G.R. No. L-19064             January 31, 1964

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PAZ E. SIGUION TORRES, deceased, ALBERTO S. TORRES, petition-appellant, vs.CONCHITA TORRES and ANGEL S. TORRES, oppositors- appellees.

Alberto S. Torres, claiming to be one of the four legitimate children of Paz E. Siguion Torres who died intestate on December 18, 1959, filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition praying for the issuance in his favour letters of administration in connection with the properties left by the decedent with an aggregate value of 300k. It was also alleged that petitioner was unaware of any existing debt or obligation contracted by the deceased or by her estate, from any of the heirs or from third persons.

This was opposed by Conchita Torres, one of the heirs, because the appointment of an administrator is unnecessary in view of the fact that on January 27, 1960, the heirs of the deceased (including petitioner) had already entered into an extrajudicial partition and settlement of the estate, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.

This was answered by petitioner who, while admitting that such extrajudicial partition was signed by the heirs, contended that attempts at the actual designation of their respective shares had failed thus needing the court's intervention. It was also claimed that some properties of considerable value were not included in said extrajudicial partition. In a supplemental answer to the opposition, subsequently filed, petitioner likewise alleged that the estate has an existing debt of P50,000.00 from third persons, a fact which he claimed was not incorporated in the petition, through oversight.

Petitioner, however, offered to amend the petition before presentation of evidence, with leave of court. On July 21, 1961, the court, finding that an extrajudicial settlement had already been entered into by the heirs, dismissed the petition. Hence, the institution of the present appeal.

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in dismissing the special proceedings.

HELD: No. The dismissal is proper.

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, provides:

SECTION 1. Extra-judicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affected affidavit filed in the office of the Register of Deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years after the death of the decedent.1äw

Thus, where the decedent left no debts and heirs or legatees are all of age, as in this case, there is no necessity for the institution of special proceedings and the appointment of an administrator for the settlement of the estate, because the same can be effected either extrajudicially or through an ordinary action for partition. (Guico, et al. v. Bautista, et al., L-14921, December 31, 1960). If there is an actual necessity for court intervention, as contended by appellant, in view of the heirs' failure to reach an agreement as to how the estate would be divided physically, the latter, under the aforequoted Rule, have still the remedy of an ordinary action for partition.

This is not to overlook the allegation that the estate has an outstanding obligation of P50,000.00. It is to be noted, however, that appellant, as heretofore observed, did not specify from whom and in what manner the said debt was contracted. Indeed, the bare allegation that, "the estate has an existing debt of P50,000.00 from third persons" cannot be considered as concise statement to constitute a cause of action. It must be for this reason that the lower court, notwithstanding the existence of such averment in appellant's supplemental answer to the opposition, dismissed the petition filed by said appellant.

Nor does the unverified statement that there are other properties not included in the deed of extrajudicial partition in the possession of one of the heirs, justify the institution of an administration proceeding because the same questions that may arise as to them, viz, the title there and their partition, if proven to belong to the intestate, can be properly and expeditiously litigated in an ordinary action of partition.

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the order appeal from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

G.R. No. 118680            March 5, 2001

MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA, petitioner, vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE, CARMEN, MERCEDES & RAMON, all surnamed RODRIGUEZ, ROSALINA RODRIGUEZ, CHAN LUNG FAI, MATEO TAN TE, TE ENG SUY, LORETA TE, VICTORIO S. DETALIA, JEROME DEIPARINE, PETRONILO S. DETALIA, HUBERT CHIU YULO, PATERIO N. LAO, LORENSITA M. PADILLA, IMMACULATE CONCEPCION COLLEGE AND LILIAN EXPRESS, INC. and TIO TUAN, respondents.

On April 8, 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated proceedings before the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption of herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. On August 1, 1946, the CFI granted the petition and declared petitioner Pedrosa the adopted child of Miguel and Rosalina.

On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguel's estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel.

On November 21, 1972, private respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner before the CFI of Ozamiz City. Said Court denied the action and upheld the validity of the adoption. The private respondents appealed the case to the CA.

On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his brothers and sisters.

Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to secure new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to the other respondents herein.2 Some of their lands were later on alienated in favour of third persons.

On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to annul the adoption of petitioner Pedrosa filed a joint Motion to Dismiss. On June 25, 1986, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal but upheld the validity of the adoption of petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they were not their blood relatives.

Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The said complaint was filed on January 28, 1987. Said complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987 to include the allegation "that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed."7

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence this appeal.

ISSUES

(1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" had already prescribed;

(2) whether or not said deed is valid; and

(3) whether or not the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which had already been transferred to the respondent buyers.

Defense:

Respondents, claim that the action of petitioner had already prescribed. In addition, they argue that petitioner, Maria Elena, and Rosalina already have their shares in the estate of Miguel Rodriguez reflected in the compromise agreement they entered into with the respondent Rodriguezes in AC- G.R. SP 00208. Finally, respondents aver that the non-participation of Maria Elena in the extrajudicial partition was understandable since her status as an adopted child was then under litigation. In any case, they assert that the shares of Miguel's heirs were adequately protected in the said partition.

HELD:

1. It has not prescribed yet

Section 4, Rule 7418 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 119 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.20

Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case.

The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that:

[The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively.21

Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her action against the respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.

Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on publication of extrajudicial settlement. It states:

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.22

Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issuedbefore the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was when publication was done in the instant case. Following Rule 74 and the ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson, since Maria Elena did not participate in the said partition, the settlement is not binding on her.

2. The Deed is invalid

The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious.23 Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate, following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code.24 The private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not aware of Maria Elena's adoption since they even filed an action to annul the decree of adoption. Neither can they claim that their actions were valid since the adoption of Maria Elena was still being questioned at the time they executed the deed of partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed only twenty six (26) years after the decree of adoption, patently a much delayed response to prevent Maria Elena from inheriting from her adoptive parents. The decree of adoption was valid and existing. With this factual setting, it is patent that private respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith with intent to defraud Maria Elena.

3. Can no longer recover

Could petitioner still redeem the properties from buyers? Given the circumstances in this case, we are constrained to hold that this is not the proper forum to decide this issue. The properties sought to be recovered by the petitioner are now all registered under the name of third parties. Well settled is the doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose.26

Petitioner asks for the award of damages. No receipts, agreements or any other documentary evidence was presented to justify such claim for damages. Actual damages, to be recoverable, must be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages.27 The same is true for moral damages. These cannot be awarded in the absence of any factual basis.28 The unsubstantiated testimony of Loreto Jocelyn Pedrosa is hearsay and has no probative value. It is settled in jurisprudence that damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence.29 Nonetheless, the failure of the petitioner to substantiate her claims for damages does not mean that she will be totally deprived of any damages. Under the law, nominal damages are awarded, so that a plaintiff's right, which has been invaded or violated by defendants may be vindicated and recognized.30

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" executed by private respondents on March 11, 1983 is declared invalid. The amount of P100,000.00 is hereby awarded to petitioner as damages to be paid by private respondents, who are also ordered to pay the costs.

G.R. No. 26751             January 31, 1969

JOSE S. MATUTE, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division) and MATIAS S. MATUTE, respondents.

On August 20. Carlos Matute, one of the heirs and full blood brother of both the petitioner and respondent Matias Matute filed a Special Proceeding 25876 ((settlement of the Matute estate) a petition praying for the removal of Matias as co-administrator and his (Carlos') appointment in such capacity. His allegations are:

1. "for a period of more than two years from the date of his appointment (on May 29, 1963), said Matias S. Matute has neglected to render a true, just and complete account of his administration," 

2. he "is not only incompetent but also negligent in his management of the estate under his charge consisting of five haciendas on account of a criminal charge for murder filed against him which is occupying most of his time."1awphil.ñêt

Matias opposed said allegations. He filed a memorandum in support of his opposition.

On September 21, 1965 the heirs of Agustina Matute Candelario, Elena MatuteCandelario and Amadeo Matute Candelario and their mother and legatee Anunciacion Candelario, moved for the immediate appointment of Agustina Matute Candelario,Carlos S. Matute and Jose S. Matute, herein petitioner, as joint co-administratorsor anyone of them in place of Matias S. Matute, whose removal they also soughttogether with the ouster of the general administrator Carlos V. Matute

on thefollowing additional grounds:

1. Despite the vast resources and income of the estate, the present administrators have failed to pay even the annual real property tax for the years 1964 and 1965;

2. The financial statements of both administrators were not properly signed andauthenticated by a certified public accountant, and do not contain the exactentries as filed by former administrators containing the daily and monthly entriesof receipts and disbursements;

3. Both administrators have deliberately failed to file their inventories andstatements of accounts of time, and did so only when ordered by the probatecourt;

4. Both administrators have made unauthorized disbursements as shown by theirfinancial statements; and

5. The probate court has discretion to remove the administrator.

Evidences were submitted by both parties.

On January 8, 1966 Matias filed a written objectionto the admission of the movants' exhibits on the ground that the same were hearsay,self-serving, irrelevant and/or mere photostatic copies of supposed originalswhich were never properly identified nor shown in court.

Four days later, or onJanuary 12, 1966, the counsel for Matias filed with leave of court a "Motion toDismiss and/or Demurrer to Evidence" which avers that "there is no sufficientevidence on record to justify and support the motions for the removal of theherein co-administrator Matias S. Matute." In the same motion, said counselreserved the right to introduce evidence in behalf of his client should theforegoing motion be denied.

On January 31, 1966 the probate court issued an order removing Matias Matute as co-administrator of the said estate.

Matias interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition for   certiorari   with preliminary mandatory injunction (CA-G.R. 37039- R) dated February 1, 1966, praying that the aforesaid order of January 31, 1966 be set aside as a nullityfor having decreed his removal without due process and the appointment of JoseS. Matute without the requisite hearing.

The Court of Appeals granted said petition conditioned on the filing of a bond by Matias.

Jose Matute moved for the dismissal of the said petition on the ground that the CA has no jurisdiction over the case since the value of the estate involved is more than 200k. He further contended that he value of the Amadeo Matute Olave estatefor purposes of jurisdiction had already been resolved in CA-G.R. 35124-R wherethe Court of Appeals refused to take jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari contesting the appointment of Matias Matute as co-administrator, on the groundthat the value of the Matute estate was placed at P2,132,282.72 as evidenced by a "Compromise Agreement" dated April 12, 1956 which was duly signed by all of the heirs.

DEFENSE OF Matias.

He maintains,however, that the respondent Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over CA-G.R.37039-R "because the subject matter involved is merely ... the right to collectthe (monthly) rentals due the Estate in the sum of P5,000.00" pursuant to acontract of lease which he executed in favor of one Mariano Nasser coveringfive haciendas of the estate under his separate administration.

ISSUE: WON CA has jurisdiction.

In fine, the pith of the controversy is the right to co-administer the entire estate. In this regard, the ruling inFernandez, et al. vs. Maravilla 1 is determinative of the jurisdictional issue posed here. In said case, this Courtruled that in a contest for the administration of an estate, the amount incontroversy is deemed to be the value of the whole estate, which total valueshould be the proper basis of the jurisdictional amount. Consequently the Courtproceeded to conclude that the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction toissue writs of certiorari and preliminary injunction prayed for in a petition concerning a conflict over administration arising as an incident in the mainprobate or settlement proceeding if in the first place the principal case or proceeding falls outside its appelate jurisdiction considering the total value of the subject estate.

the instant intra-fraternal controversy involves a contest over administration, an incident in the settlement of the vast Matute estate. Considering that the value of the said estate is more thanP200,000, and considering further that as enunciated in the Maravilla case thetotal value of the subject estate determines the jurisdictional amount anentdisputes over administration arising as incidents in a probate or settlementproceeding, like the case at bar, then it is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over CA-G.R. 37039-R nor the judicial authority to grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed fortherein.

Herein respondent insists, however, that even granting that the actual controversy pertains to administration, such contested administration does not encompassthe whole estate but is limited to the collection of a P5,000 monthly rental,which sum should be the basis of the jurisdictional amount, not the value ofthe whole estate. 

1. The averment of the respondent that the controversy centers on the collectionof the alleged P5,000 monthly rental and that the contest over administrationis limited thereto, does not find any support in the record.

2. The rule remains that the jurisdictional amount is determined by the totalvalue of the estate, not by value of the particular property or portion of the estate subject to administration, since the question of administration is merely incidental to the principal proceeding for the settlement and distribution ofthe whole estate.

3. The respondent's impression that a co-administrator's trust and responsibilityare circumscribed and delimited by the size and value of the particular propertyor portion of the estate subject to his separate administration, is erroneous. Although a co-

administrator is designated to admininister a portion of theestate, he is no less an administrator of the whole because his judiciousmanagement of a mere parcel enhances the value of the entire estate, while hisinefficient or corrupt administration thereof necessarily diminishes the valueof the whole estate. Moreover, when two or more administrators are appointed toadminister separate parts of a large estate they are not to discharge theirfunctions in distant isolation but in close cooperation so as to safeguard andpromote the general interests of the entire estate. 

In view of all the foregoing, we are of the consensus that the respondent Courtof Appeals has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of CA-G.R. 37039-R, and consequently was without power to issue or grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for in said case.

II.  The respondent contends that the disputed order removing him as co-administrator is a patent nullity for the following reasons:

(1) He was removed in wanton disregard of due process of law because the probatejudge arbitrarily deprived him of his day in court;

(2) The evidence adduced by the movants is manifestly insufficient, if not devoid of probative value, to warrant his removal; and

(3) He was removed not on the grounds specifically invoked by the movants but for causes discovered motu propio by the probate judge in the records of specialproceeding 25876 and without affording him the opportunity to rebut the findingsof the said judge.

            Upon the other hand, the petitioner advances the following reasons in support of the order of removal:

(1) The probate judge accorded the respondent all the opportunity to adduce hisevidence but the latter resorted to dilatory tactics such as filing a "motion to dismiss or demurrer to evidence";

(2) The evidences presented to sustain the removal of the respondent are incontrovertible since aside from being documentary, they are parts of the record of special proceeding 25876; and

(3) The evidence on record conclusively supports the findings of the probate judge.

Held: He was removed without due process.

It appears that shortly after the reception of evidence for the movants Carlos Matute and the Candelario-Matute heirs, the respondent filed on January 8, 1966a verified objection to the admission in evidence of the movants' exhibits on the ground that the same were hearsay, self-serving, irrelevant and/or mere photostatic copies of supposed originals which were never properly identified nor produced in court. Four days later, or on January 12, 1966, the respondent filed with leave of court a "Motion to Dismiss and/or Demurrer to Evidence",

Instead of resolving the foregoing motion, the probate judge issued the controverted order removing the respondent as co-administrator without giving him the opportunity to adduce his own evidence despite his explicit reservation that he be afforded the chance to introduce evidence in his behalf in the event of denial of his motion to dismiss and/or demurrer to evidence. We are of the view that the above actuation of the probate judge constituted grave abuse of discretion which dooms his improvident order as a nullity. In fact, even without the respondent's reservation, it was the bounden duty of the probate judge to schedule the presentation and reception of the respondent's evidence before disposing of the case on the merits because only the movants at that time had presented their evidence. This duty is projected into bolder relief if we consider, which we must, that the aforesaid motion is in form as well as in substance a demurrer to evidence allowed by Rule 35, by virtue of which the defendant does not lose his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is denied. Said Rule states:

            After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. (emphasis supplied)

            The application of the abovecited Rule in special proceedings, like the case at bar, is authorized by section 2 of Rule 72 which direct that in the "absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary civil actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings."

            But what is patently censurable is the actuation of the probate judge in removing the respondent, not on the strength of the evidence adduced by the movants (not a single exhibit or document introduced by the movants was specifically cited in the disputed order as a justification of the respondent's ouster), but on the basis of his (judge's) findings, which he motu propio gleaned from the records of special proceeding 25876, without affording the respondent an opportunity to controvert said findings or in the very least to explain why he should not be removed on the basis thereof.

III

As proof of the respondent's "indifference" in the discharge of his duties, the probate judge cited the court's order of January 5, 1966 disapproving the respondent's 1964 account for his failure to personally appear on the date set for the submission of evidence in support of the said account. It must be emphasized, however, that the respondent, two days before the issuance of the aforesaid order removing him as co-administrator, seasonably moved for the reconsideration of the aforecited order of January 5, 1966 on the ground that his failure to personally attend the scheduled hearing was due to illness on his part. Evidently, when the probate court decreed the removal of the respondent, the order disapproving his 1964 account, which was used as one of the principal justifications for his removal as co-admininistrator, was not yet final as it was still subject to possible reconsideration.

 It likewise appears that the respondent was removed partly due to his failure to pay the inheritance and estate taxes. In this regard, it bears emphasis that the failure to pay the taxes due from the estate is per se not a compelling reason for the removal of an administrator, for "it may be true that the respondent administrator failed to pay all the taxes due from the estate, but said failure may be due to lack of funds, and not to a willful omission."5 In the case at bar there is no evidence that the non-payment of taxes was willful. On the contrary, the respondent alleged, and this was unchallenged by the movants, that while the previous administrators left the taxes unpaid, he had paid the real property taxes in Davao covering the years 1954 to 1966.

IV.

The provision of Rule 83 that if "there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person," cannot be used to justify the institution of Jose S. Matute even without a hearing, because such institution has no factual basis considering that there was a general administrator (Carlos V. Matute) who remained in charge of the affairs of the Matute estate after the removal of Matias S. Matute. The abovecited provision evidently envisions a situation when after the removal of the incumbent administrator no one is left to administer the estate, thus empowering the probate court, as a matter of necessity, to name a temporary administrator (or caretaker), pending the appointment of a new administrator after due hearing. Such circumstance does not obtain in the case at bar.

            Upon the foregoing disquisition, we hold that the respondent Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction over CA-G.R. 37039-R, and that the controverted order of January 31, 1966 is a nullity and must therefore be set aside in its entirety.

G.R. No. L-18799             March 31, 1964

HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental, ASUNCION MARAVILLA, ET AL., petitioners, vs.HERMINIO MARAVILLA, respondent.

On August 25, 1958, respondent Herminio Maravilla filed with he Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for probate of the will (Spec. Proc. No. 4977) of his deceased wife Digna Maravilla who died on August 12 of that same year. In the will the surviving spouse was named as the universal heir and executor.

On September 30, 1958, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla (brother and sisters of the deceased Digna Maravilla) filed an opposition to the probate of the will, on the ground, inter alia, that the will was not signed on each page by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting witnesses and of one another.

On March 16, 1959, on motion of respondent Herminio, which was opposed by Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, the court issued an order appointing him special administrator of the estate of the deceased.

On February 8, 1960, the court rendered a decision denying probate of the will, as it was not duly signed on each page by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting witnesses and of one another.

On February 17, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a petition for appointment of Eliezar Lopez (son of Asuncion Maravilla) as special co-administrator to protect their interests, on the ground that the will, having been denied probate, they are the legal heirs of the decedent.

On February 26, 1960, respondent filed with the court his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal, from the decision denying probate of the will. Some devisees under the will, likewise, appealed from said decision.

On February 25, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a petition for the removal of respondent as special administrator, as he failed to file an inventory within 3 months from his appointment and qualification as special administrator, as provided for in Section 1, Rule 84, of the Rules of Court. To this petition, respondent filed an opposition, on the ground that said provision of the Rules of Court does not apply to a special administrator, and an inventory had already been submitted by him, before said petition for his removal was filed.1äwphï1.ñët

On February 27, 1960, the devisees Conchita and Rose Marie Kohlhaas filed with the court a petition for appointment of Conchita as special co-administratrix. Devisee Adelina Sajo, likewise, filed a similar petition February 29.

After said joint hearing, the court appointed Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator in an order dictated open court, to protect the interests of Pedro, Asuncion and Regina Maravilla.

From this order, respondent, on March 7, 1960, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for preliminary injunction) to annul the order appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator, and to prohibit the probate court from further proceeding with the petition for the removal of respondent as special administrator. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction on March 9, 1960 which was amended on March 11, 1960 to make it more specific.

On October 6, 1960, petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to certify the case to the Supreme Court, on the grounds that the principal amount in controversy in this case exceeds P200,000.00, and the writs (of certiorari and prohibition) prayed for are not in aid of appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since the probate case is not on appeal before it. To this petition, respondent filed an opposition. on the grounds that the amount in controversy is less than P200,000.00 and the decision of the probate court (of February 8, 1960) is now on appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R); hence, the writ prayed for is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, and the present case does not involve title to or possession of real estate exceeding in value P200,000.00.1

On May 16, 1961, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writs (certiorari and prohibition) prayed for by respondent, and declaring null and void the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator.

Petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: WON CA had jurisdiction to grant said writs.

HELD: No

Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent, the same not being in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

We agree with petitioners. The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, assumed jurisdiction over the present case on the theory that "the amount in controversy relative to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator to protect the interests of respondents (herein petitioners) is only P90,000.00 more or less, i.e., one fourth of the conjugal property" (of respondent and the deceased Digna Maravilla) which, is per inventory submitted by respondent as special administrator is valued at P362,424.90. This theory is untenable. Note that the proceedings had on the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator are merely incidental to the probate or testate proceedings of the deceased Digna Maravilla presently on appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) where petitioners' motion to elevate the same to the Supreme Court, on the ground that the amount herein involved is within the latter's exclusive jurisdiction, is still pending, resolution. That the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over said testate proceedings cannot be doubted, considering that the properties therein involved are valued at P362,424,90, as per inventory of the special administrator.

Note also that the present proceedings under review were for the annulment of the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator and to restrain the probate court from removing respondent as special administrator. It is therefore, a contest for the administration of the estate and, consequently, the amount or value of the assets of the whole estate is the value in controversy (4 C.J.S. 204). It appearing that the value of the estate in dispute is much more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals clearly had no original jurisdiction to issue the writs in question.

Respondent also contends that appeals in special proceedings, as distinguished from ordinary civil cases, are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since they are not enumerated in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, as amended. Granting, arguendo, that a special proceeding is not a civil action, it has never been decided that a special proceeding is not a "civil case" (Carpenter v. Jones, 121 Cal. 362; 58 p. 842). On the other hand, it has been held that the term "civil case" includes special proceedings (Herkimer v. Keeler, 100 Iowa 680, N.W. 178). Moreover, Section 2, Rule 73, of the Rules of Court provides that the rules on ordinary civil actions are applicable in special proceedings where they are not inconsistent with, or when they may serve to supplement the provisions relating to special proceedings. Consequently, the procedure of appeal is the same in civil actions as in special proceedings. (See Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, 1957 Ed., p. 326.)

The cases cited by respondent where this Court ruled that the separate total claim of the parties and not the combined claims against each other determine the appellate jurisdictional amount, are not applicable to, the instant case, because Section 2, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court is explicit that the amount or value involved or in controversy in probate proceedings is that of the entire estate. Assuming, arguendo, that the rule in the cases cited by respondent is here applicable, it should be noted that respondent claims the whole estate of at least more than 3/4 thereof. Said claim, reduced to a pecuniary standard, on the basis of the inventory, would amount to more than P200,000.00 and, consequently, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

On the question of the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as special administrator, we agree with respondent that there was no need for it. Note that the Rules of Court contain no provision on special co-administrator, the reason being, that the appointment of such special administrator is merely temporary and subsists only until a regular executor or administrator is duly appointed. Thus, it would not only be unnecessary but also impractical, if for the temporary duration of the need for a special administrator, another one is appointed aside from the husband, in this case, upon whom the duty to liquidate the community property devolves merely to protect the interests of petitioners who, in the event that the disputed will is allowed to probate, would even have no right to participate in the proceedings at all. (Roxas v. Pecson, 82 Phil. 407.)

In view of the conclusion herein reached, in connection with the amount involved in the controversy, it is suggested that appropriate steps be taken on the appeal pending in the Court of Appeals involving the probate of the will (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) to comply with the provisions of the Judiciary Act on the matter.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of May 16, 1961 is set aside and another one entered also setting aside the order of the trial court of March 5, 1960, appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator. Without costs. So ordered.