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Center for Immigration Studies

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We estimate that immigration between 1990 and 2017 added nearly 43 million people to the population, but had a minimal impact on the share of the population that is of working age. This is because immi-gration added to both the working-age population and to those outside of the working-age population

in nearly equal proportions. We also find that post-1990 immigration had a somewhat larger impact on the ratio of workers to retirees. However, raising the retirement age by one year has as large an impact on the ratio as do the nearly 43 million post-1990 immigrants and their progeny.

Among the findings:

• In2017,therewere30.8millionpost-1990immigrants(legalandillegal)and12millionoftheirU.S.-bornchildrenandgrandchildreninthecountry—42.8millionintotal,oroneineightU.S.residents.

• The42.8millionpeoplepost-1990immigration(legalandillegal)addedtothecountryislargerthanthecombined population of 22 states.

• Whileaddingsignificantlytothepopulation,thepresenceofpost-1990immigrantsandtheirprogenyonlyincreasedtheworking-age(16-64)shareofthepopulationfrom63.9percentto64.4percentin2017.

• Immigrationhadasmallimpactontheworking-agesharebecauseimmigrantsarriveatallages,growolder over time, and have children, so they added to both the working-age and those too old or too young to work in nearly equal proportions.

• Evenifthenumberofpost-1990immigrantsandtheiroffspringwasdoubledtoalmost86million,aboutoneinfourresidents,itwouldstillonlyhaveraisedtheworking-ageshareto64.8percent—0.9percent-age points higher than if there had been no immigration.

• Theworking-agesharecanbeseenasthebestwaytothinkabouttheabilityofsocietytopayforgovern-ment or support the economy, as both children and the elderly generally do not work and are supported by the labor of others.

• Excludingchildren,andlookingonlyatthenumberofworking-agepeople(16-64)relativetothoseofretirement age shows that post 1990-immigration increased the ratio from 3.7 potential workers per po-tential retiree to 4.1.

• Iftheretirementagewasraisedbyjustoneyear,assumingnoimmigration,theratioofworkerstoretireeswouldbe4.1,matchingtheeffectofpost-1990immigration.

• Increasingtheretirementagebytwoyears,assumingnopost-1990immigration,wouldhaveincreasedtheworker to retiree ratio to4.5 in2017. Itwouldhaverequireddoublingpost-1990 immigration tonearly86milliontomatchthiseffect.

Can Immigration Solve the Problem of an Aging Society? Estimating the impact of post-1990 immigration

By Steven A. Camarota and Karen Zeigler

1629KStreet,NW,Suite600•Washington,DC20006•(202)466-8185•center@cis.org•www.cis.org

Steven A. Camarota is the director of research and Karen Zeigler is a demographer at the Center.

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Center for Immigration Studies

• Intermsofusingimmigrationasawaytopayforentitlementprograms,itmustalsobepointedoutthatalargeshare of post-1990 immigrants and their children struggle, living in or near poverty and using welfare programs at relatively high rates. This makes it difficult for them to generate a fiscal surplus that can pay for social insurance programs.

• In2017,45percentofhouseholdsheadedbypost-1990immigrantsortheiradultchildrenusedoneormoremajorwelfareprograms,comparedto26percentofnative-headedhouseholds.Theratesofpovertyornearpovertyforpost-1990immigrantsandtheirchildrenwere50to60percenthigherthanthatofnatives.

• Whilethisanalysisisfocusedonallimmigrants(legalandillegal),weroughlyestimatethat32percent(13.8million)ofthepeopleimmigrationhasaddedtothecountrysince1990areillegalimmigrantsortheirprogeny.Sincelegaland illegal immigration together have a modest impact on the working-age share or the worker-to-retiree ratio, the impact of illegal immigration by itself is very small.

IntroductionToexaminetheimpactofimmigrationonthesizeandagestructureoftheU.S.population,thisanalysistakesaretrospectiveapproachbyusingCensusBureaudatatolookattheimpactofimmigrationsince1990.Mostpriorresearch,includingsev-eralanalysespublishedbytheCenterforImmigrationStudies,havestudiedtheimpactofimmigrantsonpopulationsizeandtheagestructureofthecountrybyprojectingtheeffectofimmigrationintothefuture.Whileprojectionshavetheadvantageof allowing researchers to discern the possible impact of future immigration levels, by their nature they rely on assumptions aboutfutureratesoffertility,mortality,andmigration,whicharefarfromcertain.Incontrast,thisanalysismeasurestheimpactofimmigrationbasedonwhatactuallyhappenedbetween1990and2017.RelyingprimarilyontheCensusBureau’sAmericanCommunitySurvey,wefindthatimmigrationaddednearly43millionpeopletothecountry’spopulationsince1990.Thisincludespost-1990immigrantsandtheirU.S.-bornchildrenandgrandchildren.

This large and relatively young population of immigrants is a good test of the argument that immigration can solve the prob-lem of an aging society. Our analysis shows that immigration over a 27-year period did add significantly to the working-age population,butitalsoincreasedthesizeofthedependentpopulation(childrenandtheelderly).Asaresult,itdidnotsignifi-cantly increase the share of the population that is of working-age.

Demographersoftenfocusontheworking-ageshareofthepopulation,whichissometimescalledthedependenceratio,because it reflects the ratio of people who are typically in the workforce relative to those who, because of their age, are depen-dent on workers for support. Looking at the working-age share is probably the most holistic way of thinking about whether there will be enough workers to support the government or the economy as both the elderly and children typically do not work.Whileexpendituresontheelderlyseemsobvioustomost,itissometimesforgottenhowmuchoursocietyspendsonchildren.Puttingasidewhattheirfamiliesprovide,governmentexpendituresonchildrenmakeupalargeshareoffederal,state,andlocalbudgets.Inthe2016-2017schoolyear,theUnitedStatesspent$668billion,or$13,119perpublicschoolstudent.1Further,theUnitedStatesspendsmorethan$1trillionayearonmeans-testedprogramsintheUnitedStates.Averylargeshareoftheseexpendituresareforhealth,food,housing,andcashassistancetofamilieswithchildren.Withgoodreason,allsocieties,includingours,devoteenormousresourcestoprovidingforchildren.Butalargerpopulationofchildrenalso means more people not working who have to be supported by the labor of others.

Inadditiontotheworking-age,inthisanalysiswealsolookattheratioofworking-agepeopletothoseofretirementage.Wefind that post-1990 immigration did impact this ratio somewhat more, but the impact was still modest. Further, increasing the retirement age by one year would have as large an impact on the ratio of workers to retirees or the working-age share as did post-1990 immigration.

Thisretrospectiveanalysisisverymuchinlinewithprojectionsbyacademics,theU.S.CensusBureau,andtheUnitedNa-tions. This prior research has shown that immigration does not fundamentally change the age structure of a receiving coun-tryinthelongrun.Ina1992articleinDemography,theleadingacademicjournalinthefield,economistCarlSchmertmannexplainedthat,mathematically,“constantinflowsofimmigrants,evenatrelativelyyoungages,donotnecessarilyrejuvenatelow-fertilitypopulations.Infact,immigrationmayevencontributetopopulationaging.”Afterreviewingtheimpactofim-migrationonaging,PrincetonUniversityeconomistThomasJ.Espenshadeobservedthat,“itbecomesapparentthattheef-fectofalternativeimmigrationlevelsonpopulationagestructureissmall,unlesswearewillingtoentertainavolumeofU.S.

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immigrationofhistoricproportion.”Heconcludesbystatingthat,“immigrationisaclumsyandunrealisticpolicyalternativetooffsetashortageofdomesticlaborortocorrectaperceivedimbalanceinthepensioner/workerratiointheUnitedStates.”AnextensiveUNstudyalsofoundthatimmigrationalonecannotmakeupforpopulationdeclineandaginginWesterncountries.TheCensusBureaustatedin2000thatimmigrationisa“highlyinefficient”meansforincreasingthepercentageofthepopulationthatisofworking-ageinthelongrun.TheCenterforImmigrationStudies’mostrecentpopulationprojec-tionsbasedonCensusBureauprojectionsalsoshowthemodestimpactofimmigrationonpopulationaging.2

Of course, prior research has not kept numerous commentators over the years from arguing that immigration is the solution tothesupposedargumentthattherewillnotbeenoughworkerstosupporttheeconomyorgovernment.Butouranalysisconfirmssomethingthatshouldbeobvious:Immigrantsarriveatallages,includingsomeatornearretirement.Inarecentanalysis of new arrivals we found that the share who are coming at older ages increased significantly between 2000 and 2017.3 They also grow old over time and have children who, like the elderly, have to be supported by the labor of others. For these reasons, the impact of post-1990 immigration on the ratio of workers to non-workers is quite limited.

Onefinalnoteaboutterminologyinthisreport.Weusetheterm“immigrant”torefertoallpersonsnotU.S.citizensatbirth—greencardholders,illegalimmigrants,naturalizedcitizens,andasmallnumberoflong-termtemporaryvisitors.Theyaretypicallyreferredtoasthe“foreign-born”bytheCensusBureau.Priorresearchindicatesthatmorethan90percentofillegalimmigrantsarecapturedintheCensusBureaudatausedforthisanalysis,asaretheirchildren.Sothisreportincludeslegalandillegalimmigrants.Second,atvarioustimesweexaminetheratioofworking-agepeopletopeopleofretirementage.Forshorthand,wealsorefertothisratioastheratioofworkerstoretirees.Butitshouldbeobviousthatnotallpersonsofworking age, however it is defined, are actually working; and not all persons who have reached traditional retirement ages are actually retired. Thus, this ratio actually measures potential workers and likely retirees.

FindingsIntheappendixtothisreport,weexplaininmoredetailhowweestimatedthenumberofpost-1990immigrantsandtheirprogenyinthecountrybasedprimarilyonthe2017AmericanCommunitySurvey(ACS)collectedbytheU.S.CensusBu-reau.Inshort,weusethe2017AmericanCommunitySurveytoestimatethenumberofpost-1990immigrantsinthecountryandtheirminorchildren.Toestimatethenumberofadultchildrenofpost-1990immigrantsin2017,weusetheACSandotherCensusBureaudata.Ourestimateincludestheoriginalimmigrants,theirU.S.-bornminorandadultchildren,andthemodestnumberofgrandchildrentheadultU.S.-bornchildrenofpost-1990immigrantshadby2017.

Sincethisanalysisisfocusedontheimpactofpost-1990immigrationontheagestructureofUnitedStatesasitrelatestoourability to support the economy or pay for government, we concentrate on those of working age and those not of working age, eitherretireesorminors.However,Tables1and2intheappendixreportmanydifferentwaysoflookingattheagestructureandtheimpactofdifferentimmigrationlevels.Ofcourse,thereisnooneretirementageintheUnitedStates.EarlySocialSecurity,Medicaid,andfullSocialSecurityallhavedifferenteligibilityages.Privatepensions,401ks,403bs,IRAs,andrelatedprograms, as well as military and civil service retirement, all begin making payments or allow withdrawals at still other ages. Nevertheless,ratesofemploymentarelowforthoseunder16andover64.Forthesereasonsdemographers,economists,andothers have generally focused on the working-age share and the ratio of workers to retirees, assuming working age begins at 16or18andretirementagebeginsat65.Wefollowthisconventionintheanalysis,thoughwereportfiguresassumingdif-ferent retirement ages as well.

Post-1990 Immigration.Figure1showsthesharesofpost-1990immigrantsandtheiroffspringwhoareunderage16,work-ingage(16to64),andretirementage(65-plus).The42.8millionpeoplepost-1990immigrationhasaddedtothecountryareclearlyayoungpopulation.Manyarechildrenandonlyamodestshareisofretirementage.Thisbasicfactmeansthatatleast in the relatively short term there is an inherit plausibility to the argument that immigration is the solution to an aging society. However, the figure also shows something that may be surprising to some. The share of post-1990 immigrants who areworkingageisnotthatdifferentfromtherestofthepopulation.Thisisareminderthatwhileimmigrationaddstothenumber of workers, or at least people who are of working age, it also adds to the population of people who typically do not work because they are too young or too old to do so.

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Impact on the Working-Age Population. The relative youthfulness of the population added to the country as a result of post-1990immigrationdoesnotmeanthattheynecessarilyhadalargeimpactontheU.S.agestructure.Figure2showstheeffectofpost-1990immigrationontheworking-ageshareandtheratioofthoseofworkingagevs.thoseofretirementage.Thefigureshowsthatwhenpost-1990immigrationisincluded,64.4percentofthepopulationisofworkingage(16-64);withoutit,theworking-agesharewouldhavebeen63.9percent.Thismodestincreaseintheworking-ageshareduetoim-migration stems directly from the values shown in the prior figure. The working-age share of post-1990 immigrants and their offspringisnotthatdifferentfromtherestofthepopulation.Asaresult,thepresenceofpost-1990immigrantsandtheirdescendants does not significantly change the working-age share of the total population, even though they added nearly 43 millionpeopletothecountryandaccountedforoneineightU.S.residentsin2017.

Figure 1. Immigrants who arrived 1990 to 2017 and their offspring are a relatively young population.

Source: Basedonanalysisofthepublic-usefilesofthe2017AmericanCommunitySurveyandotherCensusBureaudata.

Post-1990 Immigrants and Their Progeny

Balance of Population

4.7%

67.8%

27.5%

18.9%

63.9%

17.2%

Share Under Age 16 Share 65 and OlderShare 16-64

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Figure 2. The nearly 43 million people immigration has added to the country since 1990 only modestly changed the working-age share or ratio of workers to retirees.Raising the retirement age one year has an equal impact.

Source: Basedonanalysisofthepublic-usefilesofthe2017AmericanCommunitySurveyandotherCensusBureaudata.Thenoimmigrationandincreasedretirementagescenariosbothassumezeropost-1990immigration.Theworking-agearethose16to64inthescenarioswithandwithoutpost-1990immigrationandtheretirementageis65.Theretire-mentageis66intheincreasedretirementagescenario.

No Post-1990 Immigration

Raising Retirement Age One Year

With Post-1990 Immigration

63.9% 3.7

0

65.1% 4.1

0

64.4%4.1

42.8Million

Working-Age Share of Population Number Added to U.S. PopulationRatio Workers to Retirees

Impact on Ratio of Workers to Retirees. Turningtotheirimpactontheratiooftheworkingage(16to64)tothoseofretire-mentage,Figure2showsthattheimpactofimmigrationfrom1990to2017issomewhatlarger,buttheeffectisstillmodest.Without post-1990 immigration, there would have been 3.7 persons of working age for each person of retirement age; with immigration it is 4.1 persons. To place the impact of immigration in perspective, Figure 2 also shows what would have hap-penediftherehadbeennoimmigrationandtheretirementagewas66andtheworkingagewas16to65.Ingeneral,theeffectofincreasingtheretirementagebyoneyearisequaltotheeffectofallpost-1990immigration.Infact,theimpactofincreasingtheretirementagebyoneyearissomewhatlargerontheworking-ageshareofthepopulationthanwerethe42.8million post-1990 immigrants and their progeny.

Immigration vs. Raising Retirement Age.Figure3examinesinmoredetailtheimpactofdifferentimmigrationlevelsandretirementagesontheworking-ageshare.Theleftsideofthefigureassumestheworkingageis16to64andthenvariestheimmigration level. The right side of the figure assumes no post-1990 immigration and varies the retirement age. The figure shows that, in general, increasing the retirement age would have had a much larger impact on the working-age share of the populationthaneventrulydramaticincreasesinimmigration.Itfact,increasingimmigrationtwo,three,four,five,andsixtimes are not realistic levels of immigration. Given how much immigration has riled American politics, it seems certain that thecountrywouldneverdoubleimmigration,letaloneincreaseitseveralfold.Thepurposeofthefiguresontheleftistoshow what the impact of immigration would have been even assuming implausibly high levels.

Figure3indicatesthatdoublingpost-1990immigrationwouldhavemeanttherewere85.6millionpost-1990immigrantsandtheirdescendantsinthecountry,yettheworking-agesharewouldhavebeen64.8percent,notverydifferentfromthe63.9percentiftherewasnoimmigration.TherightsideofFigure3showsthatiftheretirementagewasincreasedoneyear,theworking-agesharewouldhavebeen65.1percent,higherthandoublingthelevelofimmigration.Thisisperhapsevenmoreremarkablewhenoneconsidersthatpost-1990immigrantsandtheiroffspringwouldhaveaccountedfornearlyoneinfourU.S.residentsundersuchascenario.

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Again,extremelyunlikelyimmigrationlevelsontheleftsideofthefigureallshowhowlimitedtheimpactofimmigrationcanbeontheworking-ageshareofthepopulation.Iftherehadbeensixtimesthelevelofpost-1990immigration,itwouldhaveadded256.8milliontothepopulation;andthispopulationwouldhaveaccountedfornearlyhalfthenation’stotalpopulationin 2017. Yet it would have still increased the working-age share of the population less than a two-year increase in the retire-ment age.

Immigration’s Diminishing Returns. One other important observation that can be drawn from Figure 3 is that each one-yearincreaseintheretirementage,uptoage70,hasasimilarimpactontheworking-ageshare.Iftheretirementagehadbeenincreasedbyoneyearfrom65to66or66to67,itcausesa1.1to1.2percentage-pointincreaseintheworking-ageshare.ToreceivefullSocialSecurityin2019,apersonhastobe66andsixmonthsold,withtheretirementageincreasingbytwomonthseachyearuntilitresearches67.Figure3showsthatiftheretirementagein2017wasincreasedoneyearfrom67to68itwouldhaveincreasedtheworking-ageshareby1.1percentagepoints.Increasingitto69wouldhaveincreasedtheworking share an additional 1.1 points.

Incontrasttoincreasingtheretirementage,theeffectofimmigrationhasadiminishingeffectontheworking-ageshareeventhoughthehypotheticalincreasesontheleftsideofthefigurearetrulyenormous.Forexample,actualpost-1990immigra-tion increased the working-age share by 0.5 percentage points, but if immigration had been doubled, the increase only would have been another 0.4 percentage points, while tripling it would raise it only an additional 0.3percentagepoints.Theeffectcontinuestodiminishifyouquadrupleandthenquintuplethelevel.Itshouldbeaddedthatthisfindingofdiminishingre-turns on increasing the working-age share from even higher levels of immigration is entirely consistent with our findings in ourpopulationprojectionspublishedearlierthisyear.4

Impact on Ratio of Workers to Retirees.Figure4issimilartoFigure3exceptthatitreportstheimpactofdifferentscenariosontheratioofworking-agepeopletoretireesratherthantheworking-ageshare.Theleftsideofthefigureshowstheimpactofimmigrationlevelsontheratioofworkerstoretirees.Figure4showsthatimmigrationhadmoreofaneffectontheratioofpotentialworkerstopotentialretireesthanitdoesontheworking-ageshare.Nevertheless,raisingtheretirementagebyoneyearwouldhavethesameimpactontheratioofworkerstoretireesasall42.8millionpost-1990immigrantsandtheir

Figure 3. Raising the retirement age would have had a larger impact on the working-age share of the population than dramatically increasing immigration and adding enormously to the population.

Source: Basedonanalysisofthepublic-usefilesofthe2017AmericanCommunitySurveyandotherCensusBureaudata. 1Workingageisdefinedas16to64,with65astheretirementage.2Workingagebeginsatage16andtheinitialretirementageis65andincreasesuptoage70.Assumeszeroimmigrationbetween1990 and 2017.

Increased Retirement Age (in Years)

Number Added to U.S. Population (millions)Share Working Age

Level of Post-1990 ImmigrationActual 2x 3x 4x 6x5x

64.4%

42.8

63.9%

0

64.8%

85.6

65.1%

0

65.1%

128.4

66.3%

0

65.4%

171.2

67.4%

0

65.6%

214.0

68.5%

0

65.8%

256.8

69.6%

0

Alternative Immigration Levels1 Alternative Retirement Ages2

+5 Yrs.+2 Yrs. +4 Yrs.+1 Yr.None +3 Yrs.

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Figure 4. Raising the retirement age would have had a larger impact on the ratio of workers to retirees than dramatically increasing immigration and adding enormously to the population.

Source: Basedonanalysisofthepublic-usefilesofthe2017AmericanCommunitySurveyandotherCensusBureaudata. 1Workingagedefinedas16to64,with65astheretirementage.2Workingagebeginsatage16andtheinitialretirementageis65andincreasesuptoage70.Assumeszeroimmigrationbetween1990 and 2017.

Increased Retirement Age (in Years)

Number Added to U.S. Population (millions)Ratio 16-64 to 65-Plus

Level of Post-1990 Immigration+5 Yrs.+2 Yrs. +4 Yrs.+1 Yr.Actual 2x 3x 4x 6x5x None +3 Yrs.

4.1

42.8

3.7

0

4.5

85.64.1

0

4.9

128.44.5

0

5.2

171.24.9

0

5.5

214.0

5.4

0

5.8

256.8

6.0

0

Alternative Immigration Levels1 Alternative Retirement Ages2

Other Scenarios.TableA1intheappendixprovidesamoredetailedlookattheimpactofimmigrationontheworkingage,workertoretireeratio,andseveralotherwaysoflookingatthenation’sagestructure.Withtheexceptionoftheaverageage,which cannot be changed by raising the retirement age, the table shows that raising the retirement age has as large or a larger impact on the age structure as it relates to having enough workers to support the economy or pay for government. Table A2 shows the impact of post-1990 immigrants and doubling it coupled with raising the retirement age.

Paying for Social Insurance Programs. A key argument for immigration as it relates to aging stems from the concern that moreworkersareneededtopayforSocialSecurityandMedicare.Priorresearchbyothers,aswellasthisanalysis,showsthatimmigration’sabilitytochangetheworking-ageshareofthepopulationortheratioofworkerstoretireesisquitelimited.Butputting that issue aside, for immigration to actually help pay for social insurance programs immigrants would need to be a fiscalsurplus—payingmoreintaxesthantheyuseinserviceswhiletheyareyoungbeforetheygrowoldandbegintodrawfromtheseprograms.Unfortunately,manypost-1990immigrantsandtheirchildrenstruggle,accessingwelfareprogramsathigher rates than the native-born.

Table 1 shows that a significantly larger share of households headed by post-1990 immigrants or their adult children access oneormoremajorwelfareprogramscomparedtothenative-born.Thetablealsoshowsthatthepercentagelivinginornearpovertyisagooddealhigherthanthenative-bornandthattheiraverageincomeislower.InornearpovertyinTable1isdefinedaslessthan200percentofthepovertythreshold;thosebelowthisleveltendtopayzerofederalincometax.Taxpay-ments mostly reflect income and the lower income and much higher poverty rates of post-1990 immigrants and their adult childrenwilltranslateintoloweraveragetaxesrelativetonatives.

progeny.Intheunlikelyeventthatimmigrationwasdoublewhatitwaspost-1990,thefigureshowsthatitwouldhavethesame impact on the ratio of workers to retirees as increasing the retirement age by two years. The various scenarios in Figure 4showthatraisingtheretirementageonlyafewyearswouldhavehadthesameoralargereffectontheworkertoretireeratio than would unrealistically high levels of immigration.

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Table 1. Welfare and Income for Post-1990 Immigrants and Natives

Source:2017CurrentPopulationSurveyAnnualSocialandEconomicSupplement.Welfareuseisbasedonthehouseholdhead.CashwelfareisprimarilySSIorTANF;foodassistanceisfoodstamps,WIC,andfree/reducedlunch;housingincludespub-licandsubsidizedhousing.Povertyandnearpoverty(<200%ofpovertythreshold)areforindividualsinhouse-holdsheadedbypost-1990immigrantsortheiradultU.S.-bornchildren.Averageincomeisforadultsages18andolder.

Any WelfareCashProgramsFood ProgramsHousing ProgramsMedicaidInPovertyInorNearPovertyAverageHouseholdIncome

Post-1990 Immigrants

and Their Adult Children

45.0%3.2%

29.3%4.9%

35.8%19.1%43.3%

$35,527

Native-Born Americans (Excluding U.S.-Born

Children of Post-1990 Immigrants)

26.3%4.8%

15.1%4.5%

20.0%11.7%27.5%

$44,213

The poverty rates and share of post-1990 immigrant households accessing welfare is roughly 50 to 70 percent higher than those of the native-born, while their average income is 20 percent lower.If thereisconcernthatthenative-bornarenotgeneratingenoughtaxrevenue,relativetocosts,topayforsocialinsuranceprograms,thehighwelfareuse,povertyrate,andlower average income of post-1990 immigrants makes it almost certain they are not making the fiscal problem better, at least atthepresenttime,eventhoughtheyarerelativelyyoungandnotmakingextensiveuseofSocialSecurityandMedicare.

While Table 1 indicates that it is unlikely that post-1990 immigrants are a net fiscal benefit, it is not a fully developed model of alltaxcontributionsandfiscalcosts.In2017,theNationalAcademyofSciences,Engineering,andMedicine(NAS)estimatedthecurrentnetfiscalimpactofallimmigrantsandtheirdependents.Theyraneightdifferentscenariosmakingdifferentas-sumptionsaboutcurrenttaxpaymentsanduseofpublicservices.Inalleightscenariostheimmigrantswerefoundtobeanetfiscaldrain,payinglessinalltaxesthanthecoststheycreateforgovernment.Thoughtheywerefoundtobeinsurplusinfourofthescenariosatthefederallevel,theirlargefiscaldrainatthestatelevelineveryscenariooffsetthefederalsurplusin those four scenarios.5

Sinceall taxrevenuehastocomefromtaxpayers, it isofnohelpif immigrantscreateafiscalbenefitat thefederal level—somethingthatisunclear—thatisentirelyoffsetbydeficitsatthestateandlocallevel.ThebottomlinefromtheNASanalysis is that immigrants at the present time are a net fiscal drain, even though many are young and are not using programs designedfortheelderly.Thismeansthatevenifimmigrantswereabletodramaticallyshifttheratioofworkerstoretirees,itseems unlikely that they are going to help pay for social insurance programs by generating large fiscal surpluses in the short term.Thereasonforthisisstraightforward:Immigrants,includingthosewhohavearrivedsince1990,arepoorerthanna-tivesandmakemoreextensiveuseofmeans-testedprograms.

Illegal Immigration. While the specific impact of illegal immigration is not the focus of this analysis, we roughly estimate thattherewere13.8millionpost-1990illegalimmigrantsinthecountryin2017,plustheirU.S.-bornchildrenandgrand-children.Theyaccountedfor32percentofallpost-1990immigrantsandtheirprogeny.Itmustberememberedthatthisisonlythepost-1990illegalimmigrantpopulationandtheiroffspring.6Illegalimmigrantswhocamepriorto1990andtheirdescendants are not included.7ItalsodoesnotincludelegalimmigrantswhoresidedintheUnitedStatesillegallyforatimebeforetheyobtainedlegalstatusoranyoffspringbornduringtheirtimelivinginthecountrywithoutauthorization.8

Ofthe13.8millionpost-1990illegalimmigrantsandtheiroffspring,weestimatethat32.9percentareunderage16,66.8per-centare16to64,andlessthan1percentare65andolder.Likeallpersonsaddedtothepopulationbypost-1990immigration,

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theillegalpost-1990populationisrelativelyyoung.Almostallareunderage16orofworkingage.However,thepresenceofthese illegal immigrants and their children and grandchildren still has only a minuscule impact on the working-age share.

Withoutpost-1990illegalimmigration,theworking-ageshareintheUnitedStateswouldbe64.3percent,almostthesameasthe64.4percentwhentheyareincluded.Thereasonforthisisstraightforward.Post-1990illegalimmigrantsare4.2per-centofthetotalpopulationand,asalreadydiscussed,theirworking-ageshareis66.8,notverydifferentfromthe64.3forallotherpersons—native-born,legalimmigrants,andpre-1990illegalimmigrants.Sotheirabilitytoimpacttheworking-agepercentage is very limited. The same holds true for their impact on the ratio of workers to retirees. Without post-1990 illegal immigrants and their descendants, the ratio of workers to retirees would be 4.0 compared to 4.1 when they are included. Like their impact on the working-age share, their impact on the ratio of potential workers to potential retirees is quite small.

Aspreviouslydiscussed(SeeFigure2,forexample),wefoundthatallpost-1990immigration(legalandillegal)increasedtheworking-agesharefrom63.9percentto64.4percent.Sobasedontheresultsabove,weestimatethat0.1percentagepointsofthisincreaseisillegalimmigrationand0.4pointsisfromlegalimmigration.Intermsoftheimpactontheratioofworkersto retirees, we found that all post-1990 immigration increased the ratio from 3.7 to 4.1. This means that of this 0.4-point in-crease,0.1isfromillegalimmigration.Sincepost-1990illegalimmigrantsandtheirprogenyaccountforlessthanone-thirdofallpost-1990immigrantsandtheirprogeny,itmakessensethattheirimpactonthenation’sagestructurewillbeverylimited.

ConclusionThisreportfirstestimatesthenumberofpeopleimmigration—immigrantsplustheirprogeny—addedtotheUnitedStatesbetween 1990 and 2017. We then use this large and relatively young population to evaluate the argument that immigration cansolvetheproblemofAmerica’sagingsociety.Wefindthat,althoughpost-1990immigrationaddedalmost43millionpeople to the country, it had a minimal impact on the share of the population who are of working age. This is because it added to both the working-age population and to those outside of the working-age population in nearly equal proportions. Post-1990 immigration had a somewhat larger impact on the ratio of workers to retirees. However, raising the retirement age evenoneyearincreasestheratioofworkerstoretireesthesameasall-post1990immigration,withoutincreasingthesizeoftheU.S.population.

Immigrants,itmustberemembered,arriveatallagesandgrowolderovertimeandhavechildren,sowhiletheyaddtotheworking-age population and thus to the number of potential workers, they also add to the population that must be supported bythelaborofothers—childrenandtheelderly.Immigrantsarepeople.Theyarenotsimplytheidealizedyoungworkersin perpetuity that many immigration advocates seem to imagine. To be sure, one can advocate for immigration for other reasons.Butpriorresearch,aswellasthisanalysis,makesclearthatthenotionimmigrationwilldramaticallyincreasethenumber of workers relative to retirees or the rest of population is mistaken.

Methods Appendix To estimate the number and ages of post-1990 immigrants in 2017, we used the following method: First, we used the year ofarrivalquestionfromtheACStoidentifyallpost-1990immigrantslivinginthecountryin2017.Second,tocalculatetheageandnumberoftheU.S.-bornminorchildren(<18)ofpost-1990immigrants,weassumetheylivewiththeirimmigrantparent(s)andlinkthechildtotheparentintheACS.IftheU.S.-borngrandchildofthepost-1990immigrantliveswiththeparent,wecapturetheseindividualsinthisstepaswell.WeassumethatthesmallnumberoftheU.S.-bornchildrenofpost-1990immigrantswhothemselvesareminors(15to17)andhaveachildwilllivewiththeirimmigrantparents.SolaterweonlycalculatethenumberofU.S.-borngrandchildrenwhoseparentsareadultsin2017.Third,weestimatetheshareofallchildren born in the 1990s to immigrants whose parents arrived in that decade based on the 2000 census. This is necessary sowecandeterminethenumberofadultswithimmigrantparentswhoarrivedinthe1990s.Fourth,usingtheMarch2017CurrentPopulationSurvey(CPS),wecalculatethenumberofU.S.-bornadultswithimmigrantfathersborninthe1990s.TheCPS,unliketheACS,asksaboutparents’placeofbirth,sousingitallowsustoestimatethenumberofadultchildrenof immigrants born in the 1990s. Of post-1990 immigrants, only those who arrived in the 1990s can have adult children in 2017.Fifth,weusethenumberofU.S.-bornpersonswithimmigrantfathersages18to27in2017andmultiplyitbythepopulationsharecalculatedinstepthreetodeterminethenumberofU.S.-bornpersonsin2017withimmigrantfatherswhoare the children of immigrants who specifically arrived in the 1990s. This allows us to estimate the number of adult children of 1990s immigrants in 2017.

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Center for Immigration Studies

Sixth,wecalculatethenumberofgrandchildrenbornto18-to27-year-old,native-bornpersonswhoarethechildrenof1990s immigrants.WebeginbycalculatingthebirthrateofU.S.-bornpersons18-to27-years-oldbyraceandHispanicoriginstartingwhenthefirstoftheseindividualsturned15in2005.(Birthsbyraceandnativityarederivedfromthe2005to2017ACS.Instepseven,weaddtogetherthenumberofpost-1990immigrants,theirU.S.-bornminorchildren,adultchildren, and grandchildren by individual year of age. We then use these numbers to calculate the results reported in the figures and tables of this report.

Table A1. The Impact of Post-1990 Immigration or Raising the Retirement Age on the Age Structure in the U.S.Alternative Immigration or Retirement Scenarios

Post-1990Immigration

NoneActual1/31/22/31.5x2x3x4x5x6x7x

Increase inRetirement Age

1 Year2 Years3 Years4 Years5 Years

AverageAge

39.9 38.739.539.339.138.2 37.7 37.036.435.835.435.1

39.9 39.9 39.9 39.9 39.9

ShareRetirement

Age

17.2%15.6%16.6%16.4%16.1%14.9%14.3%13.3%12.5%11.8%11.3%10.8%

16.0%14.9%13.7%12.6%11.5%

Share Working-

Age Starting

at Age 16

63.9%64.4%64.1%64.2%64.3%64.6%64.8%65.1%65.4%65.6%65.8%65.9%

65.1%66.3%67.4%68.5%69.6%

Share Working-

Age Starting

at Age 18

61.4%61.8%61.5%61.6%61.7%62.0%62.2%62.4%62.6%62.8%63.0%63.1%

62.6%63.8%64.9%66.0%67.1%

Ratio Workers

per Retiree, Starting at

Age 16

3.74.13.93.94.04.34.54.95.25.55.86.1

4.14.54.95.46.0

Ratio Workers

per Retiree, Starting at

Age 18

3.64.03.73.83.84.24.34.75.05.35.65.9

3.94.34.75.25.8

Number Post-1990 Immigra-

tion Added (millions)

0 42.8 14.3 21.4 28.564.285.6

128.4 171.2 214.0 256.8299.6

n/an/an/an/an/a

Post-1990 Imms. and

Progeny Share of

Population

0.0%13.1%4.8%7.0%9.2%

18.5%23.2%31.2%37.7%43.1%47.6%51.4%

n/an/an/an/an/a

Total U.S. Population

(millions)

282.9 325.7 297.2 304.3 311.5 347.1 368.5 411.3 454.1 496.9 539.7 582.5

275.8275.8275.8275.8275.8

Source: Basedonanalysisofthepublic-usefilesofthe2017AmericanCommunitySurveyandotherCensusBureaudata.

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Center for Immigration Studies

Table A2. The Combined Impact of post-1990 Immigration and Raising the Retire-ment Age on the Age Structure in the U.S.Alternative Immigration or Retirement Scenarios

Actual Post-1990Immigration and Raise in Retirement Age

1 Year2 Years3 Years4 Years5 Years

2x Post-1990Immigration and Raise in Retirement Age

1 Year2 Years3 Years4 Years5 Years

AverageAge

38.738.738.738.738.7

37.737.737.737.737.7

ShareRetirement

Age

14.5%13.4%12.4%11.4%10.4%

13.3%12.3%11.4%10.4%9.5%

Share Working-

Age Starting

at Age 16

65.5%66.6%67.6%68.6%69.6%

65.9%66.8%67.8%68.7%69.6%

Share Working-

Age Starting

at Age 18

62.9%64.0%65.0%66.0%67.0%

63.2%64.2%65.1%66.0%67.0%

Ratio Workers

per Retiree, Starting at

Age 16

4.5 5.0 5.5 6.06.7

5.0 5.4 6.06.6 7.3

Ratio Workers

per Retiree, Starting at

Age 18

4.4 4.8 5.2 5.86.4

4.8 5.2 5.7 6.3 7.0

Number Post-1990 Immigra-

tion Added (millions)

42.842.842.842.842.8

85.685.685.685.685.6

Post-1990 Imms. and

Progeny Share of

Population

13%13%13%13%13%

23%23%23%23%23%

Total U.S. Population

(millions)

325.7 325.7 325.7 325.7 325.7

368.5368.5368.5368.5368.5

Source: Basedonanalysisofthepublic-usefilesofthe2017AmericanCommunitySurveyandotherCensusBureaudata.

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End Notes1 “FastFacts”, NationalCenterforEducationStatistics,undated.

2SeeCarlP.Schmertmann,“Immigrants’AgesandtheStructureofStationaryPopulationswithBelow-ReplacementFertil-ity”,Demography,Vol.29,No.4,November1992;ThomasJ.Espenshade,“CanImmigrationSlowU.S.PopulationAging?”, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management,Vol.13,No.4(Autumn,1994),pp.759-768;“ReplacementMigration:IsItaSolu-tiontoDecliningandAgeingPopulations?”,UnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs,PopulationDivi-sion,March2000.The2000CensusBureaupopulationprojectionscanbefoundhere.SeeStevenA.CamarotaandKarenZeigler, “ProjectingtheImpactofImmigrationontheU.S.Population:Alookatsizeandagestructurethrough2060”,CenterforImmigrationStudiesBackgrounder, February 4, 2019.

3 StevenA.CamarotaandKarenZeigler,“ImmigrantsAreComingtoAmericaatOlderAges:Alookatageatarrivalamongnewimmigrants,2000to2017”,CenterforImmigrationStudiesBackgrounder,July1,2019.

4 StevenA.CamarotaandKarenZeigler,“ProjectingtheImpactofImmigrationontheU.S.Population:Alookatsizeandagestructurethrough2060”,CenterforImmigrationStudiesBackgrounder, February 4, 2019.

5 SeeTable8-12(p.430)inThe Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration, FrancineD.BlauandChristopherMackie,Eds.,Washington,D.C.:NationalAcademiesofSciences,Engineering,andMedicine,2017, which can be downloaded here.

6WearriveatthisestimateusingtheapproachreliedoninanearlieranalysisbymatchingthesizeandcharacteristicsoftheillegalpopulationpublishedbytheDHS.SeeStevenA.Camarota,KarenZeigler,andJasonRichwine,“BirthstoLegalandIllegalImmigrantsintheU.S.:Alookathealthinsurancecoverageamongnewmothersbylegalstatusatthestateandlocallevel”,CenterforImmigrationStudiesBackgrounder,October9,2018. However,DHS’smostrecentestimatesarefor2015sowe have to carry forward their estimates to 2017. This fact introduces more uncertainty to our estimates.

7 Thereareasignificantnumberoflong-timeresidentillegalimmigrantsinthecountry.Inits2015estimate,theDepartmentofHomelandSecurityestimatedthattherewere3.6millionillegalimmigrantsinthecountrywhohadbeeninthecountryformorethan20years.Iftheseindividualsandtheiroffspringwereincluded,thentheimpactofillegalimmigrationwouldbe correspondingly higher.

8RobertWarren,formallywiththeINSandnowwiththeCenterforMigrationStudies,hasdonesomeofthemostdetailedestimatesofthoseleavingtheillegalpopulationbyadjustingtolegalstatus.Hehasestimatedthatfrom1990to2010,1.48millionillegalimmigrantsadjustedtolegalstatus.Allsuchindividualsarenotincludedinourillegalimmigranttotals.SeeTable 3 in “UnauthorizedImmigrationtotheUnitedStates:AnnualEstimatesandComponentsofChange,byState,1990to2010”, International National Migration Review, Vol.47Number2(Summer2013):296–329.