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1983 7: 117Capital & ClassWolfgang Rüdig

Capitalism and nuclear power: A reassessment

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Wolfgang Rudig

Capitalism and nuclearpower: A, reassessmentNUCLEAR POWER HAS traditionally been welcomed by marxistauthors as a pinnacle of technical progress and a foundation forthe socialist land of plenty.' The only political influenceconsidered was the possible inhibiting influence of capitalism onthe pace of technological progress, due to either its misuse formilitary purposes or the basic anarchy of capitalist production .

Martin Spence's recent paper `Nuclear Capital' (Capitaland Class 16) distinguishes itself well from such rather antiquatedviews. In his argument for abandoning nuclear technology aspart of a strategy of socialist transformation, Spence attempts toestablish that capitalist influence on techological development isfar more substantial than mere `inhibition' . Spence's article mayplay an important role in putting nuclear energy on the agenda ofsocialist politics, a process which, in comparison with othercountries, is long overdue in Britain .

In my view, `Nuclear Capital' falls, however, far short of acomprehensive analysis of the issue : several central hypothesesdo not survive empirical test and many important questions havebeen dealt with inadequately or not at all . Nevertheless, thearticle does provide a good basis for further discussion andtheoretical development . This is the framework of this paper :starting from a critique of `Nuclear Capital', I will try to proceedand suggest alternative asssessments of the nuclear issue .

Martin Spence's divided his article into two major sections .

Nuclear power is nota technology of thekind which, harmfulunder capitalism,can be made benignby socialism. It is adead-endtechnology thatshould be rejectedaltogether . Thestate however isdeeply implicated inits development,marxism iscompromised byacceptance of super-industrialism andthe trade unionmovement is largelypro-nuclear. Thenew greenmovements will beendangered byseeking incorpor-ation into atraditional socialistprogramme .

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In the first part, he argues that nuclear power is a technologyprimarily chosen and promoted by multinationals, designed tosecure their increasing power . He further argues that nuclearpower is a `specifically capitalist technology', which should betotally rejected . In the second part, Spence argues for an inte-gration of a non-nuclear energy programme into an AlternativeEconomic Strategy, looks at the class base of the anti-nuclearprotest, and proposes a coalition of old and new social movements .

I will broadly follow this structure and present my thesesin three sections : Firstly, I will challenge the view that multi-nationals are the prime protagonists of nuclear power . I willargue instead that the state should be the central focus of analysisand I will try to formulate some hypotheses on its role in nucleardevelopments. Secondly, the concept of a `specifically capitalisttechnology' will be examined . I will consider different possibleinterpretations and suggest an alternative approach . Thirdly, Iwill reassess the social base of anti-nuclear movements andevaluate the possibilities of a coalition of `old' and `new' socialmovements .

The Martin Spence quite rightly points out that the development ofdevelopment of nuclear power was a highly complex process and cannot be putnuclear down to one simple principle . , However, to reach some kind oftechnology

satisfactory understanding of this development, one has to lookat the history of nuclear energy in different countries in greaterdetail . I will compare the us, West Germany, France and Britainin this respect, and come to rather different conclusions aboutthe political dynamics behind nuclear power .

USA

The industrial use of nuclear power received its first majorimpetus in the so-called `Manhattan Project', an all out effort bythe us in co-operation with Canada and Britain to construct anatomic bomb. This project must be regarded as an historicallyunique concentration of scientific, industrial and financialresources for the construction of a technical device . By the timethe project was transferred to the United States Atomic EnergyCommission (USAEC) in 1946, it comprised 37 installations in 19 usstates and Canada, had about 37,800 members of staff and rep-resented a war-investment of 2,200 million dollars .' In the lightof these figures, it seems fair to conclude that the preconditionsfor further industrial development of nuclear power would neverhave been created in such a short time without the coincidence ofessential insights of atomic physics and the second World War .'



The industrial generation of nuclear electricity in its present 119form is thus unthinkable without this initial impetus .

In the us, private companies participated in nucleardevelopment from the very early stages . Despite the total controlexercised by various state bodies and the absolute secrecy ofatomic projects until 1954, private industry was given a majorrole through a special contract system . Certain research anddevelopment projects were carried out by these firms with thecost and a fixed profit covered by state funds . Also the ad-ministration of installations, laboratories and so forth was carriedout by private firms under this system, which became thedominant feature of US nuclear R & D policy 4 . Until 1954, usnuclear policy was almost totally determined by military con-siderations. For the firms involved, this had on the one hand thedisadvantage of not being able to make use of their experience inthe market, but, on the other hand, they were guaranteed soleaccess to nuclear development and hence had no fear of com-petition from other companies . From the beginning, Westinghouseand General Electric (GE) were the main contractors, and bothcompanies became the main suppliers of nuclear installations inthe following years 5 . By 1954, it had become clear that the aim ofthe policy of total secrecy - avoiding the international spread ofnuclear weapons, particularly to the Soviet Union - had not beenreached. Westinghouse and GE were worried about losing out toEuropean suppliers on the world market . The switch of policy in1954 reflected this changed situation . Firstly, it was geared tocreating favourable conditions for the profitable exploitation ofnuclear technology at home and to securing the dominance of UStechnology on the world market . The us Atoms for Peace pro-gramme offered the supply of nuclear power stations, assuranceson the supply of fuel and financial help . By 1955, more than twodozen countries had entered co-operation contracts with the us'.Secondly, `Atoms for Peace' was an attempt to limit nuclearweapons proliferation by other means : the free offer of nucleartechnology was supposed to discourage countries from embarkingon their own nuclear projects and thus acquiring nuclear weaponscapability at the same time . Under the terms of the US programme,the whole nuclear fuel cycle remained in American hands' .

The ensuing development in the us' at first seems toconfirm the thesis that private companies took the main initiative .Westinghouse andGE were eager to capitalise on their experience .They were not interested in experimenting with further reactortechnologies, but rather in conquering the market as soon aspossible with the reactor designs originally developed for militarypurposes . The chief example is here, the Pressurized WaterReactor (PWR) which was originally chosen as the power source

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for submarines . Westinghouse was closely involved in thedevelopment of the PWR and won most contracts for submarinereactors in the 1950s . Building on this experience, they con-centrated totally on marketing the PWR. GEhad developed severaldesigns which were less successful and finally chose to concentrateon the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) design . In the middle of the1950s euphoria spread among the nuclear-industrial complex .The us home market was, however, not very promising . Elec-tricity utilities in the us were small and could hardly afford toinvest massively in a new technology with an uncertain future,particularly at a time when conventional power stations wereclearly more economic . The us reactor industry thus first con-centrated on the European market . Three reactors were sold withthe help of both us and European public funds . But the advent ofcheap oil at the beginning of the 1960s dashed early hopes of agreat commercial breakthrough on a world scale .

A turning point was reached in 1963 when a us utilitybought a nuclear power station without direct state subventions .This led to a wave of reactor orders by us utilities, inundating themain suppliers Westinghouse and GE with contracts they couldhardly carry out . Up to the end of 1967, 75 nuclear power stationswith a capacity of more than 45,000 MW had been ordered' . Whatwas responsible for this boom at a time of plentiful and cheap oilsupplies? A major factor was that reactor suppliers sold at pricesfar under production cost in the expectation of handsome profitsonce the company had established itself in the market . A RAND-Corporation study assesses the financial losses of GE andWestinghouse for the first 13 reactors built under the turnkey-system at between 875 and 1,000 million dollars, i .e . 73 to 78million dollars apiece" . Despite these artificially low prices,nuclear power was still hardly competitive with conventionalenergy sources . The central economic justification was the costcalculations of the reactor suppliers, which predicted enormous`economies of scale', but these were not founded in any concreteexperience with nuclear plants" . Why did the private electricityutilities nevertheless go nuclear without any substantial statesubsidies forthcoming? The following factors might be mostrelevant .

First, utility decision makers were characterised by anideology of technological progress . Nuclear power, seen as thelatest technical advance, thus had to be welcomed. Even if thecost calculations of the reactor suppliers were not totally accepted,there was the widespread belief that nuclear power was the powersource of the future, and that the utilities' prestige and economicstanding would be enhanced if this step was taken earlier ratherthan later . 12 Second, the 1963 `economic breakthrough' created a



`bandwagon effect': without any major change in the politicaland economic conditions, utilities started ordering reactors toavoid `being left behind' ." The third factor was the fear that theutility industry might be nationalised if it were to reject nuclearpower. Once it was seemingly established that nuclear power wasthe energy source of the not too distant future, utilities wentnuclear to avoid the creation of `massive atomic TVAS' . 14 (TheTennessee Valley Authority, the only big US utility in publicownership, was created in 1933 to manage the gigantic hydro-electric projects .)

By the beginning of the 1970s, it became clear however,that the cost calculations put forward by the reactor industrywere hopelessly wrong . Capital costs soared, due to longer con-struction times, design complexity, higher safety measures andattempts to increase plant performance ." The nuclear industrywas `saved', however, by the oil price increases in the early 1970s .Without this it is possible that the rather costly experience withnuclear power in the 1960s might have led to the halt of con-struction, at least temporarily . 'S Such a halt was not far awayanyway: the main effect of the 1973/74 oil price crisis was todepress consumption, making predictions of future demand muchmore insecure than in the 1950s and 1960s . At the same timeinterest rates increased, discouraging investment in capital in-tensive projects . Anti-nuclear protest delayed nuclear construc-tion through litigation . The private utilities, deciding on purelyeconomic grounds, could thus no longer take the risk of orderingnuclear stations" . With no further demand increases forth-coming, it proved more economic actively to invest in energyconservation than in expanding supply installations ."

One other major reason for this decline of nuclear power inthe us can be found in the behaviour of the federal administration .Despite the critical state of the US nuclear industry, there was nogovernment programme which comprehensively secured itsfuture ." On the contrary, government policy systematicallyundermined the nuclear industry's economic standing . PresidentCarter's non-proliferation policy robbed Westinghouse and GE ofany chances to play the dominant role in the world reactor market(to the benefit of the Canadian, German and French industries) .The accident at Three Mile Island made the Us home marketeven more insecure . 19 Even the present administration does notseem to be prepared to intervene in the electricity industry tosecure an ordering programme for nuclear reactors . The Americannuclear industry might press for such intervention, but it hasobviously been thoroughly unsuccessful, leaving the wholenuclear option in limbo .

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West Germany

The pattern of development in the major Europeancountries has been different, in varying degrees, from the usexperience . Most similar to the us has been the development inWest Germany . 20 Here, nuclear activities had been forbidden bythe allied powers until 1955, although some clandestine researchactivities had been going on. The main initiative came fromprivate industry which, in the nuclear euphoria of the 1950s,wanted to get involved in what was supposed to be a major futureindustry. The German government, following its ideology of freemarket economics, left it largely to a working group of industrialinterests to work out a first nuclear programme in 1957 . Thesupply industry had failed, however to consult the electricityutilities . German utilities act as private companies, althoughmost of their shares are held by various local and regional publicbodies. From an economic point of view, they were not interestedat all in nuclear power at first . While the big industrial companiesfrom many sectors (electrical engineering, steel, chemicals andother manufacturing) aimed to build up an independentGerman nuclear industry with its own reactor line to conquerworld markets, the utilities' interest was confined to the futureprice of electricity. The German government was not in a positionto provide the funds necessary for the development of an in-dependent German reactor line, being prohibited from makingmilitary use of nuclear power . There was also no intervention inthe decision-making process of the utilities which decided infavour of the us-built Light Water reactors . German industrythus had to abandon all other reactor lines and two main companiesremained, building the PWR and the BWR under licences fromWestinghouse and GE . By 1969, both companies merged to formthe Kraftwerk Union (KWU) which is now a 100% subsidiary ofSiemens .

Reactor construction reached a peak in the early 1970s,before dropping off from about 1975 onwards . As in the us, onereason for this was the influence of the anti-nuclear protestmovement, which succeeded in delaying construction throughcourt action, site occupations and other protest activities . On theother hand, unlike the us situation, the utilities remained totallycommitted to the nuclear option .

One reason for this might be that conventional energysources, such as German coal, are more expensive than in the us .The economic standing of nuclear stations thus remains morefavourable. The utilities' pricing policy also seems freer and thisgreatly improves their manoeuvrability in investment planning.The German federal government and most state (Lander)



governments retain a strong commitment to the nuclear option .In marked difference to the us, the government has gone toextremes to create conditions favourable to a continued nuclearoption in Germany . At home, strenuous efforts have been madeto contain the impact of anti-nuclear opposition . The fragmentedstructure of the German political system has made this verydifficult, but no single nuclear power plant has yet been stoppedfinally . From the point of view of the utilities the big delays innuclear construction have not been detrimental to their economicstanding. On the contrary, electricity demand has risen far slowerthan their capacity, and there is thus no urgent need to add evenmore nuclear capacity . The main pressure has been on the Kwuwhich in the early 1970s gravely miscalculated the demand fornuclear stations and built up what turned out to be a massiveovercapacity in production facilities. The German governmenthas, however, always closely identified itself with the interests ofthe KWU . Export contracts to Brazil and Argentina have beenwon after the close involvement of senior government officialswho also covered the financial risk of the transaction . Attempts tostop the implementation of these export contracts by the Carteradministration were rejected . All in all, nuclear power has receivedcomprehensive backing by the state in Germany and this must beseen as one major reason for its survival .

France 21

France from the start followed a different developmentstrategy . Private industry was never allowed to play any dominantrole in French nuclear politics . Until 1969, the French AtomicEnergy Commission (CEA) largely determined the course ofdevelopment . The first years after World War II saw the Frenchtrying to build up a scientific and technical infrastructure underthe directorship of Frederic Joliot-Curie, a member of the FrenchCommunist Party. Joliot-Curie was dismissed in 1950 and anensuing re-organisation of the CEA brought the nuclear sectorunder control of the central administration in close co-operationwith the military . These circles promoted the idea of a Frenchatomic bomb project and succeeded in guiding the CEA's researchand development strategy into a direction best suited to theseends. Successive governments of the Fourth Republic gave nopositive backing to the project and, at one point, it was explicitlyrejected . However, the CEA continued its work, with the help ofinterested military circles and a few Gaullist politicians, until theatomic bomb project was officially sanctioned in 1958. 22 Pro-grammes for the `peaceful' use of nuclear energy were first ofmarginal importance and the first reactor construction pro-

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grammes in the late 1950s were rather small compared with theUK . The CEA promoted a gas-graphite reactor which had beendeveloped from the plutonium production technology of thebomb project . The only French electricity utility, Electricite deFrance (EDF), preferred the us light water reactor, however.After long organisational conflicts the EDF won in 1969 and theCEA's influence was curtailed by a comprehensive re-organisationof the industry . The main protagonist behind the French nuclearprogramme is certainly the EDF together with relevant sections ofthe central administration, although the nuclear constructionindustry also pressed for the LWR to boost its export chances .

Nuclear power fitted the EDF development strategy whichwas first based on a policy of `tout petrole' (all oil) . In an attemptto reduce energy cost by any means, France had opened itselftotally to cheap oil imports and neglected indigenous, uneconomicresources such as coal . Already in the late 1960s, EDF had ident-ified nuclear power as a supplement to and later a substitute foroil, to ensure continuing sources of plentiful and cheap energy .In a long term development programme backed by the Parisadministration, both politically and with generous financialsupport, the EDF set out a massive electrification programmebased on nuclear power . From the state's point of view, such apolicy first increases the strategic energy independence of France(with large uranium resources under French control in Niger)and at the same time, provides the basis for a burgeoning nuclearindustry with excellent chances on the world market . EDF gaveall contracts to the company Framatome which emerged asmonopoly nuclear supplier, forming a stable alliance between theParis administration, the state utility EDF, and the privatemonopoly nuclear company Framatome . This nuclear complexremained relatively immune from the political and economicpressures against nuclear power, the French administrative systemnot allowing protestors any significant influence . The build up ofa centralised, supply-oriented electricity industry, with a mono-poly structure and access to financial resources at preferentialrates through the state, is not as dependent as, for example, thesmall private US utilities, on short-term market fluctuations .Under the new Socialist government, the EDF's nuclear programmeis seen as an integral part of a gigantic new industrialisationprogramme initiated by the state, although the economic recessionand decreasing energy demands are now forcing the utilities tocurtail their ambitious programme for financial reasons . WhetherFramatome remains `private' as part of the Creusot-Loire complexor is nationalised is irrelevant in determining the degree of nuclearactivity in France .



Britain

In Britain23 , nuclear policy-making was at first quite similarto the French pattern . Nuclear technology was developed in theframework of a nuclear weapons programme . A state agency, theUnited Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA), was in chargeof nuclear power from 1954 onwards, private industry playing aminor role . The reactor line adopted was, as in the French case, agas-graphite (magnox) type . But Britain did not make the trans-formation seen in France in the late 1960s . Firstly, while theFrench did not succeed in developing their gas-graphite tech-nology further, the British designed the Advanced Gas-cooledReactor (AGR) to replace the outdated Magnox design . TheUKAEAwhich, like the CEA in France, pushed its own technology therebyhad a better case to argue against the LWR . Secondly, the Frenchutility commanded a greater independence than the British CentralElectricity Generating Board (CEGB) . The EDF succeeded in keepingthe first reactor programme in the 1950s relatively small . Theyeven managed to order a US LWR in a French/Belgian jointenterprise, thus gaining experience with that type from the early1960s onwards. In Britain, the CEGB was much more under thesway of the UKAEA which commanded unequivocal governmentsupport. The CEGB was not even consulted on the first nuclearconstruction programme. When, in 1964, the decision was madefor the AGR, the CEGB seems to have been subject to heavypressure from UKAEA and government. It did not command thetechnical expertise with alternative reactor lines to counteract theUKAEA's claims effectively . At the time of the third major decision,in 1974, the CEGB had voiced its strong interest in a major nuclearprogramme according to the French pattern . But again its casewas dismissed. Electricity demand had fallen far behind thatexpected in the 1960s . The demand the AGR programme was tomeet never materialized, and thus the tremendous delay in AGRconstruction did not have any adverse impact on the availabilityof electricity . Furthermore, major oil and gas reserves had beendetected in the North Sea. At the time of the oil crisis Britain wasthus relatively well off in terms of energy security, and did notneed any major nuclear programme . 2' There was, however, abroad political consensus to keep the nuclear option open . Thelater decisions to go ahead with the construction of two furtherAGRS in Torness and Heysham and to build a first PWR at Sizewellmust be seen in this context . Both cases would hardly be defens-ible on purely economic grounds, but seem intended to preservethe industrial capabilities of British industry to build nuclearpower stations, thus enhancing long-term energy security.

What was the impact of industry on this process? There

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are several important differences in the structure of the industryand the nuclear market which must be noted . Firstly, Britain didnot use the `contract system', employed in the us in the earlystages of nuclear development, presumably because Britain simplydid not have large enough companies to perform such a task 21 .

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, British industry was highlyfragmented and feeble . In the us the large market for nuclearreactors allowed four major companies to establish themselves inthe market (Westinghouse, GE, Combustion Engineering, andBabcock & Wilcox) . The British market was far smaller andexport contracts were not forthcoming in sufficient numbers .The decision to spread the AGR orders among the three consortiaexisting at that time was therefore more than unwise, particularlyas none of them had been involved in AGR development and hadno experience whatsoever with the technology at prototype ordemonstration levels 26 .

Britain thus experienced a continuing uncertainty over thechoice of reactor line which put private industry in a difficultposition . In the US and Germany, it had been left totally up to theutilities to make that choice, although the LWR success has to alarge extent been predetermined by Westinghouse and GE'sinterest. With France finally deciding to adopt LWR technologyin 1969, none of the three countries experienced any insecurityover reactor choice in the 1970s .

The predominating role the UKAEA was allowed to play isthe prime reason for this insecurity which still prevails in Britain .In the us and Germany there had never been any organisation ofthe power of the AEA, and in France, the CEA had been deposedfrom its previous position . In all these countries a relatively stableand workable alliance between vendors and consumers had beenestablished, either as a result of market forces or from determinedand consistent state planning . Had Britain been in a more difficultenergy situation the government might have been forced to amore definite interventionist policy, along the French pattern .Instead, there was never any re-organisation which could haveremoved the UKAEA from its position, given the CEGB a com-prehensive long-term development programme and selected onenuclear supplier able to deliver the goods .

The rationale of nuclear energy

What is thus the current situation of the nuclear industryworld wide? Firstly, there is increasing evidence that nuclearpower is still `uneconomic' from the point of view of both vendorsand consumers. Some sectors of the nuclear business seem to bemaking profits, for example in uranium mining and fuel fabri-

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cation . But, even here, I would argue that such profits are theresult of direct or indirect government intervention . The price ofuranium, for example, is not only indirectly dependent on stateaction through the demand created by nuclear programmes, buthas in the past also been directly manipulated . An internationaluranium cartel was set up in 1975 with the participation of severalgovernments leading to major increases in uranium prices . Itreflected a common interest in increasing price incentives whichwould foster investment and thus secure future uranium supplies" .

The nuclear industry has made tremendous losses . Theelectricity supply industry, where it is organised as private capital,is not prepared to order any further nuclear stations at present .Existing overcapacities, stagnating electricity demand and theunavailability of any reasonably secure forecasts of futuredevelopment, make the extension of supply installations in generala high risk option . 28 From the point of view of the multinationals,I would argue, the nuclear sector on the whole does not seem tobe a very attractive investment .

Companies such as Westinghouse and KWU might be pre-pared to foot the bill for their idle capacities in the hope that thesituation will change and that in the end they will be able to get areturn on previous investment . Others, such as General Electric,might prefer to leave the market . There are certainly no newcompanies with new capital forthcoming in reactor construction,enrichment or reprocessing. The situation of the Americanindustry looks particularly bad as their potential export marketsare lost to the French, German, and Canadian industries .Framatome and KwU started building MRS under licence fromWestinghouse, but both companies developed their own designand the licensing agreements have run out . Westinghouse istherefore not dominating the world market, as Spence suggests" .The French have perhaps the best chance of coming out on topbecause they have a relatively secure order book for the homemarket, allowing them to mass-produce one standard design .Furthermore, they are offering complete fuel cycle facilities fromenrichment to reprocessing, provided they are able to sort out theremaining technical problems . The French industry is only ableto do this because nuclear power is pursued in France as along-term programme with comprehensive state backing . Noindustry will survive for very long without a secure home market,the world market being in any case very depressed with ThirdWorld countries' debts mounting and their economies declining .

All in all therefore, there is very little sign of multinationalspushing forward with nuclear energy to stabilise their power .Instead, the state continues to play a major role . Nuclear energyappears to be viable only in countries where the nuclear-industrial



complex is sufficiently entrenched in the state apparatus . Allmajor actors of nuclear policy-making have to be involved in anintegrated policy-making structure : government agencies, elec-tricity utilities and reactor and fuel cycle industries . Of particularimportance are the utilities . To finance a major project in thecurrent situation they have to be either very healthy financially(W. Germany), or have preferential access to financial resourcesvia the state (France) .

Without active state support, the nuclear industry'ssituation would be very difficult . What is the rationale behind thestate's action in the nuclear field? I earlier identified 'energysecurity' as the main reason . State actions in all four countries canbe understood in these terms . But it is also useful to discussnuclear power on the more abstract level of theories of thecapitalist state . This allows us to understand the broader signifi-cance of state nuclear energy policies .

The capitalist state has the general task of creating theformal and material preconditions which guarantee continuedproduction and accumulation . On the one hand, the state isdependent on successful accumulation through the tax system :on the other hand it has to win legitimacy for its actions . 30 Thecreation of favourable conditions for capital accumulation cantake various forms. The state can, for example, try to promoteR & D with the aim of developing new products . The case ofnuclear power can be partly interpreted in this way and indeedmost historical studies of nuclear power have tried to identify thebest conditions for the development of a successful nuclear tech-nology. The most sophisticated analysis comes to the conclusionthat the state should take a major role in the development phase,should then leave the major initiative in the demonstration phaseto vendors (reactor industry) and consumers (utilities), and finallyleave it to both vendors and consumers to determine the finalresult in the dissemination phase . 31

Analysed within this framework, the state's promotion ofnuclear technology would appear to be a failure, considering itsstill insecure economic standing after about forty years ofdevelopment . The technology's inherent problems of high com-plexity, continued unpredictability and tremendous capital costwould have rendered nuclear power obsolete as a commodity soldon a free market. However, one might argue that the state alsohas to provide the general infrastructure for successful capitalaccumulation. Nuclear energy must be seen in this context .Particularly after the oil price crisis of 1973/74, the centralmotivation of governments in holding on to nuclear power policiesappears to have been their aim of long-term energy security .

Different states and governments might have differentC . & C . 20-I

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views over how to promote energy security. One basic feature,seemingly followed by all nuclear countries, is a strategy to keepthe national nuclear industry afloat, either by home orders fornuclear reactors despite any immediate economic need for suchinstallations, or generous subsidisation of the export of instal-lations. Assessments of the role of nuclear energy in energysecurity policy differ widely, once one surpasses this level ofmaintaining the nuclear-industrial complex as such . The us doesnot seem to see any necessity to intervene more strongly to securenew reactor orders . In Britain there is the almost unique situationof a conservative government promoting nuclear energy in a bidto curb the importance of the coal sector and thus reduce thethreat that might be posed by striking miners.

To what extent, however, is the capitalist state able to fulfilits functions? One set of theories tries to show how the imperativesof private accumulation lead an `active' technology policy to failsystematically. Thus they try to argue that technology policydoes not contribute to the creation of stable economic growth incapitalist economies . 32 This approach makes a number of as-sumptions which might be questioned. First, the rationality ofthe process of state intervention in technology policy as such isassumed. But how, one may ask, does the state `know' what toresearch, which technology to promote, what to do to keep the`system' functioning? Hirsch and others simply assumed thatnuclear energy as such was a rational object of state interventionand that the problem was how to develop and disseminate it inthe fastest and most efficient way . A critique of this approach totechnological development leads to two theses on nuclear powerwhich might be worth further investigation . The first thesis isthat in the absence of market conditions and a virtual monopolyof expertise by the professionals of the nuclear-industrial complex,the state is in no position to evaluate its nuclear policy in-dependently. This means that one might conceptualise therationale of nuclear politics in terms of the organisational self-interest of the nuclear industrial sector rather than in the energysecurity requirements of the capitalist system per se . The secondthesis is that the reasons why nuclear energy became an issue ofpublic protest cannot be found in the failure of the state todevelop nuclear energy technology quickly and efficientlyenough, but rather in the safety questions raised by the tech-nology. This is a new concern which has to be integrated into thetheory of the state .

Aspects of Claus Offe's theory can perhaps provide ananalysis of these issues . Offe distinguishes between crises as aresult of developments in the economic system and crises resultingfrom state intervention to solve economic crises . Crises of the



latter kind would manifest themselves in new problems . Forexample, urban renewal would lead to social disintegration andmore expensive rents ; the expansion of the educational systemwould lead to a deterioration of the conditions of learning andteaching; the construction of new streets, industries, powerstations would lead to increased environmental deterioration .These new problems resulting from state intervention would alsocreate new political conflicts :

`The contradictory experience that increasingly sectors ofconcrete living conditions are determined by political-administrative institutions, but are nevertheless politicallynot controllable, creates a structural legitimationproblem .' 33

Offe thus expected that the capitalist state would increasingly beconfronted with protest activity generated by its own actions .This 'legitimation crisis' would, in Offe's view, only be solved bynew interventions which would go beyond the previous limitsand intervene in the nature of capitalist production itself .

Offe's prediction did not come true . In many areas wheresuch legitimation crises were expected, they did not materialise .Nevertheless, the rise of the environmental and anti-nuclearmovements can be interpreted as a result of a legitimation crisis .This interpretation of the nuclear power conflict as a `crisis ofstate intervention' has important implications for the analysis ofanti-nuclear resistance and its political status . But first it isnecessary to have a closer look at nuclear power as a `specificallycapitalist technology' . Offe dealt very superficially with the natureof environmental problems themselves . How is it that state inter-vention has led to a deterioration of the environment? Whatexactly makes nuclear technology a safety hazard? And whatexactly is a `specifically capitalist technology', if there is such athing at all?

Martin Spence at the beginning of his article takes the `caseagainst nuclear power' as read . But he hardly makes any sub-stantial reference at all to the arguments for and against nuclearenergy. Spence bases his rejection of nuclear power exclusivelyon an analysis of the conditions of production in nuclear in-stallations . Nuclear technology as a capital intensive technologyprovides few jobs, which, besides, are highly alienated. Nuclearworkers are required to undertake highly dangerous work . Theyare so highly regimented that democratisation of the industry isout of the question . There is low level, personal resistance againstthis control, which in turn endangers not only the workersthemselves, but also the entire population . Finally, the im-

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possibility of comprehensive strike action is claimed because ofthe safety risks involved would interfere with the workers' rightto strike, organise, and defend themselves" .

These arguments are relatively familiar and well docu-mented elsewhere . Roy Lewis' study of nuclear power and tradeunion rights in Britain demonstrates that there should be someconcern from the trade union side35 . Dave Elliott's study ofenergy and employment36 , though heavily criticised 37 , raises thispreviously neglected issue well and should provide a basis forfurther studies on the employment impact of different energytechnologies . But have these questions been the centre of concernover nuclear energy? In my view the central question, withoutwhich there would be no public controversy and mass protestabout nuclear power, concerns the safety of installations, fromnuclear power stations to reprocessing plants, waste disposal anda possible plutonium economy . Other questions, such as nuclearpower's political implications, derive from this concern . While itis reasonable to argue that the safety of nuclear workers should bepart of the issue and that anti-nuclear groups should address thisproblem, we should also note the fact that nuclear workersthemselves seem rather oblivious to such arguments . Concernover the safety of nuclear workers has certainly not made nuclearpower the major political issue it is now . In my view the majorquestion to be asked is how does the alleged character of nuclearpower as `capitalist technology' relate to the safety of nuclearpower? Spence addresses this question in a way I found un-satisfactory . To formulate my criticism more clearly, I would liketo distinguish between three different approaches to dealing withthe safety of nuclear power .

'Use-abuse' approach

The traditional view taken by 'marxist' authors is thattechnology can be used in different ways, and that its use dependson the `relations of production' . According to this approach,nuclear power is only unsafe where its use is guided by the profitmotive. Private utility companies, so the argument goes, want tomake as much profit as possible and thus do not invest sufficientlyin safety devices . However, if the electricity industry is submittedto public control, and sufficient money is made available to makethe plant safe, then there is nothing to worry about ."

This argument can be extended to whole reactor lines .One might well argue that the us light water reactor is an in-herently unsafe construction because Westinghouse and GE,

driven by the profit motive, wanted to capitalise on their ex-perience as soon as possible . They did not therefore develop the



LWR any further or look at other, possibly safer, designs . Thus,the import of LWR technology should be opposed .

This 'use-abuse' approach to nuclear technology is pri-marily taken by orthodox communist parties . The GermanCommunist Party, for example, is against nuclear power only aslong as it is run by the German private utilities and the nuclearindustry is not nationalised ." The French communists opposedthe adoption of the LWR in 1%9 but are now very pro-nuclear .The Communist Party of Great Britain is also opposed to theLWR, but not to the British AGR . The Communist Party ofLuxembourg rejected the import of a German-built LWR andsuggested an import from the USSR .40

The 'use-abuse approach' might regard certain technicaldevices as `specifically capitalist' but does seem to imply that alltechnological systems somehow can be controlled and put to use .It thus shares the traditional philosophy of unqualified tech-nological optimism .

The `labour process' approach

This approach emphasises the function of political controlwhich can be exercised through technology . The analysis ofcapitalist labour processes, inspired by Braverman, 4' alleges thatthe increasing centralisation of production and increased divisionof labour does not lead only to economic advantage . Such technicaldevelopments also tend to isolate the individual worker, to de-crease her or his independence in the production process, toenhance her or his alienation from work and, at the same time, todecrease the chances of political disruption . 42

This approach has been applied to the case of nuclearpower in various ways . Early sociological works, for example,expected that automation would be greatly enhanced by theubiquitous availability of electricity cheaply produced by nuclearstations . 43 More compelling is perhaps the view taken by theBSSRS Politics of Energy Group and Levidov44 . They reject the, use-abuse' approach because it understands the risks of a tech-nology only as technical imperfections which could be ironed outby technical solutions . Such action would, however, only lead toan ever higher control of the labour process without decreasingthe risk involved . They argue instead that the risk of nuclearpower can be explained in terms of the political deficiencies of theorganisation of the labour process :

` . . . risk is inherent in the continual struggle betweenworkers and managers for control over the labour process . . .however exceptional the risks of nuclear power, the risksexist for rather unexceptional reasons, namely the historical

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tendency of all capitalist technology to subordinate livinglabour.'45

According to Levidov, it is exactly the attempt to reduce workers'possibilities to make `mistakes' which leads to a greater divisionof labour and atomisation of workers, which in turn aggravatesworker helplessness and contributes significantly to `mishaps'occurring . 46 Spence takes a similar view, representing task frag-mentation and subsequent workers' negligence as a form ofprotest as the main reasons for nuclear power's hazards . "I

The important question to be asked here is whether suchpolitically deficient organisation of the labour process can bechanged . If the labour process in a nuclear installation could besubmitted to workers' control, then, according to these views,nuclear power might be made safe. Such a position would,however, only be a new form of the 'use-abuse' approach . Bothviews allege that it is only a question of putting right the politicalconditions under which technologies are used to make them safe .An alternative view might regard the organisation of the labourprocess as built into the technology itself . There might be tech-nologies which one might not be able to submit to politicalcontrol . Such technologies thus might be seen as `specificallycapitalist' in the sense that they could not be used in a socialistsociety . This is obviously the view taken by Spence.

The central problem with the `labour process approach',is, in my view, the alleged causal relationship between theorganisation of the labour process and the general hazards of thetechnology. While Spence names some cases where such a relationmight exist, there is also the more general implication that if noworker, for whatever reason, made a mistake nuclear powerwould be safe . There does not appear to exist convincing evidencefrom previous nuclear accidents, near-accidents and the every-day running of installations that the essence of the safety problemderives from workers' behaviour determined by the organisationof the labour process . In what way, for example, do the hazardsof nuclear waste disposal depend on labour process variables?More evidence would also be needed to support the view thatfurther `technological progress' could not eliminate many hazardswithout leading to further alienation of work .

In summary, the labour process approach has the basicflaw that it tries to locate the issue of nuclear energy exclusively inthe production sector and attempts to explain it with traditionalconcepts of labour/capital conflict .

The `Ullrich' approachIn two seminal works of 1977 and 1979, Otto Ullrich has

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power ." Ullrich is particularly critical of the traditional marxist, use-abuse' approach. Nuclear energy is, in his view, a technologywhich cannot be stripped of its disadvantages by using it inanother form. Such 'cul-de-sac' technologies should be abolishedin a socialist society .

What are the exact reasons for the development of such`cul-de-sac' technologies and how are they identified? The centralconcept of Ullrich's analysis is 'Grofle Industrie' (Big Industry),as described by Marx in the thirteenth chapter of Capital . BigIndustry is characterised by its size, a high degree of division oflabour and specialisation, hierarchical structure, centralisationand other elements .

Human progress has, in Ullrich's view, been equated withthe progress of Big Industry which has led to the present industrialsystem. This development has, however, reached a new stage :the impact of the industrial system cannot be totally taken accountof any more. Big Industry has unintentional, incalculable impactson both the biological and the social system .

Ullrich proposes a re-assessment of `Big Industry' as such .Marxist analyses have recognised the influence of the relations ofproduction on the use and speed of technological change. How-ever, the development of Big Industry as a given technologicalpath has never been questioned . The `productive forces' havethus been seen as independent from the `relations of production'per se . Ullrich challenges this view . The relations of productionhave had a far stronger and more thorough influence on theproductive forces than such a position allows for, to the extentthat some technologies are shaped in their very nature by therelations of production . Ullrich goes even further in arguing thatcapitalist relations of production have determined not onlyindividual technologies but the whole technological developmentwhich enabled the build-up of Big Industry as such . Thisintrinsic reflection of the productive forces by capitalist relationsof production did not have to be imposed on the productiveforces . Ullrich states that a 'tendential structural affinity' existsbetween capital and science and technology. Science andtechnology follow the same principles as Big Industry : bothrequire the delegation of labour to atomised subjects ; bothscientific and industrial production consists of many,particularised steps ; both scientific and technological pro-fessionals and individual capitals follow narrow aims with aunifying rationality eventually emerging only through an `invisiblehand', if at all .

While Ullrich seems tempted to reject Big Industry andindustrialisation as such, he does formulate criteria to assesstechnologies individually . His main criterion is the 'calculability'

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of their impact . If its effects are incalculable this provides, in hisview, enough reason for a socialist society to reject a technology .His alternative is the creation of a new technological system ofsmall-scale, calculable technologies .

Ullrich's work has been criticised by various authors . ForKapferer there is a contradiction between the thesis of a`structural affinity' between capital and science and the proposalof an alternative technology : the total rejection of theindustrialisation process would be the only possible solution ."'Ullrich does not want to go as far as postulating categorically anirresolvable contradiction between industrialism and socialism,but he does not exclude that possibility either .

To return to nuclear energy, it is thus seen as one exampleof a recent development of industrialism leading to an increasedincalculability of its impacts. Nuclear energy might here be thesymbol, or the actual first threshold, of a transition to a newphase of industrialism .

This concept enables us to root the issue of nuclear energyfirmly in the wider environmental and social impact of tech-nological development, outside the narrow framework of labour/capital conflicts in the production sector . To define the term`cul-de-sac technology' more comprehensively, one might intro-duce the terms `productive' and `destructive' forces'" . A giventechnological development could have certain destructive effects,which might be part of its intrinsic structure and not of a certainform of using it . A cul-de-sac technology would be one whoseintrinsic destructive effects of either manifest/calculable orlatent/non-calculable kind surpass its productive effects . Nuclearenergy is a technology of potentially high and uncalculable des-tructive effects and could thus be classiffied as cul-de-sactechnology . $'

What, however, is the real importance of nuclear powerfor `capitalism'? The fact that nuclear power is an `intrinsically'capitalist technology does not necessarily imply that, in turn,nuclear power is a necessary prerequisite for the survival ofcapitalism . Indeed, it is even possible to argue that nuclearpower, while in one sense unthinkable outside a capitalist form ofdevelopment, has always remained an alien element . It would notsurvive under strict market conditions, since it requires a steadyflow of subsidies, and it has created severe legitimation problems .Lovins and others have argued all along that nuclear powerresults from a failure to submit the energy sector to the freemarket. Lovins seems to desire a return to an ideal capitalistmarket economy with many individual capitals" . Others havecorrespondingly argued that only state intervention has createdthe severe environmental problems of today which would dis-



appear or be reduced with a return to a market economy ."Severe doubt, however, has to be voiced about whether the socialsystem Lovins and others are proposing would be free of theproblems of previous market economies. Inded, Lovins' viewseems entirely ahistorical and neglects the basic social forceswhich had led to state intervention and Big Industry in the firstplace .

Even if one accepts that state interventionism is a necessarystage of capitalist development, there is no reason to believe thatall forms of state intervention are rational or indeed necessary . Ashas been shown, nuclear power has been promoted by a nuclear-industrial complex which, from the start, had close clientele linksto the state . In countries such as Britain, France and Germany,this nuclear-industrial complex was able to remain in a com-manding position and systematically to exclude possible alter-native policies which could threaten its further expansion . Thestate and the `business community' largely accepted the nuclearcomplex's view of nuclear power as the only source of security,although both had no real way of evaluating the rationality ofnuclear development . Once the nuclear sector's position hasbeen entrenched in this way, it commands a significant amount ofpower .

In the US, this entrenchment process has never takenplace. Nuclear power remained a predominantly private businessbetween private supply companies and private utilities . However,there must be severe doubt about whether this situation willcontinue if the us energy situation becomes markedly moredifficult, or if the entire us nuclear industry were about tocollapse . There is nevertheless no reason to believe that capitalismwould break down should nuclear power become unavailable .That would be to severely underestimate the dynamics and re-sources of the system . 54 There is no reason why other centralisedtechnologies could not be developed to fill its place which, at thesame time, have a far more calculable impact, i .e . are not cul-de-sac technologies . The large scale use of solar energy, for example,is also accepted by the otherwise pro-nuclear HASA world energystudy as a possible future source of unlimited energy supplies ."In this sense, nuclear power does not appear to be a necessaryprecondition for the continued existence of `capitalism' .

Nuclear power might be replaceable by another, morebeneficial energy technology, but the point is that there are agreat number of other technologies, in other areas, whose socialand environmental impacts are absolutely incalculable . Thus,not only nuclear technology, but the system that produces suchtechnologies, is at issue here. In the end one has also, in my view,to face the fact that the further expansion of industrialism in its

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present form as Big Industry has totally incalculable impacts :acid rain, the destruction of tropical rain forests, the Coz problem,the uncontrolled release of masses of chemicals into the environ-ment and so forth . Many of these dangers have not receivedmuch public attention or led to widespread protest . Nuclearpower has served as symbol for all these concerns, as properlyanalysed by Wolf Hafele, a chief proponent of nucleardevelopment:

`If properly interpreted and understood, the public con-cern about nuclear power is not unfounded, but thatconcern is not a simple function of a peculiarity of nuclearpower. It is, rather, the general condition where themagnitude of human enterprises becomes comparable withthe magnitude of the widest detrerminants of our normalexistence . Nuclear power turns out to be a forerunner, apathfinder, of that .'"The combination of Ullrich's and Offe's approaches,

together with some ideas of Martin Janicke, lead in my view to amore comprehensive assessment of capitalism and nuclear power .The dynamics of the `system' might thus be described briefly asfollows . The capitalist economy develops in a fundamentallycontradictory way through cycles and crises. Technologiesdevelop determined by the basic rationality of accumulation, inline with the principles of Big Industry . The increase in statefunctions in response to economic crises puts the state underhigher legitimation pressure, making governments' fortunesdependent on their economic achievements . The capitalist state,in its own interest, becomes the most energetic promoter of`growth'. The state starts supporting and undertaking R&D . Thedevelopment of Big Industry is associated with further specialis-ation and professionalisation of society, leading to a number ofprofessional sectors . These sectors gain a significant amount ofindependence as the evaluation of their actual and potentialdevelopment is largely controlled by themselves . The state in-creasingly depends on these sectors to fulfil its functions . 'Solu-tions' to problems caused by capital accumulation and stateintervention are developed in ways which do not challenge thebasic features of the system which serve the self-interest of theprofessional sector and even increase economic growth . Thehealth sector can be seen as one outstanding example, others arecrime, environment and energy . The `solutions' offered do notdeal with the problem directly but rather try to compensate for it,or repair the damage . Thus policies such as the prevention ofdisease and crime or energy conservation are neglected .

With further advancing industrialisation, the problem-solving capacities of this professional sector may become more



limited at the same time as the production of `problems' increases .The further promotion of industrialisation in general, and certaincul-de-sac technologies in particular, thus leads to incalculableecological and social effects . To keep the system going moreindustrialisation will have to take place, requiring `faustian bar-gains' 58 of which nuclear power is only one. The `green' movementof today is a sign that not everybody is resigned to thisdevelopment .

Industrialism as a social system has created powerful ideologiesto legitimate its development . Resistance to industrialism hashistorically taken many forms . In the early stages of the industrialrevolution the working population, driven from the land byenclosure and suffering from the appalling conditions in the newindustrial towns, often had the desire to go back to the countryand work the land independently . 59 Another source of resistanceto industrial development in Brtain has been the landed gentry,whose protest in the late 19th century led to the establishment ofthe alkali inspectorate, still the backbone of British pollutioncontrol . 10 The Luddite movement, alternative land communitiesand the socialism of William Morris are other examples of anti-industrialist stances . Such movements have long been discreditedby 'marxist' authors as obsolete and reactionary . But with hind-sight, some of their aims merit far more serious consideration . 61

All these early forms of resistance were carried out bypeople who had not yet been absorbed in industrialism or whowere in positions marginal to or outside production and industry .The working classes soon lost their `back to the country' desires,although the rambling movements of the late 19th and earlytwentieth century in the north-west of England clearly demon-strate their basic dissatisfaction with the environmental conditionsof industrial towns . 62 There was certainly resistance in somesectors against reorganisations of the labour process but theylargely remained marginal and did not anywhere approach thedestruction of that process . 69 This must be seen as one majordilemma of the labour process approach : it comprehensivelyexplains how labour becomes more and more fragmented, workersatomised, its chances of political disruption minimised, and soforth. But it shows hardly any way out of it in the form ofsuccessful protest or resistance . Labour process theoreticiansmight hope that the experience of being subjected to politicalcontrol through the labour process might create an incentive toresist . But the theory itself would perfectly explain why suchaction is not forthcoming . The very process of control removesthe preconditions necessary for such resistance to be expressed .

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Looking at the modem stages of industrialism, it shouldnot surprise us that resistance again forms in social sectorsmarginal to the production sector . In the US, France andGermany the farming populations around prospective nuclearsites, who feared the further industrialisation of their area, thedestruction of their economic base and way of living, took up thestruggle with stiff local resistance . It was the forceful suppressionof such action by police forces in France and Germany whichmade nuclear power a political issue there and led to a significantinvolvement by the left. In Britain, local resistance has not beenforthcoming to the same extent, simply because the number ofnew nuclear power installations in the 1970s was very limited .Only at Torness and later at Luxulyan did significant local op-position arise, but in both cases an escalation of the conflict wasavoided by the authorities."

Apart from the rural population directly confronted withnuclear installations, anti-nuclear protest is mainly carried out bysections of the population outside the production sector. Assurveys of members of environmental groups have shown, themajority of them come from the non-productive service sectorssuch as education, the arts and health . 65This is, however, notonly a characteristic of the environmental movement but also ofthe other main movements outside the trade union movement .The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, for example, recruitedits members from exactly the same social base ."'

Another group outside the direct control of industrialismare the unemployed. They might be expected to protest aboutpurely economic issues rather than environmental issues, or,more likely, fall into passive agony interrupted by occasionaldestructive action . The German àlternative' movement, however,has succeeded in involving unemployed people in alternativeprojects of various kinds . The unemployed seem to have played amajor role in struggles for the maintenance of cheap housing .They have thus become part of the `green' movement fighting awhole range of issues ."

The àlternative' and `green' movements thus have theirsocial bases where the social control of ìndustrialism' is weakest .In my view, they cannot be characterised as `new working class'as Spence suggests . He does not make the vital distinction between, new workers' in the `productive' state sector, who obviouslyhave internalised the values of 'super-industrialism' and thoseoutside the `productive' sector who have chosen to avoid directsubordination to its stringent rules, 68 or whose relative freedomfrom such subordination has allowed them to perceive and act onthe `destructive' impacts of 'super-industrialism .'

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and disseminated as àdditions to the technological store' butonly after new resources are set free by terminating technologiesandtheir organisational support . In short, a new form of Luddismis required '69 which is geared to dismantling the results of previous`socialist' state-interventionist policy . Previously, socialist theoryhas recognised a need to dismantle complete industrial sectorsonly in the case of the military-industrial complex understood asan àbuse' of technology . Such an understanding is too narrowand has to be extended to other sectors of a `peaceful' nature withsimilar destructive potentials . If resistance to cul-de-sac tech-nologies should become part of a socialist strategy, then the viewof `nationalised industries' has to change dramatically . If, as Offequite rightly suggests, it is `state interventionism' which at leastin some countries is the prime protagonist of 'super-industrialism',then some creations of this interventionist policy will have to bedismantled .

Considering the social base of the `green' movement, whatare the chances that they will be politically successful? Spencehas suggested that `these new workers . . . are vital to capitalistdevelopment . ' 10 This is, in my view, a misjudgement . As analyzedabove, the new movement only emerged as a result of certainsocial sectors not being directly subordinated to the laws ofequivalent exchange. At the same time, they are in a marginalposition as regards capitalist development, and therefore do notpose a significant threat of disruption . Furthermore, significantparts of the àlternative' movement are directly dependent on thewelfare state . There can be no illusion that the so-called 'alter-native economy' is viable on its own : it depends, firstly, on directstate subsidies in the form of grants ; secondly, on indirect sub-sidies in form of social-security payments ; and thirdly, on theeconomic well-being of the `non-productive service sector' whichprovides the large majority of its consumers ." This situationobviously puts the `green' movements in a rather difficult position .On their own, they are unlikely to be able to reach the fundamentaltransformation of society they deem to be necessary .

Martin Spence's central point is that there should be acoalition between the new and the old social movements ; thegreen and the trade union movements. Such a demand is not newbut is nevertheless of undiminished topicality . In Britain, DaveEliott and SERA are veteran campaigners for such action." InFrance the CFDT has been successfully involved in environmentaland anti-nuclear struggles . In Germany such views have alsobeen put forward frequently and a special group AktionskreisLeben (Action Group Live) was set up to promote trade uniondiscussion on the nuclear power issue . How successful have theseattempts been so far? In Germany the unions have taken and

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maintained a thoroughly pro-nuclear attitude . The `AktionskreisLeben' did not succeed in stimulating major intra-union dis-cussion on nuclear power and employment . Their work wasseriously hampered by the very hierarchical internal union struc-ture, given the German Federation of Labour leadership's firmcontrol of union policy." The Federation went as far as tosupport a mass pro-nuclear rally in Dortmund in 1977 in responseto previous anti-nuclear demonstrations in Brokdorf . Particularlynoteworthy is the German government's success in winning thesupport of the coal miners for its policy . The Social Democratsadopted a policy of `first coal, then nuclear' . The SPD was onlyprepared to accept further nuclear expansion if additional energydemand could not be met by coal . The Social Democratic/Liberalgovernment of Northrhine-Westfalia, where the main Germancoal resources are situated, declared a temporary ban on nuclearstations to protect the interests of the coal industry . Thus boththe coal miners and the whole trade union movement wereassured that nuclear expansion would not be carried out at theexpense of existing energy sectors, and this made them loyalsupporters of the government's general pro-nuclear stance . Thetrade unions were also the main force inside the SPD supportingthe party leadership in their conflict with the party's left wingdemands for a halt to nuclear development" .

In France, the communist union CGT and the moderatesocialist union FO are both staunch supporters of nuclear power .But the predominantly socialist union CFDT has voiced strongcriticism of the nuclear programme . The CFDT favours nuclearenergy in principle, but is critical of the size and the implemen-tation of the programme. The CFDT have even participated in acommon front with ecologists on several occasions . In 1979, ajoint petition with Friends of the Earth and other groups wassigned demanding a nuclear moratorium"' . Why is it that such aclose association between the CFDT and the ecologists is possiblein France? First one has to note the CFDT'S ideological back-ground: it is a 'left-socialist' union with strong `syndicalist' ten-dencies favouring a 'socialisme autogestionnaire', i .e . a socialistsociety with self determination for all factories and social andpolitical units . It is opposed to the traditional French centralismand has been strongly influenced by the ideas of May 1%8 76 .Secondly, the French ecologist movement has very strongcounter-cultural and left-wing tendencies. The French Friendsof the Earth, for example, understand themselves as `socialists' inthe broadest sense and demand fundamental social changes" .Thus, to the CFDT in France than they are to any union in Britainthe environmentalists are ideologically far closer . The Germanenvironmental movement may be rather leftist, too, but there is



no trade union partner like the CFDT available to it .Thirdly, health and safety problems have led to a series of

industrial conflicts . Besides many white collar workers in thepublic sector the CFDT also organises many employees of thenuclear industry . Appalling safety conditions at the La Haguereprocessing plant did much to raise the issue . Strikes were heldin La Hague, and also at a number of nuclear power stations,when it was planned to start operating these plants despite cracksdetected in the pressure vessel . These actions were partly under-taken jointly with the CGT . 78 In the case of the CFDT, involvementin the nuclear industry has not, as in other countries, enlistedtheir unequivocal support of nuclear power . Their concrete ex-perience of the nuclear industry has led the CFDT to scepticismand a critique of the pace and content of the French nuclearprogramme. Nuclear power as such is nevertheless not rejected .However, the nuclear issue seems to be pushed only by a limitednumber of union leaders with the rank and file largely un-interested . According to Lucas, Most CFDTmembers are just `fedup' with the issue, 7 B and anti-nuclear activists have expressedtheir disillusionment with the total lack of involvement of theCFDT membership in anti-nuclear actions ."

In Britain, the trade union movement is far more frag-mented than in France and Germany ; less hierarchical than inGermany and organised primarily according to crafts and econ-omic sectors rather than by ideology as in France . SERA has beenquite successful in bringing discussions on energy and employ-ment into the unions, and quite a number of them have passedcritical motions at their conferences .

The TUC since its first statement on nuclear power in 1955has, however, never waned in its support for the nuclear industry .The TUC's energy policy making body, the Fuel and PowerIndustries Committee, has quite often been more 'pro-nuclear'than the government of the day . In 1977, the TUC Committeeobjected to the Labour Government's call for a public inquiry tolook into Windscale . The TUC's estimates of future energy demandhave also been higher than Department of Energy's figures . 81 In1980, Congress passed a motion demanding more nuclear gener-ation capacity than even the Conservative government wasplanning to build .

The most important issue about nuclear energy in unionpolitics has been the question of the reactor choice . The majority .of unions have traditionally been hostile to the LWR and in favourof the British AGR though the TUC is now less firm on thisposition . In 1974, it rejected the LWR in favour of the BritishSteam Generating Heavy Water Reactor (SGHwR) . But by 1978,the TUC Fuel and Power Industries' Committee had dropped its

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opposition to a PWR, a position confirmed in July 1979 shortlyafter the Conservative government had taken office . Most Britishunions, however, appear to be opposed to the PWR. Looking atthe unions which have adopted a general anti-nuclear stance, onecan identify quite clearly the predominance of unions repre-senting the `non-productive service sector' . The main exceptionis the coal miners' union . This is in marked contrast to theGerman situation . The leaked cabinet minutes of Decembermake it quite clear that nuclear power is seen in a favourable lightbecause of its detrimental effects on the miners' power .

Taking over from SERA, the Anti-Nuclear Campaign (ANC)decided to make the trade union campaign its main politicalaction. Since its foundation in 1979, there have not been manysuccesses. With the exception of the NUM, no other major unionseems to have been won for the anti-nuclear cause . It also appearsthat the involvement of the anti-nuclear unions in movementactivities are rather limited. Except for passing motions at con-ferences and sending a delegate to the odd meeting, there doesnot seem to have been any significant input into the anti-nuclearmovement from the trade union side. It is doubtful whether theSizewell Inquiry will bring a change . The ANC opted to form abroad-based anti-PWR campaign based on the unions, and suc-ceeded in involving unions which would be inclined to accept anAGR, such as the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) .That such a strategy could create problems became apparent atthe Anti-Sizewell Rally in November 1982 when a TGWU rep-resentative felt compelled to distance himself from the generalanti-nuclear (rather than anti-PWR) tone of the rally .

Looking at a number of other countries, there is evidencethat unions can under certain conditions, take a very activestance. In a country with no nuclear industry and a long-standinganti-nuclear activist as Vice-Chairman of the biggest individualtrade union, one might expect the chances of the trade unionmovement committing itself to an anti-nuclear stance to be high .This happened in Ireland, where John Carroll and his IrishTransport & General Workers Union (IT&GWU) started a majorinitiative to oppose plans for a first nuclear power station atCarnsore Point ."

Other experiences in Australia and Canada suggest thatunions can play a major role in disrupting the nuclear industry .Canadian longshoremen repeatedly refused to handle nuclearmaterial to, or from, Argentina where Canada has just finishedconstructing a CANDU nuclear power station . The campaign `NoCandu for Argentina' did, however, only oppose nuclear co-operation with Argentina on human rights grounds."

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paign against uranium mining . Starting in May 1976 with a oneday strike by the Australian Railway Union, there have been anumber of actions by trade unions to stop mining development .From 1979 to 1981, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU)imposed a ban on any uranium shipment . While this union actionin close co-operation with environmental groups constituted amajor threat to the Australian uranium mining industry, thecampaign suffered a major set-back when the ban was lifted in1981 . This occurred in the context of fierce inter-union disputesbetween mining workers opposing the ban and transport workersand dockers providing the back-bone of the anti-nuclear actionon both environmental and political grounds ."

To, assess the possible role of trade unions in an anti-nuclear campaign, the following factors have to be taken intoaccount . Unions will more likely become active in this field if theexisting nuclear industry in the country is small ; the unionmembers themselves are either economically threatened by, orare not dependent on nuclear development ; if the cause is limited,to say, opposition on human rights grounds or against a particularreactor line ; and if the ideological stance of the union is non-communist, grass roots based, left-socialist . Under certainconditions and for limited purposes, successful co-operationbetween the anti-nuclear and trade union movements could thusbe expected .

Nevertheless, a number of features central to the tradeunion movement make it, in my view, highly unlikely that in theirpresent form they will play a dominant role in the social trans-formations considered necessary to stop 'cul-de-sac technologies'and `super-industrialism' . First of all, it is the task of tradeunions to defend the interests of their members . Once certainindustries have developed, trade union activity will try to securethe continued existence of that sector as source of employmentfor its members. Thus, trade unions play a highly conservativerole in the sense that they contribute to cementing existingindustrial structures. It thus cannot be expected that anti-nuclearpositions will gain any major support from trade unions signifi-cantly involved in the nuclear sector . Secondly, the trade unionmovement in the main accepts the fundamental logic of indus-trialism. Looking at the trade unions with a critical attitude tonuclear power, they are predominantly located outside the main-stream production sectors, in much the same way as the othersocial bases of anti-nuclear protest" . Thirdly, there are tremen-dous difficulties in capitalising on the support given by tradeunions to the anti-nuclear movement . That support seems tohave consisted mainly in passing motions at conferences . In mostcountries, there does not seem to have been any significantC . a C . 20-J

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involvement of trade unionists in anti-nuclear activities as such .The only tangible effect might come from influencing LabourParty policy and getting an anti-nuclear motion passed at congress .But that, in itself, would far from guarantee a change in LabourParty policy, and even less the policy of a Labour government .Furthermore, there is no prospect of any strike action forthcomingon this issue which could off-set the weak bargaining power ofthe anti-nuclear movement .

Fourthly, the only effective trade union resistance to newindustrial development has taken the form of protecting anestablished economic sector challenged by new developments .There is a long-standing British tradition in that area which mayhave contributed significantly to the fact that Britain is perhapsfurther away than other countries in material terms, although notideologically, from a 'super-industrial' society . Also in the nuclearcase, Britain is perhaps the only country where such resistancehas become of major importance in the form of the mine workers'stance. Resistance would be expected from the mine workersmore than from any other sectors of the trade union movement asthe Conservative government has obviously conceived its nuclearprogramme with the miners in mind in an attempt to deprivethem both of their economic and political standing . The minersare one, relatively homogenous group with a tradition of radicalaction unlike the disparate nature of the other trade unionsconcerned. Nevertheless, strike action seems to be highly unlikelyfor the time being . The union might objectively be better off inthe long run arranging a deal on the lines of their Germancounterparts . Their resistance is also only geared against oneparticular 'cul-de-sac technology', and they are generally in favourof other forms of 'super-industrialism' . There seems to berelatively little concern for the environmental effects of coaldevelopment and use (eg Belvoir, acid rain) . In Britain theanti-nuclear movement is certainly on a sticky wicket : it has notreceived the same public attention as on the continent; there havebeen far fewer local conflicts ; and in general fewer opportunitiesto raise the issue of nuclear power politically . But even numericallystrong movements such as those in France and Germany have notachieved any significant involvement of trade unionists in anti-nuclear activities as such .

On the whole, therefore, I share Alain Touraine's assess-ment that, at present, the trade union movement will not be themovement through which the `green' forces could hope to reachtheir major aims ." This state of the working class movementmust not be seen, however, as its own fault or responsibility .Instead, it is in itself an expression of the power of industrialism,tying the worker to the machine, forming and maintaining an



ideology, and in many cases, turning to open job blackmail inplaying off environmental against employment issues ."

Martin Spence is far from uncritical of the structures andpredominant pro-nuclear attitudes of British trade unions . He isadvocating alliances of the anti-nuclear movement with thoseunions and unofficial elements of the trade union movementsympathetic to the anti-nuclear movement . I also consider this tobe highly desirable and fruitful . But I feel that Spence over-emphasises the contribution of such a strategy for the anti-nuclearmovement . I am afraid that the movement could lose part of itsidentity and strength if it concentrates too much on winning overthe labour movement at the present time . Spence misjudges therole of the French Socialists and the German Social-Democratson nuclear energy ." Both parties fudged the issue thoroughly,and in both countries the anti-nuclear movement has been leftonly with feelings of resentment and disillusionment . The German`Greens' and their recent success in the election are the directresult of the Social-Democrats being unable to accommodate themovement's demands . I do not see any reason why a BritishLabour government should not handle the British anti-nuclearmovement in much the same way, particularly as the Britishmovement is far weaker than its continental counterparts .

It would be equally dangerous, in my view, if the anti-nuclear movement were to confine itself to following the path ofchanging, short-term coalitions on single issues . The ANC isperhaps a sad example of how an organisation originally foundedto spearhead a new forceful movement degenerates into just oneof many pressure groups. Although I am only too well aware ofother factors which have contributed to this decline, (the rise ofCND, for example), I wonder whether the almost exclusive con-centration on one particular approach - trade union work - hasnot been counterproductive . There could have been otherapproaches which would have allowed it to remain a fairly broadbased body; perhaps focusing, more on local and regional anti-nuclear activities and developing into a national mouthpiece ofthem. Once an independent `green' movement has constituteditself one might think of 'red/green alliances' to carry out commonpolicies . But the possibility of any political impact would greatlybe reduced if the movement gets co-opted too early in itsdevelopment . The emphasis, in my view, should therefore lie onbuilding the movement's identity and independence . There can,however, be no illusions about the strength of even a fullyindependent movement . It must be careful not to overstretch itsresources .

There is no immediate alternative recipe to overcome thisweakness . The only lesson which seems appropriate is cautious-

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ness . Radical transformations, which on one hand seem necessary,could on the other hand seriously damage or even destroy themovement as such . Serious social crises would most certainlylead to the imposition of authoritarian measures leaving themovement no channels of political activity . The movement hasnot got the power to physically prevent-the installation of nuclearpower stations with direct action, as the experiences of thenumerically far stronger French and German movements haveshown. An electoral strategy could bear fruits as in Germany, butsuch successes do not seem likely in Britain for the time being .The movement has not many resources to create the opportunitiesfor itself, it has to take what comes along and make the best out ofit .

Nuclear power is a 'cul-de-sac technology' promoted by anuclear-industrial complex entrenched in energy policy-makingand dependent on state support . Such support is forthcomingwhere, in the state's perception, the further promotion of nuclearpower is necessary to secure the national long-term energy securitypolitically . At the same time, capitalism is unlikely to be totallydependent on nuclear power for its further survival, and mightindeed be better off without it .

As a cul-de-sac technology, nuclear power has been deter-mined in its very nature by capitalist relations of productionwhich cannot be off-set by other forms of using the technologyunder different political conditions . As such, nuclear power is,however, only a symbol of a new phase of capitalist developmentto a super-industrial society which involves the incalculability ofenvironmental and social impacts of individual technologies aswell as super-industrialism as a whole to the extent that majordestructive forces might be set free . The anti-nuclear andenvironmental movements have to be seen as central oppositionmovements to this development, having the objective function ofemancipatory social movements whatever their own actualunderstanding of their role . The `old' social movements areprimarily oblivious to or actively supportive of super-industrialism', although some important opposition, either inform of opposition to individual technologies challenging estab-lished industries (NUM) or as part of a more general considerationof social progress (CFDT) can be observed . What are the con-sequences of this analysis for the relation of new and old socialmovements?

The differences between trade union movements and theecological movements cannot be overlooked . I would followTouraine in identifying the anti-nuclear movement as a potential at UNIV NORTH TEXAS LIBRARY on October 17, 2012cnc.sagepub.comDownloaded from


new social movement reflecting a new political cleavage . WhileTouraine et al identify `technocratic power' as the adversary ofthis movement and the transfer to `post-industrial society' as itsaim . 90 I would prefer to substitute `super industrialism' for theformer and `ecological socialism' for the latter. More importantis, however, the analytical point of taking the `green movement'seriously as an independent movement in its own right whichcannot readily be subsumed under the labour movement .

In view of the above discussion of nuclear technology andenvironmental problems, it would in my view be totally wrong todemand from the environmental movement a closer involvementwith the labour movement in its present form if that impliedrenouncing central arguments and concerns . This seems to have

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Photomontage :Peter Kennard

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been the dominant approach taken by leftist critiques of theecologists," and Spence partly stands in that tradition . In hisview, the anti-nuclear movement displays many reactionary,romanticist facets . One cannot deny that some of the ideologicalconstructs used to explain environmental problems might becharacterised in these terms, but these criticisms do not apply tothe basic aims of the movement or the social function they areplaying. The ecologists are an ideologically very mixed group ofpeople, ranging from eco-fascists to, say, eco-communists, buttheir objective function in social development has to be thecentral evaluative concept .

In this context, there is in my view no point in criticisingthe ideological shortcomings of environmentalism from theseemingly high position of marxist insights . Much of this hasbeen generated by the failure to create a political mobilisation ofsignificant numbers of people with such insights . This has seenmarxists trying to convert all movements springing up withouthaving quite the `right' consciousness . It would, however, be farmore significant if ecological problems were taken seriously, evenif that entailed a total revision of standard marxist concepts .Instead, ecological problems are re-formulated so as not to upsetfamiliar concepts of analysis . The overwhelming prominence ofthe production sector in marxist analysis, for example, leadsSpence and others to the attempts to derive environmental prob-lems from traditional capital-labour conflicts at the workplace .Such an interpretation, as I have tried to show, is not adequate . Itfurthermore cements the existing political division of labourwith, say, the British Society for Social Responsibility in Sciencealmost exclusively concerned with environmental hazards at theworkplace, and other mainstream environmental organisationsexclusively concerned with environmental hazards everywhereelse but the workplace .

To remove that division, both sides have to take theproblems concerned seriously. Spence's argument for an incor-poration of an anti-nuclear programme into a general socialistprogramme does not suffice, if socialism still remains a synonymfor Big Industry and 'super- industrialism .'

AcknowledgementsI gratefully acknowledge the valuable comments and help I havereceived from a wide range of people including the editorialcommittee of CAPITAL & CLASS . I am particularly grateful toMartin Spence for his comradely counter-critique of an earlierdraft of this paper, and to Sonia Liff for her careful editing of thetext . at UNIV NORTH TEXAS LIBRARY on October 17, 2012cnc.sagepub.comDownloaded from


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1 For example, E .H.S . Burhop, `The peaceful applications of Notes andatomic energy', The Marxist Quarterly, Vol 1, No . 2, April 1954, pp.82- references93 .2

Margaret Gowing and Lorna Arnold, The atomic bomb,London etc . : Butterworths 1979.3

Friedrich Munzinger, Atomkraft: Der Bau ortsfester andbeweglicher Atomantriebe and seine wirtschaftlichen and technischenProbleme, 3rd ed ., Berlin etc : Springer 1%0, pp .259-260 .4 Harold Orlans, Contracting for atoms : A study of public policy

issues posed by the Atomic Energy Commission's contracting for research,development and managerial services, Washington, DC : BrookingsInstitution 1967 .

5 Ulrich Rodel, Forschungsprioritaten and gesellschaftlicheEntwicklung: Studie uber die Determinanten der Forschung andTechnologiepolitik in den USA, Frankfurt/Main : Suhrkamp 1972, pp . 147,169-170 .6

Irvin C . Bupp and Jean-Claude Derian, Light Water: How thenuclear dream dissolved, New York: Basic Books 1978, pp . 19-20 .7 Harald Glatz, `Zum Durchsetzungsprozefi von

Kerntechnologien', Osterreichische Zeitschrift fur Politikwissenshaft, Vol .9, No . 1, 1980, pp .81-91 .8

On the nuclear development in the us, see in particular WendyAllen, Nuclear reactors for generating electricity : us Development from 1946to 1963, Santa Monica Ca : RAND Corporation 1977 ;Frank G Dawson, Nuclear Power: Development and management of atechnology, Seattle, Wa . : University of Washington Press 1976 ;Philip Mullenbach, Civilian nuclear power: Economic issues and policyformation, New York: Twentieth Century Fund 1963 ;Lee C Nehrt, International marketing of nuclear power plants,Bloomington Ind . : Indiana University Press 1966 ;Robert Perry et al., Development and commercialization of the light waterreactor, 1946-1976, Santa Monica, Ca : RAND Corporation 1977 ;Harold Orlans, op. cit. (ref. 4) ;Irwin C Bupp and Jean-Claude Derian, op . cit. (ref 6) .9

Irwin C Bupp and Jean Claude Derian, op . cit (ref. 6), p .40 .10

Robert Perry et .al., op . cit . (ref.8), p .3511

This point is well made by Irwin C Bupp, and Jean-ClaudeDerian op .cit., (ref 6) .12

Op. cit., pp.74-75 .13

Op.cit., p.50 ;Peter deLeon, Development and diffusion of the nuclear power reactor: Acomparative analysis, Cambridge, Ma . : Ballinger 1979, p .217 .14

Irwin C Bupp, and Jean-Claude Derian, op.cit., (ref 6), pp .74-75; Robert Perry et al ., op .cit. (ref 8), p.80 .15

Robert Perry et al ., op. cit. (ref 8), p .46 .16 Man Lonnroth, and William Walker, The viability of the civilnuclear industry, New York/London : Rockefeller Foundation/RoyalInstitute of International Affairs 1979 .17 William Walker, `Utilities and energy conservation :Implications of recent developments in utility policy in the UnitedStates', in : Facing the Energy Future: does Britain need new energy

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institutions? London : Royal Institute of Public Administration 1981,pp.61-69.18

Barry R. Weingast, `Congress, regulation, and the decline ofnuclear power', Public Policy, Vol . 28, No . 2, Spring 1980, pp .231-255 .

20

On the German nuclear development, seeHelga Bufe and Jurgen Grumbach, Staat and Atomindustrie :Kernenergiepolitik in derBRD, Cologne : Pahl Rugenstein 1979 ;Christian Deubner, `The expansion of West German capital and thefounding of Euratom', International Organization, Vol 33, No .2, Spring1979, pp .203-228 ; Otto Keck, Policymaking in a nuclear program : the caseof the West German fast breeder reactor, Lexington, Ma: Lexington D .C .Heath & Co . 1981 ; Herbert Kitschelt, Kernenergiepolitik: Arena einesgesellschaftlichen Konfliku, Frankfurt/New York: Campus 1980 ;Lutz Mez, Àtompolitik- Der unaufhaltsame Aufstieg zur Atommacht?'in : Hans-Karl Rupp (ed .), Die andere Bundesrepublik : Geschichte andPerspektiven, Marburg/Lahn :/Guttandin & Hoppe 1980, pp . 195-222 .21

On the French nuclear development, seeBertrand Goldschmidt, The atomic adventure : its political and technicalaspects, Oxford etc. : Pergamon Press 1964 ;Bertrand Goldschmidt, La complexe atomique : Histoire politique de 1'energienucleaire, Paris : Fayard 1980 ;Dominique Saumon, and Louis Puiseux, Àctors and decisions in Frenchenergy policy', in : Leon N Lindberg (ed .), The energy syndrome,Lexington, Ma . : Lexington Books, D .C. Heath & Co . 1977, pp .119-172 . ;N . J . D . Lucas, Energy in France: Planning, politics and policy, London :Europa Publications 1979 ;Laurence Scheinman, Atomic energy policy in France under the FourthRepublic, Princeton, N .1 ., : Princetown University Press 1965 .22

See the excellent study by Laurence Scheinman, op .cit (ref.21)23

On the British nuclear development, see C . M . Buckley and R .Day, `Nuclear reactor development in Britain', in : Keith Pavitt (ed),Technical innovation and British economic performance, London andBasingstoke : Macmillan 1980, pp .252-266 ;Duncan Burn, The political economy of nuclear energy, London : Instituteof Economic Affairs 1967 ;Duncan Burn, Nuclear power and the energy crisis: Politics and the atomicindustry, London and Basingstoke : Macmillan 1978 ;Margaret Gowing (assisted by Lorna Arnold), Independence anddeterrence: Britain and atomic energy 1945-1952, 2 vols ., London andBasingstoke : Macmillan 1974;Roger Williams, The nuclear power decisions: British policies 1953-78,London: Croom Helm 1980 .24 J.H. Cheshire et al ., Ènergy policy in Britain : A case study ofadaption and change in a policy system', in Leon N . Lindberg (ed .), Theenergy syndrome, Lexington, Ma. Lexington Books, D.C . Heath & Co .1977, pp .33-62 .25

Philip Gummett, Scientists in Whitehall, Manchester :Manchester University Press 1980, p . 125 .26

Howard J. Rush, Gordon MacKerron, and John Surrey, `The at UNIV NORTH TEXAS LIBRARY on October 17, 2012cnc.sagepub.comDownloaded from


advanced gas-cooled reactor : A case study in reactor choice', EnergyPolicy, Vol . 5, No . 2, June 1977, pp . 95-105 .27

Marian Radetzki, Uranium : A strategic source of energy,London: Croom Helm 1981 .28

Man Lonnroth, and William Walker, op . cit . (ref. 16) .29 .

Martin Spence, `Nuclear capital', Capital and Class, No . 16,Spring 1982, pp . 5-40 (here : p .20) .30

Claus Offe, Strukturprobleme des kapitalistischen Staates,Frankfurt/Main : Suhrkamp 1972 ;Claus Offe, "Crises of crisis management" : Elements of a political crisistheory', International Journal of Politics, Vol . 6, No . 3, 1976, pp . 29-67 .James O'Connor, The fiscal crisis of the state, New York: St . Martin'sPress 1973 ;Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation crisis, London: Heinemann 1976 .31

Peter de Leon, op. cit. (ref. 13), p . 229 .32 See, for example, Joachim Hirsch, Wissenschaftlich-technischerFortschritt and politisches System : Organisation and Grundlagenadministrativer Wissenschaftsforderung in der BRD, Frankfurt/Main :Surhkamp 1970 ;Joachim Hirsch, Staatsapparat und Reproduktion des Kapitals, Frankfurt/Main: Surhkamp 1974 ;Ulrich Rodel, op . cit . (ref. 5) .33

Claus Offe, op .cit . (ref. 30), pp . 124-125 (my translation).34

Martin Spence, op . cit . (ref. 29), pp . 12-14 .35 Roy Lewis, `Nuclear power and employment rights', IndustrialLaw Journal, Vol . 7, No . 1, March 1978, pp . 1-15 ; see also Dave Elliott etal, The politics of nuclear power, London: Pluto Press 1978 .36 David Elliott, Energy options and employment, London : Centrefor Alternative Industrial and Technological Systems, North EastLondon Polytechnic 1979 .37 David Pearce, Employment and energy futures in the ux ;Ananalysis of the GAITS scenario, Aberdeen: Department of PoliticalEconomy, University of Aberdeen 1979 .38

This point of view is put forward, for example, by Helga Bufe,and Jurgen Grumbach, op .cit. ref.20 .39 For a presentation and thorough critique of this view, seeStefan Lob, 'Atomenergie - Zur Struktur eines gesellschaftlichenKonflikts', in Heinz Hulsmann, and Robert Tschiedel (eds .),Kernenergie und wissenschaftliche Verantwortung, Kronberg/Ts . :Athenaum 1977, pp . 123-154 .40 Lutz Mez, and Wolfgang Rudig, Energiediskussion in Europa :Berichie and Dokumente uber die Haltung der Regierungen und Parteien inder Europdischen Gemeinschaft zur Kernenergie, Villingen : Neckar Verlag1979 .41 Harry Braverman, Labor and monopoly capital : The degradationof work in the twentieth century, New York : Monthly Review Press 1974 .42 For analyses in this vein, see Harley Shaiken, 'NeueTechnologien and Organisation der Arbeit', Leviathan, Vol . 8, No . 2,August 1980, pp . 190-211 ;CSE Microelectronics Group, Microelectronics: Capitalist technology andthe working class, London : CSE Books 1980.

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43 See, for example, Feliks Gross, `Some social consequences ofatomic discovery', American Sociological Review, Vol. 15, No . 1,February 1950, pp . 43-50 .44 BSSRS Politics of Energy Group, Nuclear power - The riggeddebate, London: British Society for Social Responsibility in Science1981 ;Les Levidov, `Review of "The Nuclear State" (by Robert Jungk)', Headand Hand, No. 4, Spring 1980 .Les Levidov, `Controlling nuclear technology' in: Gari Donn (ed),Missiles, Reactors and Civil Liberties : Against the Nuclear State, Glasgow,Scottish Council for Civil Liberties, not dated, pp . 34-37 .45

BSSRS Politics of Energy Group, op . cit. (ref . 44), pp . 23 .46

Les Levidov, op . cit. `Review of "The Nuclear State"' (ref. 44) .47

Martin Spence, op . cit . (ref. 29), p.12 .48 Otto Ullrich, Technik and Herrschaft vom Hand-werk zurverdinglichten Blockstruktur industrieller Gesellschaft, Frankfurt/Main :Suhrkamp 1977 ;-Otto Ullrich, Weltniveau : In der Sackgasse des Industriesystems, WestBerlin : Rotbuch Verlag 1979 .49

Norbert Kapferer, `Small is beatuiful - eine ortlose Utopie?Leviathan, Vol . 6, No . 2, July 1978, pp . 314-323 .50 Hassenpflug has pointed out, that `science and technology' areaccording to Marx not synonymous with `productive forces' . Science andtechnology can have both `productive' and `destructive' effects . SeeDieter Hassenpflug, 'Marxismus and Industriekritik : Otto Ullrichs"Weltniveau" and der marx' sche Begriff der Industriekritik', PROKLA

40 (Vol . 10, No. 3), 1980, pp . 114-130 .51

Stefan Lob, op . cit. (ref. 39), p . 135 ;Lutz Mez, 'Der atom-industrielle Komplex', in : Hans-ChristianBuchholtz, Lutz Mez, and Thomas von Zabern, Widerstand gegenAtomkraftwerke, Wuppertal : Peter Hammer Verlag 1978, pp . 11-25 :Erich Kitzmuller, 'Wachstum der Produktiv- oder Destruktivkrafte?' inLutz Mez, and Manfred Wilke (eds), Der Atomfilz: Gewerkschaften andAtomkraft, West Berlin : Olle & Wolter 1977, S . 77-91 .52

Amory B. Lovins, Soft energy paths: Towards a durable peace,Harmondsworth : Penguin 1977 .53

Volmar Lauber, `Ecology politics and liberal democracy',Government and Opposition, Vol . 13, No . 2, Spring 1978, pp . 199-217 .54

Thies Gleiss, and Winfried Wolf, Der Atomverein nachHarrisburg, Frankfurt/Main : isr Verlag 1980, p . 93 .55

Wolfgang Sassin, `Energy', Scientific American, Vol . 243, No .3, September 1980, pp . 107-117 .56 Wolf Hafele, 'Hypotheticality and the new challenges : Thepathfinder role of nuclear energy', Minerva, Vol . 12, 1974, pp . 303-322(here : p .317) ;Cp. also Alvin M . Weinberg, `Science and trans-science', Minerva, Vol .10, 1972, pp . 209-222 .57 Martin Janicke, Wie das Industriesystem von seinen Mif3sstaiidenprofitiert, Kosten and Nutzen technokratischer Symptombekampfung :Unnweltschutz, Gesundheitswesen, innere Sicherheit, Opladen :Westdeutscher Verlag 1979 . at UNIV NORTH TEXAS LIBRARY on October 17, 2012cnc.sagepub.comDownloaded from


58 Alwin M. Weinberg, `Social institutions and nuclear energy',in : John Francis, and Paul Albrecht (eds .) Facing up to nuclear power,Edinburgh : St . Andrew Press 1976, pp . 21-39 .59

E.P. Thompson, The making of the English working class,Harmondsworth : Penguin 1968, pp . 253-256 .60

Maurice Frankel, The alkali inspectorate : The control ofindustrial air pollution, London: Social Audit 1974 .61

Raymond Williams, The Country and the City, London : Chatto& Windus 1973 .62 See Howard Hill, Freedom to roam : The struggle for access toBritain's moors and mountains, Ashbourne, Derbyshire : MoorlandPublishing Company 1980 ;Paul Salveson, Will you come o' Sunday mornin? The 1896 battle for WinterHill, Bolton : Red Rose Publishing 1982 .63 Craig R . Littler, The development of the labour process incomparative perspective : A comparative study of the transformation of workorganization in Britain, Japan and USA, London : HeinemannEducational Books 1982 .64 Wolfgang Rudig, `Public protest against nuclear energy : Someinternational comparisons' Unpublished paper, Department of LiberalStudies in Science, Manchester University 1982 .65

Stephen Cotgrove, Catastrophe or cornucopia : The environment,politics and the future, Chichester etc : Wiley 1982, pp . 18-20 .66

Frank Parkin, Middle class radicalism: The British Campaign forNuclear Disarmament, Manchester: Manchester University Press 1968 .67

Joseph Huber, Wer Boll das alles aifdern : Die Alternativen derAlternativbewegung, West Berlin : Rotbuch Verlag 1980 .68 Andrew Duff, and Stephen Cotgrove, `Social values and thechoice of careers in industry', Journal of Occupational Psychology, Vol .55, 1982, pp . 97-107 .69 Langdon Winner, Autonomous technology: Technics-out-of-control as a theme in political thought, Cambridge, Ma ./London : MIT Press1977, pp . 329-331 .70

Martin Spence, op . cit . (ref. 29), p . 36 .71

Joseph Huber, op . cit . (ref . 67) .72

Dave Eliott et al ., op . cit . (ref. 35) .73

Manfred Wilke, Die Funktionare, Munich : Piper 1980 .74

Lutz Mez, and Manfred Wilke, (eds) . Der Atomfilz :Gewerkschaften and Atomkraft, West Berlin: Olle & Wolter 1977 ;Jorg Hallerbach (ed), Die eigentliche Kernspaltung: Gewerkschafren anBurgerinitiativen im Streit um die Atomkraft, Darmstadt/Neuwied :Luchterhand 1978 ;Herbert Kitschelt, op .cit. (ref. 20) .75 Tony Chafer, `The anti-nuclear movement and the rise ofpolitical ecology', in : Philip G . Cerny (ed .), Social movements and protestin France, London : Francis Pinter 1982, pp . 202-220 .76 Christel Hartmann et al., 'Grundstrukturen gewerkschaftlichePolitik in Frankreich', in : Werner Olle (ed .), Einfuhrung in dieinternationale Gewerkschaftspolitik, Vol. 2, West Berlin : Olle & Wolter1978, pp . 8-48 .77

Claude-Marie Vadrot, L'icologie, histoire d'une subversion,

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Paris : Syros 1978, pp . 184-192 .78 J. S Eisenhammer, `The French Communist Party, the GeneralConfederation of Labour, and the nuclear debate', West EuropeanPolitics, Vol . 4, No . 3, October 1981, pp. 252-266 .79

N.J.D Lucas, op cit . (ref. 21) p . 173 .80 Alain Touraine et . al., Anti-nuclear protest : The opposition tonuclear energy in France, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press/Paris :Maison des Sciences de l'Homme 1983 .81 Colin Sweet and Anna Coote, `Energy : Frank Chapple'sfantasy', New Statesman, Vol. 102, No . 2644, 20th November, 1981, pp .6-8 .82

Wolfgang Rudig, British political parties and trade unions onnuclear power: A documentation of motions and resolutions, West Berlin :Institut fur Zukunftsforschung 1980 (mimeo) ;David Elliott, Trade union policy and nuclear power (Technology PolicyGroup Occasional Paper No . 3), Milton Keynes : Technology PolicyGroup, Open University 1981 .83

John F. Carroll and Petra K . Kelly, (eds) Nuclear Ireland?Dublin : Brindley Dollard, 1980 ;Lothar Meyer and Petra Kelly, `Trades Unions and Nuclear Power :Ireland-Germany-Australia', New Ecologist, No. 3, May/June 1978, pp .95-97 .84 Thijs de la Court, Deborah Pick and Daniel Nordquist, Thenuclear fix: A guide to nuclear activities in the third world, Amsterdam :World Information Service on Energy (WISE) 1982, p .27 .85 Joseph Camilleri, `Nuclear controversy in Australia : Theuranium campaign', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol . 35, No . 4, April1979, pp . 40-44 .Lothar Meyer and Petra Kelly, op . cit ., (ref. 83) ;Financial Times, 9th December, 1981 .86 Cp. Michael Pollak, `Die westeuropaischen Gewerkschaftenim Spannungsfeld technologiepolitischer Entscheidungen : Das Beispielder Auseinandersetzung urn die Atomenergie', Journal furSozialforschung, Vol. 21, No . 2, 1981, pp . 123-140 .87

Alain Touraine et al., op .cit . (ref. 80) .88

Richard Kazs and Richard L . Grossman, Fear at work: Jobblackmail, labor and the environment, New York : The Pilgrim Press 1982 .89

Martin Spence, op. cit. (ref . 29), p . 19.90

Alain Touraine et al., op cit . (ref. 80) .91

Critiques of the us anti-nuclear movement (and responses tothem) cover similar ground as the debates reported by Alain Touraine etal . for France and often touch on a similar note as Spence, s . Jeff Pector,`The nuclear power industry and the anti-nuclear movement', SocialistReview, No . 42, November/December 1978, pp. 9-35 ;Marcy Darnovsky, `A strategy for the anti-nuclear movement : Responseto Pector', Socialist Review, No. 49, 1979, 119-127 ;Stephen Vogel, `The limits of protest ; A critique of the anti-nuclearmovement', Socialist Review, No. 54, November-December 1980, pp .125-134 ;Liv Smith, `Labor and the no-nukes movement', Socialist Review, No .54, November/December 1980, pp . 135-149 . at UNIV NORTH TEXAS LIBRARY on October 17, 2012cnc.sagepub.comDownloaded from


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