motion for reconsideration interposed. Likewise, it is settled jurisprudence that once a decision becomes final, the Court can no longer amend, modify, much less set aside the same. 4 In fact, in Dueñas v. Mandi, 5 We held that the "trial court and the appellate court may have committed an error in the assignment or partition of the eight parcels of land to the parties in this case, but considering that their judgments are now final, the error, assuming that one was committed, can no longer be amended or corrected." In Icao v. Apalisok, 6 We ruled that even the subsequent discovery of an erroneous imposition of a penalty will not justify correction of the judgment after it has become final. We have also declared that, subject to settled exceptions, once a judgment becomes final, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest. 7 To allow the Court of amend or reverse a decision which has attained finality will result in endless litigations. 8 Indeed, every litigation, CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 included, must come to an end.

Moreover, petitioner already had the opportunity to set aside the questioned order of the trial court when its Motion to Set Aside and/or Annul the Order of Reconstitution, filed more than a year after the issuance of the questioned order, was granted by the trial court, however erroneous may be the procedure pursued and the consequently relief granted. Petitioner then simply failed to maintain vigilance over its perceived rights when it did not file a timely appeal from the adverse decision of the appellate court, thus allowing the said decision to become final.

Besides, as early as 1910, in Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, 9 We already ruled that land registration proceedings are proceedings in rem, not in personam, and therefore it is not necessary to give personal notice to the owners or claimants of the land sought to be registered, in order to vest the courts with power or authority over the res. 10 Thus, while it may be true that no notice was sent by registered mail to petitioner when the judicial reconstitution of title was sought, such failure, however, did not amount to a jurisdictional defect. 11 In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila, Br. 170, 12 We said that" [t]he purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the

9whole world that such a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it." Thus, notice of hearing by proper publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to clothe the court with jurisdiction, and the mere fact that a person purporting to have a legitimate claim in the property did not receive personal notice is not sufficient ground to invalidate the proceedings.

Shorn of its finery, CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 merely re-echoes the issues raised in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 which as become res judicata. Verily, petitioner’s action to annul the order of the trial court allowing reconstitution duplicates its earlier motion to set aside the said order, which was granted but later reversed by the appellate court — which reversal became final and executory due to petitioner’s failure to file an appeal within the reglementary period. A party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated. 13 

Be that as it may, there appears to be no cogent reason to disturb, as to other matters, the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals in its decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392, promulgated July 31, 1990, the same having become final and executory. Accordingly, We affirm the assailed decision promulgated April 30, 1992, and resolution issued June 26, 1991, by respondent Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, the Court adverts to the Petition for Review filed in behalf of petitioner Adez Realty, Inc., by ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY. On pages 2-4 of the Petition, counsel purports to quote, as he does, the questioned decision when he alleges —

"The facts of the case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are the following:

x       x       x

‘After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered the questioned order dated November 20, 1984, without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty, granting the applicant’s petition for reconstitution in the name of the deceased Elias Eugenio’" (Italics supplied)

However, the phrase "without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty, in the above quoted second paragraph on page 3 of the Petition for Review, is not found in the decision penned by Associate Justice Manuel C. Herrera for respondent Court of Appeals. It now appears as part of a material statement of fact in the decision of the court a quo when actually it is not. This to Us is a prima facie case of attempting to mislead 14 this Court, a serious offense which constitutes willful disregard of a lawyer’s solemn duty to act at all times in a manner consistent with truth.

ACCORDINGLY, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 are AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED.

ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within five (5) days from notice why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for intercalating a material fact in the judgment of the court a quo thereby altering and modifying its factual findings with the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment, and thus failing to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar.

Costs against petitioner Adez Realty Incorporated.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 100643. October 30, 1992.]

ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING

JUDGE, RTC, BR. 79, Morong, Rizal, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, Morong, Rizal, REGISTER OF

DEEDS, Quezon City, and AGUEDO EUGENIO, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS, COUNSEL BOUND BY ACTS OF HIS SECRETARY WHO MERELY FOLLOWS HIS ORDERS; CASE AT BAR. — After due deliberation, the Court En Banc brushed off as simply unsatisfactory and incredible counsel’s explanation that it was his secretary who committed the mistake. This "passing-the-buck" stance of counsel was already aptly treated in Adaza v. Barinaga (104 SCRA 684), where the Court observed thus — "Making the law office secretary, clerk or messenger the scapegoat or patsy for the delay in the filing of pleadings, motions and other papers and for the lawyer’s dereliction of duty is a common alibi of practising lawyers. Like the alibi of the accused in criminal case, counsel’s shifting of the blame to his office employee is usually a concoction utilized to cover up his own negligence, incompetence, indolence and ineptitude." The case of petitioner is no better; it can be worse. For, how could the secretary have divined the phrase "without notice to the actual occupants of the property. Adez Realty," without counsel dictating it word for word? Could it have been a providential mistake of the secretary as it was very material, and on which could have hinged the fate of a litigant’s cause? Whatever be the truth in this regard, counsel cannot elude administrative responsibility which borders on falsification of a judicial record to which, by his inveigling, he unfortunately drags his secretary. Indeed, by no means can he evade responsibility for the vicious intercalation as he admittedly dictated and signed the petition. It is the bounden duty of lawyers to check, review and recheck the allegations in their pleadings, more particularly the quoted portions, and ensure that the statements therein are accurate and the reproductions faithful, down to the last word and even punctuation mark. The legal profession demands that lawyers thoroughly go over pleadings, motions and other documents dictated or prepared by them, typed or transcribed by their secretaries or clerks, before filing them with the court. If a client is bound by the acts of his counsel, with more reason should counsel be bound by the acts of his secretary who merely follows his orders. The instant case originated from a petition for reconstitution of title over a parcel of land. Section 13 of R.A. 26, in relation to Sec. 12 of the same statute, on which petitioner bases one of his causes of action, provides among others that notice should be given to the occupants or persons in possession of the property. Compliance therewith is a material requirement for granting a petition for reconstitution of title. The inserted phrase "without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty," was just the right phrase intercalated at the right place, making it highly improbable to be unintentionally, much less innocently, committed; and by the secretary at that. All circumstances herein simply but strongly sustain Our belief. Certainly, making it appear that respondent Court of Appeals found that no notice was given to the occupants of subject property — when in fact it did not make such a finding — is a clear indication not merely of

10carelessness in lifting a portion of the assailed decision but a malicious attempt to gain undue advantage in the sporting arena of fairplay and, more importantly, to deceive and misguide this Court, which is the final arbiter of litigations.

2. ID.; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; RULE 10.02, CANON 10, CHAPTER III THEREOF; MISQUOTING OR INTERCALATING PHRASES IN TEXT OF COURT DECISION, A CLEAR AND SERIOUS VIOLATION OF LAWYER’S OATH; CASE AT BAR. — The distortion of facts committed by counsel, with the willing assistance of his secretary, is a grave offense and should not be treated lightly, not only because it may set a dangerous precedent but, rather, because it is a clear and serious violation of one’s oath as a member of the Bar. Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of Professional Responsibility directs that" [a] lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved." Misquoting or intercalating phrases in the text of a court decision constitutes willful disregard of the lawyer’s solemn duty to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never venture to mislead the court by false statements or quotations of facts or laws. Thus, in Bautista v. Gonzales (182 SCRA 151), We suspended respondent for six (6) months for, among others, submitting to the lower court falsified documents, representing them to be true copies. In Chavez v. Viola (196 SCRA 10), We suspended respondent counsel for five (5) months after he filed an Amended Application for Original Registration of Title which contained false statements. The case at bar, although akin to the aforementioned cases, has more serious and far-reaching repercussions. Those who attempt to misguide this Court, the last forum for appeal, should be dealt with more severely lest We be made unwilling instruments of inequity and injustice. Indeed, counsel has demonstrated his wanton disregard for truth and fairplay even before the Highest Court of the land. Worse, he compounded his unprofessional mischief by laying the blame on his hapless secretary whose duty it was simply to obey him.

3. ID.; PRACTICE OF LAW; NATURE THEREOF; DUTY OF LAWYERS TO COURT. — It is well to repeat, perhaps to the point of satiety, what We have already said —." . . that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. It cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of justice . . . A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the administration of justice would gravely suffer . . . It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that they are above all . . . sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court."

4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF COURT OF APPEALS GENERALLY BINDING UPON THE SUPREME COURT. — Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that, save in certain instances, factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court.

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:

In Our Resolution of 14 August 1992, We directed ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, counsel for petitioner Adez Realty, Inc., to "SHOW CAUSE within five (5) days from notice why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for intercalating a material fact in the judgment of the court a quo 1 thereby altering and modifying its factual findings with the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment, and thus failing to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar."

In his EXPLANATION of 1 September 1992, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay "humbly prostrates himself before the Honorable Court and throws himself at, its mercy," and explains that —

". . . whenever he prepares petitions either for the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, he, dictates to his secretary and if portions of the decision or order to be appealed from have to be quoted, he simply instructs his said secretary to copy the particular pages of the said decision or order.

"In the case at bar, he did instruct his secretary to copy the corresponding pages in the decision of the Court of Appeals. Somehow, however, some words were intercalated on a particular paragraph noted by the Honorable Court he regrettably is at a loss to explain. He remembers, however, that at the time he was preparing the petition at bar there were other pleadings necessitating equal if not preferential attention from him which could perhaps be the reason why his secretary committed a very grievous mistake. Such mistake though he does not condone and he feels upset at the turn of events." 2 

Attached to his EXPLANATION as Annex "A" is an Affidavit 3 of Alicia A. Castro, purportedly his Secretary, stating among others that —

"3. . . . in the preparation of the petition for review on certiorari filed with the Supreme Court, it was Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay who dictated to me the contents of said petition;

"4. . . . in the preparation of the petition, he told me, as he is wont to do whenever he prepares a petition, to copy the particular pages in the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 entitled ‘Adez Realty, Inc., petitioner versus The Hon. Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal, Branch 79 (not 89 as stated in the Affidavit), Et Al., respondents’;

"5. . . . when I copied the particular pages of the decision of the Court of Appeals as instructed by Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, I did as instructed, but it .was only after our office received the copy of the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 100643 . . . that Atty. Dacanay confronted me and asked me where I got that portion which was added to the particular paragraph noted by the Supreme Court, that it was only then that I realized the mistake I committed;

x       x       x

"7. . . . I surmise that the error could have been due to the fact that ADEZ REALTY, Inc. has so many cases being handled by the law office that I presume I could have copied or my intention was distracted by other pleadings atop my table at the time."

Upon receipt of the EXPLANATION of counsel, the First Division referred his case en consulta to the Court En Banc which accepted and took cognizance of it in view of the possible sanction that may be imposed on a member of the Bar.

After due deliberation, the Court En Banc brushed off as simply unsatisfactory and incredible counsel’s

11explanation that it was his secretary who committed the mistake. This "passing-the-buck" stance of counsel was already aptly treated in Adaza v. Barinaga, 4 where the Court observed thus —

"Making the law office secretary, clerk or messenger the scapegoat or patsy for the delay in the filing of pleadings, motions and other papers and for the lawyer’s dereliction of duty is a common alibi of practising lawyers. Like the alibi of the accused in criminal cases, counsel’s shifting of the blame to his office employee is usually a concoction utilized to cover up his own negligence, incompetence, indolence and ineptitude."

The case of petitioner is no better; it can be worse. For, how could the secretary have divined the phrase "without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty," without counsel dictating it word for word? Could it have been a providential mistake of the secretary as it was very material, and on which could have hinged the fate of a litigant’s cause? Whatever be the truth in this regard, counsel cannot elude administrative responsibility which borders on falsification of a judicial record to which, by his inveigling, he unfortunately drags his secretary. Indeed, by no means can he evade responsibility for the vicious intercalation as he admittedly dictated and signed the petition.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to check, review and recheck the allegations in their pleadings, more particularly the quoted portions, and ensure that the statements therein are accurate and the reproductions faithful, down to the last word and even punctuation mark. The legal profession demands that lawyers thoroughly go over pleadings, motions and other documents dictated or prepared by them, typed or transcribed by their secretaries or clerks, before filing them with the court. If a client is bound by the acts of his counsel, with more reason should counsel be bound by the acts of his secretary who merely follows his orders. 5 

The instant case originated from a petition for reconstitution of title over a parcel of land. Section 13 of R.A. 26, in relation to Sec. 12 of the same statute, on which petitioner bases one of his causes of action, provides among others that notice should be given to the occupants or persons in possession of the property. Compliance therewith is a material requirement for granting a petition for reconstitution of title. The inserted phrase "without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty," was just the right phrase intercalated at the right place, making it highly improbable to be unintentionally, much less innocently, committed, and by the secretary at that. All circumstances herein simply but strongly sustain Our belief. Certainly, making it appear that respondent Court of Appeals found that no notice was given to the occupants of subject property — when in fact it did not make such a finding — is a clear indication not merely of carelessness in lifting a portion of the assailed decision but a malicious attempt to gain undue advantage in the sporting arena of fairplay and, more importantly, to deceive and misguide this Court, which is the final arbiter of litigations.

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that, save in certain instances, factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court. 6 The distortion of facts committed by counsel, with the willing assistance of his secretary, is a grave offense and should not be treated lightly, not only because it may set a dangerous precedent but, rather, because it is a clear and serious violation of one’s oath as a member of the Bar. Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of Professional Responsibility directs that" [a] lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or

authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved" (Emphasis supplied).

Misquoting or intercalating phrases in the text of a court decision constitutes willful disregard of the lawyer s solemn duty to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never venture to mislead the court by false statements or quotations of facts or laws. Thus, in Bautista v. Gonzales, 7 We suspended respondent for six (6) months for, among others, submitting to the lower court falsified documents, representing them to be true copies. In Chavez v. Viola 8 We suspended respondent counsel for five (5) months after he filed an Amended Application for Original Registration of Title which contained false statements.

The case at bar, although akin to the aforementioned cases, has more serious and far-reaching repercussions. Those who attempt to misguide this Court, the last forum for appeal, should be dealt with more severely lest We be made unwilling instruments of inequity and injustice. Indeed, counsel has demonstrated his wanton disregard for truth and fairplay even before the Highest Court of the land. Worse, he compounded his unprofessional mischief by laying the blame on his hapless secretary whose duty it was simply to obey him.

It is well to repeat, perhaps to the point of satiety, what We have already said —

". . . that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege one of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. It cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of justice . . . A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the administration of justice would gravely suffer . . . It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that they are above all . . . sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court." 9 

WHEREFORE, We find ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, counsel for petitioner, guilty of intercalating a material fact in a judicial Decision elevated to Us on certiorari, thereby altering its factual findings with the apparent purpose, and no other, of misleading the Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment, and thus miserably failing to live up to the standards expected of him as a member of the Philippine Bar. Consequently, ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY is hereby DISBARRED effective immediately from the practice of law.

Let copies of this Resolution be served personally on Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay at his given address at Mezzanine Floor, WIL-VIC Building, 125 Kamias Road, Quezon City, entered upon his personal records, and furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all the courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 100643. December 12, 1995.]

ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Br. 79, Morong

12Rizal, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR QUEZON CITY, and AGUEDO EUGENIO, Respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

BELLOSILLO, J.:

On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, guilty of intercalating a material fact in a decision of the Court of Appeals, which he appealed to this Court on certiorari, thereby altering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals with the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment. Consequently, Atty. Dacanay was disbarred from the practice of law. 1

On 20 November 1992 movant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Leave to Offer Evidence Re Charge of Unauthorized Intercalation in a Judicial Record dated 18 November 1992. He claimed that the inserted words were written by his client, the President of Adez Realty, Inc., in the draft of the petition to be filed before the Supreme Court and unwittingly adopted by movant’s secretary when the latter formalized the petition. He manifested that he would not risk committing the act for which he was found guilty considering that he was a nominee of the Judicial and Bar Council to the President for appointment as regional trial judge. 2 But the Court on 3 December 1992 denied the motion for want of a compelling reason to justify a reversal of the questioned resolution. 3

On 23 February 1994 movant Dacanay filed a Motion to Lift (Disbarment) stating that he was already 62 years old, has learned his lesson from his mistake, was terribly sorry for what he had done, and in all candor promised that if given another chance he would live up to the exacting demands of the legal profession. He appended to his motion certifications of good moral character from: Fr. Celso Fernando, Parochial Vicar, Parish of St. Michael Archangel, Marilao, Bulacan; Fr. Lauro V. Larlar, OAR, Rector, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Sis. Aniceta B. Abion, EMM, Chairperson, Center for Housing and Ecology Development Foundation, Inc.; Dean Rufus B. Rodriguez, College of Law, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Judge Pedro T. Santiago, Executive Judge, RTC, Quezon City; Judge Teodoro P. Regino, RTC — Br. 84, Quezon City; Judge Antonio P. Solano, RTC — Br. 86, Quezon City; and Judge Gregorio D. Dayrit, MTC — Br. 35, Quezon City. 4 However, on 11 August 1994 the Court denied the motion. 5

On 1 December 1994 movant again filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment alleging among others that he had been deprived of his means to life; he had pursued civic, religious and community work, especially for the poor and the underprivileged short of extending legal assistance because of his incapacity; he had admitted "with profound regret and with utmost humility his commission of an unpardonable mistake and ask(ed) that he be given another chance;" and, he was "remorseful for what he has done and comes to this Honorable Court with a contrite heart." 6 

His wife Norma M. Dacanay likewise wrote the Court on 1 December 1994 saying that while she did not condone what her husband had done, it had been her fervent wish that the Court took a second look into its decision disbarring her husband as her entire family had been traumatized by his disbarment. 7 

On 6 March 1995 movant sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Court reiterating his Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment of 1 December 1994. Thus —

I am truly penitent for the serious offense I committed and admit full responsibility for it. I realize it was dishonest and unfair to pass the blame to my secretary

who was merely following my instructions. The intercalation was my own act and I am justly punished for it.

Your Honors, I do not question your decision but I only beg for your mercy. I have a wife and children to support but my only means of livelihood has been withdrawn from me. I am destitute and desperate and can only turn to you for relief . . . 

Looking back, I cannot imagine how I could have even thought of blackening the law profession, to which I owe so much. Please let me redeem myself by admitting me back to its precincts, where I swear to live strictly according to its canons . . . 8 

On 21 March 1995 the Court noted the letter of 6 March 1995 of movant Dacanay.

On 4 August 1995 movant again prayed for his reinstatement —

It has been 33 long months since my disbarment, during which time I have been struggling to make both ends meet to provide for my wife and three children. Please give me the chance to prove that I am a reformed offender who will henceforth do nothing whatsoever to dishonor the legal profession. 9 

On 12 September 1995 the Court noted respondent’s 4 August 1995. 10 

On 17 November 1995 movant once more wrote the Court —

I humbly acknowledge again that I committed a grievous offense for which I was justly punished at the time with the extreme sanction of disbarment.

I have been suffering much since my disbarment more than 36 months ago, but it is my wife and children who have suffered more for my transgression. Although innocent, they bear with me the stigma and burden of my punishment. 11

The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite apparently, given him sufficient time and occasion to soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct, redeem himself and prove once more that he is worthy to practice law and be capable of upholding the dignity of the legal profession. His admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion and reinstatement show that he is ready once more to meet the exacting standards the legal profession demands from its practitioners. Accordingly, the Court lifts the disbarment of Benjamin M. Dacanay. However he should be sternly warned that — 

[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a right, but a bounden duty as well . . . That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members . . . 12

WHEREFORE, the disbarment of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY from the practice of law is LIFTED and he is therefore allowed to resume the practice of law upon payment of the required legal fees. This resolution is effective immediately.

SO ORDERED.

13THIRD DIVISION

RENERIO SAMBAJON, RONALD SAMBAJON, CRISANTO CONOS, and FREDILYN BACULBAS,Complainants,  - versus -   ATTY. JOSE A. SUING,Respondent. 

A.C. No. 7062[Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1355] Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,CARPIO,CARPIO MORALES,TINGA, andVELASCO, JR., JJ.Promulgated:

September 26, 2006

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 

D E C I S I O N  CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Complainants, via a complaint[1] filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), have sought the disbarment of Atty. Jose A. Suing (respondent) on the grounds of deceit, malpractice, violation of Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.[2]

  Herein complainants were among the

complainants in NLRC Case No. 00-0403180-98, Microplast, Inc. Workers Union, Represented by its Union President Zoilo Ardan, et al. v. Microplast, Incorporated and/or Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil, for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP)   and Illegal Dismissal, while respondent was the counsel for the therein respondents. Said case was consolidated with NLRC Case No. 00-04-03161-98, Microplast Incorporated v. Vilma Ardan, et al., for Illegal Strike.

 By Decision of August 29, 2001,[3] Labor Arbiter

Ariel Cadiente Santos dismissed the Illegal Strike case, and declared the employer-clients of respondent guilty of ULP. Thus, the Labor Arbiter disposed:

 WHEREFORE, premises

considered, the complaint for illegal strike is dismissed   for lack of merit.

 Respondents Microplast, Inc.,

Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil are hereby declared guilty of Unfair Labor Practice   for union busting and that the dismissal of the nine (9) complainants are declared illegal. All the respondents in NLRC Case No. 00-04-03161-98 for illegal dismissal are directed to reinstate   all the complainants to their former position   with full backwages   from date of dismissal until actual reinstatement computed as follows:

 x x x x 3. CRISANTO CONOSBackwages:

Basic Wage:2/21/98 10/30/99 = 20.30 mos.P198.00 x 26 days x 20.30 = P104,

504.40

10/31/99  10/31/00 = 12 mos.P223.50 x 26 days x 12 = 69,

732.0011/01/00  8/30/01 = 10 mos.P250.00 x 26 days x 10 = 65,000.00P239,236.4013th Month Pay:1/12 of P239,236.40 = 19,936.36SILP2/16/98  12/31/98 = 10.33 mos.P198.00 x 5 days x 10.33/ 12 =

852.221/1/99  12/31/99 = 12mos.P223.50 x 5 days x 12/12 =

1,117.501/1/00  10/30/01 = 20 mos.P250.00 x 5 days x 20/12

= 2,083.334,053.05P263,225.81x x x x 7. RONALD SAMBAJON(same as Conos) 263,225.818.FREDELYN BACULBAS(same as Conos) 263,225.819. RENEIRO SAMBAJON (same as

Conos) 263,225.81Total Backwages P2,370,674.38 Respondents are jointly and

severally liable to pay the above-mentioned backwages including the various monetary claims stated in the Manifestation dated August 24, 1998 except payment of overtime pay and to pay 10% attorneys fees of all sums owing to complainants.[4] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

  The Decision having become final and executory, the Labor Arbiter issued on September 2, 2003 a Writ of Execution.[5]

 In the meantime, on the basis of individual

Release Waiver and Quitclaims dated February 27, 2004 purportedly signed and sworn to by seven of the complainants in the ULP and Illegal Dismissal case before Labor Arbiter Santos in the presence of respondent, the Labor Arbiter dismissed said case insofar as the seven complainants were concerned, by Order dated March 9, 2004. [6]

Herein complainants, four of the seven who purportedly executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter the said documents or having received the considerations therefor. Hence, spawned the administrative complaint at bar, alleging that respondent, acting in collusion with his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, frustrated the implementation of the Writ of Execution by presenting before the Labor Arbiter the spurious documents. In a related move, complainants also filed a criminal complaint for Falsification against respondent, together with his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, before the Prosecutors Office of Quezon City where it was docketed as I.S. No. 04-5203.[7]

In his Report and Recommendation[8] dated September 27, 2005, IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag, who conducted an investigation of the administrative complaint at bar, recommended that respondent be

14faulted for negligence and that he be reprimanded therefor with warning, in light of his following discussion:

  The issue to be resolved is whether or not respondent can be disbarred   for his alleged manipulation of four alleged RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM by herein complainants who subsequently disclaimed the same as bogus and falsified. 

A lawyer takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar. By doing so he thereby becomes an Officer of the Court on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice.

 Mindful of the fact that the

present proceedings involve, on the one hand, the right of a litigant to seek redress against a member of the Bar who has, allegedly caused him damaged, either through malice or negligence, while in the performance of his duties as his counsel, and, on the other, the right of that member of the Bar to protect and preserve his good name and reputation, we have again gone over and considered [the] aspects of the case.

 All the cases protesting and

contesting the genuineness, veracity and due execution of the questioned RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM namely: Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall, Appeal and Falsification are PENDING   resolution in their respective venues. Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos, who was supposed to know the identities of the herein complainants   is not impleaded   by the complainants when it was his solemn duty and obligation to ascertain true and real identities of person executing Release Waiver with Quitclaim.

 The old adage that in the

performance of an official duty there is that presumption of regularity unless proven otherwise, such was proven in the January 28, 2005clarificatory questioning . . . :

 x x x x . . . In the case at bar, the

question of whether or not respondent actually committed the despicable act would seem to be fairly debatable under the circumstances.[9] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

 The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Resolution No. XVII-2005-226, approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Hababag. 

After the records of the case were forwarded to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), the Director for Bar Discipline of the IBP[10] transmitted additional records including a Motion to Amend the Resolution No. XVII-2005-226[11] filed by respondent.

 One of the complainants, Renerio Sambajon

(Sambajon), by Petition[12] filed before the OBC, assailed the IBP Board Resolution. The Petition was filed three days after the 15-day period to assail the IBP Resolution. Sambajon explains that while his counsel received the Resolution on February 27, 2006, he only learned of it when he visited on March 16, 2006 his counsel who could not reach him, he (Sambajon) having transferred from one residence to another. 

Giving Sambajon the benefit of the doubt behind the reason for the 3-day delay in filing the present petition, in the interest of justice, this Court gives his petition due course.

 In respondents Motion to Amend the IBP Board

Resolution, he does not deny that those whom he met face to face before Commissioner Hababag were not the same persons whom he saw before Labor Arbiter Santos on February 27, 2004. [13] He hastens to add though that he was not familiar with the complainants as they were not attending the hearings before Arbiter Santos.[14] Complainants[15] and their former counsel Atty. Rodolfo Capocyan[16] claim otherwise, however. And the Minutes[17] of the proceedings before the National Conciliation Mediation Board in a related case, NCMB-NCR-NS-02-081-98, Re: Microplast, Inc., Labor Dispute, which minutes bear respondents and complainants signatures, belie respondents claim that he had not met complainants before.

 Respondent, who declared that he went to the

Office of the Labor Arbiter on February 27, 2004 on the request of his clients who told him that on February 27, 2004 the seven claimants w[ould] be at the office of Arbiter Santos [to] submit their respective quitclaims and waivers, heaps on the Labor Arbiter the responsibility of ascertaining the identity of the parties who executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. But respondent himself had the same responsibility. He was under obligation to protect his clients interest, especially given the amount allegedly given by them in consideration of the execution of the documents. His answers to the clarificatory questions of Commissioner Hababag do not, however, show that he discharged such obligation. 

COMM. HABABAG: But is it not a fact [that it is] also your

duty to ask.. that the   money of your client would go to the deserving employee?

 ATTY. SUING: 

I did not do that anymore, Your Honor, because there was already as you call it before a precedent   in February of 1998 when my client directly made settlement to the nine or eight of the seventeen original complainants, Your Honor,

15and I did not participate. Hindi po ako nakialam don sa kanilang usapan because it is my belief that the best way, Your Honor, to have a dispute settled between the parties is that we let them do the discussion, well let them do the settlement because sometimes you know, Your Honor, sad to say, when lawyers are involved in a matters [sic] of settlement the dispute does not terminate as in this case, Your Honor.

 x x x xCOMM. HABABAG:

Yes. What made you appear on said date and time before Arbiter Santos?

 ATTY. SUING: 

I was called by my client to go to the office of Arbiter Santos, number one,   to witness the signing   of the documents of Quitclaim and Waiver; number 2, so that according to them someone as a lawyer will represent them in that proceedings.

 COMM. HABABAG:My query, did it not surprise you

that no money was given   to you and yet there would be a signing of Quitclaim Receipt and Release?

 ATTY. SUING: I am not, your Honor, because it happened before and there   were no complaints, Your Honor. COMM. HABABAG: 

Just because it happened before you did not bother to see to it that there is a voucher so you just rely on your precedent, is that what you mean?

 ATTY. SUING: 

Yes, Your Honor, because I always believe that the parties   who are talking and it is my client who knows them better than I do, Your Honor.

 COMM. HABABAG: 

So, you just followed the instruction of your client to be present at Arbiter Cadiente Santos office because there would be signing of Quitclaim

Receipt and Release, it that clear?

 ATTY. SUING: Yes, Your Honor. COMM. HABABAG: [You] [d]id not bother to ask your client where is the money   intended for the payment of these workers? ATTY. SUING: I did not ask. COMM. HABABAG: You did not asked [sic] your client who will prepare the documents? ATTY. SUING: As far as the documents are concerned, Your Honor. COMM. HABABAG: The Quitclaim Receipt and Release? ATTY. SUING:Yes, Your Honor, I remember this. They asked me before February of 1998.

 COMM. HABABAG:When you say they whom are you referring to?ATTY. SUING:Im referring to my client, Your Honor. COMM. HABABAG:They asked me attorney can you please

prepare us a document of Quitclaim and Waiver or give us a simple [ sic ] of Quitclaim and Waiver. I do recall that I made one but this document, Your   Honor, is only a single document where all the signatories named are present because my purpose there really, Your Honor, is that so that each of them will be there together and they will identify themselves, see each other para ho siguradong sila-sila yong magkakasama at magkakakilanlan. x x x x And when the signing took place in February of 2004 it was made for any [ sic ] individual, Your Honor,   no longer the   document that I prepared when all of the seven will be signing in one document.

 COMM. HABABAG:

Okay. You did not inquire from your client whom [sic] made the changes?

16  ATTY. SUING:

I did not anymore because, Your Honor, at the time when I was there, there are already people there, the seven complainants plus another woman.[18] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.CANON 18  A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.x x x x Rule 18.03  A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.To be sure, respondents client Manuel Rodil did

not request him to go to the Office of Labor Arbiter Cadiente to be a mere passive witness to the signing of the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. That he was requested to go there could only mean that he would exert vigilance to protect his clients interest. This he conceded when he acknowledged the purpose of his presence at the Office of Labor Arbiter Santos, thus: 

ATTY. SUING: 

To go there, Your Honor, and represent them and see that these document[s] are properly signed and   that these people are properly identified   and verified them in front of Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos.[19] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

 That there was an alleged precedent in 1998 when a group of complainants entered into a compromise agreement with his clients in which he did not participate and from which no problem arose did not excuse him from carrying out the admitted purpose of going to the Labor Arbiters office that [the complainants] are properly identified . . . in front of [the] Arbiter. 

Besides, by respondents own information, Labor Arbiter Santos was entertaining doubts on the true identity of those who executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims.[20] That should have alerted him to especially exercise the diligence of a lawyer to protect his clients interest. But he was not and he did not.

Diligence is the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of negligence. A lawyer serves his client with diligence by adopting that norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from him, save by

the rules of law legally applied. It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the client. The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or that extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing and preserving their rights. All that is required is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of a   bonus pater familias. x x x[21] (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)  And this Court notes the attempt of respondent

to influence the answers of his client   Manuel Rodil when the latter testified before Commissioner Manuel Hababag:

 COMM. HABABAG:

May pinirmahan dito na Quitclaim Receipt and Release. Ito ho ba sinong may gawa nitong Receipt Waiver and Quitclaim?

 MR. RODIL:

Sila po. COMM. HABABAG:

Ibig mong sabihin ibinigay sa yo to ng complainant o sinong nag-abot sa iyo nitong Receipt Waiver and Quitclaim?

  MR. RODIL:

Si Atty. Suing po. ATTY. SUING:

In fact, ang tanong sa iyo kung ibinigay daw sa iyo yong mga dokumentong ito or what?

 COMM. HABABAG:

Okay, uulitin ko ha, tagalog na ang tanong ko sa iyo ha hindi na English. Ito bang Release Waiver and Quitclaim sino ang may gawa nito, sino ang nagmakinilya nito?

 MR. RODIL:

Kami yata ang gumawa niyan. COMM. HABABAG:

Pag sinabi mong kami yata ang may gawa sino sa inyong mga officer, tauhan o abogado ang gumawa nito?

 MR. RODIL:

Matagal na ho yan eh. x x x x

 COMM. HABABAG:

Okay. Pangalawang gusto kong itanong. Sino ang naghatid nito kay Ariel Cadiente Santos para pirmahan ni Ariel Cadiente Santos?

17MR. RODIL:Si attorney po.

 ATTY. SUING:

Wait. I did not bring the documents. The Commissioner is asking kung sino ang nagdala ng mga dokumento?

MR. RODIL:Yong mga tao. x x x x COMM. HABABAG:

Simple ang tanong ko ha. Intindihin mo muna. Kanino mo inabot ang   bayad   sa nakalagay dito sa Release waiver and Quitclaim?

 MR. RODIL:Kay attorney po.  COMM. HABABAG:Pag sinabi mong kay attorney sinong tinutukoy mong attorney? ATTY. SUING:Yong ibinigay na pera pambayad saan, yon ang tanong.  COMM. HABABAG:

Sundan mo ang tanong ko ha. Ako ang nagtatanong hindi ang abogado mo.

 MR. RODIL:Opo. COMM. HABABAG:Huwag kang tatawa. Im reminding you serious tayo dito. MR. RODIL: Opo serious po. COMM. HABABAG: Sabi mo may inabutan kang taong pera? MR. RODIL:Opo. COMM. HABABAG: 

Ang sagot mo kay attorney. Sinong attorney ang tinutukoy mo? MR. RODIL:

Atty. Suing po. COMM. HABABAG:

Okay. ATTY. SUING:

Your Honor, COMM. HABABAG:

Pabayaan mo muna. Ill come to that. Magkano kung iyong

natatandaan ang perang inabot kay Atty. Suing?

 MR. RODIL:

Yan ang hindi ko matandaan. x x x x[22] (Emphasis and

underscoring supplied) Thus, not only did respondent try to coach his client or influence him to answer questions in an apparent attempt not to incriminate him (respondent). His client contradicted respondents claim that the Release Waiver and Quitclaim which he (respondent) prepared was not the one presented at the Arbiters Office, as well as his implied claim that he was not involved in releasing to the complainants the money for and in consideration of the execution of the documents.

 As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called

upon to assist in the administration of justice. He is an instrument to advance its cause. Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct.[23] While the Commission on Bar Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the misconduct of its officers or an examination into his character.[24]

 In Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr.[25] the respondent lawyer was found guilty of gross misconduct for his attempts to delay and obstruct the investigation being conducted by the IBP. Nonetheless, this Court found that a suspension of one month from the practice of law was enough to give him the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous path of the legal profession.

While the disbarment of respondent is, under the facts and circumstances attendant to the case, not reasonable, neither is reprimand as recommended by the IBP. This Court finds that respondents suspension from the practice of law for six months is in order. 

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jose A. Suing, is found GUILTY of negligence and gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Six (6) Months, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

  Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the

Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts throughout the country.

 SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[A.M. No. RTJ-90-580. April 27, 1993.]

EDUARDO R. BALAOING, Complainant, v. JUDGE LEOPOLDO CALDERON, Respondent.

[A.M. No. RTJ-676. April 27, 1993.]

EDUARDO R. BALAOING, Complainant, v. HON. SANTIAGO MALIWANAG, Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; COUNSEL’S WANTON DISREGARD OF COURT’S STERN WARNING NOT TO AGAIN FILE

18BASELESS AND FRIVOLOUS ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS AND HIS ADAMANT REFUSAL TO ABIDE BY CANON 11, RULE 11.03 AND RULE 11.04, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IS GROUND FOR DISBARMENT. — Complainant Balaoing went out of bounds when he filed his baseless and frivolous administrative complaints against respondent Judges Calderon and Maliwanag, with no other plain and clear purpose than to harass respondent Judges, and thus, exact vengeance on them for rendering adverse judgments against him and his clients. These acts of complainant Balaoing run counter to the explicit mandate of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: CANON 11 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS . . . Rule 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case. We have painstakingly reviewed the records of these cases and find the present administrative complaints of Atty. Balaoing against Judge Calderon, Jr. and his OIC Leonor Maniago, and against Judge Maliwanag, just as frivolous and baseless as the previous ones. Like before, his present complaints are based on his personal interpretation of the law and not on material allegations of fact, substantiated by solid evidence. This We cannot countenance. Complainant Balaoing’s wanton disregard of Our stern warning not to again file baseless and frivolous complaints which only clog the already full dockets of this Court instead of serve the ends of justice, and his adamant refusal to abide by the above-quoted provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility which serve to regulate a lawyer’s conduct in this jurisdiction, have shown complainant Balaoing’s unfitness to hold the license to practice law.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

This is the latest of the several administrative complaints filed by Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing against different judges of Olongapo City and Zambales.

The first complaint was dated February 17, 1989, entitled "Atty. Balaoing v. Hon. Jaime Dojillo as Judge of Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Olongapo City, Et. Al." Said complaint was dismissed for lack of merit through this Court’s Resolution dated September 18, 1990. Further, Atty. Balaoing was required to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for having suppressed certain material facts of which he was charged with knowledge, and for having engaged in forum shopping. On September 26, 1990, Atty. Balaoing submitted his "Explanation and Motion for Reconsideration." In a Resolution 1 of the Court En Banc, said motion for reconsideration was DENIED, his explanation was DECLARED UNSATISFACTORY and he was SEVERELY CENSURED for having instituted a patently unfounded and frivolous administrative action, and WARNED that the commission by him of the same or similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely.

The second administrative complaint filed by Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing was against Judge Santiago Maliwanag, RTC, Branch 71, Iba, Zambales, charging them with grave misconduct for their alleged failure and refusal to issue the corresponding writ of execution (pending appeal) prayed for by complainant in his motion filed in Civil Case No. 983-1 (CA-G.R. No. 01234), entitled "TEOFILO ZABALA, Et. Al. v. EUGENIO BUENO." The Court was disturbed by complainant Balaoing’s unrestrained use of unsavory, even defamatory and offensive language against respondent Judge. One glaring example narrates: ". . . It is well to advise Judge Maliwanag not to be wearing his brief (short) while in his chamber during office hours; it is

downright undignified, especially so when his body has traces of fungus, which was have been afflicted during his 26 years as Assistant City Fiscal of Olongapo City, a dirty city." (This was vehemently denied by respondent Judge.) The Court, in a Resolution 2 En Banc, dated December 4, 1990, resolved to:

(1) DISMISS the complaint;

(2) SUSPEND complainant from the practice of law for one (1) year; and

(3) IMPOSE upon complainant a FINE of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00), for Violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a stern warning that subsequent similar infractions shall be dealt with more severely.

Notwithstanding the above warnings, censure and suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year, Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing is again before this Court with more administrative complaints filed against not only one, but two judges, the Honorable Leopoldo T. Calderon, Jr. and the Honorable Santiago Maliwanag, of Olongapo City and Zambales, respectively.

On September 25, 1990, Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing filed a sworn letter-complaint 3 against Judge Leopoldo T. Calderon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75, Olongapo City, for misconduct, grave abuse of authority and malicious delay in the administration of justice, allegedly committed as follows:

"Complainant alleges that in the matter of implementing the Supreme Court Circular mandating continuous trial, there is no way for it to succeed in so far as respondent Judge is concerned since the latter does not follow the Circular and merely treats it as directory; that at the start of court sessions, it has been the practice of respondent Judge to automatically grant postponements and deferments of the hearing of cases to a later hour whenever his OIC, Leonor Maniago, makes a manifestation in open court that a certain lawyer or party called up requesting that his/her case be postponed or be called later in the day; that respondent Judge drinks a lot with lawyers close to Mayor Gordon and fraternizes with them openly; that with respect to respondent’s personal driver, the latter receives his salary both from Mayor Gordon as a casual employee and from the Supreme Court as a judicial aide; and, that respondent Judge sanctions the set up of having his legal researcher, Jaime Dojildo, Jr., to work under the supervision of an OIC who, according to complainant, is grossly inefficient and a notorious swindler with no background in law.

Complainant further alleges that respondent Judge has been maliciously delaying the disposition of several cases pending in his sala.

a. Civil Case No. 418-0-88, where complainant is the counsel for the plaintiff, was filed in 1988. Since the respondent Judge allowed the defendants to keep on postponing the hearings, to date, the case remains pending, without any hearing, for more than one (1) year;

b. Sp. Proc. No. 285, where complainant is the counsel for the Petitioner, the case was submitted for decision on (sic) September 1989. To date, no decision has yet been rendered on the case to the prejudice of the petitioner who is now very old and sickly;

c. In Civil Case No. 157-0-89, where complainant is the plaintiff, respondent Judge in cahoots with his Deputy Sheriff, unlawfully prevented the implementation of the Writ of Possession;

19d. In Civil Case No. 253-0-90, where complainant is the Petitioner, the application for the immediate issuance of mandatory injunction was filed on April 27, 1990. To date the same has not yet been acted upon by the respondent Judge." 4 

A second letter-complaint 5 dated October 5, 1990, was again filed by Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing against the same Judge Leopoldo T. Calderon, Jr. and his Officer-in-Charge (OIC) Leonor Maniago charging them both with misconduct, grave abuse of authority and malicious delay in the administration of justice relative to Civil Case No. 201-0-89, entitled "Eduardo R. Balaoing v. Santiago Maliwanag and Romeo Enriquez." Complainant Balaoing, who is the plaintiff in both cases, alleges that respondent Judge abused his authority by refusing to declare in default the defendants in the above-entitled cases despite their repeated failure to attend the pre-trial conferences and to submit their pre-trial briefs. Complainant further avers that at the scheduled hearing, on October 5, 1990, respondent Judge did not call complainant’s case, and was told only three (3) hours later that the reason was because of the motion filed by him for respondent Judge’s inhibition, which the latter allegedly refused to resolve.

With respect to the other respondent OIC Leonor Maniago, complainant Balaoing alleges that when he came out of the courtroom, he was castigated by the former for allegedly calling her notorious, swindler, insane, etc.

Respondent Judge Leopoldo T. Calderon, Jr. filed his Comment 6 on November 13, 1991. He asserts that the present administrative complaint filed against him by complainant Balaoing was precipitated by incidents in Civil Case No. 190-0-89 entitled "Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing v. Eliseo Gavilan, Et. Al." for Damages, wherein defendant Gavilan defaulted. All the other cases mentioned in the letter-complaint were allegedly included to merely embellish the charges.

The factual backdrop of the Gavilan case shows that complainant Balaoing won in a foreclosure case against one Eliseo Gavilan. After the foreclosed properties (a house and lot) were sold in a public auction, where complainant Balaoing was the highest bidder, a Certificate of Sale was issued and the same was registered. Respondent Judge, however, allegedly prevented the implementation of the writ of possession, to the prejudice of complainant Balaoing. In his Comment, respondent Judge explained that the reason why he quashed the writ of possession he earlier issued in favor of complainant Balaoing was due to the fact that Gavilan’s widow, Alice, and her children, were residing in the foreclosed properties and, more importantly, the period to redeem the said properties had not yet expired. This action of respondent Judge allegedly infuriated complainant Balaoing, hence, his filing of several suits, one after the other, against respondent Judge, namely:

"a) a Motion for Inhibition of respondent Judge in the Gavilan case and in the other cases mentioned in his present administrative complaint, alleging, among other things, that respondent Judge is guilty of "mental dishonesty" and "grossness of ignorance of the laws;" 

b) a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, to prevent respondent Judge from further acting in the Gavilan case and to nullify the Order of the Quashal of the Writ of Possession rendered in his favor;

c) Civil Case No. 425-0-90, entitled "Balaoing v. Judge Leopoldo Calderon, Jr.," for Damages, the causes of action of which were anchored on the events that transpired in the Gavilan case; and

d) a Petition to cite respondent Judge in contempt filed with the Court of Appeals for expunging his motion for inhibition.

When the redemption period in the Gavilan case had expired without the heirs redeeming the property, respondent Judge issued a writ of possession in favor of complainant Balaoing. But up to the present time, complainant Balaoing has not yet taken possession of the same, showing thereby his apparent disinterest.

As to the application of complainant Balaoing for a writ of injunction and restraining order in Civil Case No. 253-0-90, respondent Judge explains that before he could finish hearing the evidence of the parties in support of and in opposition to the petition for issuance of the ancillary writ prayed for, complainant Balaoing filed another Motion for Inhibition of respondent Judge to hear his cases. Nevertheless, respondent Judge denied the motion for the issuance of the writ prayed for failure of complainant Balaoing to show a clear right over the property and that irreparable injury would visit him if the writ would not be issued.

With regard to the charge of grave misconduct, respondent Judge vehemently denies the same. Thus,

"7.1 The charge that the undersigned drinks "whisky like water" is a canard. The undersigned is not a habitual imbiber of liquor as he suffers from an occasional high blood pressure and migraine. Since undersigned became a judge, he never "patronized" with any lawyer.

7.2 The undersigned applies the Mandatory Continuous Trial Scheme in his cases. If there were occasional lapses, it was because of the abnormal case load which is now more than 500 cases.

7.3 Court Aide Antonio Faustino does not receive any compensation from the City Government. He was, before being appointed by the Supreme Court to such a position, a casual employee of the City government. Upon his assumption to his present duty, he ceased to receive compensation from any other source.

x       x       x

7.5 Atty. Jaime Dojillo was the duly appointed researcher in my sala. When he was promoted as Assistant Clerk of Court, upon his request, the Executive Judge allowed him to do researches for me. He is now a Trial Attorney in the PAO.

8. The undersigned has conducted the trial of cases and had disposed of the same consistent with the Rules of Court and various Supreme Court rulings and circulars . ." 

Other respondent OIC Leonor Maniago adopted the allegations in respondent Judge’s Comment, and alleged further that she has "faithfully performed her duties and obligations under the law to administer justice in accordance with her authority and without any impartiality, (sic) whatsoever." 8 

Consolidated with this administrative case is A.M. No. R-676-RTJ, entitled "Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing v. Hon. Santiago Maliwanag," wherein the former charges the latter with gross ignorance of the law for allegedly issuing a patently unjust order.

Respondent Judge Maliwanag, in his Comment dated September 2, 1986, denied the charge and alleged among others, that his order was issued based on jurisprudence, equity and justice, in order to prevent an unjust and inequitable execution of the judgment and an injustice perpetrated by a lawyer on the unlearned and poor couple from the barrio.

20In a Memorandum to then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, dated September 12, 1990, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of Atty. Balaoing’s complaint against Judge Maliwanag on the ground that the same failed "to specifically show and prove the facts constituting the charge of gross ignorance of the law. The allegation of the complainant are not only laconic and general but they are also based on mere and personal, interpretations of the complainant on the law instead of material allegations of facts." 9 

As shown above, complainant Balaoing has a penchant for filing administrative charges against judges, in whose sala he has pending cases, whenever the latter render decisions or issue orders adverse to him and/or his clients. In Bagamasbad v. Judge de Guzman, Jr., 10 We have already admonished lawyers to be more prudent in filing administrative charges against members of the judiciary. It is true that "The lawyer owes ‘entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability . . . No fear of judicial disfavor or public unpopularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty . . . But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand for him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client. 11 Here, complainant Balaoing went out of bounds when he filed his baseless and frivolous administrative complaints against respondent Judges Calderon and Maliwanag, with no other plain and clear purpose than to harass respondent Judges, and thus, exact vengeance on them for rendering adverse judgments against him and his clients.

These acts of complainant Balaoing run counter to the explicit mandate of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

CANON 11 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

x       x       x

Rule 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.

We have painstakingly reviewed the records of these cases and find the present administrative complaints of Atty. Balaoing against Judge Calderon, Jr. and his OIC Leonor Maniago, and against Judge Maliwanag, just as frivolous and baseless as the previous ones. Like before, his present complaints are based on his personal interpretation of the law and not on material allegations of fact, substantiated by solid evidence. This We cannot countenance.

Complainant Balaoing’s wanton disregard of Our stern warning not to again file baseless and frivolous complaints which only clog the already full dockets of this Court instead of serve the ends of justice, and his adamant refusal to abide by the above-quoted provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility which serve to regulate a lawyer’s conduct in this jurisdiction, have shown complainant Balaoing’s unfitness to hold the license to practice law. The Philippines abounds in lawyers. But as Justice Malcolm puts it, "the Philippines do not need so-called lawyers

who . . . have no ethical standards, and who are a disgrace to a great and noble profession . . . (F)or what is needed in the Philippines is not a greater quantity, but a finer quality, of professional men and women, . . . who have a sincere understanding of the high requirements of the legal profession . . ." 12 Complainant Balaoing has utterly failed to live up to the duties and responsibilities of a member of the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the administrative complaints are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Complainant Eduardo R. Balaoing is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records of complainant. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27072 January 9, 1970

SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET AL., Petitioners, vs. HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL

ETC., ET AL., respondents, In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L.

Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling;

and Morton F. Meads.

R E S O L U T I O N

SANCHEZ, J.:

After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co., the Solicitor General brought to our attention statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto, members of the Bar, with the suggestion that disciplinary action be taken against them. On November 21, 1968, this Court issued a show-cause order.

The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are set forth in the memoranda personally signed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto:

a. They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary) have made these false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur International. Such efforts could be accurately called "scattershot desperation" (Memorandum for Respondents dated March 27, 1968, pp. 13-14, three lines from the bottom of page 13 and first line page 14).

b. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners. (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to Petitioner's Memorandum Brief, dated April 13, 1968, p. 16, last two lines on bottom of the page).

c. The herein petitioners ... opportunistically change their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum, Ibid., p.17, sixth, seventh and eighth lines from bottom of the page).

MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly

21for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, the Solicitor General points out, contain the following statements:

d. ... ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).

e. ... Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).

The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 - after judgment herein was rendered - and signed by Vicente L. Santiago for himself and allegedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and Graciano Regala and Associates, asked Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "[t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states "[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case." The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that "unjudicial prejudice" had been caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism" in favor of "petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision." The "incidents" cited are as follows:

(a) said decision is in violation of the law, which law has not been declared unconstitutional.

(b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above-entitled case.

(c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the right to adduce evidence as is the procedure in all previous cases of this nature.

(d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first place when the appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss was and is neither new nor novel nor capable of leading to a wholesome development of the law but - only served to delay respondent for the benefit of the favored party.

(e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain the status quo but destroyed it, and the conclusion cannot be avoided that it was destroyed for a reason, not for no reason at all.

(f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said decision which the Honorable Supreme Court has refused to correct.

(g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided otherwise in previous decisions, and the main issue "right to reject any or all bids" is being treated on a double standard basis by the Honorable Supreme Court.

(h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme Court knows better and has greater understanding than the said decision manifests.

(i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred million dollars by said decision - without an effort by the Honorable Supreme Court to learn all the facts through presentation through the trial court, which is elementary.

On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for himself and Attys. Erlito R. Uy and Graciano Regala and Associates, in writing pointed out to this Court that the statements specified by the Solicitor General were either quoted out of context, could be defended, or were comments legitimate and justifiable. Concern he expressed for the fullest defense of the interests of his clients. It was stressed that if MacArthur's attorney could not plead such thoughts, his client would be deprived of due process of law. However, counsel sought to change the words "Chief Justice" to "Supreme Court" appearing on line 7, paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion, which in full reads:

6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial authorities believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue. Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a motion to hold himself in contempt of court - seemingly totally oblivious or uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle involved - and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an accused who is also his correspondent in two other cases. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral?

And, in addition, he attempted to explain further subparagraphs (f) and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof.

It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago filed his compliance with this Court's resolution of November 21, 1968. He there stated that the motion to inhibit and third motion for reconsideration were of his exclusive making and that he alone should be held responsible therefor. He further elaborated on his explanations made on November 21, 1968.

On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his explanations by saying that he already deleted paragraph 6 of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted from his rough draft but that it was still included through inadvertence.

On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as counsel for MacArthur, registered an amended motion to

22inhibit. While it repeats the prayer that Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr. Justice Castro inhibit themselves, it left but three paragraphs of the original motion to inhibit, taking out the dissertation on judicial ethics and most of the comments attacking the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968.

On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated that as early as October 7, 1968, he insisted in withdrawing his appearance in this case as one of the lawyers of MacArthur. His ground was that he did not agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit the two justices. According to him, "[t]he present steps (sic) now being taken is against counsel's upbringing and judicial conscience."

In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29, 1968, he took pains to say that the questioned statements he made were also taken out of context and were necessary for the defense of his client MacArthur. He made the admission, though, that those statements lifted out of context would indeed be sufficient basis for a finding that Section 20(f), Rule 138, had been violated.

On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were filed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. He there averred that the Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction over the charge against him because it is one of civil contempt against a party and the charge is originally cognizable by the Court of First Instance under Sections 4 and 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He also stressed that said charge was not signed by an "offended party or witness", as required by law; and that the Solicitor General and his assistants could not stand in the stead of an "offended Party or witness."

We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his explanation of December 2, 1968, as further clarified by a supplemental motion of December 27, 1968, he manifested that the use of or reference to his law firm in this case was neither authorized nor consented to by him or any of his associates; that on July 14, 1967, one Morton F. Meads, in MacArthur's behalf, offered to retain his services, which was accepted; that Meads inquired from him whether he could appear in this case; that he advised Meads that this case was outside his professional competence and referred Meads to another lawyer who later on likewise turned down the offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads and he agreed to terminate their previous retainer agreement; that he had not participated in any manner in the preparation or authorship of any pleading or any other document in connection with this case.

On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his side of the case. In brief, he denied participation in any of the court papers subject of our November 21, 1968 order; claimed that he was on six months' leave of absence from July 1, 1968 to December 31, 1968 as one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that he gave his permission to have his name included as counsel in all of MacArthur's pleadings in this case (L-27072), even while he was on leave of absence.

Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 3, 1969.

A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14, 1969, respondent MacArthur, through new counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling who entered a special appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration without express leave of court. Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised, and contained the following paragraphs:

4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when

in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case - which condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court - Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take part. - ... . only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ..." This requirement is especially significant in the present instance because the member who penned the decision was the very member who was absent for approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.

xxx xxx xxx

6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and /or to the United States Government, either its executive or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of law - and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or compensation is made.

This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18, 1969, requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling "to show cause within five (5) days from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be dealt with for contempt of court."

On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanita M. Caling filed his return. He there alleged that the said fourth motion for reconsideration was already finalized when Atty. Vicente L. Santiago came to his office and requested him to accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion; that he turned down said request twice on the ground that he did not know anything about the case, much less the truth of the allegations stated in the motion; that "the allegations in said motion were subsequently explained to the undersigned counsel together with the background of the case involved by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and by one Morton F. Meads"; that upon assurance that there was nothing wrong with the motion he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same; that he was misled in so signing and the true facts of the allegations were not revealed to him especially the oral argument allegedly made in the case.

Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling, this Court, on August 4, 1969, resolved "to require Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads to file in writing their answer to the said return [of Atty. Caling] and at the same time to show cause why they, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads, should not be dealt with for contempt of court, on or before August 16, 1969; and ... to direct that the three, Atty. Juanita M. Caling, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, and Morton Meads, personally appear Before this Court on Thursday, August 27, 1969, at 9:30 a.m., on which date the contempt proceedings against all of them will be heard by this Court."

On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his explanation. He disavowed the truth of Atty. Caling's statement that he (Santiago) convinced Caling to sign the motion. The truth, according to Santiago, is that one day Morton Meads went to his office and asked

23him if he knew of a lawyer nearby who could help him file another motion for reconsideration, and he (Santiago) mentioned Atty. Caling; he there upon accompanied Meads to Caling, told Caling of Meads' desire and left Meads with Caling. Santiago insists that he never prepared the motion and that he never even read it.

On August 15, 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads' version is as follows: On July 14, 1969, he went to Atty. Santiago's office with the fourth motion for reconsideration which he himself prepared. Santiago started to read the motion and in fact began to make some changes in Pencil in the first or second paragraph when Meads told him that MacArthur wanted a new lawyer, not Santiago, to file the same. Meads asked Santiago if he could recommend one. They then went to Caling whose office was on the same floor. Santiago introduced Meads to Caling at the same time handing the fourth motion to Caling. While Caling was reading the document, Santiago left. After reading the motion, Caling gave his go-signal. He signed the same after his name was typed therein. The motion was then filed. According to Meads, from the time he entered the office of Santiago to the time the motion was filed, the period that elapsed was approximately one hour and a half. Santiago was with Caling for about three minutes and Meads was with Caling for about fifteen minutes.

In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads asserts that the quotation from the Rules of Court set forth in the fourth motion for reconsideration has not been taken out of context because said quotation is precisely accurate; that the "xs" indicate that it is not a complete quotation and that it is a common practice in court pleadings to submit partial quotations. Meads further contends that the announced plan to bring the case to the World Court is not a threat. In fact, his answer also included a notice of appeal to the World Court.

On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L. Santiago and Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in oral argument with respect to the second contempt incident. We shall now discuss the first and second contempt incidents seriatim.

1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as "vulturous executives". He speaks of this Court as a "civilized, democratic tribunal", but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.

In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as "false, erroneous and illegal" in a presumptuous manner. He there charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, "a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered." In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that "it would seem that the principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself." He puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro "would be less likely to

engender favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular cause or party." Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible todelicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country, "although the process has already begun."

It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which contained language that is as disrespectful. But we cannot erase the fact that it has been made. He explained that, he deleted this paragraph in his rough draft, which paragraph was included in the motion filed in this Court only because of mere inadvertence. This explanation does not make much of a distinguishing difference; it erects no shield. Not only because it was belatedly made but also because his signature appeared on the motion to inhibit which included paragraph 6. And this paragraph 6 describes with derision "many of our judicial authorities" who "believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity." It depicts them as seemingly "incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue." After citing acts of two judges of first instance, he paused to ask: "What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral?"

Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of "unjudicial prejudice" against respondent MacArthur and spoke of "unjudicial favoritism" for petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the decision. Paragraph 8 is a lecture on judicial ethics. Paragraph 9 is a warning to this Court about loss of confidence, and paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement that "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of any board-petitioner, or their agents or principals, including the President", should also inhibit themselves.

What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also asked of, we repeat, "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or principals, including the president." The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that sense may be considered to have each received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.

The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts

24much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are thus called upon to repeat what we have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows: "By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become common place. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.' As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that '[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.' That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be 'with all good fidelity ... to the courts.' Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.' "

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice."1 His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice."2 Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people."3 Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."4

It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was necessary for the defense of his client. A client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients' success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics."5 As rightly observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his position, lacks the power to defend himself and it is the attorney, and no other, who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the incumbent of the judicial position.6 From this, Mr. Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a trying ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful obedience to the court. It may happen that counsel possesses greater knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who presides over the court. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly administration of justice."7 

The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules - against improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice8 - is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.

2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze the statements pointed out to us by the Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses petitioners of having made "false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur." He brands such efforts as "scattershot desperation". He describes a proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its face", laying bare "the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners." He charges petitioners with opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. Such language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court before which it is made. It is no excuse to say that these statements were taken out of context. We have analyzed the lines surrounding said statements. They do not in any manner justify the inclusion of offensive language in the pleadings. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession."9 It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged." 10

Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83 Phil. 702, 708, where counsel for the accused convicted of murder made use of the following raw language in his brief : "The accused since birth was a poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since his boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in his own name. Now, here comes a chance for him. A cold fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life. A simple job. Perhaps a question of seconds' work and that would transform him into a new man. Once in a small nipa shack, now in a palatial mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth, protection and stability was given to do the forbidden deed." We there held that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to the bar and an affront to the court."

It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants may not be considered offended parties in this case. This Court may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature. There should be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish him for contempt under the circumstances. For, inherent in courts is the power "[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto." 11

We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties; and that he too has committed, under Section 3 (d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice. He is, therefore, guilty of contempt.

3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano C. Regala. It was improper for Atty. Santiago to have included the name of the firm of Atty. Regala without the latter's knowledge and consent. Correctly did Regala insist - and this is confirmed by the other lawyers of respondents - that he had not participated in any way in the pleadings of the above-entitled case. Regala did not even know that his name was included as co-counsel in this case. He is exonerated.

4. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt incident is the case of Atty. Erlito R. Uy. Borne out by the record is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also involved in the preparation of any of the pleadings subject of the contempt citation. He should be held exempt from contempt.

255. We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. The fourth motion for reconsideration is, indeed, an act of contumacy.

First. It was filed without express leave of court. No explanation has been made why this has been done.

Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows: "Justices; who may take part. - ... only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ..." However, the provision in its entire thought should be read thus -

SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. - All matters submitted to the court for its consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are members of the division of the court at the time when such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication, whether such Justices were or were not present at the date of submission; however, only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication, if the parties or either of them, express a desire to that effect in writing filed with the clerk at the date of submission. 12

Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not attempt to explain this point.

Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation came about - the portion left out was anyway marked by "XS" which is a common practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and specifically states that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote." While Morton Meads is admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is being foisted upon this Court. There was a qualification to the rule quoted and that qualification was intentionally omitted.

Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the United States government. It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were injected. More specifically, the motion announced that MacArthur "will inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court" and would invoke "the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually ... ."

This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to decide the case in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads' return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.

6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that he should be exempted from the contempt charge against him. He knows that he is an officer of this Court. He admits that he has read the fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it. While he has been dragged in only at the last minute, still it

was plainly his duty to have taken care that his name should not be attached to pleadings contemptuous in character.

7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration. He cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him even though he is not a lawyer. He is guilty of contempt.

8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His insistence that he had nothing to do with the fourth motion for reconsideration and that he had not even read the same is too transparent to survive fair appraisal. It goes against the grain of circumstances. Caling represents before us that it was Santiago who convinced him to sign the motion, who with Meads explained to him the allegations thereof and the background of the case. Caling says that if not for his friendship with Santiago, he would not have signed the motion. On the other hand, Meads states that Santiago began to read the fourth motion for reconsideration and even started to make changes thereon in pencil. We must not forget, too, that according to Meads himself, he spent, on July 14, 1969, quite some time with Santiago before they proceeded to Caling. It is highly improbable that Santiago did not read the fourth motion for reconsideration during all that time.

Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case. He has not resigned from his position as such lawyer. He has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should have reminded him that "[a] lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation."

The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice.

9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again that, if only for one reason, this Court had really no alternative but to decide the main case against respondent MacArthur. As we held in our decision of July 31, 1968, MacArthur did not even adhere to the terms and conditions of the invitation to bid. For, this invitation to bid explicitly warned that "bids not accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected. And We repeat, "[a]dmittedly, the bid of the Company [MacArthur] had been submitted without the requisite bond." 13 It would not require the adroit mind of a lawyer to say that a bid unaccompanied by a bond., contrary to the instructions to bidders, is not entitled to any consideration.

It should be emphasized, too, that because the decision herein was by a unanimous Court, even if the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had not taken part in the decision on the merits of this case, the result would have been the same: MacArthur's cause would just the same have failed.

For the reasons given, this Court hereby finds:

261. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Santiago in the sum of P1,000, and Atty. Sotto, P100; and holds Attys. Graciano C. Regala and Associates and Atty. Erlito R. Uy not guilty of contempt of court; and

2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, Morton F. Meads and Atty. Juanita M. Caling guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, an additional P1,000, Morton F. Meads, P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M. Caling, P200.

Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, for whatever action he may deem proper to take in the premises against Morton F. Meads who is an alien.

Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Solicitor General, for such action as he may deem proper in relation to the disbarment or suspension of Attys. Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling.

The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of this decision to the personal records of Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling. So ordered.

EN BANC[A.C. - CBD No. 471. June 10, 1999]

LT. LAMBERTO P. VILLAFLOR, complainant, vs. ALVIN T. SARITA, respondent.

SYNOPSISThe case under consideration is an administrative

case originated from a sworn affidavit complaint filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines by Lt. Lamberto P. Villaflor seeking the disbarment of Atty. Alvin Sarita for disregarding the temporary restraining Order issued by the Court of Appeals in relation to the case entitled Lamberto Villaflor vs. Biyaya Corporation.  Records show that despite the issuance of the TRO by the Court of Appeals, respondent still filed before the Municipal Trial Court an Urgent Ex-parte Motion for the implementation and/or Enforcement of the Writ of Demolition, which was granted by MTC Judge Amatong.

The Court ruled that the facts and evidence obtaining in the instant case clearly reveal respondents failure to live up to his duties as a member of the Bar in accordance with the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Lawyers Oath and Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, thus warranting disciplinary sanction.  Particularly, respondent committed immeasurable disservice to the judicial system when he openly defied the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals.  By such act, he deliberately disregarded or ignored his solemn oath to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity to the courts.  Accordingly, the Court imposed on herein respondent the penalty of suspension for two years from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all rights and privileges appurtenant to membership in the Philippine Bar.

SYLLABUS1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; CODE OF

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; IT IS THE DUTY OF A LAWYER TO UPHOLD THE DIGNITY AND AUTHORITY OF THE COURT, TO WHICH HE OWES FIDELITY, ACCORDING TO THE OATH HE HAS TAKEN; CASE AT BAR.- The facts and evidence obtaining in this case clearly reveal respondents failure to live up to his duties

as a member of the Bar in accordance with the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Lawyers Oath and Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, thus warranting disciplinary sanction.  As an officer of the court, it is the duty of a lawyer to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken.  It is his foremost responsibility to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. The highest form of respect to the judicial authority is shown by a lawyers obedience to court orders and processes.  Atty. Alvin T. Sarita committed an immeasurable disservice to the judicial system when he openly defied the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals.  By such act, he deliberately disregarded or ignored his solemn oath to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity to the courts.  He neglected his duties to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers, and to act with candor, fairness and good faith to the courts.

2. ID.; ID.; COURT ORDERS ARE TO BE RESPECTED NOT BECAUSE THE JUDGES WHO ISSUE THEM SHOULD BE RESPECTED, BUT BECAUSE OF THE RESPECT AND CONSIDERATION THAT SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT; CASE AT BAR.- Moreover, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals was ambiguous in its phraseology, respondent should have carried out the intent and the spirit of the said TRO rather than choose to be narrowly technical in interpreting and implementing the same.  In De Leon vs. Torres, this Court said: We desire to call attention to the fact that courts orders, however erroneous they may be, must be respected, especially by the bar or the lawyers who are themselves officers of the courts.  Court orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the Government.  This is absolutely essential if our Government is to be a government of laws and not of men.  Respect must be had not because of the incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them.  Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branch of the Government to which they belong, as well as to the State which has instituted the judicial system.  Not only did respondent disobey the order of the Court of Appeals, he also misled the trial court judge into issuing the order to implement the writ of demolition which led to the destruction of the family home of complainant.  In doing so, respondent violated his oath of office and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court.  Surely, such conduct of respondent is starkly unbecoming of an officer of the court.

R E S O L U T I O NKAPUNAN, J.:

This administrative case originated from a sworn affidavit-complaint[1] dated 14 March 1997, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar Discipline, by Lt. Lamberto P. Villaflor seeking the disbarment of Atty. Alvin T. Sarita for disregarding the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued by the Court of Appeals in relation to the case entitled Lamberto Villaflor vs. Biyaya Corporation, et al.[2] now pending with the same court.

27Respondent Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is the counsel of

Biyaya Corporation, the plaintiff in the ejectment case[3] filed against complainant Lt. Lamberto P. Villaflor before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 53, of Kalookan City. Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Romanito A. Amatong decided the ejectment case in favor of Biyaya Corporation. Complainant appealed this decision to the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 131,[4] which affirmed the decision of the MTC. Not satisfied with the decision of the RTC, complainant brought the case on appeal before the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA G.R No. 50623.[5] Losing no time, complainant also filed with the Court of Appeals an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to prevent the impending demolition of his family home.

In a Resolution dated 27 December 1996, the Court of Appeals granted the prayer for a TRO, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let a restraining order forthwith issue against defendants-appellees including the public respondent Judge or Sheriff or any person under him from evicting and demolishing the family house of the movant, pending appeal. x x x

SO ORDERED.

The TRO was specifically addressed to, and personally served on, the Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 131, Kalookan City; the Sheriff/Deputy Sheriff, RTC Branch 131, Kalookan City; Atty. Alvin T. Sarita; and Atty. Romeo F. Barza.[6] Despite the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals, respondent on 8 January 1997, filed before the MTC an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Implementation and/or Enforcement of the Writ of Demolition[7] which had already been issued by the trial court as early as 12 August 1996. In his motion which is quoted hereunder, respondent stated the reason why he did not heed the TRO:

1. That last January 7, 1997, plaintiff received a Resolution dated December 27, 1996 from the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals granting the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).

2. A close scrutiny of the afore-said Resolution including the Notice of Resolution and the Temporary Restraining Order show that it was directed to the Honorable Presiding Judge (Honorable Antonio J. Fineza) of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131 and to the assigned (deputy) sheriff thereon and NOT to this Honorable Court and its deputy sheriff.

3. The only conclusion therefrom is that the Honorable Metropolitan Trial Court is not restrained nor prohibited from enforcing and/or implementing its judicial process such as the subject writ of demolition.

X X XOn 9 January 1997, Judge Amatong granted the

motion of respondent and issued an order[8] for the implementation of the writ of demolition. The demolition order was actually carried out the next day, or on 10 January 1997, by the deputy sheriff of the lower court.[9]

In response to the situation, complainant filed before the Court of Appeals an action for Indirect Contempt against respondent, Biyaya Corporation, Judge Amatong, And the Register of Deeds of Kalookan City.

The Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 20 February 1997, found respondent and his co-defendants, Judge Amatong and Biyaya Corporation, guilty of indirect contempt. The dispositive portion of the resolution states:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, defendants-appellees Biyaya Corporation and MTC Judge Ramonito Amatong, and their counsel, Atty. Alvin Sarita are hereby adjudged GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT as they are hereby fined to pay the amount of P30,000.00 each, as per SC Administrative Circular No. 22-95, amending Section 6, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Atty. Alvin Sarita is likewise REPRIMANDED for his contemptuous or improvident act despite receipt of Our Restraining Order, without prejudice to any further administrative sanctionthe injured party may seek in the proper forum.

Describing the unfortunate behavior of respondent, the Court of Appeals said:

Specifically, the Court is convinced that Atty. Alvin Sarita should answer for contempt of court for misleading if not deceiving the defendant-appellee MTC Judge into doing a precipitate act of implementing the writ of demolition of appellants family house which is restrained   by this Court, or for making false allegations that led his clients to commit a contemptuous act.(Cu Unjieng vs. Mitchell, 58 Phil. 476.) His misinterpretation of the resolution is no defense otherwise, all lawyers can effectively avoid restraining orders of the higher court by arguing around the bush.[10]

The Court of Appeals also granted the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and ordered Biyaya Corporation and Judge Amatong to immediately restore the demolished family house of complainant or, return to him the estimated value of the same.

Thereafter, complainant filed a case for disbarment against respondent before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. The commissioner[11] assigned to investigate the case issued an order[12] dated 3 September 1997, directing respondent to file his answer or comment to the complaint. The period of time allotted to answer the complaint lapsed without respondent submitting his comment. On 8 December 1997, an order[13] was issued by the investigating commissioner requiring the parties to attend the hearing of the case on 10 February 1998.Respondent failed to appear therein. The hearing was postponed and reset to 6 March 1998. A notice of hearing[14] was sent to respondent but again he failed to attend the proceeding. After giving respondent enough opportunity to face the charges against him, which the latter did not avail, the case was submitted for resolution on 6 March 1998.[15]

The commissioners report dated 10 September 1998, recommending the disbarment of Atty. Alvin T. Sarita stated in part:

As clearly established in the resolution of the Honorable Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in its disquisition on his culpability, Atty, Sarita is liable not only for deliberately misleading if not deceiving the defendant-appellee MTC Judge into violating the appellate courts restraining order, but also for making false allegations that led his clients to commit a contemptuous act;

28As a member of the Bar, Atty. Sarita is mandated by his oath to obey the laws as well as the duly constituted authorities therein and not to do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court;

In filing his urgent ex-parte motion to implement the writ of demolition issued against the residence of the complainant, Atty. Sarita was well-aware that what he was seeking to do was specifically restrained by the court of Appeals in no uncertain terms. Even if we were inclined, in a gesture of utmost liberality, to hold for Atty. Saritas (sic) and resolve any doubts in his favor, we are simply overwhelmed by the thought that as a lawyer, Atty. Sarita knew quite well or must have known quite well that what he was asking for in his motion was violative not only of an order from the second highest court but more personally was violative of his own oath as a lawyer;

The findings of the Court of Appeals says it all. What all the more moves the undersigned to recommend the ultimate penalty of disbarment against Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is the evident, even palpable disdain, in which he clearly holds this Office in particular, and the Integrated Bar in general. Nowhere is this disdain more felt than in Atty. Saritas deliberate and pointed refusal, not only to file an Answer to the complaint against him but also his unjustified refusal to appear before this Office despite repeated notices. It appears that Atty. Sarita is beyond caring for whatever sanctions this Office may recommend against him. Surely, he cannot turn his back on the possibility that the complainants prayer may be granted given the seriousness of his (Saritas) misdeeds. But then, considering that Atty. Sarita has no compunctions about misleading a judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court into disregarding and violating an order from the Court of Appeals, it is no surprise that he would ignore the Commission on Bar Discipline;

We recommend for the disbarment of Atty. Alvin T. Sarita.

In its 4 December 1998 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt the findings of the investigating commissioner, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is DISBARRED from the practice of law.

The facts and evidence obtaining in this case clearly reveal respondents failure to live up to his duties as a member of the Bar in accordance with the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Lawyers Oath and Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, thus warranting disciplinary sanction.

As an officer of the court, it is the duty of a lawyer to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. It is his foremost responsibility to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.[16] The highest form of respect to the judicial authority is shown by a lawyers obedience to court orders and processes.

Atty. Alvin T. Sarita committed an immeasurable disservice to the judicial system when he openly defied the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals. By such act, he deliberately disregarded or ignored his solemn oath to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity to the courts. He neglected his duties to observe and

maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers,[17] and to act with candor, fairness and good faith to the courts.[18]

Moreover, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals was ambiguous in its phraseology, respondent should have carried out the intent and the spirit of the said TRO rather than choose to be narrowly technical in interpreting and implementing the same. In De Leon vs. Torres,[19] this Court said:

We desire to call attention to the fact that courts orders, however erroneous they may be, must be respected, especially by the bar or the lawyers who are themselves officers of the courts.Court orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely essential if our Government is to be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not because of the incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them. Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branch of the Government to which they belong, as well as to the State which has instituted the judicial system.

Not only did respondent disobey the order of the Court of Appeals, he also misled the trial court judge into issuing the order to implement the writ of demolition which led to the destruction of the family home of complainant. In doing so, respondent violated his oath of office and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court. Surely, such conduct of respondent is starkly unbecoming of an officer of the court.

Respondents behavior also exhibited his reckless and unfeeling attitude towards the complainant. By disobeying the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals, he inflicted deep physical and moral injury upon complainant and his family by making them homeless. Obviously, it did not matter to him whether complainant and his family would still have a place to stay as long as he won the case for his client. We would like to emphasize that a lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.[20] Respondent failed to live up to this expectation.

We find the complaint against respondent fully substantiated by the evidence. However, we believe that the penalty of disbarment imposed by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is too severe and, hereby reduce it to suspension for two (2) years from the practice of law.[21]

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is hereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all rights and privileges appurtenant to membership in the Philippine Bar, effective immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION RENATO M. MALIGAYA, A.C. No. 6198

Complainant,- v e r s u s - 

 ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR.,

29Respondent. 

Promulgated: September 15, 2006

 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 

R E S O L U T I O N  CORONA, J.: 

 Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge Advocate Generals Service is before us on a charge of unethical conduct for having uttered a falsehood in open court during a hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778.[1]

 Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 was an action for

damages filed by complainant Renato M. Maligaya, a doctor and retired colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, against several military officers for whom Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel. At one point during the February 19, 2002 hearing of the case, Atty. Doronilla said:

 And another matter, Your Honor. I was appearing in other cases he [complainant Maligaya] filed before against the same defendants. We had an agreement that if we withdraw the case against him, he will  also withdraw all the cases. So, with that understanding, he even retired and he is now receiving pension.[2] (emphasis supplied)

 Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding Judge Reynaldo B. Daway asked a number of clarificatory questions and thereafter ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his statements in writing and file the appropriate pleading.[3] Weeks passed but Atty. Doronilla submitted no such pleading or anything else to substantiate his averments. 

On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline.[4] The complaint, which charged Atty. Doronilla with misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting [in] obstruction of justice,[5] was referred to a commissioner[6] for investigation. Complainant swore before the investigating commissioner that he had never entered into any agreement to withdraw his lawsuits.[7] Atty. Doronilla, who took up the larger part of two hearings to present evidence and explain his side, admitted several times that there was, in fact, no such agreement.[8] Later he explained in his memorandum that his main concern was to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial[9] and insisted that there was no proof of his having violated the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyers oath.[10] He pointed out, in addition, that his false statement (or, as he put it, his alleged acts of falsity) had no effect on the continuance of the case and therefore caused no actual prejudice to complainant.[11]

 In due time, investigating commissioner Lydia

A. Navarro submitted a report and recommendation finding Atty. Doronilla guilty of purposely stating a

falsehood in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility[12] and recommending that he be suspended from the government military service as legal officer for a period of three months.[13] This was adopted and approved in toto by the IBP Board of Governors on August 30, 2003.[14]

 There is a strong public interest involved in

requiring lawyers who, as officers of the court, participate in the dispensation of justice, to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor.[15] The common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly should not become a common reality.[16] To this end, Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility state:

 CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.  By stating untruthfully in open court that

complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty. Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated the lawyers oath to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court, of which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act infringed on every lawyers duty to never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.[17]

 Atty. Doronillas unethical conduct was

compounded, moreover, by his obstinate refusal to acknowledge the impropriety of what he had done. From the very beginning of this administrative case, Atty. Doronilla maintained the untenable position that he had done nothing wrong in the hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778. He persisted in doing so even after having admitted that he had, in that hearing, spoken of an agreement that did not in truth exist. Rather than express remorse for that regrettable incident, Atty. Doronilla resorted to an ill-conceived attempt to evade responsibility, professing that the falsehood had not been meant for the information of Judge Daway but only as a sort of question to complainant regarding a pending proposal to settle the case.[18]

 The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla,

remarkable only for its speciousness,[19] cannot absolve him. If anything, it leads us to suspect an unseemly readiness on his part to obfuscate plain facts for the unworthy purpose of escaping his just deserts. There is in his favor, though, a presumption of good faith[20] which keeps us from treating the incongruity of his proffered excuse as an indication of mendacity. Besides, in the light of his avowal that his only aim was to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial,[21] perhaps it is not unreasonable to assume that what he really meant to say was that he had intended the misrepresentation as a gambit to get the proposed agreement on the table, as it were. But even if that had been so, it would have been no justification for speaking falsely in court.

30There is nothing in the duty of a lawyer to foster peace among disputants that, in any way, makes it necessary under any circumstances for counsel to state as a fact that which is not true. A lawyers duty to the court to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and honor[22] forbids recourse to such a tactic. Thus, even as we give Atty. Doronilla the benefit of the doubt and accept as true his avowed objective of getting the parties to settle the case amicably, we must call him to account for resorting to falsehood as a means to that end. Atty. Doronillas offense is within the ambit of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which in part declares:

 A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit x x x or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice x x x.  The suspension referred to in the foregoing

provision means only suspension from the practice of law. For this reason, we disagree with the IBPs recommendation for Atty. Doronillas suspension from the government military service. After all, the only purpose of this administrative case is to determine Atty. Doronillas liability as a member of the legal profession, not his liability as a legal officer in the military service. Thus, it would be improper for us to order, as a penalty for his breach of legal ethics and the lawyers oath, his suspension from employment in the Judge Advocate Generals Service. Of course, suspension from employment as a military legal officer may well follow as a consequence of his suspension from the practice of law but that should not be reason for us to impose it as a penaltyfor his professional misconduct. We would be going beyond the purpose of this proceeding were we to do so. Therefore, we shall treat the IBPs recommendation as one for suspension from the practice of law. At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBPs recommendation on the duration of Atty. Doronillas suspension. We need to consider a few circumstances that mitigate his liability somewhat. First, we give him credit for exhibiting enough candor to admit, during the investigation, the falsity of the statement he had made in Judge Daways courtroom. Second, the absence of material damage to complainant may also be considered as a mitigating circumstance.[23] And finally, since this is Atty. Doronillas first offense, he is entitled to some measure of forbearance.[24]

 Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude

throughout the conduct of this administrative case tells us that a mere slap on the wrist is definitely not enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems, needs time away from the practice of law to recognize his error and to purge himself of the misbegotten notion that an effort to compromise justifies the sacrifice of truthfulness in court.

 WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is

hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO MONTHS. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.

  Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his

personal record and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Court Administrator, the Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General of the AFP Judge Advocate Generals Service.

 SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 5161, August 25, 2015

RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF ROLANDO S. TORRES AS A

MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR.

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:

For resolution is the Petition1 filed by respondent Rolando S. Torres (respondent) who seeks judicial clemency in order to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.

Records show that respondent was administratively charged by his sister-in-law, complainant Isidra Ting-Dumali (complainant), for "presentation of false testimony; participation in, consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainant's signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from such forgery."2 The particular charges are:

According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his relationship with her and her brothers and used his profession to deprive them of what was lawfully due them even if it involved the commission of an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act. She attributes to the respondent the following acts or omissions:

1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the perjury committed by his wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when they executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986, wherein the two made it appear that they were the sole heirs of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting, knowing fully well that the same was false. He presented that document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite for the transfer of the title over Lot No. 1586 in the names of his wife and Miriam. The lot was later sold to Antel Holdings[,] Inc. for P1,195,400. Payment was already made to, and received by, Felicisima and Miriam.

2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the forgery of complainant's signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 when he knew that she was in Italy at that time working as an overseas contract worker. He even presented the falsified document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite to transfer the title over the property in favor of his wife Felicisima and sister-in law Marcelina. The forgery or falsification was made to enable them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment was received and misappropriated by Felicisima and Marcelina.

3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re: Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Original Copy. and Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-1869 Covering

31Lot No. 1605 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite, filed by complainant's sisters Marcelina and Felicisima on 24, October 1995, the respondent made gross misrepresentation and offered false testimony to the effect that Marcelina and Felicisima are the only children and legal heirs of the late spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante for the purpose of obtaining a new title in their names. With the reconstituted title, and with the express conformity of the respondent, Felicisima and Marcelina were able to sell Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100 and profited from the sale to the exclusion of their other siblings. Partial payment was even received pending the reconstitution proceedings.

4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross and false misrepresentations for the purpose of profiting therefrom when he requested the buyer through a certain Mrs. Ong to release the full payment for Lot 1605 under the pretense that the order of reconstitution would be released within a month when he knew that it would be impossible because he presented evidence in the reconstitution case only on 12 August 1997. To facilitate the release of the money, he even used the stationery of the Philippine National Bank, of which he was an employee.3

In a Resolution4 dated April 14, 2004, the Court found merit in the complaint and, thus, held respondent guilty of gross misconduct and of violating the lawyer's oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, resulting in his disbarment from the practice of law:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the lawyer's oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.

x x x x5

Aggrieved, respondent filed on May 20, 2004 a Motion for Reconsideration6 of the aforesaid Resolution, which the Court denied with finality in the Resolution7 dated June 29, 2004.

Unperturbed, he filed on September 15, 2004 a Motion for Leave to File and Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration,8 which the Court denied for lack of merit in the Resolution9 dated November 9, 2004, stating that "[n]o further pleadings will be entertained."

On January 26, 2006, respondent filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment10 begging that compassion, mercy, and understanding be bestowed upon him by the Court in that his disbarment be lifted. The same was, however, expunged from the records in a Resolution11 dated June 13, 2006.

Still insistent, respondent wrote letters addressed to former Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga12 and former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban,13 reiterating his pleas for compassion and mercy. However, these letters were similarly expunged from the records in a Resolution14 dated September 5, 2006, considering the previous directive that no further pleadings will be further entertained in this case. These were followed by numerous submissions either seeking his reinstatement to the bar15 or the reduction of his penalty of disbarment to suspension, 16 all of which were either expunged from the records17 or denied18by the Court.

More than ten (10) years from his disbarment, or on June 23, 2015, respondent filed the instant Petition once more seeking judicial clemency from the Court to reinstate him in the Roll of Attorneys.

The Court's Ruling

"Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. The same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those who establish their present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though the doors to the practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to the legal profession as well as to the general public to ensure that if the doors are opened, it is done so only as a matter of justice."

"The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the Iawver has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character. Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement."20

In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Judicial Clemency21 the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:

1. There 'must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.22 (emphases and underscoring supplied)

32

Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds that the instant petition is not meritorious.

While more than ten (10) years had already passed since his disbarment on April 14, 2004, respondent's present petition has failed to show substantial proof of his reformation as required in the first guideline above.

The principle which should hold true not only for judges but also for lawyers, being officers of the court, is that judicial "[c]lemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. Thus the Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable."23

In this case, the only ostensible proof of reformation that respondent has presented is a Certification24dated June 5, 2015 signed by Reverend Nelson D. Feranil, Administrative Pastor of the Buenavista Evangelical Church in General Trias, Cavite, which generally states that respondent, "before and after his disbarment," has been "assisting the poor and indigent litigants in our community," and that "he has been very active in spreading the [w]ords and gospel of the Almighty God[,] being an active member of the Couples of Christ FFL." Aside from these bare statements, no other proof was presented to specify the actual engagements or activities by which respondent had rendered free legal services to indigents or had ministered to the members of his community or church, hence, insufficient to demonstrate any form of consistency in his supposed desire to reform.

The other testimonials which respondent submits, particularly that of Atty. Teofilo Pugeda Jr., who stated that "[a]s a former law practitioner, [respondent] is humble, simple, and respectful to fellow lawyers, Court Personnel, and the Presiding Judge," and that "[h]e used to give free legal advice and assisted indigent litigants in their court cases,"25 and that of Atty. Manuel Medina, retired City Prosecutor of Cavite, who stated that "[d]uring my years as Prosecutor x x x I always met him in the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City where I can say in all honesty and candor that he was an exemplary officer of the court, punctual[,] and always prepared in handling his court cases,"26 all relate to conduct or attributions prior to respondent's disbarment; hence, these are incompetent evidence to prove his reformation which connotes consistent improvement subsequent to his disbarment.

In similar vein, the testimonials attached to his previous Motion for Reconsideration27 filed on May 20, 2004 which he now incorporates in support of his present petition,28 is equally insufficient to conclude that he has already reformed. This is because all these testimonials were executed in May 2004.29 Thus, they can only attest to respondent's conduct or attributions a mere month removed from his disbarment on April 14, 2004. 

More significantly, it should be discerned that the root cause of respondent's disbarment was his fraudulent acts against his sister-in-law, the complainant herein. However, no proof was presented to show that he had reconciled or even attempted to reconcile with her so as to show remorse for his previous faults. The dismissal of the criminal complaint against him for Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents, filed by complainant is no proof of remorse since the same was based on lack of probable cause.30  Likewise, its dismissal,' could not prove that he was actually innocent of the administrative charges against him, since the parameters and considerations of an administrative case are evidently different from that in a criminal case.  As in this case, the lack of probable cause against respondent as found by the prosecutor

does not negate his administrative liability already adjudged by this Court. That the prosecutor found that respondent "merely rendered legal services to the Ting siblings"31 does not mean that he rendered the same in accordance with the lawyer's oath and ethical canons.

To add, no other evidence was presented in his Petition to demonstrate his potential for public service, or that he - now being 68 years of age32 - still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself. Thus, the third and fourth guidelines were neither complied with.

While the Court sympathizes with the predicaments of disbarred lawyers - may it be financial or reputational in cause - it stands firm in its commitment to the public to preserve the integrity and esteem of the Bar. As held in a previous case, "in considering [a lawyer's] application for reinstatement to the practice of law, the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has established moral reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity."33 Ultimately, with the above discussed guidelines not complied with, the Court has to be objective and, therefore, denies the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. 

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015

ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant, v. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN, Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Arcatomy S. Guarin against Atty. Christine Antenor-Cruz Limpin for allegedly filing a false General Information Sheet (GIS) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) thus violating Canon 12 and Rule 1.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The facts are culled from the pleadings.

In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and thereafter as President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of Companies. He resigned from his post effective August 11, 2008 and transferred to St. Luke’s Medical Center as the Vice President for Finance.

On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), another corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a GIS for LCI for “updating purposes”.  The GIS4identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD) and President.

Mired with allegations of anomalous business transactions and practices, on December 18, 2008, LCI applied for voluntary dissolution with the SEC.

On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President of LCI when she knew that he had already resigned and had never held any share nor was he elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI.  He also never received any notice of meeting or

33agenda where his appointment as Chairman would be taken up.  He has never accepted any appointment as Chairman and President of LCI.

Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI.  She argued that the GIS was provisional to comply with SEC requirements. It would have been corrected in the future but unfortunately LCI filed for voluntary dissolution shortly thereafter.  She averred that the GIS was made and submitted in good faith and that her certification served to attest to the information from the last BOD meeting held on March 3, 2008.5

She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a stockholder.  Atty. Limpin said that on October 13, 2008, she sent Guarin a text message and asked him to meet with her so he may sign a Deed of Assignment concerning shareholdings.  Guarin responded in the affirmative and said that he would meet with her on Friday, October 17, 2008.  Guarin, however, neglected to show up at the arranged time and place for reasons unknown to Atty. Limpin.  On the strength of Guarin’s positive reply, Atty. Limpin filed the GIS on November 27, 2008.

To belie the claim that LCI never held any board meeting, Atty. Limpin presented Secretary’s Certificates dated May 16, 20066, May 22, 20067, and June 13, 20078 bearing Guarin’s signature.

Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending criminal complaints against the directors and officers of LCI, where she and Guarin are co-respondents: Senator Roxas, et al. v. Celso de los Angeles, et al.9 and SEC v. Legacy Card, Inc.10 In those proceedings, Guarin raised as a defense that the November 27, 2008 GIS was spurious and/or perjured.  She averred that this Court held that “when the criminal prosecution based on the same act charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings.”11 During the mandatory preliminary conference, however, both parties stipulated that the complaint filed by Senator Roxas was dismissed as to Guarin.12

Lastly, Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant disbarment.  She stated that merely presenting the GIS does not constitute as proof of any unethical conduct, harassment and malpractice.

In its Report,13 the IBP CBD found that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.0214 of the CPR and thus recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for three months.  It noted that based on the submissions of the parties, Guarin was never a stockholder of LCI consequently making him ineligible to be a member of the BOD.  Neither was there proof that Guarin acted as the President of LCI but was a mere signatory of LCI’s bank accounts.  This made the verified statement of Atty. Limpin untrue.15

Moreover, it was noted that only Mr. Celso de los Angeles had the authority to appoint or designate directors or officers of Legacy.  Atty. Limpin was aware that this procedure was not legally permissible.  Despite knowing this to be irregular, she allowed herself to be dictated upon and falsely certified that Guarin was a stockholder, chairman and president of the company.  The Secretary’s Certificates with Guarin’s signature Atty. Limpin presented were of no moment since in these Guarin merely acceded to become a signatory of bank accounts and these do not show that Guarin was a stockholder.

The IBP Board of Governors in its April 15, 2013 Resolution16 adopted in toto the CBD Report.  Atty. Limpin moved for reconsideration17 but was denied in

the March 21, 2014 Resolution18 of the IBP Board of Governors.

We adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP. Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR.

Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes.19  A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.20

Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and can proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.  As Justice Malcolm stated “[t]he serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges pr[o]ferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath.”21

Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found in Section 27,22 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.  Among these are (1) the use of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office and (2) any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice.

After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, we agree with the IBP that there is no indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation and that he is therefore ineligible to hold a seat in the BOD and be the president of the company.23  It is undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and certified that Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in the GIS.  While she posits that she had made the same in good faith, her certification also contained a stipulation that she made a due verification of the statements contained therein.  That Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would sign a Deed of Assignment is inconsequential: he never signed the instrument.  We also note that there was no submission which would support the allegation that Guarin was in fact a stockholder.  We thus find that in filing a GIS that contained false information, Atty. Limpin committed an infraction which did not conform to her oath as a lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR.

We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the business practice of having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of the corporation despite the rules enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to the election of such officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR.

However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpin’s action in submitting a false document we see it fit to increase the recommended penalty to six months suspension from the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin GUILTY of violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

34

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 10132, March 24, 2015

HEIRS OF PEDRO ALILANO REPRESENTED BY DAVID ALILANO, Complainants, v. ATTY. ROBERTO

E. EXAMEN, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by the heirs of Pedro Alilano against Atty. Roberto E. Examen for misconduct and malpractice for falsifying documents and presenting these as evidence in court thus violating the Lawyer’s Oath,2 Canons 1,3 104 and 19,5 and Rules 1.01,6 1.02,7 10.01,8 and 19.019 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Pedro Alilano and his wife, Florentina, were the holders of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-23261 covering a 98,460 sq. m. parcel of land identified as Lot No. 1085 Pls-544-D located in Paitan, Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat.  Pedro and Florentina died on March 6, 1985 and October 11, 1989, respectively.

It appears that on March 31, 1984 and September 12, 1984 Absolute Deeds of Sale10 were executed by the Spouses Alilano in favor of Ramon Examen and his wife, Edna.  Both documents were notarized by respondent Atty. Roberto Examen, brother of the vendee.  Sometime in September 1984, Spouses Examen obtained possession of the property.

On January 12, 2002, the heirs of Alilano filed a suit for recovery of possession before the Regional Trial Court of Sultan Kudarat against Edna Examen and Atty. Roberto Examen.11  It was during this proceeding that Atty. Examen introduced into evidence the March 31, 1984 and September 12, 1984 Absolute Deeds of Sale.

On November 15, 2003,12 the heirs of Alilano filed this complaint alleging that Atty. Examen, based onBarretto v. Cabreza,13 violated the notarial law when he notarized the absolute deeds of sale since a notary public is prohibited from notarizing a document when one of the parties is a relative by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree or affinity within the second civil degree.  It is also alleged that Atty. Examen notarized the documents knowing that the cedula or residence certificate number used by Ramon Examen was not actually his but the residence certificate number of Florentina.  Atty. Examen also falsely acknowledged that the two witnesses personally appeared before him when they did not.  Lastly, it is alleged that despite knowing the infirmities of these documents, Atty. Examen introduced these documents into evidence violating his oath as a lawyer and the CPR.

In his defense, Atty. Examen pointed out that there was no longer any prohibition under the Revised Administrative Code for a notary public to notarize a document where one of the parties is related to him by consanguinity and affinity.14  With regard to the use of Florentina’s residence certificate as Ramon’s, Atty. Examen said that he was in good faith and that it was office practice that the secretary type details without him personally examining the output.15  In any event, he reasoned that the use of another’s residence certificate is not a ground for disbarment and is barred by prescription based on IBP Resolution No. XVI-2004-

13 dated January 26, 2004 where it was proposed that the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Section 1, Rule VIII, be revised to include a prescription period for professional misconduct: within two years from the date of the act.16

In its Report and Recommendation,17 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty. Examen liable for breach of the Notarial Law and introducing false Absolute Deeds of Sale before court proceedings.  It stated that there was ample evidence to support the complainants’ contention that the Spouses Alilano did not voluntarily and knowingly convey their property, i.e. denials under oath by attesting witnesses and NBI Report by Handwriting Expert Jennifer Dominguez stating that Pedro Alilano’s signature in the September 1984 Absolute Deed of Sale was significantly different from the specimen signatures.  It also noted that Ramon Examen’s residence certificate number, date and place of issue were also falsified since the residence certificate actually belonged to Florentina Pueblo.  It thus recommended that the penalty of disbarment be imposed.

The IBP Board of Governors (BOG) in its June 26, 2007 Resolution18 adopted the IBP CBD’s report but modified the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years and a suspension of Atty. Examen’s Notarial Commission for a period of two years.

Atty. Examen moved for reconsideration.  In its Notice of Resolution, the IBP BOG denied the motion for reconsideration.  It also modified the penalty imposed to suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year and disqualification from re-appointment as Notary Public for a period of two years.19

We agree with the IBP that Atty. Examen is administratively liable and hereby impose a modified penalty.

In disbarment cases the only issue that is to be decided by the Court is whether the member of the bar is fit to be allowed the privileges as such or not.20  It is not therefore the proper venue for the determination of whether there had been a proper conveyance of real property nor is it the proper proceeding to take up whether witnesses’ signatures were in fact forged.

NO PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS FOR ACTS OF ERRING MEMBERS OF THE BAR

In Frias v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada,21 the Court En Banc opined that there can be no prescription in bar discipline cases.  It pointed out this has been the policy since 1967 with the Court’s ruling in Calo, Jr. v. Degamo22 and reiterated in Heck v. Santos23 where we had the chance to state:

If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for.  It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.  This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional

35Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath.  x x x

Thus, even the lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer…. (Italics supplied)24

We therefore ruled in Frias, that Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the IBP CBD was void and had no legal effect for being ultra vires and thus null and void.25

This ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Bengco v. Bernardo,26 where the Court stated that putting a prescriptive period on administrative cases involving members of the bar would only serve to embolden them to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for.

Atty. Examen’s defense of prescription therefore is of no moment and deserves scant consideration.

THE SPANISH NOTARIAL LAW OF 1889 WAS REPEALED BY THE REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917 

Prior to 1917, governing law for notaries public in the Philippines was the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889.  However, the law governing Notarial Practice is changed with the passage of the January 3, 1916 Revised Administrative Code, which took effect in 1917.  In 2004, the Revised Rules on Notarial Practice27 was passed by the Supreme Court.

In Kapunan, et al. v. Casilan and Court of Appeals,28 the Court had the opportunity to state that enactment of the Revised Administrative Code repealed the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889.  Thus:

It is petitioners’ contention that Notary Public Mateo Canonoy, who was related to the parties in the donation within the fourth civil degree of affinity, was, under Articles 22 and 28 of the Spanish Notarial Law, incompetent and disqualified to authenticate the deed of donation executed by the Kapunan spouses in favor of their daughter Concepcion Kapunan Salcedo.  Said deed of donation, according to petitioners, became a mere private instrument under Article 1223 of the old Civil Code, so that under the ruling laid down in the case of Barretto vs. Cabreza (33 Phil., 413), the donation was inefficacious.  The appellate court, however, in the decision complained of held that the Spanish Notarial Law has been repealed with the enactment of Act No. 496.  We find this ruling to be correct.  In the case of Philippine Sugar Estate vs. Poizart (48 Phil., 536), cited in Vda. de Estuart vs. Garcia (Adm. Case No. 212, prom. February 15, 1957), this Court held that “The old Spanish notarial law and system of conveyance was repealed in the Philippines and another and different notarial law and system became the law of the land with the enactment of Act No. 496.”29 (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the heirs of Alilano stated that Atty. Examen was prohibited to notarize the absolute deeds of sale since he was related by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree with the vendee, Ramon. The prohibition might have still applied had the applicable rule been the Spanish Notarial Law. However, following the Court’s ruling in Kapunan, the law in force at the time of signing was the Revised Administrative Code, thus, the prohibition was removed.  Atty. Examen was

not incompetent to notarize the document even if one of the parties to the deed was a relative, his brother. As correctly observed by the IBP CBD:

At the time of notarization, the prevailing law governing notarization was Sections 231-259, Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative Code and there was no prohibition on a notary public from notarizing a document when one of the interested parties is related to the notary public within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or second degree of affinity.30

Note must be taken that under 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule IV, Section 3(c), a notary public is disqualified among others to perform the notarial act if he is related by affinity or consanguinity to a principal within the fourth civil degree, to wit:

SEC. 3. Disqualifications. – A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:

x x x x

(c)  is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree.

That Atty. Examen was not incompetent to act as a notary public in the present case does not mean that he can evade administrative liability under the CPR in conjunction with the provisions of the Notarial Law.

NOTARIES PUBLIC MUST PERFORM THEIR DUTIES DILIGENTLY AND  WITH UTMOST CARE

In Nunga v. Atty. Viray,31 this Court stated:

…[N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.32 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Thus under the prevailing law at the time of notarization it was the duty of the notary public to comply with the requirements of the Notarial Law.  This includes the duty under Chapter 11, Section 251 of the Revised Administrative Code:

SEC. 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of cedula [residence] tax. – Every contract, deed, or other document acknowledged before a notary public shall have certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented their proper cedula [residence] certificates or are exempt from the cedula [residence] tax, and there shall be entered by the notary public as a part of such certification the number, place of issue, and date of each cedula [residence] certificate as aforesaid.

Under Chapter 11, Section 249 of the Revised Administrative Code provided a list of the grounds for disqualification:

SEC. 249. Grounds for revocation of commission. – The following derelictions of duty on the part of a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:

36

x x x x

(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula certificates.

x x x x

In Soriano v. Atty. Basco,33 the Court stated that notaries public are required to follow formalities as these are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected.  Thus, the Notarial Law requires them to certify that a party to the instrument acknowledged before him has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of the certification. Failure to perform his duties results in the revocation of a notary’s commission.  The Court said:

As a lawyer commissioned as a notary public, respondent is mandated to discharge with fidelity the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment are sacrosanct. He cannot simply disregard the requirements and solemnities of the Notarial Law.34(Emphasis supplied)

Here, based on the submission of the complainants, it is clear that the residence certificate number used by Ramon Examen and as notarized by Atty. Examen in both Absolute Deeds of Sale was not in fact the residence certificate of Ramon but Florentina’s residence certificate number.35  Atty. Examen interposes that he was in good faith in that it was office practice to have his secretary type up the details of the documents and requirements without him checking the correctness of same.

A notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity.36  Good faith cannot be a mitigating circumstance in situations since the duty to function as a notary public is personal. We note that the error could have been prevented had Atty. Examen diligently performed his functions: personally checked the correctness of the documents.  To say that it was his secretary’s fault reflects disregard and unfitness to discharge the functions of a notary public for it is he who personally acknowledges the document.  He was behooved under Section 251, Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative Code to check if the proper cedulas were presented and inspect if the documents to be acknowledged by him reflected the correct details.  This Court cannot stress enough that notarization is not a routinary act.  It is imbued with substantive public interest owing to the public character of his duties37.

Atty. Examen posits that the failure of a notary to make the proper notation of cedulas can only be a ground for disqualification and not the proper subject for a disbarment proceeding.  We disagree.

In violating the provisions of the Notarial Law, Atty. Examen also transgressed the his oath as a lawyer, provisions of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly

and willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

By his negligent act of not checking the work of his secretary and merely perfunctorily notarizing documents, it cannot be said that he upheld legal processes thus violating Canon 1 of the CPR.  Neither can it be said that he promoted confidence in the legal system.  If anything, his acts serve to undermine the functions of a diligent lawyer. He thus ran afoul Rule 1.02 of the CPR. We cannot stress enough that as a lawyer, respondent is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession.38  A lawyer’s mandate includes thoroughly going over documents presented to them typed or transcribed by their secretaries.39

The Court notes that the case between the parties is not the first that reached this Court.  In Edna Examen and Roberto Examen v. Heirs of Pedro Alilano and Florentina Pueblo,40 Atty. Examen and his sister-in-law questioned via a petition for certiorari41 the propriety of three Court of Appeals’ Resolutions relating to a case involving Lot No. 1085 Pls-544-D this time with respect to its fruits.  There the Court of Appeals (CA) after giving Atty. Examen 90 days to file his appellant’s brief, denied a second motion for extension of time merely on the basis of a flimsy reason that he had misplaced some of the transcript of the witnesses’ testimonies.  The CA did not find the reason of misplaced transcript as good and sufficient cause to grant the extension pursuant to Section 12,42 Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court.  It stated that it was a “flimsy and lame excuse to unnecessarily delay the proceedings.”43  The CA was of the opinion that defendant-appellant’s, herein respondent, motion was “a mockery of the procedural rules.”44  This Court denied the petition for various procedural defects.45

With respect to the penalty imposed, given that Atty. Examen not only failed to uphold his duty as a notary public but also failed to uphold his lawyer’s oath and ran afoul the provisions of the CPR, the Court deems it proper to suspend Atty. Examen from the practice of law for a period of two years following this Court’s decision in Caalim-Verzonilla v. Pascua.46

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto E. Examen is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS.  In addition, his present notarial commission, if any, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public for a period of two (2) years from finality of this Decision.  He is further WARNED that any similar act or infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.