camus, algeria, and the ethics of terrorism

http://acoldandlonelystreet.blogspot.com/ Ash Hibbert

Camus, Algeria, and the ethics of terrorism

Ash Hibbert

“Yes, there was the sun and poverty. Then sports,

from which I learned all I know about ethics. Next the

war and the Resistance. And as a result, the

temptation of hatred. Seeing beloved friends and

relatives killed is not a schooling in generosity. The

temptation of hatred had to be overcome. And I did

so. This is an experience that counts.”

— Albert Camus, Resistance, Rebellion and Death

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http://acoldandlonelystreet.blogspot.com/


Introduction

This essay will investigate the legitimacy of terrorism in the context of the Algerian

War of Independence (1954-1962), with particular reference to the French-Algerian

philosopher and writer, Albert Camus. France had occupied Algeria and subjugated

its Arab population since 1830. Eventually native Arabs organised to form sub-state

groups dedicated to overthrowing their colonial rulers. It is my contention that both

the French military and the Algerian liberationists committed acts of terrorism. I will

investigate whether the use of such terrorism by either was legitimate.

For the purposes of this essay, I will subscribe to the definition that terrorism

is “the deliberate use of violence, or the threat of its use, against innocent people, with

the aim of intimidating some other people into a course of action they otherwise

would not take.”1 The definition of terrorism offered by Primoratz is compatible with

Camus’ views regarding terrorism, specifically because it does not mentioning of who

is carrying out the terrorism. Regardless of who is conducting it, terrorism, Camus

argues, is morally impermissible, and how we enact our morality and our sense of

justice must be independent of how others act towards us.2 Omitting any criteria of

who is performing it and why they are performing it, and thus the perceived

legitimacy of their goals, encourages both state and non-state groups to maintain high

standards in the conduct of war.3 Walzer argues that the response to intended violence

can quickly become as great an evil as it was intended to prevent. Camus, Walzer, 4

and Primoratz are concerned with avoiding or halting the cycle of terrorism and,

frequently, ‘counter-terrorism’. Thus, whether one belligerent’s actions are ‘terrorism’

is determined independently of the actions of their opponent’s actions5, regardless of

whether groups who may have no other means at their disposal (against unjust groups

who have already practiced terrorism) used such terrorist tactics in a just cause.6

I begin with a brief biographical study of Camus, focusing specifically on the

origins of his political views relating to Algeria. I then give a concise résumé of the

legitimacy of violence, and terrorism in particular, according to Camus. I also

examine some of terrorism’s affects on the long-term relationship between the two

sides, and discuss the argument put forth by Camus that terrorism is inevitably

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counter-productive as a means of achieving lasting peace. I briefly explore Sartre’s

notion of ‘dirty hands’ in the contexts of war and politics, and how this relates to the

particular stance Camus takes on the morality of political assassination.

I challenge the contention that state terrorism is intrinsically worse than other

forms of terrorism. I argue that independence is not in the best interests of all in

French Algerian. I argue that the defence of political entities states (including those

yet to exist) should not be the chief concern when attempting to formulate exceptions

to an anti-terrorist model. Finally, I respond to Frantz Fannon’s arguments in favour

of the use of violence by anticolonial movements.

Main

Camus was a proponent of rebellion as a lifestyle choice, and not as an aggressive

strategy,7 yet his non-fiction writing in support of this stance lacks scholarly formality

or theoretical specificity. Nonetheless, he compensated by speaking from an

experience that the debate of terrorism seems to need. Camus was a member of the

French Resistance. He fought the occupying forces of Hitler’s Third Reich8 and wrote

extensively for underground newspapers9. His special relationship with Algeria as an

Algerian-born French-nationalist also makes him an expert in this particular debate.

In France, debate raged fiercely on how to respond to the Algerian War of

Independence10. Camus refused, however, to adopt the major stance of either the Left,

who were in favour of withdrawal, or the Right, who were in favour of military

repression.11 Camus suggests that both ends of the political spectrum argued against

their own interests:

A perspicacious Right, without giving up any of its convictions,

would thus have attempted to persuade its members, both in

Algeria and in the government, of the necessity of major

reforms and of the discreditable nature of certain forms of

behaviour. An intelligent Left, without giving up any of its

principles, would likewise have attempted to persuade the Arab

movement that certain methods were essentially base. Not at

all. Most often the Right ratified, in the name of French honour,

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what was most opposed to that honour. And most often the

Left, in the name of justice, excused what was an insult to any

real justice.

… We could have used moralists less joyfully resigned to their

country’s misfortune and patriots less ready to allow torturers

to claim that they were acting in the name of France. It seems

as if metropolitan France was unable to think of any policies

other than those that consisted of saying to the French in

Algeria: ‘Go ahead and die; that’s what you deserve’ or else ‘Kill

them; that’s what they deserve.’ That makes two different

policies and a single abdication, for the question is now how to

die separately but rather how to live together.12

Camus believed that both French colonial ‘justice’ and Arab nationalist’s ‘freedom’

were flawed.13 He argued against Algerian independence14 in part because he believed

that were ‘surrendering’ Algeria to the Arabs, the colonialist minority would face

exile15. Camus also criticised the Left for suggesting that pro-independence violence

was in the best interests of the Arab Algerians16 and the French Algerians, since such

violence sabotaged the prospect of a future peace between the two.17 In common with

Jean Paul Sartre, Camus criticises the Right for suggesting that the massacring of

Arab civilians furthered France’s international standing:

It must be repeated every day to the imbeciles who wish to

terrify the world by showing it the ‘terrible face of France’:

France terrifies nobody, she does not even have the means to

intimidate any more; she is begging to disgust, that is all. In the

execution of the Guerroudj couple, if it were ever to take place,

nobody would see or admire our archangel-like inflexibility; they

would simply think that we have committed yet another crime. 18

He also opposed repression of the Algerian independence movement because of he

believed the violence was ineffective.19 He argued instead that Algeria should remain

under French rule, with bodies of government that would represent both Arab and

colon interests.20

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In common with Sartre21, Camus was concerned with colonialism’s damage to

the personal and cultural identity of the colonized22. Camus believed Colonial

violence undermined the Arabs’23 cultural and personal identity and integrity – yet he

also believed that Colonialism could help protect that integrity:

’If colonial conquest could ever be justified, it is to the degree

that it helps conquered people keep their personality. And if we

have a duty to this land, it is to allow one of the proudest and

most humane peoples in this world to remain faithful to

themselves and their destiny.’24

Camus condemned such violence25 especially when conducted against civilians26.

Both Camus and Sartre argue that the injustice in French Algeria stemmed not (or at

least, not just) from socio-economic failings but because France denied the Arab

Algerians control over their own fate. Christopher Coyne similarly argues that

violently imposed change is less sustainable compared to change promoted through

facilitating the exchange of cultural, as well as physical, products.27 Camus argues

that the failure to distinguish between civilians and soldiers, and the practice of

torture, diminishes the citizenry of the military committing the violations. He argues

that the responsibility for such violations lay with the citizenry as well as its military,

and that, therefore, the French people share responsibility for the conduct of their

armed forces. He argues that by lowering the moral standard of the war, the French

military gave the pro-independent militants the sense of having a license to respond

similarly, and that encouraged more Algerians to express their dissatisfaction through

violence.28 Camus argues that the conduct of each side during wartime would shape

the relationship between them after war.29 The only revolutions that are possible will

result in totalitarianism.30 31

All modern revolutions have ended in a reinforcement of the

power of the State. Seventeen eighty-nine brings Napoleon;

1848 Napoleon III; 1917 Stain; the Italian disturbances of the

twenties, Mussolini; the Weimar Republic, Hitler. These

revolutions, particularly after the First World War had liquidated

the vestiges of divine right, still proposed, with increasing

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audacity, to build the city of humanity and of authentic

freedom. The growing omnipotence of the State sanctioned this

ambition on every occasion. It would be erroneous to say that

this was bound to happen. But … the strange and terrifying

growth of the modern State can be considered as the logical

conclusion of inordinate technical and philosophical ambitions,

foreign to the true spirit of rebellion, but which, nevertheless,

gave birth to the revolutionary spirit of our time … In actual

fact, the Fascist revolutions of the twentieth century do not

merit the title of revolution. They lacked the ambition of

universality.32

Camus writing does not support the consequentialist argument in favour of terrorism

because of the certain suffering and death it entails but the uncertainty of what it

achieves.33

… The sure death of millions of men for the hypothetical

happiness of the survivors seems too high a price to pay. The

dizzy rate at which weapons have evolved, a historical fact

ignored by Marx, forces us to raise anew the whole question of

means and ends. And in this instance, the means can leave us

little doubt about the end.34

This corresponds to his scepticism of the effectiveness of execution as a deterrent35

Unlike Sartre, Camus was also concerned that independence would not result

in equal representation for all of those in Algeria.36 Camus writes that future

reconciliation and integration should be the most important concern when conducting

war. Disregard for civilian immunity hinders discourse between the two sides, and has

repercussions for the society that comes after such conflict.37 Prior to the Arabs

achieving independence, Camus supposed that they would presumably treat the pied

noirs in light of the French military’s conduct. Even were France to retain power in

Algeria, Camus writes that the pied noirs would still have to live with the Arabs.

Terrorism’s ‘ease of use’, he argues, is in inverse proportion to the ease of post-

conflict governance made possible using such terrorism.38 Though the writing of

Camus is optimistic that the Arab Algerians share his sense of solidarity,39 they also

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accurately predict the post-independence migration the victors forced the pied noirs

and Harkis to undertake. Camus, like Kapitan40, recognized that terrorism’s damage to

future reconciliation negates any other benefits.41 Terrorism is far from being part of a

conversation undertaken with mutual respect.42 Instead, Terrorism is a monologue

spoken to one’s opponent. In using terrorism, both the French military and the Arab

National Liberation Front (FLN) indicated that they viewed themselves as ‘moral

elites’.43

Is redemption available for those who carry out morally reprehensible actions on

behalf of others, such as carrying out acts of terrorism? Sartre refers to this moral

dilemma, that Camus and Walzer both tackle, as the problem of ‘Dirty Hands’.44

Walzer answer affirmatively, arguing for example that we require our politicians to

‘do bad’ for good causes.45 However, we also require that they feel bad in acting

immorally. In acting expediently and feeling guilty for doing so, politicians are thus

able to redeem themselves.46 The mark of a moral individual then is one who is

willing to get his hands dirty, and willing to admit that they are dirty. They must be

willing to bear the responsibilities and to face the consequences of what they have

done. According to Walzer then the expedient politician, and presumably the

homicidal soldier, can thus have ‘dirty hands’ and be moral.47

Camus similarly argues that it there are circumstances where it is possible to

act in otherwise morally repugnant ways for a good cause, and remain blameless. In

Camus’ The Just Assassins, the title protagonists absolve themselves by killing, not

only conscious that they have forfeited their immunity, but also resolved to die as a

result. Camus argues that it is wrong for a person to kill another in order to achieve

their political goals, because it is then just an accident of history whether we are the

victim or executioner.48 However, according to the argument, for those who are

willing to be executioner and martyr themselves in the process, killing is permissible.

The heroes are innocent criminals, just assassins, because,

having killed, they are prepared to die – and will die. Only their

execution, by the same despotic authorities they are attacking,

will complete the action in which they are engaged: dying, they

need make no excuses. That is the end of their guilt and pain.

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The execution is not so much punishment as self-punishment

and expiation. On the scaffold they wash their hands clean and,

unlike the suffering servant, they die happy. 49

However, since the target within The Just Assassins was a Governor General of

Moscow during the Russian Empire, whom Camus would not have seen as innocent,

terrorism remains impermissible according to Camus.

Is sub-state terrorism a legitimate response to state terrorism? Walzer argues that

since a political entity’s survival is more important than anything else is, it may resort

to terrorism should it face a Supreme Emergency such as its own destruction.50 This

notion of the Supreme Emergency relates to the sentiment of the French Left that anti-

colonial violence is legitimate. France’s imperial ambitions threatened the Algerian

independence. The Supreme Emergency legitimizes the use of terrorism by the pro-

independence Arabs. However, the Arabs were fighting for a country that did not, and

had not, existed.

The wish to recover a life of dignity and freedom, the total loss

of confidence in any political solution guaranteed by France, the

romanticism too that is natural to very young insurgents

without political background have combined to lead certain

combatants and their general staff to call for national

independence. However well-disposed one may be towards the

Arab demands, one has to admit that, as far as Algeria is

concerned, national independence is a conception springing

wholly from emotion. There has never yet been an Algerian

nation. The Jews, the Turks, the Greeks, the Italians, the Berbers

would have just as much right to claim the direction of that

putative nation. At present the Arabs do not alone make up all

of Algeria. The size and seniority of the French settlement, in

particular, are enough to create a problem that cannot be

compared to anything in history. The Algerian French are

likewise, and in the strongest meaning of the world, natives.51

Thus, this license for anti-colonial violence is unconvincing.

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Walzer also argues that a political entity is legitimate in using terrorism if a

belligerent threatens the survival of ‘civilization’. The particular historical instances

that Walzer uses to demonstrate the value of the Supreme Emergency are not

convincing, as it is not evident that they were successful as measures of self-defence:

The notion that German morale could be shattered by a

strategy of devastating German cities proved to e an entirely

false premise. ‘Morale’ in this sense basically meant the

willingness of the German people to work for and support their

government’s war effort. For a variety of reasons, the carnage

visited on Germany by British bombers never came close to

having a real effect in these terms. 52

Furthermore, Walzer’s Supreme Emergency argument would mean that individuals

have license to use terrorism in self-defence.53 However, when an aggressive entity

poses a threat to the survival of a defensive entity as well as many people who are not

party of that political entity, the defensive entity should be morally justified in

carrying out acts otherwise prohibited by the principle of proportionality. The part of

Walzer’s Supreme Emergency argument that allows for terrorism when it is necessary

to protect ‘civilization’ is useful, as it extends the scope of consideration beyond the

level of political entities. Obviously, the number of people harmed or killed

determines the scale of the horror of a war, rather than the number of political entities.

In war,54 the safeguarding of the interests of individuals rather than political-groups

such as states should be a more important consideration.55

Is the use of violence towards colonists and nationalist bourgeoisie (whom are

arguably complicit to the colonial system56) to further anticolonial projects, justified?

Fanon argued affirmatively,57 suggesting that guerrilla warfare is a practical response

to the superior technology of the colonial power58. However, the use of terrorism was

not primarily to achieve tactical advantage according to Fanon and Sartre59. Terrorism

is most valuable because it rallies colonised peoples into action; creates a sense of

solidarity; enables the colonised to redirect their aggression away from one another60;

and further ostracises those with sympathies for the colonists61.

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The practice of violence binds them together as a whole, since

each individual forms a violent link in the great chain, a part of

the great organism of violence which has surged upward in

reaction to the settler’s violence in the beginning. The groups

recognize each other and the future nation is already

indivisible. The armed struggle mobilizes the people; that is to

say, it throws them in one way and in one direction.

The mobilization of the masses, when it arises out of the

war of liberation, introduces into each man’s consciousness the

idea of a common cause, of a national destiny, and of a

collective history. In the same way the second phase, that of

the building-up of the nation, is helped on by the existence of

this cement which has been mixed with blood and anger.62

Fanon also regards anticolonial terrorism as an acceptable model of action for

broader, post-independence struggles.63 Camus’ fear that violence used in a revolution

would set the tone for post-independence governance appears justified.64 Walzer

similarly argument that ideologically motivated violence tends to have no theoretical

limits.65 As Camus argues, violence as a response to repression determines the

relationship between the parties. Yet as Walzer argues, it also determines the

relationships within a party66 since it indicates that the revolutionary government will

not differ from the oppressive government it has just overthrown, as it has failed to

challenge perceptions of the legitimacy of the use of violence.67 Walzer’s argument

thus supports Camus’ contention that the post-conflict government’s ascension to

power shapes its identity.

Fanon portrays the decolonial struggle as a battle between native and settler.68

In the case of French Algeria, though, such a model is simplistic as there were Arabs,

French colonists, and Arab veterans of the French military. Furthermore,

independence movements are not always unanimous undertakings even within one

ethnic or cultural group69. Fanon’s description of the violence intrinsic to colonial rule

recalls Primoratz’s argument that state terrorism is morally worse than non-state

terrorism. However, some of the elements by which Primoratz and Walzer70 identify

the moral inferiority of state-terrorism, specifically the presence of secrecy and

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deception, are largely absent from colonialism.71 Colonial rulers can be completely

transparent about their practice of violence, and their willingness to continue to do so;

they have no illusions about the role that it plays in their state’s governance of the

colony, and yet are able to maintain a state of fear without self-doubt.

Camus would also take issue with Fanon’s assertion that the French Algerians

would only choose to exist in Algeria in their privileged status of colonists.72 The

intimidation and coercion of the pied noirs into leaving independent Algeria suggests

that, had the Arab Algerians given the French Algerians a choice, the latter would

have elected to remain. Fanon is mistaken in identifying colonists with bourgeoisie73,

and to assume that there is clear physical separation of colonists from natives.

Conversely, though, was France’s use of terrorism in its campaign against Algerian

independence movements, a legitimate method to prevent the impending moral

disaster? According to Primoratz’s, French Algerian state terrorism would be

legitimate had the military had a more sound chance of suppressing the Algerian

independence movement in order to prevent the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the French

Algerians, and if they had no alternative.74 As it was, however, the French military

merely postponed the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the pied noirs. Furthermore, it sabotaged

any possibility of negotiation and post-war reconciliation, and bought about the very

exile of the colonialists who the French military had sought to protect75.

Conclusion

Camus did not live long enough to see an end to the Algerian War of Independence.

He died in an automobile accident at age 47, on January the 4 th, 1960 – two years

before the Évian Accords saw the formal cease-fire between the French military and

the Algerian independence group, the National Liberation Front (FLN). He was alive

however to witness the fall of the Fourth Republic during the May 1958 crises in

which the French military successfully undertook a coup d’etat that resulted in the

appointment of de Gaulle as the new head of state. The fact that France’s colonial

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governance had so dramatically twisted its domestic governance demonstrates how

violence determines the relationships within a group as well as between groups.

In spite of the best efforts of the French Military – including the deaths of

hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Algerian civilians, as well as the extensive

use of torture – Algeria gained independence. Camus was not alive to witness that the

reconciliation that he had hoped between the Arab and French Algerians never

eventuated. Instead, his fears that the colonial minority would consequently face exile

proved justified. The Algerian Civil War (1991–2002) claimed between 150 00076 and

200 00077 lives, supporting Camus’ argument that revolution does not bring about

lasting peace, and that the conduct during wartime determines the post-war justice.

The French Left dissent against their military’s presence in Algeria was

understandable – the Arab Algerians did have a right to self-determination, and

colonialism as undertaken by the French was destructive towards the Arab Algerians.

However, complete withdrawal of the French military and independence of Algeria

was far from a positive solution. It resulted in the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Europeans,

reprisals against the Arab veterans of the French military, a one-party system that

replaced colonial rule, and the Algerian Civil War. History has proven Camus correct

for calling for an alternative to both French colonialism in Algeria, and independence.

Walzer argues that recognizing and lamenting the cost of their acts redeems

the individual while Camus suggests that murder is morally permissible if the

murderer forsakes his or her own life in the process. Of the arguments discussed, all

lead to forms of moral relativism. The suggestions that an act of terrorism might be

morally permissible if the person feels justified (Sartre), actually feels guilty (Walzer),

or seeks martyrdom (Camus) are dissatisfying. For instance, if Camus is setting a pre-

requirement that all murderers must be willing to die, then history is certainly

plentiful with instances where military forces have risen to the challenge in wars on

both combatants and non-combatants.

Neither Walzer’s nor Primoratz’s exceptions to their prohibition of terrorism

are applicable to the Algerian War of Independence. The pro-independent Arabs may

have argued that they were facing a Supreme Emergency to legitimize the use of

terrorism in order to achieve Algerian independence. However, yet they were clearly

unconcerned with the large number of non-Arabs, and Arab collaborators, who would

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be adversely effected by complete independence. The French government may have

argued that Algerian independence would result in a moral disaster preventable only

with recourse to terrorism. However, it does not appear as if they seriously considered

any alternative until the success of the Algerian independence movement forced them

to compromise. Furthermore, the violence of French colonial rule in Algeria created

the very grounds of that moral disaster.

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Works cited and consulted

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End notes

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1 Primoratz, ‘The Morality of Terrorism’ 2212 Camus, Resistance, rebellion and death 843 See Primoratz, Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues 84 Walzer, Arguing about War 60 and 655 See Primoratz, Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues xi6 See Primoratz, Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues 187-‘8 and Miller 4027 Camus, The Rebel 88 Aronson 289 Aronson 2110 Camus, Neither victims nor executioners 5311 Camus, Neither victims nor executioners 5512 Camus, Resistance, rebellion and death 84-‘513 Camus, Neither victims nor executioners 3214 Camus, Resistance, rebellion and death 8115 Camus, Resistance, rebellion and death 8816 Camus, Neither victims nor executioners 1117 Camus, Resistance, rebellion and death 8518 Sartre, Colonialism and Neocolonialism 2919 Camus, Resistance, rebellion and death 10120 Camus, Resistance, rebellion and death 9021 Sartre, Colonialism and Neocolonialism 30-‘122 Aronson 2623 See Valunas 24 Aronson 2625 Camus, Resistance, rebellion and death 8326 Camus, Resistance, rebellion and death 9727 Coyne 3828 Walzer, Arguing about War 6129 Camus, Resistance, rebellion and death 10130 Camus, Neither victims nor executioners 35-’3631 Walzer, Arguing about War 6632 Camus, The Rebel 146 33 Camus, Neither victims nor executioners 27 and 4334 Camus, Neither victims nor executioners 4135 Camus, Resistance, rebellion and death 127, 13936 Aronson 26 and Camus, Resistance, rebellion and death 8137 Camus, Resistance, rebellion and death 9738 Primoratz, Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues 1139 Camus, Resistance, rebellion and death 9840 See Kapitan’s chapter in Primoratz, Terrorism: the philosophical issues41 Primoratz, Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues 187-‘842 Primoratz, ‘The Morality of Terrorism’ 22543 Walzer, Arguing about War 6144 See Les Mains Sales / Dirty Hands in Sartre, Three Plays45 Walzer, Arguing about War 5646 Walzer, Thinking politically: essays in political theory 28347 Walzer, Thinking politically: essays in political theory 28448 Camus, Neither victims nor executioners 849 Walzer, Thinking politically: essays in political theory 291-‘250 Primoratz, Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues 8651 Camus, Resistance, rebellion and death 10452 See Coady in Primoratz, Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues 15153 See Toner54 Camus, The Rebel 26855 Camus, Neither victims nor executioners 8 and 2556 Fanon 6257 Fanon 61 and 8658 Fanon 64-6559 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 20560 Fanon 6661 Fanon 85

62 Fanon 9363 Fanon 7564 Fanon 9465 Walzer, Arguing about War 5266 Walzer, Arguing about War 5967 See Orwell68 Fanon 3669 Walzer, Arguing about War 6570 Walzer, Arguing about War 6471 Fanon 38 and 8472 Fanon 4573 Fanon 3974 Primoratz, Terrorism and Counterterrorism 1475 Fanon 53 and 7276 Al Jazeera77 ABC News

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