caring across boundaries versus keeping...

Running head: MORAL VALUES AND INTERPERSONAL ORIENTATIONS 1

Caring Across Boundaries Versus Keeping Boundaries Intact:

Links between Moral Values and Interpersonal Orientations

Laura Niemi*, Liane Young, Department of Psychology, Boston College

*Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Laura Niemi,

Department of Psychology, Boston College, 140 Commonwealth Ave, 300 McGuinn Hall

Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, [email protected]

MORAL VALUES AND INTERPERSONAL ORIENTATIONS 2

Abstract

Prior work has established robust diversity in the extent to which different moral values

are endorsed. Some people focus on values related to caring and fairness, whereas others

assign additional moral weight to ingroup loyalty, respect for authority and established

hierarchies, and purity concerns. Five studies explore associations between endorsement of

distinct moral values and a suite of interpersonal orientations: Machiavellianism, prosocial

resource distribution, Social Dominance Orientation, and reported likelihood of helping and not

helping kin and close friends versus acquaintances and neighbors. We found that

Machiavellianism (Studies 1, 3, 4, 5) (e.g., amorality, controlling and status-seeking behaviors)

and Social Dominance Orientation (Study 4) were negatively associated with caring values, and

positively associated with valuation of authority. Those higher in caring values were more likely

to choose prosocial resource distributions (Studies 2, 3, 4) and to report reduced likelihood of

failing to help kin/close friends or acquaintances (Study 4). Finally, greater likelihood of helping

acquaintances was positively associated with all moral values tested except authority values

(Study 4). The current work offers a novel approach to characterizing moral values and reveals

a striking divergence between two kinds of moral values in particular: caring values and

authority values. Caring values were positively linked with prosociality and negatively associated

with Machiavellianism, whereas authority values were positively associated with

Machiavellianism and Social Dominance Orientation.

Keywords: morality, personal values, Machiavellianism, Social Dominance Orientation,

prosociality, hierarchy, authority, helping


Introduction

Across cultures and around the world people differ not only in what they take to be right

or wrong but even in what they count as morally relevant at all (e.g., Graham, Haidt, Nosek,

2009; Graham et al., 2011; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Janoff-Bulman, 2009; Jost, Federico, Napier,

2009; Jost & Amodio, 2012; Van Leeuwen, Park, Koenig, Graham, 2012). Some people focus

on the importance of individual rights, including the rights to be treated fairly and not harmed,

whereas others focus additionally on moral norms that serve not lone individuals necessarily but

entire communities. Specifically, concerns about caring for and not hurting or taking advantage

of others are often designated as “individualizing” values (Graham et al., 2009; Graham, Nosek,

Haidt, 2012, Graham et al., 2011). These norms are aimed at ensuring that each individual is

protected. By contrast, concerns about being loyal to one’s group, showing adequate respect for

authority (and extant social structures, i.e. hierarchies), and maintaining bodily or spiritual purity

often serve a different purpose – to maintain cohesive communities. Accordingly, “binding”

values are thought to “bind and build” groups of people (Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al,

2012; Graham et al., 2011, Haidt, 2007).

Recently, however, researchers have suggested that “binding and dividing” (Sinn &

Hayes, 2012) or “binding and blinding” (Haidt, 2012) may reflect a better characterization of

these values. On the one hand, moral communities guided primarily by binding values

encourage their members to stay loyal to the group, to respect the relevant authorities, and to

maintain community standards for spiritual and physical purity (e.g., Sosis & Bressler, 2003).

This represents the “bright” side of binding values. On the other hand, while group members

may selflessly elevate the needs of their group above their own individual needs, they may also

prioritize their own group over other groups (and other individuals in those different groups),

leading to negative intergroup attitudes (e.g., prejudice, bias, condoning violence toward

outgroups; Cohen, Montoya, Insko, 2006; Dovidio, Gaertner, Saguy, 2009; Leidner, Castano,

Zaiser, Giner-Sorolla, 2010; Park & Isherwood, 2011; Sinn & Hayes, 2012). This represents the


“dark” side of binding values and their tendency to blind and divide. Great strides have been

made in psychological research to map moral values onto political orientation (e.g., links

between binding values and conservative politics; Graham et al., 2009, 2011); however,

outstanding questions about the fundamental nature of various moral values highlight the need

for further research that maps individuals’ moral values onto interpersonal orientations (e.g.,

prosocial and antisocial tendencies). While moral values may be assumed to track with

prosocial outcomes broadly (e.g., more moral values = moral advantage, Haidt, 2012), an

outstanding empirical question is how people’s “lofty” beliefs about right and wrong truly relate

to more mundane, everyday interpersonal styles.

In fact, binding and individualizing values may be at odds with each other. Binding

values concern the differences between groups (and individuals), whereas individualizing values

can in principle motivate prosocial behavior across group boundaries. At the very least, nothing

inherent to individualizing values dictates differential treatment across groups or individuals.

Given the fundamental tension between binding and individualizing values and the presence of

this tension in culture wars around the world (e.g., Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2012;

Inbar, Pizarro, Bloom, 2009; Janoff-Bulman, 2009; Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, Hepp, 2009), it is

critical to examine empirically how these moral values relate to outcome variables that may

matter for ordinary social relations. The approach we take here is to investigate whether

individuals who endorse certain moral values also demonstrate other prosocial or antisocial

tendencies, measured using independent and previously validated constructs (Cf. Arvan, 2013;

Bartels & Pizarro, 2011). For example, are people who assign greater weight to binding values

(e.g., valuation of authority) more Machiavellian and oriented toward social dominance? Do

people who assign more weight to individualizing values (e.g., caring values) exhibit greater

prosocial tendencies?

Most interpersonal behavior requires individuals to balance selfish motivation with

prosocial motivation – to be a positive social partner who helps other people. These orientations


are not mutually exclusive – care for the self is at times necessary to enable care for others.

However, for some individuals, a motivation to dominate or exploit the group for selfish aims,

measureable as Machiavellianism (e.g., Dahling, Whitaker, Levy, 2009) or Social Dominance

Orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, Malle, 1994), may take precedence. Individuals high in

Machiavellianism (“Machs”) admit to employing manipulation and deception to achieve power,

status, control, and financial success (e.g., Dahling et al., 2009). These goals require successful

management of group relations, which may in turn shed light on the paradoxical nature of

Machiavellianism. Machs are often described as socially skilled, well-liked, popular, and

excellent at building alliances (e.g., Hawley, 2003), but they are also subclinically psychopathic

(Paulhus & Williams, 2002) and exploitative of others’ trust (Wilson, Near, Miller, 1996;

Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe, Smith, 2002). Machiavellian negotiation of relationships and social

structures for personal gain may benefit from a moral stance that elevates values like loyalty

and deference to authority. More specifically, these values are critical for the preservation of

existing social order but largely insensitive to concerns about caring and fairness. Moralization

of these values – alongside relative indifference to caring and fairness values – could facilitate

strategic hierarchy management while freeing the individual to feel morally justified in engaging

in manipulative or exploitative behavior.

Relatedly, Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) is characterized by a desire for

inequality and a tendency to categorize people along a hierarchical “superior-inferior dimension”

(Pratto et al., 1994, p.742). SDO, like Machiavellianism, has been found to predict various

antisocial outcomes, including explicit racism and sexism as well as reduced empathy and

concern for others (e.g., Pratto et al., 1994; Duriez & Van Heil, 2002, Whitley, 1999). While SDO

has previously been identified as negatively correlated with individualizing values and positively

correlated with binding values (Graham et al., 2011), SDO has not yet received attention for its

potential positive connection with binding values when political orientation is controlled. Since

an orientation towards social dominance requires a strict hierarchical worldview, a positive


correlation between SDO and authority values, regardless of political orientation, would be

predicted (Cf. Graham et al., 2011).

In contrast to these antisocial interpersonal orientations, an individual may instead be

motivated by a desire to be helpful or caring – a prosocial interpersonal orientation. This

cooperative orientation involves the preference for equal distributions of resources between

one’s self and another (as measured, for instance, by the social values orientation task, Van

Lange, Otten, De Bruin, Joireman, 1997). In other words, prosocial individuals take a non-

competitive stance that “levels the playing field.” Thus, values that warrant moral action only

when certain conditions are present – a demand for loyalty, respect for authority, or adherence

to purity norms, as in the case of the binding values – may be a poor fit with a more general

prosocial interpersonal orientation across social contexts. Meanwhile, values related to

unconditional caring and/or fairness may be better aligned with this orientation.

Previous research has demonstrated correlations between antisocial tendencies

(namely, the “Dark Triad:” psychopathy, narcissism, and Machiavellianism) and typically

conservative stances on a range of issues including capital punishment, the right to detain

suspected terrorists indefinitely, and the right to wage war in defiance of UN resolutions (Arvan,

2013). While this research suggests that the typically conservative moral values (i.e., “binding

values”— authority values in particular) that likely underlie such attitudes may likewise correlate

with antisocial tendencies, this deeper connection has not yet been investigated. Moreover, the

present research aims to discern the links between moral values and a more balanced set of

interpersonal orientations, ranging from antisocial to prosocial. Furthermore, this research

examines these connections both in the context of and independent of political orientation—a

focal point of prior work.

In five studies, we characterized the relationships between moral values as measured by

the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011) (caring, fairness, ingroup loyalty,

authority, purity) and interpersonal styles, in particular, Machiavellianism, Social Dominance


Orientation, and prosocial resource distribution. Furthermore, to capture greater detail

concerning the potential targets of individuals’ prosocial behavior, we also assessed self-

reported likelihood of helpful and unhelpful behaviors toward kin/close friends and

acquaintances/neighbors. In Study 1, we examined associations between moral values and

Machiavellianism. In Study 2, we investigated associations between moral values and prosocial

resource distribution. In Study 3, we investigated the relationships observed in Studies 1 and 2

within a single paradigm. In Study 4, we again tested the relationships between moral values,

Machiavellianism, and prosociality, in addition to Social Dominance Orientation and the reported

likelihood of helpful and unhelpful behaviors toward different targets (e.g., kin/close friends

versus neighbors/acquaintances). Study 5 used data from an unrelated study to again test the

replicability of associations between Machiavellianism and moral values. Finally, although the

correlational design of these studies precludes causal claims, meta-analyses were conducted to

determine aggregated correlation coefficients, allowing for demonstration of the most robust

relationships between moral values, Machiavellianism and prosociality observed across studies.

Study 1: Machiavellianism and Morality

Ethics Statement

The Boston College Institutional Review Board approved the ethics of all of the following

studies. Informed consent was obtained from all participants using an online form.

Study 1 Method

Study 1 tested the relationship between participants’ endorsement of caring and fairness

(i.e., individualizing values), and ingroup loyalty, authority, and purity values (i.e., binding

values), and self-reported Machiavellian tendencies. Participants were 117 individuals (66

females, Mage=34.71, SD=11.23) who completed the study online via Amazon.com’s Mechanical


Turk for a small payment. An additional 15 participants were excluded for failing attention

checks or for not completing the study1.

Moral values were assessed using the 30-item Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ;

See Appendix 1 in Supplementary Materials for items; Graham et al., 2011). The five

foundations (caring, e.g., “Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue;”

fairness, e.g., “Justice is the most important requirement for a society;” ingroup loyalty, e.g., “It

is more important to be a team player than to express oneself;” authority, e.g., “If I were a

soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer’s orders, I would obey anyway because that

is my duty;” and purity, e.g., “I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are

unnatural.”) were examined separately. Machiavellianism was assessed using the Machiavellian

Personality Scale (MPS: See Appendix 2 in Supplementary Materials for items; Dahling et al.,

2009). The MPS contains four subscales: (1) amorality (endorsement of lying, cheating, e.g., “I

believe that lying is necessary to maintain a competitive advantage over others”), (2) control

(e.g., “I enjoy having control over other people”), (3) status (e.g., “I want to be rich and powerful

someday”), and (4) distrust (e.g., “Other people are always planning ways to take advantage of

the situation at my expense”). Participants completed additional survey questions unrelated to

the main hypotheses, which followed all dependent measures reported here (see

Supplementary Materials). Finally, participants completed questions about their age, sex,

political orientation, and religiosity2.

Our primary analyses involved first computing zero-order correlations to determine the

direct relationships between the moral values tested and Machiavellianism. Next, partial

1 Criteria for attention-check exclusion for all studies was failure on the two catch questions provided in the MFQ (see Appendix 1 in Supplementary Material) or completion of a presented portion (8 items) of the MFQ in under 10 seconds, indicating inadequate time spent attending to, reading, and answering all questions. These represent standard exclusion criteria, but we note that the main results of all studies were unchanged when analyses were conducted with no exclusions (see Appendix 6 in Supplementary Material). 2 Studies 1-3 presented scales in a fixed order (Study 1: MFQ, MPS; Study 2: MFQ, SVO; Study 3: MFQ, SVO, MPS; the order of items within scales was randomized). We note that the testing of the various measures within the same session may have introduced pressure for participants to be consistent with their responses. This, however, appears to be less of a concern for links between moral values and Machiavellianism than caring values and prosocial resources distributions. Values centered on universal caring share an intuitive connection with prosociality, whereas connections between moral values and Machiavellianism may be counterintuitive.


correlations were computed, controlling for gender, political orientation (using a 7-point scale

from “Very conservative” to “Very liberal”), and religiosity (using a 7-point scale from “Not at all

religious” to “Very religious”). All correlations are reported in Table 1a.

Study 1 Results and Discussion

Correlations with demographic variables are reported first. Replicating prior work,

ingroup loyalty, authority, and purity values (i.e., binding values) were associated with religiosity

(r=.353, r=.404, r=.584, p’s<.001, respectively) and conservative political orientation (r=-.315,

r=-.363, r=-.358, p’s<.001) (Cf. Graham et al., 2011). By contrast, caring and fairness values

(i.e., individualizing values) were associated with liberal political orientation (r=.325, r=.319,

p’s<.001) and not with religiosity (p’s>.39). Female gender was associated with caring,

authority, and purity values (r=.277, p=.002; r=.195, p=.035; r=.216, p=.019)3.

Table 1a displays the zero-order correlations between the Machiavellianism (Mach)

Total score and Mach subscale scores and moral values (i.e., caring, fairness, ingroup loyalty,

authority, and purity values). We found that the Mach Total score correlated positively with

ingroup loyalty (r=.323, p<.001) and authority (r=.203, p=.029) values. We then examined each

of the Mach subscales (i.e., amorality, control, status-seeking, distrust) separately. Mach

Amorality was negatively associated with caring values (r=-.235, p=.011) and positively

associated with ingroup loyalty values (r=.218, p=.018). Similarly, Mach Control was negatively

associated with caring values (r=-.231, p=.012). Mach Status-Seeking and Mach Distrust were

both also positively associated with ingroup loyalty (r=.417, p<.001; r=.256, p=.005,

respectively) and authority (r=.293, p<.001; r=.199, p=.031, respectively) values.

We report partial correlations, controlling for any effects of gender, politics, and religion,

in Table 1a as well. Links between caring values and Mach scale scores dropped below

significance. The associations between Mach Total score and ingroup loyalty (r=.394, p<.001)

3 We had no prior hypotheses about the association between female gender and moral values, and this association emerged as inconsistent across studies. See results of Studies 2, 3, and 4. We do not discuss gender differences further.


and authority (r=.308, p<.001) values remained significant. Similarly, Mach Amorality, Status-

Seeking, and Distrust remained significantly correlated with ingroup loyalty (Amorality: r=.294,

p=.002; Status-Seeking: r=.458, p<.001; Distrust: r=.297, p=.001) and authority (Amorality:

r=.235, p=.012; Status-Seeking: r=.362, p<.001; Distrust: r=.256, p=.006) values.

In sum, Study 1, in addition to replicating prior associations among moral values,

religiosity, and political orientation (Cf. Graham et al., 2011), reveals negative zero-order

correlations between caring values and Mach Amorality and Mach Control, and positive zero-

order and partial correlations (controlling for religiosity, gender, and politics) between ingroup

loyalty and authority values and Machiavellianism—particularly the Status-Seeking, Distrust,

and Amorality subscales. We explore these associations in the subsequent studies.

Due to the emergence of positive correlations between some moral values and

Machiavellianism—an interpersonal orientation with antisocial characteristics—we next

examined whether moral values would differentially track with a prosocial interpersonal

orientation in Study 2.

< Table 1 here >

Study 2: Prosociality and Morality

Study 2 Method

Study 2 provided an initial investigation of the relationship between different moral

values and participants’ preferences for prosocial resource distributions using the social values

orientation task (SVO; Van Lange et al., 1997). Participants were 112 individuals (69 females,

Mage=34.40, SD=12.61) who completed the study online as in Study 1; an additional 12

participants were excluded. Moral values were assessed as in Study 1.

Resource distribution preferences were established using a previously validated social

values orientation task (Van Lange et al., 1997). This task asked participants to select one of

three different ways of distributing points to the self versus an unknown “other”: (1) prosocial


choices delivered equal payouts to self and other (e.g., Self: 500/Other: 500), (2) individualistic

choices maximized one’s own benefit without concern that the other would receive less (e.g.,

Self 560/Other: 300), and (3) competitive choices minimized payout to the other even though

the choice was also costly to the self (e.g., Self: 480/Other: 80). As in prior work (e.g., Feinberg,

Willer, Stellar, Keltner, 2012; Feinberg, Willer, Keltner, 2012; Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, Keltner,

2010; Van Lange et al., 1997), participants were advised that they were to imagine the “other”

as a random person they would not meet in the future. Instructions noted that there were no

right or wrong answers, and that the points had value—“The more of them you accumulate the

better for you. Likewise, from the other’s point of view, the more points s/he accumulates, the

better for him/her.” Following the procedures of prior research (Feinberg et al., 2012a, 2012b;

Piff et al., 2010), we took the number of prosocial choices as our key measure of prosociality.

As in Study 1, participants completed questions about their age, sex, political orientation, and

religiosity. Zero-order and partial correlational analyses were conducted (reported in Table 2a).


As in Study 1 and prior work, ingroup loyalty, authority and purity values (i.e., binding

values) were associated with conservative political orientation (r=-.228, p<.016, r=-.346, p<.001,

r=-.385, p<.001, respectively) and religiosity (r=.304, r=.378, r=.571, p’s<.001). Fairness values

were associated with liberal politics (r=.189, p=.046). Gender (female) was also associated with

caring values (r=.337, p<.001).

As shown in Table 2a, we observed a zero-order positive correlation between

prosociality and caring values (r=.202, p=.033), though this association emerged as a non-

significant trend when controlling for gender, politics and religiosity. No associations were

observed between prosociality and the other moral values we examined. Study 3 below

provides a further investigation of the observed trend between caring values and prosociality

while again investigating the links between moral values and Machiavellianism found in Study 1.


< Table 2 here >

Study 3: Machiavellianism, Prosociality, and Morality

Study 3 Method

Study 3 aimed to replicate the key result of Study 1 (i.e., the relationship between

Machiavellianism and ingroup loyalty and authority values) and also to follow up on the trend

observed in Study 2 (i.e., the relationship between prosociality and caring values), within a

single paradigm. Participants were 115 individuals (63 females, Mage=38.33, SD=11.82) who

completed the study online as in the prior studies; an additional 7 participants were excluded.

Study 3 used the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et al., 2011) as in Studies 1-

2, the Machiavellian Personality Scale (MPS; Dahling et al., 2009) as in Study 1, and the social

values orientation task (Van Lange et al., 1997) as in Study 2. Participants completed additional

surveys not reported here related to measures of guilt and shame (see Supplementary Material

for Method and Results: Supplementary Table S1; and Appendix 5). Finally, as in Studies 1-2,

participants completed questions about their age, sex, political orientation, and religiosity. The

same correlational analyses used in Studies 1-2 were conducted on the data collected in Study

3 (reported in Tables 1b and 2b).


As in Studies 1-2 and prior work, ingroup loyalty, authority, and purity values (i.e.,

binding values) were associated with conservative political orientation (r=-.199, p=.033; r=-.324,

p<.001; r=-.453, p<.001) and religiosity (r=.358, r=.511, r=.580, p’s<.001). Caring and fairness

values (i.e., individualizing values) were associated with liberal political orientation (r=.278,

r=.280, p’s<.01) and female gender (r=.374, p<.001; r=.226, p=.015).


Moral Values and Machiavellianism. As shown in Table 1b, zero-order correlational

analysis showed that Mach Total score was negatively associated with both caring values (r=-

.324, p<.001) and fairness values (r=-.210, p=.024). These links with Machiavellianism were

driven primarily by negative associations with Mach Amorality and Mach Control (p’s<.05), as in

Study 1, but the same effects held for Mach Status-Seeking and Mach Distrust (p’s<.05) for

caring values. Unlike Study 1, significant positive zero-order or partial correlations were not

observed between Machiavellianism and ingroup loyalty or authority values. However, positive

trends were observed between Mach Status-Seeking and authority values (p=.08), and also

between Mach Control and ingroup loyalty values (p=.08).

To review, we found in Study 1 that (1) Machiavellianism was negatively associated with

caring values and positively associated with ingroup loyalty and authority values, and (2)

associations between Machiavellianism and ingroup loyalty and authority values remained

significant when controlling for gender, religiosity, and politics. In Study 3, we found similar but

non-significant associations between ingroup loyalty and authority values and Machiavellian

tendencies (Control, Status-Seeking), whereas caring values emerged as negatively associated

with Machiavellianism broadly (Mach Total, Amorality, Control, Status-Seeking, Distrust), in both

zero-order and partial correlations.

Moral Values and Prosociality. As in Study 2, a zero-order correlation (Table 2b) was

observed between caring values and prosociality (r=.227, p=.015). Additionally, fairness values

were also positively correlated with prosociality (r=.241, p=.010). Partial correlations (Table 2b)

controlling for gender, politics, and religiosity revealed that the relationship between fairness

values and prosociality remained significant (r=.210, p=.027). Again, as in Study 2, no

correlations were observed between the other tested moral values and prosociality.

Study 3 Conclusions. To summarize, we found that the significant zero-order and partial

correlations observed in Study 1 between Machiavellianism and ingroup loyalty and authority

values emerged as non-significant trends in Study 3. In contrast, the negative zero-order


correlations observed between caring values and aspects of Machiavellianism in Study 1 were

found broadly across both zero-order and partial correlations here in Study 3. We aimed to

resolve these discrepancies by conducting a new study, Study 4. In addition, we added a

measure of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994), an interpersonal

orientation that, like Machiavellianism, involves pursuit of dominance over others and rejection

of equality. As SDO has been linked with antisocial tendencies (e.g., racism, sexism, low

empathy, Pratto et al., 1994; Duriez & Van Heil, 2002, Whitley, 1999), we expected the

inclusions of SDO would help to clarify our characterization of the tested moral values.

Previously, SDO has been found to be negatively correlated with individualizing values and

positively correlated with binding values (Graham et al., 2011). Replication of these links in a

new dataset alongside tests of Machiavellianism and prosociality would provide additional

validation for our methods. Moreover, links between SDO and moral values have been

unexplored when controlling for key variables of political orientation, religion and gender.

Study 4: Machiavellianism, Social Dominance Orientation, Prosociality, and Morality

Study 4 Method

Participants were 117 individuals (59 females, Mage=36.37, SD=12.99) who completed

the study online as in the prior studies; an additional 12 participants were excluded. Study 4

again tested the relationship between participants’ endorsement of moral values (MFQ: Graham

et al., 2011) and reported Machiavellian tendencies (MPS as in Studies 1 and 3, Dahling et al.,

2009), given discrepancies between Studies 1 and 3. Study 4 also assessed Social Dominance

Orientation using the 16-item Social Dominance Orientation Scale (SDO: See Appendix 4 in

Supplementary Materials for items; Pratto et al., 1994): participants rated the extent of their

agreement with statements about equality and social dominance (e.g., “If certain groups stayed

in their place, we would have fewer problems”; “We should do what we can to equalize

conditions for different groups”).


In addition to administering the social values orientation task (i.e., the prosociality

measure used in Studies 2 and 3, Van Lange et al., 1997), we also constructed a novel task to

measure participants’ attitudes toward “helping” behaviors (See Appendix 3 in Supplementary

Materials for all items; see also Table 3 for an example) to obtain a more detailed understanding

of the relationship between prosocial or helping behaviors and moral values. Specifically,

whereas the social values orientation task (Van Lange et al., 1997) involves distributing points

between the self and an anonymous “other,” our novel helping task was designed to investigate

whether links between moral values and prosociality would vary if a prosocial act was targeted

at a person who was in a close versus a distant relationship with the giver. In this new task,

participants rated the likelihood of their own helping behaviors directed at kin/close friends

versus acquaintances, across four short scenarios (the order of which was randomized across

participants). Participants read four scenarios describing hypothetical helping behaviors (one of

each: picking up paperwork, giving ride to airport, moving branches, storing a bureau) in a 2x2

design such that the favor could be for (a) kin/best friend, or (b) for an acquaintance. Each

participant received four scenarios in which (1) the protagonist helped kin/best friend, (2) the

protagonist did not help kin/best friend, (3) the protagonist helped an acquaintance, and (4) the

protagonist did not help an acquaintance. The scenarios presented were randomly selected

from four possible kin/best friend scenarios and four possible acquaintance scenarios that did

not repeat in content. Acquaintances included a man who worked next door, a woman who lived

nearby, a neighbor down the street, a neighbor who just moved in nearby; kin were represented

by either a brother or a mother. After each scenario, participants rated the likelihood that they

would have acted as the protagonist did, using a 7-point Likert scale from “Not at all likely” to

“Very likely.”

We hypothesized that self-reported likelihood of helping distant others would be

associated with caring values, as these values are not theoretically constrained by the identity of

the target. By contrast, the possibility that helping close others would be linked with binding


values is supported by the characterization of binding values as moral values aimed at binding

individuals together in tight-knit communities (Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al, 2012; Graham

et al., 2011, Haidt, 2007).

< Table 3 here >

Participants completed the helping task first, followed in random order by the SDO, SVO,

MPS and MFQ. Finally, as in Studies 1-3, participants completed questions about their age, sex,

political orientation, and religiosity. As in Studies 1-3, zero-order and partial correlational

analyses were used (reported in Tables 1c, 2c, and 4). We also conducted a 2 (kin/close

friends, acquaintances) × 2 (help, not help) ANOVA to examine the reported likelihood of

helping versus not helping across different targets.


As in Studies 1-3 and prior work, ingroup loyalty, authority, and purity values (i.e.,

binding values) were associated with conservative political orientation (r=-.325, r=-.428, r=-.505,

p’s<.001) and religiosity (r=.188, p=.043, r=.245, p=.008, r=.494, p<.001). Caring and fairness

values (i.e., individualizing values) were associated with liberal political orientation (r=.196,

p=.035; r=.281, p=.002). Female gender was associated with caring values (r=.246, p=.008).

Moral Values and Machiavellianism. As shown in Table 1c and aligning with Study 3,

zero-order correlational analysis showed that caring values were negatively associated with

Mach Total score (r=-.279, p=.002) and several subscales: Mach Amorality, Mach Control, and

Mach Status-Seeking (p’s<.05). Mach Status-Seeking was also negatively associated with

fairness values (p<.05). Like Study 1, a positive zero-order correlation was observed between

Mach Status-Seeking and authority values (r=.202, p=.029). Partial correlations (Table 1c)

controlling for religiosity, politics and gender showed that caring values remained negatively

associated with Machiavellianism (Mach Total, Amorality, Control, Status-Seeking: p’s<.05); and


significant positive associations emerged between authority values and Mach Total, Amorality,

and Status-Seeking (p’s<.05).

Summary: Machiavellianism and Morality. To summarize the results of Studies 1, 3, and

4 (Tables 1a, 1b, and 1c) related to Machiavellianism and moral values, we saw that in zero-

order correlations across all three studies, caring values were negatively associated with

Machiavellianism. When the effects of religion, politics and gender were partialled out, these

links remained significant in both Studies 3 and 4 (Tables 1b and 1c). Thus, there appear to be

reliable negative associations between caring values and Machiavellianism—primarily Mach

Amorality, Control and Status-Seeking. By contrast, we saw in both Studies 1 and 4 (Tables 1a

and 1c) (and as a trend in Study 3: Table 1b), a reliable positive association between Mach

Amorality and Status-Seeking and authority values. The positive links between authority values

and Machiavellianism on the one hand and the negative links between caring values and

Machiavellianism on the other hand are echoed by the associations among these moral values

and Social Dominance Orientation, reported in the next section.

Moral Values and Social Dominance Orientation. As shown in Table 2c, zero-order

correlational analysis revealed that caring and fairness values (i.e., individualizing values) were

negatively correlated with Social Dominance Orientation (p’s<.001; cf. Graham et al., 2011). By

contrast, ingroup loyalty, authority, and purity values (i.e., binding values) were positively

associated with Social Dominance Orientation (p’s<.05). Interestingly, partial correlations

controlling for the effects of religiosity, politics and gender (Table 2c) showed that negative links

between SDO and both individualizing values held, while, among the binding values, only

authority values remained significantly positively associated with SDO. This represents a novel

demonstration of links between SDO and moral values, regardless of political orientation, as

well as an instance when the binding values do not track together; we return to this point in the

General Discussion. In Studies 1 and 4, authority values were most reliably positively linked with

Machivellianism and, in particular, with Mach Status-Seeking. Together, these results suggest a


link between moral values related to authority and interpersonal orientations that involve support

of hierarchical social structures, which may maintain inequality and division between groups.

Moral Values and Prosociality. As in Studies 2 and 3, a zero-order correlation (Table 2c)

was observed between caring values and prosociality as measured by the social values

orientation task (r=.188, p=.042). Partial correlations controlling for gender, politics, and

religiosity (Table 2c) showed that the relationship between caring values and prosociality

remained significant (r=.214, p=.022). Again, as in all prior studies, no correlations were

observed between ingroup loyalty, authority, and purity values and prosocial resource

distribution. In sum, across Studies 2, 3, and 4 (Tables 2a, 2b, 2c), greater likelihood of

prosocial choices in the social values orientation task was associated with higher valuation of

caring but not ingroup loyalty, deference to authority, and purity. Coupled with the links between

authority values and Machiavellianism and Social Dominance Orientation, these results suggest

that in the current context, caring values were uniquely associated with a cooperative, prosocial

orientation toward interactions.

These results are further refined by the results of the helping task, in which participants

rated the likelihood of their own helping behaviors in scenarios involving kin/close friends and

acquaintances (reported in Table 4). First, a 2 (kin/close friends, acquaintances) × 2 (help, not

help) ANOVA revealed a main effect of helping indicating that participants were overall more

likely to say they would help versus not help (F(1,116)=489.85, p<.001) and a significant

interaction whereby participants reported higher likelihood of not helping if the target was an

acquaintance rather than kin or a close friend, and higher likelihood of helping if the target was

kin or a close friend versus an acquaintance (F(1,116)=48.90, p<.001). In both zero-order and

partial correlations, endorsing all moral values except authority values was positively associated

with likelihood of helping acquaintances (p’s<.05). In addition, the likelihood of not helping both

kin/close friends and acquaintances was lower in participants higher in caring and fairness

values (p’s<.05) again suggesting these values are related to prosociality more broadly. By


contrast, this effect did not obtain for ingroup loyalty, authority, or purity values (i.e., binding

values). Our initial hypothesis was that helping kin and close friends would be linked to binding

values, due to their emphasis on existing partnerships and personal ties (e.g., Graham & Haidt,

2010; Cohen et al., 2006), and that helping more distant others would be linked to

individualizing values. By contrast we found that caring, fairness, ingroup loyalty and purity

values correlated with reported likelihood of helping acquaintances, while only caring and

fairness values were related to helping kin/close friends as well.

< Table 4 here >

In sum, positive associations were observed between helping acquaintances and

caring, fairness, ingroup loyalty, and purity values, but not authority values. In addition, higher

caring and fairness values predicted reduced likelihood of not helping kin/close friends, or not

helping acquaintances (caring only). Overall, these findings highlight a critical relationship

between caring values and everyday prosociality, and also suggest questionable links between

authority values and prosocial behavior.

Study 5: Replication of Machiavellianism and Moral Values Findings

Study 5 Method

Participants for Study 5 were 187 individuals who also completed unrelated measures

online via Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk; 13 additional participants were excluded. These

participants completed the Machiavellian Personality Scale (Dahling et al., 2009) and the Moral

Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011), which allowed us to examine whether the

relationships observed in Studies 1, 3 and 4 between caring values, authority values, and

Machiavellianism would replicate. We conducted the same correlational analyses used in


Studies 1, 3 and 4 on the Machiavellianism and MFQ data collected in Study 5 (reported in

Tables 1d).


Moral Values and Machiavellianism. As shown in Table 1d, zero-order correlational

analysis showed that Mach Total score was negatively associated with caring values (r=-.194,

p<.001). A negative zero-order association between the Mach Amorality subscale and caring

values was also observed (p<.001), similar to Studies 1, 3, and 4. In line with Studies 1 and 4,

on the other hand, positive zero-order correlations were observed between Mach Total score

and authority values (p<.05) and ingroup loyalty (p<.05); Mach Status-Seeking and authority

values (p<.001), ingroup loyalty (p<.001), and purity values (p<.05); Mach Control and ingroup

loyalty (p<.05); and Mach Distrust and authority values (p<.05). Partial correlations (Table 1d)

controlling for religiosity, politics and gender showed that caring values remained negatively

associated with Machiavellianism (Amorality: p<.01); and significant positive associations were

retained between authority, ingroup and purity values and Mach Total, Distrust, Control, and

Status-Seeking (p’s<.05). Thus, Study 5 replicated the findings from Studies 1, 3, and 4 and

demonstrates that Machiavellianism is reliably positively linked with authority values and

negatively linked with caring values.

Meta-analysis: Machiavellianism, Prosociality, and Moral Values

While positive associations were repeatedly observed across studies between

Machiavellianism and authority values, there was one study (Study 3) in which this correlation

was not significant. A meta-analysis was therefore conducted to determine an aggregated

correlation coefficient for the relationship between the total Machiavellianism score and authority

values, with politics, religion and gender controlled. The r values from Study 1, 3, 4, and 5 were


converted into Fisher’s Zr effect size scores for meta-analysis. These were summed and divided

by the sum of the inverse variance weights for each study (n-3; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). The

resulting mean effect size was converted back into an aggregate r value: r = .22, which

indicates a small-medium effect size for the positive relationship between Machiavellianism and

authority values, with politics, religion and gender controlled (Figure 1, left). In contrast, caring

values were negatively associated with Machiavellianism across all studies. Nevertheless, we

conducted a meta-analysis using the same procedures to determine an aggregated correlation

coefficient for the relationship between the total Machiavellianism score and caring values, with

politics, religion and gender controlled. Here, the resulting r value = -.16 indicates a small effect

size for the negative relationship between caring values and Machiavellianism, with politics,

religion and gender controlled (Figure 1, left).

< Figure 1 here >

In addition, caring values were also the most reliably correlated with prosociality, as

measured by the social values orientation task (Van Lange et al., 1997). Using the procedures

above, a meta-analysis was conducted on the zero-order correlation coefficients from Studies 2,

3, and 4. The resulting r value = .21, indicating a small-medium effect size for the positive

correlation between caring values and prosociality (Figure 1, right).

General Discussion

The current findings across five studies provide important insight into key moral values,

in particular, values concerned with preventing harm and ensuring care, as well as values

focused on respect and deference to authority (see Figure 2 for an illustration of results across

the studies). The findings reveal that authority values are not related to prosociality as

measured by tasks targeting the likelihood of everyday prosocial behavior serving to build and


maintain relationships with close and distant others. Instead, authority values were found to be

associated with Machiavellianism and Social Dominance Orientation — manipulative

interpersonal styles that keep social boundaries and hierarchical structures in place based on

an “inferior/superior” continuum (Pratto et al., 1994). By contrast, prosocial resource distribution

was associated with endorsement of caring values, and participants who endorsed caring

values to a greater extent were less likely to report that they would deny requests for help from

either close or distant others. Finally, negative associations between caring values and

Machiavellianism and Social Dominance Orientation were revealed, again highlighting the

potential broad connections between caring values and a generally prosocial interpersonal

orientation (see Figure 2, Table 5).

< Figure 2 here >

What could account for the positive relationship between respect for authority and

Machiavellianism, an antisocial interpersonal style associated with strategic manipulation?

Indeed, Machs have been shown to lie more convincingly (e.g., Geis & Moon, 1981), steal more

readily (Harrell & Hartnagel, 1976), and rationalize deeds with callous unemotionality (McIlwain

et al., 2012). To provide the foundation for two potential explanations for this surprising

relationship, we first note two relevant details about Machiavellianism: (1) Machiavellianism and

psychopathy are distinct in relation to social norm processing, and (2) Machs are likely to be

dominant individuals in positions of authority. Next, we propose two potential explanations for

the positive relationships between moral valuation of respect for authority and Machiavellianism:

(1) Machiavellianism may entail moralization of respect for authority for a variety of strategic

reasons, and (2) authority values may license Machiavellian behavior. Finally, after discussing

the links between moral values and prosociality, we note important caveats regarding the

correlational nature of these studies, and highlight several rich areas for future research.


Distinctions between Machiavellianism and Psychopathy

Although Machiavellianism is characterized by selfishness and shares some overlap

with psychopathy (Paulus & Williams, 2002), Machs are not necessarily aloof and unconcerned

with social norms. Instead, the ability to manipulate others may actually benefit from a keen

sensitivity to norms that govern social structure. Supporting this specific link, aloofness has

been found to be negatively associated with the manipulative/deceptive hierarchy negotiation

tactics that theoretically align with Machiavellianism (Kyl-Heku & Buss, 1996). Moreover, recent

experimental work has shown that high Machs achieved greater profit than low Machs in a

public goods game by strategically and continuously monitoring their opponent and adjusting

their own moves accordingly (Czibor & Bereczkei, 2012). Likewise, individuals higher in

Machiavellianism earned more money in an economic game that involved distributing resources

to the self and another under two conditions: threat of retaliation or not (Spitzer, Fischbacher,

Herrnberger, Grön, Fehr, 2007). Here, Machs gave the least and conserved the most when they

could not be punished, but they escaped punishment by substantially increasing their giving

when punishment was possible. Moreover, brain activation patterns suggested that Machs were

especially sensitive to the punishing stimuli, which contrasts with activation patterns shown by

psychopathic individuals who disregard punishment signals (Spitzer et al., 2007; Birbaumer et

al., 2005). Thus, while Machiavellianism and psychopathy overlap to some degree (Paulhus &

Williams, 2002), these personality types may nevertheless be conceptually distinct in their

relation to moral values. Machs’ heightened attunement to social signals likely allows them to

perceive the potential self-serving benefits of moralizing respect for authority and social

structures (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009; Rozin, 1997; Rozin, Markwith, Stoess, 1997; Rozin,

1999). We detail these potential moralization processes in the section “Machiavellian

moralization” below.


Machiavellianism and Dominance

In addition to being hyper-attuned to social structure, Machs are also likely to reside at

the top of those structures in positions of authority. Machiavellian-style social climbing tactics

(e.g., manipulation and deception) are more likely to be used by individuals high in dominance

and well-equipped to assume authority over others (Kyl-Heku & Buss, 1996). Likewise,

Machiavellian supervisors in a range of business sectors have been described by subordinates

as employing authoritarian work habits involving strict control over a hierarchical workplace

structure (Kiazad, Restubog, Zagenczyk, Kiewitz, Tang, 2010). As individuals who recognize

they can personally benefit from “working the system” from a position of authority—rather than

attempting to make the system work for all—Machs may be more likely to identify respect for

authority as relevant or even central to their concepts of “right and wrong”.

Machiavellian Moralization

Ascribing moral relevance to a preference typically implies an extension of judgment on

the topic from the self to the other — if something is right or wrong for me, it is also right or

wrong for you (Goodwin & Darley, 2008, 2011; Liu & Ditto, 2012; Rozin, 1997; Skitka, Bauman,

Sargis, 2005). Since Machs are likely to be in influential, dominant positions, Machs may be

more likely to promote authority valuation among their subordinates. Proselytizing their

moralization of respect for authority would then help Machs maintain acquiescence from those

they dominate since adherence to these values will, by their nature, help keep hierarchical

structures intact. Thus, a strategic benefit of moralization of respect for authority may be that it

helps Machs maintain a dominant position through promotion of this moral position to

subordinates.

In addition to altering the behavior of their subordinates, moralization of respect for

authority might also help Machs regulate their own behavior to meet self-interested motives.

Besides being powerfully emotionally comforting (e.g., Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, Chen, 2007),


deference to the authorities within one’s own group may serve to guarantee one’s own

protection by the group, as has been observed for those ingroup members who are more

engaged in system justification (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). Adopting a moral stance related to

authority may be a way for Machs to project the appearance of a moral leader (e.g., DeScioli &

Kurzban, 2009; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006).

Finally, further utility for Machs may be found in the facilitative effects of moralization as

behaviors and preferences given moral relevance become more automatic (Rozin, 1997; Rozin

et al.,1997; Rozin, 1999). Thus, moralization of respect for authority may make the self-serving

Machiavellian tactics of flattery and ingratiation to superiors easier to maintain (e.g., Pandey &

Rastogi, 1979).

Machiavellian Outcomes

Alternatively, authority values may themselves facilitate Machiavellian-like behavior,

particularly behaviors described in the Mach Amorality subscale, because these values

prescribe deference to authority over unconditional respect for individuals’ basic human rights

and dignity. For example, when situations arise that pit these concerns against each other,

respect for authority, tradition, and extant social structures may be upheld even in the case of

what might otherwise be considered morally “bad” behavior (e.g., bribing, cheating, hazing, or

torture). Moreover, recent work suggests that individuals primed to feel high in power – that is,

closer to “authority figure” status – were more likely to endorse unethical and antisocial behavior

(Hirsh, Galinsky, Zhong, 2011; Rock, 2013). Notably, Rock (2013) found that the approach-

orientation of the powerful leads them to focus more on what they should be doing (good

outcomes), rather than what they should not be doing (bad outcomes), which has the effect of

licensing morally wrong behavior. This work broadens the self-reinforcing link between authority

values in general and Machiavellian-like behavior. Simply seeking to attain a powerful position


may induce unethical behavior and grant one a personal stake in whether authority values

deserve moral status.

Moral Values and Links with Prosociality

Negative associations between caring values and Machiavellianism (Mach Amorality,

Control, and Status-Seeking), Social Dominance Orientation, and failing to help both close and

distant others, coupled with positive links between caring values and prosocial resource

distribution broadly underscore the potential link between these values and everyday prosocial

behavior.

In the social values orientation task, prosocial choices maximized good outcomes by

equalizing resources between one’s self and another person (rather than maximizing good

outcomes for one’s self at the expense of another person) (Van Lange et al., 1997). Thus, it

appears that endorsement of moral values that prioritize caring, preventing harm, and protecting

others was associated with the kind of fair and unselfish resource distributions that most people

would appreciate in everyday life. In addition, when rating the likelihood of helpful behaviors

based on scenarios involving kin/close friends and acquaintances, caring values were

associated with reduced likelihood of denying requests for help. This suggests that caring

values are related to prosociality broadly—both in close relationships and across group

boundaries.

Authority values have been bundled with ingroup loyalty and purity values in theoretical

arguments that collectively frame them as the “binding values” (Graham et al., 2009; Graham et

al, 2012; Graham et al., 2011, Haidt, 2007). In several places, we found authority values to track

with antisocial variables, whereas ingroup values and purity values either did not, or did so

inconsistently. For example, although the binding values of ingroup loyalty and purity were

associated with helping more distant others along with caring and fairness values, authority

values were not; and, of all the binding values, only authority values remained positively


correlated with SDO when politics, religiosity and gender were controlled. These findings reveal

important dissociations within the “binding values” and, once again, the potential for a dark side

of authority values. Authority values do not specifically prohibit harming others and instead

relate to maintaining social boundaries; thus, selfish or non-cooperative behavior (as in the

current study) may be wholly in keeping with these values (Jost, 2012). Meanwhile, our

observation of a positive correlation between ingroup loyalty valuation and helping

acquaintances may be less surprising since help requesters in this condition were people who,

while not family or friends, were still described as living or working nearby. Thus, coalition

formation/maintenance, related to ingroup loyalty, may be a likely motivator in such interactions.

Future work should explore other ways in which ingroup loyalty and purity values diverge from

authority values.

Limitations and Future Directions

These studies provide evidence of correlations between moral values on the one hand

and prosocial and antisocial interpersonal orientations on the other hand. We must note though

the correlational results do not allow us to discern the causal nature of these links. It may be

that unmeasured variables account for these relationships. For example, Machiavellian

individuals have been shown to be anxious (Dahling, Kuyumcu, Librizzi, 2012) and hyper-

attuned to punishing stimuli (Spitzer et al., 2007). Likewise, anxious individuals who find

punishment especially salient may be those who are most familiar and comfortable in

authoritarian environments that foster authority values, making punitive upbringing a potential

“third variable” here.

Furthermore, the direction of the observed connections cannot yet be determined. While

we have provided possible reasons for these links in both directions (i.e., how moral values

could lead to interpersonal orientations, and how these orientations could lead to elevation of

certain moral values), it may also be the case that authority values, linked here with antisocial


tendencies, also track with other, unmeasured positive outcome variables. Future work using

experimental methods, and not correlational designs, will be necessary for investigating whether

Machiavellianism and authority values are causally connected and the direction of causality. For

example, if Machs are motivated to moralize respect for authority, then endorsement of authority

values should increase when individuals are primed to behave in a Machiavellian manner, e.g.,

when Machiavellian concerns (e.g., trust, status, control, strategy) are made relevant to goal

pursuit. Alternatively, it may the case that manipulative and deceptive tendencies increase when

authority values are primed.

Incidentally, recent research has also revealed positive links between sexism and

binding values, and negative links between sexism and individualizing values (Niemi & Young,

in preparation). If sexist attitudes, like Machiavellianism, are assumed to represent an antisocial

and undesirable interpersonal orientation involving a desire for dominance and manipulation,

these findings together underscore the need for investigation into motivated moralization as an

explanation for these striking associations.

Finally, future work should aim to determine whether these links play out on a larger

scale in group cultures. Should we expect to find more Machiavellian individuals in institutions or

organizations that emphasize authority values? Are prosocial individuals more plentiful in

settings that codify universal caring? Whether these individual-level correlations extend to

patterns at the organizational level is another fruitful area for exploration.

Implications

Links with Behavior. The importance of correlations between authority values and

Machiavellianism is underscored by research demonstrating that Machs not only perform more

unethical behaviors (e.g., cheating, stealing, sabotage) but may also carry psychological

burdens from these behaviors including anxiety, low job and life satisfaction, and feelings of

disconnection (Dahling et al., 2012; Lund, Tamnes, Moestue, Buss, Vollrath, 2007).


By contrast, the prosociality measure (SVO; Van Lange et al., 1997) related to caring

values has previously been linked with behaviors that underlie positive social interactions, some

of which may be unexpected. For example, a tendency to show embarrassment – a subjectively

unpleasant experience that actually serves to signal legitimate good will and establish trust – is

linked to prosocial choices (Feinberg et al., 2012b). Also, those ranking higher in prosociality on

this task were found to be more likely to negatively evaluate procedures in a task when people

other than themselves were denied a voice in the procedure even though they were themselves

granted a voice; this result suggests these individuals not only care about fair resource

distribution but also may be willing to advocate on behalf of those denied justice (Van Prooijen,

Ståhl, Eek, Van Lange, 2012). Thus, the independent constructs we found to relate to moral

values may have real importance for social functioning at large.

Meta-ethical Implications. Questions about the roots of morality emerge at the

descriptive level (e.g., Bloom, 2004; Suhler & Churchland, 2011; DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009,

2012) as well as the meta-ethical level – what we ought to count as morality. To the extent that

lying and cheating and otherwise manipulative strategies reflect morally bad behavior, whereas

prosocial resource distribution and meeting others’ requests for help reflect morally good

behavior, the present findings highlight the overarching importance of caring values and raise

questions about the normative status of other values – specifically, authority values.

Of course, it might also be a coincidence that authority values track with antisocial

tendencies. Suppose we had discovered that people with antisocial tendencies endorsed not

authority values but a certain kind of music – should that change our normative view of that

music?4 Most likely not. However, unlike the pairing of music preferences and antisocial

tendencies, authority values and antisocial tendencies are both of moral relevance; therefore, a

closer analogue might be the discovery of a renowned musical genius’ endorsement of a certain

kind of music. Should this endorsement affect our attitude toward that music? Perhaps so.

4 We thank an anonymous reviewer for making this useful point.


Disagreements over moral values are often unavoidable because many of us hold not

simply different moral values but also the view that our moral values represent factual truths

(Goodwin & Darley, 2008, 2011; Liu & Ditto, 2012; Skitka, Bauman, Sargis, 2005; Young &

Durwin, 2012). The present research as well as other work using this empirical approach

(Arvan, 2013; Bartels & Pizarro, 2011) can provide a unique foothold in the midst of moral

diversity and point to a clearer picture of how moral values are linked to particular interpersonal

orientations and everyday social outcomes.

Acknowledgments

This project was made possible through the support of a grant from the John Templeton

Foundation and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. Many thanks to Alek Chakroff, James Dungan,

Jesse Graham, Josh Rottman, Gary Sherman and the Boston Area Morality and Social

Cognition Discussion Group for helpful discussion and suggestions.


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Table 1. Moral Values and Machiavellianism: Correlations Across Studies 1, 3, 4, 5. 1a) Study 1: n=117

1c) Study 4: n=117

Mach Amorality (Partial)

Mach Control (Partial)

Mach Status (Partial)

Mach Distrust (Partial)

Mach TOTAL (Partial)

Mach Amorality (Partial)

Mach Control (Partial)

Mach Status (Partial)

Mach Distrust (Partial)

Mach TOTAL (Partial)

-.235* -.231* -.043 -.019 -.165 -.216* -.263** -.390*** -.011 -.279** CARING -.169 -.158 .051 .041 -.070 CARING -.215* -.238* -.381*** -.035 -.277** -.164 -.112 .024 .042 -.065 -.121 -.137 -.193* .012 -.138 FAIRNESS -.121 -.052 .100 .090 .010 FAIRNESS -.167 -.120 -.188* .011 -.148 .218* .072 .417*** .256** .323** -.117 -.040 .043 .029 -.029 INGROUP .294** .102 .458*** .297*** .394*** INGROUP -.037 -.044 .058 .007 -.003 .113 -.018 .293** .199* .203* .071 .058 .202* .120 .156 AUTHORITY .235* .030 .362*** .256** .308*** AUTHORITY .207* .060 .241** .102 .213* -.063 -.049 .075 .082 .019 -.149 -.033 .051 .212* .038 PURITY .065 .033 .144 .158 .140 PURITY .004 -.066 .064 .169 .076

1b) Study 3: n=115

1d) Study 5: n=187

-.351*** -.255** -.235* -.190* -.324*** -.287*** -.007 -.103 -.129 -.194** CARING -.234* -.188* -.170 -.122 -.223* CARING -.219*** -.041 -.017 -.054 -.097 -.189* -.306*** -.098 -.114 -.210* -.022* .031 -.060 .020 -.011 FAIRNESS -.105 -.279** -.051 -.058 -.141 FAIRNESS .011 .052 -.014 .032 .059 -.013 .160 .137 .013 .079 -.115 .185* .328*** .090 .146* INGROUP .028 .136 .111 .021 .084 INGROUP -.031 .197** .347*** .115 .199** -.039 .108 .164 .036 .074 -.076 .093 .313*** .187* .174* AUTHORITY .029 .106 .153 .043 .098 AUTHORITY .044 .106 .352*** .228** .253*** -.022 -.043 .142 .069 .071 -.196** .053 .155* .178 .023 PURITY .048 .019 .124 .073 .087 PURITY -.027 .108 .244*** .172* .169*

Notes. “Partial” refers to partial correlations with political orientation, religiosity, and gender controlled. Zero-order correlation coefficient is

presented on top, partial correlation coefficient is underneath. Boldface indicates significant correlations. * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001


Table 2. Moral Values, Prosociality, and Social Dominance Orientation: Correlations Across Studies 2, 3, and 4.

2a.

Study 2: n=112

2b. Study 3:

n=115

2c. Study 4: n =117

Prosociality (Partial)



SDO (Partial)

CARING .202* .227* .188* -.415***

.121 .164 .214* -.346***

FAIRNESS .137 .241** .095 -.495***

.109 .210* .136 -.414***

INGROUP .008 .035 .100 .275**

-.021 .056 .053 .154

AUTHORITY -.067 -.040 -.006 .416***

-.093 -.028 -.081 .279**

PURITY .013 -.043 .122 .204*

-.038 -.023 .050 -.009

Notes. “Partial” refers to partial correlations with political orientation, religiosity, and gender controlled. Zero-order correlation coefficient is presented on top, partial correlation coefficient is underneath. SDO = Social Dominance Orientation. Boldface indicates significant correlations. * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001


Table 3. Example of Helping Task Items (Study 4).

Helping Not Helping

Kin/Close Friend

Lisa’s best friend asks Lisa if she will let her store a bureau in her basement for a couple months. Lisa decides to let her store the bureau in her basement.

Lisa’s best friend asks Lisa if she will let her store a bureau in her basement for a couple months. Lisa decides to not let her store the bureau in her basement.

Acquaintance A woman who lives nearby asks Lisa if she will let her store a bureau in her basement for a couple months. Lisa decides to let her store the bureau in her basement.

A woman who lives nearby asks Lisa if she will let her store a bureau in her basement for a couple months. Lisa decides to not let her store the bureau in her basement.


Table 4. Helping/Not Helping Close and Distant Others & Moral Values: Correlations from Study 4.

Help Kin

(Partial)

Not Help Kin

(Partial)

Help Acquaint. (Partial)

Not Help Acquaint. (Partial)

CARING .079 -.207* .256** -.195* .066 -.201* .318*** -.230*

FAIRNESS .135 -.210* .184* -.100

.133 -.199* .254** -.139

INGROUP -.011 -.030 .232* -.162

-.012 -.052 .191* -.131

AUTHORITY .030 -.120 .096 -.078

.034 -.162 .026 -.031

PURITY .101 -.106 .270** -.144

.131 -.167 .268** -.112 Notes. “Partial” refers to partial correlations with political orientation, religiosity, and gender controlled. Zero-order correlation coefficient is presented on top, partial correlation coefficient is underneath. Boldface indicates significant correlations. * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001


Notes. “Partial” refers to partial correlations with political orientation, religiosity, and gender controlled. Boldface and (+) indicate significant positive correlations. Italics and (-) indicate significant negative correlations.

Table 5.

Correlations across Studies between Moral Values and Prosocial and Antisocial Variables

CARING FAIRNESS INGROUP AUTHORITY PURITY

Prosocial distributions

(Studies 2, 3, 4)

(+) Study 4, partial (+) Study 3, partial

(+) Study 4 (+) Study 3

(+) Study 3

(+) Study 2

Helping acquaintances

(Study 4)

(+) Study 4, partial (+) Study 4, partial (+) Study 4, partial (+) Study 4, partial

(+) Study 4 (+) Study 4 (+) Study 4 (+) Study 4

Not helping kin/best friend

(Study 4)

(-) Study 4, partial (-) Study 4, partial

(-) Study 4 (-) Study 4

Not helping acquaintances

(Study 4)

(-) Study 4, partial

(-) Study 4

Mach (Studies 1, 3, 4, 5)

(-) Study 1 (-) Study 3, partial (+)Study 1, partial (+)Study 1, partial (+) Study 4

(-) Study 3, partial (-) Study 3 (+) Study 1 (+) Study 1 (+) Study 5, partial

(-) Study 3 (-) Study 4, partial (+) Study 5, partial (+) Study 3, partial

(-) Study 4, partial (-) Study 4 (+) Study 5 (+) Study 3

(-) Study 4 (-) Study 5 (+) Study 5, partial

(-) Study 5, partial (+) Study 5

(-) Study 5

SDO (Study 4) (-) Study 4, partial (-) Study 4, partial (+) Study 4 (+) Study 4, partial (+) Study 4

(-) Study 4 (-) Study 4 (+) Study 4


Figure 1. Results of Meta-Analyses. Left: Illustration of results of meta-analyses of data from

Studies 1, 3, 4, 5 indicating a negative relationship between Caring values and Mach Total

Score, and a positive relationship between Authority values and Mach Total Score. Right:

Illustration of results of meta-analysis of data from Studies 2, 3, 4 indicating a positive

relationship between Prosociality and Caring values.

Figure 2. Summary of correlations observed across all studies. Each square represents an

observation of a significant partial correlation (politics, religion, and gender controlled). Each

circle represents an observation of a significant zero-order correlation. Study (#) indicated on

each circle/square. Moral values are color-coded.


Supplementary Material

A. Exploring the Role of Guilt and Shame in Associations between Moral Values and

Machiavellianism (Study 3)

In exploratory analyses, we investigated the contributions of guilt and shame to

associations between moral values and Machivellianism. On the one hand, negative behavior

evaluations and reparative behaviors motivated by guilt as well as negative self-evaluations

motivated by shame have been linked to ethical decision-making and endorsement of a range of

moral values (Caprara, Barbaranelli, Pastorelli, Cermak, Rasza, 2001; Cohen, Wolf, Panter,

Insko, 2011; Silfver, Helkama, Lönnqvist, Verkasola, 2008). On the other hand, maladaptive

shame regulation – behavioral withdrawal after experiencing feelings of shame – has been

hypothesized to predict Machiavellianism (McIlwain, 2011) and has also been linked to unethical

and antisocial behavior (Cohen et al., 2011). Therefore, we were interested in whether guilt and

shame factored into relationships between Machiavellianism and moral values in Study 3.

Method

In Study 3, participants’ guilt-related negative behavior evaluations (“Guilt NBE”),

shame-related self-evaluations (“Shame NSE”), likelihood of repair behavior in response to guilt

(“Guilt-Repair”), and withdrawal behavior in response to shame (“Shame-Withdrawal”) were

assessed using the Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale (GASP, Cohen et al., 2011; see

Appendix 5 for items). For all participants in Study 3, the GASP was presented after the

dependent measures reported in the main text. In Study 1, we also ran two of the GASP

subscales (“Shame-Withdrawal”, “Guilt-Repair”) and other newly constructed items probing guilt

and shame; for all participants, these items were presented after the dependent measures

reported in the main text. Only the exploratory analyses of data from Study 3 are reported here.

We report partial correlations between the moral values (measured with the MFQ; Graham et

al., 2011) and Machiavellianism (measured with the MPS; Dahling et al., 2009), controlling for

each of the four guilt and shame subscale scores separately (Table S1a, b, c, d).

MORAL VALUES AND INTERPERSONAL ORIENTATIONS 2 Results

We tested the relationships between the moral values and Machiavellianism in a series

of partial correlational analyses, separately controlling for each of the four guilt and shame

subscales. As reported in Table S1a, b, c, controlling for the three aspects of guilt and shame

that have been previously linked with ethical decision-making – guilt-related negative behavior

evaluations and reparative behaviors (Guilt NBE: Table S1a & Guilt-Repair: Table S1b) and

shame-related negative self-evaluations (Shame NSE: Table S1c) – changed the strength of the

associations reported for Study 3 in the main text in two ways. First, in all three of these sets of

analyses, the positive associations between Machiavellianism and authority values increased

from non-significant trends (see Table 1b in the main text) to significant positive correlations –

aligning closely with the key results of Studies 1 and 4 reported in the main text. In addition,

ingroup loyalty and purity values were also positively associated with Machiavellianism. Second,

negative associations found in Study 3 (see Table 1b in the main text) between

Machiavellianism and caring values were reduced to non-significance in these three sets of

analyses (Tables S1a, b, c). However, a fourth set of partial correlational analyses controlling for

the maladaptive shame response (Shame-Withdrawal; Table S1d) revealed the same significant

negative links between caring values and Machiavellianism, and no associations between

authority, ingroup loyalty, and purity values and Machiavellianism, as found in the main text (see

Table 1b in the main text).

Taken together (Table S1a, b, c, d), these exploratory analyses indicate that guilt and

shame and related behaviors, as measured using the GASP, can alter the strength of

associations between moral values and Machiavellianism. Nevertheless, the overall pattern of

the observed associations remains consistent: negative links between caring values (and also

fairness in some cases) and Machiavellianism, and positive links between authority values (and

also ingroup loyalty and purity values in some cases) and Machiavellianism. Future research

should explore how moral values in different domains (e.g., caring versus authority values)

MORAL VALUES AND INTERPERSONAL ORIENTATIONS 3 function alongside emotional and behavioral tendencies related to guilt and shame to predict the

kind of unethical decision-making that would be expected from Machs.

Table S1. Moral Values & Machiavellianism with Guilt NBE, Guilt Repair, Shame NSE, Shame Withdrawal Controlled: Partial Correlations from Study 3. Mach Total Mach Amoral. Mach Control Mach Status Mach Distrust

S1a. Guilt NBE Controlled

CARING -.100 p=.289

-.090 p=.340

-.150 p=.110

-.079 p=.405

-.010 p=.912

FAIRNESS -.008 p=.934

-.066 p=.482

-.227* p=.015

-.048 p=.609

.040 p=.671

INGROUP .352*** p=.000

.298*** p=.001

.289** p=.002

.313*** p=.001

.182 p=.052

AUTHORITY .296*** p=.001

.203* p=.030

.207* p=.027

.310*** p=.001

.176 p=.061

PURITY .303*** p=.001

.239** p=.010

.142 p=.133

.293** p=.002

.221* p=.018

S1b. Guilt Repair Controlled

CARING -.123 p=.193

-.134 p=.155

-.086 p=.365

-.119 p=.207

-.045 p=.636

FAIRNESS .033 p=.725

.091 p=.334

-.146 p=.122

.053 p=.578

.053 p=.576

INGROUP .232* p=.013

.141 p=.134

.288** p=.002

.226* p=.016

.102 p=.279

AUTHORITY .261** p=.005

.147 p=.119

.258* p=.006

.277** p=.003

.149 p=.113

PURITY .207* p=.027

.115 p=.222

.146 p=.121

.222* p=.017

.154 p=.102

S1c. Shame NSE controlled

CARING -.169 p=.072

-.176 p=.061

-.147 p=.120

-.161 p=.087

-.053 p=.573

FAIRNESS -.072 p=.449

-.022 p=.817

-.226* p=.015

-.025 p=.791

.002 p=.985

INGROUP .197* p=.035

.112 p=.234

.241** p=.010

.193* p=.039

.194 p=.321

AUTHORITY .218** p=.020

.111 p=.239

.203* p=.030

.235* p=.012

.138 p=.143

PURITY .161 p=.088

.071 p=.455

.098 p=.298

.185* p=.049

.134 p=.154

S1d. Shame

Withdrawal controlled

CARING -.339*** p=.000

-.356*** p=.000

-.254** p=.006

-.240*** p=.010

-.190* p=.043

FAIRNESS -.218* p=.020

-.189* p=.044

-.309*** p=.001

-.094 p=.317

-.112 p=.235

INGROUP .014 p=.882

-.062 p=.511

.125 p=.185

.083 p=.379

-.051 p=.593

AUTHORITY .020 p=.832

-.081 p=.389

.077 p=.416

.122 p=.195

-.015 p=.873

PURITY .003 p=.978

-.073 p=.442

.001 p=.988

.087 p=.360

.008 p=.929

Notes. NBE = negative behavior evaluations, NSE = negative self-evaluations. * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

MORAL VALUES AND INTERPERSONAL ORIENTATIONS 4 Appendix 1. 30-item Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Likert-Scale Scored from 1-6) (with two catch questions (6 and 22); Graham et al., 2011) When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking? (Not at all relevant to Extremely relevant) 1. Whether or not someone suffered emotionally (Caring) 2. Whether or not some people were treated differently than others (Fairness) 3. Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country (Ingroup Loyalty) 4. Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority (Authority) 5. Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency (Purity) 6. Whether or not someone was good at math (attention check) 7. Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable (Caring) 8. Whether or not someone acted unfairly (Fairness) 9. Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group (Ingroup Loyalty) 10. Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society (Authority) 11. Whether or not someone did something disgusting (Purity) 12. Whether or not someone was cruel (Caring) 13. Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights (Fairness) 14. Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty (Ingroup Loyalty) 15. Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder (Authority) 16. Whether or not someone acted in a way that God would approve of (Purity) Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement: 17. Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue. (Caring) 18. When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that

everyone is treated fairly. (Fairness) 19. I am proud of my country’s history. (Ingroup Loyalty) 20. Respect for authority is something all children need to learn. (Authority) 21. People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed. (Purity) 22. It is better to do good than to do bad. (attention check) 23. One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal. (Caring) 24. Justice is the most important requirement for a society. (Fairness) 25. People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something

wrong. (Ingroup Loyalty) 26. Men and women each have different roles to play in society. (Authority) 27. I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural. (Purity) 28. It can never be right to kill a human being. (Caring) 29. I think it’s morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children inherit

nothing. (Fairness) 30. It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself. (Ingroup Loyalty) 31. If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer’s orders, I would obey anyway

because that is my duty. (Authority) 32. Chastity is an important and valuable virtue. (Purity) Note. Failure on the attention check questions was defined as answering (5) or (6) to Question 6, or (1) or (2) to Question 22.

MORAL VALUES AND INTERPERSONAL ORIENTATIONS 5 Appendix 2. Machiavellian Personality Scale (Likert-Scale Scored from 1-5: Completely Disagree to Completely Agree) (Dahling et al., 2009) Amorality Subscale • I believe that lying is necessary to maintain a competitive advantage over others. • The only good reason to talk to others is to get information that I can use to my benefit. • I am willing to be unethical if I believe it will help me succeed. • I am willing to sabotage the efforts of other people if they threaten my own goals. • I would cheat if there was a low chance of getting caught. Desire for Control Subscale • I like to give the orders in interpersonal situations. • I enjoy having control over other people. • I enjoy being able to control the situation. Desire for Status Subscale • Status is a good sign of success in life. • Accumulating wealth is an important goal for me. • I want to be rich and powerful someday. Distrust of Others Subscale • People are only motivated by personal gain. • I dislike committing to groups because I don’t trust others. • Team members backstab each other all the time to get ahead. • If I show any weakness at work, other people will take advantage of it. • Other people are always planning ways to take advantage of the situation at my expense.

MORAL VALUES AND INTERPERSONAL ORIENTATIONS 6 Appendix 3. Helping Task Items (Participants received one of each item; Likert-Scale Scored from 1-7: Not at all likely to Very likely) What is the likelihood that you would have done the same thing as [PROTAGONIST]? Helping Close Other • Caroline’s mother asks her if she would pick up some forms for her from an office downtown

on Tuesday. Tuesday comes around and Caroline picks up the forms. • Jeff’s brother asks him if he will help move some branches out of his yard next week. The

following week, Jeff helps move the branches. • Kenneth’s best friend asks Kenneth if he could drop him off at the airport on his way to work

Thursday evening. On Thursday evening, Kenneth brings him to the airport. • Lisa’s best friend asks Lisa if she will let her store a bureau in her basement for a couple

months. Lisa decides to let her store the bureau in her basement.

Not Helping Close Other • Caroline’s mother asks her if she would pick up some forms for her from an office downtown

on Tuesday. Tuesday comes around and Caroline doesn’t pick up the forms. • Jeff’s brother asks him if he will help move some branches out of his yard next week. The

following week, Jeff doesn't help move the branches. • Kenneth’s best friend asks Kenneth if he could drop him off at the airport on his way to work

Thursday evening. On Thursday evening, Kenneth doesn’t bring him to the airport. • Lisa’s best friend asks Lisa if she will let her store a bureau in her basement for a couple

months. Lisa decides to not let her store the bureau in her basement.

Helping Distant Other • Caroline’s neighbor down the street asks her if she would pick up some forms for her from an

office downtown on Tuesday. Tuesday comes around and Caroline picks up the forms. • A man who works next door to Jeff asks if he will help move some branches out of his yard

next week. The following week, Jeff helps move the branches. • A neighbor who just moved in nearby asks Kenneth if he could drop him off at the airport on

his way to work Thursday evening. On Thursday evening, Kenneth brings him to the airport. • A woman who lives nearby asks Lisa if she will let her store a bureau in her basement for a

couple months. Lisa decides to let her store the bureau in her basement.

Not Helping Distant Other • Caroline’s neighbor down the street asks her if she would pick up some forms for her from an

office downtown on Tuesday. Tuesday comes around and Caroline doesn’t pick up the forms. • A man who works next door to Jeff asks if he will help move some branches out of his yard

next week. The following week, Jeff doesn’t help move the branches. • A neighbor who just moved in nearby asks Kenneth if he could drop him off at the airport on

his way to work Thursday evening. On Thursday evening, Kenneth doesn’t bring him to the airport.

• A woman who lives nearby asks Lisa if she will let her store a bureau in her basement for a couple months. Lisa decides to not let her store the bureau in her basement.

MORAL VALUES AND INTERPERSONAL ORIENTATIONS 7 Appendix 4. Social Dominance Orientation scale (Participants received one of each item; Likert-Scale Scored from 1-7: Very negative to Very positive) (Pratto et al., 1994) Do you have a positive or negative feeling towards the following statements? Beside each statement, rate how you feel about it, from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive). • It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the

bottom. • It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others. • We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. • All groups should be given an equal chance in life. • In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups. • If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. • We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally. • To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. • Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. • Group equality should be our ideal. • We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible. • Inferior groups should stay in their place. • It would be good if groups could be equal. • No one group should dominate in society. • Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. • Increased social equality.

MORAL VALUES AND INTERPERSONAL ORIENTATIONS 8 Appendix 5. Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale Items (Likert-Scale Scored from 1-7: Very Unlikely to Very Likely) (Cohen et al., 2011) Guilt–Negative-Behavior-Evaluation 1. After realizing you have received too much change at a store, you decide to keep it because the

salesclerk doesn’t notice. What is the likelihood that you would feel uncomfortable about keeping the money?

9. You secretly commit a felony. What is the likelihood that you would feel remorse about breaking the law?

14. At a coworker’s housewarming party, you spill red wine on their new cream-colored carpet. You cover the stain with a chair so that nobody notices your mess. What is the likelihood that you would feel that the way you acted was pathetic?

16. You lie to people but they never find out about it. What is the likelihood that you would feel terrible about the lies you told?

Guilt–Repair 2. You are privately informed that you are the only one in your group that did not make the honor society

because you skipped too many days of school. What is the likelihood that this would lead you to become more responsible about attending school?

5. You reveal a friend’s secret, though your friend never finds out. What is the likelihood that your failure to keep the secret would lead you to exert extra effort to keep secrets in the future?

11. You strongly defend a point of view in a discussion, and though nobody was aware of it, you realize that you were wrong. What is the likelihood that this would make you think more carefully before you speak?

15. While discussing a heated subject with friends, you suddenly realize you are shouting though nobody seems to notice. What is the likelihood that you would try to act more considerately toward your friends?

Shame–Negative-Self-Evaluation 3. You rip an article out of a journal in the library and take it with you. Your teacher discovers what you did

and tells the librarian and your entire class. What is the likelihood that this would make you would feel like a bad person?

6. You give a bad presentation at work. Afterwards your boss tells your coworkers it was your fault that your company lost the contract. What is the likelihood that you would feel incompetent?

10. You successfully exaggerate your damages in a lawsuit. Months later, your lies are discovered and you are charged with perjury. What is the likelihood that you would think you are a despicable human being?

13. You make a mistake at work and find out a coworker is blamed for the error. Later, your coworker confronts you about your mistake. What is the likelihood that you would feel like a coward?

Shame–Withdrawal 4. After making a big mistake on an important project at work in which people were depending on you,

your boss criticizes you in front of your coworkers. What is the likelihood that you would feign sickness and leave work?

7. A friend tells you that you boast a great deal. What is the likelihood that you would stop spending time with that friend?

8. Your home is very messy and unexpected guests knock on your door and invite themselves in. What is the likelihood that you would avoid the guests until they leave?

12. You take office supplies home for personal use and are caught by your boss. What is the likelihood that this would lead you to quit your job?

MORAL VALUES AND INTERPERSONAL ORIENTATIONS 9 Appendix 6. Results of all analyses reported in the main text conducted without exclusions. The following tables contain the results of all analyses presented in the main text conducted without any exclusions. For ease of comparison, the results for the samples without any exclusions are italicized directly over the main results. Study 1: n=132 Mach Mach Mach Mach Mach Amorality Control Status Distrust TOTAL (partial) (partial) (partial) (partial) (partial) -.335*** -.278*** -.087 -.062 -.243** CARING -.313*** -.235** -.022 -.035 -.196*

-.237** -.149 -.003 -.003 -.130 FAIRNESS -.224* -.120 .042 .016 -.097

.271** .118 .427*** .297** .359*** INGROUP .309*** .149 .467*** .325*** .406***

.215* .063 .330*** .254** .282*** AUTHORITY .295*** .118 .393*** .294*** .361***

.022 -.016 .091 .119 .073 PURITY .084 .060 .156 .167 .153 Study 1: n=117 (15 exclusions1) -.235* -.231* -.043 -.019 -.165 CARING -.169 -.158 .051 .041 -.070

-.164 -.112 .024 .042 -.065 FAIRNESS -.121 -.052 .100 .090 .010

.218* .072 .417*** .256** .323** INGROUP .294** .102 .458*** .297*** .394***

.113 -.018 .293** .199* .203* AUTHORITY .235* .030 .362*** .256** .308***

-.063 -.049 .075 .082 .019 PURITY .065 .033 .144 .158 .140 Notes. 1Exclusions for all studies were made based on failing the catch questions included in the MFQ, or completing a section of 8 MFQ questions in under 10 seconds. “Partial” refers to partial correlations with political orientation, religiosity, and gender controlled. Zero-order correlation coefficient is presented on top, partial correlation coefficient is underneath. Boldface indicates significant correlations. * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

MORAL VALUES AND INTERPERSONAL ORIENTATIONS 10 Study 3: n=122 Mach Mach Mach Mach Mach Amorality Control Status Distrust TOTAL (partial) (partial) (partial) (partial) (partial) -.387*** -.263** -.229* -.198* -.333*** CARING -.297*** -.214* -.177 -.139 -.257**

-.286*** -.325*** -.120 -.126 -.261** FAIRNESS -.206* -.293*** -.066 -.069 -.193*

.041 .179* .168 .076 .150 INGROUP .073 .153 .141 .085 .146

.002 .124 .176 .060 .120 AUTHORITY .045 .119 .163 .061 .129

.036 .071 .158 .100 .119 PURITY .081 .047 .137 .100 .118 Study 3: n= 115 (7 exclusions) -.351*** -.255** -.235* -.190* -.324*** CARING -.234* -.188* -.170 -.122 -.223*

-.189* -.306*** -.098 -.114 -.210* FAIRNESS -.105 -.279** -.051 -.058 -.141

-.013 .160 .137 .013 .079 INGROUP .028 .136 .111 .021 .084

-.039 .108 .164 .036 .074 AUTHORITY .029 .106 .153 .043 .098

-.022 -.043 .142 .069 .071 PURITY .048 .019 .124 .073 .087 Notes. “Partial” refers to partial correlations with political orientation, religiosity, and gender controlled. Zero-order correlation coefficient is presented on top, partial correlation coefficient is underneath. Boldface indicates significant correlations. * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

MORAL VALUES AND INTERPERSONAL ORIENTATIONS 11 Study 4: n= 129 Mach Mach Mach Mach Mach Amorality Control Status Distrust TOTAL (partial) (partial) (partial) (partial) (partial) -.242** -.260** -.335*** -.041 -.310*** CARING -.245** -.222* -.316*** -.062 -.298*** -.160 -.144 -.149 -.003 -.158 FAIRNESS -.192* -.112 -.127 -.003 -.149

-.083 -.049 .086 .019 .000 INGROUP -.017 -.056 .100 -.013 .014

.059 .017 .229** .069 .141 AUTHORITY .153 .020 .267** .042 .178*

-.122 -.051 .088 .187* .041 PURITY -.016 -.086 .097 .136 .052 Study 4: n= 117 (12 exclusions) -.216* -.263** -.390*** -.011 -.279** CARING -.215* -.238* -.381*** -.035 -.277** -.121 -.137 -.193* .012 -.138 FAIRNESS -.167 -.120 -.188* .011 -.148

-.117 -.040 .043 .029 -.029 INGROUP -.037 -.044 .058 .007 -.003

.071 .058 .202* .120 .156 AUTHORITY .207* .060 .241** .102 .213*

-.149 -.033 .051 .212* .038 PURITY .004 -.066 .064 .169 .076 Notes. “Partial” refers to partial correlations with political orientation, religiosity, and gender controlled. Zero-order correlation coefficient is presented on top, partial correlation coefficient is underneath. Boldface indicates significant correlations. * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001


Study 5: n=200 Mach Mach Mach Mach Mach Amorality Control Status Distrust TOTAL (partial) (partial) (partial) (partial) (partial) -.333*** -.049 -.134 -.177* -.252** CARING -.278*** -.012 -.059 -.105 -.169*

-.157* -.037 -.110 -.065 -.129 FAIRNESS -.128 -.018 -.064 .032 -.058

-.090 .175* .314*** .106 .147* INGROUP -.011 .191** .338*** .127 .200**

-.087 .072 .275*** .171* .139* AUTHORITY .013 .085 .313*** .199** .205**

-.186** .038 .139* .075 .012 PURITY -.032 .094 .232*** .147* .145* Study 5: n=187 (13 exclusions) -.287*** -.007 -.103 -.129 -.194** CARING -.219** .041 -.017 -.054 -.097

-.022 .031 -.060 .020 -.011 FAIRNESS .011 .052 -.014 .106 .059

-.115 .185* .328*** .090 .146* INGROUP -.031 .197** .347*** .115 .199**

-.076 .093 .313*** .187* .174* AUTHORITY .044 .106 .352*** .228** .253***

-.196** .053 .155* .178 .023 PURITY -.027 .108 .244*** .172* .169* Notes. “Partial” refers to partial correlations with political orientation, religiosity, and gender controlled. Zero-order correlation coefficient is presented on top, partial correlation coefficient is underneath. Boldface indicates significant correlations. * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001


2a. Study 2 2b. Study 3 2c. Study 4 n=124 n=122 n=129

Prosociality Prosociality Prosociality SDO (Partial) (Partial) (Partial) (Partial)

CARING .346*** .252** .170*p=.054 -.431*** .281** .205* .212* -.370*** FAIRNESS .263** .264** .105 -.512*** .247** .229* .158 -.439*** INGROUP .050 .009 .078 .262** -.005 .046 .026 .144 AUTHORITY -.009 -.054 -.003 .379*** -.064 -.018 -.072 .267** PURITY .041 -.050 .097 .197* -.038 .002 .020 -.023

2a. Study 2 2b. Study 3 2c. Study 4 n=112 (Exclusions) n=115 (Exclusions) n=117 (Exclusions)

CARING .202* .227* .188* -.415*** .121 .164 .214* -.346*** FAIRNESS .137 .241** .095 -.495*** .109 .210* .136 -.414*** INGROUP .008 .035 .100 .275** -.021 .056 .053 .154 AUTHORITY -.067 -.040 -.006 .416*** -.093 -.028 -.081 .279** PURITY .013 -.043 .122 .204* -.038 -.023 .050 -.009 Notes. “Partial” refers to partial correlations with political orientation, religiosity, and gender controlled. Zero-order correlation coefficient is presented on top, partial correlation coefficient is underneath. SDO = Social Dominance Orientation. Boldface indicates significant correlations. * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

MORAL VALUES AND INTERPERSONAL ORIENTATIONS 14 Study 4: n=129 Help Kin Not Help Kin Help Acquaint. Not Help Acquaint. (Partial) (Partial) (Partial) (Partial) CARING .077 -.274** .246** -.243** .058 -.276** .293*** -.270** FAIRNESS .087 -.283*** .208* -.120 .070 -.276** .264** -.144 INGROUP -.052 -.032 .199* -.142 -.044 -.065 .167 -.133 AUTHORITY -.052 -.147 .068 -.086 -.044 -.196* .014 -.070 PURITY .044 -.098 .240** -.124 .085 -.184* .243** -.130 Study 4: n=117 (12 Exclusions) CARING .079 -.207* .256** -.195* .066 -.201* .318*** -.230* FAIRNESS .135 -.210* .184* -.100 .133 -.199* .254** -.139 INGROUP -.011 -.030 .232* -.162 -.012 -.052 .191* -.131 AUTHORITY .030 -.120 .096 -.078 .034 -.162 .026 -.031 PURITY .101 -.106 .270** -.144 .131 -.167 .268** -.112 Notes. “Partial” refers to partial correlations with political orientation, religiosity, and gender controlled. Zero-order correlation coefficient is presented on top, partial correlation coefficient is underneath. Boldface indicates significant correlations. * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001


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80.

Not helping kin/close friends

(Tested in Study 4)

Caring Fairness Purity Ingroup Loyalty Authority

positive links

negative links

Not helping acquaintances (Tested in Study 4)

Mach (Tested in

Study 1,3,4,5)

SDO (Tested in Study 4)

Helping acquaintances (Tested in Study 4)

Prosocial distributions

(Tested in Study 2, 3, 4)

3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 4 4 4

4

4 4 4 4 4

3 3

3 2

4

3

4

3

1

4

1 1

4

3

5 5

5

5

5 5

5 5 4 4 4 4

4 4 4 4 4

4 4

caring across boundaries versus keeping...

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