cailloiss man play and games by thomas s. henricks

8/10/2019 Cailloiss Man Play and Games by Thomas S. Henricks

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158 A M E R I C A N J O U R N A L O F P L A Y F

rereading. More practically, academic traditions exalt themselves and motivate

their members by holding alo examples o what ollowers working within

these traditions can accomplish i only they possess the right combinations otalent, skill, perseverance, and public awareness. And, it must be added, classic

works are not inrequently books that people only claim to have read, or have

read without diligence during their student days, or have consulted only or a

ew selected themes. In short, they are not read so much as used to validate the

purported readers work.

Man, Play, and Games, I argue here, has this diminished legacy in the field

o play studies. On the one hand, the book is rememberedas it should be

as a useul characterization o the nature o play, as a guide or distinguishing

between games and the reer orms o play, and as a description o our differ-

ent types o play. Play scholars widely recognize Cailloiss work as a response

to Johan Huizingas more amous treatment o play in Homo Ludensand, at

least in some regards, they see Cailloiss work as an improvement o Huizingas

book. On the other hand, many o the more subtle and complicated themes o

Cailloiss workessentially challenges to rethink the character o play and to

prevent its corruption in our modern worldhave not been addressed ully

by the play studies community.

My purpose is to remember, reflect upon, and perhaps creatively developsome o Cailloiss thoughts about play and games. In this light, I hope in this article

to make plain many o Cailloiss themes. But I also wish to place these themes

into the wider context o Cailloiss lie and intellectual commitments, to show

some o the ways in which his ideas have been used by others, and, ultimately, to

offer an evaluationand perhaps a refinemento his contribution.

An Overview of Cailloiss Career

Intellectual careers are requently responses to the great social and political

events that mark the coming-o-age o a scholar. Certainly, this is the case with

Cailliois (Felgine 1994). Born in 1913 in Rheims, he grew up in the period be-

tween the world wars when both ascism and communism were rising in Europe,

when capitalism lurched into worldwide depression, and when artistic and cre-

ative people sought spirited responses to an increasingly bourgeois, mechanical,

and bureaucratic age. He attended Frances most prestigious university, the

Ecole Normale Supriure in Paris rom 1933 to1935 and the Ecole Pratique des

Hautes Etudes, where he studied with Marcel Mauss and Georges Dumzil and


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received a diploma in 1936 or religious studies. As Claudine Frank (2003) has

emphasized in her excellent review o Cailloiss lie and work, he was also very

much influenced by Andr Breton and the surrealist movement during thisperiod. Surrealism, itsel an extension o Dadaism, pushed orward selected

themes rom Freudian psychology and romanticism by stressing the role o the

unbounded imagination as a counterweightand ont o criticismor social

and personal routine. In Franks judgment, much o Cailloiss writing can be

seen as a movement away rom his early embrace o surrealism in an attempt

to discover other, more stable sources o the imagination.

A major event in Cailloiss career was his ounding in 1937with Georges

Bataille, Michel Leiris, and othersa so-called College o Sociology, a group

o scholars who gathered to develop and share new ideas about the character

o the social imagination (Grindon 2007; Hollier 1988). In contrast to the sur-

realist emphasis on private antasy, the members o the college tried to identiy

more communal sources o subjectivity and to find connections between the

approaches o literature and science. O special importance to this project was

the concept o the sacred as developed by Emile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, and

Rudol Otto. Te group also committed itsel to exploring the tension between

orderly, ritualized events and those order-breaking eruptions o collective imagi-

nation that Durkheim (1965) had discussed as collective effervescence. In thislight, Cailloiss own work can be described as an effort to discover the cultural

and material patterns that transcend and animate collective lieand even more

ambitiouslyto see the parallels between the physical and symbolic realms.

As might be imagined, these inquiries into the nonrational, communal

sources o human experience raised havoc in an era marked by the rising collec-

tivist ideologies o communism and ascism, and Caillois tried to distance himsel

rom both movements. As part o this process, he moved in 1939 to Argentina

where he remained until the end o World War II. Ever the public intellectual,he ounded the Institut Franais de Buenos Aires and the journal Les Lettres

Franaises. In1939 he also published perhaps his greatest book, LHomme et le

Sacr(published in English asMan and the Sacredin 1959); and during the war

he produced a number o other literary and philosophical tracts.

wo o Cailloiss more amous essays should be mentioned here as a way o

indicating the character o his thinking. Te journal Minotaurepublished the

first o these, Te Praying Mantis: From Biology to Psychoanalysis (Caillois

2003, 6981) in 1934. In his search or the biological and mythological ounda-

tions o human experience, Caillois (like several others in the surrealist camp)

was drawn to the powerul metaphor o the emale mantis who devours her mate

Cai l lo i s s Man, P lay , and Games 159


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aer (or even during) copulation. Cailloiss own treatment o this act explored

the possibilities o a death instinct, an idea that Sigmund Freud had made

popular during the preceding decade in his Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud1967). Te seemingly sado-masochistic behavior o the mantisas well as the

human ascination with itsuggested to Caillois the existence o objective ideo-

grams, or crystallized psychological associations that were transmitted through

evolution. Essentially, Caillois claimed that humans have universal urges and

longings that are part o our inherited, physical nature (hence, their objectiv-

ity). Moreover, these yearnings are over-determined (to use another Freud-

ian term); that is, in the ashion o dreams, they are made maniest by many

different kinds o physical and symbolic causes coming together at once.

A year later in 1935,Minotaurepublished a second essay, Mimicry and

Legendary Psychasthenia (Caillois 2003, 89106), similar in many respects to

the first. In this work, Caillois presented the unusual argument that mimicrythe

process by which creatures (like many insect species) take on the appearance o

oreign objects or other speciesis not a mode o sel-protection or survival but

instead an antiutilitarian luxury. In other words, creatures can be said to possess

an instinct or abandonment, or a desire to move into a dark space that stands

beyond the requirements o routine unctioning (Caillois 2003, 100). In Cailloiss

view, humans have long been ascinated by ideas about sympathetic magic; wewish to attach ourselves to images or resemblances o idealized personages and

to draw rom them their powers. Mimicry is connected to psychasthenia then in

the sense that this latter (now outmoded) term reers to the obsessive desire o

humans to escape the boundaries and limitations o their own selfood, to lose

themselves in the patterns o the world. Creatures seek obliteration as much as

they seek to advance their mundane, private interests.

Such ideas became even more extreme with Bataille, who ormed (without

Cailloiss participation) a secret society, Acphale, that antasized about deathand speculated on the prospect o collectively murdering a volunteer rom its

own ranks. As one can see, this set o conceptsnonrational or instinctual orces,

collective representations transmitted through evolution, quests or death, desires

to replace orderly human affairs with passionately destructive states o being

were a dangerous brew in an age o extremist politics. Cailloiss response was

to shi rom his prewar interest in the powers o the sacred and nonrational as

transgressive orces in history to a new theme: the importance o civilization.

Against the spectacle o Nazi atrocities, the problem then was not how to destroy

the orderliness and moral rectitude o the world but, indeed, how to save it.


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During the middle and latter portions o his career, Caillois became more

the academic statesman. Returning to France in 1945, he joined the editorial

boards o some journals and publishing houses, began his project o translat-ing the works o important South American writers into French, taught at the

Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, and resumed his own writing and publishing

activities. In 1948 he joined the Office o Ideas at UNESCO (United Nations

Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization) and headed its program o

literary translation. In 1952 he ounded the important journal Diogenes. During

this time, most o his writing ocused on political, literary, and aesthetic topics;

however, in 1958 he published Les Jeux et les Hommes, the sociological study

analyzed in this article. In 1971 he was elected to the Acadmie Franaise, the

organization that regulates the French language. Actively writing and publish-

ing until the end, he died in 1978.

Cailloiss mature writing suggests his quest to integrate the disparate styles

o study and expression ound in the sciences and humanities. Although he

was ascinated by the qualities o excess, disruption, openness o meaning, and

untrammeled subjectivity emphasized by the literary and artistic avant-garde,

he always sought to discover (in the manner o his teacher Mauss) the orderly

patterns that stand behind such discontinuities. With this end in mind, he

advocated what he called diagonal science (Caillois 2003, 33557). Modernscience, in Cailloiss view, has become ocused increasingly on narrow sub-

jects and narrow methodologies; a taste or economical, even reductionistic

explanation prevails. What is needed, then, are perspectives that span or bridge

the findings o the individual sciences and humanities and that suggest the

parallels in biological, material, social, cultural, and psychological phenom-

ena. Tese integrative hypotheses, however anciul, should be scrutinized in

the most scientifically rigorous ways. Tis search or what is basic to the lives

o creaturesand what practices represent their best orms o possibilityiscarried orward in his studies o play and games.

Play and the Sacred

Play scholars commonly see Cailloiss description o play as a response to Hui-

zingas treatment o play in Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture

(1955). I include the subtitle o Huizingas classic here because it makes plain

his challenging thesis that play is an activity that both precedes culture (in an



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evolutionary sense) and continues to serve as a context where new cultural pos-

sibilities are explored and refined. As generations o play scholars can testiy,

Huizingas work is important not only or its attempt to distill the essence oplay but also or its historical and anthropological analysis o the role o play in

such institutions as warare, philosophy, poetry, mythology, law, art, and sport.

Against the long-standing philosophical tradition o homo sapienshumans

as thinkersand the materialist thesis o homo faberhumans as makers

Huizinga advances his claim or homo ludenshuman as playersa vision o

people as active explorers and negotiators o societal possibility. In Huizingas

view, people have an impulse to play that cannot be explained by other actors

or elements o human society or nature. Tis creative (and or Huizinga, com-

petitive) impulse has been critical to processes o societal sel-consciousness and

renewal throughout history. Because o this, contemporary societies should be

careul not to restrict or corrupt the very activity that orms one basis o their

existence. Tis general, and now problematic, connection between play and

culture dominates Cailloiss writing.

Caillois critiques Huizingas work most directly inMan and the Sacred

(Caillois 2001a) in the orm o an appendix added to the book in 1946. As

mentioned, Caillois was much influenced by Durkheims (1965) distinction

between the sacred and the proane. Te proane segment o the world(really, most o it) includes those objects and activities that can be approached

directly and treated instrumentally. In contrast, the sacred is that which stands

apartand abovethe realm o everyday affairs. Te sacred possesses an aura

or power that makes it a dangerous orce in peoples lives. For this reason, the

intervention o the sacred into regular lie must be monitored with extreme care,

and proane elements must not be allowed to contactand thereby polluteit.

Caillois ocuses on the ambiguity and mystery o the sacred, the role o ritualized

taboos in guaranteeing its purity, the way in which it is used to guide peoplethrough the lie cycle, and (most interestingly, perhaps) the extent to which

it is a transgressive or revolutionary orce in societies. He develops this latter

theme in his theory o the estival.

How, then, is play different rom the sacred? Caillois begins his essay with

praise or Huizingas conception o play. He admires that Huizinga eschews

utilitarian or unctional views o his subject (Caillois shares this antiutilitarian

spirit). But he is troubled by Huizingas quest to assimilate all play activities

into one orm (what Huizinga called the agn, or competitive struggle). Surely,

there are other styles o play that involve quite different patterns o activity and


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motives. And why does Huizinga disavow the importance o material interests

in play, including (and this is one o Cailloiss special interests) gambling? On

the basis o these concerns, Caillois describes what he sees as the deect inthis admirable work. It studies the external structures better than the intimate

attitudes that give each activity its most precise meaning. And the orms and

rules o play are the object o more attentive examination than the needs satis-

fied by the game itsel (2001a, 154).

Huizingas ormalist approach also is the source o one o the most daring

and in Cailloiss view, incorrectthemes o Homo Ludens: the identification o

play and the sacred. As I have argued elsewhere (Henricks 2002, 2006), Huizinga

was especially interested in what he called the play-estival-rite complex (Huiz-

inga 1955, 31). In times past (and in traditional societies still), people perormed

their commitments to societyand to one anotherin public events that mixed

important social rameworks and symbols with personal creativity and exuber-

ance. All participants understood the events as special moments, cut away rom

the ordinariness o lie. Huizingas explores the ormal similarities o play and

ritual and the times when play itsel seems to rise to almost holy seriousness.

Caillois appreciates the view that ritual and play are oen mixed. He even

adds a number o helpul examples rom the anthropological literature that

support Huizingas case. But he does not agree that play and the sacredor theritual, the vehicle by which the sacred is regulated and presentedare the same

things. Although some games may well have distant, mythic origins and many

rituals are conducted with a kind o winking connivance by their adherents,

the two orms are animated by quite different attitudes. Tis distinction holds

even though both kinds o events are routinely cut off rom ordinary affairs

by special constructions o space and time, behavioral regulations, costumes,

language, elaborate preparations, and so orth.

An initial difference or Caillois is that play is mostly about orm whilethe sacred is prooundly about content. He explains that play is activity that

is an end in itsel, rules that are respected or their own sake (2001a, 157). Said

differently, no claims are made that the objects or actions o the playground

are o any importance beyond the moment itsel. In the same light, playing

rules are recognized simply as artificial agreements that people make to behave

in a particualr way during the event. Te sacred, on the other hand, is pure

contentan indivisible, equivocal, ugitive, and efficacious orce (2001a, 154).

Rituals are only best attempts at capturing and controlling this orce. In other

words, in play people themselves control the course o the events; in ritual, they



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Cailloiss final reflections address the theme that characterizes most o Hui-

zingas writing: the historical change toward organizational gigantism and or-

mality that has eroded the vitality and creativity o small human communities.Caillois argues that we have entered a world that is not sacred, without estivals,

without play, without fixed moorings, without devotional principles, without

creative license, a world in which immediate interest, cynicism, and the negation

o every norm not only exist, but are elevated into absolutes in place o the rules

that underlie all play, all noble activity, and honorable competition. What is

needed now, he claims, is a recommitment to the principles o the playground.

As he continues, Tere is no civilization without play and the rules o air play,

without conventions consciously established and reely respected. Tere is no

culture in which knowing how to win and lose loyally, without reservations,

with sel-control in victory, and without rancor in deeat, is not desired (2001a,

161). Such ideas, which reaffirm Huizingas own conclusions in Homo Ludens,

are taken up again inMan, Play, and Games.

Man, Play, and Games

Caillois divides his principal work on play into two parts. Te first o thesedevelops an overview o play (in contradistinction to Huizingas account) and

then establishes a classification o games and their unctions in society. Te

second explores, in a more complicated way, some relationships between his

our types o games and analyzes the variation o these types in the modern

world. In an appendix, he comments briefly on the importance o games o

chance and on the value o psychological and mathematical approaches to the

study o games.

As in his 1946 essay on play and the sacred, Caillois begins inMan, Play,and Gameswith an acknowledgement o the brilliance o Huizingas work, but

he quickly emphasizes that most o its premises are debatable. Moreover, as

he continues, Homo Ludensis not a study o games but rather an inquiry into

the creative quality o the play principle in the domain o culture and more

precisely, o the spirit that rules certain kinds o gamesthose which are com-

petitive (2001b, 3). And, although he admires Huizingas conception o play,

he argues that at least one o the elements o the definitionHuizingas claim

that play promotes the ormation o social groups which surround themselves

with secrecyis wrong. In Cailloiss view, playul activity is necessarily to



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the detriment o the secret and mysterious, which play exposes, publishes, and

somehow expends. Te idea o expenditure or waste, which was a key theme o

Bataille and other members o the College o Sociology, orms the basis o stillanother criticism. Huizingas definition, which views play as action denuded

o all material interest, simply excludes bets and games o chanceor example,

gambling, racetracks, casinos, and lotterieswhich, or better or worse, occupy

an important part in the economy and daily lie o various cultures (2001b,

4). On the basis o such statements, Cailloiss intention seems clear: he will re-

define play and discuss the different ways in which the play spirit is harnessed

in societies.

Despite his several criticisms, Cailloiss definition o play is similar to Hui-

zingas. Huizinga (1955, 313) defined play as an activity possessing the ol-

lowing qualities: (1) it is voluntary; (2) it is different rom ordinary affairs,

especially in its disregard or material interest; (3) it is secluded or limited by

special times, places, and cultural configurations; (4) it explores tension and

balance within a ramework o rules; and (5) it is characterized by secrecy and

disguising. I should emphasize that Huizingas definition o playwhich as-

sumes the competitive character o play and ocuses instead on how it tends

to emerge as a limited, orderly worldremains consistent with his attempts

to saeguard settings where creative social interaction (and, ideally, culturalinnovation) can occur (Henricks 2002). Cailloiss definition has six elements.

Play is (1) reethat is, nonobligatory; (2) separatethat is, cut off in the ways

described above; (3) uncertainin the sense that the results are not known

beorehand; (4) unproductivethat is, an expenditure that does not create

wealth or goods; (5) rule bound; and (6) fictivethat is, it is accompanied by

a special awareness o a second reality or o a ree unreality, as against real lie

(2001b, 910).

As we see, Cailloiss special contribution is his attempt to include materialconsiderationseven moneyin a definition o play. He does this by claiming

that play is distinctive because it leads to no increase in economic productivity

but instead simply expends and redistributes resources, as when poker players

pass their money to one another. Secondly, his distinction between uncertainty

and rule governance, which Huizinga lumped together, is important. Tis dis-

tinction reflects Cailloiss more general attempt to isolate the more uncertain,

spontaneous orms o play rom those that are rule bound. Finally, his ideas

about play being make-believewhat he reers to the as-i or the subjunctive

quality o playdeserves attention. In Cailloiss view, Huzinga was interested


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in disguises, jargon, and arcane rules primarily as a means to separate play

insiders rom outsiders. For Caillois, these are part o the make-believe that is

key to the play impulse. Huizinga is searching or an all-embracing or unitary conception o play,

but Caillois is reconciled to plays many orms. Some o these orms are not

easily combined or are even mutually exclusive. For example, he argues early

on that games are not ruled and make-believe. Rather they are ruled or make-

believe (2001b, 9). Similarly, he believes that competitive games (the agn that

Huizinga stressed) and games o chance are opposite affairs. In the ormer,

the player tries to vanquish a rival operating under the same conditions as

himsel: in the latter, the player merely awaits the outcome (2001b, 12). His

amous typology o games, then, ollows: agn (competition), alea (chance),

mimicry(simulation or role play), and ilinx(balance or vertigo).

Although Caillois develops these our categories, he does not claim that

his list is exhaustive. Rather, the our types suggest one scheme that places

play activities into quadrants, each governed by an original principle. Just as

games can be arranged in terms o their ulfillment o a single organizing prin-

ciple, so examples rom all our types can be placed on a continuum between

two opposite poles. One o these extremes is termed paidia, the principle o

diversion, turbulence, ree improvisation, and careree gaiety. Te other isludus,thetendency to bind this capriciousness with arbitrary, imperative,

and purposively tedious conventions. When this latter principle is applied

to the reer orms o play, it calls out in the player a greater amount o effort,

patience, skill, or ingenuity (2001b, 13).

Significantly, Caillois does not differentiate games to decide which involve

primarily mental or which primarily physical skills. Instead, he argues all games

eature a repositioning o individuals in the world. However, games do eature

quite different attitudes toward this world, and they can be categorized on thisbasis. Te first type, the agnthat Huizinga emphasized, includes regulated

competition or rivalry. It can be ound in both humans and animals and involves

games that always have some social (or invidious) element. ypically, these

games attempt to equalize the chances or either side to win, and even solitary

activities such as mountain climbing are made social (that is, competitive) by a

relying on shared rules, techniques, and equipment.

Te rivalry o peers previously described is quite different rom alea (the

Latin term or games o dice). Whereas agn celebrates willul assertion, alea

eatures willul surrender to external orces. For Caillois, at least, aleane-



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gates work, patience, experience, and qualifications (2001b, 17). Unlike their

animal kindred, humans can conceive o an abstract, inanimate power and

enjoy awaiting the decision o destiny passively and deliberately (2001b, 18).Furthermore, he believes that games o chance have relatively little appeal or

children who preer to be active.

Te importance o Cailloiss distinctionat least or his own approach

cannot be overestimated. People play in ways that are more or less active. In

some games, they try to master their own destiny; in others, they await the

touch o ate. Such distinctions should be seen in the context o Cailloiss un-

derstandings o the sacred. Humans do not simply construct and dominate

the world; they live inside ormations that have long preceded their existence

and have powers they can scarcely imagine. However, both orms are similar

in that they are vehicles or participants to gauge their standing in the world.

Because o this, they are requently combined in games, that is, alea (chance)

and agn(merit) are routinely mixed together to create a ramework o equal-

ity o opportunity. Such settings substitute perect situations or the normal

conusion o contemporary lie.

Both o these orms described allow people to continue being themselves,

albeit in new (perected) settings. Te third orm o games, mimicry, is quite

different. Tere, the player tries to escape himsel and become another. Cail-loiss chooses his terminology intentionally or he wishes to remind readers

o mimetism, notably o insects, so that the undamental, elementary, and

quasi-organic nature o the impulse that stimulates it can be stressed. Cail-

lois sought to discover the prehuman oundations o our playul impulses. He

was ascinated by the ways in which certain species camouflage themselves or

even assume the appearance o another species. In humans, masking serves

a similar purpose, to change the viewers appearance and to inspire ear in

others (2001b, 20). Unlike animals, humans can control their disguises. Tey understand that

what they are doing is a contrivance. A reveler at a carnival does not believe

that she is in act a dragon; a childs playing at cowboy is only make-believe.

And the motivation shis somewhat rom the inspiration o ear in others to

the pleasure that lies in being or passing or another. Again, the player does

not try to become entirely the person or creature that she perorms; nor does

she expect to convince others that she is really a locomotive or a toreador. o

this degree, playul make-believe in the contemporary world is a somewhat

soened version o the ritual enactments o traditional societies.


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In Cailloiss opinion, mimicry and competition (agn)sometimes mix,

not only in the obvious case o costume competitions but also in events like

spectator sports, where not the perormers but the viewers imaginatively in-habit the characters they see beore them. Furthermore, Caillois eels that

mimicry and alea have no relationship at all. For him, mimicry eatures the

process o active, incessant invention by the player, while aleaexpresses the

passive waiting or ate.

Te final type o play is ilinx, the pursuit o vertigo, which consists o an

attempt to momentarily destroy the stability o perception and inflict a kind

o voluptuous panic upon an otherwise lucid mind (2001b, 23). Here Caillois

is thinking o whirling dervishes, high-wire acrobats, Mexican voladores, and

others who are ascinated by physical and psychological disorientation. As he

notes regarding competition and mimicry, Caillois cites cases where animals

also seem to enjoy sel-directed spinning or tumult. I in earlier times ilinx (the

Greek term or whirlpool) represented turbulent ritual involvements and even

trance states, it later described the pursuit o vertigo very much associated with

the mechanized carnival rides o the industrialized world.

Just as the our types o games can combine with one another, so too can

they bear different relationships to Cailloiss distinction between ludus and

paidia.In his view, competition, chance, and mimicry all lend themselves tothe set o artificially complicated rules and restrictions that is ludus. In sharp

contrast to this pattern, ilinx defies rule-bound existence just because it is the

pursuit o disorderly uncertainty. It might be imagined then that ilinxwould be

the only orm to celebrate paidia, but this is not the case. Competition, mim-

icry, and vertigo all illustrate paidia, although, in the reest orms o these, the

activity may simply be spirited rolicking or exuberance. What does comport

with paidia, in Cailloiss view, is alea. Tis, the waiting or the all o the dice

or card, is an occasion o passive anticipation. Cailloiss schemewhich establishes a gradient between the reer and more

regulated orms o playis important. Ludus, as the set o artificial restrictions

that creatures place on activity to challenge themselves urther and even to al-

lay boredom, is the device by which activity takes coherent, communicable

orm. In this sense, ormalized games are social and cultural, rather than purely

psychological, events. Ludus disciplines paidia and in consequence, gives the

undamental categories o play their purity and excellence (2001b, 31).

Huizingas Homo Ludensis distinctiveand, some argue, can be criticized

because it does not address solitary play or even the play o children. For his part,



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the spoilsport, the cheat by his attitude, saeguards and proclaims the validity

o the conventions he violates, because he is dependent upon others obeying

the rules (2001b, 45). o this degree, he gives lip service to the canons heviolates.

Te situation becomes more problematic when one o the undamental

human impulses (the drives associated with the agn being the most common

example) spill over into society in an unplayul (that is, untempered) way.

Avidity, as he puts it, may be a natural impulse, but the very unction o play

is to regulate this desire and to put its significance into perspective. Greed in

business or warare has lost this quality o restraint. In an interesting though

disputable argument, Caillois claims that gambling is also perverted by indi-

vidual desire and assertiveness. For him, alea is essentially a respecting o the

play o ortune upon ones lie. Superstition, magic, and the various strategies

used at casinos and racetracks are different rom a respect or the all o the

dice. Tese practices are examples o individuals trying to manage their own

destinies or at least to increase their odds o success. Teir strategizing mentali-

ties extend to other spheres o lie. As Caillois calls it: Upon waking up in the

morning, everyone is supposed to find himsel winning or losing in a gigantic,

ceaseless, gratuitous, and inevitable lottery which will determine his general

coefficient o success or ailure or the next twenty-our hours (2001b, 47).Once again, the unction o play is to temper and to make coherent a persons

experience o these impulses.

Excessive involvement o a similar sort also turns mimicry into the vari-

ous orms o obsession and sel-delusion when one orgets that the character

he or she plays is only that, a character. Te desire or vertigo that becomes a

ascination with alcoholism and drugs is likewise a closely related phenom-

enon. As Caillois summarizes, i the principles o play in effect correspond

to powerul instincts (competition, chance, simulation, vertigo), it is readilyunderstood that they can be positively and creatively gratified only under ideal

and circumscribed conditions which in every case prevail in the rules o play

(2001b, 55).

Tough he does not make the connection explicitly here, Cailloiss general

point recalls Durkheims assertion that human culture always involves a bal-

ancing act between excessive individuation and excessive social control. oo

much unregulated expression, says Durkheim (1951), leads to the twin dangers

o anomie and egoism; too little produces atalism and (sel-denying) altruism.

In the same way, the great spheres o human existence, the sacred and proane,



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must be kept separate or at least monitored closely, to ensure that they stay

true to their principles (Durkheim 1965). Caillois identifies a third sphere, the

play world, which also has principles that must be honored. Although he doesnot argue or a wholesale transgression o the proane, he does eel that the

playul, like the sacred, provides important models to enhance the character

o civil lie.

In what he calls a sociology derived rom games, Caillois revises another

o Huizingas main themes. As previously noted, Huizinga saw play as an ac-

tivity that effectively precedes culture and, indeed, is a continuing source o

cultural creativity and change. Such a viewpoint, Caillois notes, opposes the

view held by most historians o games, who argue that games are a kind o

degradation o adult activities that are transormed into meaningless distrac-

tions when they are no longer taken seriously (2001b, 58). Is it possible to

resolve this chicken-or-egg dilemma? Cailloiss response to this question poses

that the spirit o play is indeed a ertile source o culture but that games and

toys are historically the residues o culture. Tat is, the essence o play, which

both Huizinga and Caillois stress, differs rom its specifically ludic develop-

ments, its complex o cultural conventions that shape the impulses to play.

Cailloiss understanding o the changing cultural contexts o play also di-

ers rom Huizingas. For Huizinga, play was deeply embedded in the sacredand secular institutions o archaic societies. In this sense, wars, debates, and

courts o law were essentially fields o play. Caillois does not dispute this point,

but he makes clear that what has occurred with play activities is that their

social unction changed, not their nature (2001b, 59). Caillois offers several

examples. Masking was once a crucial theme o religious ritual; now it is a

pleasant way to promote sociability. Games o chance and riddling were once

guides to divining the secrets o universe; now they are amusements. Weapons

o war, such as slingshots, bows, are in many cultures toys. Critically or Cail-lois, modern versions o ancient activities must not be seen as degradations. He

believes, instead, that basic human impulsesthe need to prove superiority,

the desire to conquer ear, and the search or answers to riddlesare worked

out in both the real world and in play worlds. Games are not inerior settings

but rather alternative worlds, places that allow people to play through the pos-

sibilities o lie and, in some cases at least, to find satisactions denied them in

proane society. Dismissing Huizingas lament about the declining status o

play historically, Caillois takes a more sociological position. Play orms, or

him, are inevitably mixed, both as expressions and as contributing elements,

with the patterns and practices o societies.


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Te latter portion o Man, Play, and Gamesexplores some variations

and combinations o the basic themes described. Caillois examines the game

preerences o different societies. o accomplish this study, he considers firsthow his our typescompetition, chance, vertigo, and simulationcombine.

Caillois asserts our basic types o play and six possible ways to pair them. wo

o these pairings he considers problematic or orbidden relationships. Tese

are competition-vertigo and simulation-chance. In the ormer combination,

attempts at skillul manipulation are the opposite o willul dissolution; in the

latter, attempts to disguise onessel are irrelevant to the courting o destiny.

A second set o pairingschance-vertigo and competition-mimicryare

what he calls contingent relationships. Such combinations do not enhance

either member o the pair, although they make interesting experiences pos-

sible. Tus, vertigo (as the sense o being possessed by otherness) sometimes

accompanies the receptivity to ate in games o chance. And competition is

not altered in its essence by patterns o spectacle or mimicry but develops in

ways that court spectators.

But Caillois is mostly concerned with his third set o pairs, what he calls un-

damental relationships. Tese are simulation-vertigo and competition-chance.

Why are these two combinations undamental?

o understand Cailloiss answer to this question, it helps to view his workin terms o some long-standing concerns within sociology and anthropology.

Since the inception o these disciplines, many scholars have explored what ac-

counts or cross-cultural differences in societies and, more precisely, i there

is some set o actors associated with a gradient or evolution o these societies,

essentially a clear path o social development (Parsons 1966). Older schemes

speculated on a path o progress rom savagery to civilization; newer models

used pairings like simple and complex or traditional and modern. And, it should

be emphasized, many contemporary thinkers now question the propositionthat there is any single path o development or that particular societies should

be pictured as isolated actors who are moving ahead under their own steam.

Given such qualifications, Cailloiss writing seems an attempt to understand

how societies have moved rom one type to another and how play orms also

have shied in the process.

Sociologists and anthropologists have viewed early (and economically sim-

ple) societies as smaller, more community based, traditional, religious, broadly

personal, agrarian, kin oriented, and emotional. In such societies, people lived

amidst amiliar others who shared the same values and possessed similar skills.

Over many centuries, this world changed rom intensive agriculture to indus-



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trialism. Trough a series o developments, societies became much larger, more

socially complicated, hierarchical, and economically specialized. Respect or

tradition gave way to a search or progress. Smaller amily units and, then, in-dividuals, as possessors o private property, became important social agents as

did their complements, huge organizations like nation-states, businesses, and

schools. Relations became impersonal (and even money based). Religion turned

rom community-ounded expressions to more individualized orms and (so

some argue) to a spirit o secularism. Rationalization, as Max Weber (1958)

amously described it, was let loose upon the world. Like the capitalist entre-

preneurs in Karl Marxs books or the characters in Charles Dickenss novels,

people became sel-regarding, strategizing, and hard-boiled.

Caillois presents these changes as a shi rom what he calls primitive or

Dionysian societies toward orderly or rational societies. In this view, Caillois

uses Friedrich Nietzsches (1956) treatment o the Dionysian and Apollonian

as rival cultural traditions in ancient Greece. For Nietzscheand or Ruth

Benedict, who applied these ideas to Native American culturesDionysian

traditions encourage aggressive, emotional, turbulent, and ecstatic styles o

being. Apollonian traditions emphasize order, harmony, and rational control.

For Caillois, Dionysian societies are ruled equally by masks and possession,

i.e., by mimicryand ilinx. Conversely, he continues, the Incas, Assyrians,Chinese, or Romans are orderly societies with offices, careers, codes, and ready-

reckoners, with fixed and hierarchical privileges in which agnand alea, i.e.,

merit and heredity, seem to be the chie complementary elements o the game

o living (2001b, 87).

Te reader may object, with justice, that older and newer societies do not

all into terms o disorderliness or orderliness but into terms o two different

kinds o orderliness. Durkheim (1964) took exactly this view. However, Caillois

with his images o the wild imagination was influenced equally by Nietzscheand by the surrealists. Tus, his comments on early societies emphasize the

community-based estival, an interregnum o vertigo, effervescence, and flu-

idity in which everything that symbolizes order in the universe is temporarily

abolished so that it can later re-emerge. (2001b, 87).

A reader might expect, then, that Cailloiss chapter on simulation and ver-

tigo describes the patterning o games in early societies. But no. Instead, his

approach recalls Huizingas reporting on the play-estival-rite complex. Tat

is, Caillois stresses how estivity partakes o both the playul and the sacred

and discusses mythology, initiation rites, and shamanism. But he differs with


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Huzingas view o play as an order-building activity. Caillois sees masking and

vertigo as attempts to get behind, and even counter, everyday realities, and he

believes the two orms support each other undamentally. As he summarizes,It should be understood that mask and panic are present in association, inex-

tricably interwoven and occupying a central place, whether in social paroxysms

called estivals, in magico-religious practices, or in the as yet crude orm o a

political system (2001b, 97).

Modernizing societies organize play impulses differently. I earlier ages

dramatized chaos (through combinations o ilinxand mimicry),inthe tran-

sition to civilization these categories all by the wayside. Competition and

chance take their place. Much o Cailloiss chapter on the agn and alea com-

bination treats the historical transition toward the increasingly methodical

control (2001b,101) o human expression. Rationality (as a publicly supported

process o thinking and administering) becomes dominant. Wild, orgiastic,

experiences and masking are seen only as remnants o ecstatic communalism.

More pertinently, they are considered to be dangers to a new urban style o lie

that emphasizes sel-regulation and commitment to distant, abstract orms o

authority.

In a world where individuals have the opportunity to alter their social stand-

ing, a new tension rises. Against the ascriptive, or birth-assigned, practices otraditional, hierarchical societies, modernizing societies offer the prospects or

personal mobility based on perseverance, luck, and, especially, merit. In such

societies, play dramatized the opposition between chance and merit. Societies

with egalitarian mythologies, in particular, continue to make much o the rela-

tive equality that exists on the field o play; and luck is celebrated as a actor that

enables the less able to have some prospect o victory. o be sure, competition

and luck have a place in every society, but, as Caillois emphasizes, in the earlier

world, competition has not been systematized . . . and has little place in itsinstitutions. He continues, As or chance, it is not an abstract expression o a

statistical coefficient, but a sacred sign o the avor o the gods (2001b, 126).

Te development o elaborate orms o gambling (such as state-sponsored

lotteries) are, in Cailloiss view, something o a sop thrown to the public, a

largely imaginary prospect o wealth that buttresses the broader commitment

to personal success. He sees the publics identification with sporting heroes

and other celebrities as a degraded orm o imitation that provides harmless

compensation to the masses, who are resigned and have neither hope nor op-

portunity o attaining the luxury and glory by which they are dazzled. (2001b,



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125). Most degraded o all are the modern orms o vertigo, which in his view

have become a descent into alcohol and drugs.

Cailloiss final chapter concerns his revivals o ancient practices. Forexample, masking occurs at times like Carnival or Halloween. But such use o

masking is sharply delimited and carries no proound social meaning. Indeed, in

the modern world, the mask has given way to the uniorm, which is an opposite

device that surrenders individuality to the authority o a ormal organization.

Similarly, traveling airs, amusement parks, and circuses have either become

spectacles or, in their more interactive orms, opportunities or physical disori-

entation. In both instances, the powerul social meanings o ecstatic states have

been purged. So also has the modern version o the trickster, the circus clown,

who has become little more than a public entertainer. Although clowns engage

in social satire, they do not invite their viewers into the proounder orms o

criticism, disorder, and, even, vertigo.

Although Caillois presents his arguments in the manner o one who wishes

primarily to illustrate scientifically the social underpinnings and the social con-

sequences o play orms, he also evinces regret about the course o civilization.

It is logical and perhaps appropriate that his agn-alea combination dominates

in our contemporary era. But we should not orget that play maniests itsel in

different ways, and each one o these ways expresses some kind o human long-ing. One should not conuse degraded, corrupted, or perverted expressions

with activities that provide these basic commentaries on proane existence.

Evaluating Cailloiss Work

Cailloiss scholarly interests were wide ranging, and his intellectual project was

equally broad. He sought to integrate dispersed bodies o knowledge rom thehumanities, natural sciences, and physical sciences. In his writing, he attempted

to develop a general and scientifically based theory o aesthetics that described

conditions or orms within which people experience themselves as active sub-

jects in the world. He was as much a literary theorist, a political thinker, and a

mythologist as he was a sociologist and an anthropologist. His work arose out

o a specific European socio-political context; and he was marked by some o

the prominent intellectual movements o his timeFreudianism, surrealism,

and Marxismand by his amous teachers and colleagues. He was a public

intellectual who spoke to the issues o his day.


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Cailloiss principal concerns, many o which find expression inMan, Play,

and Games,have been carried orward in a number o academic fields. Te

general themes o his work about plays status as a set o distinctive, coherent,and even transgressive patterns have influenced other theories, including Victor

urners (1986) connections between play and liminality and Wolgang Isers

interpretation o the fictive and imaginary as political acts (Iser 1993; Arm-

strong 2000). Perhaps the most noted element o Cailloiss book was his treat-

ment o the our types o play, which continue to appear in such varied works

as Denis Holliers (1988) comments on the parallels between literature and

death (mimicry), Bruce Michelsons (1977) ocus on qualities o make-believe

in tourism (mimicry), Jennier Milams (2000) analysis o the swinging scenes

in Fragonards paintings (ilinx), and Brian Sutton-Smiths (1997) comments

on gambling as play (alea).

Cailloiss distinction between paidiaand ludusalso continues to be impor-

tant or philosophers who wish to develop a general theory o games (Rowe 1992)

and or analysts and designers o electronic entertainment (Salen and Zimmer-

man 1994; Juul 2003). In this emerging field, which is sometimes called ludol-

ogy, designers try to create or players environments that eature both coherent,

shared systems o rules (ludus) and opportunities or creativity, spontaneity, and

sel-assertion (paidia). Games without paidia seem ultimately sterile, ormulaicsettings in which players quickly lose interest; but games without sufficient ludic

elements also lack appeal in that they do not lead the player toward increasingly

sophisticated challenges or permit complex social interaction. In even more

general terms, Cailloiss distinction reminds us that satisying experience bal-

ances order and disorder and ocuses the readers attention on the willul private

assertion that makes any expression coherent.

O course, Caillois has had his critics. Te literary theorist Jacque Ehr-

mann, perhaps the best-known critic, argued against the view, which Huizingaand Caillois share, that play appears as a special world isolated rom everyday

affairs (Ehrmann 1971; Motte 2009). In Ehrmanns opinion, the oppositions o

play and seriousness or play and reality will not work. Play is rarely gratuitous

or or nothing; rather, it is a part o the society in which it occurs. Players do

not stand apart; they participate in the cultural realities that course through

the playground. I think Ehrmanns criticism is unair, or both Huizinga and

Caillois sought to understand how the separated world o play intersects with

social and cultural patterns, which shape play orms and respond to their

expressions.



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Warren Motte (2009), another critic, also challenges the structure o Cailloiss

general argument. Having emphasized the value o paidia, Cailloisaccording to

Mottespends the majority o his book discussing the more ormalized expres-sions o play, that is, ludus. Cailloiss association o ludic play with developed or

even civilized societies should trouble contemporary readers all too aware o the

problems o the overdeveloped world. And his practice o grabbing examples

rom the anthropological and historical literature to illustrate his pointsmuch

in the ashion o Huizingawill satisy only those readers who are inclined to

accept his argument and who do not require more systematic presentations o

evidence. In the opinion both o Ehrmann and Motte, Man, Play, and Games

begins as a critique o Huizingas Homo Ludens,but it does not stray ar rom the

latter books theme. As a bounded world o its own sort, play provides a subtle

critique o the society that harbors it and (in its more developed orms) supports

the civilizing o the world.

Cailloiss categorizing o the our types o play also attracted criticism

(Rowe1992) and inspired rival views. Anthropologist John Roberts and his

colleagues proposed one o those alternative schemes (Roberts, Arth, and Bush

1959). Roberts divided games according to whether participants rely principally

on strategy (that is, mental calculation), physical skill, or chance. By the terms

o this conflict-enculturation thesis, societies create characteristic tensions ortheir members and give people opportunities to work through these tensions

(and develop relevant skills) in socially approved games. Because Roberts ap-

proach offers a simpler scheme or classiying games (excluding mimicry, or

example), it has been used more or cross-cultural comparisons.

O course, scholarly work can always be criticized, both or what it does

and what it does not do. Moreover, reflecting on such work rom the vantage

point o another hal century inevitably introduces new concerns. As a kind o

conclusion then, I offer a ew additional comments about the challenges raisedby Cailloiss writings.

I should emphasize at the outset that I admire Caillioiss intent, which is

to make clear the ever-present tension in play between improvisation and rule

observance, to explain the different kinds o play orms, and to discuss the shi

in play preerences throughout history. I agree with his (and Durkheims) view

that the sacred differs substantially rom the playul or, at least, they require

quite different attitudes rom their participants. I support his quest to discover

the ordering principles that give shape to human expression.


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His ocus on the development o the rules or play and on the ways they

become packaged in games is an important contribution. However, this trouble

spot also raises a wide range o questions that Caillois does not address. Such alist includes questions about when and why rules become ormulated in situ-

ations and why only some sets o rules become institutionalized in society as

defining eatures o particular game orms. It seems apparent that Caillois as-

sociates rule development with the advent o complex, hierarchical, and admin-

istered societies, but he does not develop this theme at length in his book. Nor

does he address the surrounding complex o belies, norms, supporting prac-

tices, and organizations that grow up around institutionalized games. In every

society, participants accept understandings about who should play a particular

game and who should watch, how participants at different proficiencies should

be motivated and rewarded, how the game should connect to other activities,

and how society should value the game. Tis supporting structure or paratext

is also part o the culture o games.

Moreover, understanding the different ways in which a society sponsors

and supports games gives insight into comprehending the unctions served by

the events. Some events may well offer opportunities or status reversal or other

experiences that counter daily routine; others may affirm prevailing social pat-

terns; others still may simply be alternative worlds (as Huzinga emphasized)that offer models or behavior but do not conront other social patterns in any

direct way. Stated most generally, determining the possible unctions o any

particular game (at a certain place and time) is, to a large extent, an empirical

question. Te empirical analysis must include observations determining what

kinds o actors play what kinds o roles in the sponsoring and maintenance o

the event. Again, Cailloiss scholarly approach is sensitive to these issues, but

he does not develop them inMan, Play, and Games.

His opposition o ludusto paidia is very important, though it raises asmany questions as it answers. Tis would not be the case i paidiawere only

ormlessness, the absence o the rule systems and supporting rameworks.

However, Cailloiss paidiais a broader vision o diversion, turbulence, ree

improvisation, and careree gaiety. It incorporates ideas about the attitudes

o the players themselvesthat they are enjoying themselves and improvising

as they go along. Much like Huzinga, Caillois celebrates the relative reedom

o the playground as a setting where people conduct themselves as they wish.

However, this view o the untrammeled, spirited individual evades the issue o



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misdirected. In my view, the active efforts o people to manipulate the orces

o the world (be these supernatural orces or simply natural combinations that

they cannot predict) are not corruptions but rather proper expressions o theplay impulse. It may not be possible to control the roll o the dice or the all

o the cards, but much o the un o play involves the active choices o placing

ones marker, choosing a level o the bet, shouting out inducements, reading

the actions o other players, rubbing a good luck charm in ones pocket, and

so orth. Cailloiss general pointthat people experience their placement in

the world in both active and passive waysis well taken as is his contention

that alea ultimately involves recognizing orces that players cannot control. I

would argue, however, that giving up onesel to ate (as in the decision to close

ones eyes and cross a busy street) is not playul; opening ones eyes and artully

dodging the traffic is.

Caillois also deserves much credit or his ocus on mimicry, in its senses

o simulation, identification, imagination, make-believe, masking, role play-

ing, and similar orms. In contrast to his treatment o chance, Caillois in this

instance emphasizes the active participation o the persons who inhabit the

imagined orm and play it out. And his argumentthat, in this particular orm

o play, one effectively gives up the sel to join with othernessis interesting.

However, one could just as easily maintain that mimicry (like the other ormso play) eatures an interaction between the orm that is being played and the

subjectively sustained inspirations o the player. Furthermore, his claim that

play is either rule bound or make-believe (but never both) seems doubtul. Quite

the opposite, play o this sort requently involves very clear expectationsthat

is, rulesthat must be conronted. People cannot play pirate or astronaut

in just any ashion; they must match their creativity to their shared ideas about

how pirates and astronauts normally look and behave.

Cailloiss final type, ilinix, also deserves comment. Tere is certainly plea-sure in jumping into the whirlpool, in losing ones sense o normal placement

in the world, or even in seeing the sel (as a unitary concept) dissolved. Indeed,

such ideas about sel-experience as ragmented, fluid, and contextual have be-

come popularized by postmodern writing. And I do not dispute the proposi-

tion that experiences where the sel is buffeted about and even disoriented by

otherness (as in a carnival ride) are significant. People are objects in a world that

stands beyond their powers. However, in my opinion, this act o submersion is

not equivalent to play. Rather, players hold up their arms on rides o this sort

to display their daring, they try to rock the conveyance, they shout and look



26/29


around, they tease their companions to make them nervous, and they pay their

money and climb aboard again. Such assertiveness is the playul quality that

makes the participant no longer the prisoner o the contraption. We do notsimply surrender to vertigo; we make decisions about what situations we will

enter, how we will ready ourselves or them and behave during the disorienta-

tion that ollows, what we will do to and with the other people involved, and

even (sometimes) how we will make the experience end.

I should add a ew comments about Cailloiss combining o the our types.

Recall that two pairsagnandalea and mimicry and ilinxcombine well;

two others combine with more difficulty; and a final two combine not at all. He

asserts this position because he believes that the our play modes differ as orms

o expression and that their essences either support or contradict one another.

Moreover, he believes that the competition-chance combination is more likely

to become rule bound than the other pair. Furthermore, his discussion o the

two pairs indicates that the ormer (agn and alea) is much more prominent

in modern societies while mimicry and ilinxis a eature o simpler and more

traditional societies.

I have difficulty accepting some o Cailloiss arguments about how the

various orms combine and how ludus maniests itsel in their more developed

expressions. Many modern play orms seem to me to combine all the elementshe mentions, albeit in ways he might consider degraded. For example, many

spectator sports involve mimicry in the sense o disguising (through costume)

and an identification. Chance and competition, o course, play central roles;

but so does the challenge o being thrown out o balance by orces one did

not anticipate. Extreme sports like snow boarding make this quest or physical

disorientation and the players response to it even more central to the experi-

ence. And contemporary role-playing video games bring all these themes into

ocus as players become characters who wander through conusing environ-ments, encounter random occurrences they cannot predict, and contend with

the difficulties presented both by the logic o the game and by other players.

Having said this, I do think Cailloiss classification o the our types o

play has value, or it makes play scholars analyze the different kinds o chal-

lenges that any particular game (and more inormal play activity) presents.

And it encourages these same scholars to think about the different kinds o

satisactions offered in such games. o what degree does pleasure come rom

asserting onesel against (or controlling) environmental challenges, and to


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Milam, Jennier. 2000. Playul constructions and Fragonards swinging scenes. Eigh-teenth Century Studies33:54359.

Motte, Warren. 2009. Playing in earnest. New Literary History 40:2542.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1956. Te Birth of tragedy and the genealogy of morals.Parsons, alcott. 1966. Societies: Evolutionary and comparative perspectives.Roberts, John M., Malcolm J. Arth, and Robert R. Bush. 1959. Games in culture.Ameri-

can Anthropologist 61:597605.Rowe, Marvin W. 1992. Te definition o game. Philosophy 67:46779.Salen, Katie and Eric Zimmerman. 2004. Rules of play: Game design fundamentals.Sutton-Smith, Brian. 1997. Te Ambiguity of play.urner, Victor. 1986. Body, brain, and culture. Performing Arts Journal10: 2634.Weber, Max. 1958 (first published 1920). Te protestant ethic and the spirit of capi-

talism.


cailloiss man play and games by thomas s. henricks

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