case digest constitutional law 1 part 2

7/29/2019 Case Digest Constitutional Law 1 Part 2

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Marbury v. Madison Case Brief SummarySummary ofMarbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).

Facts

On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit court

justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to takecontrol of the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took office.

The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John Marshall (who later

became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but they were not delivered before the

expiration of Adamss term as president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they

were invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of Adamss term.

William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury applied directly to

the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel Jeffersons Secretary of State, James

Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original

jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of

the United States.

Issues

1. Does Marbury have a right to the commission?

2. Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?

3. Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are

unconstitutional and therefore void?

4. Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article

III of the Constitution?

5. Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?

Holding and Rule (Marshall)

1. Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.

The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executives constitutional power of appointment has

been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required from the person possessing the

power has been performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury became effective when signed by

President Adams.

2. Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy.The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every

individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of

government is to afford that protection.

Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, the

individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy. The President, by signing

the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The seal of the United

States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the

completion of the appointment. Having this legal right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission,

a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a remedy.

3. Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are

unconstitutional and therefore void.

It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to

particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court

must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to


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any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which

they both apply.

4. No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond what is specified

inArticle III of the Constitution.

The Constitution states that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases,the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction. If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the

Legislature to apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that

body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this

court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original

jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the

Constitution, is form without substance.

5. No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.

To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or

to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.

It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already

instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to

issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for

that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.

Disposition

Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesnt get the commission.

SeeEx Parte McCardlefor a constitutional law case brief holding that that the Constitution gives Congress the

express power to make exceptions to the Supreme Courts appellate jurisdiction.

Poe v. Ullman

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Citation.367 U.S. 497, 81 S. Ct. 1752, 6 L. Ed. 2d 989, 1961 U.S.

Brief Fact Summary. The Appellants, several couples and their physician (Appellants), brought suit, seeking

the overturn of a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices and the giving of medical

advice on the use of such devices.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A penal statute is not ripe for constitutional challenge unless it is enforced by the

state enacting the statute.

Facts. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors construed a state penal statute as prohibiting the use of

contraceptive devices and the giving of medical advice on their use. Appellants included a couple who had

several pregnancies result with severely abnormal progeny which died shortly after birth, a couple whose wife

had experienced a severely traumatic pregnancy and their physician, who believes the safest course of

treatment for the couples includes using contraceptive devices.

Issue.Is the petitioners claim ripe for judicial review?
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Held. No. Judgment affirmed. Connecticut has never attempted to fully prosecute any case under the statute.

Because of this, not only have the Appellants not suffered injury in fact from the statute, but there is no

evidence that they would be prosecuted for acting in violation of the statute.

Dissent. Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas) argues that the mere threat of prosecution is injury in fact, that it

is not the choice worthy of a civilized society to require individuals to risk penalty for their behavior to have

their constitutional rights determined.

Discussion. Although ripeness is the central issue in Poe, the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme

Court) does not articulate any clear guidelines to evaluate ripeness. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court seems to

articulate that a penal statute that has not been enforced is not ripe for judicial review.

United States v. Richardson

Citation.418 U.S. 166, 94 S. Ct. 2940, 41 L. Ed. 2d 678, 1974 U.S.

Brief Fact Summary. Richardson, the Plaintiff-Respondent (Plaintiff) sued Congress. He alleged that public

reporting under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Act of 1949 violates Article I, s 9, cl. 7 (the Act) of the

United States Constitution (Constitution), the statement and account clause.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Standing is denied to generalized grievances.

Facts. Plaintiff sued Congress, hoping to compel release of detailed funding records of CIA funding. Plaintiff

based his standing to sue on his status as a United States taxpayer.

Issue. Is taxpayer status sufficient to establish standing to bring suit in this case?

United States v. Richardson case briefUnited States v. Richardson Case Summary

418 U.S. 166, 94 S. Ct. 2940, 41 L. Ed. 2d 678, 1974Constitutional Law

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Petitioner United States sought certiorari review of an order from the United States Court

of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which found respondent taxpayer demonstrated standing to challenge the

constitutionality of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C.S. 403a et seq.

FACTS:

-Respondent taxpayer attempted to obtain information from petitioner Government regarding detailed

expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

-Respondent sought a declaration that the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (CIAA), 50 U.S.C.S. 403a et

seq., was unconstitutional because the CIAA violated the federal Constitution's requirement to report federal

spending.

-The trial court granted a dismissal motion on the ground respondent lacked standing and that the issue was apolitical question.

-On appeal, the lower appellate court reversed, holding respondent met the two-tiered test for standing requiring

a logical link between respondent's status as a taxpayer and the statute, as well as a nexus between respondent's

status and a limitation on the taxing and spending power.

HOLDING:

-On the Government's petition for certiorari review, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that

respondent had failed to allege a direct injury and failed to challenge the taxing or spending power, thus,
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respondent had no standing.

Respondent failed to show he suffered an injury different from that suffered by the public in general.

CONCLUSION: The Court reversed the lower appellate court's judgment finding respondent had standing to

challenge a federal agency's expenditure reporting methods because respondent failed to allege a direct, personal

injury that was different from that suffered by the general public.

- See more at:http://www.lawschoolcasebriefs.net/2013/01/united-states-v-richardson-case-brief.html#sthash.LIQzd4kx.dpuf

DeFunis v. OdegaardCase Brief

Supreme Court of the United States

416 U.S. 312 (1974)

ISSUE:Does a law students status of being in his last term of law school render his suit challenging the

constitutionality of the law schools admission process under the EPC moot if the law school has promised not to

challenge the students ability to complete his law school studies?

HOLDING: Yes.

FACTS:

P applied to U. of Washington Law School and was denied admission

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

P brought suit seeking a mandatory injunction commanding the state-run law school to admit him as a member

of the first-year class, on the ground that the law schools admissions policy had resulted in the unconstitutional

denial of his application for admission

Trial Ct. granted the relief

Wash. Sup. Ct. reversed, holding that the admissions policy did not violate the Constitution

At time of consideration in SCOTUS, P was in his last term of law school, and the law school made it clear that it

will not seek to abrogate Ps registration

RULES:

Mootness:As a derivative of the Art. III case or controversy requirement, the federal judiciary cannot review

moot cases

Voluntary cessation: Voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive a court of power to hear and

determine the case, i.e., does not make the case moot

Voluntary cessation willrender a case moot only if there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be

repeated

REASONING:

Issue is moot: Because P will complete his law school studies at the end of the term for which he has now

registered regardless of any decision the Court might reach on the merits of the case, the Court cannot,

consistently with the limitations of Art. III, consider the substantive constitutional issues tendered by the parties

Controversy between the parties has ceased to be definite and concrete and no longer touches the legal

relations of the parties having adverse legal interests

Not about voluntary cessation, just about the fact that P will never have to face the allegedly unlawful

admissions policies again

Not a case presenting conduct capable of repetition yet evading review because anyone else allegedly

discriminated against can bring suit in the future
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DISSENT Brennan, Douglas, White, & Marshall:

P is not done with law school yet, so there is a possibility that the law school could retreat on its assurances that it

would let P continue in his studies

Mere voluntary cessation of unlawful conduct does not moot a case

No want of adversary contest in this case, as there is a fully developed factual record that came about while P was

not assured a spot in law school Avoiding repetitious litigation serves the public interest, so the inevitability of having another case on the same

issue counsels against a mootness determination

Muskrat v. United States Case Brief SummarySummary ofMuskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 31 S. Ct. 250, 55 L. Ed. 246 (1911).

Facts

Congress passed an act that conferred original jurisdiction the Court of Claims and appellate jurisdiction on the

Supreme Court to determine the validity of certain acts of Congress (i.e. to issue advisory opinions). The

Congressional acts related to the distribution and allotment of lands and funds to members of the Cherokee Indian

tribe.

Muskrat and the other plaintiffs in this case brought suit in the Court of Claims seeking a declaration that

Congressional acts of 1904 and 1906 were unconstitutional, and that an earlier (and more favorable) act of July 1902

was controlling. The Court of Claims sustained the validity of the acts of 1904 and 1906 and dismissed the petitions

and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Issues

1. What is the scope of the judicial power conferred by the Constitution upon the Supreme Court?

2. May Congress expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts by empowering them to issue advisory opinions?

Holding and Rule (Day)

1. The judicial power is limited to cases and controversies, i.e. the claims of litigants brought before the courts for

the protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress, or punishment of wrongs.

2. No. Congress may not expand the jurisdiction of the judiciary by empowering it to issue advisory opinions.

As perMarbury v. Madison, neither the legislative nor the executive branch can assign to the judicial branch any

duties other than those that are properly judicial and to be performed in a judicial manner. Under the Constitution,

judicial power is limited to cases and controversies. A case or controversy implies the existence of present or

possible adverse parties whose contentions are submitted to the court for adjudication.

Congress does not have the power to provide for a suit of this nature to be brought in federal court to test the

constitutionality of prior acts of Congress because such a suit is not a case or controversy. This court has no veto

power over legislation enacted by Congress, and its right to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional can only be

exercised when a proper case between opposing parties is submitted for determination.

Disposition

Reversed and remanded with orders to dismiss to lack of jurisdiction.

Notes: Nothing in the United States Constitution prohibits state courts from issuing advisory opinions and some states

engage in the practice.

A fair amount of Supreme Court jurisprudence has arguably been unkind to the indigenous peoples within United

States territory.
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case digest constitutional law 1 part 2

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