CITY OF BAGUIO, pPeople v Purisima PEOPLE v. PURISIMA86 SCRA 543, NOVEMBER 20, 1978Munoz Palma, J.Parts of Statute: Preamble CASE DOCTRINE: The preamble or the “whereas” clause of a statute may be referred to determine what acts fall within the purview of a penal statuteFACTS: Twenty-six Petition for Review were filed by the People of the Philippines involving three Courts of First Instance. Before those courts Informations were filed charging the respective accused with “Illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of P.D. No. 9. The mentioned courts dismissed the Informations, on the common ground, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime which was “the possession of bladed weapon charged was for the purpose of abetting, or in furtherance of the conditions of rampant criminality, organized lawlessness, public order, etc.” The respondent Judges ruled that the only reasonably, logical and valid construction given to P.D. No. 9 is that carrying of any weapon described in the Presidential decree only becomes punishable because of the motivation behind it and not the simple act of carrying the mentioned. The petitioner contends that P.D. No. 9 (3) covers one and all situations where a person carries outside his residence any of the weapons mentioned or described in the decree irrespective of motivation intent, or purpose. These conflicting views arising from its implementation is then to be settled by searching for and determining the intent and the spirit of the law through the preamble of the statute introduced usually by the word “whereas”. The petitioner, however, opposes that the preamble or the “whereas” clause cannot prevail over the text itself nor can it enlarge, confer power and cure inherent defects in the statute as it is not an essential part of an act.

ISSUE: WON the court should inquire the intent and the spirit of the decree in the preamble or the “whereas” clause?

HELD: The Court ruled that because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. No. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree which can be found among others in the preamble or “whereas” clause which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein. With these, the court denies the petition for review and affirm the dismissal by the respondent judges of the Information concerned.

Aboitiz v City of Cebu ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION; plaintiffs-appellants, vs. THE CITY OF CEBU; defendants-appellees. G.R. No. L-14526

Facts:The ordinance, No. 207, was purportedly enacted by the Municipal Board on August 14, 1956 and approved by the City Mayor on the following August 27.Plaintiffs paid the wharfage charges under protest since the said ordinance declared void, its enforcement enjoined in so far as the wharves, docks and other landing places belonging to the National Government were concerned.

Appellants have raised some questions of fact, and in particular point out certain events and circumstances to show that ordinance No. 207 was not and could not have been enacted.The respondent cited section 17 (w) of the charter of the City of Cebu which gives the Municipal board the power to “xxx to fix the charges to be paid by all watercrafts landing at or using public wharves, docks, levees, or landing places.’The lower court ruled upholding appellees' contention in this respect, that in using the terms "public wharves, docks, levees, or landing places," the legislature made no distinction between those owned by the National Government and those owned by the City of Cebu and that consequently both fall within the scope of the power granted.Issue:WON under its charter, Commonwealth Act No. 58, the City of Cebu may provide by ordinance for the collection of wharfage from shipping concerns whose vessels dock at the public wharves of piers located in said city but owned by the National Government?Held:NO. City of Cebu may not provide by ordinance for the collection of wharfage from shipping concerns whose vessels, docks, at the public wharves of piers located in said city but owned by the national government for the reason that under Sec 17(w) of the Charter of Cebu as cited by the respondent in consonance with its preceding section, would refer only to those public wharves or landing places owned by the city of Cebu and not those owned by the National Government under the exclusive supervision of the Bureau of Customs, according to sec 1142 of the Revised Administrative Code. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is reversed; Ordinance No. 207 of the City of Cebu is declared null and void, and appellees are ordered to refund to appellants all amounts collected thereunder and to refrain from making such collection. Costs against appellees.

Florentino v PNB

Florentino v. Philippine National Bank98 Phil. 959 Intrinsic Aid: Punctuation Marks JUGO, J.: Facts: The petitioners and appellants filed a petition for mandamus against Philippine National Bank to compel it to accept the backpay certificate of petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino to pay an indebtedness secured by real estate mortgage plus interest. Petitioner is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment by virtue of Republic Act No. 897. Petitioners offered to pay their loan with the respondent bank with their backpay certificate, but the respondent bank refused to accept the latter's backpay certificate. Under section 2 of Republic Act No. 879, respondent contends that the qualifying clause refers to all the antecedents, whereas the appellant's contention is that it refers only to the last antecedent. Issue: Whether or not the clause “who may be willing to accept the same for settlement” refers to all antecedents mentioned in the last sentence of section 2 of Republic Act No. 879. Ruling: Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent; that is, "any citizen of the Philippines or any association

or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines." It should be noted that there is a comma before the words "or to any citizen, etc.," which separates said phrase from the preceding ones. But even disregarding the grammatical construction, as done by the appellee, still there are cogent and powerful reasons why the qualifying clause should be limited to the last antecedent. In the first place, to make the acceptance of the backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen, association, or corporation, which are not government entities or owned or controlled by the government, would render section 2 of Republic Act No. 897 unconstitutional, for it would amount to an impairment of the obligation of contracts by compelling private creditors to accept a sort of promissory note payable within ten years with interest at a rate very much lower than the current or even the legal one. N.B.:The legal provision involved is section 2 of Republic Act No. 879, which provides:SEC. 2. The Treasurer of the Philippines shall, upon application of all persons specified in section one hereof and within one year from the approval of this Act, and under such rules and regulations as may be promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, acknowledge and file requests for the recognition of the right of the salaries or wages as provided in section one hereof, and notice of such acknowledgment shall be issued to the applicant which shall state the total amount of such salaries or wages due the applicant, and certify that it shall be redeemed by the Government of the Philippines within ten years from the date of their issuance without interest: Provided, That upon application and subject to such rules and regulations as may be approved by the Secretary of Finance a certificate of indebtedness may be issued by the Treasurer of the Philippines covering the whole or a part of the total salaries or wages the right to which has been duly acknowledged and recognized, provided that the face value of such certificate of indebtedness shall not exceed the amount that the applicant may need for the payment of (1) obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this amendatory Act for which the applicant may directly be liable to the Government or to any of its branches or instrumentalities, or the corporations owned or control by the Government, or to any citizen of the Philippines, or to any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines, who may be willing to accept the same for such settlement.

Unabia v. City Mayor

UNABIA VS CITY MAYOR ET ALL-8759May 25, 1956Case doctrine: CONSTRUCTION – Use of capitalization FACTS: The case is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu ordering respondents to reinstate petitioner Severino Unabia as foreman of the Garbage Disposal Unit of the Office of the City Engineer of Cebu City (originally under the City Health Department), who was removed from his position by the City Mayor and was replaced by two other men (Perfecto Abellana, Pedro Gonzales). The Court of First Instance held that the petitioner is a person in the Philippine Civil Service, pertaining to the unclassified service (section 670, Revised Administrative Code, as amended) and that his removal is a violation of Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code and section 4 of Art.XII of the

Constitution. Respondents however contended that the use of capital letters in the words “Civil Service” in section 1 and 4 of Article XII of the Constitution and the use of small letters for the same words as is used in section 670 of the Revised Administrative Code indicates that only those pertaining to the classified service are protected in the above-mentioned sections of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not those in the unclassified service are protected in the pertained sections of the Revised Administrative Code and the Constitution

RULING: Yes- The use of capital letters in “Civil Service” found in the Constitution is used to indicate the group. No capitals are used in the similar provisions of the Code to indicate the system. There is no reason for excluding persons in the unclassified service from the benefits extended to those belonging in the classified service; they both belong to the same Civil Service and should therefore be accorded same benefits. The distinction between classified and unclassified is the nature of their work.

In re Estate of Johnson G.R. No. 12767 (November 16, 1918)

Facts: Petitioner was a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United states but died and left a will in Manila. Section 636 of the Code of the Civil Procedure states that "Will made here by an alien- will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved, allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed and recorded in the Philippine Islands and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands." The will of Johnson was probated and allowed in the lower court, but Petitioner contends that Section 636 is applicable only to wills of aliens; and in this connection, attention is directed to the fact that the epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made here by an alien and to further fact that the word "state" in the body of the section is not capitalized.

Issue: Whether or not the will of Petitioner, a citizen of the U.S. and therefore an alien, is covered by Section 636.

Held: The fact that the words "state" and "country" are not capitalized does not mean that the. United State is excluded from the phrase "another state or country". It is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids of low degree interpreting the language of a statute and can never control against the intelligible meaning of the written words. The epigraph, or heading, of a section being nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the provision, cannot have the effect of limiting the operative words contained in the body of the text. Petitioner, being a US citizen, thus an alien, is covered by Section 636. The will duly probated.

People v Abilang

Traders Insurance & Surety v Golangco

Case Title: TRADERS INSURANCE AND SURETY CO. vs JUAN GOLANGCO Y OTRAGR No.: L-6442Date: September 21, 1954

Case Doctrine: Lingual Text FACTS: Juan Golangco, respondent, acquired an insurance policy worth P10,000 from Traders Insurance and Surety Co. for his building (No. 34 Plaza, Sta. Cruz, Manila). Two months later, the building caught fire and Golangco went to Traders Insurance and Surety Co. for the payment of the insurance amount which was denied. Golangco filed a lawsuit and won. Traders Insurance and Surety Co. filed an appeal, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in passing judgment without a full conclusion made from all points raised (without findings of fact regarding Exhibits 10 -H and 10 –I). Traders Insurance and Surety Co. cited Article 33 of Law No. 296 which in English reads: “Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it.” But in Spanish it reads: “Any decision of the Court of Appeals will contain a full statement of the facts of all matters arising before it.” ISSUE: WON the court misinterpreted Law No. 296. RULING: No—petition denied. The Court held that the English version shall be followed and not the poorly translated Spanish version which Traders Insurance and Surety Co. presented. Since Law No. 296 was approved in English, the English text shall govern over the Spanish translation.

Manila Lodge v Court of Appeals

Manila Lodge v CASeptember 30, 1976G.R. No. L-41001Case Doctrine: Construction to avoid surplusage

FACTS:The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1306 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The act provided that the reclaimed area shall be the property of the City of Manila, and the city is authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the same. Later, the City of Manila conveyed a portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. Then Petitioner sold the land, together with all the improvements, to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC).

ISSUE: Whether the reclaimed land is patrimonial or public dominion.

RULING: to say that the land is patrimonial will render nugatory and a surplusage the phrase of the law to the effect that the City of Manila “is hereby authorized to lease or sell”.A sale of public dominion needs a legislative authorization, while a patrimonial land does not.

Adong v Cheong Seng Gee

Philippine Sugar Central Agency v Collector of Customs

Estrada v Sandiganbayan

Collector of Internal Revenue v Zamora

COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE ET AL VS ZAMORA ET ALGR NOS. 15280, 15281, 15289, 15290 May 31, 1963Legislative History; History of the StatutePAREDES, J:FACTS: Mariano Zamora, owner of the Bay View Hotel Manila and Farmacia Zamora, Manila, filed his income tax returns for the years 1951 and 1952. The Collector of Internal Revenue found that he failed to file his return of the capital gains derived from the sale of a certain real properties and claimed deductions which were not allowable. The Collector required him to pay the sums of P 43,758.50 and P 7,625.00 as deficiency income tax for the years 1951 and 1952 respectively. On appeal by Zamora, the CTA modified the decision appealed from and ordered him to pay the reduced total sum of P 30,258.00 plus the corresponding surcharges and interest in case of delinquency. Mariano Zamora failed to obtain a reconsideration, hence, he appealed alleging that CTA erred in disallowing 3 ½ % per annum, at the rate of depreciation of the Bay View Hotel Building.

ISSUE: WON the CTA erred in computing the taxes due for payment by Mariano Zamora

HELD: No. As the lower court based its findings on Bulletin F, petitioner Zamora, argues that the same should have been first proved as a law, to be subject to judicial notice. Bulletin F, is a publication of the US Federal Internal Revenue Service, which was made after a study of the lives of the properties. In the words of the lower court: "It contains the list of depreciable assets, the estimated average useful lives thereof and the rates of depreciation allowable for each kind of property. It is true that Bulletin F has no binding force, but it has a strong persuasive effect considering that the same has been the result of scientific studies and observation for a long period in the United States after whose Income Tax Law ours is patterned." Verily, courts are permitted to look into and investigate the antecedents or the legislative history of the statutes involved. Zamora also contends that his basis for applying the 3-½% rate is the testimony of its witness Mariano Katipunan, who cited a book entitled "Hotel Management — Principles and Practice" by Lucius Boomer, President, Hotel Waldorf Astoria Corporation. As well commented by the Solicitor General, "while the petitioner would deny us the right to use Bulletin F, he would insist on using as authority, a book in Hotel management written by a man who knew more about hotels than about taxation. All that the witness did (Katipunan) . . . is to read excerpts from the said book, which admittedly were based on the decision of the U.S. Tax Courts, made in 1928". In view hereof, We hold that the 2-½% rate of depreciation of the Bay View Hotel building, is approximately correct.

Casco Phil. Chemical Co. v Gimenez CASCO PHILIPPINES CHEMICAL CO., INC. v. HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, et al.G.R. No. L-17931 ; 28 February 1963Concepcion, J. Facts: Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. The Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure

for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609. Petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde — which are the main raw materials in the production of resin glues — and paid therefor the margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made another purchase of foreign exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor. Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon after the last importation of these products, petitioner made a similar request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor. Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2609. The Auditor General subsequently affirmed said action of the Auditor of the Bank. Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.Issue: Whether or not the contention of the petitioner regarding that the law is not imposed on finished product?Resolution: But, said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives. Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President.

Escalante v Santos

People v Manantan People (plaintiff) v. Manantan (defendant)115 Phil. 57August 30, 1962Case Doctrine: Prior law from which statute is based FACTS: This resolution refers to a motion for consideration filed by the counsel for defendant – appellee, Guillermo Manantan. The defendant was charged with the violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The defendant questioned the ruling of the court that the effect of remanding the case to the lower court for trial on the merits is to place him twice in jeopardy of being tried for the same offense. To support his claim, he cites the case of People v Labatete. The Court denied the defendant’s plea that double jeopardy should be rejected because the defendant neither raised the issue of double jeopardy by way of resisting the appeal of the state nor argued in his brief the said plea. He is deemed to have

waived this defense. This is in accord with this Court’s ruling in the cases of People vs Rosalina Casiano and People vs. Pinulia ISSUE:Whether or not prior law from which statue is based can be an aid of clarifying ambiguities? RULING: Yes. Courts are permitted to look to prior laws on the same subject and to investigate the antecedents of the statute involved. This rule is applicable in the interpretation of codes, revised, or compiled statutes, for the prior laws which have been codified, compiled or revised will show the legislative history that will clarify the intent of the law or shed light on the meaning and scope of the codified or revised statute.

Gloria v Court of Appeals

HON. RICARDO T. GLORIA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO A. ABAD, VIRGILIA M. BANDIGAS, ELIZABETH A. SOMEBANG and NICANOR MARGALLO, respondents.G.R. No. 131012 April 21, 1999 Doctrine: Change in Phraseology by Amendments, Amendments by Deletion

FACTS: Private respondents are public school teachers. On various dates in September and October 1990, during the teachers' strikes, they did not report for work. For this reason, they were administratively charged with (1) grave misconduct, (2) gross neglect of duty, (3) gross violation of Civil Service Law Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations. (4) refusal to perform official duty, (5) gross insubordination, (6) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and (7) absence without leave (AWOL), and placed under preventive suspension. The investigation was concluded before the lapse of 90-day suspension and private respondents were found guilty as charged. Respondent Nicanor Margallo was ordered dismissed from the service effective October 29, 1990, while respondents Amparo Abad, Virgilia Bandigas, and Elizabeth Somebang were ordered suspended for six months effective December 4, 1990. Respondents sought for their rights for their salaries during suspension since they did not participate in massive strike, although reprimanded for being absent without leave. ISSUES: Whether or not public teachers, who has been preventively suspended pending investigation of the administrative charges against him is entitled for salary and benefits during such preventive suspension?

HELD:The court stated that Sec. 35 of the old Service Act of 1958 (R.A. 2260) which then provided that if the respondent officer or employee is exonerated, “she shall be restored to his position with full pay for the period of suspension,” was amended by deleting the provision regarding the payment of salaries during suspension, and that said amendment is for the purpose of disallowing the payment of salaries for the period of suspension. The court added that this amendment be deletion should be given construction different from the previous amendment.

WHEREFORE, the decision, dated September 3, 1996, as amended by the resolutions, dated July 15, 1997 and October 6, 1997, of the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of salaries to private respondents shall be computed from the time of their dismissal/suspension by the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports until their actual reinstatement, for a period not exceeding five years.

Republic v MeralcoRepublic vs. Meralco GR 141314, 15 November 2002; Third Divsiion, Puno (J) Facts: On 23 December 1993, Meralco filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the revision of its rate schedules. On 28 January 1994, the ERB issued an order granting a provisional increase of P0.184/kwh subject to the condition that in event that the board finds that Meralco is entitled to a lesser increase in rates, all excess amounts collected shall be refunded or credited to its customers. Subsequently, ERB rendered its decision adopting the audit of the Commission on Audit (COA) and authorized Meralco to implement a rate adjustment of P0.017/kwh, but ordered the refund of the excess amount of P0.167/kwh collected from the billing cycles of February 1994 to February 1997, holding that income tax should not be treated as operating expense, and applying the net average investment method in the computation of the rate base. On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the ERB decision insofar as it directed the reduction of the rates by P0.167/kwh and the refund to Meralco’s customers. Motions for reconsideration were denied. Hence, the petition before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the rates are just and reasonable.

Held: The ERB has the power to fix rates to be charged by public utilities involved in the distribution of electricity, under Executive Order 172. What is just, reasonable rate is a question of fact calling for the exercise of discretion, good sense, and a fair, enlightened and independent judgment. In determining the just and reasonable rates to be charged by a public utility, the regulating agency must consider the rate of return, the rate base, and the return itself or the computed revenue to be earned by the public utility based on the rate of return and rate base. Aside from the financial condition of the public utility, particular reasons involved for the request of the rate increase, the quality of the services rendered by the public utility, the existence of competition, the element of risk or hazard involved in the investment, the capacity of consumers, etc. should be considered for the purpose of rate regulation. Herein, the factual findings of the administrative body should be accorded great respect, even finality, if supported by substantial evidence. To the extent that the agency has not been arbitrary or capricious in the exercise of its powers, the courts should not interfere.

Vera V Cueva

Vera V CuevaMay 31, 1979L-33693-94 Case Doctrine: Weighed Accorded To Contemporary Construction

FACTS:

Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to review the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila, perpetually restraining the defendant, Commission on Internal Revenue from refraining plaintiffs now private respondents (engaged in manufacture, distribution, and sale of filled milk in the Philippines) to print out the labels of their filled milk product the words “this milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year age”.

Order from the Commission on Internal Revenue requiring the plaintiffs-private respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of Tax Code within 15 days from the receipt of order. ISSUE:Whether or not the private respondents be charged with penalty according to Section 169 released by Commission on Internal Revenue

HELD:The decision is hereby affirmed. Section 169 “Inscription to be placed on Skimmed Milk” is not to be applied to filled milk, the use of specific qualifying terms “skimmed milk” in the head note and “condensed skimmed milk” in the text of the cited section, would restrict the scope of the general clause “all milk” in whatever form, in other words, the general clause is restricted by specific term “skimmed milk” under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are restricted and limited by particular terms they follow in the statute.The difference between skimmed milk and filled milk, the former, the fatty part has been released, the latter, the fatty part has been released but substitute with coconut or corn oil or both, it cannot be safely assumed that 169 applies to both.

Chartered Bank Employees' Association v Ople CASE DOCTRINE: (Weight Accorded to Contemporary Construction) FACTS:The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the respondent Secretary, now Minister of Labor which denied the petitioner's claim for holiday pay and its claim for premium and overtime pay differentials.

On May 20, 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association, in representation of its monthly paid employees/members, instituted a complaint with the Regional Office No. IV, Department of Labor, now Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) against private respondent Chartered Bank, for the payment of ten (10) unworked legal holidays, as well as for premium and overtime differentials for worked legal holidays from November 1, 1974.

The Minister of Labor dismissed the Chartered Bank Employees Association’s claim for lack of merit basing its decision on Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9. ISSUE:Whether or not the Secretary of Labor erred and acted contrary to law in promulgating Sec. 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9. HELD:While it is true that the minister has the authority in the performance of his duty to promulgate rules and regulations to implement, construe and clarify the Labor Code, such power is

limited by provisions of the statute sought to be implemented, construed or clarified.

Obviously, The Secretary (Ministry) of Labor had exceeded his statutory authority granted by Article 5 of the Labor Code authorizing him to promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations.

Note: The rule of statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. Addition Information:· Sec. 2. Status of employees paid by the month. Employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not. · POLICY INSTRUCTION NO. 9 TO: All Regional Directors SUBJECT: PAID LEGAL HOLIDAYS The rules implementing PD 850 have clarified the policy in the implementation of the ten (10) paid legal holidays. Before PD 850, the number of working days a year in a firm was considered important in determining entitlement to the benefit. Thus, where an employee was working for at least 313 days, he was considered definitely already paid. If he was working for less than 313, there was no certainty whether the ten (10) paid legal holidays were already paid to him or not. The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally daily employees. In the case of monthly, only those whose monthly salary did not yet include payment for the ten (10) paid legal holidays are entitled to the benefit. Under the rules implementing PD 850, this policy has been fully clarified to eliminate controversies on the entitlement of monthly paid employees. The new determining rule is this: 'If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less than P240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January to December, he is presumed to be already paid the ten (10) paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are made from his monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur, then he is still entitled to the ten (10) paid legal holidays. These new interpretations must be uniformly and consistently upheld. This issuance shall take effect immediately.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v American Express COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS AMERICAN EXPRESSG.R. No. 152609 June 29, 2005

Doctrine: Contemporary Construction: Reenactment FACTS: Respondent, a VAT taxpayer, is the Philippine Branch of AMEX USA and was tasked with servicing a unit of AMEX-Hongkong

Branch and facilitating the collections of AMEX-HK receivables from card members situated in the Philippines and payment to service establishments in the Philippines.It filed with BIR a letter-request for the refund of its 1997 excess input taxes, citing as basis Section 110B of the 1997 Tax Code, which held that “xxx Any input tax attributable to the purchase of capital goods or to zero-rated sales by a VAT-registered person may at his option be refunded or credited against other internal revenue taxes, subject to the provisions of Section 112.”In addition, respondent relied on VAT Ruling No. 080-89, which read, “In Reply, please be informed that, as a VAT registered entity whose service is paid for in acceptable foreign currency which is remitted inwardly to the Philippine and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Central Bank of the Philippines, your service income is automatically zero rated xxx”Petitioner claimed, among others, that the claim for refund should be construed strictly against the claimant as they partake of the nature of tax exemption.The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) rendered a decision in favor of respondent, holding that its services are subject to zero-rate. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed this decision and further held that respondent’s services were “services other than the processing, manufacturing or repackaging of goods for persons doing business outside the Philippines” and paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of BSP. ISSUE: WON the American Express- Philippines is entitled to tax refund HELD: YES. The Supreme Court held that upon the enactment of RA 8424, which substantially carries over the particular provisions on zero rating of services under Section 102(b) of the Tax Code which states that "(b) Transactions subject to zero percent (0%) rate. -- The following services performed in the Philippines by VAT-registered persons shall be subject to zero percent (0%) rate:‘(1) Processing, manufacturing or repacking goods for other persons doing business outside the Philippines which goods are subsequently exported, where the services are paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP);‘(2) Services other than those mentioned in the preceding subparagraph, the consideration for which is paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP;’"x x x x x x x x x the principle of legislative approval of administrative interpretation by reenactment clearly obtains. This principle means that "the reenactment of a statute substantially unchanged is persuasive indication of the adoption by Congress of a prior executive construction.”The legislature is presumed to have reenacted the law with full knowledge of the contents of the revenue regulations then in force regarding the VAT, and to have approved or confirmed them because they would carry out the legislative purpose. This particular provision is re-enforced, "When a statute is susceptible of the meaning placed upon it by a ruling of the government agency charged with its enforcement and the legislature thereafter reenacts the provisions without substantial change, such action is to some extent confirmatory that the ruling carries out the legislative purpose."Having resolved that transactions of respondent are zero-rated, the Court upholds the former’s entitlement to the refund as

determined by the appellate court. Moreover, there is no conflict between the decisions of the CTA and CA. This Court respects the findings and conclusions of a specialized court like the CTA “which, by the nature of its functions, is dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of tax cases and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject."Furthermore, under a zero-rating scheme, the sale or exchange of a particular service is completely freed from the VAT, because the seller is entitled to recover, by way of a refund or as an input tax credit, the tax that is included in the cost of purchases attributable to the sale or exchange. "The tax paid or withheld is not deducted from the tax base." Having been applied for within the reglementary period, respondent’s refund is in order.

Associated Sugar Inc. v Commissioner of Customs

Associated Sugar Inc. v Commissioner of Customs GR No. Date Case Doctrine:

Facts:This case is about the legality of wharfage dues in the sum of 904,236.38 collected by the Commissioner of Customs from the five petitions in connection with their exportation of sugar which was shipped from two private wharves.

The petitioner assail the wharfage fees in question on the theory that wharfage is a charge or rent for the use of a wharf or the use of government facilities in a port. Since they used private wharves and did not use any government facilities, they contend that they should not be held liable for wharfage dues.

Issue/s W/N the definition of wharfage by the petitioner is valid.

Ruling The theory of the petitioner is not tenable under under sections 2801 and 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code, R.A. 1937, PD 231 as amended by PD 426, which provides that wharfage is a fee assessed against the cargo of a vessel engaged in a foreign or domestic trade based on the quantity, weight or measure received and/or discharged by such vessel.

It can be inferred that wharfage dues can be collected even if no wharf is used in the loading or unloading of exported or imported cargoes. Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioner is entitled for the said dues.

Tung Chin Hui v Rodriguez

Tung Chin Hui vs RodriguezGR No 137571September 21, 2000 Case Doctrine: Stare Decisis FACTS: The petitioner, a Taiwanese citizen, was arrested after bring found guilty of possessing a tampered passport earlier canceled by the Taiwanese authority who ordered his summary deportation.

Petitioner filed before the RTC that a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that his detention was illegal. His petition was granted. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner then filed an opposition claiming that the Notice had been filed beyond the 48-hour reglementary period for filing appeals in habeas corpus cases as prescribed by the pre-1997 Rules of Court. RTC rejected petitioner’s contention and granted due course to the Notice of Appeal. A motion for reconsideration was filed but was also rejected. Hence, the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the notice had been filed beyond the 48 hour reglementary period for filing appeals in habeas corpus cases prescribed by the pre-1997 Rules of Court RULING: No. Petitioner urges that the court apply precedents that held the 48 hour period for perfecting an appeal was mandatory and jurisdictional. The principled cited by the petitioner is stare decisis, et non quieta movere, which means “when the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same. In the present case, all the precedent cases had been resolved under the pre-1997 Rules of Court. Stare decisis cannot compel this court to apply to the present case alleged precedents decided during the regime of the pre-1997 Rules of Court. The cited cases applied a specific provision of the Rules of Court in effect at that time. But because that provision had already been repealed when the facts under present consideration occurred, the court can no longer rely on those cases. Bustamante v NLRC

GR number: 111651Date: November 28, 1996Case doctrine: Literal meaning or plain-meaning rule if statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. FACTS:The facts are not in dispute. Respondent company is engaged in the business of producing high grade bananas in its plantation in Davao del Norte. Petitioners Paulino Bantayan, Fernando Bustamante, Mario Sumonod and Osmalik Bustamante were employed as laborers and harvesters while petitioner Sabu Lamaran was employed as a laborer and sprayer in respondent company's plantation. All the petitioners signed contracts of employment for a period of six (6) months from 2 January 1990 to 2 July 1990, but they had started working sometime in September 1989. Previously, they were hired to do the same work for periods lasting a month or more, from 1985 to 1989. Before the contracts of employment expired on 2 July 1990, petitioners' employments were terminated on 25 June 1990 on the ground of poor performance on account of age, as not one of them was allegedly below forty (40) years old. In accordance with Republic Act No. 6715, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to his full backwages from the time his compensation was withheld from him (which, as a rule, is from the time of his illegal dismissal) up to the time of his actual reinstatement. ISSUE:Whether or not in computing the amount of backwages, an illegally dismissed employee be entitled until his actual reinstatement. HELD:

YES. The provision calling for "full backwages" to illegally dismissed employees is clear, plain and free from ambiguity and, therefore, must be applied without attempted or strained interpretation. Index animi sermo est. Therefore, in accordance with R.A No. 6715, petitioners are entitled to their full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement.

Espiritu vs. CiprianoGR No. L-32743, 55 SCRA 5333February 15, 1974

Doctrine: Literal Meaning or Plain Meaning Rule

Facts:Herein, the plaintiffs were the owners of the property in question, leased to the defendants since 1952. In January, 1969, the lease was converted to a month-to-month basis, and the plaintiffs increased the rent to P30.00 a month. Since then, the defendants have not paid the rent. This is why Espiritu, et. al, raised the complaint against the defendants Cipriano, et. al. to the Municipal court of Pasig, Rizal.

Herein, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint by invoking the prohibitory provision of R.A. 6126 which states that there should be no increase of rent during a one year period starting from March 30, 1970, where the rent does not exceed P300.00.However, the increase of rent happened a year before the enactment of the statute.

Issue:Whether or not R.A. 6126 will have retroactive effect at the case at bar.

Rulings:According to Article 4 of the Civil Code, no law shall be given retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. R.A. 6126 is not applicable at the case at bar.

It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that if the language of the law is plain, clear, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal interpretation. The principle of verba legis or the plain meaning rule was applied.

WHEREFORE, the assailed orders of August 4 and October 16, 1970, are hereby nullified and set aside. The court a quo shall proceed with the prompt disposition of Civil Case No. 338-M (12285) on the merits in accordance with Republic Act 6031 if applicable, otherwise under the prevailing procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court.Costs against respondent.

National Federation of Labor v NLRC [G.R. No. 127718. March 2, 2000]Case Doctrine: Literal Meaning/Verba Legis/Plain Meaning Rule

FACTSPetitioners are employees of the Patalon Coconut Estate in Zamboanga. With the advent of the RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the government sought the compulsory acquisition of the land for agrarian reform. Because of

this, the private respondents who are owners of the estate decided to shut down its operation. Petitioners did not receive any separation pay. Now, the petitioners pray, with the representation of their labor group, claiming that they were illegally dismissed. They cite Article 283 of the Labor code where an employer “may” terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation.ISSUEWhether or not the Court should apply the legal maxim verbal legis in construing Article 283 of the Labor Code as regards its applicability to the case at bar.RULINGYes, the legal maxim is applicable in this case. The use of the word “may,” in its plain meaning, denotes that it is directory in nature and generally permissive only. Also, Article 283 of the Labor Code does not contemplate a situation where the closure of the business establishment is forced upon the employer and ultimately for the benefit of the employees. The Patalon Coconut Estate was closed down because a large portion of the said estate was acquired by the DAR pursuant to the CARP. The severance of employer-employee relationship between the parties came about involuntarily, as a result of an act of the State. Consequently, complainants are not entitled to any separation pay. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.

Hidalgo v Hidalgo HIDALGO V HIDALGOL-25326May 29, 1970What is Within the Spirit is Within the Law FACTS: Two petitions for review of decisions with the same issue involving the same land owners and vendees which dismissed petitioner’s actions as share tenants for the enforcement of the right to redeem agricultural lands. Petitioners have been working on the lands as share tenants for several years. 1.First case: respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo owned lands and sold it with two other parcels of land for 4,000. Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Rosales as tenants alleged that the area of land they worked on is worth 1, 500 and thus they seek the execution of a deed of sale for the same amount by respondents-vendee in their favor by way of redemption.2.Second case: parcel of land worth 750 was sold by respondent. Petitioner-spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo sought the execution of a deed of sale for the same price by way of redemption. Sec12 of the Land Reform Code or RA 3844 is available to leasehold tenants only but not to share tenants. It provides that: Lessee’s Right of Redemption—In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at areas on able price and consideration.; Provided: further, that where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within two years from the registration of the sale, and shall have the priority over any right of legal redemption.

No 90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the pre-emption prescribed bySex11 of the Agricultural Land Reform was given ISSUE: WON the right of redemption granted by Sec12 of RA 3844 is applicable to share tenants also.Or,WON the plaintiffs, as share tenants are entitled to redeem the parcel of land they are working from the purchasers thereof where no notice was previously given to them by the vendor, who was their landholder,of the latter’s intention to sell their property and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec13 of RA 3844 before the registration of the deed of sale HELD: Where the true intent of the law is clear, such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter hereof. Whatever is within the spirit of a statue is within the statute, since adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice, and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.

PNB v Office of the President

PNB v Office of the PresidentG.R. 104528January 18, 1996Case Doctrine: Intent of Statute is the Law

FACTS:Petitioner bank challenges the decision of the Office of the President when it invoked P.D. 957 “The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree” in the mortgage contract in question, as having been executed prior to the enactment of said law.Petitioner contends that it’s not privy to the contract between the private respondents and mortgagor-subdivision developer, hence, the Office of the President erred in ordering the bank to collect private respondents’ remaining amortizations and issue the corresponding titles after payment. They cannot compel the private respondents to pay again the lots which they previously bought from the subdivision developer.

ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. 957 is applicable to the mortgage contract in question which was executed prior to the enactment of P.D. 957?

RULING:Yes--Pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, “laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.” However, it is obvious and indubitable that P.D. 957 was intended to cover even those real estate mortgages executed prior to its enactment, and such intent must be given effect if the purpose is to protect innocent purchasers. While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, it is the unmistakable intent of the law to protect innocent buyers from scheming subdivision developers.The intent of the law must be enforced. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. It is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent.

Solid Homes v Tan SOLID HOMES V TAN465 SCRA 137 July 29, 20005FACTS

Spouses Joe Uy and Myrna Uy buys a subdivision lot at Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision, Quezon City which was subsequently sold to spouses Ancheta K. Tan and Corazon de Jesus-Tan. From then on, respondents visited their property a number of times, only to find out the sad state of development thereat. There was no infrastructure and utility systems for water, sewerage, electricity and telephone, as announced in the approved plans and advertisements of the subdivision. Worse, squatters occupy their lot and its surrounding areas. In short, there has been no development at all.Accordingly, in a letter respondents demanded on petitioner to provide the needed utility systems and clear the area of squatters and other obstructions by the end of January, 1996 to enable them to start the construction of their house conformably with P.D. No. 957 which requires an owner or developer of a subdivision project to develop the same within one year from the issuance of its license. Having received no reply from petitioner, respondents filed with the Field Office of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), NCR a complaint for specific performance and damages.ISSUEWON Respondent’s right to bring the instant case against petitioner has already prescribed? HELDNo. Petitioner argued that the 10 yrs prescriptive period should be reckoned from April 7, 1980 when they sold the lot to spouses Uy or at the latest on February 1985. The SC disagree because it is from the time an act is performed or an omission incurred which is violative of plaintiffs right, that signals the accrual of a case of action.Thus, the period of prescription of any action is reckoned only from the date the cause of action accrued. And a cause of action arises when that which should have been done is not done, or that which should not have been done is done.In many instances, this Court has refused to apply the literal import of a particular provision of law when to do so would lead to unjust, unfair and absurd results. After all, it is the function of courts to see to it that justice is dispensed, fairness is observed and absurdity prevented.

King v Hernandez

US v Toribio

US v TORIBIOG.R. No. L-5060 January 26, 1910Construction to Accomplish Purpose

FACTS:Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the province of Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle.

The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the slaughter of large cattle in the municipal slaughter house without a permit given by the municipal treasurer. Furthermore, he contends that the municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he slaughtered his carabao in his dwelling.

Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147 provides that “no large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal slaughter

house except upon permit secured from the municipal treasurer” and “any person slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption any larger cattle except upon permit secured from the municipal treasurer shall be punished xxx.”The court said that there may be two possible constructions of these sections: the first, whereby the phrase “at the municipal slaughterhouse” referring to both “slaughtered” and “killed for food;” and the second, limiting the phrase “at the municipal slaughterhouse” to the words “killed for food”

ISSUE: Whether the slaughter of large cattle outside of the municipal slaughter house without permit by the municipal treasurer is prohibited

HELD: YES. Considering the purpose of the enactment of the act – to protect large cattle against theft and to make easy recovery and return of such cattle to their owners, when lost, strayed or stolen, allowing slaughter outside, the court ruled that the act applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, ANYWHERE, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, For to do otherwise is to defeat the purpose of the law and the intent of the law makers.

Commendador v Villa COMENDADOR vs. DE VILLAG.R. No. 93177August 2, 1991When Reason of the Law Ceases, the Law Ceases FACTS:The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d’etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989. The charges against them are violations of Articles of War: Mutiny (AW 67), Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman (AW 96), and Various Crimes (AW 94) in relation to Murder (RPC Art 248).

These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and related issues arising from the same incident.

(1) G.R. No. 93177 – a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, they are questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel constituted to investigate the charges against them and the creation of the General Court Martial (GCM) convened to try them.(2) G.R. No. 96948 – challenged the legality of GCM No. 14 and sought certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to preemptory challenge as granted by Art 18 of Com. Act No. 408.(3) G.R. No. 95020 – a petition for certiorari assailing the orders of the respondent judge of RTC of Quezon City on the ground that he has no jurisdiction on GCM No. 14 and no authority either to set aside its ruling denying bail to the private respondents.(4) G.R. No. 97454 – raised jurisdictional objections and a petition for certiorari against the decision of RTC of QC in a petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private respondents.

ISSUE:WON the military personnel are entitled to bail

RULING:NO. We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. No. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in

Arula, where we observed that “the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where we observed that the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.” The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:

The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.Aside from the structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities are paid out of the revenues collected from the people.It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul.

Matabuena v Cervantes

Morales v Subido

Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc v Court of Tac Appeals RUFINO LOPEZ & SONS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondent. G.R. No. L-9274

Facts:Petitioner appellant Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc. is appealing from a resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals dismissing its appeal from a decision of the Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, assessing additional fees on petitioner for a certain importation of wire netting. The facts are simple and undisputed. Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg, Germany. The Manila Collector of Customs assessed the corresponding customs duties on the importation on the basis of consular and supplies invoices. Said customs duties were paid and the shipments were released. Subsequently, however, and freight of said wire netting and as a result of the reassessment, additional customs duties in the amount of P1,966.59 were levied and imposed upon petitioner.Failing to secure a reconsideration of the reassessment and levy of additional customs duties, Lopez & Sons appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals. Acting upon a motion to dismiss the appeal, filed by the Solicitor General on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Tax Court, by its resolution of May 23, 1955, dismissed the appeal on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of Customs of Manila, citing section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, creating said tax court. From said resolution of dismissal, Lopez & Sons appealed to us, seeking a reversal of said resolution of dismissal.Issue:WON the Court of Tax Appeals have jurisdiction to review by appeal, decisions of the Collector of Customs?Held:Tax Court may refuse to entertain said appeal, as was done in the present case, on the ground that under section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, it had no jurisdiction to review a decision of the Collector

of Customs, section 7 clearly limiting its appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs.In view of the foregoing, we hold that under the law, particularly, the Customs Law and Republic Act No. 1125, the Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to review by appeal, decisions of the Collector of Customs. The appealed order of dismissal is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Oliveros v Villaluz

Amatan v Aujero

AMATAN VS AUJEROSeptember 27, 1995Case doctrine: Construction to Avoid Injustice

FACTS: The validity of judgment rendered by respondent judge Vicente Aujero is assailed in this case. A criminal complaint was filed against Rodrigo Umpad, accusing him of the murder (under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code) of Genaro Tagsip. Upon arraignment, the two parties entered into a plea bargaining where it was agreed that the accused would plead guilty to the lesser offense of Attempted Homicide. Respondent Judge rendered judgment exactly in accordance with the plea bargaining agreement. Pedro Amatan, the deceased’s brother-in-law, filed a complaint against the respondent judge, saying that the sentence of lesser offense of Attempted Homicide instead of Homicide, as was called for in the case, is indicative enough of the judge’s gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law or gross misconduct. Respondent judge avers that he rendered judgment relying on Sec 2 Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which allows an accused individual to plead guilty to a lesser offense, with the consent of offended party, regardless of whether or not such offense is necessarily included in the crime charged, or cognizable by the court of a lesser jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judge correctly relied on the said section of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to lower the sentence to the accused

HELD: No- The fact of the death in the case cannot be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the lower offense of Attempted Homicide. Homicide as defined in Article 249 of the RPC produces death; Attempted Homicide does not. While it is true that the judge merely applied the rule, the incongruous result ought to have alerted him of the impossibility of justice. Though there exists a hiatus in the law in this case which led to its misapprehension, the Civil Code admonishes judges to take principles of right and justice at heart in instance where a literal application of a provision of law would lead to injustice or to a result so directly in opposition with the dictates of logic and common sense.

Ursua v Court of Appeals

Co Kim Cham v Valdez Tan Teh

Case Title: Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh GR No.: G.R. No. L-5 Date: September 17, 1945Case Doctrine: Construction to Avoid Danger to public interest

FACTS: Co Kim Chan, petitioner, had a pending civil case at the Court of First Instance of Manila initiated during the Japanese occupation. Post the Japanese occupation and in accordance with the proclamation by General Douglas MacArthur, Judge Arsenio Dizon, respondent, refused to continue with the hearings of the petitioner’s case. The said proclamation stated:

"[T]hat all laws, regulations and processes of any of the government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control."

ISSUE:WON the proclamation by Gen. MacArthur has invalidated all judgments, judicial acts and proceedings of the courts under the Philippine Executive Commission.

RULING: No. The Court held that the “process” in the proclamation did not pertain to judicial processes but only to executive/administrative and legislative orders. To render the judicial processes under the Japanese occupation invalid was to violate the international laws, and such could not have been the intention of Gen. MacArthur.

International law states that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. In this light, all judgments and judicial acts by the courts during the Japanese occupation are considered good and valid. Considering the rules of statutory construction, Gen. MacArthur’s proclamation should not be construed to violate the international law.

Furthermore, the Court ruled that a construction contrary to the international law would also be detrimental to public interest for “...disputes or suits already adjudged would have to be again settled accrued or vested rights nullified, sentences passed on criminals set aside, and criminals might easily become immune for evidence against them may have already disappeared or be no longer available, especially now that almost all court records in the Philippines have been destroyed by fire as a consequence of the war.”

Rules of Statutory Construction:

1. ““A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”

2. “[W]here great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.”

Salvacion v Central Bank

Salvacion v Central Bank of the PhilippinesAugust 21, 1997G.R. No. 94723Case Doctrine: Application of the law depends on the extent of its justice.

FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial

court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00. Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?

HELD: No. The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.

Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.

The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes.

Further, the SC said: “In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.”

Demafiles v COMELEC Demafiles vs. COMELECDecember 29,1967G.R. No. L- 28396

Topic: Departure from Literal Interpretation (Statute must be capable of interpretation)Facts:The new municipality of Sebaste1 in Antique province held its first election of officers in the general elections of November 14, 1967, with the petitioner Agripino Demafiles and the respondent Benito B. Galido vying for the mayoralty. On November 21 the respondent Galido asked the provincial board, acting as municipal board of canvassers pursuant to section 167 (b) of the Revised Election Code, to disregard, as "obviously manufactured", the election return from precinct 7 on the ground that the said return shows that 195 voters were registered (of whom 188 voted), when, according to a certificate of the municipal election registrar only 182 had registered in that precinct as of October 30, 1997. The return from precinct 7 was the rejected. The resulting tally from the canvassing of votes gave Galido 888 votes as against 844 for Demafiles. Galido was proclaimed mayor-elect of the municipality of Sebaste.Demafiles filed a complaint against COMELEC protesting the board's action of rejection of the return from precinct 7 and the subsequent proclamation of Galido, and challenging the right of two members of the board of canvassers, Julito Moscoso and Quirico Escaño, to sit, considering that they were reelectionists.Issues:1. Whether or not the case is moot because respondent Galido had taken his oath and assumed office on November 22, pursuant to Republic Act 4870.2. Whether or not the canvassing board may pass upon the validity of the election return in this case.3. Whether or not the canvass and proclamation should be annulledRuling: No. In the court’s view, the last portion of the provision — "and shall have qualified" — is devoid of any meaning and does not warrant the respondent's reading that the term of office of the first municipal officials of Sebaste begins immediately after their proclamation. Here is a clear case of a failure to express a meaning, and a becoming sense of judicial modesty forbids the courts from assuming and, consequently, from supplying. The court agreed by the general rule that the term of office of municipal officials shall begin on the first day of January following their election, and so the assumption of office by the respondent Galido in no way affected the basic issues in this case. Yes. A canvassing board performs a purely ministerial function — that of compiling and adding the results they appear in the returns, transmitted to it. However, they cannot pass upon the validity of an election return, much less exclude it from the canvass on the ground that the votes cast in the precinct from whence it came are illegal. But the exclusion of the return in this case is sought to be justified on the ground that it is "obviously manufactured" because, contrary to the statement therein that there were 195 registered voters, of whom 188 voted, the certificate of the local election registrar states that only 182 voters had registered on October 30, 1967.Yes. The canvass and proclamation should be annulled because two of the four members of the board of canvassers were disqualified from sitting in it, they being candidates for reelection. The statement of respondent Galido that reelectionist members of the provincial board are disqualified under section 28 only when the board acts as a provincial board of canvassers, to prevent them from canvassing their own votes, and not when they sit as a municipal board of canvassers, is branded as obiter dictumPeople v Gutierrez

Gatchalian v COMELEC

Chua v CSC

CHUA VS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONGR. NO. 88979 Feb. 7, 1992Doctrine of Necessary ImplicationPadilla, J:

FACTS: On December 2, 1988, Republic Act 6683 was enacted to provide benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation of government employees as well as involuntary separation due to reorganization. Those who may avail are regular, temporary, casual, and emergency employees.Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired in National Irrigation Administration for 15 years as a coterrminous employee in four successive NIA projects. Believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, Chua filed an application to NIA. But the latter denied. She then went to Civil Service Commission, but was likewise denied. She was offered separation benefits equivalent to 1/2 month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980 instead.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683.

HELD: Yes. Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." Applying the criteria set forth, the Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause were we to sustain respondents' submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by said law. Co-terminous or project personnel, who have rendered years of continuous service should be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their application prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose. In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law.

COA v Province of Cebu THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT OF THE PROVINCE OF CEBU v. PROVINCE OF CEBUG.R. No. 141386 ; 29 November 2001Ynares-Santiago, J. Facts: The provincial governor of the province of Cebu, as chairman of the local school board, under Section 98 of the Local Government Code, appointed classroom teachers who have no items in the DECS plantilla to handle extension classes that would accommodate students in the public schools. In the audit of accounts conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) of the Province of Cebu, for the period January to June 1998, it appeared that the salaries and personnel-related benefits of the teachers appointed by the province for the extension classes were charged against the provincial SEF. Likewise charged to the SEF were the college scholarship grants of the province. Consequently, the COA issued Notices of Suspension to the province of Cebu, saying that disbursements for the salaries of teachers and scholarship grants are not chargeable to the provincial SEF. petitioner claims that since what is allowed for local school boards to determine under Section 99 of the Local Government Code is only the annual supplementary budgetary needs for the operation and maintenance of public

schools, as well as the supplementary local cost to meet such needs, the budget of the local school boards for the establishment and maintenance of extension classes should be construed to refer only to the upkeep and maintenance of public school buildings, facilities and similar expenses other than personnel-related benefits.Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s contention that of Sec. 99 of the Local Government Code merely refers to the upkeep and maintenance of buildings facilities and the similar? Resolution: Under the doctrine of necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF for the establishment and maintenance of extension classes logically implies the hiring of teachers who should, as a matter of course be compensated for their services. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. Verily, the services and the corresponding compensation of these teachers are necessary and indispensable to the establishment and maintenance of extension classes.

Batungbakal v National Development Co.

Gordon v Veridiano Gordon (petitioner)v.Veridiano II and spouses Eduardo and Rosalina Yambao (respondents)167 SCRA 5November 8, 1988Case Doctrine: Grant of Power Includes Incidental Power FACTS:Respondent Yambao owns a San Sebastian Drugstore and an Olongapo City Drugstore. A ‘test buy’ operation at San Sebastian Drugstore, wherein agents were sold 200 tablets of Valium without a doctor’s prescription, gave rise to the closure ordered by the FDA. Before such order was promulgated, the Mayor revoked the Mayor’s Permits issued to San Sebastian Drugstore and subsequently, a signboard was posted by the Vice-Mayor at the drugstore announcing its permanent closure. On May 7, 1980, FDA approved Respondent’s request to exchange the locations of the two drugstores (which were 5m apart and in the same building). Upon knowledge of this, Petitioner then revoked the Mayor’s Permit issued to Olongapo City Drugstore.ISSUE:The conflict between the FDA’s and the mayor’s power to grant and revoke licenses for the operation of drugstoresRULING: The power to approve a license includes by implication, even if not expressly granted, the power to revoke it. By extension, the power to revoke is limited by the authority to grant the license, from which it is derived in the first place. Thus, if the FDA grants a license upon its finding that the applicant drug store has complied with the requirements of the general laws and the implementing administrative rules and regulations, it is only for their violation that the FDA may revoke the said license. By the same token, having granted the permit upon his ascertainment that the conditions thereof as applied particularly to Olongapo City have been complied with, it is only for the violation of such conditions that the mayor may revoke the said permit.

UST v Board of Tax Appeals

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS, petitioner, vs.THE BOARD OF TAX APPEALS, respondent.G.R. No. L-5701Doctrine: Grant of Power Excludes Greater Power

FACTS: In 1950, the University of Santo Tomas was assessed a deficiency tax on its income from tuition fees. UST opposed such assessment but it paid it under protest. UST then submitted to the Secretary of Finance a memorandum regarding the matter. UST avers that the tax was illegally collected. The Secretary of Finance then advised UST to file a petition for review with the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) regarding their protest. UST complied but after filing the petition, UST filed a motion questioning the jurisdiction of the BTA. UST assailed EO 401-A which gave BTA the jurisdiction to hear cases involving illegally collected taxes. UST avers that this effectively deprives the regular courts of law their jurisdiction to take cognizance of recovery of illegally collected taxes. ISSUE: Whether or not the President has a capacity to exercise the power in RA 442? Whether or not the Board of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction over the cases involved in the taxes protest by UST.HELD:Republic Act No. 442 was enacted with the only purpose of giving to the President the authority "to reorganize within one year the different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and other instrumentalities of the Government, including the corporations owned or controlled by it, . . . . to promote simplicity, economy, and efficiency, and to improve the service in the transaction of the public business." The purpose of said Act is merely to effect a reorganization of the different bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the executive branch of the government. The power so delegated is therefore limited in scope. It cannot be extended to other matters not embraced therein, nor are incidental thereto. To do so would be an encroachement on powers expressly lodged in Congress by our Constitution.But Executive Order No. 401-A does not merely create the Board of Tax Appeals, which, as an instrumentality of the Department of Finance, may properly come within the purview of Republic Act No. 422, but goes as far as depriving the courts of first instance of their jurisdiction to act on internal revenue cases a matter which is foreign to it and which comes within the exclusive province of Congress. This the Chief Executive cannot do, nor can that power be delegated by congress, for under our Constitution, Congress alone has the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts (Article VIII, section 2, Philippine Constitution).We are therefore of the opinion that Executive Order No. 401-A is null and void in so far as it interferes with the jurisdiction of the courts of first instance in cases arising not only under the internal revenue law but also customs law and assessment law, but is valid with regard to the rest of its provisions in so far as they affect the organization and administrative functions of the Board of Tax Appeals. More specifically, we hold that part IV of said Executive Order which refers to "court Review of Board Decisions," is null and void.Wherefore, petition is hereby granted, without costs.

Dinglasan v Lee Hun DINGLASAN et. al. vs LEE BUN TING et. al.

No. L-5996 27 June 1956J. LABRADORTopic: Illegality of Act Implied from ProhibitionFACTSAppellants sold to Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, predecessor in interest of appellees, a parcel of land situated on the corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Capiz (now Roxas City) designated as lot 398. After the sale, Lee Liong constructed a concrete building which he used as a place for his lumber business and in part as a residence for himself and family. The appellants contend that the sale was null and void as it was made in violation of the Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 5, but the Court of Appeals found out that the purchaser was not aware of the constitutional prohibition, while the appellants were because the negotiations for the sale was conducted with the knowledge and direct intervention by Judge Dinglasan. It held that even if Lee Liong had known of the prohibition, the suit would not lie because of the principle of pari delicto, that courts will not aid either party to an illegal contract if both are equally guilty but will leave them where they find them. ISSUEW/NOT Lee Bun Ting et. al. have the right to repurchase.HELDNONE. The doctrine of pari delicto bars appellants from recovering the title to the property in question. As the sale to Lee Liong is prohibited by the Constitution, title to the land did not pass to said alien because the sale did not produce any juridical effect in his favor and that the constitutional prohibition should be deemed self-executing in character, in order to give effect to the Constitutional mandate. The sale after being null and void, does not guarantee that the title will remain with the vendor, who had also violated the constitutional prohibition, or that he has the right to repurchase. In such contingency another principle of law sets in to bar the equally guilty vendor from recovering the title, which he had voluntarily conveyed for a consideration, that of pari delicto.

De Los Santos v Roman Catholic Church De Los Santos v Roman Catholic ChurchFebruary 25, 1954L-6088Case Doctrine: Illegality Of Act Implied From Prohibition (Exception)

FACTS:Petition of appeal from a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance in Cotabato, declaring the sale of the homestead from Julio Sarabillo to Roman Catholic dated 1940, to be null and void.Julio Sarabillo was granted a homestead tract of land in Midsayap, Cotabato December 9, 1938 which was sold to Roman Catholic on December 31, 1940. When Julio died, Catalina De Los Santos was appointed as the administratix, and having found the course of her administration in the sale of land was made in violation of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.The court ordered the petitioner to reimburse the P800 (contract price) and P610 (amount of improvements on the land) to the defendant. Thus the petition filed stating that the court erred in declaring the said sale as null and void.

ISSUE:Whether or not the sale of the homestead tract of land in Midsayap, Cotabato to Roman Catholic, is null and void

HELD:The decision is affirmed. Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead within 5 years after the grand of the patent which is mandatory. This law is for the

purpose of promoting a definite public policy which is to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of the public land which the state has gratuitously given to him. Thus the sale in 1940 to Roman Catholic is within the 5 year period from the date of acceptance of the grant given to Julio Sarabillo in 1938 hence null and void. The purchaser has no more right to remain the possession of the land.

Acierto v De los Santos CASE DOCTRINE: EXCEPTION on Illegality of Act Implied From Prohibition FACTS:Pelagio Acierto was granted a homestead patent to a portion of public land situated in the municipality of Tuao, Cagayan province. The land was, as required by the Land Registration Act (section 122).

Palegio Acierto died and his children the plaintiffs brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan against the defendants for the recovery of the land in question and damages.

The defendant alleged the purchase of the land from Pelagio Acierto. After trial lower court found that the land in dispute rendered judgment-declaring that the sale is void hence the plaintiffs still owners of the land but under obligation to pay defendant the sum of Php 200. ISSUE: Whether or not the pari delicto doctrine should apply? Whether or not the sale of land is valid? HELD:The court ruled that the pari delicto doctrine may not be invoked, in a case of this kind since it would run counter to an avowed fundamental policy of the State (The Land Registration Act), that the forfeiture of the homestead is a matter between the State and the grantee or his heirs, and that until the State had taken steps to annul the grant and asserts title to the homestead the purchaser is, as against the vendor or his heirs, "no more entitled to keep the land than any intruder.." In view of the foregoing, the judgment below is affirmed in so far as it adjudges possession of the homestead to plaintiffs and declares the latter under obligation to pay P200 to defendants. Costs against defendants-appellants. Additional Information:1. PUBLIC LANDS; REGISTRATION OF PATENT MAKES THE LAND REGISTERED WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE LAND REGISTRATION ACT. — Where the land was granted by the State to a private individual under the Public Land Law, and the corresponding patent was registered and issued to the grantee, said land is considered registered within the meaning of the Land Registration Act. (El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60 Phil., 17, 22; Ramoso v. Obligado, 70 Phil., 86, 70.) 2. TITLE OVER REGISTERED LAND CANNOT BE ACQUIRED BY PRESCRIPTION. — Where the land is registered, no title in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. 3. SALE MADE DURING THE FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING ISSUANCE OF PATENT IS VOID "AB INITIO." — The sale of land acquired as homestead during the five years following the issuance of the patent is void ab initio.

4. WHERE APPLICATION OF "PARI DELICTO" DOCTRINE WOULD BE AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL POLICY OF STATE, IT MAY NOT BE INVOKED. — The pari delicto doctrine may not be invoked where it would run counter to an avowed fundamental policy of the State.

Barsobia v Cuenco BARSOBIA VS CUENCOG.R. No. L-33048April 16, 1982 Doctrine: In Pari Delicto Potior Est Conditio Defendentis FACTS: Epifania Barsobia, one of the respondents, and his husband, both Filipino citizens, own a one-half portion (on the northern side) of two adjoining parcels of coconut land located at Barrio Mancapagao, Sagay, Camiguin, Misamis Oriental (now Camiguin Province). On September 5, 1936, Epifania Barsobia sold the land in controversy to a Chinese, Ong King Po, for the sum of P1,050.00. Ong King Po took actual possession and enjoyed the fruits thereof. On August 5, 1961, Ong King Po sold the litigated property to Victoriano T. Cuenco (respondent herein), a naturalized Filipino, for the sum of P5,000.00 Respondent immediately took actual possession and harvested the fruits therefrom. On March 6, 1962, Epifania "usurped" the controverted property, and on July 26, 1962, Epifania through her daughter, sold a one-half portion of the land in question to Pacita W. Vallar, the other petitioner herein. Epifania claimed that it was not her intention to sell the land to Ong King Po and that she signed the document of sale merely to evidence her indebtedness to the latter in the amount of P1,050.00. Epifania has been in possession ever since except for the portion sold to the other petitioner Pacita. ISSUE: WON the respondent is the rightful owner of the property HELD: YES. The Court held that the sale of the land in question in 1936 by Epifania to Ong King Po was inexistent and void from the beginning according to Art. 1409 (7) of the Civil Code because it was a contract executed against the mandatory provision of the 1935 Constitution, which is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos. Had this been a suit between Epifania and Ong King Po, she could have been declared entitled to the litigated land on the basis, as claimed, of the ruling in Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She, 8 reading: ... For another thing, and this is not only cogent but also important. Article 1416 of the Civil Code provides as an exception to the rule on pari delicto that when the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by the law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has sold or delivered... But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person. Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful owner of the property.