San Beda College of Law

Case Analysis on the Different Perspective: Hegelian, Teleological, Historical and Utilitarian Concepts

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement In Legal Philosophy

To be submitted to:Atty. Dacanay

By:Michael Benjohn N. NievaMario Dexter S. Purugana

Adrian Espiritu

Table of Contents:I. Utilitarianism

a. Review of the Conceptb. Facts of the case

Magno v. Court of AppealsCalalang v. Williams

c. Case Analysis

II. Hegelian Perspectivea. Review of the Conceptb. Facts of the case

Stone v. MississippiIchong v. HernandezStar Paper Corporation v. Simbol et al.

c. Case Analysis

III. Teleologicala. Review of the Conceptb. Facts of the case

Navarro v. VillegasMagno v. Court of Appeals

c. Case Analysis

IV. Historicala. Review of the Conceptb. Facts of the case

Ejercito v. SandiganbayanGarcia v. Sandiganbayan

c. Case Analysis

Bibliography:

Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1868)

Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 155 (1957)

Star Paper Corporation v. Ronald Simbol, Wilfreda Comia and Lorna Estrella, G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006

Navarro v. City Mayor Antonio Villegas, G.R. No. L-31687, February 26, 1970

Oriel Magno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96132, June 26, 1992

Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726 (1970)

Villanueva v. CA (427 SCRA 439)

UTILITARIANISM is one of the schools of jurisprudence which espouses the doctrine that what is useful is good and that determining consideration of right conduct is the usefulness of its consequences on the greatest happiness of the greatest of the greatest number in the community. This, to the utilitarian, is the purpose and end of the law.

(Intro. To legal Philosophy by Pascual; 1989 ed. P. 137)

APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT:

Oliver Magno Vs. Court of Appeals

210 SCRA 471

G.R. # 96132 June 26, 1992

Petitioner Magno was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, but he did not have complete equipment that could make his venture workable. He also had another problem, and that while he was going into this entrepreneurship, he lacked funds with which to purchase the necessary equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner, representing Ultra Sources International Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed car repair service equipment of which Mancor was a distributor.

Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared that he had no sufficient funds to buy the equipment needed, the former (Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation (LS Finance for brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities.

The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not come up with such amount, he requested Joey Gomez on personal level to look for a third party who could lend him the equivalent amount of the warranty deposit. However, unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on condition that the same would be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest.

As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement whereby LS Finance would lease the garage equipments and petitioner would pay the corresponding rent with the option to buy the same. After the documentation was completed, the equipment were delivered to petitioner who in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check matured, petitioner requested through Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as he (Magno) was no longer banking with Pacific Bank.

To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated checks. Two (2) checks dated July 29, 1983 were deposited and cleared while the four (4) others, which were the subject of the four counts of the aforestated charges subject of the petition, were held momentarily by Corazon Teng, on the request of Magno as they were not covered with sufficient funds. These checks were a) Piso Bank Check Nos. 006858, dated August 15, 1983, 006859 dated August 28, 1983 and 006860 dated September 15, 1983, all in the amount of P5,038.43 and No. 086861 dated September 28, 1983, in the amount of P10,876.87.

Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage equipments. It was then on this occasion that petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng was the one who advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see Corazon Teng and promised to pay the latter but the payment never came and when the four (4) checks were deposited they were returned for the reason "account closed."

For having issued the four (4) checks that later bounced, petitioner was charged with four (4) counts of violation of B.P Blg. 22. After trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for one year in each criminal case and to pay complainant the respective amounts reflected in the subject checks.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in those convictions.

Hence, the present petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner should be punished for the issuance of the checks in questions.

RULING:

NO. the Supreme Court held that by the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00 corresponding to 30% of the "purchase/lease" value of the equipments subject of the transaction, it is obvious that the "cash out" made by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner who was just paying rentals for the equipment. It would have been different if petitioner opted to purchase the pieces of equipment on or about the termination of the lease-purchase agreement in which case he had to pay the additional amount of the warranty deposit which should have formed part of the purchase price. As the transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being paid for the loaned equipment, which were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner failed to continue paying possibly due to economic constraints or business failure, then it is lawful and just that the warranty deposit should not be charged against the petitioner.

To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he did not withdraw as it was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust "debt", to say the least, since petitioner did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing company, which is managed, supervised and operated by the corporation officials and employees of LS Finance.

It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that it was she who "accommodated" petitioner's request for Joey Gomez, to source out the needed funds for the "warranty deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of transaction that is shrouded with mystery, gimmickry and doubtful legality. It is in simple language, a scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the equipment in the name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able to "sell or lease" its goods as in this case, and at the same time, privately financing those who desperately need petty accommodations as this one. This modus operandi has in so many instances victimized unsuspecting businessmen, who likewise need protection from the law, by availing of the deceptively called "warranty deposit" not realizing that they also fall prey to leasing equipment under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement when it is a scheme designed to skim off business clients.

This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat of the penal sanction of the law in issue, as in this case. And, with a willing court system to apply the full harshness of the special law (B.P Blg. 22) in question, using the "mala prohibita" doctrine, the noble objective of the law is tainted with materialism and opportunism in the highest degree.

CASE ANALYSIS:

After characterizing the transaction which gave rise to the issuance of the checks involved in the case as “Shrouded with the mystery, gimmickry and doubtful legality”, victimizing “unsuspecting businessmen, who likewise needed protection from the law” and lamenting that “with a willing court system to apply the full harshness of the special law in question, using mala prohibita doctrine”, Justice Paras wrote in his decision as follows:

For all intents and purposes, the law (BP #22) was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account user. It did not intend to shelter or favor nor encourage users of the system to enrich themselves through manipulations and circumvention of the noble purpose and objective of the law. Least should it be used also as a means of jeopardizing honest-to-goodness transactions with some color of "get-rich" scheme to the prejudice of well-meaning businessmen who are the pillars of society.

Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and potential wrongdoers…xxx"

Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded upon that moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. This disapprobation is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all . . . That which we call punishment is only an external means of emphasizing moral disapprobation: the method of punishment is in reality the amount of punishment."

Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the "actual

and potential wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose operation could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.

Clearly, the foregoing pronouncement went into the theory of crime and punishment in their jurisprudential concepts, which were used by the ponente as the guiding principle in determining the whether the penal provision of B.P #22 must be imposed.

The traditional concept of offense Malum Prohibitum is that the act is evil because it is prohibited. (US vs. Look Chaw, 19 Phil 349) an offense Malum Prohibitum is an act made wrong by the legislator- a forbidden evil. A wrong prohibited; a thing which is wrong because prohibited; an act which is not inherently immoral but becomes so because its commission is expressly forbidden by positive law. An illegal act because of the prohibition of law.

Correlating the case to the Teleological Perspective, the much abused theory of Malum Prohibitum- that the only point of inquiry in this kind of offense is, whether the law has been violated- was already clearly relegated to the background in favor of the teleological idea of fairness and justice.

Correlating the case to the Utilitarian Perspective the Supreme Court moved to favor the accused when the law was used as a scheme designed to skim off business clients. The court looked into the nature and circumstances surrounding the issuance of checks by the accused, essential requisites of violation of B.P Blg. 22 is knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds. Mere act of issuing a worthless check is a special offense punishable by the anti-bouncing check law and the offense is Malum Prohibitum. (People vs. Gorospe, 157 SCAR 154)

The law is intended to protect the banking industry as well as the economy and if the court moved to favor against the accused, opportunist businessmen will move to abuse the law, as what happened on the case, thus, affecting the integrity of the banking and the economic integrity as well the court will fail to enact a decision envisioned by the legislature to protect the greater good.

Calalang vs. Williams

[GR 47800, 2 December 1940]

First Division, Laurel (J): 4 concur

Facts: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940, recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On 2 August 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street. On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.

Issue: Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.

Held: The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by

the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

Case Analysis

Correlating the case to the concept of Utilitarianism, Mr. Calalang cannot force the road be opened again just for the benefit of the few but rather it must encompass the greater good such as the program of the government, through their inherent state powers, to serve the general welfare. The Supreme Court in making the decision did not essentially recognized the classification of society who will be benefited in the government program but rather perceived the program to benefit “all” people, regardless of class, as “general”. By invoking the concept of “social justice” founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

Review on the Hegelian concept

Hegelian evolutionary process appears in a dialectic pattern. This pattern is design in which one element, called anti thesis, is followed by an opposite aspect, called antithesis, and the struggle between them is either wholly or partially settled or reconciled by the synthesis of the contending views.

The usual application of the Hegelian concept is individualism and collectivism, both are reconciled by means of the principle of identity, the resulting synthesis becomes the identification or reconciliation of the opposing views or ideas into a concrete concept.

Hegelian held that all concepts are actualized by these dialect movement, that is to say a concept (thesis) may evoke an opposite idea (antithesis) and out of their reconciliation or identification emerges a new concept (synthesis). This synthesis shall be the prevailing idea until it will be subject to another antithesis and that reconciliation will become the new synthesis.

Case application of the Hegelian Concept

Stone v. Mississippii

Facts:

In 1867, the provisional state legislature of Mississippi chartered the Mississippi Agricultural, Educational, and Manufacturing Aid Society. The Society was chartered to run a lottery for the next twenty five years; however, in 1868; a new constitution was ratified by the people outlawed lotteries in the state. John Stone and others associated with the society were arrested in 1874 for running a lottery. The Society claimed they were protected by the provisions of their charter while the state declared that the subsequent enforcement legislation had repealed the grant.

Issue:

Whether or not Mississippi violate the Contract Clause be repealing the Society’s grant.

Ruling:

All agreed that the Legislature cannot bargain away the police power of a state. No Legislature can bargain away the public health or the public morals. The People themselves cannot do it, much less their servants. The supervision of both these subjects of governmental power is continuing in its nature, and they are to be dealt with as the special exigencies of the moment may require. Government is organized with a view to their preservation, and cannot divest itself of power to provide for them.

The contracts protected in the Constitution are property rights, not governmental rights. Therefore, one can only obtain temporary suspension of the governmental rights in a charter which can be revoked by the will of the people.

Case Analysis

In the case at bar, it is a clear circumstance of conflict between the attainment of individualism and collectivism. The thesis or the individualism in the given case is the validity of the said society to organize and run a lottery for the next twenty five years as they were able to obtain a grant from the government of Mississippi. That obtaining a valid grant to operate must not be interfered by any of legislature. The contractual obligations arises from the charter must be enforced at all cost.

However, the antithesis or the collectivism is the need for the government to interfere for the welfare of the general public and not only for the advantage or benefit of a single group or society. In the given case, lottery is distinguished as a species of gambling and wrong in their influence.

Thus the synthesis is that the protection of the general welfare must be upheld. Lottery is considered a species of gambling, and wrong in their influences. They disturb the check and balances of a well ordered community. Society was built on such a foundation would almost of necessity bring forth a population of speculators and gamblers, living on the expectation of what, by the casting of lots, or by lot, chance or otherwise, might be awarded to them from the accumulation of others. Certainly the right to stop them is governmental, to be exercised at all times by those in power, at their discretion.

Ichong v. Hernandezii

Facts:

The Congress of the Philippines enacted the act which nationalizes the retail trade business, Republic Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business,” prohibiting aliens in general to engaged in retail trade in our country.

The petitioner is a Chinese national engaged in the retail business in the Philippines. Petitioner, for and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of RA No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional.

Issue:

Whether or not Congress in enacting RA No. 1180 violated the UN Charter, the UN declaration of Human Rights and the Philippine-Chinese Treaty of Amity.

Ruling:

The UN Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects, and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.

The treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals “upon the same terms as the nationals of any other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade.

Supposing, the laws infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope police power of the State.

Case Analysis

In the case at bar, the thesis is that retail trade practice, as averred by the complainant Ichong, must be allowed to all persons whether residents or aliens. For the complainant the government must have less restrictions or barriers on retail trade and let competition takes it place to achieve its economic level.

However, the antithesis is the State indeed has valued the importance of retail trade in the economy and thus finds reason to support it. During those times the players in the retail trade industry were mostly and almost to the brink of total domination of foreign nationals. Foreign nationals who are owners of retail trade would most likely serve only their personal interest and not of the country as a whole. Therefore the government then sees to protect the vital part of retail trade in the economy.

The synthesis is that RA NO. 1180 is a valid exercise of police power to achieve not only its economic purpose but of the national interest as well.

Star Paper Corporation v. Ronaldo Simbol, WIlfreda Comia and Lorna Estrellaiii

Facts:

The case at bar is a petition for review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case CA-G.R. SP No. 73477 reversing the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.

Petitioner Star Paper Corporation (the company) is a corporation engaged in trading – principally of paper products. Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of the Personnel and Administration Department while Sebastian Chua is its Managing Director. The respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol, Wilfreda N. Comia and Lorna E. Estrella were all regular employees of the company. Simbol was employed by the company on October 27, 1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the company, whom he married on June 27, 1998. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995: 1)New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has a relative, up to third degree of relationship, already employed by the company, 2)In case of two of our employees developed a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then decided to get married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above.

Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998 pursuant to the company policy. Comia was hired by the company on February 5, 1997. She met Howard Comia, a co-employee, whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded them that pursuant to company policy, one must resign should they decide to get married. Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.

Estrella was hired on July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuñiga, also a co-worker. Petitioners stated that Zuñiga, a married man, got Estrella pregnant. The company allegedly could have terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999. The respondents each signed a Release and Confirmation Agreement. They stated therein that they have no money and property accountabilities in the company and that they release the latter of any claim or demand of whatever nature.

Respondents then offer a different version of their dismissal, they averred that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of an illegal company policy. Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal, separation pay and attorney’s fees. They averred that the aforementioned company policy is illegal and contravenes Article 136 of the Labor Code. They also contended that they were dismissed due to their union membership.

Issue:

Whether or not the company’s employee policy was illegal and unconstitutional.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the marriage policy/regulation is violative of the constitutional rights towards marriage and the family of employees and of Article 136 of the Labor Code.

The 1987 Constitution states our policy towards protecting labor under the following provisions:

Article II, Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.

Article XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

The Civil Code likewise protects labor with the following provisions:

Art. 1700. The relation between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.

Art. 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.

Article 136 of the labor code provides protection to women employees that none of them shall be terminated from employment by any reason in relation to their marriage.

Case Analysis

In the case at bar, the thesis is the policy governing individual employees that states whoever is married to a co-employee, one shall terminate his employment with the company. This agreement with the employees of Star Paper Corporation shall prevail. While the antithesis is that the policy is violative of laws and of the constitution. The relationship of the capital and labor are not merely contractual but they must be impressed with the common good such as may be provided by labor unions. Here, the antithesis is that the promotion of employees’ welfare is best handled by a labor union. The synthesis is that the interest of individual employee is best achieved through the promotion of the common good of all workers by the labor union.

Review on Teleological Perspective

On the application of the teleological perspective in the jurisprudence, the juristic approach by modern teleological jurisprudents, Josef Kohler and Sidney Hook, consider a knowledge of right and wrong or good and evil that is relative to the changing conditions of time, place and people.

Another is the Ethical Relativity factor, Joseph Kohler agreeing with historical jurisprudence that the national oblutiacs cannot be ignored, however he felt that they cannot be sole relied upon either. In Koler’s own words, “there is no ideal absolute or absolute ideal.” By this is meant that there is no absolute formula to determine the different aspects of legal ordering of society.

Sidney Hook then posited another view that the problem “of what is right and what is wrong is to be conceived as the equilibration of interests and their adjustments to environment. The relativity of our ethical beliefs are prima facie evidence that good and bad depend upon our primary desires, and these change he qualities of good and bad change.”

Joseph Kohler’s “ideal tendencies” and Sidney Hook’s “primary desires” set the trend in modern teleological thinking and analysis in matters pertaining to the legal order away from the “ideal absolute or absolute ideal” towards the notion that all law, good, right, are relative to other transitory values and conditions.

Application of Teleological Perspective

Navarro v. Villegasiv

Facts:

The case at bar is a petition for mandamus to compel the mayor of Manila to issue a permit to enable certain group of students to hold a public rally, again at the Plaza Miranda. However the respondent mayor denied claiming that such activities could ignite turbulence with the crowd. The petitioner student then claimed that his constitutional right to freedom to peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of government. They stated the case of Primicias v. Fugoso, where the denial of issuance of a permit to have a meeting in Plaza Miranda is unconstitutional. That the respondent could only regulate and not prohibit the use of public places for the purpose indicated.

The lower court then affirmed the denial of permit by the city mayor.

Issue:

Whether or not the denial of permit to assemble to the students unconstitutional.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied he petition of the petitioner students. There was a clear and present danger for fear of public disorder as a result of the speeches delivered at the intended meeting.

Case Analysis

In the given case compared to Primicias v. Fugoso case was that during the Navarro case was a turbulent stage of the government and the student activist movement was at its height and sometimes bloody and violent. There is a reasonable clear and present danger for the respondent mayor to protect the interest of his subordinates. The Supreme Court in both ruling having of the same situation adjusted to the environment and time of occurrence. There is no absolute ideal to solve these both case of similar situation. What was made as the basis is the occurrence of a valid clear and present danger. It is the environment that decided whether an act shall be violative of the law or not.

i Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1868)ii Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 155 (1957) iii Star Paper Corporation v. Ronald Simbol, Wilfreda Comia and Lorna Estrella, G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006iv Navarro v. City Mayor Antonio Villegas, G.R. No. L-31687, February 26, 1970

Historical Perspective

A community or society of men which has advanced up the ladder of socio-political

development cannot be pure, racially or otherwise. One group may have come, for long or short

period, under the guidance of another nation. It is obvious then that colonial, commercial, religious,

and other contacts with other groups have had a great deal to do with the resulting uniformities in the

legal orders of different peoples. There are many folkways that have been incorporated into the

positive legal system of the Philippines. One attitude is the system of maybahay which pertains to the

management of the household affairs by the wife. In a case wherein there’s an insufficiently to

overcome the presumption, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage,

the presumption is that they are conjugal. Also, the attitude of pagmamagulang is now legally

expressed in Philippine positive law. In People v. Taliman, et al., where award of actual damages for

funeral expenses is deleted because the claim is not supported by any receipt. The rule is that any

pecuniary loss must be established by credible evidence before it may be awarded.

Also in a case of Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan, cases of unexplained wealth are similar cases of

bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from

the rule-making bank deposits confidential – and, undoubtedly cases for plunder involve unexplained

wealth.

In Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, to be convicted of violation of sec.3(b) of RA 3019, as amended,

the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements: a. the offender is a public officer b. who

requested or received a gift, a present, a share, a percentage; c. on behalf of the offender or any other

person; d. in which the public officer, in an official capacity under law, has the right to intervene. The

Sandiganbayan is vested with jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 1379, entitled "An Act Declaring

Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public

Officer or Employee and Providing For the Proceedings herefor."  What acts would constitute a

violation of such law? A reading of R.A. No. 1379 establishes that it does not enumerate any

prohibited act the commission of which would necessitate the imposition of a penalty.  Instead, it

provides the procedure for forfeiture to be followed in case a public officer or employee has acquired

during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public

officer or employee and to his lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property.  Section

12 of the law provides a penalty but it is only imposed upon the public officer or employee who

transfers or conveys the unlawfully acquired property; it does not penalize the officer or employee for

making the unlawful acquisition.  In effect, it imposes the penalty of forfeiture of the properties

unlawfully acquired upon the respondent public officer or employee.