MappingDeportationCorridors

-

CaseStudyofPublic-PrivateInteractionandIndustriesofForcedRemoval

inHamburg,Germany

MasterThesis

FelixWieneke

StudentID:20161619

MScGlobalRefugeeStudies

AalborgUniversityCopenhagen

Supervisor: MartinLemberg-Pedersen

Submitted: 30.01.2019

Characters: 150.944

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I.Abstract

In2017,atotalof23.966peopleweredeportedfromGermanyto115differentcountries

aroundtheglobe.Themaponthetitlepageshowsthese“destinations”offorcedremoval.

This case study presents and analyzes some significant changes in the German

deportationsystemthatoccurredfrom2012-2017andtheroleofprivateactorsinthis

context.Deportationsconnectdifferentphysical,legal,andpoliticalspacesandplacesand

involveawiderangeofactors,outsidethe‘innercircle’ofstateofficialsandpeoplewho

are subject to forced removal. The role of private actors involved in the deportation

systemhasreceivedlittleornoattentioninacademicliteraturethusfar.Toaddressthis

gap,theauthorexploreschangesinthedeportationcorridors(Drotbohm&Hasselberg

2015) that connect the city-state of Hamburg, Germany with destinations of forced

removalfromtheperspectiveofaparticipantobserver.

What role do private actors play in this highly politicized field? Who profits

financiallyfromthestate-sanctionedpracticeofdeportation?Whatdoestheprivatization

ofpartsofthedeportationsystementailintermsoftransparencyanddemocracy?This

paper addresses these and other questions based on the thesis that deportation is

becomingabusinessinandofitself.

Thisstudyfoundthatprivateactorsplayasignificantroleinthemarketization,

humanitarianization,anddigitizationofpartsoftheGermandeportationsystem.Seeking

“innovativeconcepts”and“solutions”toproblemsrelatedtodeportation,publicactors

helpedcreatemarkets inwhichprivatefirmsarecompeting.ThecityofHamburg,the

German Federal Government, and the EU mobilized financial resources, aiming at

creatingmoreeffectivedeportationsystems.Thesefinancialflowsconnectpublicactors

withmanagementconsultancies(delivering“expert”-knowledge),softwarecompanies,

(deliveringsurveillancetechnology),anddevelopmentcompaniesandNGOs,whoboth

playtheroleofhumanitarianactorsinemergingtransnationalreturnnetworks.Someof

the transformationprocessesare related to thedeteriorationof thequalityof asylum

proceduresandtheintensificationofthedeportationpolicyinHamburgandGermany

respectively.Atthesametime,thistransformationisrelatedtotheenhancementofthe

status of Appeals Courts, and to new counter strategies employed by deportees and

activistswhochallengethedeportationregime.

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ContentsI.Abstract 1II.ListofAbbreviations 3

III.ListofFigures 4

1.Introduction 52.ReflectionsonKeyConcepts 9

3.ScopeofthisStudy 11

4.Methodology 154.1LimitationsandEthicalConsiderations 17

5.LiteratureReview&TheoreticalApproach 19

5.1ForcedRemoval,ForcedArrival-ForcedMigration? 195.2Deportationasa(Contested)FormofExpulsion 21

5.3ThePoliticalEconomyofBorderControl 22

5.4DeportationinProcessesofBorderscaping 245.5Multi-LeveledGovernanceofDeportation 26

5.6Forced(Im-)Mobility 28

5.7DeportationStudies-TheGermanCase 285.8Re-AssemblageofDeportationCorridors 30

5.9DeportationCorridors 31

6.MappingtheGermanDeportationSystem 32

6.1TheGermanResidenceandAsylumRegime 356.2ObligationtoReturn 38

6.3DeportationBansandDuldung 40

6.4DublinProcedure&Transfers 416.5DeportationEnforcementintheCaseofHamburg 44

6.5.1DeportationsfromHamburgin2017 46

6.5.2TypesofForcedRemovalProcedures 487.Public-PrivateInteractioninDeportationCorridors 50

7.1SpeedingupProcedures-TheRoleofMultinationalConsultancyFirms 50

7.2DigitizationoftheInternalBorderscape 537.3CorridorsofDignifiedReturn?–Public-PrivateInteractioninReturnNetworks 56

7.4ReturnNetworksintheLocalContext 59

7.5MedicalExperts-ExpertiseforMoney 637.6MigrantActionandthe“Anti-DeportationIndustry” 65

8.Conclusion 66

9.Bibliography 69Appendix 81

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II.ListofAbbreviationsAMIF AsylumMigrationandIntegrationFund(EU)

BAMF FederalOfficeforMigrantsandRefugeesinGermany

CEAS CommonEuropeanAsylumSystem

EASO EuropeanAsylumSupportOffice

EC EuropeanCommission

ECRE EuropeanCouncilonRefugeesandExiles

ECtHR EuropeanHumanRightsCourt

ERPUM EuropeanReturnPlatformforUnaccompaniedMinors

EU EuropeanUnion

EUC EuropeanCouncil

EURODAC EuropeanDactyloscopy

FRA EuropeanUnionAgencyforFundamentalRights

FRONTEX EuropeanCoastGuardandBorderAgency

GFP GermanFederalPolice(Bundespolizei)

JRO JointReturnOperation

IRMA IntegratedReturnsManagementApplication

NGO NongovernmentalOrganization

PBL ForcedRemovalEscort(PersonenbegleiterLuft)

PSC PrivateSecurityCompany

UNHCR UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees

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III.ListofFigures Figure1:DeportationsfromGermanybetween1977-2001 12

Figure2:DeportationsfromGermanysincetheyear2000 14

Figure3:DeportationsfromGermany2017-“World” 33

Figure4:DeportationsfromGermany2017-“Europe” 34

Figure5:TemporaryResidencePermitsasof31.12.2017 36

Figure6:AsylumApplications,-Decisions,and–RejectionsinGermany2010-2017 37

Figure7:NumberofPeople“ObligedtoReturn”&Deported2010-2017 39

Figure8:DublinrequestsandTransfersfromGermany2010-2017 42

Figure9:DeportationsfromHamburg2010-2017 47

Figure10:LandRoutesofDeporteesfromHamburg2017(4thQuarter) 48

Figure11:ResultsofEUTenderProgram(ERRIN2019-21) 57

Figure12:AssistedVoluntaryReturnsfromGermany2013-2017 60

Figure13:“Voluntary”ReturnCampaign2018 62

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1.Introduction

In2017,atotalof23.966peopleweredeportedfromGermanyto115differentcountries

around the globe (Jelpke et al. 2018). The map on the title page shows these

“destinations”of forcedremoval.Before theGermanstateused itsdeportationpowers

(Gibney2013) to this extent, theGermanFederalGovernment initiated reforms from

2015-2017aimingat effectingmoredeparturesofpeoplewhoare,by law,obliged to

leavethecountry(cf.Teutebergetal.2018).However,itisnotonlystateactorswhoare

engaginginindustriesofforcedremoval(Peutz2006:221).

This study presents and analyzes some significant changes in the German

deportationsystemthatoccurredfrom2012-2017andtheroleofprivateactorsinthis

context.Theauthorexplores theprocessesofmarketization,humanitarianization, and

digitization of the German deportation system, applying the concept of deportation

corridors(Drotbohm&Hasselberg2015)tothecaseofHamburg,Germany.Deportations

connectdifferentphysical,legal,andpoliticalspacesandplacesandinvolveawiderange

ofactors,outsidethe‘innercircle’ofstateofficialsandpeoplewhoaresubjecttoforced

removal.Whilestateactors,stateinstitutionsandpeopleaffectedareofteninthefocus

ofresearchondeportation(Eule2017;Hasselberg2016;Peutz2006),theroleofprivate

actors,managementconsultingfirms,NGOsandmedicalexpertshasreceivedlittleorno

attentionthusfar.Thisstudyseekstoaddressthisgapintheresearchliteraturetosome

extentandgiveimpulsesforfurtherscientificinvestigation.

DeportationhasbecomeadominantissueinthepoliticaldebateinGermany.The

needforanintensificationofthedeportationpolicyisoftenjustifiedbypoliticianswho

refertoanenforcement-ordeportationgap(cf.Gibney2008;Günther2018;Rosenberger

&Küffner2016).AccordingtoGermanauthorities(c.f.Jelpkeetal.2018),thenumberof

peoplelegallyobligedtoleaveGermanyishigher,thanthenumberofpeopledeportedto

theterritoryofthestate,wheretheyarecitizensorwheretheyarelegallyentitledtostay.

ThissituationcreatesaperceptionamongpoliticiansofdifferentshadesthatGermany’s

stateinstitutionsresponsiblefordeportationareincapableofcompletingtheirtasksand

thusneedtobereformed(cf.Müller-Neuhofetal.2018;Krauß2018;Schröter2018).The

consequentialpolicy-shifttowardsstricterdeportationrulesandpracticesisbecoming

visible in the form of new deportation infrastructure (Walters 2018) like the pre-

deportation-detentionfacilityinHamburgthatwasrecentlyreconstructed.Onthepolicy

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sidelawsthatjustifyextendedperiodsofpre-removaldetentionandcooperationwith

neighboring federal states Schleswig-Holstein andMecklenburg-Vorpommern indicate

changes,occurringinthedeportationcorridorthatconnectsHamburgwithdestinations

offorcedremoval(HamburgerSenat2018).Whilenationalpoliticsplayasignificantrole

in these developments inHamburg, the EU-policy dimensionmust also be taken into

consideration. In thecontextof increasingborder-militarizationandenforcement,and

the extension of surveillance regimes in thewhole of the EuropeanUnion (Lemberg-

Pedersen 2015) questions concerning the forced (im-)mobility of (un-)deportable

populationsarise(cf.DeGenova&Peutz2010;Gibney2013;Lemberg-Pedersen2018a).

For this study, the author attended forced return operations in Hamburg as a

participant observer. Furthermore, he held informal conversations and conducted

interviewswithamedicalexpert,NGOstaff, legalexpertsanddeportees (cf.Section2;

Peutz 2006) involved in the deportation system in Hamburg. Usually, deportation

procedures are not open to the public and are difficult to access for outsiders. The

author’s employment as forced return operationmonitor - begun in February 2018 -

makesitpossibleforhimtorefertofirst-handinformationwhileexploringsomeofthe

changesinthedeportationprocessfromaninsiderperspective.However,thisjobentails

aconfidentialityagreementwhichlimitstheuseofclassifiedpersonaldataorsensitive

information (cf. Section 3.1). Thus, neither of these types of data/information are

includedinthispaper.

Theauthor’splaceofemployment,theforcedreturnmonitoringprojectisalocal

initiative inHamburg created byDiakonie, a faith-basedNGO,workingwith the local

immigration authority (Ausländerbehörde) and the German Federal Police (GFP;

Bundespolizei) at Hamburg Airport. This project focuses on observing and keeping

records of forced return proceedings from an external and objective perspective (cf.

Diakonie2018;Schukat2015).Furthermore,theideaoftheparticipatinginstitutions,as

laid out in the contractual agreement, is to guarantee transparency in this highly

politicized field. For deportees, the deportationprocess entails a forceddisplacement

wheretheirdesiretostayinaspecificplaceisconfrontedbythelegallysanctionedstate

practiceofremoval.Thisconfrontationbetweentheindividualandstatepowerleadsto

deportationsthatareoftenconflictualorinsomecasesevenviolent.

ThehistoryofforcedreturnmonitoringinGermanyisillustrative,asitmirrors

developments in the German deportation system over the last decade. Forced return

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monitoringinGermanywasinitiatedafterSudanesedeporteeAmirAgeeb,diedonMay

28th,1999onboardofLufthansaFlightLH588.Threeofficersof theFederalGerman

BorderGuards(Bundesgrenzschutz-nowrenamedBundespolizei)escortedAgeebduring

theflighttowardsCairo.Afterherefusedtositdown,thepoliceescortsforcedhiminto

the seat and pressed his head down (Fekete 2003). During a post mortem forensic

examination,asphyxiationinducedbytheofficers'useofforcewasidentifiedasAgeeb‘s

causeofdeath(Dahlkamp&Mascolo2001).

TheAgeebincidentsparkedapublicdebate,ledtotrialsagainsttheofficers,and

toreformsofthedeportationpractices introducedbytheministeroftheinteriorOtto

Schily. In2003, threeofficers involved in the incidentwereconvicted forbodilyharm

with lethal consequence (Woldin2015).After theAgeeb incident, enforcementagents

had to receive training before they become deportation escorts. Furthermore, the

enforcementagenciesdevelopedacodeofconduct,outlinedinaconfidentialpapercalled

BestRückLuft(GFP2016).Thisincidentalsomotivatedtheengagementofthechurchof

Northrine-Westfaliathatdemandedthecreationofacivilsocietycontrolmechanismto

monitordeportationproceedings. In2001, thechurch instituted the first independent

monitoringofforcedremovalsattheairportinDusseldorf(Schukat2015).

Today, forced returnmonitoringprojects exist inDusseldorf,Berlin, Frankfurt,

and Hamburg. The cooperation between public and non-public parties in the forced

returnmonitoringprojectiscontractualandbasedonArt.8Section6oftheEUReturn

Directive (2008/115/EG) which demands an effective forced return monitoring

mechanismexistinallEU-memberstates.Thefirstmonitoringprojectwasinstitutedin

Hamburgbetween2010-2015inHamburgandthendiscontinued.Itwasreinstalledby

Diakoniein2018andisnowfundedbythecityofHamburg.TheGreenParty,whichis

currently in the government coalition of theSenat, Hamburg’s government,made the

forcedmonitoringprojectadependentclaiminthecoalitioncontractwhenpartnering

withtheSocialDemocraticParty(SPD).

WhileotherEuropeanstateshaverealizedcomprehensivenationwidemonitoring

mechanisms(FRA2018),theGermanministryoftheinterior(BMI)remainsreluctantto

installindependentmonitoringatallairportsandinsteadreferstotheinstitutionsand

the ruleof lawalready inplace (NationaleStelle zurVerhütungvonFolter2018:42).

Because of this ministry stance, only four German airports are monitored by six

professionals.Thepractitionershavebackgroundsinlawor,asinthecaseoftheauthor,

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indevelopmentandinternationalrelations.Concretely,monitoringtakesplacedirectly

attheairportinthetimewindowbetweenthearrivalofdeporteesandlikelydeparture

of flights. Due to his employment, the author has access to leading staff of the local

administration,publicandprivateactorsandpersonsdirectlyaffectedbyforcedremoval

procedures. Being physically present and documenting deportation procedures at

various stages allowed the author to grasp the complexity and the many different

trajectoriesinprocessesofdeportation,which,aswillbeshowninthisthesis,beginlong

before and carry on long after the actual moment of forced removal (Drotbohm &

Hasselberg2015).

This paper is based on fieldwork in Hamburg, Berlin and Athens conducted

betweenMarchandDecember2018.Duringthistime,theauthorattendedforcedreturn

operations from Hamburg Airport as a participant observer, visited Asylum Law

ConferencesinHamburg,Berlin,andAthensandconductedqualitativesemi-structured

interviews with state, and non-state actors involved in the deportation corridor in

Hamburg.Thefollowingmainresearchquestionandalignedsub-questionsguidedthis

researchproject,andareaddressedinthisthesis:

1)What roledoprivateactorsplay in theGermandeportationsystemand

particularlyinthecaseofHamburg?

a)WhatsignificantchangesinthedeportationsysteminHamburgandGermanyoccurred

duringtheyears2012-2017andhowdidthesechangesaffectthepracticeofdeportation?

b)Whoprofitsfinanciallyfromthestate-sanctionedpracticeofdeportingpeoplefrom

Germany?

c)Doestheprivatizationofaspectsofdeportationcorridorsmeanthatnon-stateactors

gain influence and help shape policies concerning citizenship, and the concepts of

belongingandun-belonging?

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Accordingly,thecentralthesisofthispaperis,thatthedeportationsystemisincreasingly

becomingabusinessinandofitselfandafieldofeconomiccompetitionforprivateactors

(Peutz2006;221).

This pointwill be discussed over the course of this paper using the following

structure: chapter2 reflectsonkeyconceptsused in this study, chapter3defines the

scopeofthecasestudyandpresentscontextualinformation,includingrecentstatistical

dataondeportationsfromGermany.Chapter4outlinesthemethodologicalapproachthat

bridgesethnographicfieldworkandapproachestothepoliticaleconomyofdeportation.

Chapter5presentsliteraturefromthefieldofdeportationstudies(Coutin2015),border

studies(Brambilla2014;Lemberg-Pedersen2015)anddifferingtheoreticalapproaches

to thestudyofdeportation(DeGenova&Peutz2010;Drotbohm&Hasselberg2015).

Chapter6mapsoutdeportationsystemsexistentinGermanyandHamburg.InChapter

7,recentchangesintheassemblageofdeportationcorridors(Deleuze&Guattari1987;

Drotbohm&Hasselberg2015)aremappedandanalyzed.Chapter8analyzestheresults

ofthestudyinthelightoftheoriesofdeportationbeforeconclusionstothisanalysisare

drawninChapter9.

As this thesis deals with highly politicized concepts and categories that carry

differentmeaningsdependingonthecontextandperspectiveemployed,thenextsection

reflectsonthekeyconceptsusedinthisstudy.

2.ReflectionsonKeyConcepts

First,onemustproblematizethecriticalnotionofdeportationandthecontextwherein

thisnotionisemployed.Inacademicandpublicpoliticaldiscourse,onefindsavastarray

oftermsthatrefertodeportation(cf.GFP2018;Günther2018;Schneider2016;Walters

2010). In the German context, the word deportation is associated with the horrific

practicesduring theNazi-Regime,and theHolocaustas theGermanwordDeportation

literallyreferstothesystematicseizureanddeportationofJewsandotherminoritiesto

ghettoesand,detention-anddeath-camps (Longerich1998).The legal, technical term

that is used today for the state-sanctioned practice of deportation in Germany is

Abschiebung (§50ResidenceAct)whichtranslates into theEnglishword“push-away.”

Alternatively,MatthewGibney(2013:119)definesdeportationasthe“legalizedforced

removalofnon-citizensagainsttheirwillundertheuseofcoercionfromtheterritoryof

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a state.” Gibney’s definition highlights the coercive dimension of deportation as an

activity that is, in some cases, carried out involving direct physical force against the

deportee.Inasimilarvein,NicholasDeGenova(DeGenova&Peutz2010)declaresthat

deportationisastate-techniqueinvolvingtheuseofforcethatdrawslinesbetweenthose

belongingtothelegalizedcommunityofcitizensandothernon-citizens.

Therefore,scholarsargue,deportationisa“statetechniquethatisconstitutiveof

citizenship”(Walters2002).However,legalizedremovalofapersonfromtheterritoryof

a state does not always imply the use of direct force.More subtlemeans thought to

motivateaperson’sreturntotheircountryoforigin,orathirdcountry,areatthedisposal

ofthestate(cf.Section6.2).IntheEuropeancontext,lawfulforcedremovalisoftencalled

return(seeforinstanceEUreturndirective2008/115/EG).Whileforcedreturnseemsto

implytheuseofdirectcoercioninthecontextofadministrativeenforcement,assisted(or

non-assisted)voluntaryreturnisunderstoodtobethe‘humane’deportationalternative

(MinistryofInterior2018).Fromtheperspectiveofthispaper’sauthor,voluntaryreturn

canbeattributedtodeportationregimesastheterm‘voluntary’isoftencontroversialin

thiscontext(cf.Webber2011).Theconceptofassistedvoluntaryreturnwillbediscussed

inmoredetailintheanalysisofinternationalremovalnetworksfoundinsection6.2.As

it seems difficult to pinpoint a clear and definite meaning of the term, the word

deportationinthispaperwillrefertoabroadrangeofpracticesofforcedremoval.As

such,thetermdeportationasusedinthispaperdescribesaprocess,ratherthansingular

events(Drotbohm&Hasselberg2015).Theconceptof‘return’,is,accordingly,onlyused

when being quoted directly from the references (e.g., EU-Commission 2017, 2018;

MinistryofInterior2018).

Deportation and asylum regimes (De Genova & Peutz 2010) are closely

intertwined as failed or rejected asylum seekers are most commonly the subjects of

deportation proceedings (cf. Section 4). However, the expulsion of criminal foreign-

nationalsalsotakesplaceinGermany.Referringtotermssuchasrefugee,asylumseeker,

illegalmigrantordeporteecanbeproblematic.Forexample,deporteeisanotionthatwas

introduced by anthropologist Nathalie Peutz in the context of her anthropology of

removal(Peutz2006).Sheusesdeporteeasacontrastcategory“thatcatapultsthestate

and its exclusions directly into the transnational arena and shows how neoliberal

globalization generates a disturbing sort of im-mobility (and opacity) for some

individualsinconjunctionwiththemoretransparent“flexibilities”forceduponothers”

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(Peutz 2006: 218). However, by using this category one may create and project

imaginationsofhomogenousgroupsofpeoplewhoshareanexperience: this ishighly

problematic.

AsLisaMalkki (1998:496)pointsout,using categories suchasrefugee acts to

silencethemultipledifferentindividualstoriesbehindthegeneralizationinherentinthe

terms. Thus, one risks disregarding the qualitatively different situations and

predicaments people find themselves in. Therefore, we might better understand

deporteesasbeingpartofwhatMalkkicallsan“accidentalcommunity”(Malkki1999:

99).Statementsofdeporteesareusedassourcesinthispapertoillustrateexperiences

individualsmadewithin the (changing) deportation system.AsNathaliePeutz (2006:

222)argues,peopleaffectedbydeportationareusuallymadetovanishfromthesociety

thatdeportsthem.AccordingtoPeutzananthropologyofremovalisusefultorecordand

re-visualize stories of deportees thatwould otherwisebe forgottenor remainuntold.

Peutzmakesthispointspeakingofdeportees.Thispaperhighlights,thatother(private)

actorsinvolvedindeportationarealso(made)invisibletosomeextent,astheirpublic

roleinsocietymaynotbeperceivedasbeingrelatedtodeportation,eventhoughtheyare

verymuchinvolved.Therefore,thispaperexplorestheperspectivesandrolesofsomeof

these‘hidden’or‘unusual’actorsindeportationsystems.

The following chapteroutlines the scopeof this study andpresents contextual

information.Thechapteralsocontainsreflectionsonthechoiceofsubject, time-frame

and fieldwork location and presents statistical data regarding deportations from

Germany.

3.ScopeofthisStudy

This study draws on data from the years 2012 to 2017. In addition, fieldwork was

conducted fromFebruaryuntilNovember2018.Twokeyreasons led tochoosing this

time-spanforthisproject.OfficialstatisticaldataondeportationinGermanyisavailable

since 1977 (Ellermann 2009: 19) and if one follows the trajectory of the numbers of

deportations takingplace twodistinct ‘phasesof removal’maybe identified.The first

phase of removal occurred in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Subsequentpower-strugglesintheregionandoutburstofwarinthecountriesofformer

Yugoslavia forced many people to leave their homes to escape violence, and large

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numbers of these people sought protection in Germany. While less than 10.000

deportationsfromGermanywereregisteredinthefirstyearofofficialrecordings,1977,

over50.000tookplacein1993beforethenumbersstartedgoingdownagain(cf.Figure

1below).

Figure1:DeportationsfromGermanybetween1977-2001

Source:Ellermann(2009:19)

The rising numbers of asylum applicationswere accompanied by increasing hostility

towardsso-called foreigners,which thencontributed to theelectoral successof right-

wingpartiesinseveralstate-levelparliaments.Neo-Nazisbeganattackingmigrantsinthe

streetsandtheirhomes(Kirchhoff&Lorenz2018)Oneofthemostshockingandwidely

publishedeventsoccurredinAugust1992whenanoutburstofracistviolenceledamob

ofmorethan1000peopletoattackasylumseekersintheiraccommodationinRostock

Lichtenhagen(Stepputat2017).TheseattackersthrewstonesandMolotov-cocktailsat

people, andmanybystandersapplaudedwhilepolice forceswereunableor, from the

perspectiveofsomeobservers,unwillingtocontrolthesituation(Mauersberger2017).

At the same time, terms/notions such as asylum abuse, asylum flood, and economic

migrantwereintroducedintothepublicpoliticaldebateonasylumbyconservativeor

openly racist actors. These actors painted a dark scenario of Germany’s political and

economicdecay,presentingasylumseekersasathreat(Mauersberger2017).Inthewake

of thisuptick in racialviolence,a significantamendment to theconstitutional right to

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asylumwasintroducedinMay1993undertheframingofanAsylumCompromise.Inthe

light of its national-socialist past, the right to asylum in Germany had not only been

groundedininternationalobligations,namelythe1951RefugeeConventionbutalsohad

constitutional status since1949, that reads: “Personspersecutedonpolitical grounds

shallhavetherightofasylum”(Art16Grundgesetz,GG).

TheamendmentoftheGermanBasicLawandtheAsylumProceduresActin1993

fundamentallyrestrictedtherighttoasylum.Theconceptsofsafecountryoforiginand

safethirdcountrywere introduced:theseconceptsrequiredthatasylumwouldnotbe

grantedifanasylumseekereithercamefromasafecountryoforiginorifshehadentered

Germany through safe third countries. Due to its geographical location, Germany is

surrounded by countries legally defined as safe. Therefore, following the Asylum

Compromise,largenumbersofasylumapplicationswererejected,sinceclaimsofbeing

indangerofpersecutioncouldnowbedeclaredunfoundedaccordingtothesafecountry

principles. Consequently, the number of people legally subjected to deportation rose

significantly, as reflected in the statistical data provided in figure 1 and 2. The first

removalphaseduringwhichthenumberofdeportationsroseduringthe1990shasbeen

subject todetailed scientific investigation (cf.Kirchhoff&Lorenz2018;Müller2010).

Developments in recent years, andmore specificallydevelopmentsof thedeportation

regime inGermanyover the last five yearshave yet tobe studied extensively.As the

statisticaldatainfigure2belowshows,historyseemstorepeatitselfandthenumberof

peopledeportedfromGermanyroseagainfromlessthan8.000peopleforciblyreturned

in2010toalmost25.000in2017.Theseincreasesindeportationnumberscorrelatewith

asteepriseinasylumapplications,peakingatover700.000applicationsin2015andthen

droppingtolessthan250.000,anumberthatcontinuestofallovertime.Simultaneously,

thenumberofasylumrejectionsandfailedappealsagainstasylumdecisionsisalsoon

therise:thisimpliesthatthenumberofpeoplewhocouldfacedeportationproceedings

isrisingintandem.

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Figure2:DeportationsfromGermanysincetheyear2000

Author’sowngraph.Source:statista.de(2018)

Thesestatisticaldata,findings,andquestionsthatarisefromthemwillbediscussedin

moredetailinthemappingsectionoftheGermandeportationsysteminchapter5.

Anothercriticalconsiderationfor limitingthecasestudytothetime-spanfrom

2012-2017 are the changing dynamics in the public-political discourse around

deportationinGermany.Asmentionedintheintroduction,deportationenforcementhas

become a dominant topic, both in Germany and other democratic states. Repeatedly

officialsontheEU,federalandmunicipallevelshavecalledformoreeffectivedeportation

processes (cf. European Commission 2018; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2017;

Günther2018),andsignificantchangesandreconfigurationsofthesystemseemtohave

occurred (as will be highlighted in sections 5 and 6). One case in point here is the

amendmentstoasylumandso-calledresidence lawthat tookeffect in2016and2017

withtheaimoffacilitatingmoredeportations(cf.Bundesgesetzblatt2017).

Tofurthermanagethescopeofthisexplorativeresearchproject,itwasnecessary

to narrow down the field of attention to a limited geographical location in Germany,

namelythecityofHamburg.Hamburgwaschosenasaresearchlocationbecauseithas

an internationalairport, adeportationdetention facility, federal stateauthorities, and

other crucial deportation infrastructure (Walters 2018). Furthermore, the city one of

Germany’ssixteen federalstates. Its local immigrationauthority isresponsible for the

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administration of foreign-national residents. This also entails the enforcement of

deportation. However, Hamburg is a unique case since it exists as a city-state with

centralized institutions. Other federal states, like Lower Saxony, are home to several

immigrationauthoritiesdispersedovertheirterritorywhichareresponsibleforseparate

districts.HamburghasacentralreceptioncenteraswellasafieldofficeoftheBundesamt

für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF; Federal Authority for Migration and Refugees)

whereassessmentoflegalstatusesandso-calledvoluntaryreturncounselingtakeplace.

Atthesametime,Hamburghasapoliticallyactiveandvisiblecivilsocietyandleft-

wingsceneandishosttomanyNGOsthatadvocateforrefugeesrights.Thisenvironment

madeHamburganexcitingsiteforinvestigatingthepoliticaldimensionofdeportation.

Forexample,amidsttheriseofthepoliticalrightwinginGermany,Hamburgexperienced

ademonstrationpopulatedbythan25.000peoplewhoprotestedforanopensociety,and

against racism,under the slogan, “We‘ll ComeUnited” (Jakob2018).Anti-Deportation

campaignerswereseenamongstthoseprotesting,claiming:“Noborder,nonation-stop

deportation!“Theinfluentialroleofanti-deportationactivistsandcivilsocietyactorswill

bediscussedinmoredetailinsection6.5.

ByperformingthiscasestudyofchangesintheGermandeportationsystem,the

author seeks to contribute to the literature in the fieldofdeportation studies (Coutin

2015).While generalization will only be possible to a limited extent, changes in the

deportation system in Hamburg and effects of overarching developments shall be

illuminatedanddiscussed.Therebytheauthorhopestocontributetoamoreinformed

discussion about an issue guiding political agendas in Europe and Germany. In the

followingchapter,themethodologicalapproachofthisthesiswillbeoutlined.

4.Methodology

Thisresearchisaninterdisciplinarycasestudythatemploysmixedmethodsinspiredby

ananthropologicalperspectiveonforcedremoval(Peutz2006)andapproachestothe

political economy of deportation (Lemberg-Pedersen 2015). A case study designwas

chosen,astheauthor’sprimaryobjectiveobjectivewastoexploretherecentchangesin

the deportation system that he encountered during his employment in Hamburg,

Germany.Theresearchprocessdidnotfollowarigidpatternanddidnotincludemultiple

comparable cases which would have helped to generate broader and more general

16

insights. Instead, this paper presents findings from a specific case, identifying new

emerging problems and phenomena. Thereby, the author seeks to inspire further

discussionandscientificinvestigationofdeportation.

To shed lighton theperspectivesof actors involved indeportation, the author

used the methods of participant observation, semi-structured interviews and informal

conversationstoobtainqualitativedata(Spradley2016).Aftertheresearchproblemwas

formulatedandthefieldwaschosen,thestudywascarriedoutandwritteninaprocess

thatfollowedaresearchcycle(Ibid:29).Thefirststepwas(1)formulatingandasking

questions before (2) collecting data, (3) recording and analyzing the data and (4)

returningtosteponeandrevisitingtheoriginalresearchquestions.Byemployingthis

researchcycle,itwaspossiblefortheresearchertonarrowdownthecomplexresearch

field, to focus on specific developments and actors, and to keep up with new

developments.Accordingly,theprojectwasupdatedthroughoutthestudy.Fieldresearch

wascarriedoutduringthetimetheauthorwaspresentattheairportinHamburg.Aswas

outlinedintheintroduction,theauthor’semploymentasforcedreturnmonitorentails

documenting deportation procedures. The monitoring records are confidential and

cannot be used as sources. However, the author observed significant changes in the

deportationsystemandexploredtheperspectivesofactorsinvolved‘ontheground’.In

fourcasespersonsagreedtoparticipateinaninterview.Toprotecttheintegrityofthe

informants,theirnameswerechanged:

ListofInterviewees1.Abel-Deportee,borninSomalia–Interviewed3October2018–Duration:45min.

2.Hakan–Deportee,borninTurkey–Interviewed–5September2018–Duration:60min.

3.Alex–MedicalExpert,borninGermany–Interviewed12November2018–Duration:35min.

4.Frank–Lawyer,borninGermany–Interviewed14November2018–Duration:50min.

In addition, the author held conversations with NGO staff, Frontex officers, private

securitystaffandairportstaff.Theirstatementsarenotquoteddirectly.However,these

conversationswereavaluablesourceofinformationduringthisresearchandhelpedto

identify significant developments in the deportation system. During the fieldwork

process, the author found that the transnational nature of deportation was of such

striking importance, that he decided to expand the field research to some extent. To

17

expandhisknowledgebeyondthecity-stateofHamburgtheauthorcollectedadditional

information at conferences in Berlin and Athens, where current developments

concerning theEUasylumanddeportationpolicywerebeingdiscussed (CCME2018;

18thBerlinConferenceonRefugeeProtection).

Inadditiontodrawingonfieldwork,thispaperalsoexaminesdeportationfrom

theangleofforcedmigrationindustries(Lemberg-Pedersen2015)inlinewiththecentral

thesisthatdeportationisincreasinglybecomingabusinessinandofitself.Thus,existing

datasets,officialstatistics,scholarlyliterature,NGOandnewsmediareportsregarding

deportation in the EU, Germany, and Hamburg were collected and analyzed (cf.

ReferencesandAppendices).Theprimaryobjectivesduringdeskresearchwerefinding

andtracingfinancialflowsrelatedtodeportationandlearningmoreabouttheinteraction

betweenpublicandprivateactorsindeportationcorridors.

Statistical data and official statements regarding deportations in Germany are

accessible through the websites of the German Parliament (Bundestag 2018) and

Hamburg'scityparliament,calledBürgerschaft(HamburgischeBürgerschaft2018).Parts

of thestatisticsregardingdeportations fromGermanywere transformed intomapsof

forcedremovalfromGermanyandHamburgrespectively.Theyarepresentedinchapter

5below.Thelimitationsofthesemethodsandtheresearchprojectarepresentedinthe

nextchapter.Thesectionalsoreflectsonethicalimplicationsofsocialscientificresearch

inthefieldofdeportation.

4.1LimitationsandEthicalConsiderations

Thereadershouldnotethatthedeportationsystemiscontinuallybeingtransformedas

wespeak.Thus,thiscasestudydoesnotclaimtobecomplete.Itshedslightonsomeof

thechangesinthedeportationsysteminHamburgthatoccurredduringthechosentime-

span between 2012-2018. Though deportation corridors in Hamburg were carefully

examinedduringthisproject,alotofresearchworkremainsyettobedone.Forexample,

theroleoftheexecutivestaffofprivatesecuritycompaniesorpilotsshouldbeincluded

infutureresearch.Bothactorsseemtoplayasignificantroleindeportationcorridors.

Beyondthis,along-termcomparativestudyofanumberdifferentcasesofdeportation

corridorsindifferentregionswouldbeusefultotestthefindingsofthisprojectandgain

furtherinsights.

18

The focus of this project was placed on the assessment, pre-departure and

departurephaseofdeportationproceedingsandtheanalysisofprocessesofreassembly

withemphasisondeportationcorridors(cfchapter4&Drotbohm&Hasselberg2015)in

Hamburg.Itisforthisreasonthatforcedarrival,so-calledreintegration(cf.Section5),

litigation,andthelivedexperienceofreturninpost-deportationphasesareonlycovered

toaminimalextent.Furtherresearchthatcoversthephasesmentionedabovewouldbe

necessarytogainamorecompleteimageofdeportationtrajectories.

Inaddition,deportationisahighlypoliticizedissueandframedbyauthoritiesas

a matter of state security. Due to the delicate nature of their situation, most actors

approached over the course of this project either rejected to participate or seemed

reluctanttospeakopenlyabouttheirinvolvementindeportationcorridors.Thus,audio-

recordingasatisfyingamountofstatementswas,unfortunately,impossible.Fourpersons

haveagreedtoparticipateininterviews.

As Nathalie Peutz points out, social science tends to reify categories and

intervenesinactors’lives(Peutz2006).Ofthemostsignificantconcerninthiscontext

aretheexperiencesofindividualswhofacedeportation.Theauthor’stheexperiencefrom

fieldworkshowedthatmostdeporteesintheacutemomentofdeparturefindthemselves

inanextraordinaryandchargedsituation.Mostofthemaredeeplytroubled,orinfear

andothersexpressanger(frommyfieldnotes).Forthisreason,approachingpeoplein

suchasituationasaresearcherdemandsawarenessof thesituationof the individual,

payingcloseattentiontotheownprivilegedpositionoftheresearcher.Throughoutthis

study,allintervieweeswereapproachedwiththehighestrespect,honoringthecharged

natureoftheirsituation.Theaimofthisstudywastopresentindividualperspectivesand

accounts to enrich research regarding current changes in the deportation system.

Interviews always took placewith the explicit consent of the interview partners and

againstthebackdropofacleardescriptionandexplanationoftheresearchproject.

Inshort, this thesis isdesignedasan interdisciplinarycasestudy thatemploys

methods inspired by an anthropology of removal (Peutz 2006) and theories of the

politicaleconomyofforcedremoval(Lemberg-Pedersen2015,2018).Recentchangesin

thedeportationsystem,datafrompublicsources,academicliterature,legaldocuments,

NGOreports,andnewsoutletsareanalyzed.Thenextchapterreviewsliteraturefromthe

fieldofdeportationstudiesandoutlinesthetheoreticalframeworkusedinthisresearch

project.

19

5.LiteratureReview&TheoreticalApproach

WhiletheCEAS-CommonEuropeanAsylumSystemthataimsatharmonizingreception

andrefugeeprotectioninEuropeisanhonorableidea,itseemstoberunningincrisis

mode (Lavenex 2018), and scholars have identified that states prioritize deterring

migrantsandrefugeesandmilitarizingbordersoverfulfillingtheirobligationvis-a-vis

internationalhuman-rightslaw(cf.Lemberg-Pedersen2013).Statesprioritizeintrastate

cooperation under the buzzwords “integrated border management” and “integrated

returnmanagement” (cf.BMI2015).According toofficial documents “effective return

policies”and“jointimplementationefforts”ofEU-member-statesareneededtocontrol

and govern migratory movement (Lemberg-Pedersen 2018; European Commission

2018).ThisstudyaimstoexamineandsituatethecaseofHamburginthecontextofthese

overarching developments beyond the boundaries of the Hamburg city-state. Thus,

recentdevelopmentsareanalyzedinsection6underthetitle“Private-PublicInteraction

in Deportation Corridors.” As the author argues in the following review, this can be

accomplishedusingtheconceptofdeportationcorridorsintroducedbyHeikeDrotbohm

and Ines Hasselberg (2015) in combination with a political-economic perspective on

deportation.Fromthisangle,deportationisunderstoodasaformofforcedmigrationor

even border-induced-displacement (Lemberg-Pedersen 2018). This conceptual

frameworkhasyettobeusedtostudydeportationandtheinvolvementofprivateactors

inthisfieldinthegeographicareasofGermanyandHamburgrespectively.

5.1ForcedRemoval,ForcedArrival-ForcedMigration?

AccordingtoMatthewGibney,“deportationpowerinliberalStatesisgenerallyviewedas

a power that is correlativewith the State’s right to control the entry of non-citizens"

(Gibney 2013). The argument put forward in favor of deportation is that systems of

citizenshipandimmigrationwouldbemeaninglessifstatescouldnotlegallyexcludeand

physicallyremoveindividualswhoaredeemedunsuitableforthecollectiveofcitizens.

Gibneyassertsthatdeportationisatechniquethatisconstitutiveofcitizenshipbywhich

statesdistinguishbetweenlegallypresentmembersandnon-members(cf.Ibid.).Since

liberaldemocraticstateshaveusedtheirdeportationpowersincreasinglyoverthelast

decades,whichisdocumentedinstatisticaldataandreports,Gibneyhasintroducedwhat

hecallsdeportationturn(Anderson,Gibney&Paoletti2011:549)intheAsylumpolicies

20

of states. In using the term deportation turn, Gibney refers to thewidespread use of

deportation and expansions of systems of forced removal in which the latter is

increasinglybecominganormalizedstatetechnique(Peutz&DeGenova2010).Withthe

proliferationofdeportationasastatepower,scholarlyinterestinthisareagrew,andthe

fieldofdeportationstudiesemergedduringthelate2000s(Coutin2015).Itisrelatedto,

butalsodistinguishablefrom,theareasofsecurityandmigrationstudies.AsSusanBibler

Coutinasserts,thedirectionandqualityofthemovementofpeopleareseeninadifferent

view from this newly emerging perspective, and common theoretical assumptions

stemmingfromthefieldofmigrationstudiesarecalledintoquestionas,

“deportation is forcibleratherthanvoluntary, thedecisiontodeport is in the

hands of the state rather than that of individual migrants, the direction of

movement is from so-called ‘receiving’ country to ‘sending’ country and

definitions of ‘origin’ and ‘membership’ are disrupted by the act of removal”

(Coutin2015:672).

Furthermore, Coutin argues, that referring to deportation as a form of migration,

challengestheconventionalnotionofmigrationandopensanewfieldofinquiry.Gibney

takes this a step further by arguing, that this issue is also commonly overlooked by

scholarsofforcedmigration,sinceforhimdeportationrepresentstheepitomeofforced

migrationasmigrantsaffectedhavenochoicewhethertostayorleaveaparticularstate;

theyareforcedtodepartunderthethreatoractualuseofforce(Gibney2013).Itcould

be added thatmigrants are also forced to arrive. This disrupts the existing notion of

arrival,allowingittotakeonadifferentmeaninginthiscontext.AsSchusterandMajidi

(2013)documentedintheirworkonreturneestoAfghanistan,arrivaltoadestinationof

forcedremovalcanbehighlyproblematicforthepeopleaffected.

Insomecases,deporteesare“returned”toacountrytheyhavelittleornosocial

tiestoormighthaveneveractuallylivedbefore.Inothercases,thedeportationmaybe

understoodasafailurebythereceivingcommunityathome(cf.Ibid).Therefore,Schuster

andMajidiarguethatdeportationcannotbeunderstoodasaone-directionalprocessand

singularevent.Rather,itmustbeseenthroughtheprismofcircularmovementsaspeople

might choose to re-migrate after deportation. According to their study, returnees

frequently see their stay or sojourn in the countries towhich they are deported as a

temporaryreturnorbreakbeforeanewphaseinthemigrationcycle(cf.Ibid).

21

5.2Deportationasa(Contested)FormofExpulsion

ForWilliamWalters, deportation is a state technique that succeeded other forms of

expulsion, such as exile and population transfer. Therefore, it is not a merely new

phenomenonbutadistincttypeofexpulsioninyetanotherformandhistoricalcontext

thatservesotherpurposesthanitspredecessors.Whileexile,forinstance,wasaimedat

theexclusionofpoliticalenemies,deportationortransportation,inthecolonialcontext,

is a techniqueof labor stratificationanddisciplinaryaction in societies thatare ruled

indirectly,bygovernmentalpower,asopposedtoearlierhistoricalcontextsofadirect

sovereign rule (Walters 2002). Expulsion in its current form is contested and

contradictory,anditcreatesdoublebindsandchallengestheactorsinvolved,whatCoutin

(2015:676)explainswiththenotionof“contradictionsintrinsictodeportation.”These

contradictions include thedichotomybetween individuals’ rights tohave familiesand

states’rightstocontrolentryorthedichotomyexistingbetweenhumanitarianismand

enforcement (Ibid.). However, humanitarianism and enforcement do not necessarily

contradict eachother butmay even gohand inhand as parts of the same regime.As

scholars of critical border studies assert, framing enforcement not only in terms of

security but also in a humanitarian language has become a critical aspect of border

regimes(Section4.3;Brambilla2014;Pallister-Wilkins2015;Walters2011).

On the onehand, states likeGermany ground their political practice in human

rightsandtheruleoflaw,andtherighttoasylumisinscribedintheconstitutionofthe

FederalRepublic(Art.16aConstitution).Ontheotherhand,thestatealsodecidestoforce

peopletoreturnaboardcharteredflightstoAfghanistan,acountrythatisriddledbywar,

chaosandviolence(UNAMA2014,UNHCR2014,2018a).Anexampleofadoublebindon

thelevelofsingularactorsthatmayoccurinthiscontextcanbeillustratedbyreferencing

thedualroleofNGOworkerswhomay,fromtheirperspective,havegoodintentionsand

aremotivatedbythewishtohelppeoplewhoarepossiblyaffectedbydeportation.By

registeringmigrantswithprecariouslegalstatus,theseNGOworkersmaybeplayinginto

thehandsofstateauthoritiesbymakingtherecipientsoftheir‘help’morevisibletothem

(frommy fieldnotes). Unknowingly (or not) they might work as a node in the state

surveillancenetwork,workingagainstthewishofapersonwhoseekstoavoidforced

return(cf.Schneider2016).

22

5.3ThePoliticalEconomyofBorderControl

Surveillance and security play significant roles in deportation systems. As Heike

Drotbohm(2013)emphasizes,deportationneeds tobeseen in thebroadercontextof

bordercontrol.Inherunderstandingthepolicingofmigrantshasmigratedinwards,from

thelociofexternalbordersaszonesofimmigrationbackintothedemarcatedterritories,

“turninglivingarrangementsandeverydaylivesoftransmigrantsintoborderzonesof

law enforcement in which state officials seek to distinguish between desired and

undesiredindividuals”(Drotbohm2013:2).Thisraisesquestions,asto(1)howthese

borderzonesorinternalborderscapes-asspatialarrangementsofsurveillance,control,

and forcedmobility - are assembled, (2) how and bywhom they are set up, run and

financedand(3)whatlivingandmovinginandthroughthementailsinsocialreality.

ToanswerthislastquestionNathaliePeutzcallsforananthropologyofremoval

thatfollowsthetrajectoriesofdeporteesfromtheirincarcerationinthehoststatetotheir

reception or the processes of reintegration into their alleged home countries (Peutz

2008).Peutzproposestobroadenthisinquirytoincludeprivatecorporationsthatbenefit

frompracticesofexclusion,transnationalorganizationsorlocalnetworksthat,insome

countries,assistarrivingdeportees,aswellastheactivistgroupsthatrallytheopposition

todeportation(Peutz2006:219).ThispaperfollowsPeutz’sproposalandincludesnot

onlyto-be-displaceddeporteesandpeoplewhofearsuchsituationbutalsodoctors,NGO

staff,ground-transportproviders,andlawyersallofwhomseemtoplaysignificantroles

inthedeportationsysteminGermany(frommyfieldnotes).

Questions (1) and (2) above refer to political-economic structures and the

assemblage (Section 4.8) of deportation systems which can be seen as the changing

frameworkforactorsinvolved.Complementinganethnographicapproachthatincludes

theperspectiveofactors,apolitical-economicperspectiveisalsohelpfulforilluminating

thechangingstructuresandrationalizationsofdeportationsystems.Peutzproposesto

examinethegrowingindustryofremovals,thatfunctionsaccordingtoneoliberalmarket

mechanismsand“modelsnewmethodsofeconomicrationalization:flexibility,low-cost

buildings,lessorganizedlabor,andincreasingprivatization[...]”(Peutz2006:221).She

assertsthatstudiesofthebusinessofdeportationmayhelptoilluminatewhatappears

to be an expanding relationship between government and privatization in today’s

“security”state.

23

AspointedoutinthecaseofGermany,itneedstobenoted,thatissuesofmigrationare

increasingly"europeanized"anddealtwithinthesupranationalarenaoftheEuropean

Union.Currently,migrationisincreasinglybeingframedintermsofsecurity,framingthe

movementofpeopleacrossbordersasissuesinneedofsolutions,forinstance,theissue

ofcontrollingmigrationwouldbemetwiththesolutionofincreasingbordercontrol.The

increase in border control understood and presented by EU-actors and actors in its

member-statesasaninevitablenecessityinabidtoregularizemobilityandtoputanend

tobusinessopportunitiesofpeople-smugglersandpreventhumantragediesatseainthe

Mediterranean(EuropeanCommission2018).

Duetothisviewpoint,majorfundsarebeingchanneledtothecommonEuropean

border control project, as one can see in the form of the European Agency for the

ManagementofOperationalCooperationattheExternalBorders-Frontex-whichhasA

budget of 302 Mio € allocated in 2017 (BMI 2018b). Martin Lemberg-Pedersen has

described and analyzed the growing influence of a border control industry, that

capitalizes on the European Union’s perceived need to invest in upgraded control

measures at its external borders and beyond. The author examines the interaction

betweenPrivateSecurityCompaniesandFrontex,thekeyactorinthefieldofEU-border

control. Instead of understanding borders as a geographically fixed phenomenon,

Lemberg-Pedersenusesthenotionofborderscapeswhichheunderstands“asdynamic

andmultifacetedsitesofinterventionforpublicandprivateactors”(Lemberg-Pedersen

2013: 152). In a similar vein, Chiara Brambilla argues that using borderscapes as a

methodological angle enables “a productive understanding of the processual, de-

territorializedanddispersednatureofbordersandtheirensuingregimesandensembles

of practices” (Brambilla 2015: 221). In this sense, borders are not considered

geographicallyfixed,butinstead,bordersaremadeandre-structuredthroughprocesses

ofborderscaping(seeLemberg-Pedersen2013:152.).

As key actors in these processes, Lemberg-Pedersen identifiesmembers of an

“emergent class of security professionals“ who successfully recode borders “from

mobilitychannelsoflabour,trade,andprotection,tocontrolnodescounteringthreats”

(Lemberg Pedersen 2018: 241). However, the notion of security used in these areas

seemstodisregardthesituationofpeopleonthemove insearch forprotectionwhile

prioritizing the securityof an imaginedcommunityofprivilegedcitizens.AsLemberg

Pedersen argues, borderscaping leads to a distinct type of forcedmigration for those

24

already displaced: border-induced displacement (Ibid.). This concept refers to “state-

sanctioned practices where already-displaced people are intercepted, detained or

deportedacrossterritoriesandbetweenstatesreluctanttoassumetheresponsibilityof

assessingtheirasylumclaims”(Lemberg-Pedersen2018:242).Aswasmentionedearlier,

deportationmayalsobeunderstoodasbeingintimatelyrelatedtoborder-regimes.The

nextsectionwilldelvedeeperintoborderscapingasafruitfulconceptforthestudyof

deportation.

5.4DeportationinProcessesofBorderscaping

This paper follows Lemberg-Pedersen's point on border induced displacement and

transfers thenotionofborderscaping to thecontextofdeportationstudies.From this

view, deportations are part of border regimes as they connect the inside of alleged

boundariesof theEUand theGermannational territorywithmultipledestinationsof

forcedremovalontheoutside.Deportationsarepracticallyactingasatoolinprocesses

for re-making and rationalizing borders. This is reflected in the annual report of the

FederalGermanBorderPolice,thatstates:aborder-regimewouldbeincompletewithout

thestate’scapacitytoenforcedeportationasanactofsovereignty(GFP2018).

From this perspective, processes of borderscaping include the activities of

(inwardmigrated)bordercontrol:registration,assessmentoflegalstatus,categorization,

surveillance, detentionand finally the act of removal ofnon-citizens,which isusually

understoodtofallunderthetermdeportation.Theseactivitiesarenotonlyrationalized

andcarriedoutbystateactorsbutinvolveprivateactorsaswell.Togethertheyformwhat

can be called an industry of (forced) migration (cf. Lemberg-Pedersen 2013)

Transportation, detention, screening software, and catering are just a few aspects of

deportationthatinvolvenon-stateactors.Fromthisperspective,itcanbestatedthatthe

driveofstatestocarryoutdeportationaspartofborderprotectioncreatesamarketfor

privateactorsinwhichthereismoneytobeearned.

Concludinghisanalysisof the re-configurationof theEuropeanborder regime,

Lemberg-Pedersen states that the increasing involvement of private actors, andmore

specifically Private Security Companies (PSC’s), presents severe problems concerning

democratictransparencyandhumanitarianstandardsinEuropeanborderscapes.These

problemsareintimatelyrelatedtotheextensivefundingdirectedtoprivateactorswho

actaccordingtoeconomicself-interestsinthefieldofbordersecurityandgaininfluence

25

on critical decisionmaking and policy development (Lemberg-Pedersen 2013). As an

offshootofLemberg-Pedersen'swork,thisprojectraisesthequestionofwhethernon-

stateactorsgaininfluenceinthefieldofdeportationinGermanyaswell.

Fromtheviewofstateactors,deportationislinkedtothefieldbordercontroland

constitutes problems in need of new solutions (European Commission 2017: 2). This

problem/solutiondichotomy is reflected ina statementbyGermanChancellorAngela

Merkelwhocalledfora“nationalexertion”(NationaleKraftanstrengung)torealizethe

deportationofrejectedasylumseekerspresentinGermanywithoutlegalpermissionto

stay(Merkel2017).TheremarksfollowedaterrorattackonaGermanChristmas-market

in Berlin committed by rejected asylum seeker Anis Amri from Tunisia. Statements

framing deportation as a matter of national or European security, and reflecting a

deportationturn(Gibney2013),arevirulentinpublicpoliticaldiscourseontheEuropean

level.Inarecentpressrelease,theEuropeanCommissionpointedoutthat“aneffective

and humane [sic!] return policy is an essential part of the European Union's

comprehensiveapproachtoaddressingmigrationchallengesandreducingtheincentives

for irregularmigration” (EC2018a).This isan illustrativeexampleofhowauthorities

framedeportationandbordercontrolinalanguageofcareandhumanitarianism.

The processes of borderscaping are not exclusively based on rationalities of

enforcement and control; they are also based on concepts of humanitarianism.

(Brambilla, 2015: 240). While it seems counterintuitive to speak of a humanitarian

border, “it is important to recognize theways inwhich the exercise of humanitarian

powerisconnectedtotheactualizationofnewspaces”(Walters2011).Whetherbyits

redefinitionofcertainlocalesashumanitarian”zones”andcrisesas”emergencies”(Ibid.

139). In a press statement, the head of UNHCR’s office in Germany Dominic Bartsch

asserted,thatreturn,andthereforedeportation,isanintegralpartoftheasylumsystem.

He argued that the credibility of the asylum system faces challenges when rejected

asylumseekersarenotswiftlyreturned.AccordingtoBartsch,thiswouldcreateafalse

impressionoftheprotectionsysteminsofarasitwouldappearflawedandsusceptible

tomisusebypeople,whoarenotinneedofprotectionundertheinternationalrefugee

regime.Bartscharguesthatdeportingsomeisajustifiedmeanstomaintainhumanitarian

protectionforothers(Bartsch2018).Thenextsectionshedslightonthemultiplelevels

of deportation governance and discusses the role of Frontex in the EU deportation

system.

26

5.5Multi-LeveledGovernanceofDeportation

Sinceirregularmigration,bordercontrol,anddeportationareseeminglyviewedbystate

actorsasbelongingtoacommonsetofmigrationchallengesitcomesasnobigsurprise

thatFrontex,introducedearlierasoneofthesignificantdriversofbordermilitarization,

isalsoinvolvedinEU-andGermandeportationsystemsrespectively.Accordingtothe

officialFrontexwebsite, theagency is financing, coordinatingandmonitoringFrontex

CharterFlights(Frontex2018a).Theideabehindinvolvingthesupranationalagencywas

toexpelpeoplefromseveralmember-statesinjoint-return-operations(JROs)underthe

supervision of the agency. According to a study published by members of the EU-

parliament,thisplanwasinitiatedEvian,Francein2005byinteriorministersofFrance,

Germany,Italy,Spain,andtheUK.(Kelleretal.2011:14).ThefirstFrontexCharterFlights

took place in 2006. Austria, Poland, and France cooperated then and deported eight

peopletoArmeniaandGeorgia.Inthefollowingyears,thenumberofJROsrose.In2016

a total of 39 Frontex Charter Flights took place. (Frontex 2016). Thus far the most

significant number of Frontex Charter Operations was conducted in 2015 when the

agencyfinancedandcoordinated66so-calledJRO‘s.Germanyparticipatedin44.Atotal

of €4.65million of costs for these operationswere reimbursed tomember-states by

Frontexin2016(asktheeu.org2016).

Anotherareaofactivityfortheagencyconcernsacrucialpreconditionforforced

return: the negotiation, conclusion, and implementation of so-called readmission

agreements (Cassarino 2014; Trauner& Kruse 2008;).While states usually negotiate

bilateral agreements, Frontex aims at concluding joint arrangements for allmember-

states. So far, 14 suchagreementsbetween theEUand so-called third countrieshave

entered into force (EU-Commission 2018a). However, many receiving states seems

reluctant to conclude readmission agreements with the whole of all EU-members.

Agreementsbetweenthedeportingandthereceivingstatewhichguaranteeafrictionless

forced arrival of deportees so-called readmission agreements are a common form of

internationalcooperationinthisfield.Aspointedoutinthe“RenewedActionPlanona

MoreEffectiveReturnPolicyintheEuropeanUnion”publishedbytheEUCommissionin

March 2017, readmission presents a challenge, as “member-states notably report

difficultiestoobtainemergencytraveldocumentsfromthirdcountries”(EU-Parliament

andCommission2017:12).Thesereceivingcountriesseemtoregularlyrefusetoallow

the entry of deportees with EU-travel document substituents (Ibid.). Readmission

27

agreementsareusuallyreachedthroughbilateralnegotiations.Therefore,diplomacyand

internationalcooperationmaybeseenasanelementintheprocessesofborderscaping

asdefiningboundariesalsoinvolvesthefacilitationofcoercedmigrationthroughidentity

documentation. As pointed out in a paper by the think-tank European Institute for

Security Studies, the European Union can use the leverage of market-access, and

conditionsonpaymentofdevelopmentaid,andshouldusepragmaticdiplomacytoreach

more agreements with third countries that ensure swift return of so-called irregular

migrants(Liesiecka&Parkes2017).

However,ontheotherend,inanumberofcases,receivingstatestargetedduring

suchnegotiationsseemtohavelittleornointerestinreceivingdeportees,butratherseek

tomaintaintheflowofremittances,streamingintotheirnationaleconomies,asmigrants

abroadsendbackmoneytosupporttheirfamilies(Coleman2009:129).Insomeofthese

countries, remittances are a decisive economic factor and amount to more than any

developmentaidbeingofferedinreturnforre-admission.Forinstance,accordingtodata

providedbytheWorldBankremittancesmakeupmorethan20%ofthenationalGDPin

Gambia(20,5%),Haiti(26,5%),andTajikistan(32,2%)(WorldBank2018).Thismight

makeitevermorecostlyfordeportingstatestosetupsystemsofforcedremovalasthey

mayencounterotherstatesandtheireconomicself-interestasprohibitingfactorsvis-a-

vistheir interest indeportation.Totacklethis“problem“EUactorsareperceivingthe

approach of supranational coordination as being capable of producing solutions.

Furthermore,theEUcontinuestoworktowardsagreementswithmigrantandrefugee-

sendingcountriesthatareofspecialconcern,forinstance,theSahelzoneandSubsahara

Africa.UndertheRabatandKhartoumframeworkstheareasofmigration,return,and

readmissionarementionedastoppriorities(ICMPD2018;Khartoumprocess2018).Joint

EUeffortsarealsoincreasinglydata-driven.Tofacilitatereadmissionandreturns,theEU

createdtheIntegratedReturnsManagementApplication(IRMA)which,accordingtothe

EU-returns action plan is “expected to facilitate the planning, coordination, and

managementof returncapacitiesandoperationsby theMemberStates, theEuropean

BorderandCoastGuardAgency,EASOandEurostat”(EU-Commission2017).

Aswasillustratedinthissection,deportationpolicyisnotonlyamatterofnational

politics in the German context. The European Union has also started initiatives to

coordinate and facilitate “return.” However, Joint Return Operations and Joint EU

ReadmissionAgreementshavenotproventobeveryusefulorfeasibleinachievingthe

28

goalof facilitatingmoredeportations.Thenextsectionreflectson forcedmobilityand

immobility,crucialaspectsofdeportationregimes.

5.6Forced(Im-)Mobility

Private actors, it seems, are not only influential actors in the field of surveillance at

external borders, but they are also increasingly involved in crucial areas of

borderscaping,inmobilizingorimmobilizingmigrants.Thelatterhasbeenstudiedinthe

contextoftheprisonindustrialcomplex(cf.Arbogast2016;Velasquez2017).Toexpand

the scope of research further and beyond the security sector, this study includes

humanitarianandmanagementbusinessesthatarerelatedtoforcedmobility.According

to Walters (2018: 2799), several sectors are crucial to understanding what he calls

deportationinfrastructuresthathavebeenoverlookedbydeportationstudiesscholars.

Fromthisview,acloseexaminationofcommercialaviationasapartofthedeportation

system can bring to the fore the multitude of different trajectories of deportation

proceedings.Walters(Ibid.)statesthat“thecoercedmobilityofthedeporteedoesnot

resembleastraightlineofejectionorconveyancebetweentwostatesbutoperatesamidst

networks in which identity papers, risk assessment forms, goods, data, experts and

diplomats, free and unfree people, and sometimes bribes are being set inmotion on

multipledirections,scales,andspeeds.”

The next section presents a selection of academic studies on deportation in

Germanytohelpsituatethisprojectinthechosenfield.

5.7DeportationStudies-TheGermanCase

TheliteratureondeportationinGermanyoftenbelongstostrandsoflegalscholarship

(cf.Eule2014;Hörich2015)which isnot surprisingasdeportationcontinues tobea

complex and relevant issue from the legal perspective. At the same time, its political

dimension has been thoroughly studied. Antje Ellermann, who conceptualizes

deportationaspoliticsofcoercivesocialregulation,isanexampleofsuchascholar,ascan

beseeninhercomprehensivepolitical-scientificstudy,StatesagainstMigrants(2009).

Ellermann’scomparativestudyfocusesondeportationsinGermanyandtheUnitedStates

of America (Ibid. 3). She presents deportation in the context of the broader field of

migration control, a field that she sees as one among many challenges for liberal

democratic states. As Ellermann writes, the desire of states to deport creates

29

contradictions and problems concerning policy development and implementation.

Ellermann uses state capacity as a critical analytical concept for understanding the

capabilities of individual states to develop and implement policies of forced removal,

arguingthatthesetypesofpoliciesimposeseverecostsonboththedeportingstateand

the affected individual. Capacity, she argues, varies across different nation-states and

mustbeexplainedbystudyingtheimplementationofpoliciesratherthanfocusingonly

onthelegislativearenawhileemphasizing,inparticular,theroleofbureaucratsthatneed

tobetakenintoaccountasessentialactorsinthisfield(Ellermann2009:9).

Inasimilarvein, legalscholarTobiasEule(2014)studiestheimplementationstageof

immigrationlawinGermany,choosingimmigrationofficesasthesiteforhiscasestudy,

becauseheassertsthattheworkofbureaucratsisvastlyoverlooked.AccordingtoEule,

civilservantsarenotpresentinpublicdiscoursewhichisrelatedtotheirrole,however,

asheexplains,decisionsmadebysingleactorsintheimmigrationoffices,

[…]haveanimmenseimpactonthelivesofindividualsandfamilies,asresidence

law is superior to all other laws save the constitution, directly affects and

regulates all aspects of life from social welfare to employment and is of

particularrelevanceincountrieswithlownaturalizationratessuchasGermany.

(Eule2014:3)

In his study, Eule found that implementation of immigration law can be a chaotic,

improvisatoryandsometimesarbitrarypracticeandheattributesthistothecomplex,

politically charged and continually changing nature of the German immigration law.

Furthermore, he argues that outcomes of assessment procedures are influenced by

severalsub-statelevelsofbothexecutiveandjudicialpower,andbylocalrepresentatives

ofcivilsociety(Eule2014:4).EllermannandEulebothproviderichaccountsofthelegal

andpoliticaldimensionsoftheGermandeportationsystem.Furthermore,theyexpand

thescopeofpoliticalscientificandlegalresearchondeportationbeyondtherealmsof

thestateandincludeactorsthathadbeenlessvisibleinpreviousstudies.

Liz Fekete (2003) presents a different argument, asserting that immigration

officialsareonlyfulfillingtheirtaskunderthepressureofdeportationratesdetermined

bythetopofgovernmentalsystems:“Theactionsofgovernmentministers,politicians,

press and the extremeRight all constrain the civil servants, immigrationofficials and

policeofficerswhohavetoenforcethesetargetstoactwithgreaterzeal”(Ibid.).Fekete

30

arguesthatitisthemostvulnerablewhoaretargetedbecausetheyareeasiesttoremove.

She highlights the fact that both the EU’s and Germany’s deportation drive includes

“torture victims, those severely traumatized by war, psychiatric patients and the

terminallyill”(Ibid.).

ArecentstudyonthespecificcaseofGermanywitha focusonthesituationof

deporteeswas released by Biskup et al. (2018). The authors analyze the situation of

returneeswhoarrivedinKosovofromapsychologicalperspectiveapplyingaqualitative

approach.Biskupandher colleagues found thatvoluntary returnanddeportationare

bothexperiencedbyreturneesas“critical lifeevents”(Ibid.302).Themaindifference

betweenexperiencingvoluntaryandforcedreturnisadifferentsenseofcontrolduring

eachof thedifferentprocedures. Intervieweeswhoexperiencedavoluntary return to

Kosovostatedthattheyhadasenseofcontrolandmadeowndecisionsthatwouldhave

beenimpossibleinthecontextof forcedremoval(cf. Ibid.).StephanDünnwald(2011)

examinesthepracticeofreturncounselinginthecontextof(voluntary)returnprograms.

In his study, he focuses on the role of social welfare organizations which are “stuck

somewhere between states’ institutional interest to implement legally binding return

decisionsandtheirclientswishtostayinGermany”(Ibid.).Dünnwaldconcludedthatfew

social networks exist in the countries of arrival that would fulfill the promise of the

programstoensureare-integrationofthereturneeintosocietyinherallegedcountryof

origin(Ibid.).

Asexplainedinthisreview,theGermandeportationsystemhasbeenstudiedfrom

interdisciplinaryperspectives.However,thusfar,interdisciplinaryapproachesthatdraw

on deportation studies and bridge an anthropology of removal and approaches to

political-economyhavenotbeenappliedtothecaseofGermanyorthecaseofHamburg.

Inthenexttwosections,thedeportationcorridorapproachandthenotionassemblage

willbeintroducedaskeytheoreticalconceptsappliedintheanalysis,presentingthisnew

approachtostudyingtheGermandeportationsystem.

5.8Re-AssemblageofDeportationCorridors

Asmentionedpreviously,deportationsentailcomplexinteractionbetweenactors,ideas,

policiesandtechnologyinemergentandchangingsystems.Thenotionofassemblagewill

be used throughout this study to grasp the complexity and processual character of

deportationsystems.Theconceptofassemblagewas introducedbyFelixGuattariand

31

GillesDeleuze inAThousandPlateaus originally released in1980(Deleuze&Guattari

1987:4). At firstglance ‘deportationsystem’or ‘-infrastructure’are termsthatmight

createtheillusionoffixedentitiesthatareobservableintheirentiretyandcomparable

to others.However, the theoretical approach applied here emphasizes the processual

character of deportation systems as assemblages. Thereby, the changeability of

arrangementsaswellasthere-configurationthattakesplaceasinteroperationofsocial

activity, ideas, laws,policies, actors, and technologies isalso taken intoconsideration.

Blurred boundaries and contradictions that occur during the re-configuration and

becomingofassemblageswillbeanalyzedaccordingly.

This is done by mapping processes of becoming, a technique borrowed from

Bruno Latour (2005) who proposes to leave behind the idea of analyzing social

phenomena through a predefined set of ideas, and instead he suggests we approach

issues by accepting the associative and temporary character of assemblages and the

significanceofactors’perspectivesonthe issueatstake.WhileActor-Network-Theory

willnotbeusedinsuchsophisticatedmannerasoutlinedinLatour’sbodyofwork,the

categoryofassemblageisusedto“followtheactorsthemselves”(Latour2005:12).The

idea that deportation involves different actors came from Heike Drotbohm and Ines

Hasselberg(2015).Together,theydevelopedadistinctapproachtostudyingdeportation

thatisoutlinedinthenextsection.

5.9DeportationCorridors

Abroad rangeofdifferentactors suchasenforcementagents,NGOworkers,business

(wo)menand consultants are involved inprocessesof deportation.At the same time,

deportations connect multiple spaces and places and can be perceived as a process,

ratherthanasasingularevent.So,atheoreticalframework,suitableforanalyzingthis

complex (temporal, spatial, and contextual) issue is needed. Towards this end, the

conceptofdeportationcorridorswillbeappliedtothisanalysis(Drotbohm&Hasselberg

2015:553).AsHasselbergstates,recentdevelopmentsregardingdeportationneedtobe

examined, using a transnational optic that observes techniques, processes, and social

conditions of forced return, all of which link societies and territories across vast

geographicdistancesand includeamultitudeofactors.Thetransnationalcharacterof

deportation liesat thecoreof thedeportationcorridorconcept,basedonPeterNyers

notioncorridorsofexpulsion:“thespatialcontinuityofwaitingareas,detentionfacilities,

32

anddeportationflightscanbeseenasconstitutinga`transnationalcorridorofexpulsion´

[...]extendingacrossterritorialandnationalboundaries“(Drotbohm2013:3).

Focusing on a recent andurgent example of a deportation corridor,Martin Lemberg-

Pedersen (2018a) analyzes the ERPUM Project (European Return Platform for

UnaccompaniedMinors).ThiswasthefirstEUprojectwiththeambitiontoorganizethe

administrativedeportationofunaccompaniedminorstoAfghanistan:Nordiccountries

Norway,Denmark, andSwedenwereprimarydrivers in thisproject, accompaniedby

Great Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands (Lemberg-Pedersen 2018a). Using the

analytical lens of deportation corridors, the author succeeds in showing how “return

reliesontransnationalandmultilocalpractices,variedgeographies,anddifferentactors

andinstitutions”andthatthereexist“infrastructuresunderpinningthepolicy,including

the governments and national and international organizations and institutions”

(Lemberg-Pedersen2018a:49).

In this specific case, the corridor projectwas a failure and discontinued “after

muchpubliccriticism,increasingbureaucraticresistance,andachangedEUlandscape

wheretheDublinIIIRegulation(2013)provisionsonUAMsseemtoruncountertothe

pilot’s rationale” (Lemberg-Pedersen 2015a). Nationalist arguments in favor of

deportation, framedinthe languageofhumanitarianismandquotingthecredibilityof

asylumsystems,wereunable(inthiscase)toovershadowandobscuretherealitiesofthe

devastatinghumanitarianactualityinthewar-torncountryofAfghanistan.Accordingly,

feasibilityconstraintsledtoahaltoftheERPUMproject(Lemberg-Pedersen2018a:61).

In the following section, the German deportation system is mapped out. The

chaptercontributestoanalternativegeographyofforcedremovalinspiredbythework

ofJeanPierreCassarino(2019).Thesubsectionsthatfollowpresentcrucialaspectsofthe

Germanasylumanddeportationregime.

6.MappingtheGermanDeportationSystem

Whenquestionsconcerningthemovementofrefugeesandmigrantsarediscussedfrom

theEUandGermanperspective,oneobserveswhatWalters(2018:2799)hascalledan

ingressionbias.Walterspoints out that inpublicdiscourse andmediascapes scholars,

mediaandsecurityexpertsregularlydrawattentiontotherouteswhichmigrantstaketo

reachEuropeanshores,whileasimilarfocusonroutesofexpulsionismissing(Walters

33

2018:2799).JeanPierreCassarino(2019)hasaddressedthisgap,mappingoutforced

removalroutes.Hecreatedmapsillustratingnetworksofforcedremoval,-readmission

and-detentionwhichareavailablefromhiswebsite(cf.Cassarino2019).BothWalter’s

andCassarino’sworkhaveinspiredtheattemptsatanalternativegeographyofforced

removal depicted below. The maps were generated from official statistical data on

deportations fromGermany in 2017 (cf. Jelpke et al. 2017). They allow the reader to

partiallyvisualizedeportationcorridorsconnectingGermanywithdestinationsofforced

removalaround theglobe.Themapbelowhighlightsall countrieswherepeoplehave

beendeportedfromGermanybyplanein2017indifferentintensitiesofredcolor.The

color scale indicates the number of deportees per country from light red for one, to

intensiveredforthemostsignificantnumberof3429deportees.

Tenof115countrieswiththehighestnumberofindividualdeportationsin2017

Country Albania Kosovo Serbia Italy Macedonia Moldova Morocco Georgia Algeria Bosnia

No.ofdeportees

3429 2721 2359 2321 1530 751 634

612 504 496

Figure3:DeportationsfromGermany2017-“World”

Author’sowngraph.Source:Jelpkeetal.(2018).

34

In2017,atotalof23.966peopleweredisplacedthroughGermandeportationcorridors

to115differentcountriesaroundtheglobe.91%ofthemweredeportedaboardofplanes

(21.904).However,stateauthoritiesalsoenforced2.011deportationsacrossland-,and

51 across sea-borders. The five countries receiving the most significant numbers

deporteesfromGermanywereallinEurope,includingAlbania,Kosovo,Serbia,Italy,and

Macedonia.All thesecountries fallunderthecategoryofso-calledsafe thirdcountries.

Italy is an exception here as the number of 2.321 individual cases accounts almost

entirelyforso-calledDublindeportations.Theyaffectasylumseekersforwhoseasylum

procedureorprotectionprovisionItalianauthoritiesare legallyresponsibleunderthe

DublinIIIregulation(discussedingreaterdetailbelow).IntheAppendix,a linktothe

interactiveexcelmapisprovided.Besidesofferingalargerimageinabetterresolution,

thismapmakesitpossibletolookupthenumbersofdeporteesbycountryortozoomin

onspecificregions.Europewasthefocusregionwith82.47%ofalldeportationsfrom

Germany.Therefore,themapsegmentisshowninmoredetailbelow.

Figure4:DeportationsfromGermany2017-“Europe”

Author’sowngraph.Source:Jelpkeetal.(2018)

35

However, onemust stress that in 2017, deportations took place to some of the least

peacefulcountriesintheworldaccordingtotheGlobalPeaceIndex(GPI2017),including

Afghanistan(121),Iraq(14),andSudan(2).Thedevelopmentofthedeportationcorridor

connectingGermanyandAfghanistanisanalyzedinsection7.3.

Thenextsectionpresentsthebasicsofthelegalframeworkconcerningasylum,

theresidenceof foreign-nationalsanddeportation inGermany.Moreover, thechapter

presentsandanalyzesadditionalstatisticaldata.

6.1TheGermanResidenceandAsylumRegime

While deportation proceedings in Germany are based on and involve a number of

different national- international and supranational legal provisions, the rules most

directly related to the deportation regime in Germany are specified in the

Aufenthaltsgesetz(ResidenceAct),thatregulates“theentry,residence,economicactivity

andintegrationofforeign-nationalsinGermany”(§1ResidenceAct).

TostayinGermanylegally,holdingaresidencepermitisgenerallyobligatoryfor

foreignnationals,exceptforcitizensofEUmember-statesorstatelesspersonsforwhom

other rules apply (Section 4 Residence Act). Individuals may receive indefinite or

temporary permissions that provide different rights for the holder, for example,

permission for engaging in economic activity and labor. Temporary residence is also

legallypossibleforthepurposeofstudyandeducation(Section16ResidenceAct),forthe

purpose of gainful employment (Section 18 Residence Act), in concurrence with

internationallawforhumanitarianorpoliticalpurposes(Section22ResidenceAct),for

reasonsoffamilyreunification(Section27ResidenceAct)andaccordingtospecialrights

of residence(Section37ResidenceAct). Individualsmayapply foraresidencepermit

withtheimmigrationauthorities(Ausländerbehörde)ifoneofthesereasonsmentioned

aboveappliestotheircase.

As of 31 December 2017, German authorities registered 10.62 Mio foreign-

nationals in Germany approximately half of which, 4.68 Mio, are obliged to be in

possessionofaresidencepermitasthird-countrynationals.Theotherhalfisexempted

from the obligation as individuals in this group are citizens of EUmember-states or

statelesspersons(BAMF2017).Approximately50%ofthird-countrynationals,received

anindefinitetitle(Niederlassungserlaubnis)accordingtoSection9oftheResidenceAct

that is available for holders of temporary permissions after five years of permanent

36

residence given that the individual can economically sustain him or herself and the

family,proveskills inGermanlanguageandhaveacleancriminalrecordamongother

preconditions (BAMF 2016). The majority of foreign-nationals, who were granted a

temporaryresidencepermitaccordingtoSection7oftheResidenceAct,receivedthetitle

for reasonsunder Section22 and27of theResidenceAct, either following apositive

asylum decision or the possibility to reunite with family members who enjoy

international or refugee protection in Germany (shown in the table below). As of 31

December 2017, the total number of temporary permits issued on the grounds of

humanitarianorpoliticalreasonsis1.68Mio.

Figure5:TemporaryResidencePermitsasof31.12.2017

Author’sowngraph.Source:BAMF(2017)

As a member state of the European Union and signatory state of the 1951 Refugee

Convention Germany provides individuals who reach its territory with access to an

asylum procedure and legal protection in concurrence with inter- and supranational

humanrightslawincludingArt.16aoftheConstitution(RighttoAsylum).Everyperson

whoclaimstherighttoasylumwithinthejurisdictionofGermanterritoryneedstofilea

formalasylumapplicationwithBAMF.TheFederalAuthorityforMigrationandRefugees

isagovernmententity that is responsible forasylumprocedureanddecisionmaking.

Caseworkers employed by the authority conduct interviewswith asylum seekers and

decidetheircasesbasedonprovisionsoftheAsylumProcedureActandtheAsylumAct.

The entity belongs to the federal level of government, while immigration authorities

37

belongtofederalstates(forexampletothecity-stateofHamburg).Itisworthnotingthat

responsibilitiesandtasksinvolvedinthedeportationsystemaresharedbetweenthetwo

levelsofgovernment.

Upon arrival, asylum seekers in Germany receive an Aufenthaltsgestattung

(temporary permission) according to Section 55 of the Asylum Act. This document

legalizestheirpresenceintheGermanterritoryforthedurationoftheasylumprocedure,

yet also entails some restrictions and is therefore different from the temporary

permission (Aufenthaltserlaubnis)mentioned above. Asylum applicants are obliged to

staywithinthelimitedterritorialspaceandjurisdictionoftheimmigrationauthorityin

theappointedfederalstate.Inthebeginningstagesoftheasylumprocedure,theymust

alsostaywithinoneofthereceptioncenters.Asylumseekersarebeingappointedtoa

specificcenteraccordingtotheKönigsteinerSchlüssel,amechanismthatcalculatesthe

proportionaldistributionofnewlyarrivingasylumseekersamongstthe16federalstates

inGermany.Withtheseprecautionarymeasuresinplace,theirplaceofresidencewillbe

knownto theauthorities,whoseek tomaintainaccess to thesepersons incaseof the

necessityofforcedremovalproceedings(Section56AsylumAct).Therefore,whenthey

firstarrive,asylumseekersdonotpossessaresidencepermitinthefullsense,areless

likelytobuildsocialtiesinGermanyandhappentobevulnerabletodeportationonce

theyreceiveanegativedecision.Duringthepastfiveyears,increasingnumbersofpeople

wereseekingprotectionandhadfiledformalasylumapplicationsinGermany.

Figure6–AsylumApplications,-Decisions,and–RejectionsinGermany2010-2017

Author’sowngraph.Source:BAMF(2017)

38

Asshowninfigure6above,during2015thenumberofapplicationspeakedat745.545

applications.EscalatingwarsinSyria,Iraq,andAfghanistan,resultedinlargemovements

ofpeopleandasignificantriseinnumbersofasylumseekersin2015(Kirchhoff&Lorenz

2018).Figure6showsaconstantrise innumbersofrejectionswhileapplicationsand

decisionsaredecreasingagainsince2016.Opencasesarebeingdecidedandclosed,and

numbersofnewarrivalsdecrease(BAMF2017).Ofutmostconcernforthedeportation

systeminGermanyarethesegroupsofpersonslegallydefinedas“rejected”,or“failed“

asylumseekers.Afterrejection,asylumseekersareregisteredasobligedtoreturn,alegal

statusthatisdiscussedinthenextsection.

6.2ObligationtoReturn

Whenforeign-nationals(asylumseekersforexample),losetheirlegalresidencestatusin

Germany they possibly become subject to deportation proceedings. According to the

Residence Act deportation is the enforcement of the legal obligation to return

(Ausreisepflicht),asdefinedinchapterfive:terminationofstay:

“A foreigner is obligated to leave the country if he is not / not anymore in

possession of a residence permit and a right to remain cannot be granted

accordingtotheassociationagreementbetweentheEECandTurkey“(Section

50ResidenceAct).

Fulfilling this obligation using the logic of the ResidenceActmeans, that the foreign-

nationalmust leaveGerman territory immediatelyordepartbeforeadeadlineofone

weekoruptosixmonthshasexpired(Section50.2ResidenceAct).Crossingaborder

insidetheSchengen-areaandenteringanothermember-statefulfillstherequirementif

theperson concernedhas a residencepermit in that state andmay stay there legally

(Section50.3ResidenceAct).Inthissense,anevictionorderfromGermanterritorymay

amounttoevictionfromtheSchengenzone,wherefreecross-bordermovementislegally

possibleforcitizensoftheEuropeanUnionandlegallypresentnon-EUnationalsunder

theSchengenagreement(EuropeanCommission2018).

Thetablebelowshowsthenumberofpeoplewhoareregisteredwiththe legal

statusofbeingobligedtoreturninthecentralforeigners'database(AZR),anditshows

thenumberofpeopledeportedfromGermanysince2010.Oneseesevidenceofaclear

increaseinallofthesecategoriesoverthelastsevenyears,andadropinthenumbersof

39

deportationswhencomparing2016and2017isevident.Itisstrikingthatthenumberof

actualdeportationscarriedoutremainslowincomparisontothenumberofpeoplethat

could be possibly affected, due to their legal status. Scholars, as well as politicians,

recognize this phenomenon referring to adeportation gap. (Cf. Gibney2008;Günther

2018;Rosenberger&Küffner2016)

Figure7:NumberofPeople“ObligedtoReturn”&Deported2010-2017

Author’sowngraph.Sources:Jelpkeetal.(2017);Teutebergetal.(2018)

Registrationofaforeign-nationalasobligedtoreturndoesnotautomaticallyleadtothe

initiation of deportation proceedings. Enforcement is either prohibited by law or

practicallyimpossibleinsomeoftheindividualcases.Thedistinctionbetweenthelegal

statusofadecisionwhichcanbe‘non-enforceable’or‘enforceable’accordingtoSection

58oftheResidenceActiscritical.Adeportationdecisionisonlylegallyenforceablewhen

thepersonconcernedhasnotleftthecountryvoluntarily,ifnofurtherstaywasgranted

orifthesupervisionofreturnbyauthorities,e.g.,apoliceescortisdeemedinevitablefor

reasons of public security and order (Section 58.1 Residence Act). A further stay is

grantedtopeoplewhoareotherwiseobligedtoreturniftheyareeligibletoenjoythe

protectionoflegalsafeguards(DeportationBans).Thus,somepeoplewhoappearinthe

statisticaboveasobligedtoreturn,arefactuallyprotectedfromdeportationbylaw.The

nextsectionpresentsdeportationbansdefinedintheresidenceact.

40

6.3DeportationBansandDuldung

Section 60 of the Residence Act on deportation bans is crucial from a human rights

perspective,anditisadistinctfeatureinthelegaldimensionoftheGermanasylumand

deportation regime. It introduces the provisions of the EU Directive 2004/38/EC

(Qualificationdirective)intonationallawandentailssafeguardsforasylumseekerswho

wouldotherwisefacedeportationafterhavingtheircasesrejected(Molitor2018)

Section 60.1 of the Residence Act quotes the 1951 Refugee Convention and

establishes protection fromdeportation for all individualswhowere granted refugee

status.Accordingtotherule,nopersonshallbedeportedifheorshefacesathreattoher

lifeorlibertyonaccountofherrace,religion,nationality,ormembershipofaparticular

socialgrouporpoliticalconvictioninthestatewheretheyshallotherwisebedeported.

However,underSection60.8thisprotectionmechanismisqualifiedsothatSection60.1

does not apply if the foreign national is regarded as a threat to the general public of

Germany,e.g.,afteracriminalconvictionforseriouscrimes.Thisprovisionreflectsthe

tension between human rights protection and security concerns both expressedwith

regardstotheresidenceofforeignnationals.Whileanexplicitreferencetotheobligations

undertheinternationalrefugeeregimeismade,thestatestillkeepstheoptiontoinitiate

deportationproceedingsapersonifheorsheisthoughttoposeathreat.

In case BAMF finds no protection reasons that justify political asylum or

subsidiaryprotectionduringtheasylumproceduretheauthorityhastoexaminewhether

a deportation ban according to section 60.2,5 or 7 of the ResidenceAct applies. 60.2

ResidenceActreferstotheAsylumActandprohibitsdeportationofanindividualtoa

countrywhereheorshefacesseriousharm.60.5prohibitsdeportationifitwouldconflict

with provisions of the 1950 convention for the Protection of Human Rights and

Fundamental Freedoms while the section that follows asserts that deportation is

unlawfulifthepersonconcerned“facesasubstantialconcretedangertohislifeandlimb

orliberty”(Section60.7ResidenceAct).Thisincludessevereorlife-threateningillnesses

thatwouldsignificantlyworsenincaseofdeportation.Thesesafeguardsarecrucialwith

regardstolegalcontestationofevictionordersanddeportationproceedingsrespectively.

AdministrativecourtsaretheappealsbodyintheGermanasylumanddeportation

system.IndividualsmayfilecomplaintsaboutadministrativedecisionsbyBAMFandthe

localimmigrationauthorities.Accordingtothelaw,asylumapplicantshavetherightto

41

appealagainstanegativeasylumdecisionoradeportationorder.Thepossibilitiesand

technicalities of such appeal procedures as part of the asylum system are verymuch

depending on the quality of the decisionmade by BAMF. If a claimwas found being

inadmissible (e.g.,Dublincase)ormanifestlyunfounded, thepersononly isgivenone

weeks’timetofileanappeal,othershavetimeupto30daystohavetheircasereviewed

atanadministrativecourt.Furthermore,affectedpersonswhofileacomplaintagainsta

Dublindecisionneedtorequestasuspensiveeffectofthecourtappealseparatelywhich

willpreventinitiationofdeportationproceedings,asopposedtootherappealsprocesses

whichautomaticallysuspenddeportationuntilthefinalcourtruling.

During the past two years, administrative courts have become an increasingly

important instance in the asylum and deportation system. According to a publication

fromtheBundestagbytheendof2017,atotalof372.443opencasesconcerningasylum

were pending at courts in Germany. While 16,1 % of BAMF asylum decisions were

appealed in 2015, this quota almost tripled and reached49,8% in 2017 (Jelpke et al.

2018). This important development will be analyzed in chapter 6.1. on the role of

management consultancies. In case BAMF, the immigration authority or the

administrative court find a reason for a deportation ban, the enforcement of the

deportationdecisionistemporarilysuspended.Whiletheobligationtoreturnformally

persists,thepersonreceivesDuldung,(toleration)status.HeideCastañeda(2010:253)

hascalledthisstatusa“ratherundignifiedcondition”thatmarkspeopleasneither“fully

legal nor illegal and does not alter the fact that the personmust leave the country.”

Furthermore,itentailsahypervisibility(Ibid.)totheauthoritiesaspersonswithDuldung

statusareobligedtoremaininthedistricttheywereassignedtobythedispersalsystem.

The next section discusses a distinct type of deportation, so-called “Dublin

transfers.”Aswaspointedoutabove,aconsiderableproportionofforcedremovalsfrom

Germany take place inside Europe in concurrence with the rules of the Dublin III

Regulation.ThispaperarguesthatDublindeportationsareadistinctfeatureoftheEU-,

andGermandeportationsystem.

6.4DublinProcedure&Transfers

OneofthefirststepsduringtheasylumprocedureinoneofBAMFregionalfieldofficesis

determinationofwhetherGermany is responsible for examining the application, or if

another signatory state of the so-called Dublin III Regulation (Regulation (EU) No

42

604/2013)alreadyreceivedanasylumapplicationorprovidedprotectiontotheperson

in question. This is done by way of taking and comparing fingerprints of asylum

applicantswiththeEURODACdatabasethroughwhichmember-statesoftheEUandfour

EU-non-membersshareinformationonpersonsregisteredasasylumseekersinEurope

(RegulationEU604/213).EURODAC, (EuropeanDactyloscopy)maybeunderstoodas

‘digitalborder’ordigitalsurveillancesystemofasylumseekersmovements inEurope

andwasintroducedtoputineffecttheDublinRegulationIII,signedbyallEU-member-

statesaswellasNorway,Iceland,LiechtensteinandSwitzerland(BAMF2018a).

IfitisdeterminedduringtheprocedurethatanotherDublinstateisresponsible,

then the asylum application in Germany will be classified inadmissible according to

Section29oftheAsylumAct.Itisthenassumedthatapersoncanfindprotectionwithin

thecountryoffirstregistrationandthatareturntothatcountrymustbetheconsequence

(BAMF2018).Iftheotherresponsiblemember-stateapprovesatake-chargerequest,a

transferhastotakeplacewithinsixupto18monthsafterapproval.Incasethedeadline

isnotmet,Germanybecomesresponsibleforprocessingtheasylumclaim.Assoonasa

DublindecisioncomesintoeffectBAMFinformstheimmigrationauthoritythatregisters

thepersonasobligedtoreturn,withoutgrantingadeadlineforvoluntaryreturnwhich

then initiatesdeportationproceedings.Therefore,Dublin transfersareusuallycarried

outasdeportations.

Figure8:DublinrequestsandTransfersfromGermany2010-2017

Author’sowngraph.Source:Teutebergetal.(2018)

43

Asfigure8shows,thenumberoftake-backrequestsfromGermanytoothersignatory

statesoftheDublinIIIregulationhascontinuouslyrisenfrom9432requestsin2010to

64.267 in 2017.However, the number of actual transfers remains low even though a

risingshareoftherequestsissuedbyGermanyarebeingapprovedbyreceivingmember

states.Only11%of the transfersGermanyrequesteddid takeplace in2017.Still, the

numberofDublindeportationshadalmostdoubledfrom2016to2017when7102people

weredeportedtootherEuropeanstates.

Thereasonsforthegapbetweentakebackrequestsandenforceddeportations

aremanifold.Inmanycases,itisimpossibleforauthoritiestoenforceadecisioninthe

timeframedefinedintheDublinregulation(fieldnotes).Furthermore,legalguarantees

existthatprotectvulnerable individualswhostillappear inthestatisticsasobligedto

return.Minors, for instance,mayonlybe transferred toanotherDublin-state if family

membersareresidingthereandtheauthoritiescanguaranteeasafereunificationupon

arrivalthatisinlinewiththebestinterestofthechild.Additionalsafeguardsareinplace

forpersonswhoneedtreatmentorsupportfromcloserelativesduetoseriousillness.If

therelativeortheperson inneedof treatmentwouldundernormalcircumstancesbe

obliged to move to another EU-member-state, the member-state where the person

resides usually does not separate the family unit according to Art. 16 of the Dublin

regulation in case a relationship of dependency was identified (Art. 16 Dublin III

Regulation). Besides these and other legal guarantees for affected persons already

implemented in the Dublin III agreement, the reality of failing asylum and reception

systemsinsouthernEuropeanstatesaswellaspoliticalunwillingnessandpracticesof

non-cooperationinstateslikeHungaryinfluencethepotentialofGermanauthoritiesto

deportpeopleundertheDublinagreement.

During thepastyears,especially since2014, risingnumbersofasylumseekers

havearrivedatthesouthernbordersofEurope.Theyaremetbyasylumandreception

systems-especiallyinItalyandGreece-thathaveproventobeinadequatetoreceive,

accommodate andprotect asylum seekers according to the standardsof theCommon

European Asylum System (ECRE 2018; UNHCR 2018). The Dublin system has been

heavily criticized by scholars, politicians and public actors for placing a burden on

countriessuchasItalyandGreece(ECRE2018,Lavenex2018).Duetotheirgeographical

proximitytocrisisregionsintheMiddleEastandstatesontheAfricancontinentfrom

whichpeopledepartedintheirsearchforprotectioninEurope,ItalyandGreecesawthe

44

mostsignificantnumberoffirstarrivals.Asreceptionandaccommodationsituationsfor

asylumseekersfurtherdeteriorated,courtsfoundthatfundamentalrightsbreachesmay

occurwhenasylumseekerswhowereregisteredinGreeceorItalyandhadmovedonto

otherEU-memberstateswerereturned.Oneofthemostprominentandinfluentialcases

wastheNovember2014rulingbytheGrandChamberoftheEuropeanCourtofHuman

Rights’(ECtHR).InTarakhelvs.Switzerland,thecourtruledthatauthoritiesinsending

memberstatesneedtoobtainindividualguaranteesastowhetherthefundamentalrights

of theapplicantswouldbemet,particularly insituationswheretheabilityofmember

statestoprovideadequatelivingconditionswascalledintoquestion.Inasimilarvein,

theGermanConstitutionalCourtruledthattransferstomember-statesthatwerefound

tohavesystemic flawsregarding thereceptionandasylumprocedureconditionsmay

onlytakeplaceifindividualguaranteesaregranted(Asylumineurope2018a).

Therefore,beforedeportationstoItaly,Hungary,Malta,ItalyorGreecemaytake

place, BAMF is obliged to request individualized guarantees, that returnees will be

treated in accordancewith EU asylum directives. This situation has led to an almost

completehaltoftransferstoGreeceandHungaryin2017.Beyondgeneralsuspensionof

deportation, some individual cases thatwere brought before administrative courts in

Germany were ruled in favor of the applicants, suspending their transfers to Dublin

signatorystates(Asylumineurope2018a).Themotivesforasylumseekersandrefugees

to re-migrate or continue their journey fromanotherEuropean state toGermany are

manifold. As highlighted above, dire accommodation and reception conditions may

motivate people to move on. However, also social or community relations and job

opportunitiesmaycountasmotivatorsforsecondarymovement(frommyfieldnotes).

Thenextsectionpresentsthedeportationenforcementprocedureinmoredetail,

highlighting the interaction between authorities belonging to different levels of

government and presenting recent changes in the deportation corridor that connects

Hamburgwithmultipledestinationsofforcedremoval.

6.5DeportationEnforcementintheCaseofHamburg

Hamburg’sgovernmentsupervisesoneofthelocalimmigrationauthoritiesinGermany,

responsiblefortheadministrationofmattersrelatedtotheresidenceofforeign-nationals

inHamburgincludingdeportations:theEinwohnerzentralamt(CentralCitizensOffice).

In case a person is registered as enforceably obliged to return, appeals have been

45

unsuccessful, and no deportation bans apply, caseworkers working for the local

immigrationauthorityoughttoorganizetheforcedremovalofaperson.Thisincludesthe

acquisitionoftraveldocumentswhichmayinvolvetheembassiesofreceivingstatesand

take considerable time depending on whether a readmission agreement (Cassarino

2014) is inplacewith thecountryoforigin (frommy fieldnotes).Oncedeportation is

ordered,aflightisbookedand,ifdeemednecessary,securityescortsareorganizedwhen

adatefortheremovalprocedureisfixed.Thepersonconcernedreceivesadeportation

notewithout theactualdateonwhich theproceduremay takeplace.Before,October

2015 deportees were informed about the date of enforcement. However, since an

amendmenttotheAsylumandResidencelawcalledAslypaket1enteredintoforceon

October25,2015,deportationenforcementiscarriedoutwithoutpriornotice(Section

59.1 Residence Act). Rejected asylum seekerswho live in public accommodation, are

ordered to remain in their apartments during night time as preparation for the

enforcement procedure. If a person has not appeared at hearings in the foreign

administrationorhas“shownthewill”toabscondandpreventdeportation,authorities

mayalsorequestpre-removaldetentionwhichwillbedecidedbyacourt.

At this stage of the procedure, the immigration authorities start cooperating

closelywithanotherprincipalpublicauthority in thedeportationsystemofGermany:

The German Federal Police (GFP). This authority oversees border control, aviation

security,protectionoffederalagenciesandpublicinfrastructuresuchasrailwaystations

(Annual Report of the GFP 2017). The GFP is responsible for controlling all border-

crossings,includingtheforcedborder-crossingofdeportees.Thus,theyarepresentatall

GermanAirports and have specified deportation units that carry out tasks related to

forcedremoval.TheGFPworkforthelocalimmigrationoffices,providingadministrative

assistance (Amtshilfe) as their jurisdiction ends at the airport. Mostly early in the

morning,achargeoftheimmigrationauthorityandlocalpolice(Landespolizei)willenter

theresidenceofthepersonsconcerned,orderthemtopacktheirbelongingsandfollow

them to the police car. If the person resists to follow police orders, officers can use

coercion,e.g., to subdueandhandcuff theperson,orusecablestraps toconstrain the

movement of the deportees. Afterward, the deportee is driven to a specified airport.

Standard travel-busses are used for this taskwhenmore people are “collected” for a

charter flightdeportation(different typesofenforcementproceduresaredescribed in

section6.5.2below).

46

Officers of the GFP receive deportees from the local immigration authorities at the

airport.Atthismoment,theresponsibilityfortheenforcementprocedureistransferred

totheBundespolizei.Thefederalauthoritiesthensearchthepersonandherluggageand

bringthemtoaclosedwaitingareawherehe/sheisunderconstantsupervision.Incases

whereadetentionenactmentexists,thepersonisimmediatelybroughtintoaclosedcell.

Thedeportee’straveldocumentsarehandedover,andtheairlineisinformedwhether

thepersonhasarrivedandwhattheirrisksassessmentlevelis.Beforedeparture,officers

checkinthebaggage,bringdeporteestotheplaneorescortthemduringthewholeflight.

Thisisusuallydoneasapre-boardingprocesshappeningbefore“regular”flight-guests

arriveincaseswherecommercialstandardflightsareusedfordeportation.ThentheGFP

issuere-entrybansthatarenotedindeportees’identificationpapersandregisteredin

theborderpolicedatabase.Ifatanystageoftheprocedure,thepersonconcernedrefuses

to follow police orders, officersmay use handcuffs or a so-called body cuff. This is a

specializedbelt,withattachedhandcuffs.Withthisdevice,themovementofapersoncan

beconstrainedcompletely.Thepoliceescortsreceivespecializedtraininginusingthese

devicesandotherformsofcoercion.Aftertheycompletedthistraining,theyreceivethe

titlePersonenbegleiterLuft(PBL-personalescortair).AsofOctober2018,theGFPhas

1190PBL forces at their disposal all ofwhich also carry out other duties anddonot

exclusivelyattenddeportationproceedings(Thomaeetal.2018).Asmentionedinthe

introduction, the trainingof the forceswas introducedafter thedeathofAminAgeeb.

PolicemenandwomenaretrainedaccordingtotheBest-Rück-Luft,aconfidentialpaper

thatincludesthenationalstandardsfordeportationproceduresthatwerealsoaproduct

of the Ageeb case. In the next section, statistical data regarding deportations from

Hamburgispresentedandanalyzed.

6.5.1DeportationsfromHamburgin2017

In2017,atotalnumberof950peopleweredeportedfromHamburgairport.59%ofthe

deportationswereexecutedontheorderofHamburg’slocalimmigrationauthority(light

blue).The remainingdeportationswereexecutedon theorderof authorities inother

federal states, which use the deportation corridor that connects Hamburg with

destinations of forced removal. The table below shows that the total number of

deportations fromHamburg airport (dark blue) has increased severely from 2013 to

47

2015,yetitisnowdroppingagain.ThestatisticofdeportationscarriedoutbytheGFPat

HamburgairportonbehalfofHamburgauthoritiesshowsasimilartrajectory.

Figure9:DeportationsfromHamburg2010-2017

Author’sowngraph.Sources:Jelpkeetal.(2017);Schneider(2018)

One possible explanation for this decline in total numbers concerns the deportation

infrastructureinHamburg.CharterflightdeportationsfromHamburgarecarriedoutby

theGFP,usingaspecialized terminal.These typeofdeportation flightscarryup to80

deporteestodestinationsofforcedremovalinaday.Thus,airportsfromwhichseveral

charter deportations start everyweek record high total numbers of deportations per

year:Dusseldorf:4854,FrankfurtamMain:6756(cf.Jelpkeetal.2018).However,asthe

airport inHamburg iscurrentlyreconstructed, thecharterterminalcannotbeusedas

frequently, and most of the deportees leave Hamburg airport aboard of regular

commercial flights.Theseusuallycarrynotmorethantwoorthreedeporteesatonce.

Still, thisdoesnotmean, thatpeoplewho facedeportationontheorderofHamburg’s

immigrationauthorityarelesslikelytobeplacedoncharterflights.Beingregisteredand

residinginHamburgdoesnotautomaticallymeanthattheeventualdeportationwilltake

placefromthatlocation.Therefore,adistinctionneedstobemadebetweendeportations

fromHamburgAirportanddeportationexecutedontheorderofHamburg’simmigration

authority. Figure 10 below shows the airports that were used for deportations by

Hamburg’simmigrationauthorityinthelastquarterof2017.

48

Figure10:LandRoutesofDeporteesfromHamburg2017(4thQuarter)

Author’sowngraph.Source:Schneider(2018)

Thus,deportationstakeplaceininterregionalnetworks,connectingcitieswithairports

andfinallywithdestinationsofforcedremoval.Thistypeofmapcouldbegeneratedfor

other cities inGermanyaswell.Only14 cities inGermanyhost international airports

wherespecializeddeportationpoliceunitsarepresent.Inthenextsection,differenttypes

offorcedremovalproceduresaredescribedaccordingtoobservationsattheairportof

Hamburg.

6.5.2TypesofForcedRemovalProcedures

Currently,atleastfourdifferenttypesofremovalproceduresexistinGermany,andthey

differaccordingtotheso-calledriskassessmentandactorsinvolved.Furthermore,ineach

ofthesetypesofenforcementprocedures,policeofficersusedifferentlevelsofforce.

Type(1)isaforcedremovalofanindividualorfamilywithoutanypoliceescort

onboardofacommercialflight,type(2)isaforcedremovalwithanescortonboardofa

49

commercialflight,type(3)isremovalonboardofacharterflightcarryingonlydeportees

and type (4) is a small charter flight, booked for one or a few deportees. Usually,

authoritiesseektodeportall“obligedtoreturn”personsusingtype1flights.However,

duetothepresenceofothercustomersonboard,pilots,whohavetheresponsibilityfor

safetyonboardmayrefuse tocarry theperson if theriskassessmentshows, that the

deporteewouldrefusetocomplywiththeordersoftheairplanestaff.Therefore,ifatype

1approach“fails”asecuritypoliceescortof2-3personswillbeorganizedforanother

attempt.

Authorities refer to “failure” in thecontextofdeportationenforcementwhena

procedure was canceled, and the deportee stays in Germany. This occurs when, for

example,deporteesrefusetofollowtheinstructionsofairlinestafforwhencourtrulings

(Eilantrag)oracutemedicalreasons(e.g.,severeinjuries)prohibitacontinuationofthe

enforcement procedures in the last minutes. However, what authorities perceive as

“failure”isviewedas“relief”bythoseaffected(fieldnotes).Chapter7.5shedslighton

this difference between the two perspectives in greater detail. When an escorted

deportationattemptalsofails,thepersonwillberegisteredforacharterflight,whereno

public(exceptingairlinestaff)ispresentandwherepoliceuseallinstrumentsavailable,

anddirectforce/constrainttoensureadepartureoftheperson.Type(4)isreservedfor

themost“complicated”casesoriftheGermanstatehasinterestindeportingaperson

(e.g.,convictedterrorists).Medicalcharterswhicharespeciallyequippedsmalljet-planes

carryingmedicalequipmentalsofallunderthiscategory.Usually,theseplanesareused

to transfer patients from abroad back to Germany, provided as a service by travel

insurancecompanies(frommyfieldnotes).

Sofar,thispaperdescribedandmappedthedeportationsysteminHamburgand

Germany, described the legal-administrative framework, the role of public actors and

presentedsomeofthecrucialdevelopmentsthatoccurredbetween2012-2017.Nowwe

turn to an analysis of the role of private actors in the deportation system. It will be

discussed whether deportation is increasingly becoming a business in and of itself.

Furthermore,theresearchquestionswillbeaddressedinthissection.

50

7.Public-PrivateInteractioninDeportationCorridors

Five significant areas of change in the assemblage of theGermandeportation system

relatedtopublic-privateinteractionswereidentifiedduringtheauthor’sfieldwork.Thus,

thenextsectionissubdividedintofiveparts.Section7.1addressestherecentcooperation

betweengovernmentalagenciesandmultinationalconsultingfirms.Section7.2analyzes

theongoingdigitizationoftheasylumanddeportationsysteminGermany.Section7.3

sheds light on the role of international organizations and private corporations in the

establishmentofdeportationcorridorsundertheumbrellaofdevelopmentnetworksand

humanitarianism.Theroleofmedicalexpertsandrecentlegaldevelopmentsconcerning

documentationof illnesseswillbeanalyzedinsection7.4.Thefinalsectionbeforethe

conclusionanalyzestheroleofcarriersandtransportationfirms,deportees’resistance

andthe“Anti-DeportationIndustry.”

It will be argued, that using deportation systems as inward migrated border

controldevelopsalongtrajectoriescomparabletoprocessesofborderscapingatexternal

frontiersasoutlinedinsection5.4(Lemberg-Pedersen2015).

7.1SpeedingupProcedures-TheRoleofMultinationalConsultancyFirms

In 2015 an exceedingly large number of asylum applications challenged the existing

asylum and reception system in Germany. The reception centers and responsible

authorities in Germany were simply not capable of processing the large number of

applications and providing essential services in due time to all applicants. From the

administrativeperspective,animmensebacklogofasylumcasespiledupintheFederal

MigrationAgency(BAMF)overashortperiodoftime.In2015morethan300.000open

applicationswerepending,yettheBundesamthadonly2000caseworkerstoprocessthis

workload(Lobenstein2017).Becauseofthisbacklog,asylumseekerswerefacingyears

ofwaitingtimeinreceptioncenters(thatwerenotequippedforhostingpeopleoverlong

periods)untiltheyreceivedafinaldecisionontheirapplication.Atthesametime,public

criticism towards Angela Merkel's asylum policy pressured the German Federal

Governmenttofindworkablesolutionsandmakeeffectivedecisionsonhowtohandle

thesituation(Biselli2018;Bundesregierung2015;Lobenstein2017;Lutz&Bewarder

2016).Thetrajectorythatfollowedisaremarkableexampleofincreasingprivate-public

interactionintheareaofasylumanddeportationpolitics.Inthesearchforsolutionsto

51

this“unmanageableproblem,”theGermanFederalGovernmentdesignatedFrank-Jürgen

Weise who led the Federal Labor Agency as the person to seek solutions to the

immigration/deportationissues.Inhisofficialcapacity,Weisedecidedtohireexternal

consultants and called in multinational management consulting firms McKinsey &

Partners,RolandBergerandErnestandYoungwhoweretaskedwithstreamliningthe

asylum procedure and transforming the administrative structure of BAMF (Stanley-

Becker 2017).McKinseywas had already been hired earlier byWeise for the task of

converting of the Federal Labor Agency. McKinsey‘s take on migration and refugee-

relatedissuesisreflectedintheir2016reportPeopleontheMove,publishedbyin-house

thinktankMcKinseyGlobalInstitute.Thepaperexaminesglobalmigrationandrefugee

movesinthelightofeconomicanalysisandaccordingtotheviewsofbusinessleaders.

Thereportstatesthatthemovementofpeoplecanincreasetheproductivityofeconomies

and benefit aging societies of receiving countries (McKinsey 2016: 3). The authors

concluded that using migrants’ economic potential depends heavily on the ability of

societiestointegratenewlyarrivingimmigrants.

Changes that were made during and after the involvement of McKinsey were

publicly communicated under the buzzword “Integrated Refugee Management“

(Bundesregierung2015).Onecrucialaspectwasanewcategorizationorclusteringof

asylumseekersduringtheprocedureaccordingtotheprotectionquota.Asylumseekers

fromcountrieswithhighrecognitionrates(suchasSyria)wereplacedinClusterA,those

whowouldprobablyfacearejection(safethirdcountriessuchasKosovo)wereincluded

in cluster B, cluster C was for complicated cases (Iran, Somalia) and cluster D was

reserved for Dublin cases (Lobenstein 2017). Furthermore, consultants proposed

changing the job profiles of caseworkers and increasing their workloads. Before the

reform,thesamepersonwouldinterviewasylumseekersandmakethedecision,butwith

thenewsystem,decisionsarenowmadebyadifferentpersonwhodrawsonlyonthe

reports andpapersprovidedby the interviewer.While this process saves time, these

important,life-alteringdecisionsarenowmadebyanindividualthathasneverspoken

tothepersonwhoseeksprotection(Ibid.2017).Oneoftheeffectsofthenewsped-up

decision practice is an increase in rejections. However, this does not lead to more

enforceable obligations to return andmore deportations. As the quality of decisions

deteriorated,individualswerebetterabletoleveragetheirpossibilitiestoappealagainst

BAMFdecisions(Ibid.2017).AsastaffmemberofthelocalBAMFbranchinHamburg,

52

pointedout to theauthor, theirworkplacewaschangeddramaticallybothduringand

afterthecrisis.Theagencyhirednewstaff,mostlyso-called“deciders”andtranslators,

whoeitherconductinterviewsormakedecisions.

Furthermore,aqualitymanagementsystemwasimplemented,andtheso-called

Cluster systemwasadopted.Thisnewapproach increased thepressureon individual

caseworkers as they need to meet decision quotas and have to attend so-called

performancedialogueswheretheirworkiscloselymonitored(Ibid.2017).Theeffectsof

thismanagementturnintheasylumadministrationarenotpleasingfromahumanrights

perspective.Fromanoutsiderperspective,itseemsthattheinitialproblemisfarfrom

beingsolved.Insteadofprovidingasustainablesolutiontothebacklogproblemofthe

administrationoutlinedabove,casesnowpileupinadministrativecourtsasthequality

of BAMF decisions appears to have deteriorated. Now, asylum seekers not only face

insecurityabouttheirstatusbutalsohavetowaitlongerfortheirfinalcourtdecisions.

Between 2015 and the first quarter of 2017 the German Federal Government paid

approximately €20 million to McKinsey for “analysis, process visualization and

optimizing.”Another€6.5millionwasallocatedtoRolandBerger.

McKinseywasnotsimplyhiredtostreamlinetheasylumauthority’sprocess.In

2016theGermanFederalGovernmentplacedanorderforareportontheenforcement

gapmentionedaboveandaskedMcKinseytofindsolutionsforproblemsarisingduring

deportationenforcement.Theconfidentialreportcost€1.8millionandwasdeliveredthe

endof2016(Lutz&Bewarder2016).Itstatedthatbytheendof2017morethan480.000

peoplewouldbeobliged to return to theirhome countriesorother third states from

Germany.Intheiranalysis,theconsultantsproposed14measuresfora“moreeffective

return policy.“Most significantly,McKinsey called for the establishment ofmore pre-

removaldetentionfacilities,morefundsforso-calledvoluntaryreturn,consequentdigital

tracking of foreigners in the central foreigners' database (AZR), centralization of

responsibilitiesandadditionalstaffintheforeignadministrations(Ibid.2016).Also,the

authors of the study proposed to “limit the economic flexibility“ of rejected asylum

seekerswhoareregisteredasobligedtoreturnbyresortingtoanin-kindprovisionof

socialbenefits(Ibid.2016).Thelogicbehindthis lastproposal leadstotheconclusion

thatMcKinseyanalysts viewedasylumseekersas economicactorswho relyon social

benefits. Put differently, the argument of the proposal states: simply take away their

money,andtheywillleave.This“reveals”anobvious,butverycrucialpoint:McKinsey

53

analystsareexpertsineconomics,notinhumanrights.Still,theywerehired(inreturn

for incredible rates of up to €2000/hour) for solving complex “problems,” involving

international- and domestic residence and asylum law. What they produced, are

“solutions” based onmanagement thought, lacking both empathy for the situation of

affectedpeople,andin-depthknowledgeofthesubjectatstake.

Furthermore, the McKinsey report created fear of an increasing deportation

enforcementgap.Aswasmentionedabove,thelegalcategory“obligationtoreturn”needs

to be handled with great care and must be seen in context. This label does not

automaticallyentailthatapersonhastoleaveGermany.Legalremediesmaybeavailable,

anddeportationbansmayapply.Furthermore,thedataintheforeigners'databasemay

beincorrect.Theactualnumberofpeopleobligedtoreturnin2017was56.827,instead

of480.000projectedbyMcKinsey(seetable5inchapter3above).Thus,oneseesthat

theconsultancycreatedafalsestatisticalpictureofthesituationthat,despiteitsflaws,

has led toactualchangesof law,decision-makingproceduresand thecreationofnew

deportationinfrastructure.

ThiswasalsotrueinthecaseofHamburgastheSenat(localgovernment)decided

toreconstructitsdetentionfacilityandaspiredtomakemoreuseofdetentiontoeffect

departureofdeportees(fieldnotes).Thereconstructionthatwasfinishedattheendof

2018wasunderpinnedwith a new law that provides a broaderuse of pre-departure

detention. It entered into force on April 10th, 2018 (cf. Hamburgische Bürgerschaft

2018).Todaythereare20placesavailableinHamburg'sdetentionfacility,placeswhich

are alsousedbyneighboring federal states.Nevertheless, aswas shownabove, using

detention has not led to an increase in the numbers of deportation. The next section

outlinestherecentdrivetodigitizetheasylumanddeportationsystembeforeconcluding

withadiscussionoftheroleofprivateconsultancyfirms.

7.2DigitizationoftheInternalBorderscape

Aspointedoutearlier,animportantstrategyproposedbyMcKinseywasthedigitization

of foreigner administration procedures. This section highlights how processes of

digitization change the asylum- and the deportation system. Private actors play a

significantroleintheseprocessesofre-configuringtheassessmentphaseandchanging

thefunctionalityofinternalborderscapes.Humansarebeingreplacedbymachineswhich

arebecominganintegralpartofcriticaldecision-makingprocedures.

54

In2017,BAMFstartedusingnewIT-Systems(Jelpkeetal.2018a)allofwhichaim

atdeterminingtheidentityofasylumseekers.Oneofthemisatransliterationapplication

(TraLitA)withwhichBAMFseekstotranslateArabiclettersintotheLatinalphabetto

avoidambiguitiesinitsdataset.Thesystemcost€3.1millionandisdesignedtoidentify

whetheranamestatedbyanapplicantistypicalfortheregionthepersonclaimstocome

from.WhileTraLitAworksreasonablycorrectlywith “regular”names,unusualnames

andespeciallydata related toMaghreb states are identified inonly35%of the cases.

Therefore, in 65% of the cases, the system produces a dataset that creates suspicion

regarding the veracity of the informationprovidedby the applicant. Even though the

systemis(intheory)notadecisivefactorintheoutcomeoftheapplication(yet),ageneral

suspicionraisedbythesystemmightstillacttoinformtheconversationbetweencase-

workerandapplicantandinfluencethiscriticalprocedure(Biselli2018).

Thesecondsystemthatwasintroducedin2017intheasylumsystemassemblage

is a language detection tool created by the private company Nuance. The company

received a total of € 2.1million until 2019 for licenses and support from the federal

agency.Furtherextensionofthelicenseswillentailfurthercosts.Accordingtojournalist

and IT-expert Anna Biselli (2018), the system is not capable of correctly analyzing

unusual dialects and creates insecurities when case-workers get wrong information

regardingtheoriginofaperson.Thus,itcanbestatedthatdiscriminationisencodedin

bothsystems.Ifapersonhappenstohaveanamethatis“atypical”inaspecificregionor

happenstospeakadialectthatisunknowninthedatabase,heorsheismorelikelytobe

suspectedofidentityfraud.

Of particular concern to those worried about privacy and personal rights of

asylumseekersistheuseofthethirdnewITsystembyMSAB,asthissystemiscapable

of retrieving data frommobile devices such as smartphones. In 2017, the law on the

improvementofdeportationenforcementpavedthewayforitsusage(Bundesgesetzblatt

2017).Underthenewrules,itislegallypossibleforBAMFcaseworkerstorequestfull

access to asylum seekers’ private data, in case they cannot prove their identity with

documents.Ifapersonrefusestounlockherphoneandshareinformation,authorities

canrequest thedataset fromthetelephoneprovider(Jelpkeetal.2018a).Thesystem

retrieves incoming and outgoing phone calls, chats, GPS positions, app data, and

identificationdataforapps.Whileitisclaimedthatacontent-analysisisnotmade,the

possibilitiesarefar-rangingandcreatecovetousness(Biselli2018).Theaimofthesystem

55

is reconstructing the route a person has taken to reach Germany and verifying the

informationprovidedininterviewsbytheasylumseekers.Thissystemwillcost€11.2

millionupuntiltheendof2019,anditwasprovidedbyprivatedataforensiccompany

MSABfromSweden.Thiscontractoroperatesgloballyandhasmilitaryinstitutionsand

secretservicesinitscustomerportfolio(MSAB2018).

Sofar,theMSABsystemhasbeenusedtoretrievedatafrom27.000phones.This

datawasanalyzedin9710ofthecases.Inonly2845casesthedatawasdeemedusable,

and in the end, less than 60 [sic!] cases of identity fraud or false statements were

identified (Jelpke et al. 2018a). Thus, each successful case of fraud-identification cost

taxpayersapproximately€187.000.Itisevidentthatthesystemissomewhatinefficient

from a cost perspective if the aim is to identify fraudulent information presented by

asylumapplicants.Atthesametimeusingthistoolisasevereintrusionintotheprivacy

ofindividualswhoseekprotection.Notonlycanauthoritiesaccessprivatedata,butthis

data is also stored for ten or more years (Biselli 2018). In addition, this process of

digitizationcreatesdependenciesbetween thestate institutions/actorsandproviders.

TheGermanFederalGovernmentstatesthatMSABemployeesdonothaveaccesstothe

personaldataof asylumseekers.However, forongoingmaintenanceandupdates, the

company must access the systems (Jelpke et al. 2018a). At the same time, the

Bundesregierunghasstatedrecently,thatitispossibletopreparefake-phones,carrying

datasetsthatprovideevidenceforaspecificflight-story(Ibid.).

MSABisnottheonlycompetitorintheglobalmarketofITsurveillanceanddata

forensics.BeforeBAMFconcludedacontractwiththeSwedishmultinationalcorporation

the authority ran a “Prove-of-Concept” program, testing software from two other

competitors:T3KandCellebrite.Duringthistestingphase,another€585.480werespent

bytheGermanFederalGovernmenttofindtheappropriateprovider(Jelpkeetal.2018a).

Thus,thedrivetodigitizeadministrationscreatesmarketsforeconomiccompetitionin

whichprivatecompaniesseektoselltheirproducts.

Intheend,thisdrivetodigitizeasylumproceduresmaybeviewedasasignificant

changeintheassemblageoftheinternalsurveillancesystemorborderscape.Detecting

identities and determining belonging and un-belonging seems to have become a task

carriedoutbymachines,whichareconfiguredandprovidedbyprivatecompanies.Ifwe

returntoGuattari’sandDeleuze'snotionoftheassemblage,itcanbenotedthatideasand

technologies provided by private actors from the field of software engineering and

56

management consulting arenowbeingplugged into (Deleuze&Guattari 1987: 4) the

asylumanddeportationsystem.Formersystemsandinstitutionsresponsibleforhuman

rights protection are transformed into laboratorieswhere new surveillance soft- and

hardwareistested.Thisdevelopmentisdrivenbythelogicofeconomiccompetitionin

whatcanbecalledamanagementturnintheasylumanddeportationregimeinGermany.

This chapter partly answered the main research question and aligned sub-

questions. Aswas argued in this chapter,management consulting firms and software

companies profit financially from the drive of the German state to deport unwanted

foreign-nationals. Now we turn to the role of NGOs and development companies in

deportationcorridors.Aswillbeargued,theyareactorsinprocessesofborderscaping,

engagingin“humanitarian”returnactivities.

7.3CorridorsofDignifiedReturn?–Public-PrivateInteractioninReturnNetworks

Efforts of the EU and Germany to establish deportation corridors are linked to

development initiatives and expanding networks and funding flows. This section

presentsarecentexampleofemergingdeportationcorridorsthatarebeingestablished

betweentheEUandAfghanistanframedinthevocabularyofhumanitarianism.Itwillbe

shownhowprivatecompaniesareinvolvedintheestablishmentofreturncorridorsand

networks.

TheEuropeanReturnandReintegrationNetwork(ERRIN)isajointprojectof16

European states, including Germany. The self-declared purpose of the network is

establishingservicesandprovidingcounselingandreintegrationtovoluntaryorforced

returnees in their countries of origin. The focus of the program is the return and

reintegrationofvulnerablepersons,developmentofinnovativeconceptsintheareaof

returnand reintegration,developmentofmethods for the improvementofpre-return

counseling,andcooperationwith thirdcountries for the implementationofreturn(cf.

returningfromgermany.de2018).VoluntaryreturneesfromGermanymayreceiveupto

€2000perpersonor€3.300 for familiesplus€500whenavulnerabilitywasproven.

Forcedreturnees(deportees)maybeawardedupto€1000afterarrival.Accordingto

official statements, ERRIN offers counseling, job training, assistance with setting up

businessesandqualificationthroughlocalpartnersinthecountriesoforigin(cf.Ibid.).

Currently, ERRIN projects are present and available with services existing in sixteen

countries,includingAfghanistan,Iraq,andSudan.Privateactors,whoprovidecounseling

57

andreintegrationservicesinthecountrieswerechosenduringanEU-tenderprogram.

ThefundingforERRINstemsfromAMIFtheEU-AsylumMigrationandIntegrationFund

thatwas set up for the period from2014-2020with a total budget of€3.137billion.

AccordingtothedepartmentofmigrationandhomeaffairsoftheEU-Commission,the

priorities of the funding scheme are strengthening of the CEAS, legal migration and

integration, solidarity and support for EU-members most affected by migration and

asylumflowsand,asinthiscase,return(EC2018-Amif).

Thelargestshareor88%ofAMIFisallocateddirectlytoinstitutionsinmember-

states (in Germany BAMF) which administrate and distribute funding to projects

accordingtoasharedmanagementapproach.TheERRINtenderwasannouncedin2017

asaspecificactionprogrambythesixteenparticipatingcountriesandisadministeredby

theMinistry of Justice and Security in theNetherlands. The official text of the tender

messagestatedthatitaimedtoacquireserviceprovidersthatdeliverassistanceinthe

formofinformation,counseling,referral,andreintegrationtoreturnees.Accordingtothe

statement,itwasessentialfortheserviceproviderstohaveabroadnetworkregarding

return and reintegration in the country. The aim was to enable foreign nationals to

reintegrate and rebuild their life again after returning to their country

(neederlandenwereldwijd.nl2018).By the timeofpublishing the tender, its initiators

searchedforprivateprovidersin22countries.On1ofAugust2018,11contractswere

awarded to four different organizations (shown in the table below). For elevenother

countries,notenderwasreceived,ortheproposalswererejected.

Figure11:ResultsofEUTenderProgram(ERRIN2019-21)

Author’sowngraph.Source:EU-Supply.com(2018)

Theprocurement involves theestablishmentofa frameworkagreementwhile thenet

worthofthecontractwassetto1Europercontract,meaningservicesprovidedbythe

58

contractors will all be accounted for separately. As for transparency, the framework

agreements are not available publicly. However, it was possible to trace one of the

contractor’sactivitiestoshedlightonthenatureoftheinstitutionandbetterdescribethe

kindofnetworkcreatedaroundthereturnproject.

IRARAServicesLimitedwas awarded contracts for services inAfghanistan, Sri

LankaandBangladesh.IRARAisaprivatecompanyfromtheUKfoundedbyconsultant

JamieMcCallumin2017underthenameCorvidInternationalLimitedwithatotalcapital

of £300 in shares. It was rebranded on February 22, 2018, and registered under its

currentname.ThreeshareholdersincludingMcCallumownthecompany.Accordingto

thefinancialstatementofIRARAServicesLimited,intheperiodfromthe3rdofJanuary

to 31st of March, the company supplied services amounting to 141.173 GBP to

International Returns and Reintegration Assistance (Companieshouse.gov.uk 2018) a

non-profitorganizationalsocalledIRARAwhichisnotregisteredinthecharity-register

in the UK. According to their website, the non-profit provides re-integration and

counselingforreturneesthroughlocalpartners.InAfghanistanservicesareprovidedby

theAfghanCenterforExcellence(ACE),aconsultancyfirmbasedinKabulthat,according

toitswebsite,hassuccessfullyhelpedreturn1900peopletoAfghanistan,employed2700

peoplethroughownprograms,trained8000peopleandcompleted73differentprojects.

HowisthisrelatedtoHamburg,onemightask.DeportationstoAfghanistanaredisputed,

andnotallfederalstatesparticipateinthecharterflightstoKabulwhichregularlytake

place. Regardless of ongoing protest, Hamburg does, however, return people to

Afghanistan,claimingthat“only”individualswithcriminalrecordsandpeoplewhofaked

theiridentityorresistedtocooperatewithauthoritieswouldbereturned.Atthesame

time, authorities refer to the reintegration programs and voluntary returnees as

justificationsfortheirforcedremovalagenda(fieldnotes).Itisargued,thatarebuilding

process inAfghanistan depends onwell-educated returnees, and therefore influential

actorscontinuetoframe,assistedreturn,forcedremoval,andreintegrationinalanguage

ofhumanitarianism(cf.Fiedler2018).

In the case pointed out above EU funds for return projects are in this case

channeledthroughaprivatelimitedcompanytoanunregisteredcharitableorganization,

which is cooperating with a local partner (ACE) to provide return assistance. This

structure leaves many open questions and may serve as an example of the type of

networkstructurethatisestablishedinthefieldofreturnandreintegration.Itremains

59

unclearhowmanyEU-fundsare spentonwhatkindof servicesandwhathappens in

betweenthevariousstagesandthisleavesroomforfurtherresearch.Inthepast,non-

transparentfundingschemesandpublic-privateinteractioninthedevelopmentindustry

haveledtothemisuseoffunds,andinoneprominentcase,thisinvolvedtheparticipation

ofaGermandevelopmentcompany(Lemberg-Pedersen2015a).

Inaspectacularcasein2011,journalistsuncoveredascandalconnectedtoreturn

andreintegrationprojectsinIraqandAfghanistan.TheGermanFederalGovernmenthad

tasked the Berlin-based firm AGEF (Arbeitsgruppe Entwicklung und Fachkräfte) with

developing business opportunities in the two countries and running return- and

reintegrationprograms.Between1999and2010thecompanyhadaturnoverofaround

€52millionindevelopmentfundsfortheregionexcludingfurtherprojectscoordinated

by EU-member-states. An investigation in 2012 found that the CEO of AGEF Klaus

Dünnhaupthadsystematicallydeceivedhisclients, theGermanForeignOfficeandthe

MinistryofDevelopment.Bothreceivedbills forreintegrationservicesofpersonsthat

neverexistedorneveractuallyreturnedtoAfghanistan(Reisinger&Marquard2013).An

investigation by public accounting firm Pricewaterhouse Coopers later confirmed the

allegationsandconcluded,thatDünnhauptandhisconfidantsmisusedalmost€1million

inGermantaxmoney(Ibid.).

Againstthisbackground,itcanbelogicallystatedthattransparencyshouldbethe

keyobjectiveforallactivitiesinthefieldofdevelopment.Inthiscase,thenon-transparent

Asmentionedearlier,theEUandGermanycreatereturnnetworksandallocatefundsto

theactorsinthesenetworkswiththeaimofinnovatingreturnprocessesandestablishing

return corridors that allow for deportations, even to the war-ridden country of

Afghanistan.Ashasbeenexplicatedhere, companynetworksare created, andprivate

actorsprofitfromtheEU‘sandGermanysdrivetodeportunwantedforeign-nationalsto

their purported country of origin. Further research on the outcomes of these return

projectsisnecessary.Inthenextsection,theroleofprivateactorsinthefieldofreturn

counselinginthecaseofHamburgisdiscussed.

7.3.1ReturnNetworksintheLocalContext

Assistedvoluntaryreturnisoftenpresentedasthepreferablealternativetodeportation

asisitis“morehumaneandlessexpensive”(cf.ReturnHandbook;MinistryofInterior

2018).Aswasmentionedabove,consultancieshaveadvisedexpandingthisbranchofthe

60

removalindustryasitislesscostlyforthestatesandmayserveasaneffectivepartof

developmentpolicy.ReturnfundinginGermanywasfoundedin1979whentheso-called

REAG(ReintegrationandEmigrationProgramforAsylumSeekersinGermany)program

was introduced. Later the program was supplemented by the Government Assisted

RepatriationSystem(GARP)fundin1989beforethetworeturnfundingschemeswere

merged in 2000. Foreign-nationalswho seek to return to their country of originmay

applyforfundingfromtheREAG/GARPprogramwhichisfacilitatedbytheInternational

Organization for Migration (IOM 2018). Rejected Asylum seekers and other foreign-

nationalswhoareobligedtoreturnmayapplyforfinancialsupportfortravelexpenses

andaprivatebudgetinreturnforassisted“voluntary”departure.Figure12belowshows

thenumberofpeoplewhoparticipatedinthestate-fundedreturnprogramsfrom2013-

2017.Asonecanseethenumberofso-calledvoluntaryreturnshigherthanthenumber

ofdeportationsinthattime-span(cf.figure7,p.39).Thetrajectoryiscomparabletosome

extent,showingapeakinnumbersin2016,andnowdecliningagain.

Figure12:AssistedVoluntaryReturnsfromGermany2013-2017

Author’sowngraph.Source:Teutebergetal.(2018)

BAMFandlocalimmigrationauthoritiesbothofferreturncounselingservices,andsome

private entities engage in this field as well. The number of jobs for social workers,

languageteachersandothersinthefieldofmigrationandasylumhasgrownsignificantly,

afterthearrivalofrisingnumbersofpeopleseekingprotection(Spiegel2016).Duetoits

social state structure and historical reasons Germany has influential faith-based non-

governmentalorganizationsprovidingsocialservicesandcare.Caritas(catholicchurch)

andDiakonie(evangelicalchurch)beingthetwomostsignificantinthisarena.Diakonie

61

isoneofthesinglelargestemployerswithmorethan500.000employeesandmorethan

700.000 volunteers (cf. Diakonie 2018). This organization provides social services

beyondissuesrelatedtomigration,includingareassuchaselderlycare,careforhomeless

people and debt counseling to name a few. The social welfare state in Germany is

organizedaccordingtothesubsidiarityprinciplewhichmeansthatsocialservicesarenot

directlyrunbystateagenciesbutbyintermediarieswhoreceivefundingbythestateor

fromothersourcessuchasdonationsorEUfunds.Theintermediaries,inthiscase,faith-

basedNGOsprovide theactual servicebasedon the legal frameworkprovidedby the

legislature.CaritasandDiakoniedominatethismarket,(alongwithRedCross)andtheir

role in the field ofmigration is interesting. Both organizations advocate for refugees

rightsandtheprotectionofvulnerablepersonsandpromoteprotection.Workingtoward

this end, Diakonie and Caritas offer state- and EU-funded integration programs,

psychosocial services and run advocacy campaigns. However, due to the direct state

funding,itseemslogicaltoviewtheselargeandinfluentialactorsaspartlybelongingto

the public sector. While state officials do not direct their course of action, the

organizationsstilldependonstatefundingandthemaintenanceofgoodcooperationand

collaboration.Theambiguitiesandparadoxesthatfaceindividualactorsinthisfieldmay

bebestexemplifiedwithreferencetoassistedvoluntaryreturnactivity.

InHamburg, return counseling is provided by state authorities, directly in the

asylumreceptioncenter, the fieldofficeofBAMFand the foreignoffices. Immediately

upon arrival, asylum seekers are informed about the possibilities to return to their

countryoforiginwhichreflectsaclearpoliticalpriorityofseekingtoavoidlargenumbers

of costlydeportations.However, alsonon-stateactorsarealsoactive in this field. For

example, the Flüchtlingszentrum (Refugee-Center) is a charitable private limited

company,runbyCaritas,RedCross,andAWOandfundeddirectlybythecityofHamburg

aswellastheEU.Theirservicesincludelegalandsocialcounselinginmultiplelanguages

aswellasreturncounselingforpeoplewithprecariouslegalstatus.Theyarepartofa

network that also includes branches of charitable organizations abroad. According to

their self-understanding, counselors focus on creating possibilities for a “dignified

return“forpersonswhohaveexhaustedtheirlegalpossibilitiestostayinGermany.As

one respondent explained, return counseling is conducted in a way that leaves all

possibilities open to the client. This means that no one is pressured to leave. The

motivation to return has different sources. However, external pressures play an

62

important role, includingdire possibilities to enter a jobmarket for people holding a

Duldungstatusorfacingdiscriminatorybehaviorbyauthorities(fieldnotes).

AssistedvoluntaryreturncounselingisbasedontheprogramsREAG,andGARP,

two state initiatives which offer money to returnees. Recently the program claimed

renewedfameastheFederalMinistryoftheInteriorranamarketingcampaigninseveral

languagesofferingaspecialextrapaymenttoreturneesiftheydecidedtoleavebefore

the end of the year 2018. The campaign was run all over Germany using posters at

airports,railwaystations,androadbillboards.Itssloganread(translatedfromGerman):

YourCountry,YourFuture.Now!Offers for increasedreturnrewardswere translated

intomultiplelanguages(seepicturebelow).

Figure13:“Voluntary”ReturnCampaign2018

Source:Author’sphotograph

Whilethedirectinvolvementoftheexternalmanagementconsultantsisnotevidentin

thiscase,themanagementandmarketizationapproachtoreturnstillreverberatesinthis

project. Framing a campaign that should motivate asylum seekers to return to their

countriesoforigininmarketinglanguageisanewphenomenonthatneedsbecritically

analyzed. Public campaigning for return may create an aggravating atmosphere for

63

asylum seekers in which they feel unwanted. Furthermore, the campaign normalizes

secondary displacement by framing it as a mere consumer choice which is a clear

indicator of a marketization process taking place. Charitable organizations should

carefully reflect onwhether or not it is adequate to participate in this kind of return

management system as they run the risk of justifying such policies that view asylum

seekersasanexchangeablematterthatmaybetransferredbackincaseitisnotperceived

asusefulorneeded(forinstanceinthelabormarket).

Insum,thereturnsysteminGermanyseemsincreasinglyre-assembledaccording

tocost-benefitcalculationsframedinthelanguageofhumanrightsandprotection.The

next section zooms in on the role of a criticalgate-keeper in theGermandeportation

system:themedicalexpert.Sofar,theroleofdoctorshasnotbeenasignificantsubjectof

deportation studies even though they may have a decisive influence on deportation

trajectoriesandbenefiteconomically fromtheirparticipation indeportationcorridors

andthedeportationprocess.

7.4MedicalExperts-ExpertiseforMoney

Asmentionedearlier,medical screeninganddocumentation isa criticalaspectof the

deportationprocessandcanplayasignificantroleinthisprocessforbothdeporteesand

authorities alike.Due to the legal safeguards thatprotect ill people fromdeportation,

medicalscreeningresultsmaybedecisivefactorsthatinfluencetheresultofanasylum

or residence law case. The statement of a doctor either helps to justify deportation

enforcement or leads to the issuance of a residence permit on the grounds of a

deportationbanduetomedicalissues.Becausetheyareatriskofgettingcaughtbetween

theinterestofstateauthoritiestofacilitatedeportationandthedeporteesdesiretostay

in the country, the roleofmedical experts in this field is a critical one (cf.Bühring&

Korzilius2016).

Inprinciple,authoritiesassumethatapersonthatistobedeportedisfittotravel

unlesssheprovidesdocumentationofasevereorevenlife-threateningillnessthatwould

worsenduringdeportation.Insuchacase,medicalissuesbecomeareasonforenactinga

deportationban(seesection6.1.5).Theserulescameoutin2016afteranamendmentto

the asylum law (called Asylpaket II)which shifts the burden of proof to the affected

person.BeforeAsylpaket II deporting authorities alsohad tomake sure, thatmedical

treatmentwasavailableinthereceivingcountry.Howeverduetotheamendment,this

64

standardwas lowered, and authorities arenowonly responsible for the safety of the

personduringthedeportationprocedure.Theunderlyinglegislativeinitiativefollowsthe

argumentthatfalsifiedmedicaldocumentationpresentanenforcementobstacle.Thus,

required standards for medical documents were increased severely as a reaction to

alleged falsified and gratuitous medical reports (cf. De Maizière 2017). Part of the

argumentwasthatdeporteesinformedauthoritiesaboutmedicalproblemsstrategically

andonlyatthemomenttheyreceivedadeportationorder,knowingthatthisactionwould

preventremovalfromtakingplace.Amedicalexpertwhoworksforthestateauthorities

pointedoutthatmedicalreportswereoftenjustcopiesstatingthesameillnesses.“They

justchangedthenamesandsentthesamepapertopreventthedeportation.Thesepeople

wereallhealthy,yetonpapertheyallhadpost-traumatic-stress-disorder.Itisridiculous“

(Interview:medical-expert).Ifahealthconditionisknowntotheauthorities,deportation

maystilltakeplaceunderthesupervisionofanauthorizeddoctor.

While single casesare rarelyescorted, charter flightsalwayscarryat leastone

medicwhoisresponsibleforthemedicalwellbeingofthedeporteesonboardofflights.

This occupation is relatively lucrative for licensed doctors. In 2017, 47 out of 564

deportationsorderedby the immigrationauthorityof the city-stateofHamburgwere

escortedbymedicalexperts(cf.Schneider2018).Inthesameyear,thecityofHamburg

spent€160.000inhonorariatodoctorswhoparticipatedinforcedremovaloperations.

Thisalsoincludesservicesinthepre-removaldetentioncenterandpre-removalmedical

screenings in which a deportee’s travel-ability is assessed. According to an official

statement,doctorsearnaminimumof€500perdeployment,dependingonthelengthof

theoperation(cf.Ibid.).

As pointed out by independent doctors and psychotherapists, state-funded

medicalexpertsdisregardthesituationofaffectedindividualsandtheprofessionalismof

theirexpertcolleagues,whichcanbedangerous.(cf.Bühring&Korzilius2016).Areport

intheGermanmedicalprofessionaljournalcriticizesthenewlegislationoftheAsylpaket

IIas it followsthesuspicionof falsemedicalreportsat thecostofpeoplewithsevere

mental illnesses. As Bühring and Korzilius write in the German Medical Journal

(DeutschesÄrzteblatt),thenewlegislationwasmainlycriticizedbypsychotherapistswho

countpost-traumaticstressdiseaseintothecategoryofsevereillnesseswhichcanlead

to self-harming behavior in some cases (Ibid. 2016). The extreme situation of forced

removal in which a personmight experience direct physical force from enforcement

65

officers and other probably traumatizing things may exacerbate already persisting

mentalissues.

Medical experts are confronted with different intersecting interests and have

criticaldecisionpowerregardingwhetherindividualsmaystayinacountrybedeported.

As itwas shown earlier, neutrality is rarely achievable in a field governed by strong

interests (and monetary incentives) acting in alignment with the state's objective to

deport vulnerable people under supervision. In Hamburg the medical aspect of

deportation seems to have become a lucrative business branch of the deportation

industry. The credibility of licensed psychotherapists, on the other hand, is often

questionedorevendiscreditedbynewlegislation.

The last section of this analysis discusses counter-strategies employed by

deporteesandactivistswhochallengethedeportationregime.Asfirst-handinformation

providedbyintervieweesisclassified,thenextsectionreferstoacasethatwasreported

innewsmediaandhappenedinSweden.

7.5MigrantActionandthe“Anti-DeportationIndustry”

Privateairlinecompanies increasinglyrejecttransportingpersonsagainsttheirwill in

caseswhentheyarenotescortedbypoliceofficers(fieldnotes).Deporteesareviewedas

ariskfactoronboardairplanesandtheyareoftenexpectedtouseviolenceeitheragainst

thecabincreworotherpassengerstodelaytheflightbynotadheringtotherulesintheir

bidtostoptheforcedreturn.Inthepast,tacticsofresistancehaveproveneffective,and

deporteeswere allowed, to leave the aircraft.Oneparticular casewasbrought to the

attentionofthepublic.ArecentexampleofthisactivityfeaturedaSwedishactivistwho

refusedtositdowninanaircraftonwhichanAfghanmanwasplacedforforcedremoval

tohiswar-torncountryoforigin.ElinErssonmadea livevideoandsharedheraction

against the deportation, that causeddifferent reactions fromother passengers,which

rangedfromsupporttoangerandintervention(Crouch2018).Finally,bothErssonand

thedeporteedisembarkedtheplane.

However,thestoryofboththeseactorscontinuedandlaterdevelopmentspaint

amore complete picture regarding the use of force in the deportation system.While

Erssonfoundheractivismfirsttobesuccessful,shenoweventuallyfacesjailtimeina

trialonthegroundsofinterferenceinapolicemeasure.TheAfghanman,ontheother

hand,wasplacedonanotherplanesoonafterthefirstinterrupteddeportationattempt

66

and was eventually flown to Kabul. This shows the paradox situations, occurring in

deportationcorridors.WhileErssonactedinsolidaritywiththedeporteeandusedcivil

disobediencetoquestionthepolicyofreturningpeopletoawar-zonelikeAfghanistan

thestaterespondedbyshowing“strength”,eventuallydisplacingbothherandtheAfghan

manindifferentways.

InthecaseofGermany,theintensificationofthedeportationpolicyhassparked

massive criticism from civil society actors, churches, doctors, politicians, lawyers,

activists, representatives of employers’ associations, and people who themselves

experiencedeportability(fieldnotes).Itwouldbeanexcitingendeavortoexaminetheir

motives,andformsofprotestandcontestation,relatedtothechangesofthedeportation

systemdescribedandanalyzedinthispaper.Thenextsectiondrawsconclusionstothe

studyandpointstofurtherquestionsthatcouldbeaddressedinfutureresearch.

8.Conclusion

Aswasexplainedinthisthesis,variousprivateactorsareinvolvedinindustriesofforced

removalinGermanyandHamburg.Whileseekinginnovativeconceptsandsolutionsto

problemsrelated todeportationpublicactorshelpedcreatemarkets inwhichprivate

firmsarecompeting.ThecityofHamburg,theGermanFederalGovernment,andtheEU

mobilized financial resources, aiming at creatingmore effective deportation systems.

Thesefinancialflowsconnectpublicactorswithmanagementconsultancies(delivering

“expert”-knowledge), software companies, (delivering surveillance technology), and

development companies andNGOs,who both play the role of humanitarian actors in

emerging transnational return networks. Some of the transformation processes are

relatedtothedeteriorationinthequalityofasylumproceduresandtheintensificationof

thedeportationpolicyinHamburgandGermanyrespectively.

Whetherapersonobtainsaprotectionstatusorbecomeseligiblefordeportation

is now partly amatter of statistical calculation and computing. As Peutz argues, “the

transfer of bodies cannot be executed today, […] without the prior determination of

wheretheybelong.Foreignbodiesaremadelegiblethroughtechniquesrequiringexpert

knowledge”(Peutz2006:222).Itwasshownearlierthatitispreciselythis“production

ofdeportablesubjects”aroundwhichnewmarketsemerged.

67

Privateactorsareengagingandcompetinginthenewlyemergingdeportationcorridor

markets, profiting from the administrations need to find solutions to a lack of

administrativecapacityandthegrowingenforcementgap.Atthesametime,“experts”

fromthefieldofeconomicssellforecastsonthesituationthatcanbeflawedasshownin

thecaseoftheobligationtoreturnstatisticsmentionedabove.Thesolutionspromoted

so far appear to produce new issues instead of solving problems. Furthermore, they

undermine the human rights regime in place and discriminate against non-citizens

regardingtheirprivacyandpersonalrights.Insteadofsolvingproblems,newambiguities

arisefromthepublic-privateinteraction.

As the rule of law guarantees legal remedies to protect individual rights from

arbitraryadministrativedecisionstheresponsibilitytoprotecttheserightswasshifted

fromtheresponsibleasylumauthoritytotheadministrativecourts.Asoftheendof2018,

every thirdappealwasdecided in favorof (formerly)rejectedasylumseekers (Jelpke

2018).Economically,thisresponsibilityshifthasproventobecostly.McKinseyreceived

as€20millionfortheirconsultancywork.ThedigitizationdriveatBAMFwillcostmore

than€15millionuntiltheendof2019.Furthercostsforadditionalstaffatcourtsorlegal

remedyfundsarenotyetincluded.Anothercriticalpointneedstobemaderegardingthe

interactionbetweenprivatefirmsandpublicactors:theirconductandcooperationinthe

field of deportation are widely non-transparent. Contracts are awarded using non-

transparentprocedures,andreportsandproposalsarediscussedbehindcloseddoors.

ConsultanciessuchasMcKinseyarenotonlyactiveinGermany.Thecompany’s

workonmigrationissuesalsohastakenitsconsultantstoGreeceandSweden.In2017,

McKinseysubmittedabidforaprojectwiththeUnitedNations(Stanley-Becker2017).

Becauseoftheirgrowinginfluenceonpoliciesandprocesses,theactivityofactorssuch

asinternationalconsultanciesshouldbecloselymonitoredinotherregionsaswell.Asof

2018, the Federal Ministry of the Interior has officially stopped consultations with

McKinseyafterpubliccriticismandananalysisoftheresults(Knauß2018;Vates2018).

Against this background, it seems necessary to further examine the ongoing

public-private interaction indeportationcorridors. In future research, thequestionof

whethernewdependenciesbetweenpolicymakersandprivateactorswerecreatedcould

be addressed. Also, the roles of other private actors, for example, airline companies,

groundtransportcompanies,andsecuritycompaniescouldbeaddressed.A long-term

comparativestudyofdifferentcasesofdeportationcorridorsindifferentregionswould

68

beusefultogainfurtherinsights.Fromtheauthor`sperspective,thevastamountoftax

money thatwas spent on consulting and software solutions could have been used in

other,moremeaningfulways. From his perspective, itwould have been beneficial to

investmoreintheeducationandsocialsectortohelpcreateanenvironmentinwhich

people who newly arrived in Germany and citizens find opportunities to address

“problems”emergingincomplexsocietiestogether.

69

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Appendix

Linktotheinteractiveworldmap:

https://www.dropbox.com/s/kxu5mevx7x3lbhw/Destinations%20of%20Forced%20R

emoval%20from%20Germany%202017_interactive%20map.xlsx?dl=0&m=