case digests for sept. 28

7/27/2019 Case Digests for Sept. 28

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Felipe vs. Leuterio

91 PHIL 482 (1952)

Bengzon, J.

FACTS

In an oratorical contest held in Naga, Camarines Sur, first honor was given by the board of five judges to Nestor Nosce, and second honor

to Emma Imperial. Six days later, Emma asked the court of the first instance of that province to reverse that award, alleging that one of the

judges had fallen to error in grading her performance. After a hearing, and over the objection of the other four judges of the contest, the court

declared Emma Imperial winner of the first place. Hence, this special civil action challenging the court's power to modify the board's verdict.

On March 12, 1950 a benefit inter-collegiate oratorical contest was held in Naga City. The contestants were eight, among them Nestor

Nosce, Emma Imperial, and Luis General, Jr. There were five judges of the competition, the petitioner Ramon B. Felipe, Sr. being the Chairman.

After the orators had delivered their respective pieces, and after the judges had expressed their votes, the Chairman publicly announced theirdecision awarding first price to Nestor Nosce, second price to Emma Imperial, third price to Menandro Benavides and fourth place to Luis

General, Jr.

Four days afterwards, Emma Imperial addressed a letter to the Board of Judges protesting the verdict, and alleging that one of the

Judges had committed a mathematical mistake, resulting in her second place only, instead of the first, which she therefore claimed. Upon refusal

of the Board to amend their award, she filed a complaint in the court of first instance. At the contest the five judges were each furnished a blank

form wherein he give the participants grades according to his estimate of their abilities, giving number 1 to the best, number 2 to the second

best etc., down to number 8. Then the grades were added, and the contestant receiving the lowest number got first prize, the next second prize,

etc. The sums for the first four winners were: Nosce 10; Imperial 10; Benevides 17, General 17,

It appearing that Nestor Nosce and Emma Imperial had tied for the first place, the Chairman, apparently with the consent of the board,

broke the tie awarding first honors to Nosce and second honors to Imperial. For the convenience of the judges the typewritten forms contained

blank spaces in which, after the names of the rival orators and their respective orations, the judge could not jot down the grades he thought the

contestants deserved according to "Originality", "Timeliness", "English", "Stage Personality", "Pronunciation and Enunciation" and "Voice". From

such data he made up his vote.

It was discovered later that the form filed by Delfin Rodriguez, one of the Judges, gave Imperial and General the following ratings under

the above headings; Imperial 19-15-15-18-14-14 Total 94-Place 4th General 19-15-15 or 14-19-14-14 Total 95-Place 3rd. Imperial asserts that her



total should be 95 instead of 94 and therefore should rank 3rd place in Rodriguez' vote. And if she got 3 from Rodriguez, her total vote should

have been 9 instead of ten, with the result that she copped first place in the speaking joust. Rodriguez testified that he made a mistake in adding

up Imperial's ratings; that she should have been given a total of 95, or placed No. 3, the same as General; that he was not disposed to break the

tie between her and General and insisted that he wanted to give rank 3 to Imperial and rank 3 also to General.

ISSUE

WON The Courts can reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest.

HELD

NO. The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest. No jurisdiction. Error is

contemplated by law as a misapplication of a statute or provision. There could be error in the computation of final scores, but it is not error in

context of law. The Court would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests, and similar contests. The decision of the board in such

contests, although only implied, is final and unappealable.

Members of the court sometimes are members of the board of judges in an oratorical contest. But it is UNWRITTEN in the law that in

such contests the decisions of the board of judges be final and cannot be appealed. The contestants do not have the right to the prizes because

theirs is only a privilege to compete for the prize and did not become a demandable right. The respondent judge erred in his reasoning that

where there is a wrong there is remedy. To quote “The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered some wrong at the

hands of the board of judges. If at all, there was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do not mean the same thing. "Wrong"

as used in the aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation or violation of a right. As stated before, a contestant has no right to the prize unless and

until he or she is declared winner by the board of referees or judges. Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are

instances of "damnum absque injuria". This is one of them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it would be a different proposition. But then her

action should be directed against the individual judge or judges who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges.”

FINAL RULING

Wherefore the order in controversy is hereby set aside. No costs.

-Yeen



People vs. Sola

103 SCRA 393 (1981)

Fernando, C.J.

FACTS

CFI Negros Occidental issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the deceased bodies of 7 persons believed in the

possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. On September 16, 1980 armed with the

above warrant, the 332nd PC/INP Company proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a cane field yielded two common graves containing

the seven (7) bodies. Seven (7) separate complaints for murder were thus filed against Pablo Sola and 18 other persons. The municipal court

found probable cause against the accused and ordered their arrest. However, without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the

evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary release. Pablo Sola and two others

have since been released from detention. The witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the

CFI Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two (2) of the accused are officials withpower and influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large. There have been

reports made to police authorities of threats made on the families of the witnesses. The facts alleged argue strongly for the remedies sought,

namely a change of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds.

ISSUE

1. WON a change of venue is proper in this case at hand.

2. WON the bail bond should be cancelled for failure to abide by the basic requirement that the prosecution be heard in a

case where the accused is charged with a capital offense, prior to bail being granted.

HELD

1. YES. In this case, change of venue has become moot and academic with the transfer of the case to Bacolod City. It may not be amiss to

say a few words on the question of transferring the place of trial, in this case, from Himamaylan to Bacolod City. The Constitution is quite

explicit. The Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." The Constitutional Convention of

1971 wisely incorporated the ruling in the landmark decision of People v. Gutierrez, where Justice J. B. L. Reyes as ponente vigorously and

categorically affirmed: "In the particular case before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be

at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been



established." Why a change of venue is imperative was made clear in the Comment of the Solicitor General. Thus: "The exercise by this

Honorable Court of its above constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives. They are

afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of fear, they may either refuse to testify

or testimony falsely to save their lives. Respondent Florendo Baliscao was not averse to such transfer, but his preference is for a court anywhere

in Metro Manila. Respondent Francisco Garcia confined his comment to the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Respondent PabloSola made clear that he had "no objection to the transfer. It may be added that there may be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to

some individuals, be less than terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it has on the witnesses who will testify. The primordial aim

and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue. As a matter of

fact, there need not be a petition of this character filed before this Court. Such a plea could have been done administratively. In this particular

case, however, there is justification for the procedure followed in view of the fact that along with the change of venue, the cancellation of the

bail bonds was also sought.

2. YES. The bail bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for suchhearing. Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course

of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to

introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the

prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail

should be considered void on that ground. Justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be

strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true. This norm which is of the very essence of due process as the

embodiment of justice requires that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt. It does not suffice,

as asserted herein, that the questions asked by the municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized as searching. That fact did

not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional character.

FINAL RULING

WHEREFORE, the assailed order of Judge Rafael Gasataya granting bail to private respondents is nullified, set aside, and declared to be

without force and effect. Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to whose sala the cases had been

transferred by virtue of the resolution of this Court of March 5, 1981, is directed forthwith to hear the petitions for bail of private respondents,

with the prosecution being duly heard on the question of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the respondents is strong. This decision is

immediately executory. No costs.



Hernandez vs. CA

228 SCRA 429 (1993)

Quiason, J. .

FACTS

It appears that sometime in August 1986, petitioner was introduced to Remedios de Leon by his aunt, as one engaged in the business of

buying and selling jewelry.

Petitioner was charged in nine information with estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22. At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to

the charges. After a joint trial, petitioner was convicted of the nine charges in a joint decision. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the conviction

of petitioner was affirmed.

In this petition, petitioner claims that his conviction of nine distinct offenses subject of nine separate information in a single judgment isreversible error, Petitioner also complains that while he assigned eight errors, the Court of Appeals did not make a complete findings of fact.

Petitioner next questions: (i) as violative of the constitutional mandate that decisions shall contain the facts and the law on which they

are based (1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, sec. 14, par. 1), the decision of the Court of Appeals which merely adopted the statement of facts of the

Solicitor general in the appellee's brief, and (ii) as violative of the constitutional mandate requiring that any denial of a motion for

reconsideration must state the legal basis thereof (1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2), the denial of his motion of reconsideration on the

basis of a comparison of said motion with the "comment thereon".

ISSUE

WON the CA erred in not disclosing complete findings of fact, contrary to Sec. 14, Art VIII.

HELD

NO. Obviously, the Court of Appeals did not deem it necessary to make a separate findings of fact for said assigned errors, because they

were just the necessary consequences of the previous, assigned errors by the trial court: (a) in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable

doubt in criminal cases nos. 21-87 to 29-87 notwithstanding absence of inculpatory evidence and presence of numerous proofs negating the

soundness of such verdict; and (b) in pronouncing the accused, through a single judgment, guilty of all the nine distinct offenses covered by the

nine separate information subject matter of criminal cases nos. 21-87 to 29-87, inclusive.



In its decision, the Court of Appeals merely stated: "The facts of the case as summarized in the Appellee's Brief are as follows: " and the

quoted in full the statement of facts of the Solicitor General. According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals did not make its own "independent

judicial opinion" by such act of adopting the statement of facts made by the advance party.

What the Court of Appeals, in effect, said was that it found the facts as presented by the Solicitor General as supported by the evidence.

The constitutional mandate only requires that the decision should state the facts on which it is based. There is no proscription made in the

briefs or memoranda of the parties, instead of rewriting the same in its own words.

Precisely briefs or memoranda are required in order to aid the courts in the writing of decisions. The Court of Appeals also made f indings

of facts in the course of its discussion of the assignment of errors.

As to the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals stated in its Resolution dated March 30, 1992:

Acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused-appellant of the decision dated December 13,

1991 and the comment thereon of the Solicitor General, the Court finds no cogent reason that could justify a

modification or reversal of the decision sought to be reconsidered.

Accordingly, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

The denial, therefore, was based on the ground that the Court of Appeals did not find any "cogent reason that could justify a

modification or reversal of the decision sought to be reconsidered."

FINAL RULING

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs de oficio.

case digests for sept. 28

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