Barredo V Garcia- 73 phil 607Facts:On May 3, 1936, there was a head-oncollisionbetween a taxi of the Malate taxicab driven by Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Dimapilis. The carretela was over-turned, and a passenger, a 16-year old boy, Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla, and he was convicted. The court in the criminal case granted the petition to reserve thecivil action. Garcia and Almario, parents of the deceased, on March 7, 1939, fileda civil actionagainst Barredo, the proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Fontanilla, making him primarily and directly responsible under culpa acquiliana of Article 2180 of the Civil Code ofthe Philippines. It is undisputed that Fontanillas negligence was the cause of the accident, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road at high speed, and there was no showing that Barredo exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, a defense to Article 2180 of the said Code. Barredos theory of defense is that Fontanillas negligence being punished by the Revised Penal Code, his liability as employer is only subsidiary, but Fontanilla, was not sued forcivil liability. Hence, Barredo claims that hecannotbe held liable.

Issue:Whether or not Barredo, as employer is civilly liable for the acts of Fontanilla, his employee.

Held: Quasi-delict or culpa acquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code ofthe Philippinesis entirely distinct and independent from a delict or crime under the Revised Penal Code. In this jurisdiction, the same negligent actcausingdamage may producecivil liability(subsidiary) arising from a crime under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code ofthe Philippines; or create an action for quasi-delicto or culpa aquiliana under Articles 2179 and 2180 of the Civil Code and the parties are free to choose which course to take. And in the instant case, the negligent act of Fontanilla produces two (2) liabilities of Barredo: First, a subsidiary one because of thecivil liabilityof Fontanilla arising from the latters criminal negligence under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, and second, Barredos primary and direct responsibility arising from his presumed negligence as an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Since the plaintiffs are free to choose what remedy to take, they preferred the second, which is within their rights. This is the more expedious and effectivemethodof relief because Fontanilla was either in prison or just been released or had no property. Barredo was held liable for damages.Mendoza V Arrieta- 91 scra 113Facts:On October 22, 1969, at around 4pm, a 3-way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway Bulacan, involving a Mercedez Benz owned and driven by petitioner, a private jeep owned and driven by respondent Salazar and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Timbol and driven by Montoya. As aconsequence, separate informations were filed against Salazar and Montoya.

At the trial, petitioner testified that Salazar overtook the truck, swerved to the left and hit his car. He further testified that before impact, Salazar jumped from the jeep not knowing that Salazar was hit by the truck of Montoya. Montoya affirmed this. On the other hand, Salazar tried to show that after overtaking the truck, he flashed a signal showing his intention to turn left but was stopped at by a policeman directing traffic at the intersection which he contends to be the time he was hit by the truckcausinghis jeep to hit petitioners car.

Issues:(1) Whether or not the damages ensued to the vehicle of petitioner shall be the liability of the driver of the jeep or of the truck.

(2) Whether or not the trucks owner may be held liable for damages caused by him employee.

Held:Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that thecollisionbetween Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the result of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar.

That petitioner'scause of actionagainst Timbol in thecivil caseis based on quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in the complaint to wit: that while petitioner was driving his car along MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven by Salazar suddenly swerved to his (petitioner's) lane and collided with his car That the sudden swerving of Salazar's jeep was caused either by the negligence and lack of skill of Freddie Montoya, Timbol's employee, who was then driving a gravel and sand truck iii the same direction as Salazar's jeep; and that as aconsequenceof thecollision, petitioner's car suffered extensive damages. Clearly, therefore, the two factors that acause of actionmust consist of, namely: (1) plaintiff's primary right, i.e., that he is the owner of a Mercedes Benz, and (2) defendant's delict or wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiff's primary right, i.e., the negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner Salazar or of Timbol's employee, Montoya, in driving the truck,causingSalazar's jeep to swerve andcollidewith petitioner's car, were alleged in the Complaint.

Consequently, petitioner'scause of actionbeing based on quasi-delict, respondent Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed thecivil suitagainst the truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

In view of what has been proven and established during the trial, accused Freddie Montoya would be held able for having bumped and hit the rear portion of the jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo Salazar.Consideringthat thecollisionbetween the jeep driven by Rodolfo Salazar and the car owned and driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by Freddie Montoya, this Court behaves that accused Rodolfo Salazarcannotbe held able for the damages sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's car.PSBA V CA- 205 scra 729Facts:Carlitos Bautista was stabbed while on the second floor premises of the schools by assailants who were not members of the schools academic community. This prompted the parents of thedeceasedto file a suit in the RTC of Manila for damages against PSBA and itscorporateofficers.

The defendant schools (now petitioner) sought to have the suit dismissed on the ground of no cause of action and not within the scope of theprovisionof Art 2180 since it is an academic institution. The trial court overruled the petitioners contention and its decision was later affirmed by the appellate court.

Issue:Whether the decision of the appellate court primarily anchored on the law of quasi-delicts is valid.

Held:Although the Supreme Court agreed to the decision of the Court of Appeals to deny the petition of motion to dismiss by the PSBA, they do not agree to the premises of the appellate courts ruling.

Art 2180, in conjunction with Art 2176 of the civil code establishes the rule of in loco parentis, they can not be held liable to the acts of Calitos assailants which were not students of the PSBA and because of the contractual relationship.

The school and the students, upon registration established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations. The institution of learning must provide their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge, and maintain peace and order within its premises.

The SC dismissed the petition and the case was remanded to the trail court to determine if the school neglected its obligation to perform based on the contractual relation of them and the students.

Amadora V CA 160 scra 315Facts:A few days beforegraduation, AlfredoAmadorawas shot and killed when his classmate, Pablito Daffron fired a gun in theauditoriumof their school. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, petitioners, fileda civil actionfordamagesunder Article 2180 of the Civil Code against theColegiode San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, thedean ofboys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped.

Issue: Whether or not the school may be held liable for the acts of its students.

Held:As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student constitutes.

Teachers shall be liable for the acts of their students. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessaryprecautionsto prevent the injury, he can exonerate himself from liability.

Velarde et al V CA 361 s 56FACTS:The private respondent executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, with a balance of P1.8 million, in favor of the petitioners. Pursuant to said agreements, plaintiffs paid the bank (BPI) for three (3) months until they were advised that the Application for Assumption of Mortgage was denied. This prompted the plaintiffs not to make any further payment. Private respondent wrote the petitioners informing the non-fulfillment of the obligations. Petitioners, thru counsel responded that they are willing to pay in cash the balance subject to several conditions. Private respondents sent a notarial notice of cancellation/rescission of the Deed of Sale. Petitioners filed a complaint which was consequently dismissed by an outgoing judge but was reversed by the assuming judge in their Motion for Reconsideration. The Court of Appeals reinstated the decision to dismiss.ISSUE:Whether or not there is a substantial breach of contract that would entitle its rescission.RULING:YES. Article 1191 of the New Civil Code applies. The breach committed did not merely consist of a slight delay in payment or an irregularity; such breach would not normally defeat the intention of the parties to the contract. Here, petitioners not only failed to pay the P1.8 million balance, but they also imposed upon private respondents new obligations as preconditions to the performance of their own obligation. In effect, the qualified offer to pay was a repudiation of an existing obligation, which was legally due and demandable under the contract of sale. Hence, private respondents were left with the legal option of seeking rescission to protect their own interest.Delta motors V Genuino__________(See Compilation of oblicon Cases)_____________Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation V Santos 491 Art 1169 Demand and DelayG.R. No. 153004 November 5, 2004 SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC.,petitioner, vs.ERNESTO V. SANTOS andRIVERLAND, INC.,respondents.QUISUMBING,J .Facts:Ernesto V. Santos and Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. (SVHFI) were plaintiff and defendant,respectively, in several civil cases. On October 26, 1990, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement wherein Foundation shall pay Santos P14.5 Million in the following manner:a. P1.5 Million immediately upon the execution of this agreement; andb. The balance of P13 Million shall be paid, whether in lump sum or in installments, at thediscretion of the Foundation, within a period of not more than two (2) years from the execution of thisagreement.In compliance, Santos moved for the dismissal of the cases, while SVHFI paid the initial P1.5 million. Afterseveral demands, SVHFI failed to pay the balance of P13 million, prompting Santos to apply for the issuance of a writ of execution of the compromise judgment of the RTC dated September 30, 1991.Twice, SVHFIs properties were auctioned and sold to Riverland, Inc.

On June 2, 1995, Santos and RiverlandInc. filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Damages alleging delay on the part of SVHFI in paying thebalance. They further alleged that under the Compromise Agreement, the obligation became due on October26, 1992, but payment of the remaining balance was effected only on November 22, 1994. Thus, respondentsprayed that petitioner be ordered to pay legal interest on the obligation, penalty, attorney's fees and costs of litigation.SVHFI alleged that the legal interest on account of fault or delay was not due and payable, considering thatthe obligation had been superseded by the compromise agreement. Moreover, SVHFI argued that absent astipulation, Santos must ask for judicial intervention for purposes of fixing the period.Issue:Whether or not SVHFI incurred in delay based on the compromise agreement and thereby liable for legal interest

Ruling:SVHFI is liable for legal interest as penalty on account of delay. The Compromise Agreement was entered into on October 26, 1990. It was judicially approved on September30, 1991. Applying existing jurisprudence, the compromise agreement as a consensual contract becamebinding between the parties upon its execution and not upon its court approval. Hence, the two-year periodshould have begun on October 26, 1990.In this case, there was non-fulfillment of the obligation with respect to time. The requisites of mora were all met:(1) that the obligation be demandable and already liquidated the two-year period already lapsed and the amount of payment was already determined;(2) that the debtor delays performance SVHFI paid the balance beyond the two-year period; andfinally,(3) that the creditor requires the performance judicially or extra-judicially a demand letter was sent inaccordance with the extra-judicial demand as contemplated by law.When the debtor knows the amount and period when he is to pay, interest as damages is generally allowed asa matter of right. The legal interest for loan as forbearance of money is 12% per annum to be computed fromthe time the demand was made under the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.Fallo: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated January 30, 2002 of theCourt of Appeals and its April 12, 2002 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 55122 are AFFIRMED. Costs againstpetitioner.SO ORDERED

Abella V Francisco 55 p 447Villaroel V Manila Motors 104 P 926Chaves v Gonzales 32 SCRA 547Khe Hong Cheng v Court of Appeals 355 SCRA 701Siguan v Lim 318 SCRA 725Juan Nakpil & Sons v Court of Appeals 144 SCRA 597Gaite v Fonacier 2 SCRA 830 - Gonzales v Heirs of Tomas and Paula Cruz 314 SCRA 585 Coronel v Court of Appeals and Alcaraz 263 SCRA 15 Central Philippine University v Court of Appeals 245 SCRA 511Quijada V Court of Appeals 299 SCRA 695Lao Lim v Court of Appeals 191 SCRA 150Heirs of Timoteo Moreno v Mactan Cebu Internationa Airport Authority 413 SCRA 502 Herrera v Leviste 135 SCRA 129 Taylor v Uy Tieng Piao 43 PHIL 873Ynchausti vs Yulo 34 PHIL 978Inciong vs. CA 257 SCRA 578RCBC vs CA 178 SCRA 739Lafarge Cement Phil. vs Continental Cement 443 SCRA 522Jaucian vs Querol 38 PHIL 718Rehabilitation Finance Corporation v CA (Official gazette No. p. 2467)Quiombing vs CA 257 SCRA 578Alipio v. CA 341 SCRA 441