G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila,petitioners,vs.THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER,respondents.NARVASA,J.:pThe issue raised in the special civil action ofcertiorariand prohibition at bar, instituted by the Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by a court of justice or government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication?The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the present action. These facts,1together with others involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court2or otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth.1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed.3Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA.42. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807.53. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others, named respondents,6the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when their motion for suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings."7The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cario dated December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo.84. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition forcertioraribefore the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cario), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (oncertiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445,supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590."9Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named individuals, and"other teacher-members so numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to be impleaded."5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.106. Their complaints and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) were docketed as"Striking Teachers CHR Case No.90775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cario requiring his attendance therein.11On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cario) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize."12The Commission thereafter issued an Order13reciting these facts and making the following disposition:To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers are now suspended and deprived of their wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cario, of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.xxx xxx xxx7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case."148. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated,viz.:a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cario in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo;15andb) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of,"16andinter alia"ruling that it wasprima facielawful for petitioner Cario to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges."179. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cario's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days. . .(after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit."18It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590,supra).It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner Cario, has commenced the present action ofcertiorariand prohibition.The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590,supra. It has also made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other words,to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdictionover the following general issues:1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or strike.The Commission evidently intends to itselfadjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still timely.The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice,19or even a quasi-judicial agency,20it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it mayinvestigate,i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to thejudicial functionof a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority ofapplying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.21This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.22The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights.The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office.23Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the Constitution.24Its powers and functions are the following25(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power toinvestigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings.26But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings."Investigate,"commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry."27The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;"28"to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."29"Adjudicate,"commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge."30And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ."31In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous withadjudgein its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."32Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them,33andit appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues.34Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions involved. This would accord success to what may well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they anticipated would be adverse to them.This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary Cario, it would have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cario was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission.35It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits."SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 153310 March 2, 2004MEGAWORLD GLOBUS ASIA, INC.,petitioner,vs.DSM CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE AND ASSURANCE, INC.,respondents.D E C I S I O NTINGA,J.:Before this Court is aPetition for Review on Certiorariassailing theDecisiondated February 14, 2002, of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 67432,1which affirmed theDecision2of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC)3dated September 8, 2001, in CIAC Case No. 22-2000 finding petitioner Megaworld Globus Asia, Inc., liable to DSM Construction in the amount ofP62,760,558.49.The antecedents are as follows:Relative to the construction of a condominium project called "The Salcedo Park," located at H.V. dela Costa St., Salcedo Village, Makati City, the project owner, Megaworld, entered into three separate contracts with DSM Construction, namely: (1) Contract for Architectural Finishing Works; (2) Contract for Interior Finishing Works; and (3) Contract for Supply and Installation of Kitchen Cabinets and Closets. The total contract price, which was initially placed atP300 Million, was later reduced toP240 Million when the items for kitchen cabinets and walk-in closets were deleted.4The contracts also contain a stipulation forRetention Money,which is a portion of the total contract price (usually, as in this case, 10%) set aside by the project owner from all approved billings and retained for a certain period to guarantee the performance by the contractor of all corrective works during the defect-liability period which, in this case, is twelve months from the issuance of theTaking Over Certificate of Works.5TheLetter of Award for Architectural Finishing Worksprovides that the period for commencement and completion shall be twelve months, from August 1, 1997 to July 31, 1998. However, on February 21, 2000, representatives of both Megaworld and DSM Construction entered into anInterim Agreementwhereby they agreed on a new schedule of the turnover of units from the 26thfloor to the 40thfloor, which was the last of the contracted works.6The consideration agreed upon in theInterim AgreementwasP53,000,000.00. Of this amount,P3,000,000.00 was to be released immediately while five (5) equal installments ofP7,000,000.00 were to be released depending on the turn-over of units from the 26thfloor to the 40thfloor. The remaining amount ofP15,000,000.00 of theP53,000,000.00 consisted of half of the retention money.7Because of the differences that arose from the billings, DSM Construction filed on August 21, 2002, aComplaintbefore the CIAC for compulsory arbitration, claiming payment ofP97,743,808.33 for the outstanding balance of the three construction contracts, variation works, labor escalation, preliminaries loss and expense, earned retention money, interests, and attorneys fees.8DSM Construction alleged that it already commenced the finishing works on the existing 12 floors on August 1, 1997, instead of waiting for the entire 40-floor structure to be completed. At one time, DSM Construction worked with other contractors whose work often depended on, interfered or conflicted with said contractors. Delay by a trade contractor would start a chain reaction by delaying or putting off other works.9Interposing mainly the defense of delay in the turn-over of units and the poor quality of work of DSM Construction, Megaworld filed itsAnswerand made a counter-claim for loss of profits, liquidated damages, costs of take-over and rectification works, administration expenses, interests, attorneys fees and cost of arbitration in the total amount ofP85,869,870.28.10Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. (PGAI), which issued aPerformance Bondto guarantee Megaworlds contractual obligation on the project, was impleaded by Megaworld as a third-party respondent.11On March 28, 2001, the parties signed before the members of the Arbitral Tribunal theTerms of Reference12(TOR) where they setforth their admitted facts,13respective documentary evidence,14summary of claims15and issues to be resolved by the tribunal.16After presenting their evidence in the form of affidavits of witnesses,17the parties submitted their respective memoranda/draft decisions.18On October 19, 2001, the Arbitral Tribunal promulgated itsDecisiondated September 28, 2001, awardingP62,760,558.49 to DSM Construction andP9,473,799.46 to Megaworld.19Megaworld filed aPetition for Reviewunder Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals. It faulted the Arbitral Tribunal for finding that DSM Construction achieved a 95.56% level of accomplishment as of February 14, 2000; for absolving DSM Corporation of the consequences of the alleged delay in the performance of its work; and for ruling that DSM Construction had complied with the contractual requirements for filing requests for extension. Megaworld likewise questioned the sufficiency of evidence to justify the awards for liquidated damages; the balance of the contract price; the balance of amounts payable on account of theInterimAgreementof February 21, 2000; the amount ofP6,596,675.55 for variation orders; the amount ofP29,380,902.35 as reimbursement for preliminaries/loss and expense; the amount ofP413,041.52 for labor escalation costs; and the balance of the retention money in the amount ofP14,700,000.00 despite its award ofP11,820,000.00 under the February 21, 2000,Interim Agreement. Finally, Megaworld claimed that the Arbitral Tribunal erred in denying its claim for liquidated damages, expenses incurred for the cost of take-over work, administrative expenses, and its recourse against PGAI and for limiting its recovery for rectification work to onlyP9,197,863.55.20On February 14, 2002, the Court of Appeals promulgated itsDecision21affirming that of the Arbitral Tribunal. The court pointed out that only questions of law may be raised before it on appeal from an award of the CIAC.22That pronouncement notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals proceeded to review the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal and found the same to be amply supported by evidence.23Megaworld sought reconsideration of the Court of AppealsDecisionarguing, among other things, that the appellate court ignored the ruling inMetro Construction, Inc. v. Chatham Properties24that the review of the CIAC award may involve either questions of fact, law, or both fact and law.The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration in itsResolution25dated April 25, 2002. While acknowledging that the findings of fact of the CIAC may be questioned in line withMetro Construction,26the appellate court stressed that the tribunals decision is not devoid of factual or evidentiary support.Megaworld elevated the case to this Court through the presentPetition, advancing the following grounds,viz:ITHE COURT OF APPEALS IN EFFECT REFUSED TO HEED THE RULE LAID DOWN BY THIS Honorable Court in the Metro Construction, INC. vs. Chatham properties, inc. case when it dismissed mgais petition despite the grave questions of both fact and law brought before it by the petitioner.IIthe finding of the appellate court that the decision was based on substantial evidence adduced by both parties sans any review of the record or of attachments of dsm is fatally wrong, such finding being merely an adoption of the tribunals decision which, as earlier pointed out, was not supported by competent, credible and admissible evidence.IIIthe court of appeals seriously erred in giving blanket approval of all the unfounded claims and conclusions of the ciac arbitral tribunals SEPTEMBER 28, 2001 decision to the detriment of petitioners cardinal right to due process, particularly to its right to administrative due process.IVthe findings and conclusions made by a highly partisan ciac arbitral tribunal have no basis on the evidence on record. hence, the exception to the rule that only questions of law may be brought to the honorable court is applicable in the case AT bar.27Although Megaworld, at the outset,28intimates that the case involves grave questions of both fact and law, a cursory reading of thePetitionreveals that, except for the amorphous advertence to administrative due process, the alleged errors fundamentally involve only questions of fact. Megaworlds plea for the Court to pass upon the findings of facts of the Arbitral Tribunal, which were upheld by the appellate court, must perforce fail.To jumpstart its bid, Megaworld exploits the Court of Appeals pronouncement in the assailed decision that only questions of law may be raised before it from an award of the CIAC. The appellate court did so, Megaworld continues, in evident disregard ofMetro Construction.29Under Section 19 of Executive Order No. 1008,30the CIACs arbitral award "shall be final and inappealable except on questions of law which shall be appealable to the Supreme Court." InMetro Construction, however, this Court held that, with the modification of E.O. No. 1008 by subsequent laws and issuances,31decisions of the CIAC may be appealed to the Court of Appeals not only on questions of law but also on questions of fact and mixed questions of law and fact.Of such subsequent laws and issuances, only Section 1,32Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly mentions the CIAC. While an argument may be made that procedural rules cannot modify substantive law, adding in support thereof that Section 1, Rule 43 has increased the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals by expanding the scope of review of CIAC awards, or that it contravenes the rationale for arbitration, extant from the record is the fact that no party raised such argument. Consequently, the matter need not be delved into.In any case, the attack against the merits of the Court of AppealsDecisionmust fail. AlthoughMetro Constructionmay have been unbeknownst to the appellate court when it promulgated itsDecision, the fact remains that, as noted therein,33it reviewed the findings of facts of the CIAC and ruled that the findings are amply supported by the evidence.The Court of Appeals is presumed to have reviewed the case based on thePetitionand its annexes, and weighed them against theCommentof DSM Construction and theDecisionof the Arbitral Tribunal to arrive at the conclusion that the saidDecisionis based on substantial evidence. In administrative or quasi-judicial bodies like the CIAC, a fact may be established if supported by substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.34The tenability of the assailedDecisionis clear from the following discussion of the arguments raised by Megaworld before the Court of Appeals which significantly are the same arguments it has raised before this Court.Issue of Accomplishment LevelMegaworld contested the finding of 95.56% level of accomplishment by the Arbitral Tribunal, alleging that the receipts DSM Construction issued for payments under theInterim Agreementshow that the latter only achieved 90% accomplishment up to the 31stfloor while the 32ndto the 34thfloors were only 60% completed.35Megaworld insisted, therefore, that the level of accomplishment was nowhere near 90%.DSM Construction countered that Megaworld, in claiming a level of accomplishment of only 90%, contradicted its own Project Manager, TCGI,36which came up with a different percentage of accomplishment that are notably higher than Megaworlds computation.37In resolving this issue, the Arbitral Tribunal relied on the computation of Davis Langdon & Seah (DLS), the projects independent surveyor,38which found the level of accomplishment as of February 14, 2000, to be 95.56%. DLSs computation is recited in Exhibit "NN",39thus:Architectural Finishing :40

The 24th Progress Billing evaluated by DLS covering the period November 15, 1999 to December 15, 1999 over the Contract Price for Architectural Finishing Works.Php213,658,888.7741Php223,456,756.6842= 95.62%

Kitchen Cabinets & Bedroom Closets:43

The 9th Progress Billing evaluated by DLS covering the period December 1, 1999 to December 9, 1999 over the contract price for Kitchen Cabinet and Bedroom Closet.Php26,228,091.7344Php28,556,915.1745= 91.84%

Interior Finishing Works:46

The 13th Progress Billing evaluated by DLS covering the period January 8, 2000 to February 7, 2000 for the Interior Finishing Works over the contract price for Interior Finishing Work.Php49,383,114.6747Php50,685,416.5548= 95.55%

Php213,658,888.77+Php26,228,091.72+Php49,383,114.67=289,270,295.17=95.56%

Php223,456,756.68Php 28,556,915.17Php50,685,416.55302,699,097.40

Clearly, thus, CIACs finding that the level of accomplishment of DSM Construction as of February 12, 2002, stood at 95.56% was affirmed by the Court of Appeals because it is supported by substantial evidence.The Court of Appeals also noted that the Arbitral Tribunal did not give due course to all of DSM Constructions claims. Indeed, the Arbitral Tribunal rejected the construction companys demand for payment for subsequent works done after February 12, 2000, becauseExhibit "OO,"on which DSM Constructions demand was based, does not bear any mark that it had been received by Megaworld. Thus, the Arbitral Tribunal concluded that subsequent works up to September 22, 2000, when DSM Construction supposedly stopped working on the project, had not been established.49This Court observes that between the two contrasting claims of Megaworld and DSM Construction on the percentage of work accomplishment, the Arbitral Tribunal instead accorded weight to the assessment of DLS which is the project surveyor. Apart from being reasonable, DLSs evaluation is impartial. Thus, as correctly pointed out by the Arbitral Tribunal, DLS rejected DSM Constructions 99% accomplishment claim when it limited its evaluation to only 95.56%.Issues of Delay and Liquidated DamagesNext, Megaworld attributed the delay in the completion of the construction project solely to DSM Construction. The latter countered that among the causes of delay was the lack of coordination among trade contractors and the absence of a general contractor.50Although the contract purportedly contains a provision for the coordination of trade contractors, the lack of privity among them prevented coordination such that DSM Construction could not require compliance on the part of the other trade contractors.The Arbitral Tribunal decided this question by turning to Section 2.01 of the General Conditions of the Contract, which states:2.01 SITE, ACCESS & WORKSThe Contractor shall accept the Site as found on the date for possession and at their own expense clear the site of any debris which may have been left by the preceding occupants/contractors.The Arbitral Tribunal held that Section 2.01 presupposes that on the date of possession by DSM Construction of the work premises, the preceding contractor had already left the same.51The tribunal explained that the delay incurred by other trade contractors also resulted in the delay of the work of DSM Construction.It also pointed out that under Section 5.3 (1)52of theInterim Agreement,53Megaworld is required to complete and turn over to DSM Construction preceding works for the latter to complete their works in accordance with the Revised Work Schedule. Section 5.3 (1), the Arbitral Tribunal noted, even allows DSM Construction to recover losses incurred on account of the standby time of DSMs personnel/manpower or workers mobilized while Megaworld is not ready to turn over the preceding works. The Arbitral Tribunal further held that, in accordance with Section 5.3 (2)54of theInterim Agreement, DSM Construction was entitled to an extension of time corresponding to the number of days of delay reckoned from the time the preceding work item or area should have been turned over to DSM Construction. Consequently, such delay, which is not exclusively imputable to DSM Construction, negates the claim for liquidated damages by Megaworld.55In affirming the Arbitral Tribunals disposition of the issues of delay and payment of liquidated damages, the appellate court noted that the Arbitral Tribunal narrated the claims and defenses of both DSM Construction and Megaworld before making an evaluation thereof and arriving at its conclusion.56Clearly, the evidence and arguments were carefully weighed to justify the said disposition.The Tribunals finding that the project had already been delayed even before DSM Construction commenced its work is borne out by the evidence. In his letter, Exhibit X-2,57Project Management Consultant Eduardo C. Arrojado, conceded that the previous contractors had delayed the project, at the same time faulting DSM Construction for incurring its own delay. Furthermore, the work of DSM Construction pertaining as it did to the architectural and interior finishing stages as well as the supply and installation of kitchen cabinets and closets, obviously related to the final details and completion stage of the project. Thus, commencement of its task had to depend on the turn over of the complete work of the prior contractors. Hence, the delay of the previous contractors resulted in the delay of DSM Constructions work.Issues of the Contract Price Balance and Retention MoneyMegaworld also questioned the Arbitral Tribunals awards ofP7,129,825.19 corresponding to the balance of the contract price, andP11,820,000.00 pursuant to theInterim Agreement.58Megaworld alleged that DSM Construction was no longer entitled to the balance of the contract price and the retention money after the latter received payments pursuant to theInterim Agreementin the amounts ofP5,444,553.18 for the 26thto the 28thfloors, anotherP5,444,553.18 for the 29thto the 31stfloors at a 90% completion rate, andP4,161,818.18 for the 32ndto the 34thfloors which were 60% completed. Megaworld also contended that since it spent more money to complete the scope of work of DSM Construction, the latter was no longer entitled to any of the balance.On the other hand, DSM Construction argued that the award was justified in view of the failure of Megaworld to controvert the amount ofP7,129,825.19 included in the Account Overview of DLS. DSM Construction also emphasized that it was not claiming the entireP53 Million under theInterim Agreementbut only the amount corresponding to the actual work done. Even based on DLSs computation, a total ofP11,820,000.00 of retention money is still unpaid out of the 50% agreed to be released under theInterim Agreement(P15,000,000.00 lessP3,180,000.00 retention money orP11,820,000.00 for the paid billings).59The Arbitral Tribunal ruled that the balance claimed under the three contracts was based on what DSM Construction had actually accomplished less the payments it had previously received. Considering that the remaining works which were performed by another trade contractor, Deticio and Isabedra Builders, were paid directly by Megaworld, no other cost for work accomplished in theInterim Agreementis due DSM Construction except the retention money ofP11,820,000.00.60The Court of Appeals affirmed the award of the Arbitral Tribunal regarding the balance of the contract price ofP7,129,825.19 and the retention money ofP11,820,000.00 to DSM Construction. The Court of Appeals noted that the Arbitral Tribunal again narrated the claims and defenses of both DSM Construction and Megaworld before arriving at its conclusion. The appellate court further stated that the mere fact that the tribunal did not award the whole amount claimed by DSM Construction (P12,820,000.00) and instead awarded onlyP11,820,000.00 belies Megaworlds allegation that the tribunal adopted "hook, line and sinker" DSM Constructions claims.61This Court finds the award of the balance of the contract price ofP7,129,825.20 justified in view of DLS explanation inExhibit MM-362that the amount ofP7,129,825.20 represented the unpaid billing for architectural, interior and kitchen billings before Megaworld and DSM Construction drafted theInterim Agreement.Issue of Variation WorksMegaworld also disputed before the Court of Appeals theP6,686,675.5563award by the Arbitral Tribunal for variation works. Variation works consist of the addition, omission or alteration to the kind, quality or quantity of the works.64DSM Construction originally claimed a total ofP26,208,639.00 for variation works done but, of this claim, the Arbitral Tribunal only awardedP6,686,675.55 in line with the evaluation of DLS.Megaworld conceded that DSM Construction performed additional works to the extent ofP5,036,252.81. However, Megaworld claimed that since it incurred expenses when it hired another trade contractor to take over the works left uncompleted by DSM Construction, the latter lost its right to claim such amount especially since DSM Construction did not comply with the documentation when claiming variation works.65DSM Construction asserted that the Arbitral Tribunal, in fact, should have awardedP26,208,639.00 instead of limiting the award to onlyP6,686,675.55 because it was not even disputed that variation works were performed. It also contended that it cannot be faulted for the lack of documentation because the fault lay on Megaworlds project manager who failed to forward the variation orders to DLS.66The Arbitral Tribunal ruled in favor of DSM Construction, holding that there was enough evidence to prove that the contractor made a request for change or variation orders. The Arbitral Tribunal also found the testimony of Engineer Eduardo C. Arrojado convincing, factual and balanced despite Megaworlds attempt to discredit him. However, while the amount claimed for variation works wasP26,208,639.00, the Arbitral Tribunal limited the awarded to onlyP6,686,675.5567since a closer scrutiny of the other items indicated that some works were not performed.68The appellate court upheld the award of the Arbitral Tribunal because the award was based not only on the documentary exhibits prepared by DLS but on the testimony of Engineer Eduardo C. Arrojado, as well.69This Court is convinced that payments for variation works is due. Undoubtedly, variation works were performed by DSM Construction. This was confirmed by Engineer Eduardo C. Arrojado who testified that he recommended the payment for substantial additional works to DSM Construction. He further stated that since time was of the essence in the completion of the project, there were variation orders which were performed without the prior approval of the owner. However, he explained that this was a common construction practice. Finally, he stated that he agreed with the evaluation of DLS.70The testimony justified the Arbitral Tribunals reliance on the evaluation made by DLS which limited the claim for variation works toP6,596,675.55.Issue of Preliminaries/Loss and ExpenseMegaworld also disputed the award ofP29,380,902.35 for preliminaries/losses and expense.The provision for preliminaries/loss and expense in the contract assumes a direct loss and/or expense incurred in the regular progress of work for which the contractor would not be reimbursed under any other provision of the contract.71DSM Constructions claim for preliminaries/loss and expense in the amount ofP36,603,192.82 covered the loss and expense incurred on payroll, equipment rental, materials and site clearing on account of such factors as delay in the execution of the works for causes not attributable to DSM Construction.72Megaworld refused to recognize DSM Constructions claim because the latter allegedly failed to comply with Clause 6.16 of the Conditions of Contract, which imposes a two-month deadline for submission of claims for preliminaries reckoned from "the happening of the event giving rise to the loss and expense."73DSM Construction, however, argued that the documentary evidence shows that out of the four claims for preliminaries, only one (Exhibit MM-5with an evaluation ofP17,552,722.47), covering the period August 1, 1998 to April 1999, was submitted beyond the two-months requirement.74DSM Construction also pointed out that the two-month requirement for this claim was waived by Megaworld through DLS when the latter recognized the validity of claims by coming up with an evaluation ofP17,552,722.47 for the period covered inExhibit MM-5.75The Arbitral Tribunal ruled that DSM Construction was entitled to extended preliminaries considering that delay was not attributable to DSM Construction. The Arbitral Tribunal observed that Megaworld did not present evidence to refute the claim for extended preliminaries which were previously evaluated by DLS. However, after assessing the two previous evaluations by DLS, the tribunal ruled that the claims for hauling and disposal and cleaning and clearing of debris should not be included in the extended preliminaries. Hence, the Arbitral Tribunal reduced the amount ofP44,051.62 from the claim ofP2,655,879.89 perExhibit"MM-7,"andP3,883,309.54 from the claim ofP5,651,235.24 perExhibit "MM-8,"such amounts being unnecessary.76The appellate court affirmed the award, stressing the fact that the Arbitral Tribunal denied some of the claims which it did not find valid.77DSM Constructions entitlement to the payment for preliminaries was explained by Engineer Eduardo C. Arrojado to be the necessary result of the extension of the contract between DSM Construction and Megaworld.78Notably, majority of the claims of DSM Construction was reduced by the Arbitral Tribunal on the basis ofExhibit MM-479or theSummary of Variation Order Status Reportprepared by DLS.Although the Arbitral Tribunal ruled that DSM Construction was entitled to claim for preliminaries, the award was not based on the claim of DSM Construction but on the evaluation made by DLS.The foregoing disquisition adequately shows that the evidence on record supports the findings of facts of the Arbitral Tribunal on which the Court of Appeals based its decision. In fact, although not all the exhibits in the Arbitral Tribunal were presented before the Court of Appeals, the record of the appellate court contains the operative facts and the substance of said exhibits, thus enabling the intelligent disposition of the issues presented before it. This Court went over all the records, including the exhibits, to ascertain whether the appellate court missed any crucial point. It did not.The alleged undue favor accorded by the Arbitral Tribunal to DSM Construction is belied by the fact that the Arbitral Tribunal did not grant all of DSM Constructions claims. In majority of DSM Constructions claims, the Arbitral Tribunal awarded amounts lower than what DSM Construction demanded. The Arbitral Tribunal also granted some of Megaworlds claims.80Neither did the Court of Appeals merely "swallow hook, line and sinker" the award of the Arbitral Tribunal. While the appellate court affirmed the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal, it also ruled in favor of Megaworld when it limited DSM Constructions lien to only six units instead of all the condominium units to which DSM was entitled under the Contract, rationalizing that theP62 Million award can be covered by the value of the six units of the condominium project.81Considering that the computations, as well as the propriety of the awards of the Arbitral Tribunal, are unquestionably factual issues that have been discussed and ruled upon by Arbitral Tribunal and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, we cannot depart from such findings. Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.82Megaworld, however, adamantly contends that the present case constitutes an exception to the above rule because: (1) there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (2) the judgment is premised on misapprehension of facts; and, (3) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.83We disagree. None of these flaws appear in this case. Grave abuse of discretion means the capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.84No abuse of discretion was established by Megaworld. On the contrary, what is apparent is Megaworlds effort to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Arbitral Tribunal simply because of the unfavorable judgment against it. Megaworlds assertion that there was misapprehension of facts and that the evidence is insufficient to support the decision is also untenable. TheDecisionsof the Arbitral Tribunal and the Court of Appeals adequately explain the reasons therefor and are supported by substantial evidence.Likewise unmeritorious is Megaworlds assertion that it was deprived of administrative due process. The Arbitral Tribunal considered the arguments and the evidence submitted by both parties. That it accorded greater weight to DSM Constructions evidence, by itself, does not constitute a denial of due process.WHEREFORE, thePetitionis DENIED. TheDecisiondated February 14, 2001, of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on July 12, 2002, is hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioner.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 148318 November 22, 2004NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.HON. ROSE MARIE ALONZO-LEGASTO, as Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 99, JOSE MARTINEZ, Deputy Sheriff, RTC of Quezon City, CARMELO V. SISON, Chairman, Arbitration Board, and FIRST UNITED CONSTRUCTORS CORPORATION,respondents.

D E C I S I O NTINGA,J.:National Power Corporation (NPC) filed the instant Petition for Review1dated July 19, 2001, assailing the Decision2of the Court of Appeals dated May 28, 2001 which affirmed with modification the Order3and Writ of Execution4respectively dated May 22, 2000 and June 9, 2000 issued by the Regional Trial Court. In its assailed Decision, the appellate court declared respondent First United Constructors Corporation (FUCC) entitled to just compensation for blasting works it undertook in relation to a contract for the construction of power facilities it entered into with petitioner. The Court of Appeals, however, deleted the award for attorney's fees having found no basis therefor.The facts culled from the Decision of the Court of Appeals are undisputed:On April 14, 1992, NPC and FUCC entered into a contract for the construction of power facilities (civil works) Schedule 1 1x20 MW Bacon-Manito II Modular Geothermal Power Plant (Cawayan area) and Schedule 1A 1x20 MW Bacon-Manito II Modular Geothermal Power Plant (Botong area) in Bacon, Sorsogon (BACMAN II). The total contract price for the two schedules is P108,493,966.30, broken down as follows:SCHEDULE

1 Cawayan areaP 52,081,421.00

1A Botong areaP 56,412,545.30

P 108,493,966.30

Appended with the Contract is the contract price schedule which was submitted by the respondent FUCC during the bidding. The price for grading excavation was P76.00 per cubic meter.Construction activities commenced in August 1992. In the latter part of September 1992 and after excavating 5.0 meters above the plant elevation, FUCC requested NPC that it be allowed to blast to the design grade of 495 meters above sea level as its dozers and rippers could no longer excavate. It further requested that it be paid P1,346.00 per cubic meter similar to the rate of NPC's project in Palinpinon.While blasting commenced on October 6, 1992, NPC and FUCC were discussing the propriety of an extra work order and if such is in order, at what price should FUCC be paid.Sometime in March 1993, NPC Vice President for Engineering Construction, Hector Campos, created a task force to review FUCC's blasting works. The technical task force recommended that FUCC be paid P458.07 per cubic meter as such being the price agreed upon by FUCC.The matter was further referred to the Department of Public [W]orks and Highways (DPWH), which in a letter dated May 19, 1993, recommended the price range of P500.00 to P600.00 per cubic meter as reasonable. It further opined that the price of P983.75 per cubic meter proposed by Lauro R. Umali, Project Manager of BACMAN II was high. A copy of the DPWH letter is attached as Annex "C", FUCC's Exhibit EEE-Arbitration.In a letter dated June 28, 1993, FUCC formally informed NPC that it is accepting the proposed price of P458.07 per cubic meter. A copy of the said letter is attached as Annex "D", FUCC's Exhibit L Arbitration.In the meantime, by March 1993, the works in Botong area were in considerable delay. By May 1993, civil works in Botong were kept at a minimum until on November 1, 1993, the entire operation in the area completely ceased and FUCC abandoned the project.Several written and verbal warnings were given by NPC to FUCC. On March 14, 1994, NPC's Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 94-63 approving the recommendation of President Francisco L. Viray to take over the contract. President Viray's recommendation to take over the project was compelled by the need to stave-off huge pecuniary and non-monetary losses, namely:(a) Generation loss estimated to be at P26,546,400/month;(b) Payment of steam penalties to PNOC-EDC the amount estimated to be at P10,206,048.00/month;(c) Payment of liquidated damages due to the standby of electromechanical contractor;(d) Loss of guaranteed protection (warranties) of all delivered plant equipment and accessories as Mitsubishi Corporation, electromechanical contractor, will not be liable after six months of delivery.To prevent NPC from taking over the project, on March 28, 1994, FUCC filed an action for Specific Performance and Damages with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order before Branch 99, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City.Under paragraph 19 of its Complaint, FUCC admitted that it agreed to pay the price of P458.07 per cubic meter.On April 5, 1994, Judge de Guzman issued a temporary restraining order and on April 21, 1994, the trial court resolved to grant the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.On July 7, 1994, NPC filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before the First Division of the Court of Appeals asserting that no injunction may issue against any government projects pursuant to Presidential Decree 1818.On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals through then Associate Justice Bernardo Pardo issued a temporary restraining order and on October 20, 1994, the said court rendered a Decision granting NPC's Petition for Certiorari and setting aside the lower court's Order dated April 21, 1994 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated May 5, 1994.However, notwithstanding the dissolution by the Court of Appeals of the said injunction, on July 15, 1995, FUCC filed a Complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against several NPC employees for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Together with the complaint was an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the issuance of a cease and [d]esist [o]rder to restrain NPC and other NPC officials involved in the BACMAN II project from canceling and/or from taking over FUCC's contract for civil works of said project.Then on November 16, 1994, FUCC filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for Review assailing the Decision of the Court of [A]ppeals dated October 20, 1994. In its Comment, NPC raised the issue that FUCC resorted to forum shopping as it applied for a cease and desist order before the National Ombudsman despite the dissolution of the injunction by the Court of Appeals.Pending the petition filed by FUCC before the Supreme Court, on April 20, 1995 the NPC and FUCC entered into a Compromise Agreement.Under the Compromise Agreement, the parties agreed on the following:1. Defendant shall process and pay the undisputed unpaid billings of Plaintiff in connection with the entire project fifteen (15) days after a reconciliation of accounts by both Plaintiff and Defendant or thirty (30) days from the date of approval of this Compromise Agreement by the Court whichever comes first. Both parties agree to submit and include those accounts which could not be reconciled among the issues to be arbitrated as hereunder provided;2. Plaintiff accepts and acknowledges that Defendant shall have the right to proceed with the works by re-bidding or negotiating the project immediately upon the signing of herein Compromise Agreement;3. This Compromise Agreement shall serve as the Supplemental Agreement for payment of plaintiff's blasting works at the Botong site;4. Upon approval of this Compromise Agreement by the Court or Plaintiff's receipt of payment of this undisputed unpaid billings from Defendant whichever comes first, the parties shall immediately file a Joint Manifestation and Motion for the withdrawal of the following Plaintiff's petition from the Supreme Court, Plaintiff's Complaint from the National Ombudsman, the Complaint and Amended Complaint from the RTC, Br. 99 of Quezon City;5. Upon final resolution of the Arbitration, as hereunder prescribed, the parties shall immediately execute the proper documents mutually terminating Plaintiff's contract for the civil works of the BACMAN II Project (Contract No. Sp90DLM-918 (I & A);6. Such mutual termination of Plaintiff's contract shall have the following effects and/or consequences: (a) the construction works of Plaintiff at the Kawayan and Bolong sites, at its present stage of completion, shall be accepted and/or deemed to have been accepted by defendant; (b) Plaintiff shall have no more obligation to Defendant in respect of the BACMAN II Project except as provided in clause (e) below; (c) Defendant shall release all retention moneys of plaintiff within a maximum period of thirty (30) days from the date of final Resolution of the Arbitration; (d) no retention money shall thenceforth be withheld by Defendant in its payment to Plaintiff under this Compromise Agreement, and (e) Plaintiff shall put up a one-year guaranty bond for its completed civil works at the Kawayan site, retroactive to the date of actual use of the plant by defendant;7. Plaintiff's blasting works claims and other unresolved claims, as well as the claims of damages of both parties shall be settled through a two stage process to wit:STAGE 17.1 Plaintiff and Defendant shall execute and sign this Compromise Agreement which they will submit for approval by this Court. Under this Compromise Agreement both parties agree that:xxx xxxSTAGE 27.1 The parties shall submit for arbitration to settle: (a) the price of blasting, (b) both parties' claims for damages, delays, interests, and (c) all other unresolved claims of both parties, including the exact volume of blasted rocks;7.2 The arbitration shall be through a three-member commission to be appointed by the Honorable Court. Each party shall nominate one member. The Chairman of the Arbitration Board shall be [a] person mutually acceptable to both parties, preferably from the academe;7.3 The parties shall likewise agree upon the terms under which the arbitrable issues shall be referred to the Arbitration Board. The terms of reference shall form part of the Compromise Agreement and shall be submitted by the parties to the Honorable Court within a period of seven (7) days from the signing of the Compromise Agreement;7.4 The Arbitration Board shall have a non-extendible period of three (3) months within which to complete the arbitration process and submit its Decision to the Honorable Court;7.5 The parties agree that the Decision of the Arbitration Board shall be final and executory;7.6 By virtue of this Compromise Agreement, except as herein provided, the parties shall mutually waive, forgo and dismiss all of their other claims and/or counterclaim in this case. Plaintiff and defendant warrant that after approval by the Court of this Compromise Agreement neither party shall file Criminal or Administrative cases or suits against each other or its Board or member of its officials on grounds arising from the case.The Compromise Agreement was subsequently approved by the Court on May 24, 1995.The case was subsequently referred by the parties to the arbitration board pursuant to their Compromise Agreement. On December 9, 1999 the Arbitration Board rendered its ruling the dispositive portion of which states:WHEREFORE, claimant is hereby declared entitled to an award of P118,681,328.28 as just compensation for blasting works, plus ten percent (10%) thereof for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.Considering that payment in the total amount of P36,550,000.00 had previously been made, respondent is hereby ordered to pay claimant the remaining sum of P82,131,328.28 for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.Pursuant to the Compromise Agreement approved by this Honorable Court, the parties have agreed that the decision of the Arbitration Board shall be final and executory.SO ORDERED.On December 10, 1999 plaintiff FUCC filed a Motion for Execution while defendant NPC filed a Motion to Vacate Award by the Arbitration Board on December 20, 1999.On May 22, 2000 Presiding Judge Rose Marie Alonzo Legasto issued an order the dispositive portion of which states:"WHEREFORE, the Arbitration Award issued by the Arbitration Board is hereby APPROVED and the Motion for Execution filed by plaintiff hereby GRANTED. The Motion to Vacate Award filed by defendant is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.Accordingly, let a writ of execution be issued to enforce the Arbitration Award.SO ORDERED."5(Bracketed words supplied)NPC went to the Court of Appeals on the lone issue of whether respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Order dated May 22, 2000 and directing the issuance of a Writ of Execution.In its assailed Decision, the appellate court declared that the court a quo did not commit grave abuse of discretion considering that the Arbitration Board acted pursuant to its powers under the Compromise Agreement and that its award has factual and legal bases.The Court of Appeals gave primacy to the court-approved Compromise Agreement entered into by the parties and concluded that they intended the decision of the arbitration panel to be final and executory. Said the court:For one, what the price agreed to be submitted for arbitration are pure issues of fact (i.e., the price of blasting; both parties' claims for damages, delay, interests and all other unresolved claims of both parties, including the exact volume of blasted rocks). Also, the manner by which the Arbitration Board was formed and the terms under which the arbitrable issues were referred to said Board are specified in the agreement. Clearly, the parties had left to the Arbitration Board the final adjudication of their remaining claims and waived their right to question said Decision of the Board. Hence, they agreed in clear and unequivocal terms in the Compromise Agreement that said Decision would be immediately final and executory. Plaintiff relied upon this stipulation in complying with its various obligations under the agreement. To allow defendant to now go back on its word and start questioning the Decision would be grossly unfair considering that the latter was also a party to the Compromise Agreement entered into part of which dealt with the creation of the Arbitration Board.6The appellate court likewise held that petitioner failed to present evidence to prove its claim of bias and partiality on the part of the Chairman of the Arbitration Board, Mr. Carmelo V. Sison (Mr. Sison).Further, the Court of Appeals found that blasting is not part of the unit price for grading and structural excavation provided for in the contract for the BACMAN II Project, and that there was no perfected contract between the parties for an extra work order for blasting. Nonetheless, since FUCC relied on the representation of petitioner's officials that the extra work order would be submitted to its Board of Directors for approval and that the blasting works would be paid, the Court of Appeals ruled that FUCC is entitled to just compensation on grounds of equity and promissory estoppel.Anent the issue of just compensation, the appellate court took into account the estimate prepared by a certain Mr. Lauro R. Umali (Mr. Umali), Project Manager of the BACMAN II Project, which itemized the various costs involved in blasting works and came up with P1,310.82 per cubic meter, consisting of the direct cost for drilling, blasting excavation, stockpiling and hauling, and a 30% mark up for overhead, contractor's tax and contingencies. This estimate was later changed to P983.75 per cubic meter to which FUCC agreed. The Court of Appeals, however, held that just compensation should cover only the direct costs plus 10% for overhead expenses. Thus, it declared that the amount of P763.007per cubic meter is sufficient. Since the total volume of blasted rocks as computed by Dr. Benjamin Buensuceso, Jr.8of the U.P. College of Engineering is 97,032.16 cubic meters, FUCC is entitled to the amount of P74,035,503.50 as just compensation.Although the Court of Appeals adjudged FUCC entitled to interest,9the dispositive portion of the assailed Decision10did not provide for the payment of interest. Moreover, the award of attorney's fees was deleted as there was no legal and factual ground for its imposition.Petitioner, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General in the instant Petition, rehashes its submissions before the Court of Appeals. It claims that the appellate court failed to pass upon the following issues:1. The Chairman of the Arbitration Board showed extreme bias in prejudging the case.2. The Chairman of the Arbitration Board greatly exceeded his powers when he mediated for settlement in the court of arbitration proceedings.3. The Chairman of the Arbitration Board committed serious irregularity in hastily convening the Board in two days, which thereafter released its report.4. The Arbitration Board Committed manifest injustice prejudicial to petitioner based on the following:a. It rendered an award based on equity despite the mandatory provision of the law.b. The Board's decision to justify that equity applies herein despite the fact that FUCC never submitted its own actual costs for blasting and PHESCO, INC., the succeeding contractor, did not employ blasting but used ordinary excavation method at P75.59 per cubic meter which is approximately the same unit price of plaintiff (FUCC).c. It gravely erred when the Board claimed that an award of just compensation must be given to respondent FUCC for what it has actually spent and yet instead of using as basis P458.07 which is the price agreed upon by FUCC, it chose an estimate made by an NPC employee.d. It gravely erred when it relied heavily on the purported letter of NPC Project Manager Lauro R. Umali, when the same has not been identified nor were the handwritten entries in Annex ii established to be made by him.5. The Arbitration Board gravely erred in computing interest at 12% and from the time of plaintiff's extrajudicial claim despite the fact that herein case is an action for specific performance and not for payment of loan or forbearance of money, and despite the fact that it has resolved that there was no perfected contract and there was no bad faith on the part of defendant.6. On June 25, 2000, NPC discovered the Sub-Contract Agreement of FUCC with a unit price of only P430/per cubic meter.11[Emphasis in the original]Specifically, petitioner asserts that Mr. Sison exhibited bias and prejudgment when he exhorted it to pay FUCC for the blasting works after concluding that the latter was allowed to blast. Moreover, Mr. Sison allegedly attempted to mediate the conflict between the parties in violation of Section 20,12paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 876 (R.A. 876) otherwise known as the Arbitration Law. Petitioner also questions the abrupt manner by which the decision of the Arbitration Board was released.Petitioner avers that FUCC's claim for blasting works was not approved by authorized officials in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1594 (P.D. 1594) and its implementing rules which specifically require the approval of the extra work by authorized officials before an extra work order may be issued in favor of the contractor. Thus, it should not be held liable for the claim. If at all, only the erring officials should be held liable. Further, FUCC did not present evidence to prove the actual expenses it incurred for the blasting works. What the Arbitration Board relied upon was the memorandum of Mr. Umali which was neither identified or authenticated during the arbitration proceedings nor marked as evidence for FUCC. Moreover, the figures indicated in Mr. Umali's memorandum were allegedly mere estimates and were recommendatory at most.Petitioner likewise claims that its succeeding contractor, Phesco, Inc. (Phesco), was able to excavate the same rock formation without blasting.Finally, it asserts that the award of P763.00 per cubic meter has no factual and legal basis as the sub-contract between FUCC and its blasting sub-contractor, Dynamic Blasting Specialists of the Philippines (Dynamic), was only P430.00 per cubic meter.In its Comment13dated October 15, 2001, FUCC points out that petitioner's arguments are exactly the same as the ones it raised before the Arbitration Board, the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Moreover, in the Compromise Agreement between the parties, petitioner committed to abide by the decision of the Arbitration Board. It should not now be allowed to question the decision.FUCC likewise notes that Atty. Jose G. Samonte (Atty. Samonte), one of the members of the Arbitration Board, was nominated by petitioner itself. If there was any irregularity in its proceedings such as the bias and prejudgment petitioner imputes upon Mr. Sison, Atty. Samonte would have complained. As it is, Atty. Samonte concurred in the decision of the Arbitration Board and dissented only as to the award of attorney's fees.As regards the issue of interest, FUCC claims that the case involves forbearance of money and not a claim for damages for breach of an obligation in which case interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum.Finally, FUCC asserts that its sub-contract agreement with Dynamic is not newly-discovered evidence. Petitioner's lawyers allegedly had a copy of the sub-contract in their possession. In any event, the unit price of P430.00 per cubic meter appearing in the sub-contract represents only a fraction of the costs incurred by FUCC for the blasting works.Petitioner filed a Reply14dated March 18, 2002 reiterating its earlier submissions.The parties in the present case mutually agreed to submit to arbitration the settlement of the price of blasting, the parties' claims for damages, delay and interests and all other unresolved claims including the exact volume of blasted rocks.15They further mutually agreed that the decision of the Arbitration Board shall be final and immediately executory.16A stipulation submitting an ongoing dispute to arbitration is valid. As a rule, the arbitrator's award cannot be set aside for mere errors of judgment either as to the law or as to the facts. Courts are generally without power to amend or overrule merely because of disagreement with matters of law or facts determined by the arbitrators. They will not review the findings of law and fact contained in an award, and will not undertake to substitute their judgment for that of the arbitrators. A contrary rule would make an arbitration award the commencement, not the end, of litigation. Errors of law and fact, or an erroneous decision on matters submitted to the judgment of the arbitrators, are insufficient to invalidate an award fairly and honestly made. Judicial review of an arbitration award is, thus, more limited than judicial review of a trial.17However, an arbitration award is not absolute and without exceptions. Where the conditions described in Articles 2038, 2039 and 2040 of the Civil Code18applicable to both compromises and arbitrations are obtaining, the arbitrators' award may be annulled or rescinded.19Additionally, judicial review of an arbitration award is warranted when the complaining party has presented proof of the existence of any of the grounds for vacating, modifying or correcting an award outlined under Sections 24 and 25 of R.A. 876, viz:Section 24. Grounds for vacating an award. In any of the following cases, the court must make an order vacating the award upon the petition of any party to the controversy when such party proves affirmatively that in the arbitration proceedings:(a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; or(b) That there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators or any of them; or(c) That the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; that one or more of the arbitrators was disqualified to act as such under section nine hereof, and willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or(d) That the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to them was not made.When an award is vacated, the court, in its discretion, may direct a new hearing either before the same arbitrators or before a new arbitrator or arbitrators to be chosen in the manner provided in the submission or contract for the selection of the original arbitrator or arbitrators, and any provision limiting the time in which the arbitrators may make a decision shall be deemed applicable to the new arbitration to commence from the date of the court's order.Where the court vacates an award, costs not exceeding fifty pesos and disbursements may be awarded to the prevailing party and the payment thereof may be enforced in like manner as the payment of costs upon the motion in an action.Section 25. Grounds for modifying or correcting an award. In any one of the following cases, the court must make an order modifying or correcting the award, upon the application of any party to the controversy which was arbitrated:(a) Where there was an evident miscalculation of figures, or an evident mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award; or(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted; or(c) Where the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy, and if it had been a commissioner's report, the defect could have been amended or disregarded by the court.The order may modify and correct the award so as to effect the intent thereof and promote justice between the parties.In this case, petitioner does not specify which of the foregoing grounds it relies upon for judicial review. Petitioner avers that "if and when the factual circumstances referred to in the provisions aforementioned are present, judicial review of the award is warranted."20From its presentation of issues, however, it appears that the alleged evident partiality of Mr. Sison is singled out as a ground to vacate the board's decision.We note, however, that the Court of Appeals found that petitioner did not present any proof to back up its claim of evident partiality on the part of Mr. Sison. Its averments to the effect that Mr. Sison was biased and had prejudged the case do not suffice to establish evident partiality. Neither does the fact that a party was disadvantaged by the decision of the arbitration committee prove evident partiality.21According to the appellate court, "[p]etitioner was never deprived of the right to present evidence nor was there any showing that the Board showed signs of any bias in favor of FUCC. As correctly found by the trial court, this Court cannot find its way to support petitioner's contention that there was evident partiality in the assailed Award of the Arbitrator in favor of the respondent because the conclusion of the Board, which the Court found to be well-founded, is fully supported by substantial evidence."22There is no reason to depart from this conclusion.However, we take exception to the arbitrators' determination that based on promissory estoppel per se or alone, FUCC is entitled to just compensation for blasting works for the reasons discussed hereunder.Section 9 of P.D. No. 1594, entitled Prescribing Policies, Guidelines, Rules and Regulations for Government Infrastructure Contracts, provides:SECTION 9. Change Order and Extra Work Order.A change order or extra work order may be issued only for works necessary for the completion of the project and, therefore, shall be within the general scope of the contract as bid[ded] and awarded. All change orders and extra work orders shall be subject to the approval of the Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, the Minister of Public Highways, or the Minister of Energy, as the case may be.The pertinent portions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. 1594 provide:CI - Contract Implementation:These Provisions Refer to Activities During Project Construction, i.e., After Contract Award Until Completion, Except as May Otherwise be Specifically Referred to Provisions Under Section II. IB - Instructions to Bidders.CI 1 - Variation Orders - Change Order/Extra Work Order/Supplemental Agreement4. An Extra Work Order may be issued by the implementing official to cover the introduction of new work items after the same has been found to strictly comply with Section CI-1-1 and approved by the appropriate official if the amount of the Extra Work Order is within the limits of the former's authority to approve original contracts and under the following conditions:a. Where there are additional works needed and necessary for the completion, improvement or protection of the project which were not included as items of work in the original contract.b. Where there are subsurface or latent physical conditions at the site differing materially from those indicated in the contract.c. Where there are duly unknown physical conditions at the site of an unusual nature differing materially from those ordinarily encountered and generally recognized as inherent in the work or character provided for in the contract.d. Where there are duly approved construction drawings or any instruction issued by the implementing office/agency during the term of contract which involve extra cost.6. A separate Supplemental Agreement may be entered into for all Change Orders and Extra Work Orders if the aggregate amount exceeds 25% of the escalated original contract price. All change orders/extra work orders beyond 100% of the escalated original contract cost shall be subject to public bidding except where the works involved are inseparable from the original scope of the project in which case negotiation with the incumbent contractor may be allowed, subject to approval by the appropriate authorities.7. Any Variation Order (Change Order, Extra Work Order or Supplemental Agreement) shall be subject to the escalation formula used to adjust the original contract price less the cost of mobilization. In claiming for any Variation Order, the contractor shall, within seven (7) calendar days after such work has been commenced or after the circumstances leading to such condition(s) leading to the extra cost, and within 28 calendar days deliver a written communication giving full and detailed particulars of any extra cost in order that it may be investigated at that time. Failure to provide either of such notices in the time stipulated shall constitute a waiver by the contractor for any claim. The preparation and submission of Change Orders, Extra Work Orders or Supplemental Agreements are as follows:a. If the Project Engineer believes that a Change Order, Extra Work Order or Supplemental Agreement should be issued, he shall prepare the proposed Order or Supplemental Agreement accompanied with the notices submitted by the contractor, the plans therefore, his computations as to the quantities of the additional works involved per item indicating the specific stations where such works are needed, the date of his inspections and investigations thereon, and the log book thereof, and a detailed estimate of the unit cost of such items of work, together with his justifications for the need of such Change Order, Extra Work Order or Supplemental Agreement, and shall submit the same to the Regional Director of office/agency/corporation concerned.b. The Regional Director concerned, upon receipt of the proposed Change Order, Extra Work Order or Supplemental Agreement shall immediately instruct the technical staff of the Region to conduct an on-the-spot investigation to verify the need for the work to be prosecuted. A report of such verification shall be submitted directly to the Regional Director concerned.c. The Regional Director concerned after being satisfied that such Change Order, Extra Work Order or Supplemental Agreement is justified and necessary, shall review the estimated quantities and prices and forward the proposal with the supporting documentation to the head of office/agency/corporation for consideration.d. If, after review of the plans, quantities and estimated unit cost of the items of work involved, the proper office/agency/corporation committee empowered to review and evaluate Change Orders, Extra Work Orders or Supplemental Agreements recommends approval thereof, the head of office/agency/corporation, believing the Change Order, Extra Work Order or Supplemental Agreement to be in order, shall approve the same. The limits of approving authority for any individual, and the aggregate of, Change Orders, Extra Work Orders or Supplemental Agreements for any project of the head of office/agency/corporation shall not be greater than those granted for an original project.CI 3 - Conditions under which Contractor is to Start Work under Variation Orders and Receive Payments1. Under no circumstances shall a contractor proceed to commence work under any Change Order, Extra Work Order or Supplemental Agreement unless it has been approved by the Secretary or his duly authorized representative. Exceptions to the preceding rule are the following:a. The Regional Director, or its equivalent position in agencies/offices/corporations without plantilla position for the same, may, subject to the availability of funds, authorize the immediate start of work under any Change or Extra Work Order under any or all of the following conditions:(1) In the event of an emergency where the prosecution of the work is urgent to avoid detriment to public service, or damage to life and/or property; and/or(2) When time is of the essence; provided, however, that such approval is valid on work done up to the point where the cumulative increase in value of work on the project which has not yet been duly fully approved does not exceed five percent (5%) of the adjusted original contract price, or P500,000 whichever is less; provided, further, that immediately after the start of work, the corresponding Change/Extra Work Order shall be prepared and submitted for approval in accordance with the above rules herein set. Payments for works satisfactorily accomplished on any Change/Extra Work Order may be made only after approval of the same by the Secretary or his duly authorized representative.b. For a Change/Extra Work Order involving a cumulative amount exceeding five percent (5%) of the original contract price or original adjusted contract price no work thereon may be commenced unless said Change/Extra Work Order has been approved by the Secretary or his duly authorized representative. [Emphasis supplied]It is petitioner's submission, and FUCC does not deny, that the claim for payment of blasting works in Botong alone was approximately P170,000,000.00, a figure which far exceeds the original contract price of P80,000,000.00 for two (2) project sites. Under the foregoing implementing rules, for an extra work order which exceeds 5% of the original contract price, no blasting work may be commenced without the approval of the Secretary or his duly authorized representative. Moreover, the procedure for the preparation and approval of the extra work order outlined under Contract Implementation (CI) 1(7) above should have been complied with. Accordingly, petitioner's officials should not have authorized the commencement of blasting works nor should FUCC have proceeded with the same.The following events, culled from the decision of the Arbitration Board and the assailed Decision, are made the bases for the finding of promissory estoppel on the part of petitioner:1. After claimant [respondent herein] encountered what it claimed to be massive hard rock formation (Testimony of witness Dumaliang, TSN, 28 October 1996, pp. 41-42; Testimony of witness Lataquin, 28 November 1996, pp. 2-3; 20-23; Exh. "JJJ" and sub-markings) and informed respondent [petitioner herein] about it, respondent's own geologists went to the Botong site to investigate and confirmed the rock formation and recommended blasting (Cf. Memorandum of Mr. Petronilo E. Pana, Acting Manager of the Geoscience Services Department and the report of the geologists who conducted the site investigation; Exhs. "F" and "F-1").2. Claimant asked for clearance to blast the rock formation to the design grade (Letter dated 28 September 1992; Exh. "UU"). The engineers of respondent at the project site advised claimant to proceed with its suggested method of extraction (Order/Instruction given by Mr. Reuel R. Declaro and Mr. Francis A. Paderna dated 29 September 1992; Exh. "C").3. Claimant requested that the intended blasting works be confirmed as extra work order by responsible officials of respondent directly involved in the BACMAN II Project (i.e., then BACMAN II Project Manager, Mr. Lauro R. Umali and Mr. Angelito G. Senga, Section Chief, Civil Engineering Design of respondent's Design Department which bidded the project). These officials issued verbal instructions to the effect: (a) that claimant could blast the rock formation down to the design grade of 495 masl; (b) that said blasting works would be an extra work order; and (c) that claimant would be paid for said blasting works using the price per cubic meter for similar blasting works at Palinpinon, or at P1,346.00 per cubic meter.4. Claimant sent two (2) confirmatory letters to respondent, both addressed to its President, one dated 30 September 1992, and sent through Mr. Angelito Senga, Chief Civil Design Thermal, the other dated 02 October 1992, and sent through Mr. Lauro R. Umali, Project ManagerBacMan II (Exhs. "D" and "E"; Testimony of witness Dumaliang, TSN, 28 October 1996, pp. 43-49). The identical letters read:We wish to confirm your instruction for us to proceed with the blasting of the Botong Plant site to the design grade pending issuance of the relevant variation order. This is to avoid delay in the implementation of this critical project due to t