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Basiao thereafter filed with the then Ministry of Labor a complaint4against the Company

and its president. Without contesting the termination of the first contract, the complaint

sought to recover commissions allegedly unpaid thereunder, plus attorney's fees. The

respondents disputed the Ministry's jurisdiction over Basiao's claim, asserting that he was

not the Company's employee, but an independent contractor and that the Company had no

obligation to him for unpaid commissions under the terms and conditions of his contract. 5

The Labor Arbiter to whom the case was assigned found for Basiao. He ruled that theunderwriting agreement had established an employer-employee relationship between him

and the Company, and this conferred jurisdiction on the Ministry of Labor to adjudicate his

claim. Said official's decision directed payment of his unpaid commissions "... equivalent to

the balance of the first year's premium remaining unpaid, at the time of his termination, of

all the insurance policies solicited by ... (him) in favor of the respondent company ..." plus

10% attorney's fees.6

This decision was, on appeal by the Company, affirmed by the National Labor Relations

Commission.7Hence, the present petition for certiorariand prohibition.

The chief issue here is one of jurisdiction: whether, as Basiao asserts, he had become the

Company's employee by virtue of the contract invoked by him, thereby placing his claim for

unpaid commissions within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under

the provisions of Section 217 of the Labor Code,8or, contrarily, as the Company would have

it, that under said contract Basiao's status was that of an independent contractor whose

claim was thus cognizable, not by the Labor Arbiter in a labor case, but by the regular courts

in an ordinary civil action.

The Company's thesis, that no employer-employee relation in the legal and generally

accepted sense existed between it and Basiao, is drawn from the terms of the contract they

had entered into, which, either expressly or by necessary implication, made Basiao the

master of his own time and selling methods, left to his judgment the time, place and means

of soliciting insurance, set no accomplishment quotas and compensated him on the basis of

results obtained. He was not bound to observe any schedule of working hours or report toany regular station; he could seek and work on his prospects anywhere and at anytime he

chose to, and was free to adopt the selling methods he deemed most effective.

Without denying that the above were indeed the expressed implicit conditions of Basi

contract with the Company, the respondents contend that they do not constitute the

decisive determinant of the nature of his engagement, invoking precedents to the effe

that the critical feature distinguishing the status of an employee from that of an

independent contractor is control, that is, whether or not the party who engages the

services of another has the power to control the latter's conduct in rendering such ser

Pursuing the argument, the respondents draw attention to the provisions of Basiao's

contract obliging him to "... observe and conform to all rules and regulations which thCompany may from time to time prescribe ...," as well as to the fact that the Company

prescribed the qualifications of applicants for insurance, processed their applications

determined the amounts of insurance cover to be issued as indicative of the control, w

made Basiao, in legal contemplation, an employee of the Company.9

It is true that the "control test" expressed in the following pronouncement of the Cour

the 1956 case of Viana vs. Alejo Al-Lagadan10

... In determining the existence of employer-employee relationship, the following elem

are generally considered, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee;

the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the

employees' conduct although the latter is the most important element (35 Am. Jur....

has been followed and applied in later cases, some fairly recent.11

Indeed, it is withou

question a valid test of the character of a contract or agreement to render service. It s

however, be obvious that not every form of control that the hiring party reserves to h

over the conduct of the party hired in relation to the services rendered may be accord

effect of establishing an employer-employee relationship between them in the legal o

technical sense of the term. A line must be drawn somewhere, if the recognized distin

between an employee and an individual contractor is not to vanish altogether. Realist

it would be a rare contract of service that gives untrammelled freedom to the party hi

and eschews any intervention whatsoever in his performance of the engagement.

Logically, the line should be drawn between rules that merely serve as guidelines towa

the achievement of the mutually desired result without dictating the means or metho


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be employed in attaining it, and those that control or fix the methodology and bind or

restrict the party hired to the use of such means. The first, which aim only to promote the

result, create no employer-employee relationship unlike the second, which address both the

result and the means used to achieve it. The distinction acquires particular relevance in the

case of an enterprise affected with public interest, as is the business of insurance, and is on

that account subject to regulation by the State with respect, not only to the relations

between insurer and insured but also to the internal affairs of the insurance

company. 12Rules and regulations governing the conduct of the business are provided for inthe Insurance Code and enforced by the Insurance Commissioner. It is, therefore, usual and

expected for an insurance company to promulgate a set of rules to guide its commission

agents in selling its policies that they may not run afoul of the law and what it requires or

prohibits. Of such a character are the rules which prescribe the qualifications of persons

who may be insured, subject insurance applications to processing and approval by the

Company, and also reserve to the Company the determination of the premiums to be paid

and the schedules of payment. None of these really invades the agent's contractual

prerogative to adopt his own selling methods or to sell insurance at his own time and

convenience, hence cannot justifiably be said to establish an employer-employee

relationship between him and the company.

There is no dearth of authority holding persons similarly placed as respondent Basiao to be

independent contractors, instead of employees of the parties for whom they worked.

In Mafinco Trading Corporation vs. Ople,13

the Court ruled that a person engaged to sell soft

drinks for another, using a truck supplied by the latter, but with the right to employ his own

workers, sell according to his own methods subject only to prearranged routes, observing no

working hours fixed by the other party and obliged to secure his own licenses and defray his

own selling expenses, all in consideration of a peddler's discount given by the other party for

at least 250 cases of soft drinks sold daily, was not an employee but an independent

contractor.

In Investment Planning Corporation of the Philippines us. Social Security System14

a case

almost on all fours with the present one, this Court held that there was no employer-

employee relationship between a commission agent and an investment company, but that

the former was an independent contractor where said agent and others similarly placed

were: (a) paid compensation in the form of commissions based on percentages of their

sales, any balance of commissions earned being payable to their legal representatives

event of death or registration; (b) required to put up performance bonds; (c) subject t

of rules and regulations governing the performance of their duties under the agreeme

with the company and termination of their services for certain causes; (d) not required

report for work at any time, nor to devote their time exclusively to working for the com

nor to submit a record of their activities, and who, finally, shouldered their own sellin

transportation expenses.

More recently, in Sara vs. NLRC,15

it was held that one who had been engaged by a ric

miller to buy and sell rice and palay without compensation except a certain percentag

what he was able to buy or sell, did work at his own pleasure without any supervision

control on the part of his principal and relied on his own resources in the performance

work, was a plain commission agent, an independent contractor and not an employee

The respondents limit themselves to pointing out that Basiao's contract with the Com

bound him to observe and conform to such rules and regulations as the latter might fr

time to time prescribe. No showing has been made that any such rules or regulations

in fact promulgated, much less that any rules existed or were issued which effectively

controlled or restricted his choice of methods or the methods themselves of sell

insurance. Absent such showing, the Court will not speculate that any exceptions orqualifications were imposed on the express provision of the contract leaving Basiao ".

to exercise his own judgment as to the time, place and means of soliciting insurance."

The Labor Arbiter's decision makes reference to Basiao's claim of having been connect

with the Company for twenty-five years. Whatever this is meant to imply, the obvious

would be that what is germane here is Basiao's status under the contract of July 2, 196

the length of his relationship with the Company.

The Court, therefore, rules that under the contract invoked by him, Basiao was not an

employee of the petitioner, but a commission agent, an independent contractor whos

claim for unpaid commissions should have been litigated in an ordinary civil action. Th

Labor Arbiter erred in taking cognizance of, and adjudicating, said claim, being withoujurisdiction to do so, as did the respondent NLRC in affirming the Arbiter's decision. Th


4/30

conclusion renders it unnecessary and premature to consider Basiao's claim for commissions

on its merits.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is set

aside, and that complaint of private respondent Melecio T. Basiao in RAB Case No. VI-0010-

83 is dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.


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02. FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 119930 March 12, 1998

INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION (Fourth Division, Cebu City), LABOR ARBITER NICASIO P. ANINON and

PANTALEON DE LOS REYES, respondents.

BELLOSILLO,J.:

On 17 June 1994 respondent Labor Arbiter dismissed for lack of jurisdiction NLRC RAB-VII

Case No. 03-0309-94 filed by private respondent Pantaleon de los Reyes against petitioner

Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. (INSULAR LIFE), for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of

salaries and back wages after finding no employer-employee relationship between De los

Reyes and petitioner INSULAR LIFE. 1On appeal by private respondent, the order of

dismissal was reversed by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which ruled that

respondent De los Reyes was an employee of petitioner.2Petitioner's motion for

reconsideration having been denied, the NLRC remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for

hearing on the merits.

Seeking relief through this special civil action for certiorariwith prayer for a restraining

order and/or preliminary injunction, petitioner now comes to us praying for annulment of

the decision of respondent NLRC dated 3 March 1995 and its Order dated 6 April 1995

denying the motion for reconsideration of the decision. It faults NLRC for acting without

jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion when, contrary to established facts and

pertinent law and jurisprudence, it reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and held

instead that the complaint was properly filed as an employer-employee relationship existed

between petitioner and private respondent.

Petitioner reprises the stand it assumed below that it never had any employer-employee

relationship with private respondent, this being an express agreement between them in the

agency contracts, particularly reinforced by the stipulation therein that De los Reyes was

allowed discretion to devise ways and means to fulfill his obligations as agent and would be

paid commission fees based on his actual output. It further insists that the nature of t

work status as described in the contracts had already been squarely resolved by the C

the earlier case of Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. NLRCand Basiao3where the

complainant therein, Melecio Basiao, was similarly situated as respondent De los Reye

that he was appointed first as an agent and then promoted as agency manager, and th

contracts under which he was appointed contained terms and conditions identical to t

of Delos Reyes. Petitioner concludes that since Basiao was declared by the Court to be

independent contractor and not an employee of petitioner, there should be no reasonthe status of De los Reyes herein vis-a-vispetitioner should not be similarly determine

We reject the submissions of petitioner and hold that respondent NLRC acted appropr

within the bounds of the law. The records of the case are replete with telltale indicato

an existing employer-employee relationship between the two parties despite written

contractual disavowals.

These facts are undisputed: on 21 August 1992 petitioner entered into an agency cont

with respondent Pantaleon de los Reyes4authorizing the latter to solicit within the

Philippines applications for life insurance and annuities for which he would be paid

compensation in the form of commissions. The contract was prepared by petitioner in

entirety and De los Reyes merely signed his conformity thereto. It contained the stiputhat no employer-employee relationship shall be created between the parties and tha

agent shall be free to exercise his own judgment as to time, place and means of solicit

insurance. De los Reyes however was prohibited by petitioner from working for any ot

life insurance company, and violation of this stipulation was sufficient ground for

termination of the contract. Aside from soliciting insurance for the petitioner, private

respondent was required to submit to the former all completed applications for insura

within ninety (90) consecutive days, deliver policies, receive and collect initial premium

balances of first year premiums, renewal premiums, deposits on applications and paym

on policy loans. Private respondent was also bound to turn over to the company

immediately any and all sums of money collected by him. In a written communication

petitioner to respondent De los Reyes, the latter was urged to register with the Social

Security System as a self-employed individual as provided under PD No. 1636. 5


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On 1 March 1993 petitioner and private respondent entered into another contract6where

the latter was appointed as Acting Unit Manager under its office the Cebu DSO V (157).

As such, the duties and responsibilities of De los Reyes included the recruitment, training,

organization and development within his designated territory of a sufficient number of

qualified, competent and trustworthy underwriters, and to supervise and coordinate the

sales efforts of the underwriters in the active solicitation of new business and in the

furtherance of the agency's assigned goals. It was similarly provided in the management

contract that the relation of the acting unit manager and/or the agents of his unit to thecompany shall be that of independent contractor. If the appointment was terminated for

any reason other than for cause, the acting unit manager would be reverted to agent status

and assigned to any unit. As in the previous agency contract, De los Reyes together with his

unit force was granted freedom to exercise judgment as to time, place and means of

soliciting insurance. Aside from being granted override commissions, the acting unit

manager was given production bonus, development allowance and a unit development

financing scheme euphemistically termed "financial assistance" consisting of payment to

him of a free portion of P300.00 per month and a validate portion of P1,200.00. While the

latter amount was deemed as an advance against expected commissions, the former was

not and would be freely given to the unit manager by the company only upon fulfillment by

him of certain manpower and premium quota requirements. The agents and underwriters

recruited and trained by the acting unit manager would be attached to the unit but

petitioner reserved the right to determine if such assignment would be made or, for any

reason, to reassign them elsewhere.

Aside from soliciting insurance, De los Reyes was also expressly obliged to participate in the

company's conservation program, i.e., preservation and maintenance of existing insurance

policies, and to accept moneys duly receipted on agent's receipts provided the same were

turned over to the company. As long as he was unit manager in an acting capacity, De los

Reyes was prohibited from working for other life insurance companies or with the

government. He could not also accept a managerial or supervisory position in any firm doing

business in the Philippines without the written consent of petitioner.

Private respondent worked concurrently as agent and Acting Unit Manager until he was

notified by petitioner on 18 November 1993 that his services were terminated effective 18

December 1993. On 7 March 1994 he filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter on the

ground that he was illegally dismissed and that he was not paid his salaries and separa

pay.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint of De los Reyes for lack of jurisdictio

citing the absence of employer-employee relationship. It reasoned out that based on t

criteria for determining the existence of such relationship or the so-called "four-fold

test," i.e., (a) selection and engagement of employee, (b) payment of wages, (c) powe

dismissal, and, (d) power of control, De los Reyes was not an employee but an indepe

contractor.

On 17 June 1994 the motion of petitioner was granted by the Labor Arbiter and the ca

was dismissed on the ground that the element of control was not sufficiently establish

since the rules and guidelines set by petitioner in its agency agreement with responde

Delos Reyes were formulated only to achieve the desired result without dictating the m

or methods of attaining it.

Respondent NLRC however appreciated the evidence from a different perspective. It

determined that respondent De los Reyes was under the effective control of petitione

the critical and most important aspects of his work as Unit Manager. This conclusion w

derived from the provisions in the contract which appointed private respondent as Ac

Unit Manager, to wit: (a) De los Reyes was to serve exclusively the company, therefore

was not an independent contractor; (b) he was required to meet certain manpower an

production quota; and, (c) petitioner controlled the assignment to and removal of soli

agents from his unit.

The NLRC also took into account other circumstances showing that petitioner exercise

employer's prerogatives over De los Reyes, e.g., (a) limiting the work of respondent De

Reyes to selling a life insurance policy known as "Salary Deduction Insurance" onlyto

members of the Philippine National Police, public and private school teachers and oth

employees of private companies; (b) assigning private respondent to a particular place

table where he worked whenever he was not in the field; (c) paying private responden

during the period of twelve (12) months of his appointment as Acting Unit Manager th

amount of P1,500.00 as Unit Development Financing of which 20% formed his salary a

rest, i.e., 80%, as advance of his expected commissions; and, (d) promising that upon


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completion of certain requirements, he would be promoted to Unit Manager with the right

of petitioner to revert him to agent status when warranted.

Parenthetically, both petitioner and respondent NLRC treated the agency contract and the

management contract entered into between petitioner and De los Reyes as contracts of

agency. We however hold otherwise. Unquestionably there exist major distinctions between

the two agreements. While the first has the earmarks of an agency contract, the second is

far removed from the concept of agency in that provided therein are conditionalities that

indicate an employer-employee relationship. The NLRC therefore was correct in finding that

private respondent was an employee of petitioner, but this holds true only insofar as the

management contract is concerned. In view thereof, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over

the case..

It is axiomatic that the existence of an employer-employee relationship cannot be negated

by expressly repudiating it in the management contract and providing therein that the

"employee" is an independent contractor when the terms of the agreement clearly show

otherwise. For, the employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and not

by what the parties say it should be.7In determining the status of the management

contract, the "four-fold test" on employment earlier mentioned has to be applied.

Petitioner contends that De los Reyes was never required to go through the pre-

employment procedures and that the probationary employment status was reserved only to

employees of petitioner. On this score, it insists that the first requirement of selection and

engagement of the employee was not met.

A look at the provisions of the contract shows that private respondent was appointed as

Acting Unit Manager only upon recommendation of the District Manager.8This indicates

that private respondent was hired by petitioner because of the favorable endorsement of its

duly authorized officer. But, this approbation could only have been based on the

performance of De los Reyes as agent under the agency contract so that there can be no

other conclusion arrived under this premise than the fact that the agency or underwriter

phase of the relationship of De los Reyes with petitioner was nothing more than a trial or

probationary period for his eventual appointment as Acting Unit Manager of petitioner.

Then, again, the very designation of the appointment of private respondent as "acting" unit

manager obviously implies a temporary employment status which may be made perm

only upon compliance with company standards such as those enumerated under Sec.

the management contract.9

On the matter of payment of wages, petitioner points out that respondent was

compensated strictly on commission basis, the amount of which was totally dependen

his total output. But, the manager's contract, speaks differently. Thus

4. Performance Requirements. To maintain your appointment as Acting Unit Manag

must meet the following manpower and production requirements:

Quarter Active Calendar Year

Production Agents Cumulative FYP

Production

1st 2 P 125,000

2nd 3 250,000

3rd 4 375,000

4th 5 500,000

5.4. Unit Development Financing (UDF). As an Acting Unit Manager you shall be giveduring the first 12 months of your appointment a financial assistance which is compos

two parts:

5.4.1. Free Portion amounting to P300 per month, subject to your meeting prescribed

minimum performance requirement on manpower and premium production. The free

portion is not payable by you.

5.4.2. Validate Portion amounting to P1,200 per month, also subject to meeting the sa

prescribed minimum performance requirements on manpower and premium product

The validated portion is an advance against expected compensation during the UDF pe

and thereafter as may be necessary.

The above provisions unquestionably demonstrate that the performance requirement

imposed on De los Reyes was applicable quarterlywhile his entitlement to the free po

(P300) and the validated portion (P1,200) wasmonthlystarting on the first month of th


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twelve (12) months of the appointment. Thus, it has to be admitted that even before the

end of the first quarter and prior to the so-called quarterly performance evaluation, private

respondent was already entitled to be paid both the free and validated portions of the UDF

every month because his production performance could not be determined until after the

lapse of the quarter involved. This indicates quite clearly that the unit manager's quarterly

performance had no bearing at all on his entitlement at least to the free portion of the UDF

which for all intents and purposes comprised the salary regularly paid to him by petitioner.

Thus it cannot be validly claimed that the financial assistance consisting of the free portionof the UDF was purely dependent on the premium production of the agent. Be that as it

may, it is worth considering that the payment of compensation by way of commission does

not militate against the conclusion that private respondent was an employee of petitioner.

Under Art. 97 of the Labor Code, "wage" shall mean "however designated, capable of being

expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, price or

commission basis . . . ."10

As to the matter involving the power of dismissal and control by the employer, the latter of

which is the most important of the test, petitioner asserts that its termination of De los

Reyes was but an exercise of its inherent right as principal under the contracts and that the

rules and guidelines it set forth in the contract cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be

deemed as an exercise of control over the private respondent as these were merelydirectives that fixed the desired result without dictating the means or method to be

employed in attaining it. The following factual findings of the NLRC11however contradict

such claims:

A perusal of the appointment of complainant as Acting Unit Manager reveals that:

1. Complainant was to "exclusively" serve respondent company. Thus it is provided: . . . 7..7

Other causes of Termination:

This appointment may likewise be terminated for any of the following causes: . . . 7..7..2.

Your entering the service of the government or another life insurance company; 7..7..3. Your

accepting a managerial or supervisory position in any firm doing business in the Philippines

without the written consent of the Company; . . .

2. Complainant was required to meet certain manpower and production quotas.

3. Respondent (herein petitioner) controlled the assignment and removal of soliciting

to and from complainant's unit, thus: . . . 7..2. Assignment of Agents: Agents recruited

trained by you shall be attached to your unit unless for reasons of Company policy, no

assignment should be made. The Company retains the exclusive right to assign new

soliciting agents to the unit. It is agreed that the Company may remove or transfer any

soliciting agents appointed and assigned to the said unit. . . .

It would not be amiss to state that respondent's duty to collect the company's premiu

using company receipts under Sec. 7.4 of the management contract is further evidenc

petitioner's control over respondent, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

7.4.Acceptance and Remittance of Premiums. . . . . the Company hereby authorizes

to accept and to receive sums of money in payment of premiums, loans, deposits on

applications, with or without interest, due from policyholders and applicants for insur

and the like, specially from policyholders of business solicited and sold by the agents

attached to your unit provided however, that all such payments shall be duly receipte

you on the corresponding Company's "Agents' Receipt" to be provided you for this pu

and to be covered by such rules and accounting regulations the Company may issue fr

time to time on the matter. Payments received by you shall be turned over to the

Company's designated District or Service Office clerk or directly to the Home Office no

than the next working day from receipt thereof . . . .

Petitioner would have us apply our ruling in Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. NLRC an

Basiao12to the instant case under the doctrine of stare decisis, postulating that both c

involve parties similarly situated and facts which are almost identical.

But we are not convinced that the cited case is on all fours with the case at bar. In Bas

the agent was appointed Agency Manager under an Agency Manager Contract. To

implement his end of the agreement, Melecio Basiao organized an agency office to wh

gave the name M. Basiao and Associates. TheAgency Manager Contract practically

contained the same terms and conditions as the Agency Contract earlier entered into,

the Court observed that, "drawn from the terms of the contract they had entered into

(which) either expressly or by necessary implication, Basiao (was) made the master of


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own time and selling methods, left to his own judgment the time, place and means of

soliciting insurance, set no accomplishment quotas and compensated him on the bases of

results obtained. He was not bound to observe any schedule of working hours or report to

any regular station; he could seek and work on his prospects anywhere and at anytime he

chose to and was free to adopt the selling methods he deemed most effective." Upon these

premises, Basiao was considered as agent an independent contractor of petitioner

INSULAR LIFE.

Unlike Basiao, herein respondent De los Reyes was appointedActing Unit Manager, not

agency manager. There is no evidence that to implement his obligations under the

management contract, De los Reyes had organized an office. Petitioner in fact has admitted

that it provided De los Reyes a place and a table at its office where he reported for and

worked whenever he was not out in the field. Placed under petitioner's Cebu District Service

Office, the unit was given a name by petitioner De los Reyes and Associates and

assigned Code No. 11753 and Recruitment No. 109398. Under the managership contract, De

los Reyes was obliged to work exclusively for petitioner in life insurance solicitation and was

imposed premium production quotas. Of course, the acting unit manager could not

underwrite other lines of insurance because his Permanent Certificate of Authority was for

life insurance only and for no other. He was proscribed from accepting a managerial or

supervisory position in any other office including the government without the writtenconsent of petitioner. De los Reyes could only be promoted to permanent unit manager if he

met certain requirements and his promotion was recommended by the petitioner's District

Manager and Regional Manager and approved by its Division Manager. As Acting Unit

Manager, De los Reyes performed functions beyond mere solicitation of insurance business

for petitioner. As found by the NLRC, he exercised administrative functions which were

necessary and beneficial to the business of INSULAR LIFE.

In Great Pacific Life Insurance Company v. NLRC13which is closer in application

than Basiaoto this present controversy, we found that "the relationships of the Ruiz

brothers and Grepalife were those of employer-employee. First, their work at the time of

their dismissal as zone supervisor and district manager was necessary and desirable to the

usual business of the insurance company. They were entrusted with supervisory, sales and

other functions to guard Grepalife's business interests and to bring in more clients to the

company, and even with administrative functions to ensure that all collections, reports and

data are faithfully brought to the company . . . . A cursory reading of their respective

functions as enumerated in their contracts reveals that the company practically dictat

manner by which their jobs are to be carried out . . . ." We need elaborate no further.

Exclusivity of service, control of assignments and removal of agents under private

respondent's unit, collection of premiums, furnishing of company facilities and materi

well as capital described as Unit Development Fund are but hallmarks of the managem

system in which herein private respondent worked. This obtaining, there is no escapin

conclusion that private respondent Pantaleon de los Reyes was an employee of herein

petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd., is DENIED and the

Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 3 March 1995 and its Orde

April 1996 sustaining it are AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the Labor Arbite

quowho is directed to hear and dispose of this case with deliberate dispatch in light o

views expressed herein.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.


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In sum, the main issue before this Court is whether the CA acted correctly in giving due

course and granting respondents late Petition for Certiorari.

This Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Main Issue:

Timeliness of the Appeal to the CA

The records reveal that respondents received a copy of the NLRC Decision on September 18,

1998. On September 24, 1998, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied

on November 27, 1998. On February 19, 1999, they filed their Petition for Certiorari, which

this Court referred to the CA.

Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, provides:

Section 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non -compliance with requirements.

xxx xxx xxx

In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showingwhen notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when

a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial

thereof was received.

xxx xxx xxx

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be

sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.[22]

In the present case, not only did respondents fail to include an explanation for the service by

registered mail but, more important, their Petition also lacked a verified statement on the

material date of their receipt of the notice of the NLRCs denial of their Motion for

Reconsideration. Hence, the CA properly dismissed their Petition.

However, the CAs dismissal of their appeal did not deter respondents from committin

more grievous blunders. In their Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated June 25, 19

they stated that they had received notice of the NLRCs denial of their Motion for

Reconsideration on December 21, 1998. Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Cou

Petition for Certiorari shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the

judgment, the order or the resolution sought to be assailed. Furthermore, it provides:

If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after n

of said judgment, order or resolution, the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If th

motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining perio

[it] shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such deni

xxx.[23]

Applying the above-mentioned rule, the 60-day period for filing a Petition for Certiora

interrupted when respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration on September 2

1998. When their Motion was denied, they had a remaining period of fifty-four (54) da

until February 15, 1999, within which to file their Petition for Certiorari.[24]

However, t

filed their Petition only on February 19, 1999, thereby prompting the CA to issue on Ju

1999, another Resolution of denial, reiterating its dismissal of their Petition for having

filed late.

In another Motion for Reconsideration filed on August 17, 1999, respondents reasone

they were allegedly not aware of Supreme Court Circular No. 39-98, which had taken e

on September 1, 1998. This Motion was, however, denied by the CA since a second M

for Reconsideration was a prohibited pleading.

On September 8, 1999, respondents filed a third Motion for Reconsideration, arguing

the Motion filed on August 17, 1999 was not a Second Motion for Reconsideration. Th

contended that it was a plea for reconsideration of the CAs Resolution dated June 22,

which had reiterated its dismissal of their Petition for being four (4) days late.

Citing Siguenza v. Court of Appeals,[25]

respondents contend that rules of procedure sh

not to be applied in a very rigid and technical manner. They are supposed to be used help secure, not override, substantial justice. Further, a short delay does not warrant

dismissal of an appeal.
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We hold, however, that procedural rules setting the period for perfecting an appeal or filing

a petition for review are generally inviolable. It is doctrinally entrenched that appeal is not a

constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. Hence, parties who seek to avail

themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it. The requirements for

perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in law must, as a rule, be

strictly followed. Such requirements are considered indispensable interdictions against

needless delays and are necessary for the orderly discharge of the judicial

business. Furthermore, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the periodpermitted by law is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. Failure to perfect the appeal

renders the judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a losing party has the

privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner also have the

correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision.[26]

This Court may deign to veer away from the general rule only if, on its face, the appeal

appears to be absolutely meritorious. Indeed, this Court has in a number of instances

relaxed procedural rules in order to serve substantial justice. However, we see no reason to

do so in this case. The delay incurred by respondents was simply inexcusable. They explain

that they were not aware of SC Circular 39-98, which had been published in several

newspapers of general circulation in the country on July 26, 1998, and had taken effect on

September 1, 1998. Respondents filed their Petition for Certiorari on February 19, 1999,some seven (7) months after the Circular had been published in major newspapers, five (5)

months after taking effect. This Court must emphasize once again that lawyers are duty-

bound to keep abreast of legal developments and to participate in continuing legal

education programs.[27]

We repeat: the timely perfection of an appeal is a mandatory requirement, which cannot be

trifled with as a mere technicality to suit the interest of a party. The rules on periods for

filing appeals are to be observed religiously, and parties who seek to avail themselves of the

privilege must comply with the rules.[28]

In view of the foregoing, we find no necessity to pass upon the other issues raised,

especially regarding the legality of petitioners dismissal. After all, the NLRCs Decision hasbecome final and, whether right or wrong, is no longer reviewable on appeal. It has become

the law of the case.[29]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution SET A

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
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Petitioners construe the above paragraph to mean that the refusal of the employer to

reinstate an employee as directed in an executory order of reinstatement would make it

liable to pay the latter's salaries. This interpretation is correct. Under Article 223 of the

Labor Code, as amended, an employer has two options in order for him to comply with an

order of reinstatement, which is immediately executory, even pending appeal. Firstly, he

can admit the dismissed employee back to work under the same terms and conditions

prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or to a substantially equivalent position if the

former position is already filled up as we have ruled in Union of Supervisors (RB) NATU

vs. Sec. of Labor, 128 SCRA 442 [1984]; and Pedroso vs. Castro, 141 SCRA 252 [1986].

Secondly, he can reinstate the employee merely in the payroll. Failing to exercise any of the

above options, the employer can be compelled under pain of contempt, to pay instead the

salary of the employee. This interpretation is more in consonance with the constitutional

protection to labor (Section 3, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution). The right of a person to his labor

is deemed to be property within the meaning of the constitutional guaranty that no one

shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property without due process of law. Therefore, he

should be protected against any arbitrary and unjust deprivation of his job (Bondoc vs.

People's Bank and Trust Co., Inc., 103 SCRA 599 [1981]). The employee should not be left

without any remedy in case the employer unreasonably delays reinstatement. Therefore,

we hold that the unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate an illegally dismissed

employee entitles the employee to payment of his salaries . . . .21

The Court, however, deviated from this construction in the case of Maranaw. Reinterpreting

the import of Article 223 in Maranaw, the Court22declared that the reinstatement aspect of

the Labor Arbiter's decision needs a writ of execution as it is not self-executory, a

declaration the Court recently reiterated and adopted inArchilles Manufacturing

Corp. v. NLRC.23

We note that prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 6715, Article 22324of the Labor Code

contains no provision dealing with the reinstatement of an illegally dismissed employee. The

amendment introduced by R.A. No. 6715 is an innovation and a far departure from the old

law indicating thereby the legislature's unequivocal intent to insert a new rule that will

govern the reinstatement aspect of a decision or resolution in any given labor dispute. Infact, the law as now worded employs the phrase "shall immediately be executory" without

qualification emphasizing the need for prompt compliance. As a rule, "shall" in a statute

commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of

discretion25and that the presumption is that the word "shall", when used in a statute

mandatory.26

An appeal or posting of bond, by plain mandate of the law, could not ev

forestall nor stay the executory nature of an order of reinstatement. The law, moreov

unambiguous and clear. Thus, it must be applied according to its plain and obvious me

according to its express terms. In Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. NLRC,

held that:

Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from

ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted

interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legisderived from themaxim index an

sermo est(speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the wo

employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclud

court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning

words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of su

words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words

statute there should be no departure.28

And in conformity with the executory nature of the reinstatement order, Rule V, Secti

(3) of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC strictly requires the Labor Arbiter to dir

the employer to immediately reinstate the dismissed employee. Thus:

In case the decision includes an order of reinstatement, the Labor Arbiter shall direct t

employer to immediately reinstate the dismissed or separated employee even pendin

appeal. The order of reinstatement shall indicate that the employee shall either be ad

back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or

separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll.

In declaring that reinstatement order is not self-executory and needs a writ of executi

the Court, in Maranaw, adverted to the rule provided under Article 224. We said:

It must be stressed, however, that although the reinstatement aspect of the decision

is immediately executory, it does not follow that it is self-executory. There must be a wexecution which may be issuedmotu proprioor on motion of an interested party. Artic

of the Labor Code provides:


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Art. 224. Execution of decision, orders or awards. (a) The Secretary of Labor and

Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter, or med-arbitter

or voluntary arbitrator may, motu proprio or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ

of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and

executory . . . (emphasis supplied)

The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule VIII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC also

provides:

The Labor Arbiter, POEA Administrator, or the Regional Director, or his duly authorized

hearing officer of origin shall, motu proprioor on motion of any interested party, issue a writ

of execution on a judgment only within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and

executory . . . . No motion for execution shall be entertained nor a writ he issued unless the

Labor Arbiter is in possession of the records of the case which shall include an entry of

judgment. (emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

In the absence then of an order for the issuance of a writ of execution on the reinstatement

aspect of the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the petitioner was under no legal obligation to

admit back to work the private respondent under the terms and conditions prevailing priorto her dismissal or, at the petitioner's option, to merely reinstate her in the payroll. An

option is a right of election to exercise a privilege, and the option in Article 223 of the Labor

Code is exclusively granted to the employer. The event that gives rise for its exercise is not

the reinstatement decree of a Labor Arbiter, but the writ for its execution commanding the

employer to reinstate the employee, while the final act which compels the employer to

exercise the option is the service upon it of the writ of execution when, instead of admitting

the employee back to his work, the employer chooses to reinstate the employee in the

payroll only. If the employer does not exercise this option, it must forthwith admit the

employee back to work, otherwise it may be punished for contempt.29

A closer examination, however, shows that the necessity for a writ of execution under

Article 224 applies only to final and executory decisions which are not within the coverageof Article 223. For comparison, we quote the material portions of the subject articles:

Art. 223. Appeal. . . .

In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated

employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be exec

even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the s

terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of

employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer sha

stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 224. Execution of decisions, orders, or awards. (a) The Secretary of Labor and

Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter, or med-a

or voluntary arbitrator may, motu propioor on motion of any interested party, issue a

of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and

executory, requiring a sheriff or a duly deputized officer to execute or enforce final

decisions, orders or awards of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or regional dire

the Commission, the Labor Arbiter or med-arbiter, or voluntary arbitrators. In any case

shall be the duty of the responsible officer to separately furnish immediately the coun

record and the parties with copies of said decisions, orders or awards. Failure to comp

with the duty prescribed herein shall subject such responsible officer to appropriateadministrative sanctions.

Article 224 states that the need for a writ of execution applies only within five (5) year

the date a decision, an order or award becomes final and executory. It can not relate t

award or order of reinstatement still to be appealed or pending appeal which Article 2

contemplates. The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award for reinstatement sh

immediately executory even pending appealand the posting of a bond by the employe

not stay the execution for reinstatement. The legislative intent is quite obvious, i.e., to

an award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even pending appeal. To require

application for and issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the execution o

reinstatement award would certainly betray and run counter to the very object and in

Article 223, i.e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement order. The reason is simp

application for a writ of execution and its issuance could be delayed for numerous rea


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former exercise supervision and control over the latter. The management of the business is

in the owner's hands. The owner as holder of the certificate of public convenience must see

to it that the driver follows the route prescribed by the franchising authority and the rules

promulgated as regards its operation. Now, the fact that the drivers do not receive fixed

wages but get only that in excess of the so-called "boundary" they pay to the

owner/operator is not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them from that of

employer and employee. We have applied by analogy the abovestated doctrine to the

relationships between bus owner/operator and bus conductor,20

auto-calesa

owner/operator and driver,21and recently between taxi owners/operators and taxi

drivers.22

Hence, petitioners are undoubtedly employees of private respondent because as

taxi drivers they perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual

business or trade of their employer.

As consistently held by this Court, termination of employment must be effected in

accordance with law. The just and authorized causes for termination of employment are

enumerated under Articles 282, 283 and 284 of the Labor Code. The requirement of notice

and hearing is set-out in Article 277 (b) of the said Code. Hence, petitioners, being

employees of private respondent, can be dismissed only for just and authorized cause, and

after affording them notice and hearing prior to termination. In the instant case, private

respondent had no valid cause to terminate the employment of petitioners. Neither were

there two (2) written notices sent by private respondent informing each of the petitioners

that they had been dismissed from work. These lack of valid cause and failure on the part of

private respondent to comply with the twin-notice requirement underscored the illegality

surrounding petitioners' dismissal.

Under the law, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to

reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,

inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed

from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual

reinstatement.23

It must be emphasized, though, that recent judicial

pronouncements24

distinguish between employees illegally dismissed prior to the effectivity

of Republic Act No. 6715 on March 21, 1989, and those whose illegal dismissals wereeffected after such date. Thus, employees illegally dismissed prior to March 21, 1989, are

entitled to backwages up to three (3) years without deduction or qualification, while those

illegally dismissed after that date are granted full backwages inclusive of allowances a

other benefits or their monetary equivalent from the time their actual compensation

withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement. The legislative policy

behind Republic Act No. 6715 points to "full backwages" as meaning exactly that, i.e.,

without deducting from backwages the earnings derived elsewhere by the concerned

employee during the period of his illegal dismissal. Considering that petitioners were

terminated from work on August 1, 1991, they are entitled to full backwages on the b

their last daily earnings.

With regard to the amount deducted daily by private respondent from petitioners for

washing of the taxi units, we view the same as not illegal in the context of the law. We

that after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has driv

the same clean condition when he took it out. Car washing after a tour of duty is indee

practice in the taxi industry and is in fact dictated by fair play.25

Hence, the drivers are

entitled to reimbursement of washing charges.1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed DECISION of public respon

dated October 28, 1994, is hereby SET ASIDE. The DECISION of public respondent date

28, 1994, and its RESOLUTION dated December 13, 1994, are hereby REINSTATED sub

MODIFICATION. Private respondent is directed to reinstate petitioners to their positio

held at the time of the complained dismissal. Private respondent is likewise ordered to

petitioners their full backwages, to be computed from the date o f dismissal until their

reinstatement. However, the order of public respondent that petitioners be reimburse

amount paid as washing charges is deleted. Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,concur.

Buena,on official leave.


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Aggrieved, Balagtas appealed the decision to the National Labor Relations Commission

(NLRC) but failed to post either a cash or surety bond as required by Article 223 of the Labor

Code. Instead, petitioners filed a manifestation and motion, stating, among others, that

under Republic Act No. 6938, Article 62(7) of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines,

petitioners are exempt from putting up a bond in an appeal from the decision of the inferior

court.

On July 20, 1998, the NLRC rendered the assailed order, to wit:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents are hereby given ten (10) inextendible

days from receipt of this Order within which to post a cash or surety bond in the amount of

TWO HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P218,000.00) PESOS, failure of which shall

constitute a waiver and non-perfection of the appeal.

In addition thereto, the employer as well as counsel shall submit a joint declaration under

oath attesting that the surety bond posted is genuine and that it shall be in effect until final

disposition of the case.

SO ORDERED." (NLRC Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 15)

On September 28, 1998, the NLRC struck down petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration

(Annex B, pp. 18-20, Rollo).

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, alleging that the NLRC acted with

grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in directing them to

post an appeal bond despite the clear mandate of Article 62, paragraph (7)4of Republic Act

No. 6938 (Cooperative Code) which dispensed with such requirement. The CA initially

dismissed the petition for failure of petitioners to attach copies of the certain relevant

documents and records cited therein. However, when the matter was elevated to the Court,

the CA was directed to admit the petition filed by petitioners.

After the parties submitted their respective pleadings, the CA resolved to dismiss the

petition in the assailed decision dated September 27, 2002 holding that the exemption from

putting up a bond by a cooperative applies to cases decided by inferior courts only. The CAratiocinated as follows:

If the lawmakers' intention is for an "all embracing exemption in favor of all cooperativ

including but not limited to quasi-judicial bodies, Congress could simply have provided

all cooperatives are exempted from the requirement of posting appeal bonds in all its

appeal(s) regardless of the nature of the suit or the forum where the action is filed.

Ironically, this is not what appears in the cooperative law, and [it] instead delimits the

exemption only to appeals from the decision of the inferior courts. That, a fortiori, is t

manifest intention of the legislators.

Withal, we are dealing with a matter of exemption from a usual requirement in takingappeal. In the ordinary course of things, if there is a genuine intention to give coopera

"a cover all" exemption from the appeal bond requirement, it must be clearly and

unequivocally stated in the law. Exemptions cannot spring out o f mere presumptions o

deductions.5

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed the present pet

The issues are:

Whether cooperatives are exempted from filing a cash or surety bond required to per

employer's appeal under Section 2236of Presidential Decree No. 442 (the Labor Code)

Whether a certification issued by the Cooperative Development Authority constitutes

substantial compliance with the requirement for the posting of a bond.

Petitioners argue that Article 62, paragraph (7) of the Cooperative Code exempts

cooperatives from posting an appeal bond. Moreover, the CA should not have given a

restrictive interpretation to "inferior courts" as encompassing only municipal, metropo

and regional trial courts because the term appears in a special law. Rather, "inferior co

should be interpreted to have a generic meaning which includes even quasi-judicial co

or bodies like the NLRC. Petitioners assert this would be more in accord with the inten

the legislators to grant more benefits and privileges to cooperatives under the Cooper

Code. Otherwise, the exemption granted under the law would have no meaning consi

that appeal bonds are, in almost all instances, no longer required in perfecting an appe

from the decisions of municipal, metropolitan and regional trial courts.
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(4) Any judge in his capacity as notary public, ex-officio, shall render service, free of charge,

to any person or group of persons requiring either the administration of oath or the

acknowledgment of articles of cooperation of a cooperative applicant for registration and

instruments of loan from cooperative not exceeding Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).

(5) Any register of deeds shall accept for registration, free of charge, any instrument relative

to a loan made under this Code which does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) or

the deeds of title of any property acquired by the cooperative or any paper or document

drawn in connection with any action brought by the cooperative or with any court judgmentrendered in its favor or any instrument relative to a bond of any accountable officer of a

cooperative for the faithful performance of his duties and obligations.

(6) Cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of all court sheriff's fees payable to the

Philippine Government for and in connection with all actions brought under this Code, or

where such action is brought by the Cooperative Development Authority before the court,

to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative.

(7) All cooperatives shall be exempt from putting up a bond for bringing an appeal against

the decision of an inferior court or for seeking to set aside any third party claim: Provided,

That a certification of the Authority showing that the net assets of the cooperative are in

excess of the amount of the bond required by the court in similar cases shall be accepted bythe court as a sufficient bond.

(8) Any security issued by cooperatives shall be exempt from the provisions of the Securities

Act provided such security shall not be speculative.

Considering that the above provision relates to "tax and other exemptions," the same must

be strictly construed. This follows the well-settled principle that exceptions are to be strictly

but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language warrants, and all doubts

should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions.8

An express exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes other exceptions. Express

exceptions constitute the only limitations on the operation of a statute and no other

exception will be implied.9The rule proceeds f rom the premise that the legislative body

would not have made specific enumerations in a statute, if it had the intention not to

restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

Consequently, where a general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, the Co

will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication.10

Courts may not, in the

of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not pro

nor intended by the lawmakers.11

Statutes which are plain and specific should be appl

without attempted construction and interpretation. Thus, where a provision of law

expressly limits its application to certain transactions, it cannot be extended to othertransactions by interpretation.

12

The term "court" has a settled meaning in this jurisdiction which cannot be reasonably

interpreted as extending to quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC unless otherwise clearl

expressly indicated in the wording of the statute. Simply because these tribunals or ag

exercise quasi-judicial functions does not convert them into courts of law.

In any event, Article 119 of the Cooperative Code itself expressly embodies the legisla

intention to extend the coverage of labor statutes to cooperatives, to wit:

Art. 119. Compliance with Other Laws. (1) The Labor Code and all other labor laws s

apply to all cooperatives.

For this reason, petitioners must comply with the requirement set forth in Article 223

Labor Code in order to perfect their appeal to the NLRC. It must be pointed out that th

right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a privilege of statu

origin and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute. The law may val

provide limitations or qualifications thereto or relief to the prevailing party in the even

appeal is interposed by the losing party.13

In this case, the obvious and logical purpose of an appeal bond is to insure, during the

period of appeal, against any occurrence that would defeat or diminish recovery by th

employee under the judgment if the latter is subsequently affirmed.14

This is consisten

the State's constitutional mandate to afford full protection to labor in order to forcefu

meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic force.15
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_159268_2006.html#fnt8


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