Pilapil vs. CA, Alatco Transportation Company IncG.R. No. 52159 December 22, 1989 PADILLA, J.:

Facts:While boarding an Alatco Transportation Company bus, Jose Pilapil, a paying passenger, was hit by a stone thrown by a bystander in the highway. Despite a series of treatment, Jose lost his left eye vision. Consequently, he filed before the CFI of Camarines an action for damages against Alatco. The trial court ruled in favour of Pilapil. On appeal by the company, the lower court decision was reversed.

Issue: Whether Alatco should be held liable to Pilapil due to the throwing incident by a mere bystander.

Ruling: No. While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers. 

Fortune Express, Inc. vs. CA, et.al

[G.R. No. 119756. March 18, 1999]

MENDOZA, J.:

Facts:

A bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney owned by Maranaos. Upon investigation, it was found out that certain Maranaos are planning to take revenge against petitioner. A year later, a bus of petitioner was ambushed by three armed Maranaos. The passengers were taken out of the vehicle to proceed with the Maranaos’ plan of burning the same with its driver, however, Atty. Caorong, one of the passengers, returned to retrieve something from the overhead rack. Seeing the shot driver, Atty. Caorong pleaded that the driver be released. The Maranaos were adamant and in that heated argument, Atty. Caorong was shot and subsequently died. The heirs of Atty. Caorong brought an action for damages before the RTC of Iligan. The lower court ruled in favour of private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the RTC was reversed.

Issue: Whether the bus company should be held liable to the death of Atty. Caorong.

Ruling: Yes. Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts of other passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the act the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. In the present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioners employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made possible.

Belgian Overseas Chartering And Shipping NV and Jardine Davies Transport Services vs. PFIC[G.R. No. 143133. June 5, 2002]PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: 242 coils of Prime Cold Rolled Steel sheets were shipped from Germany to Manila. The same were consigned to PSTC. Upon arrival at the port, it was found out that 4 coils are in bad condition. Resultantly, PSTC declared the damaged coils as total loss. Due to the refusal of PFIC to grant PSTC’s claim, Belgian instead paid the same and was subrogated to PSTC’s rights. Subsequently, Belgian instituted a complaint before the RTC of Makati for the recovery of the amount it paid to consignee against PFIC. Upon the dismissal of the complaint, Belgian appealed to the CA. In reversing the RTC’s decision, the appellate court ruled that petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on common carriers. .

Issue: Whether petitioner has overcome the presumption of the negligence of negligence of a common carrier.

Ruling: No. The presumption of fault or negligence will not arise[21] if the loss is due to any of the following causes: (1) flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2) an act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) an act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4) the character of the goods or defects in the packing or the container; or (5) an order or act of competent public authority. This is a closed list. 

Corollary to the foregoing, mere proof of delivery of the goods in good order to a common carrier and of their arrival in bad order at their destination constitutes a prima facie case of fault or negligence against the carrier. If no adequate explanation is given as to how the deterioration, the loss or the destruction of the goods happened, the transporter shall be held responsible.[24]

That petitioners failed to rebut the prima facie presumption of negligence is revealed in the case at bar by a review of the records and more so by the evidence adduced by respondent.[25]

First, as stated in the Bill of Lading, petitioners received the subject shipment in good order and condition in Hamburg, Germany.[26]

Second, prior to the unloading of the cargo, an Inspection Report[27] prepared and signed by representatives of both parties showed the steel bands broken, the metal envelopes rust-stained and heavily buckled, and the contents thereof exposed and rusty.

Third, Bad Order Tally Sheet No. 154979[28] issued by Jardine Davies Transport Services, Inc., stated that the four coils were in bad order and condition. Normally, a request for a bad order survey is made in case there is an apparent or a presumed loss or damage.[29]

Fourth, the Certificate of Analysis[30] stated that, based on the sample submitted and tested, the steel sheets found in bad order were wet with fresh water.

Fifth, petitioners -- in a letter[31] addressed to the Philippine Steel Coating Corporation and dated October 12, 1990 -- admitted that they were aware of the condition of the four coils found in bad order and condition.

These facts were confirmed by Ruperto Esmerio, head checker of BM Santos Checkers Agency. Pertinent portions of his testimony are reproduce hereunder:

Q. Mr. Esmerio, you mentioned that you are a Head Checker. Will you inform the Honorable Court with what company you are connected?

A. BM Santos Checkers Agency, sir.Q. How is BM Santos Checkers Agency related or connected with

defendant Jardine Davies Transport Services?A. It is the company who contracts the checkers, sir.Q. You mentioned that you are a Head Checker, will you inform this

Honorable Court your duties and responsibilities?A. I am the representative of BM Santos on board the vessel, sir, to

supervise the discharge of cargoes.x x x x x x x x x

Q. On or about August 1, 1990, were you still connected or employed with BM Santos as a Head Checker?

A. Yes, sir.Q. And, on or about that date, do you recall having attended the

discharging and inspection of cold steel sheets in coil on board the MV/AN ANGEL SKY?

A. Yes, sir, I was there.x x x x x x x x x

Q. Based on your inspection since you were also present at that time, will you inform this Honorable Court the condition or the appearance of the bad order cargoes that were unloaded from the MV/ANANGEL SKY?

ATTY. MACAMAY:Objection, Your Honor, I think the document itself reflects the condition of the cold steel sheets and the best evidence is the document itself, Your Honor that shows the condition of the steel sheets.

COURT:Let the witness answer.A. The scrap of the cargoes is broken already and the rope is loosen and

the cargoes are dent on the sides.[32]

All these conclusively prove the fact of shipment in good order and condition and the consequent damage to the four coils while in the possession of petitioner,[33] who notably failed to explain why.[34]

Further, petitioners failed to prove that they observed the extraordinary diligence and precaution which the law requires a common carrier to know and to follow, to avoid damage to or destruction of the goods entrusted to it for safe carriage and delivery.[35]

True, the words metal envelopes rust stained and slightly dented were noted on the Bill of Lading; however, there is no showing that petitioners exercised due diligence to forestall or lessen the loss.[36]Having been in the service for several years, the master of the vessel should have known at the outset that metal envelopes in the said state would eventually deteriorate when not properly stored while in transit.[37] Equipped with the proper knowledge of the nature of steel sheets in coils and of the proper way of transporting them, the master of the vessel and his crew should have undertaken precautionary measures to avoid possible deterioration of the cargo. But none of these measures was taken.[38] Having failed to discharge the burden of proving that they have exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law, petitioners cannot escape liability for the damage to the four coils.[39]

In their attempt to escape liability, petitioners further contend that they are exempted from liability under Article 1734(4) of the Civil Code. They cite the notation metal envelopes rust stained and slightly dented printed on the Bill of Lading as evidence that the character of the goods or defect in the packing or the containers was the proximate cause of the damage. We are not convinced.

From the evidence on record, it cannot be reasonably concluded that the damage to the four coils was due to the condition noted on the Bill of Lading.[40] The aforecited exception refers to cases when goods are lost or damaged while in transit as a result of the natural decay of perishable goods or the

fermentation or evaporation of substances liable therefor, the necessary and natural wear of goods in transport, defects in packages in which they are shipped, or the natural propensities of animals.[41] None of these is present in the instant case.

Further, even if the fact of improper packing was known to the carrier or its crew or was apparent upon ordinary observation, it is not relieved of liability for loss or injury resulting therefrom, once it accepts the goods notwithstanding such condition.[42] Thus, petitioners have not successfully proven the application of any of the aforecited exceptions in the present case.[43]

Second Issue:Notice of Loss

Petitioners claim that pursuant to Section 3, paragraph 6 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act[44] (COGSA), respondent should have filed its Notice of Loss within three days from delivery. They assert that the cargo was discharged on July 31, 1990, but that respondent filed its Notice of Claim only on September 18, 1990.[45]

We are not persuaded. First, the above-cited provision of COGSA provides that the notice of claim need not be given if the state of the goods, at the time of their receipt, has been the subject of a joint inspection or survey. As stated earlier, prior to unloading the cargo, an Inspection Report[46] as to the condition of the goods was prepared and signed by representatives of both parties.[47]

Second, as stated in the same provision, a failure to file a notice of claim within three days will not bar recovery if it is nonetheless filed within one year.[48] This one-year prescriptive period also applies to the shipper, the consignee, the insurer of the goods or any legal holder of the bill of lading.[49]

In Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[50] we ruled that a claim is not barred by prescription as long as the one-year period has not lapsed. Thus, in the words of the ponente, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.:

Inasmuch as the neither the Civil Code nor the Code of Commerce states a specific prescriptive period on the matter, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA)--which provides for a one-year period of limitation on claims for loss of, or damage to, cargoes sustained during transit--may be applied suppletorily to the case at bar.

In the present case, the cargo was discharged on July 31, 1990, while the Complaint[51] was filed by respondent on July 25, 1991, within the one-year prescriptive period.

Third Issue:Package Limitation

Assuming arguendo they are liable for respondents claims, petitioners contend that their liability should be limited to US$500 per package as provided in the Bill of Lading and by Section 4(5)[52] of COGSA.[53]

On the other hand, respondent argues that Section 4(5) of COGSA is inapplicable, because the value of the subject shipment was declared by petitioners beforehand, as evidenced by the reference to and the insertion of the Letter of Credit or L/C No. 90/02447 in the said Bill of Lading.[54]

A bill of lading serves two functions. First, it is a receipt for the goods shipped.[55] Second, it is a contract by which three parties -- namely, the shipper, the carrier, and the consignee -- undertake specific responsibilities and assume stipulated obligations.[56] In a nutshell, the acceptance of the bill of lading by the shipper and the consignee, with full knowledge of its contents, gives rise to the presumption that it constituted a perfected and binding contract.[57]

Further, a stipulation in the bill of lading limiting to a certain sum the common carriers liability for loss or destruction of a cargo -- unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value[58] -- is sanctioned by law.[59] There are, however, two conditions to be satisfied: (1) the contract is reasonable and just under the circumstances, and (2) it has been fairly and freely agreed upon by the parties.[60] The rationale for, this rule is to bind the shippers by their agreement to the value (maximum valuation) of their goods.[61]

It is to be noted, however, that the Civil Code does not limit the liability of the common carrier to a fixed amount per package.[62] In all matters not regulated by the Civil Code, the right and the obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws.[63] Thus, the COGSA, which is suppletory to the provisions of the Civil Code, supplements the latter by establishing a statutory provision limiting the carriers liability in the absence of a shippers declaration of a higher value in the bill of lading.[64] The provisions on limited liability are as much a part of the bill of lading as though physically in it and as though placed there by agreement of the parties.[65]

In the case before us, there was no stipulation in the Bill of Lading[66] limiting the carriers liability. Neither did the shipper declare a higher valuation of the goods to be shipped. This fact notwithstanding, the insertion of the words L/C No. 90/02447 cannot be the basis for petitioners liability.

First, a notation in the Bill of Lading which indicated the amount of the Letter of Credit obtained by the shipper for the importation of steel sheets did not effect a declaration of the value of the goods as required by the bill.

[67] That notation was made only for the convenience of the shipper and the bank processing the Letter of Credit.[68]

Second, in Keng Hua Paper Products v. Court of Appeals,[69] we held that a bill of lading was separate from the Other Letter of Credit arrangements. We ruled thus:

(T)he contract of carriage, as stipulated in the bill of lading in the present case, must be treated independently of the contract of sale between the seller and the buyer, and the contract of issuance of a letter of credit between the amount of goods described in the commercial invoice in the contract of sale and the amount allowed in the letter of credit will not affect the validity and enforceability of the contract of carriage as embodied in the bill of lading. As the bank cannot be expected to look beyond the documents presented to it by the seller pursuant to the letter of credit, neither can the carrier be expected to go beyond the representations of the shipper in the bill of lading and to verify their accuracy vis--vis the commercial invoice and the letter of credit. Thus, the discrepancy between the amount of goods indicated in the invoice and the amount in the bill of lading cannot negate petitioners obligation to private respondent arising from the contract of transportation.[70]

In the light of the foregoing, petitioners liability should be computed based on US$500 per package and not on the per metric ton price declared in the Letter of Credit.[71] In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court[72] we explained the meaning of package:

When what would ordinarily be considered packages are shipped in a container supplied by the carrier and the number of such units is disclosed in the shipping documents, each of those units and not the container constitutes the package referred to in the liability limitation provision of Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.

Considering, therefore, the ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines and the fact that the Bill of Lading clearly disclosed the contents of the containers, the number of units, as well as the nature of the steel sheets, the four damaged coils should be considered as the shipping unit subject to the US$500 limitation.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is partly granted and the assailed Decision MODIFIED. Petitioners liability is reduced to US$2,000 plus interest at the legal rate of six percent from the time of the filing of the Complaint on July 25, 1991 until the finality of this Decision, and 12 percent thereafter until fully paid. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., (Chairman), abroad, on official leave.

Calvo vs. UCPB

G.R. No. 148496      March 19, 2002

MENDOZA, J.:

Facts: Petitioner Virgines Calvo is the owner of Transorient Container Terminal Services, Inc. (TCTSI), a sole proprietorship customs broker. Petitioner entered into a contract with SMC for the transfer of reels from Manila Port to SMC warehouse. The goods were insured by UCPB. SMC however received damaged reels. SMC thereafter claimed from UCPB. In turn UCPB was subrogated to the rights of SMC, who then filed a complaint to recover the damage. The trial court and CA found petitioner liable to respondent.

Issue: Whether petitioner is a common carrier that must observe extraordinary diligence in its carriage.

Ruling: Yes.

The contention has no merit. Considering the circumstances in the case, there is greater reason for holding petitioner to be a common carrier because the transportation of goods is an integral part of her business. Moreover, the rule is that if the improper packing or, in this case, the defect/s in the container, is/are known to the carrier or his employees or apparent upon ordinary observation, but he nevertheless accepts the same without protest or exception notwithstanding such condition, he is not relieved of liability for damage resulting therefrom. In this case, petitioner accepted the cargo without exception despite the apparent defects in some of the container vans. Hence, for failure of petitioner to prove that she exercised extraordinary diligence in the carriage of goods in this case or that

she is exempt from liability, the presumption of negligence as provided under Art. 173515 holds.

Southern Lines, Inc. vs. CA, and City of IloiloG.R. No. L-16629             January 31, 1962

DE LEON, J.:

Facts:Iloilo City requisitioned for rice from NARIC in Manila. Thereafter, NARIC shipped the city’s order on board a vessel owned by Southern Lines, Inc. The City received the shipment however with shortage prompting them to file a complaint to recover the amount it had previously paid equivalent to the shortage. The lower court absolved NARIC from its liabilities but found Southern Lines, Inc. liable to pay the City’s claim. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Issue: Whether defendant-carrier is liable for the loss or shortage of the rice shipped.

Ruling: Yes. Under the provisions of Article 361, the defendant-carrier in order to free itself from liability, was only obliged to prove that the damages suffered by the goods were "by virtue of the nature or defect of the articles." Under the provisions of Article 362, the plaintiff, in order to hold the defendant liable, was obliged to prove that the damages to the goods by virtue of their nature, occurred on account of its negligence or because the defendant did not take the precaution adopted by careful persons. In this case, if the fact of improper packing, as argued by defendant, is known to the carrier or his servants, or apparent upon ordinary observation, but accepts the goods notwithstanding such condition, it is not relieved of

liability for loss or injury resulting thereform. According to the Court of Appeals, "appellant (petitioner) itself frankly admitted that the strings that tied the bags of rice were broken; some bags were with holes and plenty of rice were spilled inside the hull of the boat, and that the personnel of the boat collected no less than 26 sacks of rice which they had distributed among themselves." This finding, which is binding upon this Court, shows that the shortage resulted from the negligence of petitioner.

Philippine Charter Insurance Corp vs. Unknown Owner of the Vessel M/V National Honor, National Shipping Corp of the Philippines and International Container Services, Inc.

[G.R. No. 161833.  July 8, 2005]

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Facts: PCIC is the insurer of a shipment on board the vessel M/V National Honor, represented in the Philippines by its agent, NSCP. The M/V “National Honor” arrived at the Manila International Container Terminal (MICT). The International Container Terminal Services, Incorporated (ICTSI) was furnished with a copy of the crate cargo list and bill of lading, and it knew the contents of the crate. The following day, the vessel started discharging its cargoes using its winch crane. The crane was operated by Olegario Balsa, a winchman from the ICTSI, exclusive arrastre operator of MICT.Denasto Dauz, Jr., the checker-inspector of the NSCP, along with the crew and the surveyor of the ICTSI, conducted an inspection of the cargo. They inspected the hatches, checked the cargo and found it in apparent good condition. Claudio Cansino, the stevedore of the ICTSI, placed two sling cables on each end of Crate No. 1. No sling cable was fastened on the mid-portion of the crate. In Dauz’s experience, this was a normal procedure. As the crate was being hoisted from the vessel’s hatch, the mid-portion of the wooden flooring suddenly snapped in the air resulting in extensive damage to the shipment. PCIC paid the damage, and as subrogee, filed a case against M/V National Honor, NSCP and ICTSI. Both RTC and CA dismissed the complaint.

Issue: Whether defendants must be held liable.

Ruling: Yes. The common carrier’s duty to observe the requisite diligence in the shipment of goods lasts from the time the articles are surrendered to or unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation until delivered to, or until the lapse of a reasonable time for their acceptance, by the person entitled to receive them. When the goods shipped are either lost or arrive in damaged condition, a presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that diligence, and there need not be an express finding of negligence to hold it liable. To overcome the presumption of negligence in the case of loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods, the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence. Nevertheless, the presumption of negligence does not apply to the circumstances enumerated in Art. 1734. Evidences showed that defendants were negligent in their duties over the shipment. They failed to rebut the presumption of negligence.

Gacal vs. PALG.R. No. L-55300 March 15, 1990

PARAS, J.:

Facts: Sps. Gacal, Sps. Anislag and de Guzman were passengers of PAL in a flight from Davao to Manila. It was unknown to them that they are with MNLF members. A few minutes after the plane’s take off, MNLF members announced the hijacking of the aircraft. It was only on the second day of the hijacking when the passengers were allowed to eat and the relatives of the hijackers were allowed to board the plane. When their relatives went out of the plane, the battle between the military and the hijackers commenced causing the death of de Guzman and injuries to the spouses. Hence, plaintiffs instituted a complaint for damages against PAL. In dismissing the complaint, the trial court ruled that the incident is a force majeure.

Issue: Whether hijacking or air piracy during martial law and under the circumstances, is a caso fortuito or force majeure which would exempt an aircraft from payment of damages to its passengers whose lives were put in jeopardy and whose personal belongings were lost during the incident.

Ruling: No. In order to constitute a caso fortuito or force majeure that would exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that the following elements must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will (the will of the debtor or the obligor); (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the. Applying the above guidelines to the case at bar, the failure to transport petitioners safely from Davao to Manila was due to the skyjacking incident staged by six (6) passengers of the same plane, all members of the MNLF, without any connection with private respondent, hence, independent of the will of either the PAL or of its passengers. Under normal circumstances, PAL might have foreseen the skyjacking incident which could have been avoided had there been a more thorough frisking of passengers and inspection of baggages as authorized by R.A. No. 6235. But the incident in question occurred during Martial Law where there was a military take-over of airport security including the frisking of passengers and the inspection of their luggage preparatory to boarding domestic and international flights.

Juntilla vs. FontanarG.R. No. L-45637 May 31, 1985 

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Facts: Plaintiff was a passenger of a public utility jeepney driven by Barfol Camoro, registered under the franchise of Clemente Fontanar but actually owned by Fernando Banzon. When the jeepney reached in a city, the right rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to turn turtle. Plaintiff sustained injuries and even lost his watch because of the incident. This prompted plaintiff to file a complaint for breach of contract with damages. On appeal to the CFI of Cebu, the defendants were exonerated from their liabilities.

Issue: Whether the tire blow-out is a fortuitous event.

Ruling: Yes. Generally, a tire blow-out does not constitute negligence unless the tire was already old and should not have been used at all. While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the

tire were still visible, this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident.

Landingin and Bocasas vs. Pangasinan Transportation CoG.R. No. L-28014-15 May 29, 1970

Facts: Plaintiffs alleged that the bus where their daughters were riding was open in one side and enclosed in the other in violation of the Public Service Commission rules. Moreover, PANTRANCO, defendant and owner of the bus, was in bad faith as it pretended to have secured a permit for the special trip. Plaintiffs further alleged that due to the fault and mishandling of the driver, the bus suddenly swerved and steered toward a mountainside thereby causing their daughters and some passengers to be thrown out of the bus through the open side. The passengers suffered injuries but plaintiffs’[ daughters died. Aside from a separate criminal complaint filed by plaintiffs, they are also filing complaints for damages. The trial court found PANTANCO not negligent thus it is not liable to plaintiffs. The CA affirmed the findings of the lower court but ordered defendants to pay an amount as sympathy or goodwill to the families. Issue: Whether PANTRANCO is liable to plaintiffs.

Ruling: Yes, as the bus company was negligent contrary to the finding of the lower courts. It is settled that accident caused by defects in the automobile is not a caso fortuito. The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that "the passenger has neither the choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use by the carrier." When a passenger dies or is injured, the presumption is that the common carrier is at fault or that it acted negligently (Article 1756). This presumption is only rebutted by proof on the carrier's part that it observed the "extraordinary diligence" required in Article 1733 and the "utmost diligence of very cautious persons" required in Article 1755 (Article 1756).

Jose Son vs. Cebu Autobus CompanyG.R. No. L-6155             April 30, 1954

PARAS, C.J.:

Facts: Plaintiff was a passenger of defendant in one of its truck. Allegedly due to the negligence of the driver or defective engine, the truck fell into a canal causing plaintiff to receive serious injuries and to kill two of his hogs (loaded therein). This prompted plaintiff to institute a complaint for damages against the company. The trial court and the CA ruled in favour of plaintiff. Issue: Whether the bus company must be held liable.Ruling: Yes. The defense of defendant, that the breakage of the drag-link spring could not be foreseen and if foreseen was inevitable, is untenable. It

was already held that an accident cause either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito. As such, the company must be held liable.

La Mallorca vs. CA, Mariano Beltran et alG.R. No. L-20761             July 27, 1966

Facts: As soon as Mariano and his family stopped at their destination, they went off the La Mallorca bus where they are on board. To retrieve their remaining personal belongings, Mariano left his family 4 or 5 meters away from the bus and waited the conductor in the running board. He however did not notice that his child, Raquel, followed him. At that time, the engine of the

bus was not shut off. Notwithstanding that the conductor has not given the driver the signal to start, the bus started moving forward. Incidentally, when the bus was again in complete stop, it has already travelled 10 meters away from where Mariano has gotten off. Sensing that the bus is in motion again, Mariano jumped from the running board without getting his personal belonging from the conductor. He then found out that Raquel was run over by the bus. For the death of Raquel, the family brought a complaint for damages against the bus company. The trial court found defendant liable for breach of contract of carriage thereby liable for damages. Sustaining as well the ruling of the trial court, the appellate court found defendant also guilty of quasi –delict.

Issue: Whether as to the child, who was already led by the father to a place about 5 meters away from the bus, the liability of the carrier for her safety under the contract of carriage also persisted.

Ruling: Yes. As a rule the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. Moreover, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost diligence required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. Applying the above principles, the Court concluded that the bus company’s agent was indeed negligent. The driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran and family.