cartel investigations in the eu: procedural fairness for defendants and claimants dave anderson –...

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Cartel investigations in the EU: Procedural fairness for defendants and claimants Dave Anderson – Partner, Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP, Brussels UOHS St Martin Conference Brno, Czech Republic 11 November 2010

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Page 1: Cartel investigations in the EU: Procedural fairness for defendants and claimants Dave Anderson – Partner, Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP, Brussels UOHS St

Cartel investigations in the EU: Procedural fairness for defendants and claimants

Dave Anderson – Partner, Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP, Brussels

UOHS St Martin Conference

Brno, Czech Republic

11 November 2010

Page 2: Cartel investigations in the EU: Procedural fairness for defendants and claimants Dave Anderson – Partner, Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP, Brussels UOHS St

www.blplaw.com Page 2 © Berwin Leighton Paisner 2010

A lack of procedural fairness

• For defendants:• Significant steps taken by the Commission

• Best Practices• Guidelines

• But, despite the good work…• Numerous points of material procedural unfairness• Significant concern about the overall structure• Concern regarding increased visibility for protection

of human rights

• For plaintiffs:• The procedural imbalance remains

Page 3: Cartel investigations in the EU: Procedural fairness for defendants and claimants Dave Anderson – Partner, Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP, Brussels UOHS St

The view from the defendants…

Page 4: Cartel investigations in the EU: Procedural fairness for defendants and claimants Dave Anderson – Partner, Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP, Brussels UOHS St

www.blplaw.com Page 4 © Berwin Leighton Paisner 2010

Dawn raids and inspections

• Authorisation of inspection• Often based on uncorroborated information from

immunity applicant• Lack of independent checks• Infringes right to privacy?

• Interviews and explanations• Individual's rights v. benefit to the company• Provision of self-incriminating information

• No legal privilege for in-house counsel

Page 5: Cartel investigations in the EU: Procedural fairness for defendants and claimants Dave Anderson – Partner, Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP, Brussels UOHS St

www.blplaw.com Page 5 © Berwin Leighton Paisner 2010

The Oral Hearing

• Limited benefit for significant effort

• No cross-examination and no real debate

• Limited attendance by senior officials

• Hearing Officer is reactive rather than proactive

• A missed opportunity

Page 6: Cartel investigations in the EU: Procedural fairness for defendants and claimants Dave Anderson – Partner, Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP, Brussels UOHS St

www.blplaw.com Page 6 © Berwin Leighton Paisner 2010

Is this the right system for this level of prosecution?

• Astronomical level of EU cartel fines changes everything

• General Court Judge Forward – competition proceedings “presenting a quasi-penal character”

• Creeping criminalisation of a system not designed to withstand it

• Commission as:• legislator, prosecutor, judge, jury, occasional damages

claimant

• Spectrum of possibilities for internal or structural change

• Reform will be needed to comply with ECtHR, EU Charter • Resist and fight – or lead by reforming now? • Many options – Inspiration from Member States

Page 7: Cartel investigations in the EU: Procedural fairness for defendants and claimants Dave Anderson – Partner, Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP, Brussels UOHS St

www.blplaw.com Page 7 © Berwin Leighton Paisner 2010

Is the structure sound?

Page 8: Cartel investigations in the EU: Procedural fairness for defendants and claimants Dave Anderson – Partner, Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP, Brussels UOHS St

And the view from the plaintiffs…

Page 9: Cartel investigations in the EU: Procedural fairness for defendants and claimants Dave Anderson – Partner, Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP, Brussels UOHS St

www.blplaw.com Page 9 © Berwin Leighton Paisner 2010

Obstacles to access to justice (I)

• Still no EU-wide legislation, and significant disincentives for claimants

• Key is to strengthen the threat of court proceedings to improve the prospect of more efficient settlements

“Out of court settlements can only really work if they are coupled with a realistic chance of effective court action” – Neelie Kroes

• Right now, typical European procedures encourage defendants to stall and fight and discourage plaintiffs from proceeding at all

Page 10: Cartel investigations in the EU: Procedural fairness for defendants and claimants Dave Anderson – Partner, Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP, Brussels UOHS St

www.blplaw.com Page 10 © Berwin Leighton Paisner 2010

Obstacles to access to justice (II)

• Passing-on defence• Need to strengthen the position of direct purchasers –

e.g. German system

• Discovery/disclosure• Anything is better than nothing• Still can protect leniency programs and submissions• Defendants assisting plaintiffs

• Single damages only?

• Calculation of damages

• Delay of agency published decisions

Page 11: Cartel investigations in the EU: Procedural fairness for defendants and claimants Dave Anderson – Partner, Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP, Brussels UOHS St

www.blplaw.com Page 11 © Berwin Leighton Paisner 2010

Creative solutions to encourage private settlements

• Possibility for interplay between public and private enforcement

• Some options• Immunity applicant must help plaintiffs in civil

proceedings• Reward private restitution with reduction of fines• Integrate private remedies into public

settlements• Impose as a requirement for immunity or

leniency

Page 12: Cartel investigations in the EU: Procedural fairness for defendants and claimants Dave Anderson – Partner, Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP, Brussels UOHS St

Thank You

[email protected]