ALAWI V. ALAUYA

Facts:

Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of

Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent

executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were

classmates, and used to be friends.

Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on

installments by Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing

loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation

(NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.

advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his

consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit,

fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice

President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.

On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against

him. One of her grounds was Alauya’s usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only

regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically

synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful

claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often

mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local

legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

Issue:

Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use the title of Attorney

Held:

He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had

occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members

of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who

has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine

Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or

advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is

reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and

successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who

are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

CUI V. CUI

Facts:The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by the

spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons.” It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to “such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of the spouses deed of donation)”

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna Cui. In 1960, the then incumbent administrator of the Hospicio, resigned in favor of Antonio Cui pursuant to a “convenio” entered into between them that was embodied on a notarial document. Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of either the “convenio” or of his brother’s assumption of the position.

Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his brother Antonio, demanding that the office be turned over to him. When the demand was not complied, Jesus filed this case. Lower court ruled in favor of Jesus.

ISSUEWho is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?

HELD Antonio should be the Hospicio’s administrator.Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be preferred

pursuant to sec.2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews named, who if not a lawyer (titulo de abogado), should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.

Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by resolution, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio.

The term “titulo de abogado” means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor’s degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. By itself, the degree merely serves as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has “successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education.

The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of all, because in all of the works of an administrator, it is presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.

Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, to the office of administrator. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio was disbarred (for immorality and unprofessional conduct). However, it is also a fact, that he was reinstated before he assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place. Also, when defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.

In Re: Almacen

FACTS:Vicente Raul Almacen’s “Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title,” filed on Sept. 26, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is “a great injustice committed against his client by Supreme Court”. He indicts SC, in his own phrase, as a tribunal “peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.” His client’s he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court’s “unjust judgment,” has become one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.”

He ridicules the members of the Court, saying “that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.” He then vows to argue the cause of his client ”in the people’s forum,” so that “ people may know of the silent injustices committed by this court’ and that “whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated.” He ends his petition with a prayer that: ………a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.”

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Yaptichay v. Calero, in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court rencered judgment agains his client. On June 15, 1966 atty. Almacen receive acopy of the decision. Twenty days later on he moved for its reconsideration but did not notify the latter of the time and plce of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, onJuly 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For lack of proof of service, ‘the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who earlier, that is, on Aug. 22, 1966 had already perfected the appeal. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals.

HELD:

Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.

As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he “professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen.Atty. Almacen is suspended from the practice of law until further orders.

In Re Garcia2 SCRA 985

Facts:

Arturo E. Garcia,has applied for admission to the practice of law in the phils. without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers among others that he is a filipino citizen born in bacolod city of filipino parentage. He finished Bachillerato Superior in spain. He was allowed to practice law profession in spain under the provision of the treaty on academic degrees and the exercise of profession between the republic of the phils.

Issue:

Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the phil. bar.

Held:

The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on academic degrees between the republic of the Philippines and Spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. The said treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain. The treaty could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason the executive may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of the law in the Philippines. The power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the congress of the Philippines.