MARIANO v. COURT OF APPEALSJune 7, 1989 (174 SCRA 335)FACTS:The proceedings at bar concern (1) an attempt by a married man to prevent execution against conjugal property of a judgment rendered against his wife, for obligations incurred by the latter while engaged in a business that had admittedly redounded to the benefit of the family, and (2) the interference by a court with the proceedings on execution of a co-equal or coordinate court. Both acts being proscribed by law, correction is called for and will hereby be effected.The proceedings originated from a suit filed by Esther Sanchez against Lourdes Mariano in the Court of First Instance at Caloocan City, for recovery of the value of ladies ready made dresses allegedly purchased by and delivered to the latter.Daniel Sanchez, Esthers husband, now made his move. He filed a complaint for annulment of the execution in the Court of First Instance at Quezon City in his capacity as administrator of the conjugal partnership. He alleged that the conjugal assets could not validly be made to answer for obligations exclusively contracted by his wife, and that, moreover, some of the personal property levied on, such as household appliances and utensils necessarily used in the conjugal dwelling, were exempt from execution.

ISSUE: WON the claim that property levied on in execution of a judgment is not property of the judgment debtor, Daniel Sanchezs wife, but of the conjugal partnership of the Sanchez SpousesHELD:In the case at bar, the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a stranger to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife. In any case, whether by intervention in the court issuing the writ, or by separate action, it is unavailing for either Esther Sanchez or her husband, Daniel, to seek preclusion of the enforcement of the writ of possession against their conjugal assets. For it being established, as aforestated, that Esther had engaged in business with her husbands consent, and the income derived therefrom had been expended, in part at least, for the support of her family, the liability of the conjugal assets to respond for the wifes obligations in the premises cannot be disputed.

Spouses Laperal vs Spouses KatigbakSpouses Laperal vs Spouses KatigbakGR 16991, March 31, 1964

FACTS:

CFI Manila declared the property covered by TCT No.57626 as separate or paraphernal property of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak. The spouses Laperal disagree with this finding reiterating that its improvements and income are conjugal assets of the Spouses Katigbak.

When the spouses Katigbak got married, neither of them brought properties unto the marriage. Ramons occupation rendered him a monthly income of P200.00. The property in question was registered in the name of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak married to Ramon Katigbak. The latter declared that her mother was the one who bought the property for her and had placed it only in her name as the practice of her mother in buying properties and placing them directly in the names of her children. The husband having no interest with the property only signed the document for the purpose of assisting his wife.

In August 1950, the Laperals filed a case and was granted by the trial court against the Katigbaks in recovery of P14,000 and jewelry amounting to P97,500 or in lieu thereof, to pay such amount. A month after the decision was rendered, Evelina filed a complaint against her husband for judicial separation of property and separate administration which was granted by the court and was sought for annulment by the Laperals.

ISSUE:WON the property in question constitutes the paraphernal property of Evelina.

HELD:

All properties acquired during the marriage are presumed conjugal. It is however not conclusive but merely rebuttable, unless it be proved that the property belong exclusively to the husband and wife. In the case at bar, the deed of the land is under the name of the wife. At the time it was purchased, the property was of substantial value and as admitted, the husband by himself could not have afforded to buy considering the singular source of income.

Hence, the property covered by TCT 57626 is considered a paraphernal property of the wife.

AGAPAY VS PALANG

Case Doctrines:

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.

Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except byjudicial orderor without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in themarriage settlements.

Questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession.

Facts:Miguel Palang married Carlina in 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in 1950. When Miguel returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with Carlina.

In 1973, Miguel who was then 63 years old contracted a subsequent marriage with 19-year old Erlinda Agapay. Two months earlier, they jointly purchased a riceland. A house and lot was likewise purchased, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher.

1975, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia.

In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. Two years later, Miguel died. Carlina and Herminia instituted a case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against Erlinda, seeking to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision.

Erlinda claimed that: (1) The Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining the validity of two deeds of absolute sale covering the riceland and the house and lot, the first in favor of Miguel and Erlinda and the second, in favor of Erlinda alone. (2) The CA erred in not declaring Kristopher as Miguels illegitimate son and thus entitled to inherit from Miguels estate. (3) The CA erred in not finding that there is sufficient pleading and evidence that Kristoffer should be considered as party-defendant in Civil Case No. U-4625 before the trial court and in CA-G.R. No. 24199.

Issues:

1. Who owns the riceland?2. Who owns the house and lot?3. Does the trial courts decision adopting the compromise agreement partake the nature of judicial confirmation of the separation of property between spouses and the termination of the conjugal partnership?4. Can Kristophers status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for recovery of ownership and possession?

Held:

1. The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still susbsisting and unaffected by the latters de facto separation.

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government.Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of the same.

Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was intended to exclude their case from the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the precise date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation not having been adduced, we cannot state definitively that the riceland was purchased even before they started living together. In any case, even assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.

Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.

2. With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim.Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee.

The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.

3. No. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except byjudicial orderor without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in themarriage settlements. The judgment which resulted from the parties compromise was not specifically and expressly for separation of property and should not be so inferred.

4. No. Questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession.Kristopher, not having been impleaded, was not a party to the case at bar. His mother, Erlinda, cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in the case at bar.(Erlinda Agapay vs. Carlina Palang, G.R. No. 116668, July 28 1997).