cambridge university press united states and the … the greater malaysia scheme ii: the cobbold...

In the early 1960s, Britain and the United States were still trying to cometo terms with the powerful forces of indigenous nationalism unleashedby the Second World War. The Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation – acrisis which was, as Macmillan remarked to Kennedy, ‘as dangerousa situation in South East Asia as we have seen since the war’ – was acomplex test of Anglo-American relations. As American commitment toVietnam accelerated under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations,Britain was involving herself in an ‘end-of-empire’ exercise in state-building which had important military and political implications forboth nations. Matthew Jones provides a detailed insight into the origins,outbreak and development of this important episode in internationalhistory; using a large range of previously unavailable archival sources,he illuminates the formation of the Malaysian federation, Indonesia’sviolent opposition to the new state and the Western powers’ attempts todeal with the resulting conflict.

MATTHEW JONES is a Lecturer in International History at RoyalHolloway College, University of London. His previous publicationsinclude Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942–44(1996).

© Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org

Cambridge University Press0521801117 - Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-1965: Britain, theUnited States and the Creation of MalaysiaMatthew JonesFrontmatterMore information

http://www.cambridge.org/0521801117

http://www.cambridge.org


Conflict and Confrontation inSouth East Asia, 1961–1965Britain, the United States andthe Creation of Malaysia

Matthew Jones






PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, VIC 3166, AustraliaRuiz de Alarcon 13, 28014 Madrid, SpainDock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa


C© Matthew Jones 2002

This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exceptionand to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,no reproduction of any part may take place withoutthe written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2002

Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge

Typeface Plantin 10/12 pt. System LATEX 2ε [TB]

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data

Jones, Matthew, 1966–

Conflict and confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965 : Britain, theUnited States and the Creation of Malaysia / Matthew Jones.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0 521 80111 7 hardback

1. Asia, Southeastern – Foreign relations – Great Britain. 2. GreatBritain – Foreign relations – Asia, Southeastern. 3. Asia, Southeastern –Foreign relations – United States. 4. United States – Foreign relations – Asia,Southeastern. 5. Indonesia – Foreign relations – Malaysia. 6. Malaysia –Foreign relations – Indonesia. I. Title.DS525.9.G7 J66 2001327′.0959′09046 – dc21 2001025561

ISBN 0 521 80111 7 hardback






For Anya and Alexander






Contents

List of maps page ixPreface and acknowledgements xiList of abbreviations xvi

Introduction: Britain, the United States and theSouth East Asian setting 1

Part I Build-up 29

1 The Kennedy Administration, Indonesia and the resolutionof the West Irian crisis, 1961–1962 31

2 The Greater Malaysia scheme I: the move towards merger 61

3 The Greater Malaysia scheme II: the Cobbold Commissionand the Borneo territories 79

4 Britain, Indonesia and Malaya: from West Irianto the Brunei revolt 98

Part II Outbreak 123

5 The emergence of confrontation: January–May 1963 125

6 The path to the Manila summit, May–July 1963 150

7 From the Manila summit to the creation of Malaysia:August–September 1963 172

8 Avoiding escalation, September–December 1963 205

vii






viii Contents

Part III Denouement 233

9 The diplomacy of confrontation, Anglo-American relationsand the Vietnam War, January–June 1964 235

10 Escalation, upheaval and reappraisal,July 1964–October 1965 268

Conclusion: The Western presence in South East Asiaby the 1960s 295

Bibliography 305Index 314






Maps

1 South East Asia page xviii2 Indonesia and Malaysia xx

ix






Preface and acknowledgements

The Vietnam War, particularly for scholars of American foreign rela-tions, has dominated studies of Western involvement in South East Asiaduring the 1960s. The destructiveness and significance of that conflictmakes this entirely understandable, yet this emphasis has led to com-parative neglect for the major events and upheavals taking place else-where in the region. Above all, another destabilizing conflict eruptedduring the course of 1963, as a new state, the Federation of Malaysia,was brought into being under the protective wing of its British patron,in the face of the hostility of its vast neighbour, Indonesia. The result-ing Malaysian–Indonesian konfrontasi (confrontation) saw a low-intensityguerrilla war fought out across the inhospitable terrain of Borneo, punc-tuated by raids into peninsular Malaya itself, as Jakarta tried to underminethe fledgling Federation before it could take root. An official agreementending hostilities and resuming normal diplomatic relations between thetwo states was eventually concluded in August 1966, but in the meantimeboth had also witnessed profound internal transformations. Singapore’srancorous departure from Malaysia in August 1965 spelt the end ofthe original conception of the Federation, while an attempted coup inIndonesia at the beginning of October gave the Army the opportunity itrequired to assert a dominance over national political life that was to lastuntil the end of the century. While the public face of confrontation hasbeen the subject of notable scholarly study (the leading work in the field,based on open sources, is J. A. C. Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia–Malaysia Dispute, 1963–1966 (Kuala Lumpur, 1974)), less attention hasbeen paid to the British role in the conflict. As the Americans commit-ted ever greater resources (and eventually manpower) to the fighting inVietnam, the British were simultaneously engaged with substantial forcesin supporting Malaysia against the Indonesian military threat. By late1964 and early 1965, at a time when domestic pressures for reductionsin defence spending were intense and imperial contraction almost com-plete, the British found themselves maintaining around 68,000 servicepersonnel, 200 aircraft and 80 ships in the South East Asian theatre. As

xi






xii Preface and acknowledgements

one study of the end of empire has remarked, ‘Two centuries of expan-sion into Asia had reached a bizarre finale’ (John Darwin, Britain andDecolonisation (London, 1988), 287).

My interest in the British role in the origins and outbreak of confronta-tion, combined with the opening during the 1990s of official British gov-ernment records under the thirty-year rule, and the absence of any majorarchive-based study of this crucial phase of Western involvement inSouth East Asia, drew me into research for this book. It soon becameapparent, however, that the study would need to be expanded and deep-ened to encompass the inevitable connections that existed between Britishpolicies, attitudes and perceptions of the South East Asian scene andtheir American equivalents, particularly if one was to appreciate conflict-ing Western responses to the regime of President Sukarno in Indonesia.Therefore, it would be necessary to extend my researches into Americanarchives and the policies and attitudes of the administrations of John F.Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. Another perspective that would alsoneed to be more fully developed was an understanding of the process bywhich Malaysia was created. In this context, it was required that aspectsof British colonial policy should be explored through the newly availableprimary source material and some fresh views offered on the negotiatingand bargaining process, both internal and international, that resulted inthe inauguration of the new Federation in September 1963.

Hence, in the work that follows, an initial chapter introduces post-warBritish and American policies in their South East Asian setting, buildingup to the arrival in office of the Kennedy Administration. Part I of thebook goes on to trace two strands of Western policy, beginning with USefforts to cultivate closer relations with Indonesia under Kennedy, andthen moving on to examine the scheme for a ‘Greater Malaysia’ whichbegan to gather momentum from the spring of 1961 onwards. By theend of 1962, when Part I closes, both Britain and the United States dis-played some satisfaction with their policies in the region. A major Dutch–Indonesian dispute had been settled by American mediation, substantialUS aid to Jakarta was under consideration, and Sukarno’s regime showedsigns of moderating its behaviour. In Vietnam, the counter-insurgency ef-fort appeared to be making progress, and Kennedy might consider thata sought-after but elusive post-colonial regional stability was nearer insight. From London’s perspective, the plans to form Malaysia were welladvanced and there were expectations of an orderly exit from colonialresponsibilities and a reduction of burdensome commitments.

During 1963, these British and American hopes received severe blowsas Indonesian objections to Malaysia’s formation became clear, and thesituation in South Vietnam steadily deteriorated. Part II follows the






Preface and acknowledgements xiii

diplomacy that accompanied the creation of Malaysia during this pivotalyear, and highlights the way Anglo-American policies came into conflictover how to respond to Indonesian belligerency. By the time of Kennedy’sassassination, sharp disagreements had arisen, with Washington pressingfor a political solution to the dispute, while London resisted the notionof making concessions to the Indonesian position and argued that morepressure should be put on Jakarta to desist from its attempts to subvertMalaysia.

As Part III demonstrates, Lyndon Johnson’s assumption of the pres-idency, combined with the imperatives of the struggle in Vietnam, helpedto resolve some of the earlier tensions in Anglo-American relations. Withthe British offering support for US policies, and opposition to contempo-rary French calls for the neutralization of South East Asia, the Americanswere ready to adopt a tougher attitude to Indonesia and affirm their back-ing for the British effort to defend Malaysia. Meanwhile, the diplomacyand tactics of confrontation continued, and in September 1964 the con-flict threatened to spill over into a full-scale war as military clashes mul-tiplied. Although they entertained doubts over the increasingly offensiveposture assumed by Washington towards North Vietnam, and began tosee the advantages that neutrality for the region might bestow, the Britishfelt they had little choice but to back US escalation in Vietnam. WhenBritish plans were thrown awry by the sudden departure of Singaporefrom Malaysia in August 1965, and London contemplated a negotiatedsettlement to the dispute, it was the Americans who now insisted thatconfrontation with Indonesia be continued, so great had their aversion toSukarno’s international orientation become. Within a few months, how-ever, dramatic upheaval in Indonesia heralded a gradual transformationin Jakarta’s foreign policy, from strident anti-imperialism to one far moreconducive to Western Cold War interests. Soon after, with the end ofconfrontation, Britain was able to take overdue steps to reduce and even-tually remove its military presence from the region altogether, at just thetime the American commitment was reaching its peak.

As indicated, the focus throughout the book is on the roles and be-haviour of Britain and the United States, but their actions were invariablymediated through the key regional players, and hence I have tried alsoto convey the essence of significant developments in Malaya, Singapore,the Borneo territories and Indonesia bearing on the external scene, aswell as to chart the course of confrontation itself. In this way, the presentstudy differs in scope and approach from John Subritzky’s ConfrontingSukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy inthe Malaysian–Indonesian Confrontation, 1961–5 (London, 2000), a workwhich appeared just as this book was consigned for publication, and which






xiv Preface and acknowledgements

concentrates primarily on the period 1963–5. Finally, in a conclusion tothe study which looks at the overall experiences of Britain and the UnitedStates in South East Asia during the 1960s, the point is emphasized thattheir policies had to work to accommodate the emergence of powerful lo-cal voices and impulses, increasingly suspicious of Western ‘advice’ anddetermined to chart their own course in international affairs. Indeed,this period marks a stage where both powers were having to adapt andadjust their positions, and where a formal and visible presence ‘on theground’ was becoming positively harmful to the preservation of influenceand interests. As the United States assumed even more onerous tasks inits mantle of global policeman, one of the chief sources of tension inAnglo-American relations during the 1960s was Washington’s pressureon Britain to maintain a world-power role when British political leaderswere finally coming to appreciate the urgent need to shed an imperialpast and release themselves from their formal commitments, particularlyin the area ‘east of Suez’.

I have incurred many debts over the past few years in the research andwriting of this book. For stimulating and good-humoured discussions, Iwould like to thank Tony Stockwell, whose own documentary study ofthe creation of Malaysia will soon be appearing. As ever, Philip Murphyoffered ideas on British colonial policy and much encouragementthroughout. Among friends in the United States who provided supportand hospitality during two research trips, John Parachini stands out for hisgenerosity. Correspondence with the late George McT. Kahin enhancedmy feel for American views of Indonesia in the early 1960s. Of contempo-rary participants, I am grateful to Sir James Cable, Walt W. Rostow andthe late Lord Perth for sharing their recollections of the period with me.Crown copyright material in the Public Record Office is reproduced bypermission of The Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, whilethe Trustees of the Macmillan Archive allowed use of quotations fromthe Macmillan diaries. Parts of an article published in Journal of Imperialand Commonwealth History were derived from chapters 2, 3 and 4, whileparts of an article for Diplomatic History were also drawn from materialused in chapters 9 and 10. Financial assistance for travel was forthcom-ing from the John F. Kennedy Foundation, as well as from the HistoryDepartment at Royal Holloway College, University of London, wheremany colleagues have been supportive and encouraging. I have been for-tunate in having Elizabeth Howard and Sophie Read as my editors atCambridge University Press, as well as Margaret Berrill as copy-editor.Thanks are also due to the staff of the archives and libraries, listed inthe bibliography, that I have used in the preparation of this study. As






Preface and acknowledgements xv

with my previous work on Anglo-American relations, I am indebted tothe late Christopher Thorne, who as my undergraduate tutor at SussexUniversity first sparked my interest in Western approaches, attitudes andpolicies in the Far East. On a more personal note, I would like to thankmy wife, Amir, who has again helped to sustain me through this projectwith love and advice. Providing a welcome and demanding distraction tothe task of writing-up has been the arrival of two children, and it is toAnya and Alexander that this book is lovingly dedicated.

Brighton, 1997–2000 MATTHEW JONES






ABBREVIATIONS

ANZUS AUSTRALIA–NEW ZEALAND–UNITED STATES

CAB CABINET (CABINET PAPERS AT THE PRO)CCO CLANDESTINE COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION (IN SARAWAK)C-IN-C COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

CIA CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CO COLONIAL OFFICE

COS CHIEFS OF STAFF

CRO COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE

DO DOMINIONS OFFICE

DOS DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FO FOREIGN OFFICE

HMG HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

ICJ INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

IMF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

ISC INTERNAL SECURITY COUNCIL

JCS JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

JIC JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

MCA MALAYAN CHINESE ASSOCIATION

MCP MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY

MSCC MALAYSIA SOLIDARITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE

NATO NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

NSC NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

NSF NATIONAL SECURITY FILE

OECD ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

PAP PEOPLE'S ACTION PARTY

PKI PARTAI KOMMUNIS INDONESIA (INDONESIAN COMMUNIST

PARTY)PRC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

PREM PREMIER (PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE FILES AT THE PRO)PRO PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

xvi






List of abbreviations xvii

PRRI PEMERINTAH REVOLUSIONER REPUBLIK INDONESIA

(REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC

OF INDONESIA)RG RECORD GROUP

SEA SOUTH EAST ASIA

SEATO SOUTH EAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION

SUPP SARAWAK UNITED PEOPLE'S PARTY

TNKU TENTARA NASIONAL KALIMANTAN UTARA (NORTH BORNEO

LIBERATION ARMY)UMNO UNITED MALAYS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION

UN UNITED NATIONS

UPP UNITED PEOPLE'S PARTY

USNA US NATIONAL ARCHIVES

WNG WEST NEW GUINEA






F E D E R A T I O N O F

M A L A Y S I A

I N D I A N

O C E A N

BALIJojakarta

Jakarta

MadiunBandung

JAVA

S o u t h

C h i n a

S e a

Brunei(Br.)

SARAWAK

KALIMANTANBORNEO

Sunda Strait

CantonMacao

Hongkong

(Port.)

(Br.)Gulf ofTonkin

Hanoi

NORTHVIETNAM

SOUTHVIETNAM

Danang

Saigon

CAMBODIA

THAILAND

Phnom Penh

Bangkok

Vientiane

LA

OS

UNION OFBURMA

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OFCHINA

Padang

SINGAPORE

AndamanIslands

KualaLumpur

AndamanSea

Medan

NicobarIslands

(India)

(India)

Rangoon

Luang Prabang

Hué

Str. of Malacca

Kuching

J a v a S e a

Gulf ofSiam KraIsthmus

Haiphong

SUMATRA

xviii






P A C I F I C

O C E A N

Manila PHILIPPINE

REPUBLIC

Manado

C e l e b e sS e a

S u l uS e a

MoluccaSea

TAIWAN

Taipei

Ambon WESTIRIAN

NEWGUINEA

TIMOR(Indon.)

(Port.)

CELEBES

SABAH

Jesselton(Br.N.Borneo)

SULAWESI

0 200 400 600 800 1000 km

0 200 400 600 miles

xix






MALAYSIA

I N D I A N

O C E A N

BALIJojakarta

Jakarta

MadiunBandung

JAVA

S o u t h

C h i n a

S e a

SARAWAK

KALIMANTANBORNEO

SOUTHVIETNAM

Saigon

CAMBODIA

THAILAND

Bangkok

Singapore

KualaLumpurMedan

J a v a S e a

Gulf ofSiam

S

UM

AT

RA

FOURTHDIVISION

THIRDDIVISION

SECONDDIVISION

I N D O

FIFTHDIVISION

FIRSTDIVISION

BRUNEI

Malinau

Kalabakan Tawao

Miri Seria

Brunei Limbang

Sibu Kuching

(WEST) MALAYSIA(EAST)

SABAH Lawas

BURMA

Balikpapan

Jesselton

LabisPontian

RiauArchipelago

xx






P A C I F I C

O C E A N

ManilaPHILIPPINES

Manado

C e l e b e sS e a

S u l uS e a

AMBON

WESTIRIAN

NEWGUINEA

PORTUGUESETIMOR

SULAWESI

0 200 400 600 800 1000 km

0 200 400 600 miles

PAPUANEW

GUINEA

TIMO R

SuluArch.

N E S I A

xxi






cambridge university press united states and the … the greater malaysia scheme ii: the cobbold...

Documents